D v E (Welfare Decision following Findings of Domestic Abuse)

This is my final welfare judgment in respect of CDE (‘C’), who was born in 2019 and is now seven. It follows my fact finding judgment in September last year, in which I made findings against the father ‘D’ of serious domestic abuse including a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour. I found that CDE had witnessed and been exposed to this behaviour and that there were elements of coercion in the father child relationship. The details of those findings are set out in that judgment and not repeated here, but this judgment should be read in conjunction with that earlier judgment (see D v E (Findings of Domestic Abuse)[2025] EWFC 506 (B)).

At the conclusion of the fact finding hearing I directed that Cafcass should prepare a report pursuant to s7 Children Act 1989 in order to assist me in making welfare decisions in light of my findings.

C lives with her mother, ‘E’, and has done so since shortly after her parents separation in March 2024 following a police call out to the family home. The father, Mr D, had supervised contact in a contact centre until it was suspended in January following receipt of the Cafcass report. I had suspended video call contact at the conclusion of the fact finding hearing, but at that point allowed for the supervised face to face contact to continue, since it was said that C enjoyed it.

The issues before me today relate to C’s contact with her father, and a proposed prohibited steps order concerning medical information. In view of my findings and the recommendations, and the guidance in PD12J and PD12Q I raised the issue of a possible order under s91(14) Children Act 1989 of my own motion.

I also need to deal with the question of publication of my previous judgment, having received submissions in the autumn about that issue, but postponed dealing with it pending clarification as to whether there was likely to be an appeal of my findings. Although there was not, I have not had an opportunity to rule on that issue to date, and have indicated to the parties I will deal with issues relating publication of both judgments today.

An application by a journalist for a transparency order with a view to attending the hearing this week was not pursued as it transpired that journalist was unable to attend the hearing.

As a result of needing to deal with the complexity in understanding the father’s position and my view that it was important to provide a written record of my reasons for the family I have finalised this judgment under some time pressure. I hope that it adequately captures the reasons for my decisions in a logical way. The order in which I present information in this judgment does not necessarily reflect the order in which I have dealt with matters. I have simply organised the information in a way which I hope will assist the reader to make sense of my conclusions.

Cafcass officer Ms Murray prepared a report dated 6 January 2026 and gave oral evidence today. She recommends the cessation of direct contact until such time as the father can evidence completion of a Respect accredited Domestic Abuse Perpetrators Programme and therapy, and can evidence underlying change. She had recommended indirect contact by exchange of emails and photographs, but in oral evidence expressed some ambivalence about whether that was appropriate in view of the anxiety such contact appeared to be causing to the mother.

Although not included as a recommendation in her report, when raised by me Ms Murray supported the making of a s91(14) order, although she could not say what would be an appropriate duration.

The mother accepts the recommendations of Cafcass. She says that the interim PSO regarding medical information should continue, on the basis that her duties to consult and inform the father of any major medical issues are understood and accepted, and that she agrees to the continuation of indirect contact. She says that she had expected, but not received, responses to the emails she has sent to the father with pictures of C, but that she agrees to him sending cards and letters and appropriate gifts.

She supports the making of a s91(14) order for a period of something like 20-24 months, based upon the time it will likely take for Mr D to become eligible for a Respect Accredited DAPP and to complete that work. Ms E was not sure who would be best to deliver the decision to C, but thought perhaps the school counsellor or ELSA worker might be best placed.

Ms E does not oppose the anonymised publication of both judgments.

When speaking to Cafcass Mr D’s position was that he sought equal shared care of C. Today Ms Quadri confirmed that the father no longer seeks a shared care order (or a prohibited steps order against the mother) and that the father’s revised position is that he has been engaging in supervised contact for long enough and that I should make an order for a stepped progression moving into the community and increasing ultimately to overnight contact at his home. Evidence has been produced as to courses the father has completed and two that he says he is engaging with or will engage with. He says that work can take place in parallel to a progression in contact.

Although none of the position statements filed on the father’s behalf since my findings were made actually say as much, Ms Quadri told me today that the father ‘accepts the findings’. What the position statement filed on behalf of the father for today’s hearing actually says is that:

By the close of submissions I was told that the father now accepted that my findings were correct, acknowledged the harm caused and wished to apologise. I deal with the emergence of that position below. His substantive position as to the s8 orders I should make was, however, unchanged.

No submissions were made on behalf of the father as to what indirect contact I should order, other than to say that the father did not know he was expected to respond to the emails with photographs the mother has been sending since the suspension of direct contact at the DRA, and that in any event he could not meaningfully respond to an email containing a photograph with no text. I will assume that he would like the opportunity to send indirect contact and to receive such contact from C.

The father opposes the continuation of the current interim prohibited steps order restricting Mr D’s access to medical records on the basis that there is ‘no evidence’ medical misconduct. He opposes the making of a s91(14) order. No representations were made by him about who should deliver my decision to C.

Mr D opposes publication of either judgment for the reasons set out in his written position statement.

Both parties were represented at this hearing. Mr Blount has been involved since the fact finding and Ms Quadri at this and the previous hearing.

Participation directions have been screens and separate waiting areas.

Concerned about the clarity of the father’s position as presented, I have gone some way to clarify it by permitting an adjournment and further submissions on his behalf and am satisfied that he has had every opportunity to put his best case.

I have also actively considered evidential and case management points even where not raised.

I am satisfied that this hearing has been fair to both parties.

At a Dispute Resolution Appointment in January following the filing of the s7 report, where both parties were represented, District Judge Gorman set the matter down for a final hearing before me. She directed that the parents should file position statements in advance of this hearing and that the court would hear oral evidence from the Cafcass Officer, indicating hat the court did not anticipate hearing evidence from the parents, and there were no directions for the filing of further evidence (although the father has, in fact submitted evidence in the form of certificates of courses he has completed and courses he says he is enrolled on, with links to the providers, which nobody has objected to me considering).

Notwithstanding those directions, and the absence of any request for me to hear oral evidence from either party, I gave some consideration to whether or not it was necessary to hear oral evidence from either parent, but in view of the parties’ positions and the nature of the dispute I could see that hearing evidence from either would assist me. I could have heard oral evidence from the Father about the submission made this morning that he now ‘accepts’ my findings, but given that at best this is a very recent acceptance and not yet underpinned by the father having undertaken any domestic abuse work, I do not think that hearing him repeat this could take matters much further.

Apart from material I have read previously, the bundle includes some updating contact records (running up to mid January when that contact was suspended), the s7 report, and the various orders and position statements filed since my fact finding judgments.

Ms Murray’s evidence was thoughtful and clear. She was able to explain the rationale for her recommendations with clarity provided some helpful further detail or information received subsequent to the writing of her report.

Ms Murray’s report is dated 5 January 2026. It sets out her summary of meetings with each parent in December and C alone at her mother’s home, and of conversations with C’s therapist and teacher. The starting point for the report is, rightly, the findings that I made in September which are accurately summarised.

The recommendations made are for a ‘live with’ order to be made in favour of C’s mother, a prohibited steps order to be made to prevent Mr D from accessing C’s medical records (that order was put in place on an interim basis at the DRA), and for direct contact to be paused until Mr D has completed the necessary courses (an in person Respect accredited DA course) and begun to take responsibility for the harm he has caused. There are various other ancillary recommendations about communication between parents and indirect contact, and around how C should be informed of any decision to stop direct contact (not by her mother).

Ms Murray describes the mother’s presentation in interview as ‘a mother who holds herself and the family together valiantly, but who is exhausted, and still living with the emotional, physical and psychological impact of Mr D’s abuse.’ Ms E described the lengths that she goes to in order to avoid criticism by Mr D of the care she gives to C, and C’s behaviour in the run up to contact and after, which involves hurting her mum and brothers, kicking car windows or trying to grab the gear stick, and sometimes saying ‘mummy’s a bitch’ or ‘mummy’s shit’ over and over. The family routine on the Sunday after contact is necessary to stay at home and having a quiet day rather than doing Sunday activities, because C’s dysregulation. Ms E worries that Mr D may abduct C or harm her or himself as a result of his previous threats to ‘take everyone down with him’ and the GP letter produced by him which linked his mental health stability to the outcome of proceedings. Whether or not those risks are real, the anxiety is entirely understandable, and it is an illustration of the continuing impact of the abuse.

Ms Murray reported that Mr D on 9 December (approaching 3 months post findings) was presenting as a victim and did not accept he was a perpetrator, saying that he had not been given a fair hearing because he is a man or a ‘foreigner’ (his term), and that he had been discriminated against. Ms Murray records that there was no expression of regret or evidence of accountability. Ms Murray told me that at that stage Mr D continued to seek shared care, and she did not think he had grasped the significance of the findings or the impact of his behaviour on C. She described his position of fixedly proposing a staged increase in contact and his insistence that C would ‘always want to see her daddy’ in response to questions as ‘detached from reality’. She thought that any work to help Mr D grasp that reality would take a significant amount of time, and the sort of course proposed by him on the morning of this hearing (which has an online component and a single day’s face to face work) would be insufficient. She clarified in oral evidence that she thought Mr D would need 1:1 therapy in addition to undertaking domestic abuse group work. He would also need to evidence remorse and understanding of the impact of his behaviour, rather than a ‘tick box’ compliance. This would require in depth work.

The recommendations are based, in part, upon ongoing harm to C through contact and partly on the ongoing impact upon her mother. She says that

Ms Murray says that C’s father presents himself as C’s rescuer or protector, giving her gifts to keep the monsters away now he cannot keep her safe by sleeping in the same bed as her. That this message continues to effect C is evident from the fact that C has asked her mother ‘What if daddy is right about the monsters?’ Ms Murray’s opinion is that C is experiencing confusion and conflicted feelings for her mother as a result of this dynamic and that this is played out in her behaviour. Ms Murray raises concern that in due course C may feel shame about her own behaviour towards her mother and brother, which will in itself be harmful to her. She warns:

“If C continues to be exposed to covert messages from her father, that Ms E cannot be trusted or is somehow at fault, C is likely to struggle with any boundaries her mother puts in place. I also consider Mr D’s behaviour towards Ms E in the home, being derogatory and critical, and his refusal to impose any boundaries on C. The longterm impact of this for C might be that she increasingly rejects her mother’s attempts to parent her.”

Ms Murray also considered that C and her mother need time and space for repair work to be undertaken in respect of their relationship, but also for C to come to an understanding of her family history, of her relationship with her father, and why in light of that history she continued to see her dad, and – if I stop that contact – why it has now been stopped.

Ms Murray was not challenged on these aspects of her report other than through oblique questioning about whether ‘other’ (unspecified) factors may be behind C’s behaviour.

Ms Murray raised concern that the coercion is ongoing through contact, in particular through the continuing preoccupation with C’s health, and that ‘Mr D is continuing to manipulate his daughter by presenting as a very loving and playful father; while denying the harm he has caused her, her brothers and their mother.’ Ms Murray raised concern that the father’s recent request for access to C’s medical records might be a precursor to further coercive behaviour around C’s health and care.

C was seen in December at home, and Ms Murray told me that although she had conducted this visit and Ms E had been appropriately supportive of C at the outset of the visit, she had also facilitated C being seen alone, being anxious to avoid any criticism for influencing C from the father. Her anxiety was not entirely misplaced as this was indeed a criticism made through cross examination. Ms Murray did not think there was any influence of inappropriate influence by Ms E.

Ms Murray was concerned that the suggestion in cross examination that Ms E might have somehow influenced C was potentially another example of F’s lack of trust in M and a continuation of past behaviour (I bear in mind here that the father’s cross allegations, which I dismissed, included allegations of influence or ‘alienation’).

Of note from the session with C are the ‘fixed smile’ C used when talking about her father, and her unhesitating statement that she wanted ‘the “video calls with dad” to be put on the Far Far Away Island. C said, “I didn’t like it. Not in the mornings, not afternoons, not in the evenings”. Further, her response to being asked if she enjoyed time with her dad: ‘she replied in a high pitch voice and smile, “he’s my dad”.’

Challenged about whether there was an inconsistency in being prepared to take C’s expressed wishes about video contact at face value but not being willing to do so when it came to contact, Ms Murray acknowledged that C had not said she didn’t want to see daddy at all, but observed that C hadn’t actually answered the question about whether she enjoyed the contact directly, and that she used the same distraction tactics she used in contact with her father in contact, when being asked about him.

Although C is a child who is able to express her wishes to an extent Ms Murray reminded me that she is also a child who just turned 7 and whose father is an adult that adults have found difficult to negotiate and understand so expecting her to say exactly what her views are or for those to be taken at face value was not realistic. Ms Murray said ‘she has been manipulated and coerced, given lots of gifts, made to feel special and been called a princess’. She had been told her dad and his gifts could keep her safe from monsters. Her opinion, which I accept, is that C’s expressed wishes and feelings have to be seen in the context of her experience of her father’s coercion and manipulation, and alongside her non-verbal communication through her behaviour.

C’s therapist was spoken to. She said C is a little girl who likes to have things ‘perfect’ and that her calm and smiley exterior masks her ‘inner turmoil’. This chimes very much with the videos of contact I was concerned about at the fact finding hearing and the detailed notes of contact. She interpreted C’s outbursts of angry and physical behaviour towards her mother as follows: ‘C is likely to let out her deepest feelings with the person she feels most safe with’. In cross examination Ms Murray was asked if she accepted that C’s behaviour before and after contact, which the mother says is dysregulated and often physical, could be explained by factors other than contact with her father. Her response was that behaviour can be a result of various factors but ‘in this case we have facts that help us understand what her feelings are’. I agree that the findings I have made and the shadow of them, alongside the continuing, subtle behaviour recorded during contact are more than adequate explanation for C’s behaviour. The therapist’s view as reported by Ms Murray was that ‘2 hours is a long time for a 6 year-old child to have to “wear different hats and put on a show”’.

It was suggested to Ms Murray during oral evidence that a father giving his daughter presents and calling her a princess is just a normal father daughter relationship. Ms Murray agreed that on the surface this was so, but beneath that ‘we know it wasn’t normal, she was very much set apart by her father’ – Ms Murray is referring here to the differential treatment C received at home, as compared with her half brothers. She thought that Mr D’s behaviour could possibly be described as grooming behaviour in that grooming is the giving of gifts in order to manipulate someone vulnerable to get them on your side, and so Ms Murray suggested one needed to look deeper than the surface appearance.

Ms Murray highlighted in oral evidence that the father had given C gifts with his and her name inscribed upon them in permanent marker, which she said was unusual and uncomfortable, and more for his benefit than hers. The gifts that he would mark in this way were soft toys, blankets and squashies, ‘things that provide nurture in bed’. Against a backdrop of Mr D telling C there were monsters in the bed from which he could protect her (something which was a feature of the evidence at fact finding stage, when the mother said that this had been a narrative through which Mr D kept C sleeping in his bed rather than on her own), I agree that with Ms Murray that this is an indicator of concern. It seems to me that it perpetuates the shared narrative and roles between Mr D and C in a way that is not helpful to her or to her relationship with her mother.

Ms Murray shared that Ms E reports continuing anxiety around being criticised by Mr D for her care of C, going to extra lengths to ensure she is clean and well presented, and being worried about her sustaining injury in the course of ordinary childhood activities, such as climbing on rocks at the beach. Ms Murray worried that Ms E was still under the coercive effect of Mr D in that she was restricting C’s ordinary activities in order to placate him (those are my words but convey the gist of the evidence from Ms Murray). I agree that this shows the pernicious and continuing effect of the coercive and controlling and critical behaviour that I have found was a feature of the father’s behaviour. I made findings last year about the father covertly photographing an injury on C’s back during contact before going on to report the injury to the police, even though the contact centre were satisfied it was accidental. I was critical of Mr D for doing this and for exposing C to a uniformed police check unnecessarily. It is clear from the contact notes that C is aware of her father’s preoccupation with injuries and health, because she actively deflects his questions about minor injuries. Even after my findings he can be seen in the contact logs repeatedly questioning her about why she had a plaster on her leg. This unnecessary questioning (and his insistence through counsel that this is just normal parenting) demonstrates that the father does not yet have an understanding of the nature of his problematic behaviour or its impact on C, and in repeating the questions he does not seem to have been attuned to C’s discomfort. When C’s distraction tactics do not work she is recorded to have resorted to putting her hand over his mouth. Ms Murray says it is inappropriate that a 7 year old (then 6 year old) should be managing her father in this way, and I agree.

Ms Murray was able to give me further information about the views of the contact centre in oral evidence, following a telephone call with them the day after the report was filed. The contact centre worker raised concern that whilst on the surface contact went well Mr D did not listen to advice and will persist in asking C about things she does not want to engage in, prompting distraction tactics. Although these questions ‘look playful, she is saying no’. Mr D did not listen to feedback at the end of sessions. The worker also reported that his emails could go from ‘very charming to aggressive’. As Ms Murray observed, this is the complex grown up that C is having to manage by a combination of behaviours in her contact sessions.

I was a little surprised that, although Ms Murray seemed to have a good understanding of the mechanisms through which coercive and controlling behaviour might impact on parent and child, and the risks that it might pose even after separation, and although there was a specific recommendation for the father to complete a ‘Respect Accredited DAPP course’ without Ms Murray appreciating that a deliberate component of such accredited courses is a 12 month wait before commencement of the course, on the basis that this increases the likelihood that a perpetrator will be in a better place to engage meaningfully and make change, based on genuine reflection rather than simply completing a course as a route to progression of contact. I can and do take judicial notice of the fact that this is the Respect framework, on the basis that this has been the evidence before me in other recent cases, and in any event, this was agreed to be the position by the advocates.

Ms Murray maintained that in any event a period of time away from her father would be in C’s best interests to enable her and her mother to undertake therapeutic work, and that what she was looking for before the resumption of any direct contact was genuine reflection and change through both a DAPP and individual therapy, which would not be a quick process.

Ms Murray expressed some scepticism about the ‘Temper’ organisation whose details were provided to her this morning at court, and encouraged Mr D to do some more research before choosing an appropriate provider. She did not think that a course which is largely online with a 1 day face to face component was sufficient, saying that a day was ‘not long enough’ to effect the change needed. Ms Murray was concerned given the father’s views expressed to her in December when preparing her report that this was a ‘box ticking’ exercise, given the father’s motivation to seek a progression of contact with his daughter.

Ms Murray told me that the risks of a continuation of contact were that Ms E would continue to be wary about letting C play normally, C would continue to feel conflicted in circumstances where daddy pays her lots of attention, gives her gifts and makes her feel special, which reinforces the dynamic that ‘mummy is shit’ (one of the remarks that Mr D is reported to have made to C, although my specific finding concerned telling C and her brothers ‘fuck your mummy’). C needed time to build trust with her mum away from the confusing dynamic in contact with dad.

Ms Murray told me that she would expect C to need some time to understand what had happened in her family, and the decisions that had been made firstly to allow her to see her dad and then to stop it, and that this news should be given to C by a neutral third party (perhaps C’s therapist) and not Ms E, for fear that C would blame her mother. Ms Murray said that she would write two letters to C, one for now, explaining the judge’s decision, and one for ‘later life’ when C was old enough to understand a bit more. She agreed that a letter from the judge would be helpful for C, whatever my decision, because C knows that grown ups are trying to make decisions about what is best for her and the judge is going to decide soon.

She was reluctant to say how long all the work required might take and therefore how long a s91(14) order should be, because the ‘dynamic is so entrenched I wouldn’t want to put a time limit on how long it might take’.

Ms Murray was under the impression that there had been an order or expectation after direct contact was suspended in January that the father would respond to indirect email contact, and that the fact he had not done so and the mother was anxious about sending those emails and being criticised for them made her worry whether that recommendation was appropriate. Having heard submissions from both parties about that issue there seems to be potential for this to have been a crossed wire. In the absence of direct evidence on this I can’t establish what happened on this issue, save that in fact Mr D did not respond, but it seems to me it would be wrong for me to hold that against him on the state of the evidence.

I have read the contact notes with care, just as I watched the video contact recordings with care previously. I agree that on the surface they show active and fun contact, and Mr D is attentive and C busy and energetic. It is also possible to identify subtle points of concern in those notes when they are considered in light of the findings and patterns of behaviour (C’s and her fathers) as found or observed. I accept the interpretation of those records offered by Ms Murray, which is reinforced by the additional information that she obtained from the contact centre after the completion of her report. In overview, I thought that C reads as somewhat frenetic and I wondered if the contacts are emotionally exhausting as she kept herself busy moving from activity to activity doing and demanding tricks, and perhaps performing a role.

In light of the submissions made it is necessary to set out in some detail a number of events over time since I handed down my judgment in September.

Having handed down a lengthy judgment at the end of the court day on the final listed day of the fact finding hearing, I gave the parties three weeks to reflect on my judgment and to provide their response.

The mother filed a position statement accepting my findings entirely, and subsequently she filed a position statement accepting the recommendations of Cafcass entirely.

The father’s position requires setting out in more detail. On 15 October 2025, through solicitors Mr D filed a detailed position statement in which he took issue with a number of my findings saying:

In particular the father

The position statement stated that

The submission is made that the findings should not be allowed to ‘operate as punitive findings in perpetuity.’ For the record, this is a mistaken and unnecessary submission: the purpose of the findings has nothing to do with punishment, and only to do with risk assessment and the welfare of the child.

The position statement invited me to

Upon receipt of this position statement I took immediate steps to issue an order making clear that the route through which to challenge my findings was appeal, and that in the absence of a successful appeal Cafcass were to operate on the basis of the findings made. I also set out briefly why the submissions made were misconceived or inaccurate.

No appeal was issued.

I record elsewhere Mr D’s position in December when he spoke to Cafcass remained one of clear non-acceptance. The Cafcass report was filed on 5 January 2026.

Between 16-21 January the father completed three online parenting programmes, certificates in respect of which were appended to his position statement prepared by Ms Quadri for the DRA which took place before DJ Gorman on 28 January. From the weblinks to the course providers in that position statement none of these courses related to domestic abuse.

The father’s position statement for the DRA stated that ‘The Father recognises and understands that the findings made by Recorder Reed KC on 25 September 2025 stand unless overturned on appeal. He does not seek to relitigate those findings in these proceedings.’ Instead it was said that his focus was on looking forward and moving beyond ‘conflict’. I did not make findings about (mutual) conflict, I made findings of domestic abuse perpetrated by the father upon the mother and C.

The position statement stated that the father accepted ‘that the court’s findings require him to reflect on communication, boundaries, and emotional awareness. He has therefore taken steps to engage in learning and self-reflection’. This is, no doubt, a reference to the online courses I have mentioned.

The father relied upon the recital in my order of 25 September that the direct contact was considered safe to continue. That recital was a record of an interim decision which pre-dated the receipt of the Cafcass report.

I do not read that position statement as setting out an acceptance of my findings as a reflection of reality. The position statement appears to be a carefully worded invitation to draw a line, move on and look forwards.

At the DRA, in light of the recommendations made, the father’s direct contact was suspended pending this hearing, and an interim prohibited steps order was made prohibiting the father from accessing C’s medical records. The order was silent as to indirect email contact between C and Mr D but it is agreed that some photos were sent by email on the mother’s behalf to Mr D and that no response was sent. Beyond that, it is difficult to work out what happened or why.

I am told, and accept, that at that DRA the mother’s team provided Mr D with details of Respect Accredited DAPP programmes so that Mr D could make enquiries of suitable providers.

On 1 March 2026 Mr D made contact with an organisation called Temper Domestic Violence Ltd. He completed an interview and was accepted on the course on 17 March 2026.

On 19 March in advance of this hearing Ms Quadri filed a further position statement on behalf of Mr D. Its content is in many respects similar to the previous position statement. Appended to it are the previous certificates and a document entitled ‘offer of a place’ from Temper dated 17 March 2026. The information suggests the course is a DA Intervention Course ‘previously described as a DAPP equivalent’ which will feature 8 x 3 hour sessions online spread over four weeks and a single day face to face work. Mr D has not begun that work. Temper are not Respect Accredited. Additional material which was admitted on the morning of the hearing from Temper makes clear that Temper are critical of the DAPP format, offering a wide ranging critique of that programme and of Respect. The format, content and duration of the course is markedly different from that of Respect Accredited programmes which are accepted to be six months in duration, with weekly sessions (usually face to face or majority face to face) and with a year long wait after the end of proceedings built in (essentially in order to avoid ‘tick box’ course completion and promote meaningful engagement and change).

The position statement also asserts that Mr D is ‘currently undertaking’ the Freedom Programme. No evidence of his enrolment or progress is provided. It is said, somewhat ambitiously, that the completion of the parenting courses, and enrolment on the two domestic abuse programmes was ‘clear evidence of rehabilitation’.

The position statement of 17 March has this to say about the father’s position:

I did not interpret this carefully worded position statement as an acceptance of the correctness of my findings, only an acceptance of the fact that they had been made. When Ms Quadri attempted to put a question to the Cafcass officer based upon the proposition that the father accepted the findings I therefore sought clarification. Ms Quadri said that Mr D did in fact accept the findings. Subsequently, in his questions to Ms Murray, Mr Blount asked about the absence of remorse, understanding of C’s experience, apology or demonstrated insight, which Ms Murray accepted were not evident.

Having heard Ms Quadri’s submissions on behalf of Mr D, which were very much along the lines of the written position statement - save that it was said that Mr D did NOT seek shared care - I expressed concern that rather than the submissions engaging with the evidence before the court, it had been asserted repeatedly that there was ‘no evidence’, when in fact there was evidence which needed to be addressed. I stood the case down for 20 minutes to allow Ms Quadri to consider with her client whether any other submissions should be made.

For instance, it was asserted that there was ‘no evidence’ to support the PSO regarding medical records (notwithstanding my findings about the fathers conduct in relation to medical matters), ‘no evidence’ of vexatious or repeated applications to support a s91(14) order (nothing to the point, and ‘no new evidence that undermined the finding that contact had taken place safely’ (as above I did not make a finding as much as reach an interim welfare decision on the evidence then available). In fact, there is evidence – albeit Mr D may not agree with it – such as the evidence of the contact supervisors, albeit received via the Cafcass Officer in oral evidence, and thus hearsay. It might be submitted (for instance) that this evidence was not accepted as accurate, or that it was hearsay, that the father had not had an opportunity to consider it or challenge it, and as such limited weight could be attached to it. No such submissions were made (save as at paragraph 81), but for the avoidance of doubt I have considered those points.

On the parties’ return to court further submissions were made for Mr D. However, rather than addressing the points I had raised about the nature of the submissions, and assisting me with how I should deal with the evidence already before the court Ms Quadri proceeded to read parts of a ‘statement’ from her client that he had just given to her by way of further instructions. It was now said that Mr D accepts the findings, recognised their seriousness and the harm caused to his daughter, and recognised that the behaviour had been found unacceptable to both mother and child. Mr D asserted through Ms Quadri that he now understood he lacked empathy and caused hurt through his behaviour and that he would ensure it didn’t happen again. He accepted it would take time and effort to rebuild trust and was committed to demonstrating he could provide safe stable care for his daughter. And her mother ‘where appropriate’. He ‘respectfully asks the court to take into account his acceptance of the findings, his insight into harm cause and proactive steps taken to make positive and lasting change’. I was invited to ‘move beyond conflict towards restoration of a relationship with both parents’.

I reiterated that my concern had been to elicit submissions that helped me deal with the evidence rather than to simply receive submissions denying the existence of evidence. In response to me giving an illustrative example relating to the hearsay evidence of the contact supervisors, Ms Quadri’s only submission was to agree with me that it was hearsay evidence.

In light of the apparent change of position I sought clarification of how I should now treat the position statement filed for this hearing, and whether it was an accurate reflection of Mr D’s position at the time it was made i.e. that there had been a change in position since 17 March, or if it was based on a misunderstanding of his position. Ms Quadri told me that ‘His position has remained [the same] since the last hearing. He accepts [the] findings and acknowledges what happened. It may well be my drafting has not come across exactly to the point and he accepts what happened in the past is correct’. Ms Quadri apologised ‘if the position was not clear enough. His position is as per my submission’.

I will deal with what I make of Mr D’s position over time and at the final hearing below.

There has not really been any factual challenge at this hearing, nor has it been asserted at any point that this was necessary. Nonetheless, I must attribute to each piece of evidence appropriate weight. That includes proper consideration of how I should treat hearsay evidence, which includes but is not limited to the information provided by the Cafcass officer from the school, therapist, parents, child and contact centre. Nobody has asserted that they do not accept the records as accurate. I have taken the view that it is sensible to treat with caution the incomplete information I have about the email contact, but otherwise I have no reason to think that the reports provided by Cafcass of the accounts or responses of others are not broadly reliable, though of course I bear in mind the potential for information to become distorted as it passes through different hands. When I consider the information from one source alongside others there is a degree of consistency which supports broad reliability.

There is of course no such need for caution in respect of my findings, which as a matter of law are established fact.

I must give proper weight to the recommendations of Cafcass, but may depart from those recommendations where the report is not balanced. My task is to look at the case in the round and form my own view taking into account all the evidence (Re E (Relocation: Removal from Jurisdiction) [2013] 2 FLR 290, CA; Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal) [2018] 2 FLR 608, CA).

Ms Quadri draws my attention in her position statement on behalf of Mr D to the statutory presumption of parental involvement in s1(2A) Children Act 1989, which (where applicable) requires the court to presume that unless the contrary is shown, involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child’s welfare. Not mentioned in the position statement is s1(6) Children Act 1989 which sets out when the presumption does and does not apply. The presumption does not apply in respect of involvement of a parent where there is ‘some evidence before the court in the particular proceedings to suggest that involvement of that parent in the child’s life would put the child at risk of suffering harm whatever the form of the involvement’. Although Ms Quadri’s submissions included the assertion that there was ‘no evidence’ to support the recommendations for the cessation of contact, there is in fact ‘some evidence’ to support such a recommendation. That evidence is the findings I have made and the evidence of Ms Murray (who in terms says that direct contact does put the child at risk of suffering harm and who expressed concern in oral evidence that even indirect contact may do do).

Accordingly, it seems to me that the presumption of parental involvement does not strictly apply because in light of that evidence Mr D is not a ‘parent’ for the purposes of s1(6)(a). That does not, however, mean that there should be no contact, it simply means I cannot presume that contact would further C’s welfare. Given the findings I have made about the harm she has already suffered, even if the presumption did apply, it would be easily displaced. Even then, that would still not really assist me in reaching a decision about contact because I have to evaluate all the circumstances before making an order that is in C’s overall best interests.

(Many would say) fortunately, the statutory presumption of parental involvement is likely to be repealed in the near future, but as it remains currently on the statute books and has been relied upon by Ms Quadri I address it here. It does not assist me at all in making a safe, welfare focused decision on the facts of this case.

I have been referred to various Court of Appeal authorities by Ms Quadri concerning contact, dating from between 2000-2012, and starting with Re L & Ors (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 194. Whilst cited for the proposition that ‘findings of harm do not automatically preclude contact’, in fact Re L is also authority for the propositions that domestic abuse is a very serious and significant failure in parenting, and that the absence of certain key factors weighs heavily against contact being ordered. Those factors, proposed by Dr Sturge and Dr Glaser are broadly represented in the modern Practice Direction 12J at paragraph 37 a-e, which provides that

“In every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made, or where domestic abuse is otherwise established, the court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of the same. In particular, the court should consider –

(a)

the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living;

(b)

the effect of the domestic abuse on the child and its effect on the child’s relationship with the parents;

(c)

whether the parent is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent;

(d)

the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and

(e)

the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse.”

The other authorities are familiar authorities dealing with the priority which must ordinarily be given to a child’s relationship with both parents, but which are cases involving issues such as ‘implacable hostility’ (as then described) and not cases of proven domestic abuse, and which have to be read in light of Re L, more recent Court of Appeal such as the conjoined appeals in H-N And Others (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 and of course PD12J (Footnote: ¹).

I also need to consider paragraphs 35-6 of PD12J which directs me to consider welfare in light of the proven domestic abuse and its impact both on the mother and C, and to make an order for contact only if I am satisfied that both C and her mother will be emotionally and physically safe before, during and after such contact, and that her mother will not be subject to further domestic abuse from Mr D.

PD12J Para 37A.1 deals with s91(14) Children Act 1989 in light of the amendments made by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, through s91A. It requires me to consider whether or not such an order should be made. I accordingly raised s91(14) and PD12Q with the parties. Regrettably, submissions received from Ms Quadri directed me to Re P [2012], cited for the proposition that there had been no vexatious or repeated applications and I should therefore not make an order. Although I allowed Ms Quadri some time to consider the effect of s91A no further submissions were made on Mr D’s behalf.

My primary guide however is the welfare checklist in s1 Children Act 1989 and the principle that C’s welfare in its broadest sense is paramount.

I must also make decisions that are consistent as far as is possible with the Article 8 ECHR rights of the parties and child, but where C’s needs and rights are in tension with the rights of her parents, it is C’s welfare and rights that must prevail.

C’s welfare is not simply about her relationship with her father, though that is an important facet of it. Other important aspects of her welfare are the need for physical and emotional safety, including the need for repair and re-stabilisation of her relationship with her mother following its distortion as a result of domestic abuse, and C’s need for her primary carer to be safe and well and not impacted by domestic abuse.

C is 7. Her ascertainable wishes and feelings are not simply what she says. They can be ascertained from what she doesn’t say and from her behaviour. C’s behaviour, as noted by professionals, speaks of complexity and conflict beneath the smiley exterior. Her response to her father in contact are uncomfortable when one understands the background and context in which they take place. In my judgment when one reads C’s responses through the lens of the findings she is, as Ms Murray suggests, continuing to be impacted by the coercive nature of her relationship with her father, even though the interactions are superficially playful. I do not think that this is healthy, more so when considered alongside the more obvious expressions of confusion and conflict that C does feel able to show towards her mother (and sometimes her brothers). In my judgment the current situation continues to be harmful to C.

I expect that if it stops C will initially find it difficult to understand and to accept that she is not going to see daddy for some time. That may provoke a response directed at her mother. However, it seems to me that this is a decision that cannot be determined on the basis of wishes and feelings, partly due to C’s age and partly because she is a victim of ongoing coercive behaviour, evidence in my judgment through the subtle actions of the father by the giving of gifts with explicit or coded messages, the repeated questioning of C, and the continued references to her as daddy’s Princess. I have to consider C’s wishes in light not just of her age but her understanding. The perpetuation through contact of her as a princess who needs to be kept safe by daddy is a factor which means that her ‘understanding’ of her situation, particularly where she has not yet been able to be given an age appropriate understanding of why her family has fractured in the way it has, of what her father has done, and what I have found happened. Importantly, as noted by Ms Murray, C may well have her own (wrong) ideas about whether she or her mother are to blame for what has happened.

C’s particular needs for my purposes are predominantly emotional. She needs, as Cafcass identify, a safe space and a period of time away from the coercive dynamic in order to repair and come to understand her relationships with both parents. She needs her mum to have that space too. Whatever my provisional view in September, it is now clear that direct contact is not emotionally safe for C. It is harmful and that harm is ongoing, most obviously seen in the distortion it produces in her life at home.

The most important characteristic of C that I must consider is that she is a victim of domestic abuse, both witnessed and directly. She is the child of a mother and main carer who is still affected by it, and for whom the current arrangements are continuing to prolong that effect. She is a child who loves her father, and who feels her father’s love for her, but who is emotionally confused by her experience of him. She is in my judgment a victim of quite serious harm through domestic abuse and part of the court’s responsibility is to protect her from further such harm. I agree with Cafcass that the risks are not just immediate. There are risks that, without action, C will come to feel shame affecting her sense of self worth, her relationships with her mother and brothers will be damaged, and that her ability to form safe and rewarding relationships with others will be distorted or compromised.

I am acutely conscious that there has been a lack of clarity as to the father’s up to date position in the course of this hearing and I am keen to ensure that I do him no unfairness in how I approach his position. However, I do not think that even taken at its highest, the father’s position is anywhere close to where it would need to be for me to consider the continuation of direct contact to be safe.

I have set out the history of the father’s position in some detail as an exercise to assist me in evaluating the father’s position. It is absolutely clear that the father’s position up to the end of 2025 (for some months after the findings were made) was of absolute rejection of my findings. Some of the assertions made by him and on his behalf during that period are of real concern and evidence at that point a real lack of insight into his behaviour and a lack of understanding of what coercive control is and how it functions. This is not uncommon, coercive control is not well understood, but in my judgment it must be understood and owned in order for it to be avoided in future. Mr D did not evidence any such insight or understanding in that period, rather he showed a single-minded persistence in pursuit of his original goal of shared care that was entirely disconnected from the reality of the findings.

Ms Quadri’s submissions to me were that not only was Mr D’s position as at the start of this hearing one of full acceptance, insight and understanding, accompanied by remorse and apology, but also that this was his position at the hearing on 28 January. I cannot reconcile that at all with the position statement filed or the directions made at that hearing or with his substantive position as to the orders I should make. I cannot understand why Mr D would not ensure that his fulsome acceptance and apology were not front and centre in his written position, nor why if that had not been made sufficiently clear in January it was left uncorrected in his March statement. Moreover, the dates on which Mr D has taken steps to obtain certificates are clustered around hearings. The initial October position statement implies the father has done sufficient work through previous conflict resolution workplace training. The January position statement offers up parenting courses without the acknowledgment that domestic abuse work is required. The first indication of any attempt to demonstrate engagement with actual domestic abuse work is that Temper confirm Mr D made contact with them shortly after the DRA. It appears that at that point Mr D had rejected the information provided by the mother, and implicitly the recommendation that he should undertake a Respect accredited course, and selected instead a quicker course. Even that was not followed up until shortly before this hearing. There is no evidence that the Freedom programme has been started at all, but since this is an online course that can be accessed on a rolling basis there is also no reason why it could not have been commenced before the hearing on 28 January and completed by now. I do not think the chronology of the father’s pursuit of domestic abuse work is at all consistent with the notion he has been in a state of full acceptance since January.

In my judgment the confusion over the parties’ position results from the father’s evolving understanding of what he needs to say or do in order to secure ongoing contact. I do not think his understanding of his behaviour has demonstrably evolved.

At any rate, the position the court is left with is that the father hasn’t undertaken any domestic abuse work, and from the cross examination and submissions made on his behalf he certainly doesn’t accept or even understand that his behaviour since the findings has in any way been inappropriate or that it has in fact perpetuated harm. That work in my judgment is vital – there is a long way to travel. The work cannot be done quickly. There are good reasons why a pause is required following proceedings before accredited providers allow perpetrators to commence their courses by self-referral. They are to dissuade box tickers, and to try and ensure that engagement is real rather than compliance. The duration of the accredited programmes ensures that there is time for change to evolve and for a perpetrator to really reflect on their behaviour and the impact of it, and to unlearn patterns of behaviour. In my judgment the recommendation that there should be attendance on a Respect accredited course before contact could be reconsidered is correct. It also seems likely to me, particularly in light of the initial response to my findings, that individual therapeutic work will be necessary. I cannot direct either of those things, but I do encourage the father to explore and prioritise them.

I am going to order the cessation of direction contact by discharging all contact orders.

I am not going to order that there should be indirect contact, because the mother is, I think, willing to facilitate it through a third party and I am not prepared to make an order which will lead to the mother feeling as if she has to comply or risk criticism. I will leave it up to the mother to exercise her judgment as to the sending of indirect contact and updates, either from C with her support by email, OR by updates prepared by her. The father may respond to any such contact at a frequency of not more than once a month, again through a third party. He may send cards and appropriate gifts at birthdays, Christmas and other special occasions (including appropriate religious festivals). By ‘appropriate’ I mean gifts that are not exorbitant in nature, and gifts that are NOT inscribed with messages or names. The mother can exercise her judgment to withhold any contact that is not appropriate in content.

I am of the clear view that there needs to be a break in proceedings as well as contact. There can be no proper basis for the proceedings continuing unless and until there is robust evidence of real change. There is no reliable evidence of proper acknowledgment or understanding, and I can place little to no weight on the apology offer in the father’s second set of submissions through counsel, coming as it did after the point had been made by Mr Blount that there was a notable absence of any acknowledgment of harm or apology, and only after submissions had closed for the first time. At no stage has the father sought to file or give proper evidence of the remorse he now says he has felt since January. In any event, remorse without a real understanding of how the little things he has continued doing in contact are perpetuating a pattern of harm, cannot make contact any safer.

Mr D’s submissions reference proportionality. It is right that a decision to stop all direct contact with a child is a momentous decision for any child. That is why I was at pains to ensure that Mr D had every opportunity before I made my decision, to ensure his case was fully put and all arguments that could properly be made were put. But that does not make my decision disproportionate. In my judgment C’s emotional safety now and in the longer term demands this pause in contact and, since supervision has been ineffective, and I accept the evidence of a need for a pause for repair and therapeutic work for C and her mother, there is no less draconian outcome consistent with C’s welfare. This is in line with the welfare principle, and with the criteria that PD12J requires me to consider, in particular as to the safety of contact for C and her mum.

I hope that the pause is not forever, but that is in Mr D’s hands. He will need to reflect on whether he is willing to commit to the in depth work required, and prioritise it. He should be under no illusion that returning to court with a fresh application for the resumption of contact before he has completed that work is unlikely to be met with success. It is a matter for Mr D what course he undertakes but I am going to impose a prohibition on further applications concerning C for 20 months from today, unless permission is given. That will allow time for the Respect accredited work to be undertaken, and for proper reflection and change, and at least for 1:1 therapy to start. Mr D has my permission to release both judgments to any course provider or therapist to assist in this work.

In the event of any application before the 20 months has elapsed, that must be made initially without notice to the mother to be dealt with on paper. Any such application must be supported by evidence and accompanied by my judgments and the orders from the fact finding hearing and today.

I give permission for the order from today to be shared with professionals working with the family and the school, and for the order and judgment to be shared within the financial remedy proceedings, for use within those proceedings only and on condition that anonymity is maintained insofar as there are any reports of the financial proceedings.

I will continue the Prohibited Steps Order. Ms E assures me that she understands her ongoing responsibilities as a parent who shared PR with Mr D and I see evidence of that in her attempts to seek consent from him for C to have her ears pierced. Those duties continue. Mr D does not need access to C’s medical records. He can and should be confident that she is well cared for by her mother and will be informed of any major medical developments. I note school report an improvement in C’s health and attendance since being in her mother’s sole care.

For the avoidance of doubt, I am going to direct also that since C is already in receipt of therapy following my findings being made, and there is no opposition to that, that this work can continue at the mother’s sole discretion.

I will write C a letter explaining my decision in age appropriate terms. I know that Cafcass will do so also, although sadly because Ms Murray is a s7 report writer rather than a Guardian I did not think I could prevail on her to carry out a face to face meeting with C to tell her my decision. I know that the mother will give anxious consideration to how best to inform C of my decision and to support her after, and will do so likely in discussion with her school and therapist. I agree that the mother should not be left to deliver the news on her own, and that she should, if she can, identify a neutral third party to do so, either alone or perhaps in her company. That is a matter that I leave to the discretion of the mother.

I have read and considered the written submissions on publication. Both parties’ advocates have confirmed that their position is the same in respect of both judgments (albeit that those submissions were made without sight of this judgment). The mother agrees to anonymised reporting.

The father opposes reporting primarily on the basis of a risk of damage to his reputation and employment prospects. Providing there is adequate anonymisation it seems to me this is not a strong basis upon which to oppose publication, particularly since it is the father’s own conduct (which he tells me he now accepts) which is presumably going to give rise to any reputational damage. In any event, I intend to anonymise my judgment to omit reference to identifying features including most of those sought by the father (I say most because some of the maters he suggests would be identifying are not even in my judgments).

I will anonymise all the ‘usual’ identifying information (names, dates, places) and any information about the particular characteristics of the family which might identify them (which I am not specifying here).

When I consider the balance of factors in favour and against publication it seems to me that the balance falls firmly in favour of publication of both judgments, showing how I have approached the findings and welfare decisions in this case, and why I have made the important decisions I have. The Family Court’s treatment of issues around domestic abuse is a topic of considerable public debate and concern, and it is important that, where possible, information is made available to the public to better inform those debates. The legitimate rights and welfare of the parties and C will not be adversely affected by the publication, as these are protected by my decision on anonymisation.

Before publication I will take the opportunity to correct any typographical errors in this judgment and a number of obvious ‘voice dictation’ errors in my earlier judgment, none of which alter the substance of my decision.

I intend to publish both judgments in due course, in a suitably anonymised form.

That is my judgment.