Lynsay Watson, R (on the application of) v The Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Constabulary

This is the Claimant’s renewed application for permission to judicially review the Defendant’s decision of 20 March 2025 to take no further action on a complaint into an alleged hate crime. The complaint had been made by the Claimant, Ms Lynsay Watson. The complaint concerned tweets posted by the First Interested Party, Ms Helen Joyce, about the Second Interested Party, Ms Freda Wallace. The tweets are set out in the Claimant’s bundle and summarised in the Defendant’s Summary Grounds of Resistance (“SGR”).

The claim was issued on 3 June 2025 and the Defendant filed his acknowledgement of service and SGR on 17 July 2025. Within the SGR, the Defendant sets out the context and background to the claim and refers to a letter from six individuals sent to the Defendant, and to three other Chief Officers of Police, as well as the Independent Office for Police Complaints. The letter states that the six individuals had been harassed by the Claimant and asked that their complaints be investigated.

By application, dated 2 August 2025, the Claimant sought an order for disclosure of the letter from the six individuals. By Order dated 16 October 2025, Andrew Kinnier KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, refused the disclosure application and refused permission to apply for judicial review. The Claimant renewed both of those applications and the matter came before me at an oral hearing.

At the hearing I asked whether the two Interested Parties had been served with the proceedings. The Claimant said that she had sent a copy of the proceedings to Ms Wallace, her friend, and that she was in touch with her every day. She did not produce any letter or correspondence from Ms Wallace to that effect. The Second Interested Party attended at the hearing and confirmed that she had received the papers and was there to observe. Mr Palmer for the Defendant confirmed that he was content to proceed and was encouraged by the attendance of Ms Joyce. I shall deal with the position of Ms Wallace on the question of standing later. At the hearing I confirmed that I was satisfied that the Interested Parties were aware of the proceedings and that the hearing should proceed.

In his Order of 16 October 2025 DHCJ Kinnier gave renewal directions which required the Claimant to file and serve an electronic copy of the permission bundle within 21 days of the date of the Order in the event that a valid request for reconsideration was made. Mr Palmer told the Court that the Claimant had failed to serve the documents electronically. He reminded the Court that a litigant in person is expected to comply with procedural requirements and that, in this case, Ms Watson had not adequately explained the basis for the failure. Mr Palmer invited the Court to exclude section F of the renewal bundle and the written argument of the Claimant from consideration.

In reply Ms Watson said that any delay in providing the renewal bundle had not caused procedural unfairness to the Defendant, it arose out of an oversight and she was unrepresented. Mr Palmer, fairly conceded that the impact on the Defendant’s ability to prepare for the hearing was minimal. Having considered matters, insofar as it is required, I am going to grant relief from sanctions in relation to the Claimant’s failure. The additional papers mostly contain information which was before the Defendant anyway, and the written submissions are useful in assisting the Court to understand the basis on which the Claimant puts her case.

At the hearing Ms Watson renewed her application for disclosure of the letter from the six individuals. That letter is not on the Court file and was not before the Judge refusing permission. The Claimant’s contention that there was procedural unfairness because Judge Kinnier had prejudicial material before him is ill-founded. The letter in question was not before Judge Kinnier and did not form part of his assessment when refusing permission.

In any event any such letter is of no material relevance to consideration of the matters in this case. As I explained to the Claimant at the oral hearing, there has been no separate appeal against the refusal of Judge Kinnier to order disclosure. In my view that would have been the proper course of action by which the Claimant could have challenged that particular case management decision. I therefore refuse the application.

The Claimant contends that she reported the matter with the Second Interested Party’s consent and therefore has a sufficient interest to challenge the police decision. She further relies on alleged breaches of Articles 2, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The Defendant submits that the Claimant does not have standing because she is not the subject of the tweets and has provided no evidence of authority to act for the Second Interested Party. She is therefore not a “person aggrieved” for public law purposes and is not a “victim” under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Defendant notes that there is no evidence in the Claimant’s bundle confirming such authority.

The Claimant was not the subject of the tweets. She reported the matter as a third party, asserting that she did so with Ms Wallace’s consent. Despite the Claimant being on notice that the Defendant disputed that she had sufficient interest, or standing, to bring a claim she has not produced any document or letter from Ms Wallace indicating that the Claimant acts on her behalf.

The Claimant’s legal rights and obligations were not directly or adversely affected by the decision made by the Defendant. The decision complained of was not taken in relation to her, and she has no sufficient interest in the outcome. The Claimant asserts that this is an exceptional case sufficient to warrant her being ascribed standing. As a transgender woman she has an interest in such matters but it is no more than that which many others were have. There are no exceptional circumstances such as to justify this as an exceptional category of case. As the Claimant does not have sufficient interest in this claim, I therefore conclude that she lacks standing to bring a public law challenge.

The Claimant also asserts breaches of Articles 2, 8 and 14 ECHR. However, she is not a “victim” for the purposes of section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The decision did not concern her private life, safety, or discrimination. The Defendant is correct to submit that she has no standing to bring human rights grounds. The claim is refused permission on this basis alone.

The Defendant’s SGR sets out the relevant statutory tests for malicious communication and harassment. The relevant offences are contained within section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988; section 127 of the Communications Act 2003; and within the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Article 10 of the ECHR sets out the right to freedom of expression and its attendant duties and responsibilities.

The threshold for “grossly offensive” communications is high. The Courts have repeatedly emphasised that offensive, shocking or disturbing speech is not enough; and that political speech attracts enhanced protection - see Connolly v DPP [2007] EWHC (Admin); R v Casserly (Thomas) [2024] EWCA Crim 25; and R (Miller) v College of Policing [2021] EWCA Civ 1926.

The contemporaneous crime report shows that the reviewing officer, PS Misik, considered the content and context of the tweets, relevant case law, and the threshold for criminal offences. He concluded that the tweets were unpleasant but not grossly offensive; that “Deadnaming” is unpleasant but not criminal. He further noted that there had been no direct contact between Ms Joyce and Ms Wallace and concluded that the conduct did not meet the threshold for harassment. The matter was appropriately recorded as a hate incident, not a crime. These findings appear in the supervisor review of 13 November 2024.

The Force Crime Registrar later suggested that the matter could amount to harassment, but expressly noted insufficient additional verifiable information to progress the allegation and that the crime could not be cancelled only because the evidential threshold was not met at that stage.

On 11 December 2024, PS Misik reviewed the case again and concluded that: there was no evidence to support the allegation that Ms Joyce incited others; the parties were on opposite sides of a polarised political debate; there were freedom of expression considerations; and there was no evidential basis on which to interview the suspect. As a result he recommended that the case should be closed pending new evidence. This is recorded in the closing report of 11 December 2024.

The Courts have repeatedly emphasised that, when reviewing police decisions, they will respect the margin of appreciation or discretion which a Chief Constable has when taking such decisions. The Court’s discretion to review a Chief Constable’s decision not to investigate matters further or not to launch a prosecution is to be exercised sparingly (R (Bermingham) v Director of Serious Fraud Office [2007] QB 727).

The Claimant alleges that the police failed to investigate adequately, failed to gather available evidence, and failed to keep the Second Interested Party informed.

The Defendant points to multiple reviews conducted between 11 November 2024 and 11 December 2024, during which the police assessed the available material, spoke to the Second Interested Party, and concluded that no viable investigative steps remained. The Defendant also notes that the Claimant did not pursue the matter through the Professional Standards Department.

Communication Offences: The Claimant contends that the tweets were “grossly offensive” and intended to cause distress, thereby meeting the threshold for offences under the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and the Communications Act 2003.

The Defendant relies on the police assessment that the tweets did not meet the high statutory threshold for “grossly offensive” communications. The police considered relevant case law and concluded that the content fell within the scope of protected political expression.

The tweets in question, while insensitive and provocative, were part of a public debate on gender identity, a topic of significant political controversy. The police were reasonably entitled to conclude that they did not cross the criminal threshold. It is not arguable that it was irrational of the Police not to investigate further. Permission is refused in relation to this matter.

Harassment: The Claimant asserts that the tweets formed part of a persistent and targeted campaign of harassment against the Second Interested Party, including repeated deadnaming, sexualised comments, and the mobilisation of followers to cause real‑world harm. The Claimant argues that the conduct amounted to a “course of conduct” under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, taking into account both the tweets and the alleged actions of followers.

The Defendant states that the tweets were not directed at the Second Interested Party, were part of a wider public debate on gender identity, and were “unpleasant but not criminal”. The police found no evidence of direct contact or incitement by the First Interested Party. The Defendant submits that the statutory elements of harassment were not met: the tweets were not directed at the Second Interested Party, there was no evidence of encouragement of others, and the evidential material was insufficient to justify further investigation.

The harassment offence requires a course of conduct which a reasonable person would consider harassment. The tweets were not directed at Ms Wallace, and the police found no evidence of incitement or targeted behaviour by Ms Joyce herself. That conclusion was open to them and it is not arguable that the decision was irrational.

ECHR: The Claimant contends that the tweets were hate‑motivated and therefore fall outside the protection of Article 10, or that any protection is outweighed by the harm caused to the Second Interested Party.

The Defendant argues that the tweets constituted gender‑critical political speech, which attracts enhanced protection under Article 10. Any interference would have been disproportionate, particularly given the absence of evidence of criminality.

The police are entitled to take “no further action” where the evidential threshold is not met. The Director of Public Prosecutions’ Guidance on Charging expressly recognises this. The decision here was reasoned, lawful, and proportionate. The Police clearly had regard to the need to eliminate harassment and to ensure equality for transgender and disabled persons. Those matters were considered initially and on review during the investigation process. The Claimant’s disagreement with the outcome does not render it unlawful. Judicial review does not permit the Court to substitute its own view for that of the decision maker.

The Claimant further alleges that there was an unreasonable failure to communicate with the Claimant which constituted procedural unfairness and a breach of the Victim’s Code. On her own submission, the Claimant was a witness to the alleged crime and it is clear that the Police communicated their decision to Ms Wallace. It is not arguable that there was a breach of data protection laws or indirect discrimination by the Police in their communication with Ms Wallace.

Therefore, even if the Claimant had standing, the claim is not arguable on any of the grounds advanced. The decision to take no further action was one the police were lawfully entitled to reach.

The Claimant lacks standing to bring this claim, whether on public law or human rights grounds. In any event, the claim is not arguable. The police decision was lawful, rational, and consistent with the statutory framework and Article 10 ECHR. Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.

The Defendant seeks summary assessment of costs in the sum of £4,020. The Claimant having been refused permission, and there being no reason to depart from the usual order, the Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs in that sum, unless representations are received from the Claimant objecting within 14 days of the date of the Order accompanying this judgment.

That concludes my judgment.