N (A child) (Financial provision: contact travel costs), Re

This application concerns one child, N, a girl who was born in 2024 and is now therefore approaching her second birthday. She lives with her mother.

The applicant is K, N’s mother. She represented herself at this hearing with the assistance of her McKenzie Friend. The respondent is N’s father, L, who also represented himself and was assisted by his McKenzie Friend. I will refer to the parties as “the Mother” and “the Father” for convenience during the course of this judgment; I mean them no disrespect by doing so.

This is the Mother’s application for financial support for the benefit of N pursuant to Schedule 1 Children Act 1989. She seeks an order for periodical payments, including backdated payments. There is no application for a lump sum or transfer of property order.

This hearing was conducted remotely on 9^th January 2026, during which I heard the parties’ submissions. Due to the complexities and the volume of material submitted by the parties, I required additional time to consider my decision and therefore reserved my judgment.

The parties are both 40 years old. The Mother was born in an African country but has lived in the UK since 1999 and acquired British citizenship in 2002. I understand she moved to a Caribbean island in 2021. The Father is an American citizen, who also moved to reside in the Caribbean in 2022. That is where the parents met and began a relationship in 2023. N was born in 2024. A few months after her birth, the parties travelled to the UK on a planned visit, but, while here, they separated. The Mother retained N in her care and what followed were unfortunately lengthy and contentious court proceedings under the Children Act, including a High Court application for a summary return to the Caribbean (which was refused).

The full history is set out in the judgment of HHJ Gillespie of 12^th June 2025 and will not be repeated here. She conducted the final hearing in the s.8 CA 1989 proceedings. She ordered that N should live with her Mother and spend time with her Father on an increasing basis, building to April 2026, following which she will spend time with her Father “on no less than six separate periods of time per annum, each for a consecutive fourteen-night period at a frequency of every two months”. This therefore means she will spend 84 nights per year with her Father. Additionally, video contact should take place every other day. The Father is permitted to take N out of the jurisdiction twice per year to travel to the Caribbean or the USA, or another destination for the purpose of a holiday. The remainder of his contact is due to take place in the UK. The order requires the Father to meet N’s travel costs for contact.

I understand that contact has progressed successfully in line with the order.

The Mother works as a consultant providing IT services for one client. She operates as a limited company. The Father is employed by an American market research company. Both are generally able to work from home, although the Mother travels from time to time when necessary. The Father has voluntarily been contributing maintenance of £400 per month from January to April last year, and £525 per month since then.

This case falls outside the jurisdiction of the Child Maintenance Service both because the Father resides abroad and because his gross income exceeds the higher threshold.

The Mother issued this application in February 2025. A First Appointment took place on 17^th September 2025 and an FDR hearing on 8^th December 2025. No settlement was reached and the final hearing was directed to take place on the basis of submissions before me. It has previously been determined, notwithstanding that there have been no findings of domestic abuse, that the Mother is a vulnerable party and that the prohibition on cross-examination between the parties applies. She did request permission shortly before the hearing for the parties to have their cameras turned off as a special measure, because she preferred not to see the Father. I refused that request in advance because it would have significantly hindered my ability to conduct the remote hearing if I could not see either party. The Mother did not renew her application and was able to participate fully in the hearing, notwithstanding that both parents could see one another throughout. It must be said that both parents conducted themselves with impeccable courtesy towards one another and the Court.

Despite the complex nature of this dispute, and the volume of material before the Court (which I will come to), the parties do largely agree regarding the available assets and one another’s income, summarised below and subject to my explanatory comments which will follow:

I have not heard oral evidence at this hearing. The parties have filed witness statements, as well as detailed questionnaires, replies to questionnaires, and “follow-up” questionnaires and replies. In accordance with the Practice Direction, the supporting evidential documents have not been included in the hearing bundle(s), which was limited to 350 pages. Where necessary, I have looked at supporting documents available on the FRC portal. I have not been invited to make factual determinations about issues in dispute relating to the above schedule, but I have endeavoured to formulate the most realistic picture of the parties’ respective finances on the basis of the information available to me.

It appears that there has been full and frank disclosure by both parties and neither party sought to submit during the hearing that relevant information had been withheld, notwithstanding the Father’s comments in his witness statement to the effect that there had previously been a lack of disclosure and an undervaluing of assets by the Mother.

The ES2 reveals a dispute between the parents as to the value of the Mother’s home. I do not know the reason for this and cannot readily see any valuation documentation. I have therefore, for these purposes, taken the average between the parents’ proposed values of £285,000 and £317,734.

I have applied 2% notional costs of sale to both properties, as is standard practice.

Where there are marginally different figures included in the ES2 (for example, outstanding mortgage balance) I have preferred the figure advanced by the party to whom the asset/income belongs, assuming they are best placed to provide accurate figures.

I have excluded the 2024/25 Y/E dividend from the valuation of the Mother’s business shares. I note there has been no formal business valuation and, in any event, this is of limited relevance as her business is her income stream rather than a liquid asset which she can or will sell. I note what the Father says about capital reserves being available to the Mother to access from the business.

I have excluded the parties’ chattels from consideration as the parties do not need to sell those chattels to meet any financial obligations towards N or otherwise; they are therefore irrelevant. I note both parties have cars.

I have excluded the alleged debts owed by both parties to one another as suggested by the Father as these are disputed and have not been subject to evidence before me.

The Father’s debts include a large loan from his father which he says was to fund his legal fees arising from the Children Act proceedings. The Father’s liabilities are not disputed by the Mother.

The Father’s income includes a discretionary quarterly bonus, but, as this has been fully paid thus far, he accepts it should be factored into the assessment of his income.

I have taken the Mother’s actual current income for the purpose of my exploration of the parties’ respective financial situations. I will consider the relevance of her potential increased earning capacity later.

I have excluded the current voluntary child maintenance payments from the Mother’s income at this stage as they will be replaced with the order I shall make.

I have already referred to complexities in this case. Those complexities arise primarily due to how case has been presented to me. In accordance with PD12J, the Mother produced an electronic bundle which did not exceed the 350 page limit (346 pages) and which contained most of the relevant documents; however, the pages do not follow the (sensible) order in the index, so it was quite difficult to follow logically. Nevertheless, it was an appropriate bundle and this is no criticism of her. It includes the ES2 which contains the areas of dispute between the parties, and it includes two competing chronologies prepared by her and the Father, as well as both of their witness statements and position statements.

Unfortunately, the Father did not agree the bundle contents and instead submitted his own bundle to the court for consideration (349 pages). This also included most of the relevant documents and was generally sensible; however, the submission of two competing bundles by self-representing parties has required me to consider both bundles in full, lest I omit relevant evidence. They do contain different documents. Unhelpfully, the Father’s bundle also included a plethora of documents from the previous Children Act proceedings which are not relevant to my determination today, including statements and excerpts of transcripts of evidence from those proceedings. He had applied to the Court for permission to rely on these documents and that permission was refused by DJ Dinan-Hayward.

The most difficulty has been caused by the Father’s evidence. I recognise at this stage that both parents are highly intelligent and competent individuals who have presented their cases with a significant level of skill. The Father has plainly spent many hours in preparation of his case and it is apparent he has undertaken a forensic examination of the parties’ respective financial disclosure. He has produced complex statements and spreadsheets in support of his calculations and projections, which I cannot possibly adequately summarise or include within this judgment. Suffice to say I have taken them into account. The Father’s oral submissions were valuable in aiding my understanding of his rationale.

The parties exchanged open offers in advance of the hearing and articulated their proposals in position statements.

The Mother seeks:

Monthly periodical payments of £1,100, to be paid on the first day of each month and linked to UK CPI;

An order that the Father pay 70% of the costs of childcare (currently nursery, in the future “wrap-around” school care and holiday clubs);

An order that the Father contribute 70% towards other “reasonable agreed child-related costs”;

A lump sum order (pursuant to Schedule 1 paragraph 5) to represent costs already incurred, namely unpaid maintenance (at a retrospective rate of £1,100 per month, deducting voluntary maintenance already paid) of £11,740, and to cover previous nursery fees (at 70% of the total nursery liability) of £6,093.50;

An order that the Father contribute 70% towards an annual travel insurance policy for N;

A requirement that the Father maintain a life insurance policy, naming her as a trustee, for the benefit of N.

The Father proposes:

He will pay monthly periodical payments which he has calculated at £478 for 2026, £556 for 2027, £408 for 2028 and £162 thereafter. The calculation is based on the James v Seymour model, reducing his exigible income by the grossed-up amount he spends each year travelling to spend time with N and “extras”, including medical insurance (which I believe he calculates to be around £43,000). From that, he seeks an offset for the Mother to pay half of his travel costs and he adds half the cost of nursery. He also assumes that the Mother will return to full-time work in 2026 and increases the nursery costs accordingly;

The periodical payments should be linked to an average of CPI in the UK and USA;

The periodical payments will cease when N completes her A-levels;

There should be a financial review every three years and a recalculation based on material changes (which he has set out in his open offer);

The Father will fund a travel medical insurance policy for N’s benefit;

The Mother should repay him for half of the travel costs he has spent thus far to see N under the child arrangements order, which he calculates at £19,158. She should also repay him for an alleged pre-separation debt of £10,099. He calculates the maintenance he would have paid (pursuant to his own model, above) from the issue of Form A, plus half of the nursery costs, and offsets it against what he has actually paid voluntarily, to calculate that he owes the Mother £183 in “back payments”. He offsets that against the alleged debt of £29,257 to assert that the Mother owes him £29,074. He asserts that she should pay this to him or N as a lump sum in order to contribute to their future travel costs;

The Father will pay 70% of the costs of N attending university in the future.

On an application by a parent, the Court may make any of the orders set out in Schedule 1 CA 1989 paragraph 1(2), namely:

The powers at sub-paragraphs (2)(b), (d) and (e) relate to secured periodical payments, and settlements and transfers of property, which are not relevant to this case.

In accordance with sub-paragraph (3), the powers may be exercised at any time, and in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), an order for periodical payments may be varied or discharged by subsequent order.

The duration of an order for periodical payments is set out in paragraph 3 of the Schedule:

The term to be specified in an order for periodical payments made under paragraph 1(2)(a) or (b) in favour of a child may begin with the date of the making of an application for the order in question or any later date or a date ascribed in accordance with sub-paragraph (5) or (6) but –

Paragraph (b) of sub-paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a child if it appears to the court that –

Sub-paragraphs 3(5) and (6) relate to circumstances in which a CMS calculation is in place, so are not relevant here.

Paragraph 4(1) sets out the matters to which the Court is to have regard when considering the application:

The Court will of course consider the welfare of the child, but strictly speaking the child’s welfare is not the Court’s paramount consideration, and thus s.1 CA 1989 does not apply.

Paragraph 5 regulates lump sum orders and provides the following at sub-paragraph (1):

The Father has pointed me to a number of authorities, including the case of James v Seymour [2023] EHWC 844 (Fam). In that case, Mostyn J suggested a formula to be applied as a starting point for the assessment of periodical payments in cases where the proposed payer’s gross earned income falls between £156,001 (therefore above the Child Maintenance Service threshold) and £650,000, and where there are fewer than four children. He refers to the calculation as an Adjusted Formula Methodology (AFM) which gives a Child Support Starting Point (CSSP). Notably, he says this at paragraph 43:

It is clear therefore, that the CSSP produced by the AFM is a starting point, but is not binding and does not substitute an assessment of the criteria in paragraph 4(1).

The formula to be applied to calculate the CSSP is set out in the appendix to Mostyn J’s judgment. The payer’s exigible income must first be calculated. This is their gross earned income, adjusted as follows:

Reduced by reference to the number of other children in their household (not applicable here);

Pension contributions are deducted (not applicable here);

The “grossed-up school fees” are deducted. This means the total amount the payer is paying towards school fees, divided by 0.55 to find the share of their gross income which goes towards school fees.

The exigible income is then applied to the CMS formula, depending on the number of children who are subject to the application, and adjusted depending on the amount of time the child or children spend in the payer’s care. The appendix includes tables of the applicable results for the range of incomes between £156-650,000 and what the adjustments would be for 1-3 children within seven brackets of shared care, ranging from no shared care to equal care.

In the present case, subject to the Father’s position regarding travel costs, which I will come to, the result of the applicable formula to find the CSSP would be:

The Father submits that I should treat the costs he incurs in travelling to spend time with N, and the cost to him of maintaining a policy of medical insurance for her benefit, should be deducted from his gross income to calculate his exigible income, in the same way as school fees in the Mostyn formula. In support of this contention, he points to paragraph 3 of the appendix to the judgment (where the algebraic formula is included), in which it is said “S is the amount of school fees and extras currently being paid.”

The Father also relies on the much earlier case of A v M [2005] EWHC 1721 (Fam), in which an appeal against an order for periodical payments was allowed on a number of grounds. One argument advanced on behalf of that father was that, as he had to fund travel from his home in France to see the child in the UK, the monthly sum ordered was not affordable. The Father relies on the following at paragraph 82, per Sumner J:

The Father submitted to me that the travel costs caused the Judge in that case to reduce the maintenance award by 25%, although that is not strictly correct. There were a number of factors which led the appellate court to reduce the maintenance award, including having found that the father’s income was less than that found by the judge of first instance. The judgment does not set out in detail the basis of the judge’s revised calculation of maintenance.

The Father also relies on Regulation 63 of the Child Support Maintenance Calculation Regulations 2012 which provides that travel costs constitute a special expense to be considered on any application for a variation of the usual CMS calculation pursuant to Schedule 4B of the Child Support Act 1991.

The Father also referred me to the cases of TK v LK [2024] EWFC 71 and Y v Z [2024] EWFC 4, which I have considered in full, but which have no real application here.

The issues for me to determine are therefore:

The Mother earns a net annual income of £56,505 from PAYE, dividends and rental income: £4,708.75 per month. The Mother tells me that her income last year was high because she took almost no time off for holidays, and she points out that she may have sick days in the future.

I accept, as submitted by the Father, that the Mother’s income could increase in the future and that she could theoretically work full-time (five days per week rather than her current three) and therefore earn up to two-thirds more. However, I accept that her earning capacity is currently limited by being N’s sole carer day-to-day and that, given N’s age, it is not unreasonable for her to work only three days per week. I also accept that, were the Mother’s net earnings to exceed the £100,000 threshold, she would lose her entitlement to 30 hours of free childcare, which would be prohibitive at this stage. I acknowledge she will, in the future, be required to take leave during school holidays, however it is also right that the Father will be spending two weeks with N every two months and therefore this will relieve some of the childcare burden on the Mother, assuming this is planned to coincide with future school holidays for the most part. The Mother told me that she thinks it likely she will return to working four days per week when N is 10-11, but in my view it is reasonable for her to increase her earnings before then, probably when N begins school.

Nevertheless it is not possible for me to realistically quantify what the Mother’s future earning capacity will be and in my view, given N will not commence school until September 2028, for these purposes I take her current income as the basis of my calculations. I do consider, however, that this represents the Mother’s minimum earning capacity.

The Father also suggests the Mother should draw further dividends from her business capital reserves. The Mother tells me she will need to use all this to meet her upcoming tax liabilities of c. £30,000, which I accept.

The Mother has capital by way of the net equity available in her home, although this is required for N’s housing. She also has an investment property with net equity of around £104,000, which she could realise if she wished to do so. I understand the rental income generated does not produce a net profit when the mortgage and administration costs are considered. She has £6,000 in the bank, but she also has quite significant liabilities in terms of her tax liability and other loans and credit cards. She could not realise the capital from the rental property to live off to meet N’s needs, nor could it generate an income for her to do so were it invested. It is of limited relevance to my decision.

Similarly, the Mother has shares in her own business but that business is a vehicle for her income stream and is not realisable.

The Father earns £138,816 net per year: £11,568 per month. It is to his credit that he accepts his discretionary bonus should be taken into account due to it having been reliably paid for a significant period. There is no suggestion that the Father’s income will increase or decrease in the foreseeable future.

The Father has very significant debts, in excess of £100,000. He services these monthly from his income and there is no suggestion he will become bankrupt. He does not own property and has very limited cash in the bank.

Unfortunately, the Mother has not produced a detailed budget of the type one might ordinarily expect in these proceedings. In fairness to her, it has not been specifically directed. She told me her monthly outgoings were as per her Form E, namely:

In addition, the Mother pays N’s nursery fees. She mistakenly included the incorrect figure on her Form E, so we spent some time in the hearing working this out. The Father sought to rely on excerpts from the nursery website which estimated how much the cost would be per month for a child attending three days, but the Mother said this was not accurate due to the extra fees she has to pay.

I calculate the nursery fees as follows:

Any additional days at nursery are charged at the full rate.

The Mother did not know what the future costs of wraparound school care and holiday clubs would be, although she believed holiday clubs would be likely to be £50-80 per day. I note the costs of childcare overall will significantly reduce when N begins school.

The Mother’s current average outgoings are therefore £3,168.73 + £369.63 = £3,538.36.

I note that this budget does not allow any costs for the Mother’s clothing, life insurance, pension contributions, medical costs or any entertainment spending. Nevertheless, from the Mother’s net income of £4,708.75, she has a surplus of income of £1,170.39 to meet those costs.

I accept the Mother’s budget is reasonable and that the majority of the costs, save the mortgage spent on the rental property, are directly for N’s benefit.

The Father has produced a very detailed budget of annual expenditure. This includes:

The Father also includes within his budget additional costs for food and clothes etc for N when he is spending time with her. I have excluded that from consideration for the time being because the AFM allows for an adjustment for the time spent in a paying parents’ care to account for those costs. I have also excluded the current maintenance he is paying, for obvious reasons.

I have included the projected future costs of the Father’s liabilities because he tells me the loan repayments he makes to his father will increase next year.

On an average net monthly income of £11,568, the Father has a small surplus of £391.67.

I note this budget is high. Even if I exclude the cost of the Father’s travel for contact and the sums he is paying towards his liabilities, his annual expenditure is £75,454. This is for him alone as I have excluded any costs relating to N. By contrast, the Mother’s total annual expenditure for both her and N is £42,460.32. I have not heard evidence and no submissions have been made about the Father’s expenditure, but it appears excessive. I strongly suspect he could make savings, notwithstanding that he says the cost of living is higher on his Caribbean island than the UK. For example, he spends over £17,000 on food, drink and eating out (not including what he spends during contact with N), which is plainly unreasonable. I am, however, in no doubt that the Father’s schedule is based on his actual expenditure as I am sure he has forensically analysed this in order to put the evidence before the Court.

N’s financial needs are those as set out in the Mother’s budget, save that the mortgage payments for the rental property are not directly for her benefit. Her specific needs are currently for her nursery fees, food, clothing and additional items. She is adequately housed and I have not been pointed to any specific items of expenditure required to meet her needs.

N has no property or financial resources in her own right and no earning capacity due to her age.

N, happily, has no mental or physical disabilities and no additional health or emotional needs which impact on my decision.

N is not currently being “educated” but she is attending a nursery setting. The parents anticipate she will attend a UK state school. They hope she will be educated to university level.

There is plainly a significant disparity in income between the Mother and the Father in this case and the Father must be liable to make a contribution to N’s living costs. I note that, were he to live in the UK, and were he to earn just slightly less each year, bringing him under the CMS threshold, he would inevitably be required to make the CMS contribution of £1,088 each month, notwithstanding his outgoings and notwithstanding the Mother’s income.

First, with respect to the Father’s position that I should order the Mother to pay him (or to N for, in part, his benefit) a lump sum in excess of £29,000: there is no jurisdiction under Schedule 1 for me to make a lump sum order payable to the respondent to the application, therefore this must fail. In any event, the Father’s claim is not justified based on the evidence and I reject it.

Next, there is no power afforded to me under Schedule 1 to require the Father to maintain a policy of life insurance for N’s benefit. Therefore, this also fails. If he chooses to do this, that is a matter for him.

The Father has, in part, framed his arguments and the justification for his offer based on his calculations of the percentage of income which each parent spends for the benefit of N. Such arguments are not relevant to my decision and are not justified on the basis of the statute, authorities and indeed the evidence. The Father’s calculations omit the amount spent by the Mother on her housing and her daily living costs, including food, all of which is undoubtedly for the benefit of N, who lives with her day-to-day. I accept I need to look at the overall affordability for both parents, set against N’s financial needs. I do understand why the Father has made these calculations for his own purposes and why he has projected his future income against his outgoings and liabilities due to the weight of debt which he is required to service, and his hope to become debt-free within a reasonable timeframe. I do not, however, rely on these calculations in my reasoning.

I reject the Father’s assertion that I should exclude his costs of travel to reduce his exigible income when undertaking the James v Seymour calculation of the CSSP, in the same way that school fees are specifically excluded. Were it to have been Mostyn J’s intention to exclude from the calculation any costs incurred by the paying party in caring for the child, he would have said so explicitly. “School fees and extras” does not cover this scenario; extras are likely to be school uniform and equipment costs etc. The reason for the distinction is because school fees are a fixed and known cost for which the paying parent is liable, which are common to many of the so-called “big money cases”.

I do, however, accept that the travel costs are a feature which I need to factor into my consideration with respect to the Father’s obligations and outgoings, noting that he is ordered specifically to meet N’s costs of foreign travel when contact takes place in the Caribbean and the USA. Of course, the CSSP is just a starting point and I can adjust any award in line with my assessment of the paragraph 4(1) criteria, and all the circumstances. There is no mathematical formula for any reduction to take account of the travel costs for contact and I retain a wide discretion.

The further problem with the Father’s case in this regard, and one which I find troubling, is that the Father appears to have double- or even potentially triple-accounted for these costs. He seeks to reduce the CSSP by reducing his exigible income to remove the grossed-up travel and insurance costs. He also seeks to offset the periodical payments resulting from that calculation against a half contribution to the travel costs from the Mother. Additionally, he sought a reimbursement from her for half of the travel costs he has already paid, to be credited to his future travel costs. This is a highly unattractive argument which appears to have been advanced as a means of justifying his very low offer. His proposal of maintenance at a rate reducing annually to £162 per month from 2029 onwards (albeit in addition to 50% of extra-curricular and school “extras”) for the remainder of N’s childhood, on his income of in excess of £138,000 per year after tax, is farcical and totally unjustified. I reject his argument that the maintenance obligation significantly falls away when N no longer attends nursery; she will have different and developing needs and consequential expenses throughout her childhood even when the nursery costs cease, including but not limited to: higher food and clothing costs, extra curricular activities, school uniform etc.

There is no justification for requiring the Mother to contribute towards the Father’s costs of travelling and spending time with N. The Father suggests that she should do so as it is only due to the Mother’s decision to remain in the UK with N that he must incur such costs. That may be so, but it does not mean she should bear the costs of that in circumstances whereby the Father earns far more than she does and where he is able to afford to meet those costs.

The CSSP of £1,091, on the basis of James v Seymour, is the appropriate starting point in this case. It is right that the Mother has sufficient income to cover N’s expenditure, but that does not remove the Father’s moral and legal responsibility to contribute to his daughter’s upbringing.

I accept that, on the evidence before me, the Father’s income only just, currently, covers his outgoings. However, his expenditure is manifestly excessive for a single person, and far in excess of the Mother’s outgoings for both her and N, including the fact that she is servicing two properties.

Taking all of the above into consideration, I have determined that the appropriate figure for monthly periodical payments is £700. This covers the nursery costs and allows an additional c. £330 towards N’s housing and living costs. In my judgment, the reduction from the total annual liability under the CSSP of £4700 (£13,100 to £8,400) is a fair one to represent a portion of the Father’s travel costs and the insurance policy he maintains for N’s benefit. This is affordable for the Father as his outgoings are excessive, as I have set out above.

In terms of any reviews or variations, I accept that the periodical payments should be reviewed annually based on UK CPI. I accept the argument that N’s costs are incurred here, so that is the relevant measure of her needs.

I do not direct mediation or any tri-annual review of the payments. I have no power to order parties to mediate. However, I expect the parents to co-operate in the assessment of any variations if a change of circumstances arise, and I also direct that the Father should provide the Mother with the equivalent of his P60 (annual summary of income and tax, which is a “W-2” form) within 14 days of him receiving it each year. Of course, it remains open to either parent to apply for a variation in the future, but, as they are aware, they will be required to consider mediation and attend a MIAM in the first instance, which I hope would lead to them considering forms of non-court dispute resolution if they cannot readily reach agreement between themselves.

As for the duration of the payments, I accept these should continue beyond N’s eighteenth birthday until the following September in order to allow her to conclude her academic year and A-levels (or the equivalent). I accept it is likely she will continue in education until then. However, while both parents clearly hope she will attend university, I cannot possibly at this stage consider that to be likely because it is too far into the future and her academic choices remain unknown, given her very young age. It does appear that the Father is more than willing to contribute significantly to her university education, so I would hope this can be agreed between the parents closer to the time.

The Mother also seeks a further order for a payments to represent a proportion of the nursery and future childcare costs, as well as for further agreed necessary expenditure and for a percentage of a travel insurance policy. In my view, the powers afforded to me under Schedule 1 do not allow for such an order. In any event, the global maintenance figure has been calculated to take into account the nursery costs, as well as all of N’s foreseeable needs, and therefore a further, discrete order for additional contributions is not justified as a matter of principle. It would not be desirable for the parents need to agree additional sums from time to time, because it is likely to be controversial.

Finally, the Mother seeks a lump sum order to backdate “arrears” of maintenance and nursery fees. I have a broad discretion as to whether to make such an order; neither the Schedule nor the case law gives much guidance on the issue. In the present case, the Mother has not demonstrated a need for such reimbursement. She met the nursery costs herself and did have financial contribution from the Father from January 2025. She has met the costs without penalty or detriment to herself. She has not justified such an order based on N’s needs. The Father does not have any cash reserves or capital from which he could meet any lump sum payment and it would not be fair to require him to do so.

My order is therefore that the Father should pay the Mother periodical payments at a rate of £700 per month, payable on the first day of each month. The amount payable shall be reviewed annually in line with the UK consumer price index, reviewable on 1^st January each year. The first payment should be made on 1^st February 2026. Within 14 days of receipt of his equivalent P60 each year (W-2), the Father should provide the Mother with a copy of this.