BDH, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Lambeth

The claimant, who is now aged 15 years, seeks judicial review of the decision of the defendant’s Children’s Services Care department (“CSC”) on 20 March 2025 to terminate (or, more properly, not to reinstate) her social care direct payments. The single ground of challenge is that the decision was irrational in the sense that it lacked process rationality. Permission was granted by Mr Jason Beer KC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, on 1 July 2025. By a previous order, dated 4 April 2025, Mould J appointed the claimant’s mother as her litigation friend in these proceedings and granted both the claimant and her mother anonymity. I shall refer to them simply as “the claimant” and “the claimant’s mother”, respectively, and shall substitute those designations for any other in the documentation cited.

I am grateful to Mr Persey, counsel for the claimant, and Mr Harrop-Griffiths, counsel for the defendant, for their well-focused submissions.

As no point turns on the detail of the statutory framework, I can set out the main provisions fairly shortly.

Section 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 provides in relevant part:

“(4)

Where a local authority have functions under Part 3 of the Children Act 1989 in relation to a disabled child and the child is ordinarily resident in their area, they must, in exercise of those functions, make any arrangements within subsection (6) that they are satisfied it is necessary for them to make in order to meet the needs of the child.

…

(6)

The arrangements mentioned in subsection (4) are arrangements for any of the following—

(a)

the provision of practical assistance for the child in the child’s home;

…

(c)

the provision for the child of lectures, games, outings or other recreational facilities outside the home …”

In Part 3 of the Children Act 1989, section 17 provides in relevant part:

“(1)

It shall be the general duty of every local authority (in addition to the other duties imposed on them by this Part)—

(a)

to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need; and

(b)

so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children by their families, by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children’s needs.

(2)

For the purpose principally of facilitating the discharge of their general duty under this section, every local authority shall have the specific duties and powers set out in Part 1 of Schedule 2.

…

(10)

For the purposes of this Part a child shall be taken to be in need if—

(a)

he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the opportunity of achieving or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without the provision for him of services by a local authority under this Part;

(b)

his health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, without the provision for him of such services; or

(c)

he is disabled, …

(11)

For the purposes of this Part, a child is disabled if he is blind, deaf or dumb or suffers from mental disorder of any kind or is substantially and permanently handicapped by illness, injury or congenital deformity or such other disability as may be prescribed; …”

The defendant accepts that, as the claimant has autism, she is disabled for the purpose of section 17. It is common ground that the claimant is ordinarily resident in the defendant’s area.

Section 17A provides in part:

“(1)

The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for and in connection with requiring or authorising the responsible authority in the case of a person of a prescribed description who falls within subsection (2) to make, with that person’s consent, such payments to him as they may determine in accordance with the regulations in respect of his securing the provision of the service mentioned in that subsection.

(2)

A person falls within this subsection if he is—

(a)

a person with parental responsibility for a disabled child,

(b)

a disabled person with parental responsibility for a child, or

(c)

a disabled child aged 16 or 17,

and a local authority (‘the responsible authority’) have decided for the purposes of section 17 that the child’s needs (or, if he is such a disabled child, his needs) call for the provision by them of a service in exercise of functions conferred on them under that section.”

The regulations in question are the Community Care, Services for Carers and Children’s Services (Direct Payments) (England) Regulations 2009. I need not refer to their provisions.

Schedule 2 to the Children Act 1989 provides in part:

“3.

Where it appears to a local authority that a child within their area is in need, the authority may assess his needs for the purposes of this Act at the same time as any assessment of his needs is made under—

(a)

the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970; ...

6.

(1) Every local authority shall provide services designed—

(a)

to minimise the effect on disabled children within their area of their disabilities;

(b)

to give such children the opportunity to lead lives which are as normal as possible; and

(c)

to assist individuals who provide care for such children to continue to do so, or to do so more effectively, by giving them breaks from caring.”

In broad summary, therefore, the position is as follows. The defendant has a duty to assess the needs of the claimant as a disabled child within its area. It is for the defendant alone to decide what those needs are and what is required to meet them; in making that decision, however, it is subject to normal public law principles. If it is satisfied that arrangements within section 2(6) of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 are necessary to meet the claimant’s needs, it has a duty to make those arrangements.

The claimant has diagnoses of Autism Spectrum Condition, social anxiety disorder, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, oppositional defiance disorder and, more recently, premenstrual dysphoric disorder. A family tragedy in July 2023, when one of her brothers was killed and the other seriously injured in a road traffic accident, had a further and substantially adverse effect on her mental and emotional wellbeing.

The defendant has maintained an Education, Health and Care Plan (“EHCP”) for the claimant since 2018. A social care package for the claimant was put in place in 2019, comprising both social care from the CSC and educational provision from the defendant’s Special Educational Needs (“SEN”) department. Immediately prior to July 2023 she was receiving 23 hours of social care support each week from a carer called Millie Hughes. The cost of this social care was met by direct payments from the defendant pursuant to section 17A of the Children Act 1989. In the aftermath of the tragedy in July 2023, the claimant’s mother requested that the social care package be increased to 60 hours each week. The defendant did not agree to this, but it did increase the social care package to 30 hours each week and commit to carrying out a further Child and Family Assessment (“CFA”) to consider the matter further.

The CFA was completed on 12 January 2024 by Tashena Wallace, a social worker employed by the defendant. It did not agree the request for 60 hours of social care each week, but it confirmed that the existing 30 hours would continue. In the section headed, “Analysis of risk and future danger”, Ms Wallace stated:

“The claimant is a 14 year old young person with complex needs which makes her vulnerable to be being exposed to lot more elements of peer pressure which includes risk taking behaviours etc. It is felt that a robust CIN [Children in Need] plan is essential to mitigate any further risks that could escalate and trigger a mental health crisis.

The claimant has complex mental health difficulties; however, as indicated in this assessment, she is a well versed and intelligent young individual capable of making reasoned decisions. Consequently, she does not fall under the classification of being profoundly or severely disabled, which is a prerequisite for receiving services from Lambeth CWD team… As such, upon agreement on appropriate care hours, it is my view that the case should be transferred to the Children and Family team for ongoing management and support.”

The mention of the Lambeth CWD team was a reference to the Children With Disabilities team, which is a section within the CSC. (It has since been renamed the 0-25 Disabilities team.) The mention of the Children and Family team was a reference to the Family Support and Child Protection(“FSCP”) team, which is another section within the CSC. There is a third section within the CSC, called the Short Breaks team, which is concerned with the provision of respite for carers.

Ms Wallace’s Manager, Jennifer Wilson, agreed with her recommendation. In the Manager Comments at the end of the CFA she stated:

“This is a holistic assessment [t]hat provided clear details of the claimant’s current needs an[d] subsequent need for support.

It is evident that the claimant has some complexities to her emotional presentations however these are not currently assessed to be severe or profound it would be reasonable for this case to be transferred to the appropriate service where she can continue to receive support.

I note that the claimant’s voice is clear in this assessment as she has been able to contribute her wishes and feelings throughout. I acknowledge the parent request for additional hours however have to be mindful that this takes away from the parenting capacity which is not being questioned as parent is proactive in ensuring the claimant’s needs are met but effective care planning. Given that the claimant has said she spend much of her time resting therefore I would question the need for an increase.

SW will continue to explore current support to ensure this is is [sic] being used in the most effective way however given that we are transferring the case to the most appropriate service this can be revisited.”

The conclusion, accordingly, was that the claimant’s disability did not merit the involvement of the CWD team, that she would be referred to the FSCP team, and that she would continue to receive 30 hours (but not the requested 60 hours) of social care each week. Accordingly, in February 2024 the social worker confirmed the increase of the social care direct payment package, backdated to August 2023, with the body that administered the direct payments for the defendant.

The current version of the claimant’s EHCP was finalised on 12 February 2024. It was there recorded: “Social care provides an ongoing package of support of 30 hours support via Direct payments.” (I should mention that there was an EHCP review in December 2024, but the defendant has not published the EHCP and does not intend to do so until these proceedings have been concluded.)

The events of the following months are conveniently taken from the witness statement of Jennifer Heritage, who is a service manager in the CSC and was the responsible service manager for the claimant between April and October 2024. She states:

“6.

A child in need (‘CIN’) review meeting was held on 12 March 2024. During that meeting, the claimant’s mother and the professional network were advised that following re-assessment the claimant no longer met the criteria for the CWD service and that her CIN plan would be transferring to the Family Support and Child Protection (‘FSCP’) service. Of particular note is the manager’s comment entered by Ms Jennifer Wilson, which states: ‘Having noted the ongoing issues around the assessment and support for the claimant, it is evident she requires ongoing management of her CIN plan to ensure her needs are managed - we have determine[d] that the claimant does not have a disability that is set out in the CWD eligibility criteria and have requested a transfer of the claimant’s case management to the FSCP team for a more targeted approach. The claimant herself has refused to engage with the current services and package of support is not being utilized which is in an indication of required need.’

7.

It is evident from that statement that concerns were being raised with the family as to whether or not the current social care package was appropriate as the claimant was not using the funds on offer. This suggests that during this period her level of need had decreased as she was not utilising the external support on offer.

8.

The FSCP service supports children who are deemed to be suffering from or at risk of serious harm. This can be via a child protection plan or via a CIN plan. Specifically, a CIN plan supports a child who is considered to be in need of support.

9.

The case was subsequently transferred to Brett Parsley, a social worker within the FSCP service on 11 April 2024. Following transfer, Mr Parsley undertook an initial home visit to the family on 25 April 2024. During that visit he met briefly with the claimant and with the claimant’s mother. As part of his visit, Mr Parsley explained his role to [the claimant’s mother], including the difference between the FSCP service and the CWD service. He advised the claimant’s mother that he had read the background to the case and attended a professionals meeting in respect of the claimant.

10.

Mr Parsley shared with the claimant’s mother the following, as recorded in our records: ‘I explained to mum that from what I can see she is meeting the claimant’s needs, and in my view does not need a social worker, because [the claimant] has all the support she needs from CAMHS [Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services], and they are supporting with education. Mum said that she understood, and did not fully understand why a CIN plan was required. But she was willing to engage because it could help with school and funding. I said that we have no influence on funding or school acceptance. I explained there would have been support we could have given; however mum has been more then [sic] capable to arrange this and has done so already.’

11.

Mr Parsley goes on to record: ‘I said that I am not saying that we will step away at this point, I just wanted to explore if the children with disabilities team may be more appropriate. Mum said she understood and did not want to take a social worker away from a family who needed my type of social worker, I said this does not mean [the claimant] is any less important, but it’s about being with the most appropriate team, mum understood.’

12.

In my view based on the initial home visit, it is evident from the outset that Mr Parsley not only set out that [the claimant] did not meet the remit of involvement from the FSCP team, but that as a service we are also not responsible for matters pertaining to funding or the provision of education. The claimant appeared to recognise and acknowledge this based on what is recorded.

13.

During a home visit conducted on 18 July 2024, Mr Parsley again revisited the proposal for case closure, explaining what areas had been explored prior to reaching this decision. It is recorded as follows: ‘I then said that my manager had a conversation/meeting with the previous manager from the Children with Disabilities Team, and it was clear that they did not have a role, and that the claimant’s disability does not warrant having a social worker in their team. Mum said that she has a disability and she is not in education, so she should have a social worker. I explained that it does not work that way, she has to need one. I then explained that my manager and I agree that the claimant does not require a social worker, and that I do not have a role. I explained that the fact that mum messaged to say she would like visits to be every 8 weeks, because 3-4 weeks was too often, and the fact that I have not done anything or had a role since I took over the case, signifies that the claimant does not require my support. Mum said that was fine, but could I write a letter explaining, and then she will send to her solicitor.’”

Mr Parsley no longer works for the defendant. Ms Heritage’s evidence is taken largely from the file notes. What appears from the notes, therefore, is that, after the claimant was transferred from the CWD team to the FSCP team, the FSCP team formed the view that she did not in fact fall within its remit. Mr Parsley wondered whether the claimant would better be dealt with by the CWD team, but that team again made clear that it did not have a role.

A Child in Need review meeting was held on 30 August 2024, attended by the claimant’s mother and by one education officer and one CIN reviewing officer. In the section of the report headed, “Analysis of risk and future danger”, the social worker wrote:

“I am still of the view that FSCP social work team is not the right team for the claimant, and that the Children with Disabilities Team is also not the team who will support her. It was agreed that the team manager would arrange a consultation with the short breaks team.”

The Manager’s Comment at the foot of the review updated the position:

“The care package of direct payments is supporting the family and the claimant has a good relationship with PA. The claimant gets 30 hours per week from social care and 30 hours from SEN. The meeting was clear that there was no role for FSCP and only outdoing [outstanding?] query was to explore if meets criteria for short breaks. This was discussed on 09/09/2024 - not meet threshold and case to close.”

The Manager’s Comment on the Child in Need review shows that the Short Breaks team decided that the claimant did not meet the threshold criteria for respite provision. There are two case notes from 9 September 2024 on the defendant’s file, both of them made by Chipo Mazambani, an FSCP team manager, with the heading “Discussion held – appears not to meet threshold of shortbreaks”. Taking the sequence of the case notes as I believe them to be, the first one reads as follows:

“I had a discussion with Daviene Trotman and she reported that short breaks are for young people who have profound and complex needs and require additional support in the community to complete day to day skills of daily living

When I relayed to social worker Brett, he was agreeable that the claimant does not meet the criteria. He will inform mother and already has support partly funded by herself and partly by”.

The text breaks off abruptly; I believe the document in the hearing bundle to contain all there is. It seems that Ms Mazambani entered an edited version of the same note a couple of minutes later (oddities of spacing, not replicated here, are identical in both versions); the revised version reads:

“I had a discussion with Daviene Trotman and she reported that short breaks are for young people who have profound and complex needs and require additional support in the community to complete day to day skills of daily living

When I relayed to social worker Brett, he was agreeable that the claimant does not meet the criteria. He will inform mother and case will close as only work outstanding”.

In these proceedings the defendant has referred to the decision on 9 September 2024 as the initial decision to terminate direct payments. Although that characterisation has been criticised, it seems to me to be substantially correct. But it is necessary to understand the sequential way it came about. A case note on the defendant’s file for 30 August 2024, headed “Closing CIN review took place”, records: “All agreed FSCP social worker did not have a role, agreed closed to FSCP.” The CWD team had already ruled out its own involvement. On 9 September 2024 the Short Breaks team said that the claimant was not within its remit. Therefore each of the three parts of the defendant’s CSC—and in his oral submissions Mr Harrop-Griffiths confirmed and relied upon the fact that the three parts comprise the entirety of the CSC—had decided that the claimant did not qualify for its specialist services. Ms Mazambani’s record that the “case will close” clearly was intended to mean that all social care provision (as distinct from SEN provision) by the defendant would cease.

On 18 September 2024 Mr Parsley sent an internal email, asking the CSC to send a closure letter to the family. The subject line of the email was “LBL Close to Department (CYPS [Children and Young People’s Services] Only)” and then the claimant’s name. The file records that the letter was sent that afternoon. The file also shows that the following morning a service manager with responsibility for payments sent an internal email to Ms Mazambani: “I note that the claimant’s case is being closed. There remains open a direct payments package for 30 hrs per week. Please confirm if this needs to be closed and the end date.” Ms Mazambani replied: “I have had a discussion with Manyara [Walker] and the fact that there is no longer CSC involvement, there is no one to monitor the package. The family does not meet threshold for FSCP and CWD. The closing date is effective 19/09/2024.”

On 18 September 2024 Mr Parsley sent an email to the claimant’s mother, clearly intending to give her an account and explanation of developments. The email said:

“My manager has met with the short breaks team, and it was determined that the claimant does not meet the threshold, because they offer support to young people who have profound complex needs, to access the community and the claimant already has this support with the 30 hours support worker that the LA already pays for, and that you top up yourself. Unfortunately, this is a service that is not able to provide additional support for the claimant. As it stands the claimant will be closed to our service and a letter will be sent to you.”

The claimant’s mother quite reasonably understood this to mean that it was only support from the FSCP team that was to end and no support would be given by the Short Breaks team, but that the 30 hours of social care would continue. The letter dated 18 September 2024, which she would have received after the email, began: “This is to inform you that the claimant’s case has now been closed to Lambeth Children Services.” The claimant’s mother will, I think, have understood those words in accordance with the understanding she had taken from the previous email.

However, by email on 18 October 2024 Mr Adam Yarnold, the defendant’s SEN lead, wrote to the claimant’s MP concerning both SEN and social care provision. Regarding the latter, he said:

“In regard to your inquiry about the claimant’s care package; [the claimant] does no longer meets [sic] the threshold for involvement from Lambeth Social Care’s Children with Disabilities Team. They have closed the case and the 30 hours care package she was receiving has now ended. This has also been communicated to the claimant’s mother.”

In fact, it had not been communicated to the claimant’s mother—at least, not in terms that were clear in their meaning. The claimant’s mother learned of the decision to end the care package when the MP forwarded Mr Yarnold’s email to her. In her first witness statement in these proceedings, the claimant’s mother states:

“On 18 October 2024, Mr Yarnold, who is in the SEN team, stated that the 30-hour personal budget for care had been ceased. As detailed above, this had never been discussed with me and was never suggested by any of the social workers who assessed the claimant. Mr Yarnold may have simply misunderstood which personal budget was being ceased, and the Defendant is now trying to retrospectively justify that mistake.”

Ms Heritage says that she does not know why Mr Parsley wrote in the terms he did on 18 September 2024, and that the defendant acknowledges that the claimant’s mother was not aware of the full implications of the decision to close the case to CSC, namely that the 30-hours care package would cease. Even so, the file notes show that the claimant’s mother’s surmise that Mr Yarnold had misunderstood the position is incorrect. The decision to close the case meant just that, and it included the termination of the direct payments. It seems to me, however, to be most likely that Mr Parsley wrote in the terms he did because he did not appreciate that the direct payments were to be ended.

The claimant’s mother instructed solicitors and pre-action correspondence ensued. On 13 February 2025 the defendant’s Legal & Governance department wrote by email to the claimant’s solicitors (I set out only the answers to the claimant’s demands):

“1.

Given the old package is closed, we would not be able to simply re-instate it without a new assessment of the current needs, however we will endeavour to expedite the process of assessment.

2.

Lambeth’s children’s services have agreed to a new assessment under s. 17.

3.

Lambeth will look into a carers assessment as part of the claimant’s new assessment.”

On 18 February 2025 Deborah Sylvestre, the social worker carrying out the new CFA, met with the claimant. On 11 March 2025 Ms Sylvestre emailed all interested parties as follows:

“Please be advised the Lambeth Children’s Services assessment has been completed in respect of the above named child ...

The assessment recommendation is for Children With Disabilities services involvement – with reinstatement of Direct Payments and Short Breaks service for the claimant and the claimant’s mother.

A Child In Need meeting is to be held on Tuesday 18.03.24 at 3pm. An invitation will be sent to you via separate email.”

However, the CFA recorded that, also on 11 March 2025:

“… the Social Worker had a discussion with CWD Team Manager, Jennifer Wilson and Kerry Dunn. They are of the view that given the claimant’s circumstances are mainly in respect of her diagnoses and mental health - which is acknowledged as impacting her behaviour and choices at times - her condition does not meet the severe or complex eligibility criteria of the CWD Levels of Need currently. Consideration is to be made of reinstatement of the short breaks local offer.”

Later that week Ms Sylvestre left the defendant’s employment; she therefore did not complete the CFA, and the Child In Need meeting was cancelled. On 18 March 2025 Ms Jodie-Ann Dunbar, the Team Manager of the defendant’s Child Assessment Team, wrote to the claimant’s mother by email:

“The assessment is being finalise[d] and will be made available to you by Friday. Please be advise[d] that any prior outcome shared by Deborah was not agreed/finalise[d] by senior management.”

The CFA dated 20 March 2025 is the decision being challenged in these proceedings. It recorded the observations and opinions of Ms Sylvestre as the conducting social worker. These included the following:

“The claimant continues to struggle with complex mental health needs, despite input from CAMHS / DBT sessions, there is a history of the claimant’s suicide attempts, self-harm and absconding behaviours.”

“The claimant not wanting to go to sleep, get up, attend to her hygiene, go to tutoring sessions.”

“The claimant has several diagnoses (Autism Spectrum, Social Anxiety Disorder, Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder and Oppositional Defiance Disorder) which affect her day to day functioning, thinking and behaviour. Many of her behaviours have been identified as concerning and include self-harm, suicide attempts, verbal and physical aggression (especially towards family members). The claimant’s mother’s own mental and physical health have been impacted by caring for the claimant when she does not want to attend tuition or other specialist services in place to provide support for her. The claimant was previously in receipt of CIN support under s17 of the Children Act 1989, first from CWD and later on from FSCP. She was then closed to FSCP in September 2024 following a period of Child in Need planning.”

“The Social Worker has had sight of the most up to date information from the professionals involved with the claimant and noted that she has social and mental health needs for which support can be offered via the SEND local offer, parenting support and community universal services. It is considered that the SEND local offer will be able to provide support and some form of respite to the family. We note that there were a number of positives from the previous FSCP involvement and detailed in the 2024 EHCP and the current Child and Family Assessment has not identified a change of circumstances for the claimant since then. There are currently no ongoing safeguarding concerns or support needs which require a CIN plan from the Local Authority and ongoing intervention from a social worker.”

“The Social Worker, parents, Lionheart tuition and DBT service are worried that without the appropriate level of support for the claimant, she will fail to make positive progress (mental health, health, education, life skills, socialisation etc) currently and in future.”

“The Social Worker recommends the family access the SEND local offer given the claimant’s support needs. SEN service to meet with the claimant and the claimant’s mother to discuss safe, alternative education options.”

It will be noted that the social worker’s recommendation in the CFA did not reflect what she had written in her email to the claimant’s mother on 11 March 2025. The CFA did not contain anything along the lines of what was contained in the email.

The Manager’s (Ms Dunbar’s) Comments in the CFA of 20 March 2025 were as follows:

“This assessment was completed following Lambeth being notified of a judicial review pre-action protocol in respect of Lambeth Council ending the claimant’s social care/direct payment package on 18.10.24. The claimant’s mother is requesting for the claimant’s support to be reinstated due to financial burden and impact on the claimant and their family overall. An updated child and family assessment is required before this is decided. An assessment was completed January 2024 due to the claimant’s behaviour escalating absconding and self-harming, on one occasion the claimant attempt[ed] to use a ligature in a bathroom at her then placement. The claimant was then made subject to CIN plan with a social care package provided by the (CWD) Team. In the January 2024 assessment, the claimant’s social care needs were deemed to have changed, and she longer met the threshold for the CWD Team, because: ‘she does not fall under the classification of being profoundly or severely disabled, which is a prerequisite for receiving services from Lambeth CWD team.’

The claimant has a number of needs in relation to her diagnoses, social and mental health needs for which she can access support from the SEND local offer, parenting support and community universal services. This assessment has found no safeguarding concerns, therefore a child in need plan is not warranted.”

The CFA was provided to the claimant’s mother on 21 March 2025. On the previous day Ms Dunbar had written to the claimant’s mother by email:

“We note that there were a number of positives from the previous FSCP involvement and detailed in the 2024 EHCP and the current Child and Family Assessment has not identified a change of circumstances for the claimant since then. There are currently no ongoing safeguarding concerns or support needs which require a CIN plan from the Local Authority and ongoing intervention from a social worker. Please be advised [the claimant and her brother] are now closed to Lambeth CSC, I have sent a copy of the assessment to you by post along with information on how to access the SEND local offer.”

This wording is not entirely clear, because the 2024 EHCP referred to the 30-hours package for social care that was approved by the CFA in January 2024. However, I think that what Ms Dunbar had in mind was that there was no change from the earlier view that no involvement of a social worker or of the FSCP team was required, and there was no need for a CIN plan.

On 25 March 2025 solicitors instructed by the claimant’s mother sent a further pre-action protocol letter. So far as relevant to these proceedings, the letter alleged that the defendant was failing to meet the claimant’s identified social care needs in breach of section 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. It complained that, although Ms Sylvestre’s findings were set out in the report, her recommendations had been omitted. On this point, the letter concluded:

“To date, the Local Authority has provided no justification as to why it has departed from Ms Sylvestre’s view, nor why her recommendations were not specifically detailed within her report. Ms Sylvestre is a qualified social worker with over 12 years’ experience and it is unclear why the Local Authority took the trouble of arranging a social care assessment if it intended to completely disregard its findings. This is quite clearly an irrational decision, and clearly in breach of the Local Authority’s duties towards the claimant.”

On 31 March 2025 the defendant responded:

“We apologise that the email from Ms Sylvestre dated 11 March 2025 stipulated a recommendation/outcome that was not as indicated by Ms Dunbar’s email dated 21 March 2025. Lambeth had not departed from Ms Sylvestre’s views, rather there was a subsequent internal discussion with social care managers, taking account all factors current and historic respect the claimant, that came to a final analysis and recommendations. …

It is not agreed that we have failed to meet the claimant’s social care needs, either historically or by way of the assessment referred to above. As outlined in social care’s responses to date, we submit that social care have applied all legislation, national guidance and internal policies correctly when assessing and putting in services for the claimant, and subsequently in decisions to end services following reviews.”

The defendant then undertook a further CFA, which was provided to the claimant’s mother on 23 June 2025, before the grant of permission in this case. The document records that a visit to the claimant and her mother was made by a social worker, Jade Jivanda, and also the 0-25 disabilities social worker. It said: “A meeting was also held on the 27th May with 0-25 disabilities team managers and they remain of the view that the claimant does not meet with criteria for the 0-25 disabilities service. This is because they think her needs are largely linked to her mental health and not her disability. They remain of the opinion that the claimant’s needs do not meet the severe/ complex threshold in 3 or more of the assessment criteria areas.” The social worker’s views appear in, for example, the following passage:

“In conjunction with 0-25 disabilities team, we have assessed that the claimant does not meet the 0-25 disabilities threshold criteria. She has been assessed as moderate in most areas, which would not come under their remit. There are various options available to the family under the moderate threshold with accessing universal services as previously identified in the March assessment. The claimant’s needs have not changed since March, her main areas of support are needed for her social and mental health needs of which support can be access via the SEND local offer, such as universal community services and parenting support. Whilst the claimant has not started her psychotherapy yet, she remains under CAMHS and this work is due to begin.

It is understood that this is not the support that the claimant’s mother thinks the claimant needs and whilst support workers can be provided to families in the FSCP team, these are provided in times of crisis for short periods of time, not over prolonged periods. The claimant’s mother does not understand why the direct payments stopped and this should clearly be explained to her by the Local Authority. …

The other main obstacle appears to be that the claimant is not in full-time education, this impacts on the claimant’s learning, but also the claimant’s mother’s work schedule as the claimant is only able to access half days. …

At this stage there are no current significant safeguarding needs for the children which would require on going Children’s services intervention. Therefore I am recommending the assessment closes with no further action.”

The Manager’s Comments (again, from Ms Dunbar) concluded as follows:

“In the January 2024 assessment, the claimant’s social care needs were deemed to have changed, and she [no] longer met the threshold for the 0-25 disabilities Team, because: ‘she does not fall under the classification of being profoundly or severely disabled, which is a prerequisite for receiving services from Lambeth 0-25 disabilities team.’ In March 2025 0-25 disabilities team were of the view the claimant’s needs were assessed as mild to moderate and this remains the case for the reviewed assessment of her needs now. The claimant has several needs in relation to her diagnoses, social and mental health needs for which she can access support from the SEND local offer such as parenting support and community universal services outlined in this assessment. This assessment has found no current safeguarding concerns, therefore a child in need plan is not warranted at this time and the family will close to Lambeth CSC. If CSC is expected to provide any further updated assessment, I would request that the claimant’s updated ECHP plan is made available for consideration.”

The claim before me is put on the basis of process irrationality, a concept explained by Chamberlain J in R (KP) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, and another [2025] EWHC 370 (Admin), at [55]-[56]:

“55.

In most contexts, rationality is the standard by which the common law measures the conduct of a public decision-maker where there has been no infringement of a legal right, no misdirection of law and no procedural unfairness. It encompasses both the process of reasoning by which a decision is reached (sometimes referred to as ‘process rationality’) and the outcome (‘outcome rationality’): see e.g. R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin), [2019] 1 WLR 1649, [98] (Leggatt LJ and Carr J).

56.

Process rationality includes the requirement that the decision maker must have regard to all mandatorily relevant considerations and no irrelevant ones, but is not limited to that. In addition, the process of reasoning should contain no logical error or critical gap. This is the type of irrationality Sedley J was describing when he spoke of a decision that ‘does not add up – in which, in other words, there is an error of reasoning which robs the decision of logic’: R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex p. Balchin [1998] 1 PLR 1, [13]. In similar vein, Saini J said that the court should ask, ‘does the conclusion follow from the evidence or is there an unexplained evidential gap or leap in reasoning which fails to justify the conclusion?’: R (Wells) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin), at [33].”

Mr Persey also relied on the decision in R (KP) in support of his submission that the present case called for a high intensity of review by the court: see Chamberlain J’s judgment at [75]-[78]. I do not find the concept of highly intense review, or “anxious scrutiny” as it is often called, to be particularly helpful in the present case. R (KP) concerned a decision by the Home Secretary to refuse leave outside the rules to the claimant to enter the UK from Diego Garcia. The claimant challenged the decision on the grounds that it was irrational because it left him facing a serious risk to his health and life. The discussion of the standard review in Chamberlain J’s judgment begins at [58] and considers the line of authorities stemming from the decision of the House of Lords in Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514. This is not the place to review the case-law on anxious scrutiny. But I note that the concept is usually invoked when interference with rights—typically legally protected human rights—is alleged. That, indeed, was the context in which the point was considered in R (KP): see [75]. Many administrative decisions have significant implications for individuals, but I should be suspicious of too promiscuous an invocation of the concept of anxious scrutiny. With reference to the present case, I make two observations. First, the intensity of review will depend on both the legal context (the nature of the right asserted) and the factual context (the subject matter impugned): see R (KP) at [63], citing R (Horeau) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2020] EWCA Civ 1010, [2021] 1 WLR 472, at [154]. See also R (Mahmood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 840, per Laws LJ at [18]: “the intensity of review in a public law case will depend on the subject matter in hand; and so in particular any interference by the action of a public body with a fundamental right will require a substantial objective justification.” Second, as regards anxious scrutiny, De Smith’s Judicial Review (9^th edition) makes the important point at para 6-061 (citations omitted):

“However, such heightened scrutiny is not the same as merits or ‘correctness’ review. The courts have urged a common sense approach. Thus, ‘the concern of the court ought to be substance not semantics’, so it is inappropriate to focus ‘on particular sentences’ in a decision-maker’s determination ‘and to subject them to the kind of legalistic scrutiny that might perhaps be appropriate in the case of a statutory instrument, charter party or trust deed’.”

In R (KM) v Cambridgeshire County Council [2012] UKSC 23, [2012] PTSR 1189, the Supreme Court explained the correct approach to decisions under section 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. (The case concerned section 2(1) of that Act, but for present purposes what was said is equally applicable to section 2(4).) Lord Wilson JSC, with whom the other Justices agreed, said:

“15.

When a local authority is required to consider whether it is ‘necessary in order to meet the needs of that person for that authority to make arrangements for’ the provision of any of the matters on the service list [that is, the list of arrangements in section 2(1); in the present case the service list is in section 2(6)], it is required to ask itself three questions and should do so in three separate stages: (i) What are the needs of the disabled person? (ii) In order to meet the needs identified at (i), is it necessary for the authority to make arrangements for the provision of any of the listed services? (iii) If the answer to question (ii) is affirmative, what are the nature and extent of the listed services for the provision of which it is necessary for the authority to make arrangements? There is a fourth potential stage of the inquiry which I will identify in para 23 below.

…

21.

It is common ground that, once the second stage has been passed … by an identification of the requisite necessity and thus of the eligibility of the needs, the duty of the local authority to make provision for them in accordance with the third and fourth stages of the inquiry becomes absolute.

…

23.

[I]n cases like the present in which a disabled person qualifies for a direct payment in lieu of its own provision of services to him, the local authority is required to proceed to the fourth stage as follows: (iv) What is the reasonable cost of securing provision of the services which have been identified at (iii) as being those for the provision of which it is necessary for the authority to make arrangements?

…

36.

… I agree with Langstaff J in R (L) v Leeds City Council [2010] EWHC 3324 (Admin) at [59] that in community care cases the intensity of review will depend on the profundity of the impact of the determination. By reference to that yardstick, the necessary intensity of review in a case of this sort is high. Mr Wise also validly suggests that a local authority s failure to meet eligible needs may prove to be far less visible in circumstances in which it has provided the service-user with a global sum of money than in those in which it has provided him with services in kind. That point fortifies the need for close scrutiny of the lawfulness of a monetary offer. On the other hand respect must be afforded to the distance between the functions of the decision-maker and of the reviewing court; and some regard must be had to the court’s ignorance of the effect upon the ability of an authority to perform its other functions of any exacting demands made in relation to the manner of its presentation of its determination in a particular type of case. So the court has to strike a difficult, judicious, balance.”

Mr Persey’s submissions to me may be summarised as follows. The defendant has not grappled with the issues, with the result that there is a critical gap in its reasoning: the decision does not add up but rests on a “leap of logic” or even a simple mistake. At the very least, it fails to give a rational explanation for the withdrawal of the direct payments and the subsequent failure to reinstate them, even though the social worker who conducted the latest CFA in June 2025 had expressly mentioned the need to explain to the claimant’s mother why the direct payments had stopped. The lack of a logical or evidential basis for the decision in March 2025 (and indeed the subsequent decision in June 2025) can be seen by considering a number of matters. First, the initial decision to stop the social care direct payments in September 2024 was the product not of any holistic assessment that the claimant did not need to have the social care but of piecemeal decisions by the three teams in the CSC, whereby each of them in turn decided that the claimant was not within its remit. This resulted in completely circular reasoning: as none of the teams was to be involved, there was “no one to monitor the package” (Ms Mazambani’s email mentioned in paragraph 21 above). Second, Mr Parsley himself clearly did not understand that a consequence of the several decisions by the individual teams was the termination of the social care direct payments. Third, even Ms Heritage’s witness statement, filed with the defendant’s detailed grounds, does not give a cogent explanation of the decision in September 2024. Fourth, the defendant has never directly addressed the question whether the social care package is needed by the claimant. It has identified what it says she does need, but the withholding of social care direct payments appears to be treated as a necessary consequence of the decision of each of the three CSC teams that the claimant is not within its remit. Consequently, both of the two latest CFAs are dependent on the decision taken in September 2024.

Fifth, the defendant’s policy document, 0-25 Disabilities Service – Levels of Need (September 2024), shows that, in cases not meriting the involvement of the Specialist 0-25 Disabilities Service, other assistance, including direct payments, may be appropriately given. At page 10, on “Understanding the Levels of Need”, the document states:

“Where children or young people are referred into Children’s Social Care as meeting three or more indicators that show they have a complex or severe disability, the referral team may signpost directly to the Specialist 0–25 Disabilities Service, who will undertake an assessment and determine what support is required or what relevant short breaks are required.

Many children or young people will be assessed as meeting the indicators of mild or moderate disability and will therefore receive an assessment that is from various Children’s Social Care Teams, Child and Adolescent Mental Health or from Early Help (all of whom can also signpost to relevant short breaks). Where those assessments show that the child or young person has indicators within the complex or severe categories, they may be referred into the Specialist 0–25 Disabilities Service.”

At page 17, the document sets out the support that is available at each level. The support available for Moderate disability is listed as follows: Local Offer; Universal provision – early years; Universal provision – youth and play; Parenting support; Parent Carer / Sibling carer assessment (as part of C&F assessment); Care Act Assessment; Direct Payments; Early Help; and Lambeth Contact – Parent Participation and Engagement. Thus direct payments were still available as a matter of discretion for a person, such as the claimant, with a moderate level of disability. Yet the defendant has not addressed this and, as is now apparent, appears to have disregarded it as a possibility.

Mr Persey does not contend that the decision not to reinstate the social care direct payments is itself irrational: this is not an outcome rationality challenge. But he submits that the process of consideration and reasoning that resulted in the decision—and in the later decision in June 2025—fails the test of process rationality.

For the defendant, Mr Harrop-Griffiths made two basic points. First, the claimant could only be entitled to direct payments if the defendant decided for the purposes of section 17 of the Children Act 1989 that her needs called for the provision by it of a service in exercise of its functions under section 17. Each of the three teams in CSC had decided, repeatedly, that the claimant was not eligible to receive services from it. It is not being argued that any of those decisions was wrong: it has never been contended that the claimant ought to have been receiving provision from the CWD team or the FSCP team, and it is no part of her case in these proceedings that she is or might be eligible for short breaks. Therefore there is no basis for the complaint about termination of the direct payments, because there is nothing to hang such payments on. Second, since the original decision in September 2024 the defendant has on two separate occasions carried out a fresh assessment. Each assessment was carried out with specific regard to the claimant’s social care needs, and on neither occasion did the defendant consider that the claimant required social care funded by direct payments. There is no proper basis for imputing to the defendant a desire to (so to speak) cover its back regarding any shortcomings in its decision in September 2024, and it is unjustified to imply that the defendant’s employees have not carried out the assessments with an open mind. In these circumstances, Mr Harrop-Griffiths submitted that there were no grounds for a finding of unlawfulness against the defendant. He also submitted that, if to the contrary there were any unlawfulness in the decision taken in March 2025, the further decision in June 2025 showed that the challenge was now redundant and that, if necessary, the court should refuse relief on the basis of section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. He also observed that Mr Persey was pursuing only declaratory relief, not a quashing order or a mandatory order, and that such relief was unwarranted on the facts of the case.

Although I see force in Mr Harrop-Griffiths’ submissions, I have come to the view that the claimant is correct to complain that the CFAs in both March and June 2025 are tainted by process irrationality. This is by no means to say that I consider that the conclusions of those assessments were wrong and that the claimant is entitled to reinstatement of direct payments for social care. Those are matters for the defendant to determine. But in my judgment its decisions hitherto have not been reached by a sufficient process of reasoning to withstand scrutiny.

The essential problem is that the termination of the social care direct payments was the result not of an assessment that the claimant did not need the provision of social care direct payments but rather of the decisions by each of the three teams within the CSC that the claimant did not qualify for its services. This is clear from the foregoing narrative in respect of the events of September 2024. The logic of that initial decision has clearly carried through into the CFAs in 2025: each begins by acknowledging that the assessment is required because of the dispute about the termination of direct payments for social care, but thereafter they do not actually address directly the question of direct payments but rather deal with it by not mentioning it as a potential option. This is not merely a matter of placing an interpretation on silence; though I regard the failure to address the matter expressly, with reasons, as a failure of process rationality in circumstances where a valuable service had been withdrawn from the claimant without explanation. I pressed Mr Harrop-Griffiths on this point, and his position—both initially and after I had risen to allow him to take instructions—was that, as the CWD team, the FSCP team and the Short Breaks team comprise the entirety of Lambeth’s CSC, and as the claimant had been assessed as ineligible for support from any of these teams, she could not be eligible for direct payments for social care pursuant to sections 17 and 17A of the Children Act 1989.

In my judgment, that cannot be right. The questions for the defendant were those identified by Lord Wilson in R (KM) v Cambridgeshire County Council at [15]. The starting point for the defendant must be to identify the claimant’s needs and then to ask whether it is necessary to make arrangements for the provision of any of the services listed in section 2(6) of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. The defendant’s approach, however, has been to ask, in effect, whether the claimant requires the particular services provided by the CWD team (which she does not, because she has only moderate but not severe disability) or by the FSCP team (which she does not, because there are no safeguarding concerns over her) or by the Short Breaks team (which she does not, because “short breaks are for young people who have profound and complex needs and require additional support in the community to complete day to day skills of daily living”: see para 19 above); and, when the answer to that question is negative, to conclude that the claimant has no social care needs (as distinct from needs that can be met by special educational provision or by mental health services). But what if, though not eligible for the services available for children with serious disability, the claimant needs a measure of social care funded by direct payments? The defendant’s approach simply precludes that question. The consequence is illustrated by the way in which direct payments were terminated in September 2024 (contrary, it seems, to the expectation of the social worker with responsibility for the claimant) and by the failure of the two recent CFAs to deal expressly with the question of direct payments.

The problem is thrown into further relief by the defendant’s policy document, 0-25 Disabilities Service – Levels of Need. As already mentioned, the policy lists “Direct Payments” as one of the kinds of support available for children with moderate disability. Such children will not qualify for support from the CWD team (now the 0-25 Disabilities Service), and there is nothing in the policy document to link the availability of direct payments for children with moderate disability to safeguarding concerns. Therefore, if the defendant’s position in these proceedings is correct, it is unclear why direct payments should be mentioned as an available means of support for children with moderate disability. When I pressed Mr Harrop-Griffiths on this, he could not explain the reference to direct payments for children with moderate disability and suggested that it might have been included by mistake. It seems to me that a far more likely explanation is that the policy document recognises that a child with only a moderate but not a severe disability might nevertheless have a need that requires to be met by the provision of social care direct payments. Whatever the explanation, the apparent decision to rule out ad limine the very support that the claimant was receiving until September 2024, although the defendant’s own policy confirms that support of that nature is in principle available, calls for proper justification.

I have full regard to the fact that the defendant has, in good faith as I accept, carried out two assessments this year and has not identified the provision of social care direct payments as necessary to meet the claimant’s needs. But for the reasons given above I regard both of those assessments as having been skewed by faulty reasoning and curtailed analysis. I repeat that this is not to say that a different conclusion ought necessarily to be reached as to the claimant’s needs and the arrangements necessary to meet them. But it is to say that, in the discharge of its ongoing duties to the claimant, the defendant must address the correct questions and not permit its own organisational arrangements to limit the scope of the available answers. If the defendant concludes that the claimant does not have a need for social care direct payments, it will have to say so in terms and give the reasons for that conclusion.

The claim form seeks a quashing order in respect of the CFA of 20 March 2025 and a mandatory order requiring the defendant to reassess the claimant’s needs. In submissions to me, Mr Persey did not pursue either of those remedies, because of the continuing nature of the defendant’s duties towards the claimant. Instead, he sought a declaration, the terms of which would be dependent on the terms of my judgment. My present view, however, is that, while the continuing nature of the defendant’s obligations makes a quashing order unnecessary, a declaration is neither necessary nor appropriate. I shall make a mandatory order for a reassessment to be carried out in accordance with the terms of this judgment. I am willing to hear counsel further on the question of any other appropriate relief, if they think it necessary.