A Child born 2017 – Final Hearing, Re

I heard this matter on Friday 27 February 2026 at West London Family court sitting at the RCJ, for a final hearing in an application for child contact arrangements pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989.

The applicant father, (who I shall hence refer to as “F” as is customary), made an application in December 2024 to enforce a contact order made in 2022, so as to have contact with the parties’ child, who I shall refer to as ‘C’, who was born in summer 2017 and is currently eight years old. F has not had contact with C since 2022.

F’s application is opposed by the child’s mother, (‘M’) and it is not supported by CAFCASS. C has refused to have contact with F on several occasions notwithstanding the prior order for contact made in 2022. F believes this is due to purported ‘parental alienation’ by C against him, on the part of M. This is a submission the court sees very regularly and has been dealt with at length by the Family Justice Council in its 2024 report (Footnote: ¹) where parental alienation was debunked as a ‘syndrome’.

In that report, judges were reminded to closely consider the facts of each case and take the circumstance of each child on their own merits, which is what I have attempted to do throughout the hearing in coming to my decisions.

M (and C) became known to Women’s Aid in September 2017 where M was assessed as a high-risk domestic abuse victim. M reported during this period that she had been in a relationship with F for three years and disclosed physical, sexual, financial and emotional abuse throughout the relationship but advised that the abuse, violence and control was much worse during the pregnancy, between late 2016 into 2017.

M raised concerns to Women’s Aid that F raped her during pregnancy. She said that F regularly pulled her around the house by her hair. F had allegedly attempted to strangle her twice. F would tell her she is not praying correctly, not dressing correctly, he hid her make up and broke her straighteners to stop her “dressing up for other boys”.

In December 2017, when C was only a few months old, F was convicted at the Crown Court sitting at Cardiff of the offence of Controlling or Coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship, contrary to section 76(1) and (11) of the Serious Crime Act 2015. F pleaded guilty to this offence. The victim of his offending was M. I infer that much of the domestic abuse which was subject of those criminal proceedings will have occurred when C was still in utero.

F was sentenced to four months imprisonment, suspended for eighteen months; made subject to a five-year Restraining Order; ordered to carry out unpaid work for 100 hours; and to participate in the ‘Building Better Relationships’ course for thirty days.

The fact of a conviction in the criminal court is probative. It is trite to say that the criminal court decides facts to a higher standard of proof than the civil and family courts- namely that a Magistrate or juror must be sure that a fact is proven and be sure of guilt. The only way that can happen is after a guilty plea, which is taken to be dispositive of that fact, or after a trial.

However, the mere presence of a conviction is not definitive as a reason why a parent cannot have contact with their child. To suggest otherwise would be churlish and contrary to the principles of access to justice and to parental responsibility.

It is arguable at least that the fact of a conviction for domestic-abuse related matters, where they are less historic in the whole context of the child’s life, and where the convicted does not accept the conviction or fails to show insight into the impact of that harm, is likely to be highly relevant as a welfare consideration within the context of section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. This is the north star which judges of the family court must follow in cases such as this.

A print from the Police National Computer (‘PNC’) indicates that F has five convictions for six offences between 2017 and 2025; and a non-conviction outcome (reprimand, warning or caution) from 2011. In addition to the index offence involving M, F’s antecedent forensic history includes drug driving and failing to give a sample relating to the same offence in July 2021, for which he was banned from driving and given 80 hours of unpaid work. In 2023 this order was subsequently varied for his failure to complete that penalty, and he was given an additional 20 hours of unpaid work.

F has convictions for possession of cannabis and possession of cocaine in 2023 and 2025, for which he was fined. In May 2025 he was given a community resolution notice by the police after being a passenger in a stopped car who was in possession of eight cannisters of nitrous oxide. He was referred, as part of this, to a drugs intervention programme. It is not clear to me whether he complied with this.

C has been subject to Children Act proceedings for much of her life. Proceedings were initiated by F in 2020. During the course of those proceedings, C was represented by a Guardian, who prepared a ‘section 7 report’. Those proceedings concluded with a final order on 30 November 2022 providing for C to live with M; to spend time with F via supervised contact, eventually extending to unsupervised contact in the community in due course.

Contact was not successful. C refused to meet with F and has not had contact with him since at least November 2022. The present proceedings began with an application made by F for enforcement of the 2022 final order. CAFCASS were in turn directed to prepare a safeguarding letter and the case was listed for a hearing in February 2025.

At the hearing on 25 February 2025, before Deputy District Judge Fallows, F’s application for enforcement was dismissed and the court deemed that the appropriate application was an application to vary. The 2022 final order was suspended. F informed the court that the reason for his delay in applying was due to health issues. He was directed to file a letter from his GP in respect of his health issues. The matter was listed for a FHDRA.

At the FHDRA on 29 April 2025, before District Judge Dias, the court directed CAFCASS to prepare a report pursuant to Section 7 Children Act. F was directed to undergo hair strand testing. The matter was listed for a DRA.

CAFCASS produced their report on 7 October 2025. The report concludes, by way of summary, that direct or indirect contact with F would present a risk of harm to C. The report recommends that no order for contact with F be made by the court and that the court consider granting a s91(14) order against F to safeguard C from further litigation.

At the DRA on 7 November 2025, before District Judge Fenton, agreement was reached between the parties that there should be a final lives-with order in M’s favour. The parties were directed to file witness statements in response to the section 7 report and the matter was listed for a final hearing. The report author was directed to attend and directions were made for the appointment of a QLR for F. F was directed to file a list of questions by 4pm on the date seven days before the final hearing and the order provided that if he did not do so, he would be barred from cross-examining M. A police disclosure order was made against the Police.

M supports the recommendations of CAFCASS and seeks a final order making no provision for direct or indirect contact between C and F. She also supports the making of a s91(14), placing restrictions on F’s ability to make further applications under the Children Act. M reports that C is well-settled and has no desire to see F. It is M’s case that in light of F’s history of domestic abuse, his failure to demonstrate any insight or take any responsibility for the same, and his ongoing active substance usage, to grant any order requiring C to have contact with F would be greatly deleterious to her wellbeing and hazardous to her safety. M describes herself as mentally and physically broken from the effects of F’s behaviour.

F has not filed and served his witness statement in response to the section 7 report. He also remains in breach of the order of 25 February 2025 in which he was directed to provide a GP letter. Police disclosure has been received from the Police.

At the hearing, the court heard from M, who was ably represented by Mr Holley of counsel, and from F via an appointed QLR, Mr Nwadike. The court had the benefit of a bundle and position statements, and a report from CAFCASS, who attended remotely to assist the court in the person of Ms Lambert, a manager within the CAFCASS team.

As a preliminary point, due to the lack of a witness statement or list of questions from F in advance (see para 19, above) the court was in the dark as to:

After hearing submissions, I decided to decline to allow F to cross examine M via his QLR, and instead to be able to rely on submissions only. I made this decision because of a lack of a witness statement, a list of questions and generally lack of compliance with the prior orders on those points. In order to ensure I understood F’s case, I allowed F to address me on the points arising at point c, above, regards the Hair Strand Test.

I asked F for his position on substance misuse, and he responded at length, and with candour, setting out that he accepts he has an addiction problem, that he is “not proud” of this; that he has misused cannabis, cocaine and alcohol by mixing them together on a regular basis over recent years; and that when he has tried to reduce one of these substances, use of the others has sometimes increased. F recognised that mixing substances, for example alcohol and cocaine, is very dangerous. He indicated that he feels using cocaine makes him feel “more sober” but accepts this is misconceived.

F said that his substance problem has come about, or at least been exacerbated by, his feelings of anxiety and depression, which he attributes in part to separation from C. He indicated he had sought help via his GP in 2025, and had been referred to substance misuse intervention and talking therapy last year. He accepted this has not yet caused abstinence with regard to all substances, indicating he last misused cocaine a month ago, and drinks roughly once a week, but perhaps to excess. He suggested he had not used cannabis for some time. He frankly accepted that he had not evidenced any of this prior to today by way of a witness statement and information from medical professionals. He accepted that his application would be better served by such evidence, including of abstinence and having overcome the addiction he speaks of.

Ms Lambert for CAFCASS then gave evidence remotely and was cross examined by each advocate in turn. She endorsed the conclusions of the report, and maintained that CAFCASS’ position is that no contact (indirect or direct) should be ordered at present, and that F should be made subject to a debarring/permission order per section 91(14) Children Act 1989, on the twin basis that he needs to address his prior convictions for domestic abuse (and undertake work on this theme) and his substance abuse (and provide evidence of abstinence). Ms Lambert gave credit to F for his candour as to his substance misuse, and indicated this was the first step toward working toward overcoming this problem in future. I echo this.

Mr Nwadike cross examined Ms Lambert and asked her why it was that CAFCASS in November 2025 was recommending no contact – whereas there had been previous proceedings in 2022 where a guardian was appointed and a prior section 7 report done. Mr Nwadike suggested, by inference, that for the court to make an order for contact in 2022, the report in those proceedings must have a) been aware of the issues F faces and b) not raised sufficient safeguarding concerns to oppose all contact. Ms Lambert accepted she had not had sight of the prior report, but suggested that in the interim between 2022-2025/6 the training and approach of CAFCASS had evolved over time, such that more credence was being given to the impact of indirect harm toward children who experience abuse between parents vicariously.

Ms Lambert also pointed out that the recent HST and admissions by F suggested ongoing issues, and that he had faced further police matters involving drugs since the prior order, indicating ongoing concerns. Ms Lambert indicated that in her view, where a child had witnessed domestic abuse between parents, they should be taken to be a victim of domestic abuse themselves.

F then made submissions, supported by Mr Nwadike, who I allowed to assist in making those points as he had done prior. F submitted that the court should take note of the fact that the 2022 final order was made on the basis that it tacitly must have been found that F was safe to have at least some degree of contact with C. F asked that I disregard the 2025 CAFCASS report, which F submitted is not in the best interests of furthering the bond between C and F.

F submitted that he would accept any form of indirect contact, just to keep the relationship going, because he was worried that any further gap between him and C in contact would strain the relationship between them further. F pointed out that for three years he has not had contact with C. F submitted that the medical issues (which were of course not evidenced before me prior) would be assisted by having some sort of indirect contact with C, suggesting that at least seeing pictures of C would help him to achieve his goals as to abstinence.

F was silent as to any intervention he would make of his own volition as to completing a DAPP programme or other similar work aimed at improving his understanding of the harm his previous actions have caused. Indeed, he failed to reference his prior domestic violence conviction, and I must take as a starting point the clear minimisation and obfuscation which F outlined in the CAFCASS report.

On behalf of M, Mr Holley reiterated that F had failed to provide any positive case as to welfare. He had failed to advance any medical evidence, he had failed to provide a witness statement and had failed to indicate any insight whatsoever as to the impact of his prior actions on M and C. Any one of these failures would be enough to prevent contact between F and C, and taken together they were insurmountable, M said.

Mr Holley pointed out that C had refused to see F relatively soon after the prior child arrangements order had been made, yet F had failed to take steps to enforce that order for nearly three years, which indicated a lack of child-focussed thinking by F.

It is a fact that F has been convicted of a serious domestic violence offence by his guilty plea, but since then has sought to minimise and deny any such behaviour to professionals involved in his case. This indicates a complete absence of insight by F.

M submitted that I should only rely on the up-to-date report from CAFCASS and should not be taken off track by a submission that the court in 2022 must have been sufficiently happy that safeguarding issues could be managed.

There was no indication that F had taken steps to address his abuse or his substance issues. He had told the CAFCASS report writer that he had used drugs around the prior proceedings (in 2022) but tested positive for active cocaine use in the high range in 2025, and was now admitted to ongoing use of other substances. This was indictive of profound long term drugs problems. The candour displayed today by F was a good first step, but it did not offer solutions to that problem.

The court was being invited to direct contact in the context of ongoing, significant and unknown risks around substances by F, in context where he had denied to the HST reporter prior to the results that he had used any illicit substances. It is not sufficient to say that F will “in future” engage and deal with this problem, he had had several years to engage in substance abuse courses and had not yet done so.

F had not put a positive case which was child focussed and addressed the significant concerns. No thought had been given as to how to reintroduce contact with C, and F accepted he had not been involved in C’s life for over three years. Any directions for contact would be unsafe. Even indirect contact would impose risks of emotional harm to C, indirect contact by letter or email was not supported by any positive welfare-based case – i.e. “how would such an order benefit C?”

On the point that F seemed to suggest in his submissions that at least seeing photos of C would provide something for him to work towards in lessening his substance issues, M did not oppose this. I explored this with counsel at some length. I am satisfied that there is on balance an argument that providing photos of C to F does not cause C harm, and may in turn provide emphasis to F to work toward becoming a better co-parent in future. I am aware that this is perhaps somewhat of a circuitous argument, but on balance, I am prepared to make such an order with consent of the parents.

In regards s.91(14) of the Act (a so called ‘debarring or permission’ restriction in the Order, which would prohibit a party from making applications under conditions in the future for a period of time) M submitted that this ought to be on the following broad basis:

I have closely considered the evidence and the submissions from both parties. I accept, and note with concern, that F has failed to apply his mind to this application and has failed to comply with judicial orders. It is not acceptable that he did not provide a witness statement in response to the CAFCASS report, and failed to provide medical evidence or evidence as to substance abuse or domestic abuse.

Those failures have been complete and compounded. Taken separately, one or two missing documents, with a fulsome apology and perhaps oral evidence to fill in the blanks, might assist. I take the view that F has failed to advance a positive case as to how contact with C would be in the child’s best interests, whatsoever. He has failed to advance a positive welfare case as against the Welfare Checklist at s.1(3) of the Act, so I struggle to assess the quality, if it can be put like that, of his position.

F has failed to grasp the nettle when it comes to his prior convictions and the seriousness of the coercive control conviction. He has failed to address the point that C would have been subject to abuse by F against M both in utero and as a small baby. He has failed to address the harm he caused to M and indirectly to C. I find that he has largely minimised, obfuscated, diminished and gaslit M by way of the things he said to CAFCASS – in essence denying that he was an abuser apart from limited examples – which I note included smashing M’s head into a mirror, inter alia.

F has also failed to understand the impact of his substance abuse upon his ability to coparent C and to play an active and safe part in C’s life at the moment. He has focussed on the anxiety, depression and upset that not seeing C has caused him over the years, and uses this as a cause of his substance misuse. I do not accept that. It is more likely that F has had an ongoing and not insignificant substance abuse problem for many years, which coupled with his domestic abuse against M, which C was involved in collaterally, has diminished his insight and empathy as to how his behaviour impacts M and C. In essence, he places his own needs and wants as higher than those of M and C, and in doing so has completely failed to offer insight in a child-focussed manner.

Albeit I cannot make directions to F as to what he must do next, I would strongly urge him to address the twin problems in his life: domestic abuse and substance abuse. They are rarely, in these cases, in my experience completely distinct and discrete. Just as F suggested that cocaine makes him feel more sober after 2-3 drinks, and allows him to drink more, his minimisation of his substance misuse and abuse has emboldened him to see himself through the mistaken lens of the victim. This is not unusual in this court.

As to any notion of parental alienation by M of C, I reject this as lacking in any good faith evidential basis. It is more likely that C did not want to see F because of the things F had done to her and to her mother. F needs to take ownership of that if he is to make himself a better parent.

I would strongly suggest that F needs to remain sober and also address his perpetration of domestic abuse before any safe contact can take place. At present, all the positive evidence I have as to each parents respective ability to meet C’s needs apropos the Welfare Checklist has been provided by M in her witness statement. F has completely failed to provide me with anything I can assess positively in his favour, and therefore this whole application was misconceived and mistimed, and was likely to cause harm to M and C which I find it has done.

I am satisfied to the extent that I need to make positive findings about M, that all the evidence from her and from the professionals about her is that she is eminently capable of meeting all C’s needs as a parent and is doing the best she can at this.

For those reasons, I am going to make an order per s.91(14) to give breathing space to C and to ensure M has the clarity and safety to meet her needs as sole parent until such time as F can show M, C and the court that he has worked on himself as a parent and worked on reducing his risks in regards substance and domestic abuse. I have closely considered the terms of such an order and make the last oppressive order I can, with a view that F will be encouraged to really take the opportunity to work through his issues before the next time he comes back to court.

The terms of the order will be that F may not make an application in the Children Act regards C for a period of 5 years. I think the rest of her minority is too long. During that time, I will impose a condition per PD12Q that the court will avoid service of any application on M until F’s application has been assessed by a Judge at the first instance.

I will also strongly recommend and reflect in the order from this hearing, my expectation that F will not make further applications in regards C until he can demonstrate:

Because arrest or investigation by the police is not evidence in itself of poor behaviour or a conviction, and because such matters may take an inordinate length of time, I will not impose any such conditions on F. However, I take notice of his prior convictions, in theme and in time, and note that they are indictive of substance problems and a lack of adherence to court orders which must be worked on in future if he is to have positive outcomes.

I would strongly recommend to F to continue with the sense of candour and engagement he has displayed today in court. Better results will come to him from listening to professionals, being open and honest about the impact of his actions on others, and being self-evaluating rather than ignoring warning signs. He has the potential, that is the first step.

To that end I will direct indirect contact only, in the form of photographs in digital or hard copy format to be sent to F of C via M on a frequency of at least once every nine months. The condition will be that F must not display such photos on social media or otherwise disseminate them, or that contact will cease. The first photo can be provided in 30 days.

The remaining application for direct contact is dismissed.