Birmingham City Council v RB & Anor

I am concerned with a young child who is 2 years of age. This is an application by the Local Authority for both a final care order and a placement order.

From the threshold document, for which I will need to make findings, there has been previous involvement with the Local Authority concerning older children, who I understand have been placed with the maternal grandmother.

Mum's difficulties stem from her poor mental health and substance misuse. She was detained under the Mental Health Act but discharged. Her lifestyle has been chaotic, involving criminality and the use of illicit substances, which has been ongoing. The have home conditions have been and there has been domestic abuse.

I note from the history that previously matters had been more positive. In 2024 proceedings were stepped down from pre-proceedings to a child in need plan on 3 February 2025.

I note that mother has been involved in the sex industry, and sadly she then suffered a relapse, presenting with erratic behaviour, whereupon the child was accommodated under section 20 of the Children Act on 1 August 2025, the mother again being detained under the Mental Health Act. Again, she was subsequently discharged.

The matter first came before me on 1 October 2025, and I made an interim care order, which the Children's Guardian supported, the issues being that of drug misuse, mental health difficulties, domestic abuse, poor home conditions, and the mother's inability to prioritise the child's needs over her own. The matter was timetabled accordingly, and the 26 weeks expired on 17 March 2026.

At that initial hearing, mother did not attend, neither did she give instructions to her representatives, nor had she been attending family time.

The father is unknown.

There are no alternative carers.

The order itself recited a number of expectations pertaining to the mother. It also contained a number of directions for her to respond to the threshold document; to file her response to initial evidence; to respond to the final evidence; and undertake hair strand testing. She has undertaken none of that.

There was a parenting assessment. It does not recommend reunification due to ongoing substance misuse, exposure to unsafe relationships, domestic abuse, acute mental health crisis, homelessness and neglectful behaviours. It assesses the mother as being prone to periods of engagement and thereafter relapse.

The final statement of the Local Authority refers to that, and indeed the mother's ongoing non-engagement. It asserts that the mother continues to struggle with substance misuse as well as mental health difficulties, and inconsistent engagement with services. Her housing position remains unstable, she continues to be involved in sex work, and there is no evidence of sustained or meaningful change.

The plan for placement for adoption has been endorsed by the Independent Reviewing Officer and ratified by the Agency Decision Maker.

I am also informed that the mother is now 11 weeks pregnant with twins.

I have read the GP report of the mother. She has a significant mental health history, being diagnosed with Schizophrenia in 2013, as well as bipolar disorder, and Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder in 2015, as well as mental health diagnoses due to drug misuse in 2016. It reports that there were multiple hospital admissions.

I have also seen a report from the community mental health team. It records admissions on 15 August 2025 to 21 August 2025, the mother's ultimate non-engagement, and the fact that she has mental health and behavioural disorders due to multiple drug use.

The Children's Guardian in her final report and analysis says that the mother has significant issues with regards to mental health, housing and drugs, and has not engaged with any services. Her lifestyle remains erratic, and she has failed to engage with the court process or indeed family time, or indeed with the Children's Guardian.

It is reported that the child is thriving in foster care, and therefore the Guardian supports the Local Authority's application for both a care order and a placement order, and for mum's consent to be dispensed with. The Guardian recommends that the Local Authority should undertake life story work a goodbye visit and appoint a family finder.

The minutes of the advocates meeting reports that mum is aware of today's hearing and the plan but has not provided substantive instructions to her solicitors.

Just prior to this hearing, out of the blue, despite significantly repeated attempts by those being instructed by the mother, counsel for the mother was able to speak to her. This came about upon counsel's instigation, not the mothers.

The mother reports that she is currently with CGL, an organisation in relation to people who have addictions. She says that there has been a negative test result, so that she has been clean for six weeks, although there is no evidence before the court with regards to that. She also says her mental health has improved; again there is no evidence before the court with regards to that. She wants to contest these proceedings on the basis that she says there has been a change in her circumstances.

Of course, the difficulty that the court is faced with is it that this is at the 11th hour of what is to be a final hearing, with a backdrop of non-engagement, and no evidence being provided by the mother in support of what she asserts. Her own solicitors and counsel today can be commended for the steps they have taken to engage with her, but at the end of the day, it is her child, and the onus clearly rests with her.

To be fair, counsel indicated that the mother is well aware of the proceedings, and there have been significant attempts by her solicitor to engage with her. An appointment was fixed just only yesterday, mother asserting that she was unable to attend because she was not well, although there were no details as to what that illness comprised of.

The Local Authority seeks to pursue the application, and the Children's Guardian seeks for the matter to be concluded today. The mother has had no contact with the child since August 2025. She has the bundle, including the placement application and notice of hearing has been served on her by a process server, yet sadly there has been no engagement.

I am aware of the importance of children being brought up in their birth family, the caselaw emphasises that time and time again.

The perceptions of parenting should not be elevated into a gold standard, as set out as long ago as in Re KD (a minor, ward, termination of access) [1988] AC 806;

"The best person to bring up a child is the natural parent. It matters not whether the parent is wise or foolish, rich or poor, educated or illiterate, provided the child's moral and physical health are not endangered".

To that end the Local Authority is under a duty to provide support to families in order to preserve the family unit. This is moreover set out in the Children Act 1989, Guidance and Regulations Volume 3, as well as section 17 of the Children Act 1989, and indeed schedule 2 of the Children Act 1989 with regards to provision of services.

There is an evidential burden that has to be met prior to removal of children from a parent's care, reflected in the statutory gateway in section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989. It is there to protect both children and their parents from unjustified intervention in their lives by the State.

The statutory test is that the child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm, and that the harm or likelihood of harm is attributable to the care given to the child, or likely to be given to them if orders were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to them.

In this case the mother has not provided any evidence to the court and has not responded to the threshold.

However, the threshold cannot be determinatively resolved by agreement within the parties, nor by default. I am required to scrutinise the documents, and satisfy myself of the truth of the same, and say why I am satisfied that the threshold is met. I have to make formal findings. In other words, as set out in the case of Re D (threshold findings and final orders at Issues Resolution Hearing) [2025] EWCA 1362:

"The threshold cannot be deemed to have been accepted by lack of response. Even if unchallenged, there needs to be a positive finding ".

Where the threshold is crossed, the court must then go on to apply the welfare test under section 1 of the Children Act, to determine what, if any, order is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child. Furthermore, within any assessment of whether a child should be removed from their parents, the court must consider the European Convention on Human Rights for both the child and the parents, and in particular the child's and parents' Article 6 and 8 rights pursuant to that.

Therefore, I must ask myself whether the removal of a child permanently from his parents in such circumstances is proportionate to the risk of harm to which they would be exposed if they were allowed to remain or be returned to their parents' care. In other words, I have to be satisfied that it is necessary to do so, and that nothing else will do, having undertaken a global holistic evaluation of the available options before the court as to the child's future upbringing.

A care order, I am acutely aware, is a serious order that can only be made where the facts justify it, where it is in the child's interests, and where it is both necessary and proportionate.

The aphorism "nothing else will do" applies with particular reference to cases involving a plan for adoption, where the court is considering the most serious of all orders, one which will sever the parental relationship for all time, as noted in Re B-S (adoption, application of section 47(5)) [2013] EWCA 1146:

"Such orders are very extreme, a last resort, and should only be made where nothing else will do".

In addition, the presence of adoption in the range of realistic options also dictates that regard must be had to section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.

Accordingly, where a placement order is sought, I must satisfy myself that the threshold conditions under section 31(2) of the Children Act are satisfied, and, if so, in what respects, what the realistic options for the child's future are and the advantages and disadvantages of each option and an analysis of the checklist under section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002

In summary, treating the child's welfare as paramount, and comparing each option one against the other, am I driven to the conclusion that a placement order is the only one that can meet the child's immediate and lifelong welfare needs? To that extent I refer to the case of Re D (a child, placement order) [2022] EWCA 896.

With regards to placement orders, I have to bear in mind section 1(2) and section 1(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, as well as section 1(5).

I am acutely aware that the mother, although she has not filed any evidence, wishes to oppose what is the most draconian order the court can make. I could effectively refuse to make final orders today, given their draconian nature, and give the mother an opportunity, even at this 11th hour, to contest and provide evidence which hitherto she has not provided, although I am mindful of the fact that the 26 weeks in this case ends on 17 March 2p026.

Not only do I have to consider the timetable for proceedings, but I also have to consider the timetable for the child. The child cannot wait for the mother to turn things around. We are already approaching the 26-week timescale.

As set out in North Yorkshire Council v B [2008] 1 FLR 1645:

"If the evidence is available, there is nothing wrong in the court determining that a particular individual is not going to be in a position to care for a child safely and in the sort of timescales that the child needs".

Although strikeout in either private or public law proceedings, as well as adoption and placement proceedings is not available, as set out in Re C (family proceedings, case management) [2012] EWCA 1489, and SZ v Birmingham City Council [2021] EWFC 15, in an appropriate case the court can summarily determine an application as being lacking in enough merit to justify pursuing the matter.

However, the court cannot take things too far, as robustness cannot trump fairness, and a parent facing removal of their child must be entitled to put their case to the court, however seemingly forlorn.

A parent who wishes to give evidence in answer to the Local Authority's care application should be permitted to do so. A parent who wishes to challenge a witness whose evidence is being relied on by the Local Authority should be permitted to do so. However, the context of those comments in the case of Re SW (children) [2015] EWCA 27 is different from that which I am faced with today with an application which is being made at the end of the 26-week timescale.

The public law outline contemplates the resolution of the final determination of applications under the Children Act section 31 at an Issues Resolution Hearing in an appropriate case, subject of course to the necessary evidence being before the court. The overriding objective is whether the determination of this case at this stage is a just and a fair one.

As set out in Re H (final care orders at Issues Resolution Hearing) [2025] EWCA 1342, where proceedings conclude at an Issues Resolution Hearing, particularly where the outcome of the proceedings is contested, I am required to give clear reasons, both why this hearing has been used as a final hearing, and substantive final orders made.

In my determination of this matter, I have reached the conclusion that matters should be concluded today by making a final care order and placement order and dispensing with the mother's consent. In doing so, I refer to Re C (children, revocation of placement orders) [2013] EWCA 1598 and the paramount consideration for a court when considering outcomes for a child being that of the child's welfare.

I accept the principle that the welfare of the child is best met by maintaining the connection with birth parents to as full an extent as possible, underpinned by the least interventionist principle enshrined in section 1(5) of the Children Act, and that the permanent severing of ties between a child and birth parents is an outcome only to be ordered in exceptional circumstances, and where motivated by the overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, including exploration of alternative family members, an examination as to necessary support to enable that to happen, including care by the mother.

I have to look at all the competing options for care, assessing their respective strengths and weaknesses, and then determine what outcome is most able to meet the welfare needs of the child, and to consider whether the outcome is itself a proportionate interference with the rights of the child.

In conclusion, I am satisfied that the threshold criteria is met in this matter, based upon the mother's substance misuse, mental health, chaotic lifestyle, and her inability to prioritise her child's needs over her own. Her difficulties have been longstanding but sadly, despite her recent requests, there is no positive evidence that she is able to put before the court.

If this was the outset of the proceedings, she would be given time in which to amass the appropriate evidence, but we are at the 11th hour, on the cusp of the 26 weeks. She has not had contact with the child for a considerable period of time, she has not engaged with the process, she has not engaged with solicitors, and she has not attended court. At the end of the day. this is her child.

The evidence fully supports the difficulties that this mother faces. There are no alternative carers. There is no evidence base on which to feel solidity in the mother's requests to be given time to amass evidence which she believes is available.

Accordingly, evaluating the whole evidence by reference to section 1(2)(a), section 1(3) and section 1(5) of the Children Act 1989, and sections 1(2), 1(4) and 1(6) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, and reviewing the matter holistically with regard to the two options before the court, which are rehabilitation to mum's care and placement for adoption, treating the child's welfare as paramount, and comparing one option against the other, I am driven to the conclusion that a placement order is the only order that can meet this child's immediate lifelong welfare needs, and that placement for adoption is both necessary and proportionate, having regard to the Article 8 rights of the parents and of the child concerned.

Therefore, I make a final care order and a placement order and dispense with mother's consent.

That is my judgment in relation to that. The judgment will be transcribed, and I also intend to publish it anonymised, unless there are any objections.