Nduka, R (on the application of) v His Honour Judge Riddel

MR JUSTICE WILKIE: This is an application by Winifred Nduka that I reconsider her application for permission to judicially review decisions of District Judge Morley on 8th November last year, and Circuit Judge Riddel on 3rd February of this year at Edmonton County Court, in which District Judge Morley ordered her claim, brought against Mr and Mrs Onerindu under claim number EE 202307, to be struck out as an abuse of process, the claimant having no reasonable prospect of success. His Honour Judge Riddel refused permission to appeal against that decision. In each case, the hearing was attended by Miss Nduka in person and counsel for the defendants.

The single judge, Crane J, in refusing permission, made the following observation:

Miss Nduka has attended today and has addressed me with great courtesy and restraint. Her complaint arises out of events from November 2001 when she says that she was beaten up by her landlords, the defendants, and excluded or evicted unlawfully from the premises she was then occupying. Thereafter, she suffered from various forms of abuse when she was rendered effectively homeless. She sets out succinctly in the judicial review claim form a brief history of her attempts to obtain redress, and in some cases an attempt to have legal assistance in order to do so. That redress included seeking an injunction and proceeding against the defendants.

The measure of the loss which it appears that Miss Nduka believes that she has suffered, is reflected in the monetary claim she makes in the sum of £50 million concerning the loss of belongings, including paintings that the defendants stole. It is very clear to me that Miss Nduka feels that she is the victim of a conspiracy, the perpetrators of which appear to be the governments of Nigeria and the United Kingdom, following on from her being given indefinite leave to remain in this country after her claim for refugee status, having left from Nigeria. It is her view that many of the agencies of the state, including the judges and the police and the defendants, are involved in this conspiracy, apparently using long range transmitting arrangements as she describes them.

I have absolutely no doubt that Miss Nduka genuinely believes that she cannot obtain justice and has not obtained justice from the Edmonton County Court. Unfortunately for her, the County Court, including the Edmonton County Court, has vested in it wide-ranging, and in some cases Draconian, powers of case management designed to achieve the overriding objectives set out in the Civil Procedure Rules. I have looked at various orders that the court -- in various forms, District Judge and Circuit Judge -- has made in the proceedings brought against Mr and Mr Onerindu, and it is clear to me that, from the presentation of a 94 page handwritten particulars of claim, the courts have been very indulgent of Mrs Nduka, as she is unrepresented. Ultimately, the defendants persuaded the District Judge that her claims under the Protection Against Eviction Act and for theft of her property were an abuse of process and that she had no reasonable prospect of success. That was the order that was made on 8th November.

That is an order which was well within that judge's case management powers to make. It is not a decision which contains any error of law. There appears to have been no procedural impropriety, and, on the documentation that I received, it cannot be described as having been irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. Similarly, the decision of the learned judge to refuse permission to appeal was one which was within his case management powers. As Crane J points out, the Civil Procedure Rules set out a series of arrangements for appeal whereby somebody who is aggrieved by the substance of a decision may challenge it. Judicial review stands outside that system and is available only where the inferior tribunal acts outside its jurisdiction in a procedurally unfair way. The mere fact that someone disagrees with the decision is not sufficient to give rise to a claim for judicial review.

It therefore follows that, in my judgment, this is a claim for judicial review which is unarguable and therefore I refuse permission to appeal.

MISS NDUKA: Please, I just want to say that I made two paid applications which were scheduled to be heard on 8th November 2004 but District Judge Morley refused to hear it. It is in the bundle. I refer you to pages 861 to 862.

MR JUSTICE WILKIE: Yes.

MISS NDUKA: The application was never heard so that the police can prosecute my landlords for selling my property. It was never heard. There was no order. Another one is on pages 672 to 675. It is another.

MR JUSTICE WILKIE: Yes. I will just add a couple of sentences. My attention has been a drawn to the fact that there may well have been applications made by Miss Nduka which, as can be seen in the decision of District Judge Morley, never were dealt with because the effect of his order was that the proceedings were struck out.

MISS NDUKA: No, but --

MR JUSTICE WILKIE: Miss Nduka, I am sorry but I have made my decision. I have other cases to hear.

MISS NDUKA: Sorry, my Lord. Can I say one statement more. What I am saying is that I paid for this application and this is procedural impropriety by District Judge Morley to refuse to hear my paid application. He would have heard it and issued an order, whatever his decision, but he had to hear the paid application. I paid for the application and then it was not heard. There were two applications. So it is against the court's practice not to hear a paid application. It is procedural impropriety.

MR JUSTICE WILKIE: Thank you very much. I will just add a sentence.

MISS NDUKA: 54.1.3.

MR JUSTICE WILKIE: Thank you. Miss Nduka has sought to add to her application in this way. She says that there were matters for which she issued applications and paid court fees which were not entertained by the District Judge. As I have already indicated, when the District Judge took the decision to strike the claim out, that, of necessity, meant that the court was not going to consider any applications made in respect of those proceedings which had been struck out as an abuse of process as having no reasonable prospect of success. It seems to me that the argument that this constitutes procedural impropriety is misconceived. It amounts to no more than the necessary consequence of the order which, as I have concluded, the District Judge had the power to make. Thank you.