EF (No. 3) (Disclosure to GMC) (Anonymisation and Publication), Re

This is my ex tempore judgment addressing two discrete issues arising from otherwise concluded private law Children Act proceedings. The first issue is whether the Court should disclose to the General Medical Council, the GMC, the Court’s judgments in these proceedings and other documentation underpinning those judgments. The second issue is whether the Court should publish anonymised versions of the judgments handed down in these proceedings to The National Archives.

This is the third substantive judgment that the Court has given in these proceedings, which concern the child EF, who was born in November 2024 and is therefore aged one year old. EF’s father is the Applicant in the proceedings, TC, and her mother is the Respondent, WF.

Plainly this judgment should be read alongside the other two, Re. EF (No.1) (Finding of Fact Hearing)[2025] EWFC 533 (B) and Re. EF (No. 2) (Welfare) (Non-Molestation Order) (Costs)[2026] EWFC 222 (B), and for that reason I do not propose to rehearse in any detail the background to the proceedings It does serve, though, to provide a brief outline of what the other two judgments concluded. The first judgment in time, dated 18 November of 2025, followed a finding of fact hearing. The Court made several findings in respect of the father’s behaviour towards the mother and EF throughout their relationship, after their relationship and then through the course of the proceedings. The findings included:

The Court then proceeded to determine welfare matters at a hearing in March, with it handing down its second substantive judgment on 2 April of this year making the following orders:

As part of the judgment on welfare I note that I found that the father had continued beyond the finding of fact hearing to use the proceedings as an opportunity to attack, denigrate and harass the mother.

Disclosure of Material to the GMC

In terms of the two issues that the Court is grappling with today, I commence by addressing the question of disclosure of material to the GMC. It will be noted that the father is a medical practitioner, his speciality being a hospital doctor when he is working, registered with and regulated by the GMC. The issue of disclosure of the Court’s judgments did not actually originate from any application by a party, rather the Court itself raised the question of whether its findings should be disclosed, further to consideration of the guidance set out by Knowles J in Re Z (Disclosure to Social Work England: Findings of Domestic Abuse) [2023] EWHC 447 (Fam). Having regard to the court’s observations on the process set out at paragraph 65 of that judgment, at the conclusion of the welfare stage of the case the Court formally invited the GMC to intervene and directed it to file a position statement addressing a range of issues including:

The GMC accepted the invitation to intervene, and filed a position statement addressing those issues dated 24 April of this year. The parties were then given the opportunity to address the Court by way of skeleton arguments, expanding on these by way of oral submissions this morning. In short the GMC seek disclosure of the following material:

As previously set out, the mother adopts a position of neutrality in respect of permission for disclosure to the GMC, although it was indicated on her behalf today that if the Court does direct disclosure it ought to be as full as possible in scope to assist a meaningful investigation, if one is undertaken, and she supports the remit of disclosure sought by the GMC.

The father, as also recorded previously, vehemently opposes disclosure. I am drawing from his skeleton argument filed in advance of the hearing in March, in which he adopts the view that domestic arguments of a personal nature do not, or should not be referred to the GMC for consideration. He continues to take issue with the findings of the Court and also questions the basis of the GMC pursuing an investigation in respect of events that took place when he was not in work, albeit remained registered as a practising doctor. On that point, I note that although the father currently remains out of work, his position, as expressed in recent correspondence with the GMC, is that he is now ready to look for a job and return to medical practice.

The Court’s power to permit disclosure of information from private family proceedings derives from rule 12.73(1)(b) of the Family Procedure Rules. Where neither the automatic permissions under rule 12.73(1)(a) applies, or alternatively the general authority under rule 12.73(1)(c) and Practice Direction 12G apply, disclosure can only be made with the Court’s express permission.

The longstanding authority governing how the discretion is exercised is Re C (A Minor) (Care Proceedings: Disclosure) [1996] Fam 76, as reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Re M (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 1364 and P (Children) (Disclosure) [2022] EWCA Civ 495. There is no presumption in favour of disclosure, the question is which public interest should prevail on the particular facts.

In Re C, Swinton Thomas LJ identified ten factors which are likely to relevant when determining a disclosure application. None of those can be ranked; their relative importance will vary from case to case. The factors are:

As both Knowles J in Re Z, and Baker J, as he was then, in X and Y (Disclosure of Judgment to Police) [2014] EWHC 278 (Fam) noted, since Re C was decided the relative importance of its ten factors has “inevitably changed” and the cloak of confidentiality, as it is described, surrounding family proceedings has been progressively lifted by the successive relaxation of the disclosure rules and moves towards much greater transparency in family proceedings.

Although Re C concerns disclosure to the police, its principles apply equally to applications for disclosure to professional regulatory bodies. I note that Knowles J reviewed and applied the line of cases in which disclosure to regulators had been permitted in Re Z, including Re R(Disclosure) [1998] 1 FLR 433 which concerned disclosure to the Probation Service, Re L (Care Proceedings: Disclosure to Third Party) [2000] 1 FLR 913, which concerned the nursing regulator, and A Local Authority v SK & HK [2007] EWHC 1250 (Fam), which concerned an employer of a residential care worker. The common thread is the public interest in ensuring that those who work with vulnerable people, whether it is children or vulnerable adults, are fit to do so.

I also note the decision of Hedley J in Re D and M (Disclosure: Private Law) [2002] EWHC 2820 (Fam), which is relevant to the question of private law proceedings where the encouragement of frankness may be accorded greater weight than in public law proceedings because section 98 of the Children Act does not apply in private law cases, and because the court is more dependent on parental evidence alone. However, and it seems an important qualification, the absence of section 98(2) protection does not create an assumption against disclosure in private law cases; it is simply a factor that that might well be given greater weight on the facts.

Finally, I am reminded, as per paragraph 57 of Re Z, that importantly the court retains control over the manner of disclosure. It may impose safeguards, including anonymisation and restrictions on further use or publication, to mitigate the impact on privacy.

In her detailed position statement dated 24 April of 2026, Miss Amy Codling, GMC legal advisor, states that the GMC seeks disclosure for the purpose of its regulatory function and to further its statutory objectives pursuant to section 1(1A) and 1(1B) of the Medical Act 1983 to act in pursuit of the following objectives:

Miss Codling confirmed that serious misconduct may arise from private conduct, and domestic abuse allegations directly engage professional standards which are encapsulated in the Good Medical Practice framework. She describes in detail the arrangements for taking regulatory action against doctors, including the process that has to be followed pursuant to the General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise) Rules 2004.

Miss Codling went on to outline how the GMC had already opened an investigation into the father, further to a police referral following the mother’s police complaint. However, this investigation was closed following communication from the police that the mother had withdrawn her support for a prosecution and/or was no longer contactable. I note that this is something which is strenuously denied by the mother, who describes having received no approach whatsoever about liaising further with the GMC about any investigation they wished to undertake. In any event, upon receipt of the Court’s order indicating that the father had been the subject of findings, the GMC determined it was appropriate for them, under the rules, to examine matters afresh.

Miss Codling invited the Court to disclose not just its judgments, but also the underlying source material, in order to allow it to make a properly informed decision as to whether its test for referring the matter to a hearing before a Medical Practitioners Tribunal (“MPT”) was met. In terms of the outcome of any MPT hearing that might ultimately take place, the range of sanctions might include taking no action, accepting undertakings offered by the doctor, imposing conditions, suspending the doctor’s registration, or erasing their name from the medical register.

Finally, Miss Codling described the type of confidentiality and privacy safeguards available if the matter did go to an MPT, including the anonymisation of material, restrictions on the dissemination of that material, both internally and otherwise, the possibility of private hearings within the MPT process, and redacted publication of outcome.

In her skeleton argument and oral submissions, Miss Fry made the point that the Court could attach conditions to its release of documentation, including that specific safeguards are implemented. These might typically include the anonymisation of detail relating to both the mother and EF, and also a requirement that the GMC can only rely on the documentation if the MPT hearing agrees to sit in private whilst considering the same, even if that evidence is anonymised as part of the submission to the MPT. Whilst the Court clearly cannot dictate the outcome of any application made to the MPT for part of a hearing to be conducted in private, it is able to dictate that the GMC must make such application pursuant to rule 41 of the FTP rules. The MPT would then consider the nature of the findings and the risk of jigsaw identification as part of its determination.

It is obviously helpful to frame my analysis with reference to the Re C factors, but I remind myself that I do not treat them as a checklist, rather they are indicators for the Court to rely upon as part of its holistic analysis of the relevant considerations. I am only going to refer to those relevant to this exercise and there are, to my mind, seven points of note.

First, the welfare of EF. There is no evidence that disclosure would directly harm EF. The father does not contend that any adverse regulatory consequences may affect his earning capacity and thus the child’s financial support. He is not currently in work and does not pay child maintenance. In any event, as observed in Re Z at paragraph 55, any financial consequences cannot be treated as determinative. It is also not inevitable that any disclosure would lead to a loss of livelihood. I have just outlined the range of sanctions that might be available to the GMC in the event of findings made against him within the MDT process, and it cannot to be said that any loss would be irreparable.

Second, turning to the welfare and interests of other children generally, per Re C, the father is a practising doctor, and his professional role necessarily involves contact with members of the public, including those who are vulnerable, both adults and children. As in SK & HK and in Re Z, there is a clear analogy between the protection of children and the protection of vulnerable adults. High standards are properly expected of doctors engaged with vulnerable individuals, and it is the GMC’s statutory remit to protect the health, safety and wellbeing of the public, and as such this carries substantial weight in the balancing exercise.

Third, confidentiality. Children Act proceedings are held in private and so disclosure inevitably compromises confidentiality and engages the child, the father, and the mother’s Article 8 rights. However, the Court has the power to control the manner of the disclosure and to apply safeguards to confidential information, and as such, the impact can be mitigated by stringent anonymisation and conditions on use of the material. The GMC has indicated its willingness to comply with such conditions, and so although this is an important factor to weigh into the balance, it is a factor capable of accommodation.

Fourth, in terms of encouragement of frankness, I accept that private law proceedings depend heavily on parental candour. However that does not create a barrier to disclosure, as emphasised in P (Disclosure) and Re Z, it is a factor to be weighed, not a presumption. I note also that he is a registered professional that owes a duty of honesty to his regulator, and, as in Re Z, the frankness argument would therefore cut both ways.

Fifth, and I think of considerable weight, is the public interest in the administration of justice and the desirability of cooperation between agencies. It strikes me that it is of critical importance that regulatory bodies charged with protecting the public are not deprived of relevant judicial findings. The GMC’s duties and its fitness to practise procedures are underpinned by statute and regulations, and these engage fully with the question such as the right to fair process, as well as the public interest, in ensuring doctors are fit for practice. Its duties are clear and transparent. It is a body that routinely manages highly sensitive information and serious allegations and outcomes, and also shares an interest with the Family Court in terms of safeguarding the vulnerable. The public would rightly expect there to be a degree of mutual respect and cooperation between the Family Court and bodies such as the GMC.

Sixth, the seriousness and relevance of the findings. The findings made against the father include coercive control, physical abuse and conduct exposing EF to harm. He was found to be untruthful on a number of occasions and he continues to minimise and reject the findings made. The findings are plainly serious and his behaviour was such that it resulted in the Court concluding that it had no choice but to direct that he has no contact with his daughter. They are directly relevant to the GMC’s standards and the Good Medical Practice, and in particular the requirement to maintain trust and integrity and to not engage in behaviour that would cause harm.

Finally, in terms of the extent of prior disclosure, the GMC, as I have already said, was originally alerted to there being an issue arising out of the complaints the mother had made to the police. However, the GMC was not provided with the full picture, in that it was told the investigation had gone no further and the mother was not contactable. The mother states quite clearly, and frankly I accept, bearing in mind all I know about how she has litigated these matters, that she would have supported such enquiries had they been properly directed to her. This reinforces the desirability of there being controlled and authorised disclosure of information rather than partial or unsupervised dissemination. I have no faith whatsoever that the father would be frank with the GMC about the Court’s findings absent the GMC being in possession of that material directly, and I note that even at this hearing he continues to distance himself from the findings the Court made and the evidence upon which they were founded. The only way to get round that is by providing the GMC with the material directly, so that it can form its own views.

In conclusion, I am entirely satisfied that the balance falls decisively in favour of disclosure to the GMC in the circumstances of the case. The interests of public protection and the proper functioning of a statutory regulator outweigh the limited impact on the mother, father, and EF’s Article 8 rights and questions of privacy. Insofar as that impact is concerned, it can be mitigated by stringent conditions and anonymisation. The interference with the parties’ Article 8 rights is necessary and proportionate, and made with the various rights engaged in Re C balanced and in mind.

Therefore, the Court grants permission pursuant to FPR r.12.73(1)(b) for disclosure to the GMC of the documentation identified within Miss Fry’s skeleton argument. The list includes the bundles prepared for the finding of fact hearing, transcripts of the evidence given in the course of that hearing to be obtained by the GMC at their cost, the written judgments handed down, both further to the finding of fact hearing and the welfare hearing, the order of Garrido J, dated 5 February of this year, refusing the father’s application for permission to appeal the finding of fact judgment on the basis that it was totally without merit, email correspondence between the father and the administrative office of the High Court in relation to his application to appeal (as referred to within the welfare judgment), and additional items such as, for example, the audio files relied on by the Court within the finding of fact hearing.

In terms of how that documentation is to be managed, the conditions to preserve confidentiality shall be as follows:

First the GMC shall not, without further permission from the Court, disclose any Family Court documents it receives, including any transcripts received in due course, to anyone other than those employees and members of the GMC concerned with the initial consideration and/or any promoted investigation and/or ultimate determination of the allegation of impaired fitness to practise and/or the parties to any consequent GMC proceedings and their legal representative, if any, including if necessary, any Committee/Tribunal and/or appeal hearing and/or judicial review application arising from any decision to investigate et cetera, including Legal Assessors and other advisors to the Tribunal, involved in any such hearings relating to or arising from this investigation, and any independent counsel or experts instructed in due course on the behalf of the GMC or the father in relation to the aforementioned investigation and/or proceedings.

Secondly, the GMC shall also undertake, in accordance with section 35A(5) of the Medical Act 1983, to ensure that if the matter proceeds to a public enquiry before the Medical Practitioners Tribunal, the information disclosed to it, pursuant to this order, shall be put into such form that the children and mother who are the subject of these proceedings are, as far as reasonably practicable, not capable of being identified.

Thirdly, should the GMC’s investigation result in any tribunal or other hearing at which the material disclosed from these proceedings, in accordance with this order, falls to be considered, the GMC is invited to provide that such part of that hearing dealing with this private material to be dealt with in private, using best endeavours to ensure that the risk of jigsaw identification are minimised.

Then lastly, in particular the names, dates of birth and/or other identifying features of the mother and/or EF shall not be published by the GMC. Should it become necessary to publish the name of any third party who is named within these Family Court documents, but who may, in due course, be treated as a witness in MPTS proceedings, insofar as the publication relates to their evidence dealing with the material arising from the Family Court’s documents, an application to the Family Court on notice to the parties, is required.

Anonymisation and Publication of Judgments

The second issue for the court to determine at this hearing is whether anonymised versions of the Court’s judgments should be published on the National Archives. The judgments under consideration are the fact-finding judgment, which was handed down in writing, the final welfare judgment, again handed down in writing, and this judgment provided orally, but with the intention that a transcript will be obtained at public expense in due course.

The mother supports anonymised publication. The father’s position is to oppose any form of publication of any of the judgments, regardless of whether and the extent to which the Court anonymise the details contained therein, the identification of the parties and so on, his view being that he does not see what need there is for publication or what benefit it will bring.

The governing principles on publication of judgments and the anonymisation of judgments is set out within the document Transparency in the Family Courts, Publication of Judgments, Practice Guidance (June 2024). The starting point is open justice, which favours publication even in private proceedings, subject to any countervailing Article 8 considerations. The court must conduct a balancing exercise between Article 6, the right to a fair trial, Article 8, private and family life, and Article 10, freedom of expression.

The required balancing exercise is summarised in Re J (A Child) [2013] EWHC 2694 (Fam), in short, that:

Publication and anonymisation is interlinked. The court must ensure that any publication does not undermine anonymity, whilst preserving the integrity of its reasoning, and the guidance identifies that fact-finding and final welfare decisions, particularly when written copies of transcripts of judgment exist, are particularly suitable for publication.

Each of the judgments that the Court has given, including this one, are of substance. They concern serious findings of domestic abuse and the welfare of a very young child and how those findings and the welfare of the child are interlinked. They also include and deal with issues pertaining with the wider protection of the public when the perpetrator of abuse is a registered professional, a doctor. They are representative of the broad jurisdiction of the Family Court and the type of issues that the Family Court has to grapple with on a day to day basis, and they fall squarely within the categories identified as suitable for publication. There is a clear public interest in transparency, particularly where findings intersect with professional regulation.

Against that I must consider the welfare of EF and also the Article 8 rights, not just of EF, but also her mother and the father. The risk is identification, including by way of a jigsaw effect. However, so long as the proposed anonymisation is robust, checked and checked again, it can mitigate that risk and the impact on EF and the parents’ Article 8 rights. Publication in an anonymised form significantly limits the risk of intrusion.

Having regard to the range of options the Court has available to it when it comes to anonymisation, I am satisfied that publication can occur without disproportionate interference with the parties’ Article 8 rights. The fact-finding judgment and the final welfare judgment, as well as this judgment, shall be published in anonymised form on the National Archives. The anonymisation shall include the removal of names of EF, the parents and other family members referred to during the course of the proceedings. Where possible and without detracting from the integrity of the judgment, it shall also look to generalise dates, locations and identifying features, and also remove reference to the speciality of the father’s role as a doctor. By approaching matters in that way, the Court can mitigate, in all respects, risk of jigsaw identification.

In terms of the practicalities for that, I propose that I will endeavour to run a first draft of the approach to anonymisation, which will then be submitted to the mother and the father for any observations before approval.

I think that deals with all matters.