The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, R (on the application of) v Police Conduct Panel

The claimant, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, challenges by way of judicial review the decision of the defendant, a police misconduct hearing panel (“the Panel”), dated 20 November 2024 (“the Decision”) dismissing allegations of gross misconduct against the interested party, Detective Constable (DC) Tyrone Ward.

The claimant applies for judicial review on two grounds, which I will set out more precisely after I have set out the background. Broadly, the grounds are that the Decision was wrong for one or both of the following reasons:

The remedy sought by the claimant is that the Decision should be quashed and either the court should substitute a finding that DC Ward is guilty of gross misconduct or the matter should be remitted to be considered again by a freshly constituted police misconduct hearing panel.

As is normal in relation to a judicial review of this kind, the Panel has not responded to this claim and is not represented. The claimant is represented in relation to this claim by Mr Paul Ozin KC and Mr Zander Goss, and the interested party, DC Ward, is represented by Mr Matthew Butt KC. Before the Panel, the claimant was represented by Mr Ozin, Mr Daniel Hobbs, and Mr Goss, and DC Ward was represented by Mr Neil Saunders.

DC Ward is an officer serving with the Metropolitan Police Service. In March 2021, he was working as an Acting Detective Sergeant (A/DS) on a Safeguarding Team in the Community Safeguarding Unit (“CSU”) on the South West Basic Command Unit of the Metropolitan Police, which is based in Kingston upon Thames (“the SW-BCU”).

The Panel is a police misconduct hearing panel that was convened in 2024 under The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (“the Conduct Regulations”), which are regulations made pursuant to powers granted to the Secretary of State by various provisions of the Police Act 1996, the Police Reform Act 2002, and the Policing and Crime Act 2017 and which came into force on 1 February 2020. The Panel consisted of Ms Sharmistha Michaels (who was the legally qualified chair), Chief Superintendent Richard Smith, and Mr John Vaughan, who was the independent panel member.

The claimant was the “appropriate authority” under the Conduct Regulations, with responsibility, among other things, for initiating and making arrangements for the misconduct hearing and for presenting the case against DC Ward to the Panel. References in this judgment below to the “appropriate authority” are to the claimant, unless otherwise indicated by context.

On 4 March 2021, Ms Sarah Everard was reported missing.

On 9 March 2021, former Police Constable (PC) Wayne Couzens was arrested on suspicion of the kidnap of Ms Everard. He was detained in the custody suite at Wandsworth Police Station. As a result of information about the investigation that had been leaked to the press, the police conducted audits of police information management systems (also referred to by the police as “indices”), which identified that seven police officers had accessed files relating to Wayne Couzens and Sarah Everard without appearing to have had a proper policing purpose for doing so.

As a result of these audits, the claimant found that DC Ward had accessed two police systems at different times on 10 and 11 March 2021 to view confidential police information relating to the detention of Wayne Couzens. The two police systems that DC Ward was found to have accessed in relation to the detention of Wayne Couzens were:

On 10 March 2021, DC Ward was working a “spare” shift in the CSU, and on 11 March 2021 he was working a “core” shift in the CSU. I will revert in due course to the distinction between a spare and a core shift, which is an important aspect of this claim.

On 14 April 2021, A/DS Stephanie Powles, in the Specialist Investigations Unit of the Directorate of Professional Standards of the Metropolitan Police, emailed DC Ward asking him to provide an explanation, by return of email via his line manager, as to why he had accessed the custody record on NSPIS for Wayne Couzens at various times on 10 and 11 March 2021.

On 15 April 2021, DC Ward replied to A/DS Powles’s email via his line manager, Detective Inspector (DI) Matthew Griffiths, who forwarded DC Ward’s email response to A/DS Powles together with an email response of his own. In essence, DC Ward said that “from memory” he had been on core shift in the CSU on the relevant dates, dealing with a high volume of prisoners at both Kingston and Wandsworth custody suites each day. As part of his duties, he regularly and proactively monitored the NSPIS whiteboards for both custody suites and each associated COPA file to ascertain whether it was a CSU matter and, if so, to allocate to an officer accordingly. He had not realised at that point that Wayne Couzens was suspected of having murdered Sarah Everard. Once he did so, he did not return to those records. He denied any improper purpose in accessing either NSPIS or COPA. DI Griffiths passed this response to A/DS Powles, noting in his own message to her that he had discussed the matter with DC Ward, and he was satisfied that the relevant access had been conducted for an appropriate policing purpose.

On 10 August 2022, DC Ward was served with a notice of investigation (“the Notice of Investigation”) under Regulation 17 of the Conduct Regulations.

On 6 October 2022, DC Ward served a written statement in response to the Notice of Investigation, setting out an expanded account of his actions and motivations on the relevant dates (“the Regulation 17 Response”). I note that the Regulation 17 Response is also referred to at various points in the papers for the hearing of this claim as the “MG14”.

On 22 November 2022, the claimant’s investigating officers submitted their Conduct Matter Investigation Report relating to the allegations against DC Ward (“the Investigation Report”).

On 1 December 2023, the claimant served a misconduct notice (“the Regulation 30 Notice”) on DC Ward in accordance with Regulation 30 of the Conduct Regulations. The original allegations against DC Ward set out in the Regulation 30 Notice were, in summary, that:

In the Regulation 30 Notice, the claimant set out the background to the allegations, noting that DC Ward was one of seven officers who appeared to have accessed files relating to Wayne Couzens and Sarah Everard without a proper policing purpose, all of whom would be required to attend a joint misconduct hearing convened in accordance with Regulation 25(1) of the Conduct Regulations.

The Regulation 30 Notice stated that by allegedly accessing confidential information without a proper policing purpose, DC Ward contravened three of the Standards of Professional Behaviour set out in Schedule 2 to the Conduct Regulations (“Schedule 2”). Schedule 2 sets out relevant standards under ten headings. The three relevant headings in this case are as follows:

“Orders and Instructions

Police officers only give and carry out lawful orders and instructions.

Police officers abide by police regulations, force polices and lawful orders.

…

Confidentiality

Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of police duties.

…

Discreditable Conduct

Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty.

Police officers report any action taken against them for a criminal offence, any conditions imposed on them by a court or the receipt of any penalty notice.”

On 9 January 2024, DC Ward’s solicitors, Reynolds Dawson, served on his behalf a response under Regulation 31 of the Conduct Regulations (“the Regulation 31 Response”). DC Ward admitted to accessing the information as alleged, although not necessarily for the amount of time alleged. He accepted that any such access would have had to have been for a legitimate policing purpose. He denied any misconduct, much less gross misconduct. Specifically, he denied that he had deliberately accessed the information without a proper policing purpose. Although he admitted accessing the information, he explained that on the days in question one of his roles in the CSU was to review custody information in the NSPIS to identify whether there were any prisoners who should be investigated by his team.

In the Regulation 31 Response, DC Ward noted that in his email response of 15 April 2021 to A/DS Powles, he made an error in stating that he had been on core rather than spare duty on 10 March 2021. (He had previously admitted this error in the Regulation 17 Response, which is summarised in the Investigation Report at paragraph 5.5.) He stated that this was an error in recollection as he did not have his shift pattern to hand at the time of his reply to A/DS Powles. He had since discovered that he had been on spare duty on 10 March 2021. He gave reasons why it was unlikely that he had accessed the NSPIS on 10 March 2021 at 14:52 for over 13 minutes.

In the Regulation 31 Response, DC Ward noted that the normal shift pattern for the CSU was: (i) an “early turn” core shift from 07:00 to 15:00, (ii) a “late turn” core shift from 14:00 to 23:00; and (iii) a “spare shift” from 10:00 to 18:00. On 9 March 2021 he was on the late turn core shift, on 10 March he was on the spare shift, and on 11 March he was on the early turn core shift.

The misconduct hearing in relation to DC Ward and initially six other officers (“the Misconduct Hearing”) began on 28 October 2024. During the course of the Misconduct Hearing, matters arose requiring one officer’s case to be severed. Each of the officers faced allegations similar to those facing DC Ward, namely, accessing sensitive police information in March 2021 relating to the disappearance of Sarah Everard and the subsequent arrest of Wayne Couzens without a proper policing purpose.

For the Misconduct Hearing, the Panel was provided with extensive documentary evidence, which is set out in the Decision at paragraph 14, including evidence regarding relevant audits of access to the various relevant police systems or indices at the relevant times. During the Misconduct Hearing, the Panel heard live evidence from a number of witnesses. The live evidence of relevance to the case against DC Ward came from DI Kara Moulds, DI Griffiths, and DC Ward.

DI Moulds provided a witness statement dated 1 October 2023. At the time, she was a DI in the CSU on the SW-BCU. She gave evidence about the role and expectations of DSs on “Reactive Investigation Teams” (referred to elsewhere in the evidence as Safeguarding Teams) in the CSU. She noted that each DS is responsible for leading and managing the investigations of their officers and ensuring that cases are progressed expeditiously. They are also responsible for supporting and monitoring the wellbeing of their staff. Several times a week they manage a “core” team role, meaning that they must review and allocate all crime reports that have been sent to the CSU during that shift and that prisoners who need to be interviewed by the CSU are dealt with promptly and effectively. She noted that:

“… all my Detective Sergeants will be proactive in identifying prisoners requiring CSU attention and ensuring that staff are despatched to the relevant custody suite to process them. This is essential to prevent prisoners remaining in custody for longer than is necessary.

I acknowledge that there is policy in place requiring a written/verbal handover by the arresting officer to the Duty OS, however, in reality this can be overlooked and the ask of my DSs is that a search of the custody database ‘NSPIS’ is completed at least once during the shift to identify possible CSU prisoners.

The DS will routinely check the two South West custody suites [at Wandsworth and Kingston] on the NSPIS ‘Whiteboard’ which shows all prisoners held at that location and the offence details. However, they may also check neighbouring BCUs if prisoners are being sent there.

If it is unclear on the ‘Whiteboard’ whether the prisoner has been arrested, or ought to have been arrested for Domestic Abuse offences, a further search of that entry by the DS would be necessary. It may also be necessary to check the corresponding case file via COPA (or more recently CONNECT) to ascertain more detail and to make an assessment as to whether CSU assistance will be required. ”

In her witness statement, although she referred to “the ‘Core Team’ role”, DI Moulds did not discuss the distinction between the duty of a DS on core shift and that of a DS on spare shift.

DI Griffiths provided a witness statement dated 4 November 2024. He was called, with the permission of the Panel, on behalf of DC Ward, and his evidence dealt with the role and duties of DC Ward on Team 4 in the CSU at the relevant times, during which period DI Griffiths was his line manager. DI Griffiths noted that the two Safeguarding Teams he led, Teams 3 and 4, were charged with investigating all allegations of “domestic abuse” across the London boroughs of Wandsworth, Merton, Kingston, Richmond, and Twickenham “falling within our remit”. He explained the “remit” as follows:

“Any incident or pattern of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate (or romantic) partners or family members who are 18 and above, regardless of gender or sexuality.

Any incident not falling within the definition of domestic abuse where the Crime Manager has particular concerns about the risk to the victim or the impact of the incident on the community.”

DI Griffiths explained in his witness statement that this meant the CSU would investigate all types of offences falling within that remit ranging from the most serious, including kidnapping, false imprisonment, sexual assault, assault occasioning grievous bodily harm (GBH) through to minor assaults, controlling and coercive behaviour, and assisting high risk missing persons enquiries.

In his witness statement, DI Griffiths then turned to the specific role of DC Ward as an A/DS on Team 4 at the time when on a “core” shift. His main function for the core early/late and night duty shifts was as a duty sergeant leading a team of up to fifteen PC/DC investigators with a number of key duties, including receiving handover from the previous duty team and handing over to the next duty team, receiving details of prisoners in custody, allocating investigators, and directing enquiries, acting as a point of contact for the CSU to provide advice to colleagues, reviewing evidence with a view towards disposal (bail, no further action, or charge), and identifying operational or reputational risk and escalating identified risk to an appropriate senior officer.

DI Griffiths then noted in his witness statement that A/DS Ward, when not on a core shift or on a rest day, would “attend a ‘spare’ shift catching up on admin/investigations and assisting the core team where required” (emphasis added). Given the importance of the distinction between the duties of A/DS Ward on “core” and “spare” duty, it is worth setting out the next section of DI Griffiths’ witness statement in full:

“A/DS Ward when on the spare shift would often be called upon or volunteer to assist the core duty Sgt whom may busy/over worked or absent (Annual Leave/attending a crime scene).

Our designated custody suites were Wandsworth and Kingston Police Stations. It became a common occurrence for arresting officers would not contact CSU or notify late in the detention clock for prisoners in custody for CSU allegations. This encouraged issues with locating statements/arrest notes, gathering evidence, arranging solicitors/appropriate adults and assigning officers within the 24 hour PACE detention clock. To mitigate these issues, it became common practice for the duty Sgt to frequently check NSPIS/Custody records throughout the shift for any CSU prisoners – I would perform this check myself as the duty Sgt prior to promotion. The NSPIS/Custody record main page was a drop down list numbered by cells with limited details including the prisoner name and offence. To determine and understand the full details of the offence/allegation, it was necessary to open and read the individual custody record reviewing against the CSU remit – relationship between prisoner/victim, date of birth/age/Venue of offence/location.Often the custody record would not contain sufficient details necessitating a review of the COPA/Connect file.

In my time both as D/Insp and Duty Sgt – the CSU has investigated kidnap allegations/prisoners. It is also not uncommon for the custody officer has not input the correct offence and may enter Kidnap as opposed to False Imprisonment. I would expect a good duty Sgt as was A/DS Ward to check all custody records that may be CSU related.” (emphasis added)

In his witness statement, DI Griffiths then dealt with the email from A/DS Powles sent to DC Ward on 14 April 2021, to which DC Ward had responded, as requested, through DI Griffiths on 15 April 2021. DI Griffiths also gave evidence as to DC Ward’s positive good character, stating, among other things, that DC Ward was “an exceptional officer” and that he would not hesitate to recruit DC Ward to any of his teams.

The Panel had opening and closing notes from the appropriate authority, as well as oral submissions made on behalf of each party at the conclusion of the live evidence. DI Moulds gave her live evidence to the Panel on 31 October 2024. DI Griffiths gave his live evidence on 7 November 2024. DC Ward gave his live evidence on 7-8 November 2024.

The transcript of DI Moulds’s live evidence on 31 October 2024 is at pages 183 to 218 of the Additional Documents Bundle provided for this claim. The transcript of her cross-examination by Mr Saunders begins at page 199, and her re-examination by Mr Ozin begins on page 213.

During her evidence-in-chief by Mr Ozin, DI Moulds gave evidence as to the organisation of work during a duty shift on the CSU, with particular reference to the responsibilities of a DS, seeking to identify incoming cases and prisoners of relevance to the CSU as potential domestic abuse cases. In particular, her evidence focused on the responsibilities of a DS and his or her team when on a core shift and the need proactively to monitor incoming cases as well as prisoners in the two custody suites on the SW-BCU, namely, in Wandsworth and Kingston. She noted that sometimes an incoming domestic abuse case or prisoner would be directed to the core team by the frontline (emergency response) team or by officers in the custody suite or by colleagues in other Basic Command Units. But sometimes none of these things happened as soon as it should. In relation to the need for proactivity by a DS on core shift, DI Moulds said:

“It can be quite – the core shift is extremely frenetic and busy and it may be that you’re just constantly trying to play catch up. I can’t think of many more reasons than that but they would be centrally why you’ve heard something to imply you’re missing a prisoner and, as I say, that is – that’s what we proactively drum into them, we don’t want prisoners sitting not being progressed and risk not being managed. So we do perhaps go quite heavy on explain that to them, that they’re not just to wait reactively for prisoners to come to them, they are to find out because the systems in place don’t always work.”

Accordingly, a DS on core shift was encouraged proactively to monitor the custody suites. In March 2021, this would have involved accessing NSPIS to see the whiteboard and sometimes drilling down into individual custody records relating to a prisoner. Even then, there was sometimes insufficient information, and it was therefore appropriate to look at the case information in COPA to see if it was within the remit of the CSU. DI Moulds noted that NSPIS and COPA had each since March 2021 been replaced by another police information management system.

During cross-examination by Mr Saunders, DI Moulds gave evidence of what was involved in being a DS on the “spare” shift, as DC Ward was on 10 March 2021. There was usually an early core shift and a late one. The spare shift was normally between 10:00 and 18:00 or 19:00. The spare shift was not necessarily performed in the office. The DS could be working from home. The spare shift was there to assist the members of the team working on the core shift. While on the spare shift, the DS would catch up on other work, such as dealing with a professional development review (PDR) for a member of his or her team.

The following exchange then occurred between Mr Saunders and DI Moulds:

“Q. On this day Mr Ward goes into one custody record. That custody record is for a detainee who has been arrested for kidnap. He says – his case is, ‘I went in there because that could be a domestic abuse case’.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree with that?

A. Yes, that would be one of the things I would expect a sergeant to do.”

DI Moulds agreed that if the information on NSPIS was not sufficient to identify such a case as falling within the remit of the CSU, then it might be necessary to go into COPA to see whether there were other factors that brought it within the remit. DI Moulds would expect that as soon as the DS was aware that a case was not a case for the CSU, the DS would stop looking at the relevant records for that case. The DS would not, however, necessarily write an email to a senior officer or otherwise write down that he or she had accessed a case not relevant to the CSU, unless there was a reason why the DS thought that his or her accessing the case might have had an impact on the case or might otherwise require explanation.

During re-examination, Mr Ozin explored in more detail with DI Moulds what it meant for a DS to perform a proactive role while on the spare shift. DI Moulds noted that the DS on the spare shift might be called upon to help the core team with the prisoners. This would be a local arrangement made between the relevant DSs. For example, the DS on the core shift might ring the DS on the spare shift and specifically ask for help because he or she was struggling to get through the prisoners. If the spare shift DS was not expressly asked to do so, however, DI Moulds would not expect the spare shift DS routinely to be looking at the custody records. She also stated that there was no way of knowing whether there had been a local arrangement on 10 March 2021 that the interested party should assist the core team in this way.

DI Moulds noted that a spare shift was “still a very busy shift”, where the relevant DS would be carrying on with enquiries and developing his or her own investigations. The core shift would have primary responsibility for proactively identifying potential CSU cases by looking at incoming crime reports and prisoners, but if the core shift was struggling, then it would be normal for the core shift DS to ask the spare shift DS to help.

The re-examination then concluded as follows:

“Q. In your statement you described two aspects to the role; one is carrying on looking at existing workload and developing cases and the other is the proactive scanning role. So have I understood this correctly, a proactive scanning role means primarily the job of the core team on duty?

A. Yes.

Q. And the spare would only be called upon to become involved in the proactive scanning as a result of a specific arrangement or a specific request?

A. Yeah.

Q. If they are, what does that role involve? Would it involve looking at just one particular prisoner or would it involve looking at prisoners generally?

A. It could be looking at prisoners generally. It could -- it could be anything. It depends what the arrangement is. It depends what the need is on that day. If there's a lot of prisoners and too few staff it could be, ‘Look, could you please look at all these prisoners?’ It could be, ‘Could you look at the work file of crime for me while I deal with the prisoners?’ It could be some combination of the two. It very much -- it is very much kind of a dynamic thing really on the day. We have some very, very busy shifts.”

The Panel had no questions for DI Moulds, and she was released.

The transcript of DI Griffith’s live evidence on 7 November 2024 is at pages 306 to 350 of the Additional Documents Bundle. The transcript of his cross-examination by Mr Ozin began at page 320 and his re-examination by Mr Saunders began on page 346. In his evidence-in-chief, he dealt with and expanded upon topics dealt with in his witness statement.

In relation to the MG3 report that DC Ward had accessed on COPA on 10 March, DI Griffiths explained that COPA was “not the most user friendly of systems” and not easy to navigate through. The system offered the option to export the MG3, which meant that the MG3 could be downloaded and opened up in a Word document, so that it could be read through more easily. DC Ward confirmed during his live evidence that this is what he did on 10 March, when he accessed the MG3 relating to Wayne Couzens on COPA.

During cross-examination, Mr Ozin explored with DI Griffiths the distinction between the responsibilities of a DS on core shift and a DS on spare shift. DI Griffiths agreed with the suggestion put to him that a DS on the spare shift would be expected to respond to requests for assistance from the DS on core duty. Mr Ozin also put to him that the principal reason why a DS in the CSU would be interested in a prisoner who, according to the whiteboard, had been arrested for the offence of kidnap is that this could be a miscategorisation of the offence of false imprisonment, which would be of relevance to the CSU. DI Griffiths agreed that that was possible, but he noted that the CSU also dealt with offences of kidnap. So if the whiteboard showed that a prisoner had been arrested for kidnap, it would be necessary to look for more detail in the custody record to determine if this was a CSU matter. Sometimes a custody officer would have included quite a bit of helpful detail in relation to the facts of the arrest but other times just “one line”.

DI Griffiths noted that if there was insufficient detail, it might be necessary to look at the crime report (also known as the CRIS (Crime Report Information System) report) or at the MG3 report on COPA, in either case looking at the relationship between the person arrested and the victim to establish if the matter fell within the remit of the CSU. It did not matter whether one looked first at the CRIS report before looking at the MG3 on COPA or vice versa. If one looked at one of the two and did not get enough information, then one would look at the other. Mr Ozin then took him through the process of viewing the MG3 report by exporting it and the parts of the MG3 report that would be of interest to a DS in the CSU.

In re-examination, Mr Saunders dealt with a few points of clarification. The Panel had no questions for DI Griffiths, and he was released.

DC Ward’s evidence-in-chief began on 7 November 2024 and continued to the end-of-day adjournment. The transcript of this evidence is at pages 355 to 552 of the Additional Documents Bundle. Mr Saunders took DC Ward through his shifts on 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 March 2021 and the different times he accessed NSPIS and COPA as part of his work on those shifts, including but not limited to records relating to Wayne Couzens. DC Ward was on the late turn core shift on 9 March, spare shift on 10 March, early turn core shift on 11 March, and late turn core shift on each of 12 and 13 March.

In respect of the MG3 relating to Wayne Couzens that DC Ward accessed on COPA on 10 March, Mr Saunders asked DC Ward what he recollected having seen on the MG3. His response was:

“No, so the MG3 contents for me were completely blank. I went to review the facts of the offence. There was nothing written in there whatsoever and there were no supporting documents attached to the case file at all.”

In his evidence-in-chief, DC Ward also described the other work he undertook during his shifts during the period 9-13 March, including dealing with email messages, preparing a performance development review (PDR) for a colleague (during the spare shift on 10 March), making ERO (Evidential Review Officer) decisions, conducting CRIS supervisions, allocating CSU cases to members of his team, and so on. DC Ward then gave evidence about (i) his response to the email he received from A/DS Powles on 14 March 2021, (ii) the Regulation 30 Notice, and (iii) the Regulation 31 Response. At the end of DC Ward’s evidence-in-chief, Mr Saunders referred to the character statements of eight colleagues that had been submitted to the Panel as part of DC Ward’s case, along with a commendation that he had received. DC Ward confirmed that he was inviting the Panel to consider those statements and the commendation as part of its assessment of the case he had to meet.

At the beginning of the day on 8 November 2024, Mr Ozin raised an issue with the Panel regarding the MG3 summary relating to Wayne Couzens that DC Ward had accessed on COPA on 10 March 2021. The transcript of this part of the proceedings is at pages 555 to 570 of the Additional Documents Bundle. Mr Ozin stated that there had been some uncertainty as to what was actually shown on the MG3 on COPA relating to Wayne Couzens at the time DC Ward accessed it on 10 March 2021 at 15:41.

Mr Ozin told the Panel that, using metadata, the appropriate authority had managed to identify what appeared at the relevant time on the MG3 viewed by DC Ward. The appropriate authority produced, and proposed to have admitted as part of its case, a version of the MG3 with sections highlighted in yellow that showed what it said appeared in those sections at the relevant time, together with supporting material identifying the relevant metadata used to prepare the relevant highlighting.

That version of the MG3 appears at page 14 of the Core Bundle for the hearing of this claim. I note the following about it. The highlighted fields of the MG3 include Wayne Couzen’s forename and surname, his date of birth, and gender. The field “Domestic abuse” is marked “no”. The field “CSU risk assessment” is marked “– Not applicable –“, the field “Offence 1” is marked “COML020 – Kidnap – common law”, with the date marked as 3 March 2021, the location of the offence as “Poynders Road, SW4” and the victim as “Sarah EVERARD”. No other offences are highlighted in yellow, meaning that the additional offences of murder and indecent exposure that later appeared on the MG3 were not on it at the time that DC Ward accessed it.

There is also a section of the MG3 with various fields highlighted in yellow relating to Olena Couzens, Wayne Couzens’s wife, with her date of birth and gender, “Offence 1” marked as “CL67011 – Assisting offender – indictable offence (except murder)” on dates between 3 March and 9 March 2021, with location marked as “Freemens Way, Deal” and the victim as “Sarah EVERARD”.

Further down the MG3 there is a section marked “Facts of Offence”, which is not highlighted in yellow, indicating consideration of the metadata showed that this section was blank when DC Ward viewed it on 10 March 2021 and that, at that time, no supporting documents had been uploaded with the MG3. This is consistent with what DC Ward said about the MG3 in the Regulation 17 Response and in his live evidence-in-chief (see [49] above).

From page 14 of the highlighted version of the MG3, under the heading “Key Witnesses”, the first person listed after the heading “Victim” was Sarah Everard, with her date of birth, and a statement that no victim personal statement had been obtained as “The victim is currently still missing and can not be located by the police.” Two other witnesses were also listed there and highlighted in yellow, one being the friend with whom she had spent the evening before she was kidnapped and the other being her boyfriend, who was said to have provided a statement regarding his knowledge of the victim, their relationship, their communications, and her last known movements.

Mr Saunders was given time by the Panel to review the highlighted version of the MG3 with DC Ward in relation to the highlighted version of the MG3, even though he had not yet concluded his evidence. Following this, there was no application by DC Ward that this version of the MG3 should not be admitted. Mr Saunders was permitted to ask a few additional questions in relation to the highlighted MG3, which appear in the transcript at pages 570 to 573 of the Additional Documents Bundle, before Mr Ozin began his cross-examination.

In summary, DC Ward’s evidence was that he accepted that highlighted sections of the MG3 presented to him that morning would have been present on the MG3 when he viewed it. He acknowledged that he now saw a highlighted box on the MG3 form that read “Domestic abuse: no” and another that read “CSU risk assessment not applicable”. He did not, however, recall having seen either of those boxes when he reviewed the form on 10 March 2021. When asked whether he recalled seeing Sarah Everard’s name on the form, he replied, “Absolutely not, no. I don’t recall seeing that.” He also did not recall seeing a reference to Elena Couzens on the MG3.

Mr Saunders then drew DC Ward’s attention to the section of the MG3 headed “Facts of Offence”, which was not highlighted in yellow and therefore (as already noted) had been empty at the time that DC Ward viewed it on 10 March 2021, as DC Ward had said in his Regulation 17 Response and in his evidence to the Panel on the prior day. In relation to the list of witnesses starting on page 14 of the highlighted version of the MG3, DC Ward said he would not have scrolled that far. He had only been interested in the “Facts of Offence” section.

Mr Ozin then cross-examined DC Ward at some length. Mr Saunders briefly re-examined him. The Panel had no questions for DC Ward. His live evidence concluded on the afternoon of 8 November. The transcript of his evidence on 8 November is at pages 570 to 649 of the Additional Documents Bundle, with cross-examination beginning on page 574 and re-examination beginning on page 648.

In due course, closing speeches were made to the Panel on behalf of the appropriate authority and each of the officers represented at the Misconduct Hearing, including DC Ward. The appropriate authority’s closing speaking note appears in the Additional Documents Bundle at pages 135-151, with pages 147-150 relating specifically to the case against DC Ward. The Misconduct Hearing concluded on 15 November 2024.

On 20 November 2024, the Panel issued the Decision, which dealt with the position of all of the officers apart from the one whose case was severed during the course of the Misconduct Hearing. The Panel found that three of the officers were guilty of gross misconduct, and the Panel then went on to consider the appropriate sanction that should be imposed on each of them. In relation to the other three officers, including DC Ward, the Panel found that the appropriate authority had failed to discharge the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that the relevant officers had been guilty of misconduct, much less gross misconduct. The position in relation to the officers other than DC Ward is noted only by way of background. Nothing further need be said about the specific case in relation to any other officer.

At paragraphs 17-18 of the Decision, the Panel noted that it had reminded itself that its task was to review the facts of the case against each officer and to decide whether the appropriate authority had demonstrated the relevant officer’s conduct amounted to misconduct, gross misconduct, or neither. In making this assessment, it had regard to Schedule 2 and the three standards alleged to have been breached by each of the six officers, namely, those relating to Confidentiality, Orders and Instructions, and Discreditable Conduct (see [19] above).

Regulation 2 of the Conduct Regulations defines “misconduct” and “gross misconduct” as follows:

“‘Misconduct’ … means a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action.

‘Gross Misconduct’ means a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal.”

At paragraph 22 of the Decision, the Panel reminded itself that the burden of proof remained on the appropriate authority throughout and that in deciding matters of fact it was to apply the civil standard, namely, the balance of probabilities. In other words, apart from in relation to facts that were admitted by the relevant officer, the Panel needed to be satisfied by the evidence that it was more likely than not that the alleged conduct occurred.

At paragraph 23 of the Decision, the Panel reminded itself that the balance of probabilities is a “single unvarying standard”. It included in the Decision the following quotation from version 1.0 of the Home Office Guidance entitled “Conduct, Efficiency and Effectiveness: Statutory Guidance on Professional Standards, Performance and Integrity in Policing”, which was published on 5 February 2020 (“the HO Guidance”) at paragraph 9.10:

“The seriousness of the allegation of misconduct and/or the seriousness of the consequences for the officer do not require a different standard of proof, merely appropriately careful consideration by the panel before it is satisfied of the matter which has to be established. The inherent probability or improbability of the conduct occurring is itself a matter to be taken into account when deciding whether, on the balance of probabilities, the conduct occurred.”

The Panel then considered the relevant factual background to the six cases, which it summarised at paragraphs 24-32 of the Decision.

At paragraph 33 of the Decision, the Panel noted that each officer was of good character, and that it had received evidence of positive good character in relation to some of the officers. It directed itself that, in relation to each officer for whom such evidence was provided, the evidence was admissible at this stage of proceedings in respect of the officer’s credibility and also in respect of the officer’s propensity to behave in the way alleged.

The Panel then turned to the specific case and its findings of fact and conclusions in relation to each officer.

The Panel considered the case of DC Ward at paragraphs 79 and 88-92 of the Decision. (The formatting of the paragraph numbering in this section of the Decision went awry, so that paragraph numbers 80-87 were mistakenly applied to paragraphs within the quotation reproduced at paragraph 79.)

The Panel noted at paragraph 88 of the Decision that DC Ward had admitted in the Regulation 31 Response and at the outset of the hearing the allegations of the appropriate authority as to accessing the NSPIS and the COPA at various times on 10 and 11 March 2021, although he disputed the timings.

In response to DC Ward’s challenge to the timings of alleged access, the appropriate authority amended the allegations after the misconduct hearing had begun. The amended allegations were then put to DC Ward, who confirmed that he admitted the specific allegations of access as amended, namely, that while on duty in the CSU:

When the amended allegations are compared with the original allegations set out in the Regulation 30 Notice (which are summarised at [17(i)] above), it can be seen that the net effect of the amendments was to replace the first allegation regarding having accessed the NSPIS on 10 March 2021 at 14:52 for “13 minutes odd” into three separate alleged instances of access for considerably shorter and more precise periods, as set out at [72] above at (i)-(iii). The other three alleged instances of access in the Regulation 30 Notice remained the same.

DC Ward denied the remaining allegations, namely, that:

At paragraphs 89 and 90 of the Decision, the Panel summarised the evidence of DI Moulds and DI Griffiths, respectively.

At paragraph 91, the Panel stated its conclusion that the evidence of DI Moulds and DI Griffiths supported the account given by DC Ward and did not materially differentiate between the role of a DS on the core shift as contrasted with the spare shift. Each role, the Panel concluded, implied a significant level of proactivity that was not, in the Panel’s view, dependant on whether the relevant DS was performing the core role or the spare role. It took the view that the level of proactivity expected of a DS on a Safeguarding team in the CSU was “clearly” dependent on resourcing on each day. The Panel went on, therefore, to conclude:

“What was apparent to the Panel was that DC Ward in his role as A/DS Ward at the time would have been required to proactively check NSPIS and other indices for prisoners that may fall within the CSU remit. That the Safeguarding team were allocated to cover the custody suites at Kingston and Wandsworth and that kidnapping would have been an offence relevant to his team. The Panel were assisted by the helpful schedule produced on behalf of DC Ward which detailed a productive and conscientious officer.”

At paragraph 92, the Panel stated its conclusion that the appropriate authority had not discharged the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that DC Ward’s access to information was not undertaken in the course of his duties or that he had no proper policing purpose in accessing the information. As the Panel did not find the factual allegations proved, it held that by accessing the information as he did, DC Ward did not act in breach of any of the three Standards of Behaviour that he was alleged by the appropriate authority in the Regulation 30 Notice to have breached. It followed that there could be no finding of misconduct or gross misconduct in DC Ward’s case.

An officer dissatisfied with a decision of a police misconduct hearing panel making a finding of gross misconduct against him or her has a route of appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal. However, an appropriate authority dissatisfied with a decision of a panel making a finding of no misconduct or no gross misconduct by an officer has no route of appeal. Accordingly, if the appropriate authority wishes to challenge the decision of the panel, it can only do so on public law grounds by way of judicial review, as the claimant has sought to do in this case.

On 22 January 2025, the claimant sent a pre-action letter to the Panel and to DC Ward.

On 13 February 2025, this claim was issued setting out the following two grounds:

On 10 April 2025, David Pittaway KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, granted permission to apply for judicial review on both grounds.

The relevant legal principles applicable to this claim include:

It appears to be agreed between the parties that the HO Guidance on the burden and standard of proof, which I have quoted at [66] above, is an accurate summary of the law on the applicable burden and standard of proof. The claimant, however, objected to the following statement in DC Ward’s Detailed Grounds of Defence at paragraph 11:

“It is well established that cogent evidence is required to satisfy a tribunal that a person has behaved in a reprehensible manner or to prove serious allegations see Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153, 194 [at [55]] as reflected in [the Home Office Guidance] at §9.10.” (emphasis added)

The claimant apparently construed this as an erroneous statement by the interested party that the standard of proof is higher than the balance of probabilities when a disciplinary tribunal is considering serious allegations against an individual subject to its jurisdiction. It is clear, however, that the reference to “cogent” evidence being required, in reliance on Rehman at [55], is not a reference to the standard of proof but rather to the inherent probability that the allegation is true. This is illustrated by Rehman itself at [55] and also by the authorities to which the claimant referred in its skeleton argument at paragraph 40, namely, In re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11 (HL(E)) at [14]-[15] (Lord Hoffmann) and [69]-[72] (Baroness Hale) and In re D [2008] UKHL 33, [2008] 1 WLR 1499 (HL(NI)) at [29] (Lord Carswell) and [42]-[46] (Lord Brown).

Accordingly, I consider that the claimant has simply misunderstood the Detailed Grounds of Defence on this point. It is clear that the Panel correctly directed itself that the standard of proof is simply the balance of probabilities, as set out in the HO Guidance at paragraph 9.10, and that the interested party accepts that. The Panel was, however, entitled to consider the inherent probability that DC Ward committed the alleged breaches of the Standards of Behaviour as part of its overall assessment. Among other things, both the seriousness of the allegations and the evidence of DC Ward’s positive good character were relevant to that consideration of inherent probability.

Burnett J in R (Chief Constable of Dorset) v Police Appeals Tribunal (Neil Salter) [2011] EWHC 3366 (Admin) at [19] and [25] set out the approach to be taken by a court on a claim for judicial review of the decision of a Police Appeals Tribunal:

“19.

… Proceedings in the Administrative Court seeking to challenge the decision of a Police Appeals Tribunal do not arise by way of appeal, but by way of a claim for judicial review. In those circumstances, a claimant in judicial review proceedings must establish a public law error before the decision of that Tribunal could be quashed.

…

25.

At each level in the disciplinary process, the decision maker or decision making body is expert in nature. It knows and understands how the police service works. It knows and understands the importance of maintaining integrity amongst police officers. It knows and understands the impact that serious misconduct can have on the force concerned and the police service in general. Parliament has provided that the Tribunal is the appellate body for these purposes. There is no further appeal to the High Court. The Tribunal is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of this court. I have already observed that the approach of this court in judicial review is different from the approach adopted when sitting in an appellate capacity from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Absent another error of law on the part of the Police Appeals Tribunal its decision on sanction could be interfered with only on classic Wednesbury grounds, in short that on the material before it no reasonable Tribunal could have reached the conclusion that it did.”

In Salter, Burnett J was reviewing a decision of a Police Appeals Tribunal that overruled a decision of a police misconduct hearing panel, which had imposed a sanction of dismissal on an officer for serious misconduct. The Tribunal substituted the lesser sanction of reduction in the officer’s rank from sergeant to police constable. Burnett J found at [32] that the Tribunal had misdirected itself as to the law in two important respects and at [39] that on the material before the Tribunal, had it applied the correct legal approach, the Tribunal would have been bound to dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, at [40] he quashed the decision of the Tribunal and substituted a decision dismissing the appeal to the Tribunal.

Although this claim involves judicial review of a decision of a police misconduct hearing panel rather than of the Police Appeals Tribunal, it is clear that the principles set out by Burnett J in Salter at [19] and [25] apply to this claim. The claim can only be upheld if I find that the Decision is flawed by a public law error.

This is a case in which it is not suggested that the Panel misdirected itself as to the law. Each ground alleges that, in effect, the Panel failed properly to engage with the evidence or to give adequate reasons for views that it reached, or both. One of the issues raised by the parties is what, if any, caution, respect, deference, or weight should be accorded to the Decision when considering the grounds and whether the Decision is flawed by a public law error.

It is clear that an appropriate and substantial degree of deference is due to the Panel for two reasons:

I bear in mind that this claim is neither a rehearing nor even a review on appeal but rather a judicial review, the scope of which is limited to the identification (or not) of a relevant public law error in the Decision. I also bear in mind, however, that I have the relevant documentary evidence considered by the Panel and transcripts of the relevant live evidence at the hearing. So, I am able to make an assessment of the evidence that was considered by the Panel for purposes of determining whether one or both grounds is made out.

The claimant has drawn my attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in General Medical Council v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369, [2007] 1 WLR 2007 (CA) at [41]. In that case, the Court of Appeal was considering an appeal against an order of Bean J extending by six months an interim suspension order that had previously been made by the Interim Orders Panel (“IOP”) of the General Medical Council for a period of 18 months. The principal judgment was given by Arden LJ, where at [41] she said the following:

“… The judge held that the court ‘naturally [paid] great respect to the view of the evidence taken by the IOP’, in view of their ‘immense experience’. I would prefer to say that the approach of the court to the opinion of the IOP is not a question of giving respect but of attaching appropriate weight to the evidence in the ordinary way. In contrast to the giving of respect, there can be no automaticity about the attaching of weight to evidence. Weight does not attach to a person’s evidence by virtue only of his experience or status. The giving of weight to opinion evidence entails a holistic evaluation of the persuasiveness of the evidence on the relevant issue, having regard to all relevant circumstances including its content as well as the viewpoint of the author of the opinion. …”

I respectfully agree that this passage is relevant to the degree of weight that I should give to the expressed views of the Panel on the evidence it considered, when assessing the grounds.

The parties are largely in agreement on the legal principles underpinning the duty to give adequate legal reasons. Much of the jurisprudence concerns decisions given by judges, but the principles apply to other public decision-making bodies such as disciplinary tribunals.

The classic extended statement of the relevant principles is the decision of the Court of Appeal in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 WLR 2409 (CA) at [15]-[19], where the judgment of the court was given by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR. That passage confirms, among other things, that:

In South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953 (HL(E)) at [36], Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood gave guidance on the proper approach to a reasons challenge in a planning context. That guidance can be applied mutatis mutandis to a reasons challenge in any public law case, and I have borne it in mind. In particular, I note the final sentence of that passage, which reads:

“… A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

Fordham J in R (Exolum Pipeline System Ltd) v Crown Court at Great Grimsby [2023] EWHC 2811 (Admin) at [75] has also provided the following useful gloss on the principles that apply to reasons challenges in public law cases:

“… The legal standard applicable in public law, to assess whether legally adequate reasons have been given by decision-maker, is a practical one. It recognises that decisions are being given to an informed audience. It identifies as a key part of the standard of legally adequate reasons the need to address the principal controversial issues. …”

In R (Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis) v Police Conduct Panel (Hayley Russell & Christopher Strickland) [2022] EWHC 2857 (Admin) at [56], Mostyn J said:

“It is axiomatic that reasons for a decision will always be capable of having been better expressed. It is well-known that a reviewing court should not subject a decision to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it were a piece of legislation or a contract … .”

Along similar lines, Swift J in R (Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police) v Police Misconduct Panel (Taylor) [2025] EWHC 3018 (Admin) at [22], where he addressed a submission made by the claimant that the defendant misconduct panel had made a finding unsupported by the evidence and given no reasons to explain one of its conclusions, said the following:

“… One matter to have clearly in mind when assessing a submission such as this, which touches on the way in which a misconduct panel has reasoned its decision, is that those decisions must be read realistically and fairly. Notwithstanding that the chairman of a misconduct panel will be a lawyer, panel decisions are not intended to be significant works of legal scholarship. Decisions should state clear conclusions and reasons, but they are not to be picked over in search of respects in which they could have been better or more fully expressed, or for other immaterial error.”

In relation to Ground 1, Mr Ozin submitted that, given the evidence of DI Moulds and DI Griffiths at the Misconduct Hearing, the distinction between the responsibilities of a DS on core duty and a DS on spare duty was a core issue in the case. It was immaterial that this distinction was not fully appreciated by the claimant prior to that evidence. It was clearly of critical relevance to the allegations made against DC Ward. The significance of the distinction was clearly set out in the appropriate authority’s closing submissions to the Panel. The Panel was therefore bound to engage with the relevant evidence concerning that distinction and to address this critical point in its reasons.

Mr Ozin submitted that the Panel’s bare conclusion that the evidence “did not materially differentiate between the spare vs the core shift to the extent suggested by the [appropriate authority]” made the public law error of failing “to demonstrate engagement with the relevant factors identified on the evidence adduced in the particular case”: R (Chief Constable West Midlands Police) v Panel Chair, Police Misconduct Panel (Officer A) [2020] EWHC 1400 (Admin) at [59] (Eady J)

Referring to the guidance given by the House of Lords in South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) at [36], Mr Ozin submitted that:

Mr Ozin submitted that the absence of adequate reasons in the Decision meant that the appropriate authority was left not able to understand why the Panel had disregarded the evidence relied upon by the appropriate authority that a DS on the spare shift, without being tasked to do so, ought not to scan the custody whiteboards on NSPIS proactively. The absence of adequate reasons prejudiced the appropriate authority’s ability to discharge its duties as the guardian of professional standards in policing. Accordingly, the inadequacy of the Panel’s reasoning also amounted to a public law error.

Mr Butt submitted that the Panel’s reasons adequately engaged with the rival arguments in relation to whether proactivity was expected of a DS on the spare shift. The Panel’s summary of the evidence of DI Moulds and of DI Griffiths in this regard at paragraphs 89-90 of the Decision was perfectly adequate. The evidence did not support the appropriate authority’s contention that a DS on the spare shift “ought not” proactively to scan the custody whiteboards on NSPIS.

In my view, the claimant has failed to demonstrate that there was any public law error in the Panel’s reasoning in the Decision, either by way of a failure to engage with the evidence or a failure to give adequate reasons. I agree with the submission of Mr Butt that the evidence does not support the appropriate authority’s contention that a DS on the spare shift “ought not” proactively to scan the custody whiteboards on NSPIS. The Panel was justified in concluding that neither DI Moulds nor DI Griffiths gave evidence to that effect or materially differentiated between the role of a DS on the core shift and the role of a DS on the spare shift “to that extent” (in the words of the Panel).

During Mr Ozin’s re-examination of DI Moulds, DI Moulds made clear that the DS on core duty had primary responsibility for proactivity in identifying prisoners in custody who potentially fell within the remit of the CSU. She would not normally expect the DS on the spare shift to be proactively scanning the custody whiteboards on NSPIS, and she would only have expected the spare shift DS to be doing so proactively in response to a request to that effect from the core duty DS. This was partly, she explained, because a spare shift is “still a very busy shift”, with the DS on spare shift (working from home given COVID restrictions at the time) carrying on with enquiries and developing his or her investigations. The core shift had primary responsibility “for looking at the prisoners and the crimes”. If the core shift DS was overwhelmed or struggling with resources, he or she could either directly, or via the responsible DI, contact the spare shift DS and ask for support. Nowhere, however, does DI Moulds say that this precludes a DS on the spare shift from proactively scanning the custody whiteboards on NSPIS for a proper policing purpose.

Towards the end of this part of Mr Ozin’s re-examination of DI Moulds, there was the following exchange:

“Q. In your statement you described two aspects to the role; one is carrying on looking at existing workload and developing cases and the other is the proactive scanning role. So have I understood this correctly, a proactive scanning role means primarily the job of the core team on duty?

A. Yes.

Q. And the spare would only be called upon to become involved in the proactive scanning as a result of a specific arrangement or a specific request?

A.

Yeah.”

I note that DI Moulds agreed here with the suggestion that the proactive scanning role was “primarily” the job of the core team. I also note that she agreed that the spare would only “be called upon” by the core duty DS to become involved in proactive scanning “as a result of a specific arrangement or a specific request”.

The Panel was perfectly justified in interpreting this evidence, particularly having regard to the whole of the evidence relating to DC Ward (including the rest of DI Moulds’s evidence, DI Griffiths’s evidence, and DC Ward’s evidence), as not precluding DC Ward from proactively scanning without having been specifically requested to do so. The claimant has failed to identify any evidence that DC Ward was prohibited by any rule or policy from proactively scanning the whiteboards in the absence of a specific request. One is not compelled to draw such an inference from the evidence of DI Moulds or the evidence of DI Griffiths. DC Ward’s own evidence was that he proactively scanned the whiteboard on NSPIS on 10 March 2021 in order to identify and prepare for work of relevance to the CSU. I note that his next shift on 11 March was the early turn core shift.

While I bear in mind that the only custody records DC Ward accessed on NSPIS on 10 March 2021 related to Wayne Couzens, that fact alone does not carry any particular weight, given that he was on a spare shift, dealing with a lot of other matters, as he described in his evidence. On every other day during the period about which he gave evidence (namely, 9-13 March 2021), DC Ward was an A/DS on core duty and therefore under a duty proactively to monitor the custody whiteboards in NSPIS. He accessed relevant records relating to a number of other prisoners. He did not have the duty proactively to monitor the custody whiteboards for Wandsworth and Kingston when he was on the spare shift, but that does not mean that he was not permitted proactively to monitor the custody whiteboards if he had a proper policing purpose, as the Panel accepted that he did.

It is also of relevance, as noted by the Panel at paragraph 90 of the Decision, that DI Griffiths, when asked during cross-examination whether DC Ward’s being on spare shift at the time he accessed the information relating to Wayne Couzens would change his opinion previously expressed that he was satisfied that DC Ward had a proper policing purpose in doing so, stated that it would not change that opinion.

For these reasons, I am satisfied that the Panel engaged properly with the evidence relating to the distinction between the responsibilities of a DS on the core shift and a DS on the spare shift, and that the Panel gave adequate reasons for concluding that this evidence did not preclude it from reaching the view on a balance of probabilities that DC Ward had a proper policing purpose for accessing the information relating to Wayne Couzens that he accessed on NSPIS and COPA on 10 and 11 March 2021.

Ground 1, therefore, fails.

In relation to Ground 2, Mr Ozin submitted that both in cross-examination of DC Ward and in its closing submissions, the appropriate authority methodically set out why it was inconceivable that DC Ward could have viewed the MG3 on COPA relating to Wayne Couzens without realising that it was part of the Sarah Everard case. The highlighted version of the MG3 showed Ms Everard’s name on the first, second and 14^th pages. It also showed on the first page of the MG3 that this was not a domestic abuse case and that, therefore a CSU risk assessment was “not applicable”.

Mr Ozin submitted that DC Ward’s evidence that he only looked at the “Facts of Offence” section on page 2 of the MG3 was unsustainable in light of the evidence of DI Griffiths that a DS seeking to identify whether the prisoner fell within the remit of the CSU would check the name of the victim to determine whether there was a relationship between the prisoner and the victim of a type relevant to the remit of the CSU.

In response to Ground 2, Mr Butt noted that DC Ward had consistently maintained from the time of the Regulation 17 Response onwards that when he accessed the MG3 in COPA, he looked only at the “Facts of Offence” section to see whether the matter was within the remit of the CSU, and he went no further. DI Griffiths’s evidence that DI Griffiths would have looked at the identity of the victim to work out whether the matter was within the remit of CSU did not make DC Ward’s position “unsustainable”. Mr Butt submitted that it was clear, having regard to the Panel’s overall findings, that the Panel accepted DC Ward’s evidence as to what he did and did not see on the MG3 on 10 March 2021. The Panel made it clear at paragraph 14 of the Decision that it had had regard to the “Annotated MG3” in relation to DC Ward.

Mr Butt submitted that the Panel made it clear in its conclusions in relation to DC Ward in the Decision that it found that DC Ward did have a proper policing purpose when he accessed the custody records relating to Wayne Couzens and the MG3. There was therefore no breach of relevant standards as set out in the Regulation 30 Notice, and there could therefore be no finding of misconduct, much less gross misconduct, in DC Ward’s case.

In considering Ground 2, I bear in mind that the Panel in giving its reasons in the Decision was addressing an informed audience (Exolum Pipeline System at [75]). While it is the true that at paragraphs 88-92 of the Decision, where it gives its reasons for rejecting the appropriate authority’s case against DC Ward, the Panel makes no specific reference to the MG3 as highlighted (to which it refers as the “Annotated MG3” at paragraph 14 of the Decision), it is clear that the Panel accepted DC Ward’s evidence that he looked only at the “Facts of Offence” section, saw it was blank, saw that no relevant documents had been uploaded, and therefore did not at that stage realise the connection to the Sarah Everard case. This point simply turned on DC Ward’s credibility.

During the course of his cross-examination of DC Ward, Mr Ozin explored with him what and when he may have learned about the Sarah Everard matter from press releases, media reports and/or discussions with colleagues during the relevant time period. In his closing submissions on behalf of the appropriate authority, Mr Ozin was critical of DC Ward’s evidence regarding when the “penny dropped” on the morning of 11 March 2021 that the matter he was accessing in relation to Wayne Couzens related to the Sarah Everard matter. The Panel can be presumed to have had all of this evidence and these submissions in mind when assessing DC Ward’s credibility.

In support of DC Ward’s credibility was:

In short, although the appropriate authority was entitled to comment that it was “inconceivable” that DC Ward failed to see the references to Sarah Everard on pages 1 and 2 of the MG3 or the fields on the MG3 that indicated that it was not a domestic abuse case and that a CSU risk assessment was “not applicable”, the Panel was not bound to accept or agree with the appropriate authority’s comment. The Panel were entitled to take into account that DC Ward had maintained consistently that he looked only at the “Facts of Offence” box on page 2 of the MG3 form, which was, indeed, found to be blank, as DC Ward had said it was, at the time that he viewed the MG3 on 10 March 2021.

The Panel in that regard would have been entitled to take into account that even though DC Ward was on a spare shift, it was still a busy shift, as noted by DI Moulds in her evidence and by DC Ward in his evidence. There was no evidence as to how long precisely on 10 March 2021 DC Ward looked actively at the MG3. I therefore consider that the Panel was entitled to accept DC Ward’s evidence as credible and to reject the appropriate authority’s submission that it was “inconceivable” that DC Ward did not see Sarah Everard’s name on the MG3.

Given that the Panel was giving reasons to an informed audience, I consider that its reasons for accepting DC Ward’s evidence regarding the MG3 and for rejecting the appropriate authority’s submissions in this regard can be safely inferred from the reasons that it did give. I therefore reject the submission that the Panel failed adequately to take account of the evidence relating to the MG3 exported from COPA and the submission that the Panel failed to give adequate reasons for reaching the decision that it did in relation to the MG3.

Accordingly, Ground 2 also fails.

In light of my conclusions, it is not necessary for me to deal with submissions made on behalf of DC Ward about there being some unfairness by the appropriate authority in the way it conducted the case against DC Ward, both as to its reliance on the distinction between the duty of a DS on core shift and the duty of a DS on spare shift, which arose after the case was opened, and as to its introduction at a late stage of the Misconduct Hearing of the highlighted version of the MG3 after DC Ward had substantially completed his evidence-in-chief.

It is also not necessary for me to deal with submissions made on behalf of DC Ward in reliance on sections 31(2A) and 31(2B) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

For the reasons I have given, this claim is dismissed.