Maurice Mbugua Soetsane, R (on the application of) v Chelmsford Justice Centre

MRS JUSTICE STACEY:: This matter comes before the court for the oral renewal hearing of the Claimant's application for permission to judicially review the order of HHJ Renvoize, of 1 July 2025, sitting in the Chelmsford Family Court. The Claimant is the father of a number of daughters, and in respect of two of them, born in 2020 and 2022, there is an ongoing dispute in the family court between him and the mother of those two children.

On 1 July 2025, the Chelmsford Family Court adjourned its fact-finding hearing and made an interim order that the children live with their mother. The fact-finding hearing had originally been listed for 12 October 2024 which was then adjourned for a two-day hearing on 1 and 2 July 2025.

Prior to 1 July 2025, the Claimant had applied to the High Court for interim relief consisting of a stay of the family court proceedings pending the outcome of judicial review proceedings. He brought the claim and the interim relief application on grounds of errors in the family court's procedural decisions and omissions. He explained that there was a breach of the Family Procedure Rules, the overriding objective, breach of article 6 right to a fair trial and article 8 ECHR in the interference with his family life and the denial of a fair hearing due to unanswered procedural objections. There were issues, too, raised about the pre-action protocol letter and concerns about the bundles and documentation and the appointment of a QLR (a qualified legal representative), which he considered to have been premature, and that there were other failures which engaged the judicial review process.

The interim relief application was refused on the papers by Lang J. In her order of 1 July, refusing the application to stay the forthcoming fact-finding hearing in the Chelmsford Family Court Lang J explained that, in her judgment, the claim for judicial review and interim relief was misconceived as there were suitable alternative remedies.

Judicial review is the remedy of last resort, she explained. The Claimant should raise his complaints of procedural unfairness with the judge in the family court and ask for a ruling on them. If he is dissatisfied with the Family Court's decision, he can seek to exercise his rights of appeal. The Administrative Court will not case manage the proceedings of the Family Court.

The hearing did, indeed, proceed on 1 July 2025 before HHJ Renvoize, and she made rulings on the concerns raised by the Claimant which he considered had compromised the integrity or the fairness of the proceedings and the matters that he had sought to raise through the interim relief application.

As is recorded in the order of HHJ Renvoize, the father (the Claimant in these proceedings) raised his concerns about procedural irregularities at the hearing, which were the same concerns raised in his application for judicial review. The family court made a ruling on them. The court found that none of the concerns compromised the integrity or fairness of the proceedings and that in any event those concerns did not form part of the reasons for adjourning the case, because the case did, indeed, have to be adjourned on 1 July 2025 because of other matters. The case was, therefore, relisted to be heard on 18 and 19 August 2025 and orders were made to ensure that that case could go ahead and make the decisions and findings of fact required.

The judge also, in recognition of the Claimant's concerns, required that the 182-page document entitled, "The Applicant's Response to Allegations and Preliminary Observations", be included in the bundle for the next hearing.

Meanwhile, the Claimant applied for a reconsideration of Lang J's judgment and this was refused on the papers by Lieven J, who refused reconsideration and permission for him to bring the claim for a full judicial review. Her order records that the applications were misconceived for the reasons set out by Lang J and reminded the Claimant that he has an alternative remedy to appeal the order of HHJ Renvoize to the High Court.

The judge went on, "All the grounds raised relate to alleged procedural error and they are all matters which can be raised on appeal. Therefore, judicial review is not the appropriate way to challenge the decision". The judge went on that, for the avoidance of doubt, her order was not intended to encourage the Claimant to appeal or to give any suggestion that there is any merit in any of the grounds being advanced.

The renewal application followed on from Lieven J's refusal. The application was made on form 86B on 25 July 2025, listed for today's hearing.

The Claimant's concerns about the fact-finding hearing did not prevent the 18 and 19 August 2025 hearing remaining listed, but it was, in fact, adjourned on the day for other reasons: since no qualified legal representative attended. It was relisted for 20 and 21 October 2025 and I have today been provided with the order made at court that day.

The hearing was before Recorder Purchase KC, as HHJ Renvoize had recorded on the earlier order that it was suitable for a recorder and was not a matter that was reserved to her, as the fact-finding process had not yet started. The rulings of Recorder Purchase KC were to reset a timetable and to make findings of fact on the mother's allegations of domestic abuse. The mother was questioned at that hearing on behalf of the father and the father was questioned by the mother's counsel. The summary of the Court's findings was set out in the schedule to the order. There was insufficient time for the court to deliver a full judgment, which would be handed down in due course.

The court ordered the father, the Claimant in this matter, to undergo a hair-strand test for cannabis and alcohol use and a carbohydrate-deficient transference test for alcohol abuse to determine some of the issues in the proceedings: CAFCASS was to serve further reports, the parties to have a further opportunity to file responses, a further hearing to be listed after 24 March 2026. The two children were ordered to remain with the mother in the interim.

The findings of fact set out in the schedule are not disputed by the Claimant and, in some respects the Claimant's account had been preferred over that of the mother, but in other respects they were not. It is a mixed outcome. There is evidence of verbal abuse by the father found to the civil standard and of some sexual abuse but not to the full extent as alleged by the mother, it would seem.

The only other matter to which to draw the parties' attention is that there was an order granting permission to the Claimant to attend remotely but his request for a stay of the family court proceedings, pending the outcome of this renewal application, was refused by the lawyer on the case.

As was carefully explained by Lang J on 1 July 2025 and reiterated by Lieven J on 24 July 2025: whatever the substantive rights and wrongs, the route to challenge is through the appeal process in the Family Courts. The Claimant's remedy, if there is one, lies there. All his allegations and concerns can be raised within the Family Court jurisdiction and I remind him, and reassure him, that the Family Courts follow and apply the European Convention on Human Rights, including Article 6 and Article 8, in accordance with their duty under the Human Rights Act 1998, just as the High Court does.

In the oral presentation today, the Claimant has not only fully adopted his grounds but also he now seeks to argue a matter which has not been pleaded in the original application or the statement of facts and grounds, subsequently served, about delays in the resolution of matters.

He argues that the four-year delay, during which period he says he has not had direct contact with the two children he had with their mother, is a breach of his legal rights and is justiciable through judicial review. However, he also acknowledges that, in the matter of the children's welfare and their well-being, care not haste is paramount. I note that he declined the offer of indirect contact that was made last year.

The delay is not a pleaded allegation but, even if it was, issues concerning delay are apt to be dealt with through case management in the family court proceedings and, as explained by both the previous judges who have looked at the papers, it is not for the High Court in judicial review to case manage family court cases.

This application for judicial review is, I find, totally without merit in accordance in the sense that it was "bound to fail" (Civil Procedure Rule 23.12). I acknowledge, of course, that an application which is totally without merit is a higher hurdle than the realistic prospect of success threshold necessary for permission for judicial review and can only be made by a judge if he or she is confident that the application is truly bound to fail (see Crown (on the application of W) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 82.

I have had the opportunity at this oral renewal hearing to consider the powerful oral advocacy advanced by the Claimant in this matter. It has been his opportunity to address the perceived weaknesses in the claim which led the judge to refuse permission on the papers. However the Claimant has failed to address those fundamental points about the correct route for challenge of family law decisions and case management decisions, such as have been made in this case, lying with the family court and not the High Court. I understand that he is dissatisfied with the family court in his daughters’ case, but he must address his concerns to that court.

I, therefore, refuse to grant permission and I make a declaration that the application for judicial review is totally without merit.

Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof.