B v C & Anor

This is my extempore judgment in respect of an application to enforce a child arrangements order. The applicant father is [redacted] and he appeared as a litigant in person. I pause there to give a note to any transcribers that Child in this judgment should be referred to as “E”, the mother referred to as “C” and the father referred to as “B”.

The respondent mother is C, formerly [Redacted]. She did not attend the hearing and I am satisfied that she was aware of the hearing. The court received an email from her sent to the solicitor for the child at 8.04am on 28 January this year. E is a party to proceedings. She is represented by Ms Sanderson, solicitor. The rule 16.4 guardian who has been appointed by CAFCASS. The mother, it appears, has never attended court and she has not engaged in these proceedings. Her failure to properly engage is inexcusable.

It is with regret that I need to set out the procedural background in some length to give context to this judgment. The parents commenced a relationship in 2008. E was born on 23 November 2010. The relationship between the parents ended at the end of 2011 or the start of 2012. A final child arrangements order was made by consent on 1 December 2012. The order provided for the father to see E on Tuesday afternoons and alternate Saturdays.

The family were known to Hertfordshire in 2020 and 2021 with concerns predominantly relating to the mother’s new husband, referred to as “D”. In November 2021 contact between E and her father ceased. The relationship with D appears to have been domestically abusive. Mother and D have two children together. For the avoidance of any doubt, this is not B and nor has he been involved in concerns by the local authority as to any domestic abuse.

On 4 March 2022 the father applied for an order to enforce the child arrangements order from 2012. A safeguarding letter was produced on 15 July 2022 and whilst not wanting to go too far back into the history, that safeguarding letter sets out that the father applied for a child arrangements order when E was 18 months of age and that he had played a significant role in her life prior to separation with the mother. No safeguarding concerns were identified and I note there is some reference to the paternal grandfather sending abusive letters to the mother’s solicitors and also to the parents arguing.

At that hearing various directions were made, including for a statement from the mother and an update from E’s school. On 10 February 2023 CAFCASS provided an updating safeguarding letter and a FHDRA was listed on 16 February 2023. The order of 16 February 2023 provided for a section 7 report and suspended the order made on 1 December 2012. On 28 June 2023 the court directed an ICFA (improving child and family arrangements) service. The mother attended the hearing and agreed to the ICFA along with indirect contact.

Proceedings were transferred to Cambridge at the request of the mother. On 22 November 2023 a hearing was listed at the Family Court sitting at Cambridge. The mother did not attend. The order records the mother refused to travel for the ICFA. It appeared that indirect contact had commenced. The case was reallocated to district judge level. A penal notice was attached for the mother to attend the next hearing along with a direction for personal service.

On 19 March 2024 a further hearing took place. The mother attended via video link. It is recorded that the mother stated that E refused to attend the first ICFA session. A further ICFA was directed and a penal notice attached to secure the mother’s attendance at the DRA listed on 22 October 2024 along with a direction for an addendum section 7 report. Again, the mother and E did not engage in the ICFA.

On 22 October 2024 a further hearing took place. The mother did not attend. The court fined her £250 for breach of the penal notice attached for her to attend the hearing. A further penal notice was attached to secure her attendance at the next hearing. It does not appear that there was a direction for personal or substituted service of that order on the mother.

A further hearing took place on 7 January 2025 and again the mother failed to attend. On 7 March 2025 a hearing took place in Cambridge again. The mother did not attend. A warrant for arrest was made for the mother to be brought to court to account for her failure to attend the hearing and to consider possible contempt of court. An adjourned hearing was listed on 30 April 2025 with the mother to attend in person, again with a penal notice attached. My reading of that order, I can see no reference to personal service or otherwise of the penal notice. On 30 April 2025 the mother failed again to attend the hearing but had been in contact with the court indicating she had not received the notice of hearing. E was made a party to proceedings and a rule 16.4 guardian appointed to act on her behalf.

There was a hearing on 16 June 2025. The mother did not attend. A direction was made for her to provide recent school reports, a copy of the EHCP, if it existed, and any medical reports. A statement was sent by the mother to the solicitor for the child as well as a video statement. A direction was made for E to be taken to CAFCASS offices to meet with the guardian. Personal service was directed and yet a further hearing directed to take place on 15 July 2025. A warrant of arrest was attached to secure the mother’s attendance. I noted that the mother’s position was set out in that order. Her position was E wished to have no contact with her father but recorded that contact did take place between the two of them from 2012 until 2021.

On 15 July 2025 the mother failed to attend the hearing before HHJ Choudhry. A DWP order was made. The matter was transferred to the Family Court sitting at Watford as it was believed that E now resided in Hertfordshire. The order also sets out that a section 16A risk assessment was undertaken by CAFCASS. A section 37 report was directed to be undertaken by Hertfordshire County Council. Personal service was directed on the mother and permission given for her to attend remotely at the next hearing.

On 16 September 2025 the case came before HHJ Richard Clarke. The mother did not attend. An addendum section 37 report was directed and a further hearing listed on 19 November 2025. On 19 November 2025 the matter returned before HHJ Clarke. The mother did not attend the hearing despite having notice. Directions were made for the filing of statements and the matter listed for a final hearing with a time estimate of one day. In addition, the court refused a further section 37 report or a change of primary residence. The court recorded that the mother had repeatedly failed to attend or to participate in proceedings. Due to social work and guardian availability, this matter has been listed before me today, 28 January 2026. On my maths, there have been at least 13 hearings on the enforcement application, twice before lay justices and before eight different judges.

I turn to the evidence. I have read the father’s statements. They are balanced. They set out his reasons for wanting to have a relationship with his daughter and the efforts to try and secure the same. He is clearly saddened at the mother’s total lack of engagement in proceedings and the undue influence by the mother with impunity has caused him great sadness and frustration. I sympathise with his position. I have seen five short statements from the mother and purportedly from E. I have read these in light of the matters contained in the section 7 and section 37 reports.

Put simply, the mother does not accept she has exaggerated or fabricated events as reported by CAFCASS. She does not accept she has encouraged E to have a negative view of her father or failed to promote him positively to E. Her latest statements, which do not contain a statement of truth but are said to be written by both the mother and E, contain abusive, threatening and condescending tones, threats to make reports to the police and others, including getting her ex-husband, D, to take matters into his own hands.

The tone of the statements sets out a clear position that E does not want to see her father and suffers from poor mental health. As I have said, they are also abusive towards CAFCASS, the father and the local authority. She has made threats to go to the press. They are accusatory in nature and do not in any way show any understanding of the importance of proceedings and the likely damage caused to E by the mother’s own entrenched views and lack of engagement.

Her final statement makes allegations that the paternal grandfather is a paedophile, that the paternal family are unstable and verbally and emotionally abusive. The mother suggests that the decision to stop contact was down to E but I note the long period of contact between 2012 and 2021 that took place before contact stopped. The mother’s final statement concludes with the following:

“This family should never be allowed access to children and this should of never got this far in the court system given that E voiced her wants, wishes and needs repeatedly from the very start. She’s done a video statement. She’s wrote statements. She spoke to my previous solicitor. She spoke to a children’s services worker. She wrote letters to both family members. She spoke to CAFCASS, though they lied to her and twisted her words. She has done everything she possibly can to get her message across and you have still ignored her. E DOES NOT want contact visits, pictures, phone calls, smoke signals, carrier pigeon or any other form of communication/visitation. If these happen they will be reported to the police continuously and I will then file for a non-molestation order.”

As I say, I have read a transcript of a video allegedly made by E when she was 14.

I turn to the evidence of social services and CAFCASS. The section 7 report dated 6 June 2023 records that the mother made allegations of domestic abuse, notwithstanding the lack of contact between her and the father and the time spent between E and her father for nearly ten years. The mother believes that E is autistic but there is no diagnosis of this. In the report, E explains that the family are in a refuge away from D who allegedly is the perpetrator of domestic abuse. The CAFCASS officer records that there has not been any contact between E and her father since November 2021 and that the father refuted any allegations of domestic abuse.

There was concern highlighted that the mother was placing a responsibility on E far beyond her age and that the mother had over shared information. It was noted that the language used was similar between E and her mother. The CAFCASS officer did not believe there was sufficient reason or justification for E to be rejecting her father and little thought had been given by the mother to consider E’s need to have a relationship with him. The report concluded with the recommendation of an ICFA as well as indirect contact by way of letters.

Hertfordshire County Council have undertaken two section 37 reports. The first is dated 2 September 2025 and the second dated 23 October 2025. The first section 37 report records that the social worker spoke with the mother who told her that she would not be permitting the social worker to speak to E and was suggesting that the author had fabricated information in the proceedings. That section 37 report sets out the background of the father’s relationships and some of the successful contact and activities that they engaged in together. The report fully considers the welfare checklist and the range of orders open to the court and concludes that E should spend time with her father and have indirect contact.

It became apparent that E had been withdrawn from her school in February 2025 and home-schooled. The addendum section 37 report considered information from E’s former school and therapeutic sessions which she engaged in. The report records that E was registered as a young carer. The elective home education team confirmed that they had not seen E during their visits and have no rights of access without consent. This in turn means there is little independent information as to E’s welfare and wellbeing or the education that she is currently actually receiving. The report again reflects the concerns that E is being socially isolated which in turn is causing harm by way of lack of meaningful relationships with her family, friends and therefore peer validation. Additional concerns for E are that she is being “alienated” from her father.

The outcome of the report was to arrange a strategy discussion to consider whether the threshold is met for the provision of protective services. That took place but the report concluded that threshold was not found to instigate public law proceedings. I also note that E’s half siblings were withdrawn from school in October 2025 and are both being home-schooled as well. As I have said, E is registered as a young carer.

The strategy meeting was convened on 7 November 2025 and the initial child protection conference (ICPC) took place on 12 November 2025. The threshold for a child protection plan was not found to have been met and it was thought then that little would be gained by a child in need plan as that required the voluntary agreement to work with social services from the mother and therefore the case was closed with no further action.

On 11 November 2025 the police were asked to undertake a welfare check by the local authority. They did so. There were no concerns documented as to the home conditions or E’s presentation, but I remind myself that a police welfare check is likely to be very different in nature to a welfare check undertaken by a social worker or, indeed, a joint welfare check with the police and social services.

The rule 16.4 guardian filed his report on 14 November 2025. Due to E’s age and the total lack of engagement by the mother and E in the process, the report recommends that proceedings conclude without any orders. Other options such as a transfer of primary care would not be in E’s best interests, and I will come on to this a little bit more, because in his report the guardian highlights his concerns about E’s emotional wellbeing in the care of her mother, the quality of education she may be receiving and that her immediate welfare is being harmed by not having any form of communication or relationship with her father. The guardian has balanced this against taking steps to re-establish E spending time with her father and determines that E’s welfare would be greatly or more harmed by taking steps to try to re-establish that relationship.

The guardian reminds me that these proceedings have now been going on for nearly 200 weeks. He has made many attempts to contact the mother without response. He has been unable to meet with E notwithstanding his role as her rule 16.4 guardian. None the less, having considered the written evidence, the guardian’s opinion is that E is a very vulnerable child who has and continues to experience high levels of adversity. He is particularly concerned about the mother’s non-engagement with professionals and the isolation of E through her home education. He says there is evidence that she is being emotionally harmed and requires professional support which is no longer in place.

The guardian in his report sets out the Family Justice Council 2024 definition of alienating behaviours which are defined as:

“Psychologically manipulative behaviours, intended or otherwise, by a parent towards a child which have resulted in the child’s reluctance, resistance, or refusal to spend time with the other parent.”

He goes on to explore this further and, in particular, the way in which children can develop distorted belief systems that impact on their internal working models of self and others. There is very limited information available about E’s needs and she is not receiving support from professional services having previously been assessed as necessary. The ability of E’s mother to be able to make decisions that are in E’s best interests remains questionable. However, this has to be seen in the context that the local authority does not consider the threshold met to convene a further child protection conference.

The guardian opines that it is extremely unlikely that the mother will work in partnership with the local authority under any framework where her consent is required. The guardian concludes that, with sadness and regret, there is no workable way for E to re-establish a relationship with her father within these proceedings. No criticism is levied at the father at all and the guardian recognises the feelings of frustration and disappointment with proceedings needing to end without any form of relationship being re-established between E and her father.

The guardian also has had regard to the amount of time that E has not seen her father, her reportedly stating that she does not want to see him regardless of any undue influence from the mother, her emotional difficulties and her ability to vote with her feet all mean that any change of residence would be an extreme measure to take and likely to have a very significant impact on her welfare without any guarantee of success and he sets out it may go further than this and lead to a significant detrimental impact on E’s emotional wellbeing and her relationship with her father.

When undertaking this balance, including the ingrained strong sense of loyalty E has to her mother and the relationship with her half siblings, the guardian is unable to support a change of residence or, indeed, to support the making of an order for E to spend time with her father. His recommendation is therefore proceedings to conclude with no order. The guardian totally sympathises with the father’s predicament and the impact of that recommendation.

The guardian recommends E should have access to therapeutic supports, including life story work, for E to have her father’s contact details, for the father to create a memory box for E for the future and for him to be updated as much as possible by professionals, including those providing updates as to her education and involved with E because, of course, he continues to share parental responsibility for her.

I heard short oral evidence from the father, the social worker and the guardian. The social worker confirmed that the home education team had not met E but that the father is entitled to receive information from them about E’s academic progress. She did say that E has been seeing her friends from her previous school which his positive.

The social worker agreed that there should be a re-referral for a further strategy meeting to consider whether or not to convene an ICPC. E is not accessing support for young carers and is not accessing the therapeutic intervention previously deemed necessary due to her emotional vulnerability. I remind myself that there were suggestions of autistic traits but there has been, of course, no formal diagnosis for E.

The father in his evidence confirmed that he has only ever wanted to resume his relationship with E and will do anything to support her in doing so. He also showed me some photographs of himself and E together which were lovely.

The guardian was clear that the local authority should reconsider convening an ICPC and that his concerns as to E’s emotional and educational wellbeing had not abated from his report.

I set out the law briefly. Section 1 of the Children Act provides when a court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child, the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration. Section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 sets out the welfare checklist. Section 1(5) provides that the court should not make any order with regard to a child unless it is satisfied that it is better to make an order for the child than to make no order at all.

I have to consider the rights in respect of the family and private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and if there is an interference with the right to private and family life, that I should only interfere to the extent that it is necessary and proportionate to do so and if the rights of a child conflict with those of the parents, the rights of the child prevail.

I deal briefly with section 11J in respect of enforcement of orders. Subsection (2) provides that if the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person has failed to comply with a provision of the child arrangements order, it may make an order (an “enforcement order”) imposing on the person an unpaid work requirement. The court, subsection (3) provides, the court may not make an enforcement order if it is satisfied that the person had a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the provision. (4) the burden of proof as to the matter mentioned in subsection (3) lies on the person claiming to have had a reasonable excuse, and the standard for that is the balance of probabilities.

This is a case where there has been total disengagement by the mother with the court process other than sending emails, as I have referred to earlier, and one actual statement. I have the section 37 reports which set out the threshold for commencing public law proceedings is not met. I have a full welfare analysis. I have a welfare check undertaken by the police which raises no concerns and there is an entrenched view of a 15 year old who will be 16 later this year who has constantly and consistently said, rightly or wrongly, that she does not want to see her father. There is no pathway for her to move on from these views however they have come about.

On the evidence before me, the impact of trying to force E to have contact in one way is not easily achieved and if I made an order for the same, it would go directly against the ascertainable wishes and feelings of E in light of her age and understanding notwithstanding how she has come to this view. The guardian has carefully analysed the impact and balance of harm and the father’s suggested strategy perhaps of a change of primary carer or making an interim care order is not in any way likely to succeed, in my judgment, because very sadly there is nothing to be gained and likely to only create further rejection and anger and hostility towards the father and paternal family and in coming to this decision, I have reminded myself of the Article 8 rights I have referred to earlier.

So I have to decide what steps, if any, I should take on the father’s application to enforce a child arrangements order. I have to consider what is necessary and proportionate having had regards to E’s welfare needs. E has a highly negative mindset towards her father. The evidence of this is overwhelming in the “joint letters” sent to the father and to the court. The lack of engagement in the section 37 reporting process and the court process is patently obvious but a change in primary residence for a child of this age when I consider the other welfare matters identified by the guardian is simply not justifiable.

So it is with deep frustration that the father’s application and the work undertaken by the local authority by way of their assessments and the appointment and reports of a rule 16.4 guardian, have all come to nothing. I am sure the father will think what a waste of time and that the last 46 months has achieved simply nothing. He is no further forward with his relationship with his daughter than when he started this entire process and whilst I sympathise with that position, I have of course to make welfare determinations having regard to section 1 and 1(3) of the Children Act 1989.

I find that the father genuinely wants a relationship with his daughter which he says has been totally frustrated by the mother and that the court process has been unable to achieve that for him and, indeed, E.

The responsibility of making E available to spend time with her father rests with the mother. She is clearly a substantial part of the problem by not complying with court orders or engaging in proceedings or assessments and that is her responsibility to bear. However, the options are limited. I have had to consider the family dynamics. I have considered whether there is a real possibility that any order is practical and workable and whether in the event of non-compliance there is a realistic possibility of it being successfully enforced, bearing in mind the length of these proceedings and E’s age.

Very sadly, what has now become clear to me is that E will not benefit from continuing attempts for her to make a relationship between her and her father. There are limits to the attempts that can be made to re-establish that contact and especially with an unwilling child of E’s age and presentation. The guardian is clear that it is contrary to her welfare interests to try and re-establish direct contact within these proceedings or for there to be a change of primary care. Having undertaken my own welfare analysis, I accept this opinion. I am satisfied that all avenues have been explored appropriately and that continued efforts within these proceedings should be no longer pursued, save that the local authority should make a fresh referral for consideration of a strategy meeting and for consideration for an ICPC to be convened.

I do not know the extent that E has been influenced by her mother’s hostility towards the father but I think it highly likely. I do not know the extent of emotional harm that E has suffered as a result of this. I have to be realistic in concluding whether or not any further attempt to enforce contact is bound to fail and would be harmful to E and I remind myself of the no order principle and by making no order, I am saddened to say, is the lesser of two evils. As I have said, the welfare ramifications for forcing E to either live with her father or spend time with her father outweigh the potential benefits because all decisions must be linked to her welfare. I come full circle to section 1 that the paramount consideration by the court is E’s welfare.

If E reads this judgment one day, she will need to understand that her mother’s behaviour has been lamentable. Her mother has entirely frustrated the court process and therefore, in effect, prohibited any relationship between E and her father for nearly the last five years. That is the mother’s responsibility to bear and E needs to know that. I have no doubt that the father loves E and has done absolutely everything to reignite that relationship that they once had and only has her best welfare interests in this application.

So, in conclusion, I make the following orders. I find beyond reasonable doubt that the mother has breached the child arrangements order dated 1 December 2012 and there is no reasonable excuse for doing so. I make no separate order as to any unpaid work in the circumstances of this case. I make no order on the father’s application for a child arrangements order. A copy of my judgment will be transcribed and a copy provided to the local authority. I invite the local authority to make a referral for a further strategy meeting, an ICPC and for the father to be provided with information about E’s education notwithstanding she is home-schooled.

That concludes my judgment.