Kevin Herceg v Budapest Environs Regional Court (Hungary)

I now give judgment on (1) an application for an adjournment, (2) a renewed application for permission to appeal against an extradition order, (3) an application to extend time to serve the renewal application and (4) an application to adduce fresh evidence to support an amended ground of appeal.

At the hearing on 27 January 2026 I started to read out my judgment on applications (2), (3) and (4) when the Applicant interjected and made his application for an adjournment. Specifically he wished for more time to instruct a new legal team, contending that lawyers would be able to advance his case more effectively than he can do in person. I reserved judgment on all the applications.

When I deal, in a moment, with the other applications I will set out the relevant chronology in slightly more detail. It will be seen that the applicant was represented at his extradition hearing on 16 August 2024, counsel settled perfected grounds of appeal on 3 October 2024, renewal grounds on 26 February 2025 and a skeleton argument on 8 June 2025, and he continued to be represented until his solicitors came off the record on 11 December 2025.

The matter first came before me on 22 January 2026. The applicant was not represented and there was no Hungarian interpreter. I adjourned the matter to today, Tuesday 27 January 2026, so that an interpreter could be present. I also ordered that any application or new documents be filed by 4pm on Monday 26 January 2026. Nothing was filed.

At the hearing today, the applicant made submissions to which I will return below. Although lawyers will very often be able to make submissions more effectively than a litigant in person, the applicant in fact made clear and focused submissions. In other words, his lack of representation did not prevent him from raising the issue on which I give a ruling below.

Nor did lack of representation prevent him from relying on the renewal grounds drafted by counsel although, as will be seen, he indicated that he now wished to narrow his case just to rely on a single contention. In fact I fully considered the renewal grounds as drafted.

If the applicant did now instruct new representatives, no doubt they would consider whether there are any other issues which they can raise. That, however, is not a reason to grant an adjournment. This extradition case has already been professionally argued at first instance, at the written permission stage and in perfected renewal grounds over, as can be seen, an unusually extended period. I have been told of no reason why it would be in the interests of justice for a new legal team now to search for any new grounds to put forward.

I doubt that there could ever have been a meritorious application to adjourn these proceedings for the purpose of seeking new representation. But if there had been any such application to make, it needed to be made as soon as the applicant knew that his previous representatives wished to come off the record. That fact was known by no later than 11 December 2025 as I shall explain.

I therefore dismiss the adjournment application. It is made far too late and in reality there are no proper grounds to support it.

I return to the application for permission to appeal and the other ancillary applications.

The applicant seeks permission to appeal against the decision of DJ Turnock (“the DJ”) dated 16 September 2024, to order extradition pursuant to a conviction warrant. The warrant relates to two offences of fraud committed in October and November 2015 and handling stolen goods committed in February 2011 resulting in a conviction in 2014.

The applicant had originally been the subject of an accusation warrant and he consented to be extradited to Hungary to face trial. At a hearing in 2019 he was given a sentence of 3 years 6 months imprisonment for the fraud offences and 10 months imprisonment for the handling stolen goods offence. A total of 4 years and 4 months remain to be served. I will say more about those proceedings in a few moments.

The issues raised at the extradition hearing were: (i) the applicant’s right to freedom from torture and inhumane or degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR; and (ii) his right to a private and family life under Article 8 ECHR.

The Article 3 issue was based on the fear that prison conditions would be insufficient to guarantee the applicant’s rights. The DJ noted that the Hungarian authorities had given an assurance that the applicant would be given accommodation of at least 3 square metres of personal space exclusive of sanitary facilities and that his prison environment would be compatible with the ECHR, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the Council of Europe Recommendation’s on the European Prison Rules.

The DJ ruled that there was no evidence which was capable of displacing the presumption that this assurance would be complied with, and therefore that there were no substantial grounds for believing that if the applicant were to be extradited to Hungary there is a real risk that he would be held in prison conditions which do not comply with Article 3 of the ECHR.

In respect of Article 8, the Applicant contended that he had lived in the UK since 2017 and has been with his partner for 10 years, he lives with his 2 children aged 5 and 6 who are dependent on him and he also supports another daughter in Hungary, he is well integrated in UK society with various family members, both he and his partner having caring responsibilities towards his partner’s mother and he is her registered carer. She suffers from obesity and from schizophrenia and he is one of very few people she trusts to help her.

The DJ directed herself to the well known principles set out in the cases of Poland v Celinski & Others [2015] EWHC 1274, Norris v Government of the USA [2010] UKSC 9 and HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25. In accordance with Celinski she identified and balanced the factors for and against extradition. Against extradition, she listed the private life factors to which I have already referred and the applicant’s concern about how he may be treated in custody in Hungary, having regard to discrimination against Roma people, and about discrimination which his family could experience if they return to Hungary to join him, and a lack of clarity about whether he would be permitted to return to the UK after extradition. In favour of extradition she referred to the strong and continuing public interest in the UK abiding by its international extradition obligations, the serious nature of the offences involving the targeting of elderly and vulnerable persons from whom a significant amount of money/goods were taken, the long sentence outstanding, a finding that he came to the UK as a fugitive from justice, the fact that since 2019 he has known that he was wanted to serve these sentences and the fact that the judicial authority was not responsible for any significant delay in the case.

The DJ accepted that extradition would cause familial separation for a significant period but noted that there was no specific evidence about the likely impact on the children, over and above what can normally be expected in an extradition case. A return to Hungary by the applicant’s family would be an “informed and deliberate decision by them”. The DJ considered that there was an element of “Brexit uncertainty” about his ability to return but there was no evidence of a real risk that he could not return. She found the “key factor” raised against extradition to be the impact on the applicant’s mother in law, but also found that that “a substantial amount of the evidence that has been placed before the court has been exaggerated”, noting that there was no medical evidence whatsoever and that an occupational therapist who provided a report had not directly assessed her condition. There have been no aids or adaptions to the family home and the mother in law had not been provided with a walking aid, and no care arrangements or support had been sought from the community mental health team. The DJ also noted various inconsistencies in the evidence put forward, and did not accept that the applicant was the only person who could provide support.

Overall, the DJ ruled that the balance fell in favour of extradition.

Grounds of appeal were drafted by counsel and perfected on 3 October 2024. Only the Article 8 issue remained live at that point. Counsel referred to an intention to make an application to adduce further evidence about the circumstances of the applicant’s mother in law as soon as possible.

On 6 February 2025, permission to appeal on the Article 8 point was refused by Lang J, who noted that no new information had been put forward.

An application to extend time for renewal was made on 13 February 2025 on the ground that there had been a change of representatives and there was a “complex issue in relation to new material” though no particulars of this were given.

On 26 February 2025 the applicant filed renewal grounds. I will grant the necessary extension of time for that step. The reliance on Article 8 was maintained but with no new evidence or information. The applicant also relied on Article 3 “in light of new developments”. On the same date he applied to adduce new material dealing with “the deterioration of the rule of law in Hungary”. It was said that “most of the material” was not available at the time of the extradition hearing. The material consisted of three reports from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and a report from the European Committee on the Prevention of Torture (“CPT”) and a response to it.

In a written response on 20 March 2025, the respondent accepted that most of this material was new but submitted that it should not be admitted because it was not “decisive” and therefore could not satisfy the test for admitting fresh evidence in Hungary v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231. Specifically the material did not indicate that the assurance as to detention conditions in Hungary could not be relied upon and therefore could not satisfy the test set out in Zabolotnyi v Hungary [2021] 1 WLR 2569 at [42].

On 8 June 2025 Louisa Collins of counsel provided a skeleton argument in support of the renewed application for permission. She placed reliance on the upcoming consideration of the assurance issue in Szuchs v Hungary AC-2024-LON-001347.

On 18 June 2025 Murray J made an order that this case be listed as soon as possible after the hearing of Szuchs. He expressed the view that both the Article 8 and Article 3 grounds would be dismissed unless there were new evidence which the Court, applying the usual principles, agreed to admit.

The case was adjourned again by Lieven J on 11 December 2025 in an order which also allowed an application by the applicant’s then solicitors to come off the record.

Meanwhile, on 26 November 2025 permission to appeal was refused in Szuchs [2025] EWHC 3374 (Admin). Following another judgment of this Court in Berki v Hungary [2025] EWHC 1080 (Admin) by Farbey J, Calver J ruled that evidence including the same reports of the CPT and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee as are relied on in the present case was not capable of undermining the reliability of Hungary’s assurance about personal space or of rebutting the presumption of compliance by an EU member state with article 3.

I have not been told of any reason why a different conclusion could be reached in the present case, and therefore I dismiss the application for permission to adduce fresh evidence. It follows that permission to appeal on the article 3 ground is also refused.

At the hearing on 27 January 2026, supported by an interpreter, the applicant made submissions about other issues.

He repeated some of the submissions previously made in respect of Article 8, arguing that extradition would be oppressive because of the time which has elapsed since his offending, because of his status as a caregiver and because of the risk that he will experience bias and prejudice against him as a member of the Roma community. There was no application to rely on any fresh evidence. He did show me some medical records relating to his mother in law. These date from between April 2019 and September 2025. In short, they contain some evidence relating to her medical conditions, but in my judgment nothing that could have changed the DJ’s assessment of the evidence which was before her. They did not shed any new light on the role of the applicant as a carer.

The applicant also advanced what I believe is a new argument. He says that during his 30 months on bail he has been on electronically monitored curfew. If he received a custodial sentence for an offence in this country, part of that period would be credited against his sentence. He believes that the Hungarian authorities will not give credit for this period. In support, he cites the fact that in the criminal proceedings against him in 2019, the Hungarian court acknowledged that he had been under a “place of residence ban” or a curfew and that he had been in custody in England for 10 days but refused to give credit for these periods. He fears that the same will happen again. He asks this court to seek a diplomatic assurance from Hungary that credit will be given for the relevant periods, failing which I should order his discharge. He also said that this was now the only issue that he wished to pursue, although that is inconsistent with his repetition of his Article 8 grounds and reliance on medical notes to which I have referred.

The new submission was foreshadowed at the ineffective hearing on 22 January 2026 when the applicant handed me a document which said that he was making a “motion to stay proceedings pending Hungarian judicial ruling on sentence enforcement status and application for judicial order to facilitate identity documentation”.

The applicant brought the Hungarian court’s 2019 judgment to the hearing on 27 January 2026 and, although it is in Hungarian, he referred to some of its contents with the help of the interpreter. It apparently states that the Hungarian court did not give credit for time served because the relevant documentation had not been provided by the UK authorities. In my judgment, that does not suggest that the Hungarian court was ignoring whatever duties it may have had in that regard.

Be that as it may, his submission must fail for either of two reasons. First, the calculation of the sentence and any credit to be allowed against it is a matter for the Hungarian court and not for this court. Even if the applicant is right that under Hungarian law he is entitled to some credit against his sentence but that, for no good reason, he might not be given the credit, it remains clear that his extradition is sought to serve a validly imposed prison sentence for an extradition offence. On the present facts, even taking his case at face value, we are far from a situation in which this court could conclude that sentencing practice in Hungary would be so defective as to give rise to any of the statutory bars to extradition.

It follows from that first reason that there are no grounds for the stay which the applicant seeks. A decision of the Hungarian court to withhold credit would not set up a bar to extradition under section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 and the ECHR. There are therefore no grounds on which diplomatic assurances in that regard could be requested as a condition for ordering extradition.

The second reason is that this point could have been raised by the applicant’s legal representatives at any time since his arrest in August 2023. It will immediately have been obvious that he faced a significant period on bail with conditions that would curtail his liberty.

The applicant candidly told me that his representatives were not keen on pursuing this point on his behalf because they did not think it had merit. In those circumstances there is no excuse for a delay of over two years in introducing the point now.

In the circumstances, permission to appeal on the article 8 ground is also refused. The DJ plainly reached a permissible conclusion and there are no grounds for going behind her findings of fact. The submissions made today do not add anything of significance to what was before her.

I therefore dismiss the applications to stay the proceedings and to rely on fresh evidence and the renewed application for permission to appeal.

Purely for completeness I grant the extension of time for the renewal application.