Ivan Remenar, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

THE DEPUTY JUDGE: The Claimant, who has appeared before me today in person, is a Croatian national. On 31 October 2024, he claimed asylum in the United Kingdom, as he feared he would be killed if he returned to Croatia, and he had no confidence in the Croatian state's ability to protect him.

The essential history behind the claim is as follows. On 3 January 2024, the Claimant entered the United Kingdom, according to the Secretary of State, on a six-month visit visa. On 3 July 2024, the Claimant's leave expired. On 21 October 2024, the Claimant was encountered and referred to immigration enforcement. He was detained and was served with the reasons for his detention, notification of the requirement to provide fingerprints, and a notice of liability. On 31 October 2024, he was served with a Notice of Intention to Remove (NIR) and a Notice of Departure Details (NDD) which explained that he was to be removed on 8 November 2024 to Zagreb in Croatia. He claimed asylum on that day, as I have said, and the removal directions set for 8 November were cancelled. He was granted immigration bail on 27 November 2024 and released from detention.

On 18 July 2025, the Defendant made an inadmissibility decision on his asylum claim under section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, and paragraph 327F of the Immigration Rules. They give rise to no right of appeal. On 8 October 2025, the Claimant was detained when he attended to report. On 22 October, he was again served with a NIR and a NDD. The removal directions provided for his removal on 3 November, again, to Zagreb in Croatia.

He appealed by way of a statutory appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. On 30 October 2025, the First-tier Tribunal held that his appeal was inadmissible. I understand from the papers that the Claimant then refused to leave for his removal, and on 4 November he was served with a Notice of Cancellation of Removal Directions.

On 14 November, he lodged an appeal against the refusal of his asylum claim. This was not accepted, as there was, as I have said, no right of appeal. On 18 November, he was served again with a NIR and a NDD, and the removal directions were set this time for 27 November 2025.

On 21 November, he served on the Home Office an unsealed bundle, challenging the decision of 18 July 2025. Accordingly, on 25 November, the removal directions to 27 November were cancelled. And on 27 November, he was released from detention. The Judicial Review claim form was not in fact lodged until 11 December 2025. On 4 February of this year, 2026, he further filed an application for urgent interim relief on the basis that he had had to vacate his section 95 accommodation.

On 11 February 2026, Mrs Justice Lang made no order on the application for interim relief and on 16 February, HHJ Marquand, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, refused permission on the papers.

On 23 February, Mr Remenar filed a renewal notice. He essentially advances two grounds. First, he argues that the Secretary of State acted in a procedurally improper manner because the decision of 18 July 2025 to refuse his claim for asylum on the grounds that it was inadmissible, was taken on the basis of his interview alone, and the seriousness of his situation, and in particular, the governmental situation in Croatia, to which he would then be made subject on return, was not properly considered. Second, he argues that the decision was irrational.

In my judgment, both these grounds are unarguable.

First, the claim for judicial review has been brought out of time by a significant margin and there is no good reason upon which to extend time.

Mr Remenar has said in his renewal application and orally before me today that he sought legal advice and was told that no immediate remedy was available following the decision of 18 July 2025. He had to rely, he says, on that advice because he is a litigant in person and he did not appreciate that judicial review was available, but only if it is brought promptly, and in any event within three months.

I am not clear that the Claimant was told in fact that there was no longer term remedy such as judicial review available. I suspect that he was told merely that there was no right of statutory appeal against the decision of 18 July 2025. But in any event, what he was told can provide no basis for extending time. His reliance on legal advice and, of course, his present lack of legal representation, do not amount to good reasons for non-compliance with procedural rules and time limits.

But Mr Remenar goes further because he argues that his detention on 8 October 2025 materially affected the position, because he was not informed of the reasons for his detention for approximately 16 days. He only received a delayed communication of the removal directions and was again operating without legal representation. He says that during this period, he received conflicting information as to whether the claim had been refused rather than treated as inadmissible.

In my judgment, this again can provide no basis for extending time. Mr Remenar was plainly aware of the decision of 15 July 2025, and of course of its impact, not least because he had sought impermissibly to seek a statutory appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. Moreover, a significant further passage of time elapsed between the decision of the First-tier Tribunal on 30 October 2025, holding his appeal to be inadmissible, and his filing of the judicial review claim on 11 December 2025.

Second, and in any event, there is in my judgment nothing to suggest that the decision of the Secretary of State was procedurally unfair or irrational. To the contrary, the Secretary of State's decision was carefully considered and reached, and was amply justified. The Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that exceptional circumstances did not exist to warrant a grant of asylum, given that, in accordance with section 80A(4) and 80A(5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Croatia is a country listed under Section 80AA of that Act. There was nothing to suggest that Croatia had derogated from any of its obligations under Article 15 of the Convention and nothing to suggest that it was the subject of a proposal initiated in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 7(1) of the Treaty on the European Union. Accordingly, the Secretary of State was obliged to consider the application inadmissible.

Despite the Claimant's skilful and attractive argument today, he has produced nothing to suggest that there was anything by way of exceptional circumstances that would have warranted the Secretary of State taking a different position. There is, in truth, nothing, other than his generic assertion that there has been an attempt on his life, about which the court knows very little, to suggest that he would be personally at risk on return and therefore that, exceptionally, the presumption of inadmissibility should be reversed. There was, properly analysed, nothing to suggest that the Secretary of State acted unlawfully in concluding that there was a sufficiency of protection available to the Claimant in Croatia.

For all those reasons, I must refuse permission and I dismiss Mr Remenar's application for renewed permission today.