Malgorzata Borkowska v Regional Court in Radom, Poland

This is an appeal against the order of District Judge Ciecióra, dated 12 November 2024, directing the extradition of Malgorzata Borkowska, the Appellant, to Poland pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”).

Permission to appeal was granted on one ground under Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) and refused on all other grounds. A ground under Section 21 of the 2003 Act (Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”)) was renewed and listed to be considered at a “rolled‑up” hearing at the same time as the appeal.

Section 27 of the 2003 Act provides that on an appeal against an extradition order under Section 26, the appeal may be allowed if the conditions in section 27(3) are satisfied. Those conditions are that the judge ought to have decided a question before them at the extradition hearing differently and that if they had decided the question in that way, they would have been required to order the person’s discharge.

The approach to be taken by the Court on appeal is well-established and was summarised by Aikens LJ in Belbin v Regional Court of Lille, France [2015] EWHC 149 (Admin) where he said:

“… If, as we believe, the correct approach on appeal is one of review, then we think this court should not interfere simply because it takes a different view overall of the value-judgment that the District Judge has made or even the weight that he has attached to one or more individual factors which he took into account in reaching that overall value-judgment. In our judgment, generally speaking and in cases where no question of ‘fresh evidence’ arises on an appeal on ‘proportionality’, a successful challenge can only be mounted if it is demonstrated, on review, that the judge below; (i) misapplied the well-established legal principles, or (ii) made a relevant finding of fact that no reasonable judge could have reached on the evidence, which had a material effect on the value-judgment, or (iii) failed to take into account a relevant fact or factor, or took into account an irrelevant fact or factor, or (iv) reached a conclusion overall that was irrational or perverse.”

On 2 October 2007, the Appellant, acting jointly with others, committed an offence of fraud in Radom, Poland. The offending involved the use of a forged employment certificate to obtain a substantial amount of money, PLN 68,000, by way of a bank loan from Bank BGŻ.

On 17 March 2010, the Appellant was convicted and sentenced to 1 year 4 months’ imprisonment, conditionally suspended for 3 years. She was ordered to repay PLN 58,855.57 by 13 July 2011 and required to inform the probation service of any change of address.

The repayment deadline of 13 July 2011 expired without the Appellant having fully complied with the compensation order. On 5 October 2011, after hearing submissions from her lawyer about the Appellant’s personal circumstances, the court declined to activate the custodial sentence.

From 12 February 2012, attempts to contact the Appellant at her registered address were unsuccessful. It appeared that she had ceased active contact with her probation officer, left her address and stopped responding to correspondence. In fact, on 8 October 2011, shortly after the court hearing she had left Poland with her family and moved to the UK. It subsequently emerged that she had committed a further offence in 2008 (in respect of which she was convicted in 2018).

On 7 December 2012, the District Court in Radom made an order enforcing the custodial sentence. That decision became final on 8 January 2013. The Appellant did not surrender herself to serve the sentence on 27 February 2013, as ordered, because by then she was in the United Kingdom (“UK”). On 12 March 2013, the court instructed the police to arrest her and take her to prison. On 3 April 2013, given that she could not be located, a domestic warrant for her arrest was issued.

According to the further information provided by the Respondent, on 18 September 2018 the relevant Polish authorities received information that the Appellant was in England. On 26 June 2019, the Regional Court in Radom issued an EAW which was certified by the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) on 15 April 2024. The delay in certifying was unexplained, but I note the observation made in RT v Poland [2017] EWHC 1978 (Admin) at [61] and [62] that:

“An EAW will not be issued until the requesting judicial authority believes that the wanted person has left the country and is elsewhere in the European Union. Until there is clear information of his location here the NCA will not consider certification. To behave in any other way would result in the waste of resources in dealing with cases which may not have any practical worth.

…

It is a frequent submission that someone has been living in the United Kingdom openly, often having had contact with various official bodies here. But neither the foreign judicial authority nor the NCA can be expected to explore the byways and alleyways of British officialdom to discover whether someone is in this country.”

On 29 June 2024, the Appellant was arrested in Burnley. On 1 July 2024, she appeared in court, did not consent to extradition, and was released on conditional bail. The extradition hearing took place on 15 October 2024. The Appellant denied being a fugitive. She asserted that she had left Poland for economic reasons, not to evade justice, and that she resumed contact with the Polish authorities in 2018, providing her UK address and cooperating thereafter. The Appellant observed that the offence dated back to October 2007, with conviction in March 2010, and that the EAW was issued in 2019 but only certified in 2024. She contended that the delay was not attributable to her, that she was under no obligation to remain in Poland, and that she had established a settled life in the UK. On that basis, it was argued that her extradition would be oppressive.

In relation to Article 8 ECHR, the Appellant submitted that extradition would constitute a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private and family life. She relied on her long residence in the UK, caring responsibilities, and integration into the community. It was submitted that the historic nature of the offence and the passage of time significantly reduced the public interest in extradition.

The District Judge handed down a written decision on 12 November 2024 and ordered the Appellant’s extradition.

The District Judge found that the Appellant had deliberately and knowingly placed herself beyond the reach of the legal process when she left Poland in 2011, aware of her obligations and the risk that her sentence would be activated. She rejected the Appellant’s claimed ignorance of the 5 October 2011 hearing [24-25] saying:

“24.

I am sure that the Requested Person was aware of the terms of her sentence. I am sure that she was informed, in 2009, of the obligation to inform the authorities of any change of address. She was aware that she had not paid back all the money and therefore, regardless of the frequency of communication with the probation officer (or absence of any), I am sure she was aware that the matter had not concluded and she was still subject to that obligation. She failed to comply with that obligation.

25.

I do not accept her account that she did not know of the hearing on 5 October 2011, or that the lawyer was not instructed by her. The information from the RJA is detailed and clear, and I accept it. I found her assertion that the lawyer would somehow guess at her personal circumstances from the payments she had made to be fanciful. I am sure that she was aware that the hearing was to consider whether her sentence should be activated, and that she had been granted a brief reprieve, but that she was still at risk of this happening.”

The District Judge concluded accordingly that the Appellant had left Poland and come to the UK as a fugitive. However, she accepted the Appellant’s evidence that she had later resumed contact with the Polish authorities [17]:

“She has been to the Polish Consulate several times since coming to the UK, to make applications for passports. Also, on 8 March 2018, she was invited to attend an interview at the Consulate regarding the offence committed in 2008 (for which she was convicted in 2018). At that time, she provided her address and contact details. She gave evidence in the presence of the Polish authorities, and had a lawyer in Poland who was given her written authority to deal with her 2008 case.”

This led to express findings in relation to the period of fugitivity [27-28]:

“27.

I note that she did recommence communication with the authorities in 2018. I accept that from that point forward, she cannot be said to be evading the legal process, as the RJA would have had access to her contact details. Further, it is clear she started making repayments (and I accept that regardless of what has happened to the money (as there seems to be some dispute as to whether it has been paid to the victim), she made payments to her lawyer on the understanding that he would forward the money for the purposes of satisfying the compensation order).

28.

I am therefore sure that, when the Requested Person left Poland in 2011, she deliberately and knowingly placed herself beyond the reach of the legal process in Poland, but that she stopped being a fugitive in 2018, when she provided the Polish authorities with all her contact details.”

There is no appeal against these findings in respect of fugitivity, indeed they underpin part of the Appellant’s argument.

The Appellant relies on two distinct but related grounds: the statutory bar under Section 14 of the Act 2003 and the human rights protection afforded by Section 21/Article 8 ECHR. Each engages different legal principles and thresholds.

The appeal raises two issues in relation to the District Judge’s conclusions to:

These issues intersect with the question of fugitivity because of the finding that the Appellant had come to England as a fugitive but that her fugitive status had ended whilst she was still here.

Although both of the provisions relied on permit consideration of delay, they operate differently:

Although the Appellant’s skeleton argument also referred to Section 25 of the 2003 Act, permission was refused on the ground framed under that section and it does not appear to have been the subject of an application to renew.

Section 14, of the 2003 Act provides that extradition is barred if it would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time since the person is alleged to have committed the offence or became unlawfully at large. Whether a person is unlawfully at large within this provision depends, for present purposes, on whether they are at large in contravention of a lawful sentence under the applicable legal system. This is an objective state of affairs to which their knowledge and understanding are irrelevant (Wisniewski v Poland (DC) [2016] EWHC 386 (Admin) at [54]). The Appellant would have been unlawfully at large after her suspended sentence was activated and she was required to surrender to prison.

The statutory bar is subject to the general principle that a person who has deliberately fled the jurisdiction which seeks their extradition cannot ordinarily rely on any elapse of time which their own conduct has caused. In referring to this principle in Gomes & Goodyear v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21 Lord Brown, when considering Section 82 of the 2003 Act, referred to flight operating as “an almost automatic bar to reliance on delay” [27].

In Kakis v Government of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 at 782H–783B, Lord Diplock explained:

“Delay in the commencement or conduct of extradition proceedings which is brought about by the accused himself by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest cannot, in my view, be relied upon as a ground for holding it to be either unjust or oppressive to return him. Any difficulties that he may encounter in the conduct of his defence in consequence of the delay due to such causes are of his own choice and making. Saving the most exceptional circumstances it would be neither unjust nor oppressive that he should be required to accept them.

…

“Unjust” I regard as primarily directed to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial itself, “oppressive” as directed to hardship to the accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration; but there is room for overlapping, and between them they cover all cases where to return him would not be fair.”

In Zengota v Poland [2017] EWHC 191 (Admin) at [32], Cranston J summarised the relevant principles in relation to Section 14 including the impact of fugitivity on an assertion of oppression by reason of the passage of time:

“32 Drawing the threads together, the law regarding the bar of oppression through passage of time is as follows: (i) oppression is not easily satisfied and hardship is not enough; (ii) the onus is on the requested person to satisfy the court that it would be oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time; (iii) the requested person must establish a causal link between the passage of time and its oppressive effects through the change in circumstances; (iv) the gravity of the offence is relevant to whether changes in the circumstances of the requested person have occurred which would render his return to stand trial oppressive; (v) if the requested person is a fugitive he cannot take advantage of oppression, save in the most exceptional circumstances; (vi) the requesting authority must establish that the requested person is a fugitive to the criminal standard; (vii) delay brought about other than by the requested person is not generally relevant since the focus is the effects of events which would not have happened, for example a false sense of security; (viii) it is only in borderline cases, where the accused himself is not to blame, that culpable delay by the requesting state may tip the balance against extradition.”

On the factual matrix as set out in the judgment the conclusion that the Appellant ceased to be a fugitive strikes me as generous. The paradigm way in which fugitivity will be brought to an end is by the return of the fugitive to the country from which they have fled and their surrender to the authorities. Simply providing contact details in the country to which a fugitive has fled and from which they are subsequently contesting their extradition is not likely to be enough. If it were otherwise fugitive status might routinely cease when the requesting state became sufficiently aware of the location of the fugitive to issue an arrest warrant and seek an extradition order. As Yip J observed in Argeseanu v Romania [2023] EWHC 513 (Admin) at [30]:

“...a person who has left the jurisdiction of the requesting state as a fugitive does not cease to be treated as a fugitive simply because he has been arrested and then takes part in extradition proceedings.”

The Appellants re-engagement with the Polish authorities, apart from resuming some payments, appears to have been in relation to other offending rather than that for which she had been convicted and sentenced to a suspended sentence. In Zengota, Cranston J considered the position in in relation to Section 14 of the 2003 Act where there was an EAW issued in respect of more than one extradition offence:

“34.

None of these cases considered the implications, if any, of the Extradition Act 2003 (Multiple Offences) Order 2003 (“the Multiple Offences Order”)...

35 With respect to the bars to extradition in section 11(1) of the 2003 Act, including section 14, article 3 provides:

“Bars to extradition

“(1)

Section 11 is modified as follows.

“(2)

For subsection (3) substitute ‘(3) If the judge decides any of the questions in subsection (1) in the affirmative in relation to an offence, he must order the person’s discharge in relation to that offence only.’”

36 In my view, the effect of the Multiple Offences Order is that in principle individual assessment of each offence is needed in considering under section 14 of the 2003 Act oppression by reason of the passage of time. Depending on the circumstances a requested person could be a fugitive in relation to one set of proceedings but not another. Further, a person’s knowledge may differ with his offences. That could bear on his entitlement to rely on the passage of time as a bar to extradition in respect of one set of proceedings but not another. The passage of time may vary with different offences on a warrant or on the various warrants a requested person faces. That may be because the relevant period of time for the purposes of section 14 varies according to whether he stands accused or convicted, as well as according to the dates of individual offences and convictions. Finally, the offences may be widely different in their gravity.

37 In practice, however, it is for a requested person to establish oppression. That is not an easy task. Delay on the part of the authorities will generally play no part in the calculation, certainly if the requested person is also to blame for the delay. The focus must be on the oppressive effects of the passage of time of extraditing a person. If it is not oppressive to extradite a person for an offence or offences, the impact of extraditing him for other offending or convictions is likely to be diminished, notwithstanding what would otherwise have been the effects of the passage of time: see Kalemba’s and Zakrewski’s cases. In summary, individually assessing each offence for whether extradition is oppressive by reason of the passage of time does not mean that the section 14 bar to extradition for each offence is to be considered in isolation. Thus I would add to the considerations in para 32 above: (ix) if a requested person’s extradition is ordered for one or more offences, any oppressive effects of extradition in relation to further offending are likely to be much diminished.”

Thus, multiple extradition offences are to be considered separately in relation to allied questions such as fugitivity which require individual assessment even if they may then be considered in the round. The fact that the Appellant had been interviewed in relation to further offending which was not the subject of an extradition request does not seem to me to necessarily led to the conclusion that fugitivity had come to an end in relation to separate offending just as participation in the extradition process itself would not do so.

Kakis was nevertheless relied upon as authority for the proposition that “it was possible to move into and then out of fugitive status” so that the District Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant had ceased to be a fugitive was not wrong in principle. For my part, I do not regard Kakis as throwing much light on when and how, absent return and surrender, fugitivity may be brought to an end. Kakis was an in-country fugitive who ceased to be so as a result of a political and legal act on the part of the government of Cyprus. As May J observed in Done v Romania [2020] EWHC 3192 at [54], when concluding that the Section 14 bar in that case had properly been found to be unavailable:

“Kakis was at all relevant times present in Cyprus, he avoided the legal process by hiding in the mountains, not by leaving the jurisdiction. In the present case the appellant remained out of reach of the domestic Romanian legal process whilst he remained in the UK, whether or not he had been arrested on the first, or any subsequent, warrant.”

In Argeseanu, Yip J did not ultimately determine whether or not the District Judge should have treated fugitivity as having come to an end as a result of engagement with the Romanian authorities, protracted extradition proceedings and the discharge and reissue of warrants. However, she contemplated that the Section 14 bar might be available, without analysing whether or not fugitivity had ceased, on the basis of considerations of conduct and causality:

“31.

The term “fugitive” is not a statutory one. It is a concept developed in the case law to prevent someone who has fled the jurisdiction to avoid justice benefiting from the consequences of his own conduct. In Wisniewski, the Divisional Court said (at [59]):

“Where a person has knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of a legal process he cannot invoke the passage of time resulting from such conduct on his part to support the existence of a statutory bar for extradition.”

As the court made clear, it is more fruitful to consider the applicability of that general principle on a case by case basis than to seek a comprehensive definition of the term “fugitive”.

32.

For my part, I consider it may be open to the appellant to say on the facts of this case that the passage of time since 2012 was not due to conduct on his part and therefore does not prevent him seeking to rely on the statutory bar under section 14 in relation to the passage of time since then.”

In Goodyer and Gomes, Lord Brown indicated what sort of conduct on the part of a requesting state might give rise to an argument that delay was not to be attributed to a fugitive [26] :

“This is an area of the law where a substantial measure of clarity and certainty is required. If an accused like Goodyer deliberately flees the jurisdiction in which he has been bailed to appear, it simply does not lie in his mouth to suggest that the requesting state should share responsibility for the ensuing delay in bringing him to justice because of some subsequent supposed fault on their part, whether this be, as in his case, losing the file, or dilatoriness, or, as will often be the case, mere inaction through pressure of work and limited resources. We would not regard any of these circumstances as breaking the chain of causation (if this be the relevant concept) with regard to the effects of the accused’s own conduct. Only a deliberate decision by the requesting state communicated to the accused not to pursue the case against him, or some other circumstance which would similarly justify a sense of security on his part notwithstanding his own fight from justice, could allow him properly to assert that the effects of further delay were not “of his own choice and making”“

Having observed that the rule set out by Lord Diplock in Kakis should be “strictly adhered to” but provided latitude in “the most exceptional circumstances”, Lord Brown concluded [29]:

“In the great majority of cases where the accused has sought to escape justice, however, he will be unable to rely upon the risk of prejudice to his trial or a change in his circumstances, brought about by the passing years, to defeat his extradition.”

In the present case, the District Judge heard the evidence in relation to the Appellant’s re-engagement with the Polish authorities, in particular as a result of her visits to the Manchester Consulate. She concluded that the Appellant “stopped being a fugitive in 2018”. Whatever doubts I might entertain about this conclusion it was submitted, and I accept, that this was a clear finding on an important issue which should be respected and is not, in any event, subject to appeal.

This gives rise to the somewhat paradoxical position that the Appellant ceased to be a fugitive in 2018 but continued to be unlawfully at large. The Appellant accepted that cases of this sort were likely to be rare but submitted that the consequence of the District Judges finding was that there were two periods to be considered; a period when the Appellant was a fugitive which could only be taken into account as giving rise to delay if there were exceptional circumstances and a period after she ceased to be a fugitive in relation to which there was no such impediment to a finding of oppression.

When the District Judge came to consider the Section 14 ground she concluded [41]:

“In light of my findings as to fugitivity, as per Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 and Gomes and Goodyer v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21, the Requested Person is precluded from relying on section 14 as a bar to extradition unless there are exceptional circumstances.”

It was submitted that the District Judge erred in law in her approach to fugitivity because she treated fugitivity as a permanent status rather than a fact-specific inquiry by reference to periods of delay, contrary to the guidance in Kakis. The question of whether there were exceptional circumstances was, it was argued, confined to the period when the appellant had been a fugitive. The Judge failed to consider the significant period between 2018 and 2024 during which she was not a fugitive and maintained contact with the Polish authorities, including her voluntary participation in proceedings. The effect of the passage of time, and its bearing on fairness and oppression, was not, it was submitted, properly assessed. The Appellant argued that the delay, coupled with her deteriorating health and family circumstances, meant that extradition would be unjust and oppressive.

I do not consider that this is the correct analysis of the approach that should be taken to a mixed period of fugitivity and non-fugitivity. Fugitivity arises because of flight. The strong public policy reasons, including that this jurisdiction should not be a haven for those seeking to avoid justice, remain in place. Where a requested person’s presence is as the result of seeking to avoid the imposition of a criminal penalty or participation in criminal proceedings any argument about the elapse of time is necessarily built upon a foundation of fugitivity. Displacing the period which falls to be assessed forward to the point at which fugitivity ended would itself be the result of fugitivity.

Section 14 provides:

“Passage of time

14.

A person’s extradition to a category1 territory is barred by reason of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have - (a) committed the extradition offence (where he is accused of its commission), or (b) become unlawfully at large (where he is alleged to have been convicted of it).”

The statute therefore requires the overall elapse of time to be assessed. Where the period being considered includes deliberate flight to avoid justice there is nothing unprincipled in depriving a requested person of arguments about delay unless there are exceptional circumstances. Consideration of whether such circumstances exist provides a flexible mechanism for the court to take into account conduct on behalf of the requested person and the judicial authority as well as changes in individual circumstances and the balance between any relevant periods of fugitivity and non-fugitivity. This is precisely what the District Judge did.

She found expressly that the Appellant was a fugitive from 2011 until at least 2018, and that she was aware of the risk of activation. These findings were rooted in her obligations (including to notify address changes) and her conduct. On those findings, Wisniewski applies squarely: by breaching conditions that required contact and notification, and leaving the jurisdiction without providing an address, the Appellant became a fugitive. That status continued to bear on the Section 14 analysis even if, in 2018, she later provided contact details.

The Appellant’s argument is that re‑engagement with the authorities from 2018, coupled with the delay between the EAW (2019) and certification/arrest (2024), renders extradition oppressive. The difficulty is two‑fold:

First, fugitivity generally precludes reliance on Section 14 save in exceptional circumstances. The District Judge determined that later engagement did not amount to such an exceptional circumstance, and that conclusion was open to her on the facts.

Secondly, while some unexplained delay between 2019 and 2024 may have contributed to a false sense of security, the District Judge correctly noted that this delay was neither the fault of the Appellant nor the judicial authority and weighed it in the Article 8 balance rather than as clearing the high hurdle of oppression under Section 14. The impact of delay was therefore assessed within the less stringent requirements of Article 8. As Yipp J observed in Argeseanu:

“33....following the observations of the Supreme Court in Konecny v Czech Republic [2019] UKSC 8 (at [57]), Article 8 provides an appropriate and effective alternative means of addressing the passage of time even where section 14 is not available. There it was stated:

“Passage of time is clearly capable of being a relevant consideration in weighing the article 8 balance in extradition cases. (See H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italic Republic, Genoa (Official Solicitor intervening) [2013] 1 AC 338, paras 6 and 8, per Baroness Hale JSC.) It is capable of having an important bearing on the weight to be given to the public interest in extradition. In the article 8 balancing exercise, the relevant period of time will not be subject to the restrictions which appear in section 14.”

34.

In the circumstances, I find it unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the District Judge was wrong to treat the appellant as a fugitive after 2012. That question is not determinative of the appeal. That is because the arguments on delay can be fully accommodated under Article 8. That allows for a more nuanced consideration, based upon the finding that the appellant was a fugitive when he came to this country in 2007 and the conclusion that he cannot be held responsible for the delay since 2012. Indeed, both parties conceded in the course of argument that the most obvious and appropriate way for the appellant’s arguments based upon the troubled history of the extradition proceedings, and the resulting delay, was via Article 8.

[...]

39 However, I agree with the parties that any arguments as to the passage of time can be dealt with appropriately and effectively within the required Article 8 balance, allowing for a more nuanced consideration of the delay and the reasons for it. On the facts of this case, it cannot be the case that the appellant might succeed in obtaining his discharge under section 14 yet fail on an Article 8 challenge. I therefore do not need to reach a separate decision on section 14 since it is not determinative of the appeal. I will accordingly adopt the approach ultimately taken by both sides and address the passage of time within Article 8.”

Given the District Judge’s finding that there were no exceptional circumstances in this case, the high threshold for oppression was not met. The causative delay is predominantly the product of the Appellant’s own evasion during 2011–2018; any later administrative lapse did not, on the facts, turn extradition into oppression within Section 14. The appeal under the Section 14 ground therefore fails.

In Norris v Government of the United States of America (No 2) [2010] UKSC 9 at [56] the Supreme Court stated:

“The public interest in extradition is a constant and weighty factor. Only a very strong Article 8 claim will outweigh it.”

The Appellant submitted that extradition would constitute a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private and family life. She relied on her long residence in the UK, caring responsibilities, and integration into the community. It was submitted that the historic nature of the offence and the passage of time significantly reduce the public interest in extradition.

She is the primary carer for her husband and plays a central role in her children’s lives. It was argued that the original compensation order was unrealistic and effectively compelled her to relocate abroad, thereby diminishing the public interest in extradition. In light of the gravity of the offence, the passage of time, and her family responsibilities, the Appellant contends that extradition would constitute a disproportionate interference with her Article 8 rights.

The structured proportionality approach required in extradition cases is set out in Poland v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) at [9], it involves an assessment balancing interference with private and family life and the public interest in extradition. The public interest is weighty: ensuring sentences are served, honouring treaty obligations, and avoiding safe havens.

The Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23, reiterated that cases where Article 8 defeats extradition will be rare, particularly on private‑life grounds and only in cases of exceptionally severe family impact. Moreover, where the person is a fugitive, very strong counter‑balancing factors are required before extradition could be disproportionate. Delay may reduce the weight of public interest but is rarely decisive absent compelling circumstances.

The District Judge conducted the required balancing exercise and made a series of careful findings:

It is not arguable that this analysis was wrong. Delay from 2019 onwards was weighed in the Appellant’s favour but did not outweigh extradition. The offence was serious, involving fraud and breach of court orders. Family and health circumstances, though significant, were capable of mitigation and did not reach the threshold of exceptional severity. Even taking the Appellant’s circumstances at their highest, it was open to the District Judge to conclude that the consequences of extradition were not sufficient to displace the strong public interest in extradition. The Appellant’s prolonged fugitivity substantially elevates that public interest and demands very strong counter‑vailing factors, which are not present here. The renewed Article 8 ground is not reasonably arguable and therefore fails.

The overall result therefore is that I dismiss the appeal and refuse the application for permission to appeal.