PQR, R (on the application of) v Derbyshire County Council

JUDGE SEPHTON: This is the renewal of an application for permission to bring judicial review.

The background is that PQR is the father of three children, CDG and DXB born of one mother, and AMS, born very recently of another mother.

The defendant, Derbyshire County Council, has entertained significant concerns about the welfare of those children because of PQR behaviour. He has been imprisoned on more than one occasion, and the allegations are that he has exhibited violence towards these children's parents in their presence. There are, therefore, concerns for their welfare and wellbeing.

In relation to CDG and DXB, the County Court at Stockport has already entertained proceedings and has made orders. PQR tells me today that he has brought proceedings in relation to AMS with which the court will deal in December.

The nature of PQR’s complaints against the local authority is not entirely clear, because the letter of complaint which he sent to the Council does not appear in the bundle before me. What I have is the Council's response to it, or at least the final response (there had been a previous response which PQR found to be unsatisfactory). That response was sent to PQR on 18 December 2024.

PQR issued a claim form on 13 August 2025, seeking a judicial review.

He complains that there is no use going to the Ombudsman, which was the suggested path offered by the Council in the event that his complaints had not been dealt with to his satisfaction in the letter of December 2024, because the Ombudsman could not deal with the substantive matters about which he complained, namely his access to his children.

In my judgment, this application is bound to fail.

The first ground upon which it is bound to fail is that the matter which PQR complains of occurred on 18 December 2024 and he is required by Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules to bring proceedings as soon as possible and, in any event, within three months. PQR, I take it, is seeking an extension of the time permitted by Part 54.

He referred me to the case of R (on the application of Hysaj) v Secretary of Statefor theHome Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1195 a decision of the Court of Appeal. Although that decision is not directly in point, because it concerns whether or not an appellant's notice issued after the 21-day limit set out in Part 52 can nevertheless proceed, it makes two important points. One is that an extension of time, such as this, needs to be considered in the context of an application for relief from sanctions. The second is that in an application for relief from sanctions, the fact that the litigant who is seeking relief from sanctions was ignorant of the law and was acting as a litigant in person is not a good reason.

I turn to consider whether I should grant an extension of time by applying the principles which are relevant to relief from sanctions.

First of all, I consider whether the failure to comply with rules was a significant one. In my judgment, it clearly was. The provisions of Part 54 require expedition, which is why the rule says that the action must be taken as soon as possible. The "in any event within three months" is a longstop and not an entitlement. The delay in this case is one of several months.

I then turn to consider whether there is a good reason. The only reason put forward by PQR is that he was unaware of the ability to come before this court, and as I have already explained, Hysaj indicates that is not a good reason.

I turn to consider all the circumstances of the case, and it seems to me that the overwhelming consideration is the requirement that public law should be dealt with speedily – and will not be in this case.

I am confirmed in my view that the claim should not succeed in this court by the observation that the substantive matters which lie behind PQR’s complaints are properly the concern of the Family Court. It is to the Family Court that PQR should refer in seeking contact with his children.

The Family Court is the jurisdiction which can stipulate whether the defendant in this case has the right, power or obligation to interfere in the arrangements between this father and his children. I note PQR has come to that conclusion himself, and that he has issued proceedings in relation to AMS. The court will, no doubt, deal with his desire to see AMS next month.

As far as the complaints which he makes are concerned, however, it seems to me that in this action, his complaints are made far too late and therefore cannot be pursued. As Judge Bird found in his short judgment, there are alternative remedies in relation to the complaints about the way in which his issues were handled by the Council. He can refer to the Local Government Ombudsman in relation to the substantive matters. As I have already indicated, he has the remedy of going to the Family Court.

For those reasons, it seems to me this application must be dismissed and I dismiss it.