A Father v A Mother

This judgment follows a short final hearing in private law proceedings between the applicant father (‘the father’) and the respondent mother (‘the mother’) concerning contact between the father and the parties’ child (‘the child’). I am also asked to consider the making of a prohibited steps order, non-molestation order and section 91(14) order.

I reserved judgment partly due to the time at which the case finished but also partly because of concerns I have arising from the CAFCASS evidence. I consider the issues raised are such as to justify a written judgment explaining my conclusions and publication of the judgment to record the approach of CAFCASS in this case which I consider to be inconsistent with their reporting duty to the Court.

I heard evidence from each party and from the appointed CAFCASS Officer (‘the Reporter’). I do not intend to name the Reporter or her manager referenced in §26(f) below. The questions of the mother were asked by me on behalf of the father by way of a participation direction. The mother was ably represented by Ms Brennan. Both parties were assisted by interpreters although they have a reasonable grasp of English and on occasions addressed me directly in English. I take account of this evidence as I do the documents contained in the final hearing bundle and the submissions made by each party. I keep all of this in mind whether or not I specifically reference it below. Post hearing I received a copy of the contact note from the contact on the following Saturday. Although I have heard neither evidence nor submissions on the same I bear it in mind as part of the wider picture.

The parents both derive from European Country X. The father is aged 47 and the mother is aged 34. The parties met in this country in 2017 when it appears each had unresolved immigration status in the country. They appear to have commenced cohabiting shortly after this from late August 2017 before becoming engaged in November 2017. The respondent fell pregnant with the child in about October 2017 and the child was born on [ ] 2018. She is now aged 8. The relationship did not last very long with the mother leaving the father in about April 2018.

The parties are fundamentally apart as to what happened between 2018 and about 2021. The father appears to accept a period of separation but claims to have been contacted after the child’s birth in July 2018 whereafter they remained in touch and he saw the child before the parties resumed cohabiting between June 2019 until August 2022. In contrast the mother claims they separated due to the father’s domestic abuse prior to the child’s birth. She agreed she then contacted the father after the child was born and did facilitate contact but she does not agree they resumed living together. However problems returned and she claims she did not see him between 2019-2021 although it is clear she alleges they spoke. The mother accepts she returned to facilitating contact in late 2021.

An allegation is made relating to August 2022. It appears both parties agree this was the end of any relationship between them. The mother claims no contact between 2022-2023 (for about 13-14 months) before she then contacted the father again on the occasion of the child’s birthday. Contact both indirect and direct then happened until January 2024 when the mother stopped contact due to the father’s alleged behaviour. The father appears to largely agree this part of the chronology except for the complaints raised against him.

Proceedings started in another Court in February 2024 with the father seeking a prohibited steps order to prevent the mother removing the child from the jurisdiction. This was granted but replaced with undertakings at the next hearing. It is now agreed the mother should be able to travel with the child. The matter was then transferred to this Court where steps towards a fact-finding hearing were case managed. The orders note both parties as making allegations against the other. The initial safeguarding letter from CAFCASS (23.4.24) recommended a section 7 report rather than a fact-finding hearing notwithstanding the letter recorded the mother’s allegations around domestic abuse. At a hearing on 14 April 2025 a DDJ requested CAFCASS to advise as to the need for a fact-finding hearing. I cannot find a direct response to that request and it may be the request was not received by CAFCASS.

In any event on 21 July 2025 the Court proceeded to consider whether there should be a fact-finding hearing and the parameters of the same if directed. On that day a DDJ determined that the allegations to be considered would be limited to a single event relating to August 2022. In doing so the DDJ determined the father’s allegations would not be heard and those raised by the mother for the period 2017-18 equally would not be litigated. I record for the avoidance of doubt that no challenge was made to this case management decision. Although the order does not set out the basis for this decision I suspect it reflects the dating of the earlier allegations and the continuing relationship and facilitation of contact thereafter. It may be the Court determined in the light of the history only the most recent matter should be considered.

On 26 September 2025 a different DDJ heard the fact-finding hearing and decided the allegation was not proven. By combination of the preceding case management and the fact-finding the case was thereafter to proceed with no findings having been made. I record for the avoidance of doubt that no challenge has been made to this determination. Having reached this conclusion the DDJ decided there should be a section 7 report and standard directions were given in that regard. At that time CAFCASS in London required 23 weeks for the provision of a post-fact-finding section 7 report. As a result the report was directed to be provided by 30 September 2026. Within the section 7 direction the DDJ recorded:

Up to the point of fact-finding the Court had not ordered any contact to take place between the father and the child. This likely reflected the Court’s unwillingness to set such arrangements prior to the determination of the facts in dispute. However, having made no findings the DDJ then ordered contact between the father and child on a supervised basis each fortnight for two hours at a contact centre (or in the community if equally supervised). The costs of the same were to be wholly borne by the father. I note in London the hourly rate for such session varies but is typically in excess of £50 meaning this contact would likely have cost in excess of £100 per fortnight. The DDJ fixed a dispute resolution appointment.

Thereafter I have case managed this case. I undertook case management in the light of the age of the case. On 10 March 2026 I made an order of my own motion noting the case was 112 weeks old at that point. I listed the case for DRA and made clear the Court would if possible look to see whether final orders could be made. Unfortunately this was not to be the case. At the hearing on 9 April 2026 agreement could not be reached and the parties were too far apart for the Court to resolve the case at that hearing or conduct an early final hearing. It was clear the recommendations of the Reporter were central to this given she was recommending the complete cessation of contact between father and child. The mother adopted this view whereas the father was looking to maintain, indeed develop the relationship.

This hearing considers the welfare of the child. Her welfare is my paramount concern and entirely governs my decision-making. I approach her welfare through the prism of the welfare checklist found in section 1(3) Children Act 1989. This is a checklist of factors which assists the Court in ensuring key considerations are kept in mind. The Court is permitted to look outside of this checklist to consider ‘all the circumstances of the case’. There is a general recognition that children benefit from having a relationship with both parents so long as such a relationship is safe (both for the child and the adults around the child). This is enshrined in the Children Act 1989 although this presumption is currently under review and there is a real likelihood the legal presumption will be removed. It may be it is replaced with an alternative presumption or the presumption may be removed altogether. That being said in my experience I cannot recall a case in which the presumption operated in such a manner as to materially change the outcome otherwise set by the assessment undertaken with regard to the welfare checklist.

The Court when considering child arrangements is typically deciding where and with whom a child lives and the time they spend with their other parent. When considering time spent (or contact) the Court has a range of powers from unsupervised extended periods, particularly during holiday periods, to visiting and supervised contact. Supervision by definition is used where there is felt to be an overriding safety issue that requires the eyes and ears of a third party (professional or otherwise). The safety issue is most often based on risk of domestic abuse or physical harm but might be linked to a medical condition that means a parent cannot safely care for a child alone. In the normal course of events supervision requires some justifying rationale. In extreme cases a Court can terminate the relationship between a parent and child. This may be by not making an order for contact or specifically ordering there will be no contact. Such decisions should be shaped by the welfare assessment but a Court will obviously proceed with care before taking such a step.

Given my observations below it is important to set out how a Court approaches fact-finding and the implications that derive from the fact-finding process. The first point of note is that it is for the Court to determine whether or not there should be a fact-finding process. In considering this question a Court will be guided both by authority: see Re H-N (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Findings of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448; K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468, and by the applicable rules: Family Procedure Rules 2010 PD 12J. In H-Nthe Court observed:

Whilst this process is often easier said than done, it nonetheless remains the duty of the Court to establish whether fact-finding is necessary to determine appropriate child arrangements and if it is deemed to be necessary what matters are required to be determined to properly reach safe conclusions. As a result on a daily basis Court’s not only decide whether fact-finding is or is not required but also determine the range of allegations requiring resolution in line with the authorities, PD12J and with regard to the overriding objective. In very many cases a Court will in some way or other limit or restrict the ambit of investigation to only that which is necessary. This will be case specific but is a significant part of the case management powers of the Court towards an effective and timely hearing. The key point is that the Court and only the Court makes this decision. Of course in making the decision the Court considers representations, whether from the parties themselves or from agencies such as CAFCASS or a designated local authority. In the case of CAFCASS such representations will most often be found in the initial safeguarding letters filed at an early stage of the proceedings.

Where a Court decides to hold a fact-finding and proceeds to investigate allegations it applies the balance of probabilities asking whether it is more likely than not that an alleged event occurred. Where the Court finds this threshold crossed the Court will find the allegation to be a fact and thereafter acts on this finding. Where the threshold is not crossed the allegation is not proven and is disregarded. This is a binary approach which does not permit shades of grey. The purpose of fact-finding is to inform the welfare decision as set out above. It also informs those appointed by the Court to give guidance or offer expert opinion. This will often be the CAFCASS reporter but may include other experts or agencies. Importantly those advising must advise on the basis of the facts as found by the Court. It is impermissible for the reporter, expert or agency to proceed otherwise. This point is made clear in Re Y (Experts and Alienating Behaviour: The Modern Approach) [2026] EWFC 38 where the former President of the Family Division explained at §45:

It is important not to lose sight of the fact that a decision to limit the parameters of fact-finding is also a judicial determination which equally binds those tasked with reporting to the Court. If a Court determines a fact-finding should not happen then a professional is obliged to report in the light of that factual matrix as set by the Court. If a Court considers a fact-finding should occur but that only certain matters need be determined then the factual matrix will be only those matters proven within that context. It is central to the maintenance of the integrity of the fact-finding process that matters not proven or not examined fall outside of the factual matrix when one considers welfare decision making. After all it would be frankly purposeless for the Court to consider and provide careful case management if that were thereafter to be ignored by those reporting or were those reporting to be entitled to shape their recommendations by reference to matters which the Court determined had not occurred or were not required to be considered in any event. To do otherwise is to bring the process into disrepute. Where a Court decides allegations are true or not true and where it decides allegations do not need to be investigated then that is the end of the matter, subject to legitimate procedural challenge.

Having made these points I recognise there is a continuing duty on the Court to apply PD12J and there will be cases in which the Court reviews a previous decision with regards to fact-finding and modifies the approach to be taken. This may be the pull back from fact-finding or to proceed with it where it had previously been otherwise determined. But this is materially different from revising whether there should be a fact-finding process after there has been both fact-finding case management and the actual hearing of evidence and determination of relevant facts. By that stage the Court has concluded its fact-finding process and the case is then ready for the welfare determination. Applying the law to the facts of this case, a DDJ considered and contained the matters that would be litigated at fact-finding. A different DDJ then factually determined those matters listed for fact-finding. Any agency reporting to the Court was obliged to proceed on the basis of the facts as found, i.e. no findings made, rather than introduce into their reasoning matters not proven or indeed not subject to fact finding. This was the clear direction given by the DDJ as cited at §9 above.

For the reasons given below it can be seen the Reporter in this case has fundamentally failed to follow the legal principles set out above.

The report starts by setting out what the case is about and outlining the concerns expressed by each party. This scene setting was entirely appropriate. The report correctly recorded the outcome of the fact-finding process and then recorded the terms for the report set by the Court for the section 7 report. However curiously, whilst the Reporter accurately quoted the burden of these directions she failed, for reasons which are not clear, to record the explicit direction that the report must proceed on the basis of no findings having been made.

The Reporter then turned to consider the mother’s accounts of domestic abuse. In doing so she was directly considering both the matter heard by the Court (and found unproven) and those matters which the Court had determined did not require determination (and thus remained unproven). The Reporter observed that if the allegations were true then this would mean the child and mother are victims of significant domestic abuse and further, that if the allegations are true and the father is wrongly denying the truth of the same then this would raise significant concerns as to the father’s insight and ability to change. The Reporter did not explain her purpose in carrying out this intellectual exercise or where she intended to proceed with such an endeavour in the light of the clear factual matrix set by the Court.

However having done so she proceeded to provide a professional judgment having utilised the Domestic Abuse Practice Pathway and Distinguishing Domestic Abuse and Harmful Conflict Practice Aide and the Safety of Spending Time Arrangements Indicator. Both of these are recognised as having use in cases of established domestic abuse and on a daily basis will assist the Court in finding safe outcomes for children where abuse has been established.

In carrying out this exercise the Reporter set out the mother’s allegations and the implications of the same if true commenting “…if [the mother]’s accounts are true, then the dynamics are consistent with domestic abuse, with [the father] as a primary perpetrator… [the mother] presents as afraid of [the father], and there is a power imbalance in the sense of [the father]’s physical stature. The level of abuse reported is significant as it has resulted in [the mother] having physical injuries, being very fearful and has potentially had a significant impact on her wellbeing. It has had a significant impact on [the child] in respect to her feeling worried about her mother’s safety and wellbeing, and in respect to the resulting instability and changes she has experienced, as well as the prolonged absence from her father. There are some suggestions that the abuse may be ongoing and that spending time arrangements may have been used to facilitate this, and ongoing concerns about the safety of [the child] and her mother.” On any reading the Reporter had travelled from identifying allegations to accepting the same (see emphasis above).

She approached the question of the safety of spending time arrangements through the question “if it would be safe for [the child] to continue to spend time with her father, in light of [the mother]’s accounts” concluding “…[the child] does have positive memories of her father and does want to spend time with him, and there are positives in their relationship which would be beneficial for [the child] and contribute to a positive sense of paternal identity. However, [the child] also has negative memories of her father, is fearful of spending time with him without somebody else present and worried about him following her mother. [The mother] is presenting as afraid, and there are suggestions that spending time arrangements are being used to continue abuse and undermine [the mother], which is emotionally abusive to [the child]. [The father] does not accept any harm to [the mother] or [the child], or express remorse. He has not been able to reliably attend spending time arrangements on time…I do not consider that it would be safe for [the child] to continue to spend time with her father at this time, and arrangements would fail to protect [the child] and her mother under Practice Direction 12J.” [my emphasis throughout].

Having applied these points the reporter recommended a final order under which all contact ended between child and father and further recommended that for arrangements to progress the father would need to make a further application to Court on the basis that he had been able to provide proof of his engagement in a Domestic Abuse Perpetrator Programme (DAPP) that rigorously challenged domestically abusive behaviour and the impact of the same on the mother and child. The reporter considered the father should be clear that completion of the course should not be felt to be grounds for future automatic progress but that such progress would be linked to evidence of learning from the course plus an ability of the mother to be able to facilitate such contact. The unavoidable conclusion of the above is that the Reporter unilaterally chose to depart from the clear Court direction, elevate her own assessment of the disputed allegations over that of the Court and determine contact should cease on such assessment with the prospects of future contact being contingent on the father engaging in work to correct domestically abusive conduct which had not in fact been established before the Court.

The approach taken by the Reporter was entirely inappropriate and I draw the following points of importance:

These observations fundamentally undermine the weight that can be attached to the recommendations contained within the report. Unfortunately, they appear to have led to the position taken by the mother. In that regard the report has let down the mother by not providing an appropriately balanced assessment. Having plainly expressed my concerns with the report and with the Reporter I was somewhat taken aback when she concluded her evidence by asking to be provided with immediate notice of any order made as she was intending to make a safeguarding referral following the hearing on the basis she was concerned how the father would respond to any final order, and presumably the final order proposed by her. I do intend to share this judgment with the Reporter as I do with the identified manager and those locally responsible for CAFCASS in West London. I will be seeking a response from management as to how they propose to address the issues highlighted in this judgment. Frankly I do not want to be confronted by such a scenario again.

I have noted points made by the Reporter which merit consideration and it is not my intention to simply put the report to one side. I will look at some key points from her evidence and report which remain relevant and attempt to dovetail these with the evidence of each party (which was short in length).

The Reporter details an event which took place at contact on 25 November 2025. Indeed this event led the Reporter to separately (in December 2025) file a s16A risk assessment with Court. The nature of the concern can be found in the risk assessment which reads:

In her report the Reporter suggests the above account raises a concern as to the father seeking to follow the mother. It appears clear this concern factors into the recommendation for no contact (see §38 of the report). It is therefore important to consider the available documents that shed light on this contact:

I accept the mother was concerned by what occurred and I agree any arrangements cannot undermine her sense of security (whatever the outcome of fact-finding). She does not want the father to follow her and he plainly should not. But the evidence needs to be approached realistically. The aunt was at the centre for a legitimate reason and had she been part of contact none of this would have occurred given the father and aunt would have been required to wait for the mother to leave first. It was the unplanned post-contact meeting that rearranged events. As such it is difficult to view this as a staged event or planned by the father.

I agree the actions in leaving and then stopping raise suspicion. But I also note there is no suggestion this was repeated or that the mother was then followed as suggested by the Reporter. Notwithstanding my concerns as to her report I accept the Reporter likely recorded what she was herself told by the mother. That being the case it is clear the mother mischaracterised what happened and in doing so significantly overstated the events. The true events therefore do undermine the factual basis on which the Reporter was proceeding. I am far less clear as to what to make about the suggested following undertaken during contact. I cannot see how this was geared to discovering where the mother lives as all agree the distances are such that the mother would not return home during contact. It may be the aunt was checking up on the mother but it is equally possible the mother has overstated the events and that some limited interactions have been exaggerated to become the aunt following her.

I heard very limited evidence on this matter. It was not suggested to the father that he had planned this or followed the mother home. The mother was asked as to why she claimed she had been followed home and repeated that the aunt had been seen ‘200 steps’ from the centre. In my judgment the Court has dealt with this by the consequential handover directions and can provide for this in future. It does not impact on my assessment although it clearly influenced the Reporter who felt the full account including the mother being followed home fitted with her own overarching assessment of the case.

Two related issues are the father’s immigration status and his commitment to contact. The second of the two was raised particularly through a focus on his timely arrival at contact sessions.

In this case both parents had precarious immigration entitlements although I understand the mother’s status has been settled. The father continues to be subject to a risk of removal and his current claim to remain is based on appeal and/or pursuant to a claim to exercise private family rights under Article 8. The mother has expressed continuing concern as to whether the father is more motivated by obtaining immigration rights than maintaining a relationship with the child. She is concerned that should he resolve his immigration rights that he would then fail to commit to contact with emotional consequences for the child. From her perspective this application is about the underlying immigration issue not the child. The father denies this although it is undeniable his immigration claim is closely associated with his exercise of contact with the child. His case is that he values his relationship with his child and wants to develop it.

Issues of this sort are common before this Court given the international population who appear before it. In many cases a concern is raised as to unresolved immigration whether with regard to commitment or ability to exercise rights if a claim ultimately fails. This Court cannot simply wait for immigration procedures to conclude before dealing with child welfare and indeed the circular nexus in operation between the two would make this almost impossible. Where the worry is as to what will happen if contact starts but is then interrupted by a removal, the Court simply has to approach the circumstances as they are and make the decision consistent with the welfare of the child. Such considerations will often involve a balance in recognising that whereas the above might lead to emotional harm there is an alternative argument that establishing a relationship even if it is interrupted has importance for the child and secondly to simply refuse a relationship because of the risk of interruption would be contrary to a proper welfare assessment. Where the worry is as to commitment the Court will resolve this on the evidence it has. It is of course entirely possible for the two motivations to coexist and a party may be both concerned to resolve immigration and ensure a relationship. In such circumstances each impacts on the other. But there will be cases in which the Court can conclude an application is solely motivated by immigration and in such cases the Court may determine the application lacks merit.

When considering this point one can reflect on how the two alternatives would likely play out. Assuming a claim entirely motivated by immigration then one might expect contact to end once a final order providing for contact has been obtained on the basis this is the essential evidence needed to buttress the immigration claim. However, in the alternative if this is not the sole motivator one might expect contact to continue notwithstanding the obtaining of the final order. Viewed in this way one can see the answer will ultimately be answered in relatively short order after an order is made.

I am not persuaded there is anything in the evidence that suggests to me this claim is solely a consequence of a wish to obtain immigration status, although I am confident obtaining immigration status is closely aligned with the resolution of this claim. This is shown by the pre-proceedings efforts made to maintain a relationship and the commitment throughout these proceedings. Further, having seen both parents give evidence I am satisfied the father is pursuing contact in material part, if not exclusively, so as to maintain a relationship with his daughter.

A separate point is as to the father’s timely attendance at contact. I should make clear this in no way supports the immigration argument considered above. Rather I see it as a welfare consideration as to the ability of the father to successfully maintain and sustain contact and the impact for the child if he is unable to do so, the child having invested in such contact. There is good evidence of the father being late on repeated occasions for contact. The Reporter drew on this as a reason to support her recommendation for cessation of contact. I agree there is room for criticism of the father in this regard but it has to be significantly tempered by consideration of the extent of the timeliness (or otherwise) and the quality of the contact which follows. I make the following points:

I bear these criticisms in mind. I don’t ignore them and consider the father needs to take steps to ensure lateness only occurs where it is wholly unavoidable but it is plainly not a justification for the contact to end. It is also plainly not an evidential basis for suggesting a lack of commitment on the facts of this case. It is noteworthy that when I questioned the mother as to the factors which were most present in her mind as to future contact it was the issue of commitment that she first turned to rather than issues of abuse or other matters. I formed the strong view it was this that was of most concern for her. I consider this demonstrates that this mother is in fact genuinely child motivated around the issues of contact even though I may not entirely agree with the outcome that she reaches.

A further concern for the Reporter was as to the father’s criminality. By the time of the final hearing all police checks had been obtained. They show the father has related criminal reports but no criminal convictions (see three safeguarding letters) and the question is as to whether this materially impacts on the child welfare determination as suggested by the Reporter. The most recent police checks detail the reports relating to the father. In 2011 there was a report of a threat to kill a female who was in shared occupancy accommodation with the father. There is no evidence to suggest they were in an intimate relationship and no further action followed. I have no evidence of this allegation beyond the headline noted. Twenty years ago in 2006 a male made allegations against the father of a common assault and threatening words but there was no further action. This has no direct bearing on matters of domestic abuse. There is then the report which was subject to fact-finding in respect of which the police took no further action. Finally there are matters with no obvious direct bearing on this case including theft, driving offences and documentary offences.

In her evidence the mother raised these matters as a concern and suggested a broader level of criminal activity but was unable to evidence the same. The sense I had was of a suggestion that the father was in some way involved in documentary offences around gaining access to the country. I remain unclear as to how, even if this were true, it would have a particularly significant impact on contact issues. The Reporter noted the father’s acceptance of a driving offence and his view ‘that this could happen to anyone’. She also noted he had remained in the jurisdiction ‘illegally’ between December 2023 and 2025. She suggested this raised ‘some questions about his adherence to UK laws’. These points do not assist me.

The Reporter cited aspects of her meeting with the child as support for her conclusions at the same time as appropriately confirming the child was expressing enjoyment in seeing her father. I have reservations in placing significant weight on this part of the report for the following reasons. First, it is clear from the report that the child is passing on what her mother has told her with regards to part of her account. Secondly, part of her reporting, accepted by the Reporter, is her limited account of the event subject to fact-finding which must be reviewed in the light of the finding. Thirdly, and finally it is clear to me the child has a sense of being caught in the middle of the parents and is plainly conscious of her mother’s worries. Finally, I would briefly address actions taken by the father which the Reporter considered were corroborative of the allegations. It is correct the father reported to the Reporter that during his relationship with the mother he read messages on her phone and took photographs of her in various context as part of an investigation as to whether she was in a relationship with a drug dealer. I accept these actions might be viewed as part of a controlling pattern of behaviour if the same was established through fact-finding. However, the father’s account is that each of the parents read the other’s messages and this was not felt by either to be an issue. This might materially impact whether the behaviour was controlling. Further, there has been no investigation of the father’s concerns as to whether the mother was in a relationship with a drug dealer and again one would need to be careful not to interpret every action as supportive of a general view or to apply a confirmation bias to information received.

The evidence from contact is of positive, warm and focused interaction. I have already commented as to the child’s wish to engage with paternal family members and I note the evidence that she does want to spend time with him. It is noteworthy as to the relative ease with which the child returned to spending time with her father after what was a prolonged period of absence and before that an interrupted pattern of contact. A sense of the child’s bond to her father can be found in the Father’s Day card she gave him in which she described him as her ‘hero’ and expressed very positive feelings towards him. I suspect the mother must have played a role in the construction of the card and again I sense this demonstrates her ability to put her own feelings second.

But there are counter points to keep in mind. First, it is clear to me the child is wary about the relationship between the parents. She appears to remember the arguments between them and is careful to ensure her mother is not part of the proposed contact arrangements. I have a strong sense she has taken on board some of her mother’s feelings around the issue and this is likely to impact on her wish for some supervision. In talking to the Reporter some of this impact was explicit in saying her mother told her about what happened. In other regards it is likely to be a mix of memory and information. A second point is the father’s approach to contact which at times leads him to engage in conversation which concerned the Reporter as suggesting he was trying to find out where the mother lived (“how long is your walk to school”) but at other times is open to criticism for an over abundance of expensive gifts for the child. Since the hearing I have received a further contact note in which the father engages in unhelpful conversation about the court hearing and inappropriately presses the child as to what she wants for the future.

The father needs to reflect on this engagement and be mindful of how it appears to the mother. It is clear his daughter loves him and whilst it is understandable he wishes to provide her with treats and demonstrate his love for her a more restrained approach would be sensible. He also needs to think about some of the conversation he engages in to avoid the sense that he is questioning the child. She is sensitive to the issues between her parents and there is a danger such questioning will be received poorly by the child. I am less critical as to the recent note although I accept the conversation was not appropriate. This contact followed a hearing at which the father was being told by both the Reporter and the mother that this would be his last contact potentially ever. As a litigant in person with a poor grasp of English he may not have been aware of my concerns as to the report and may have felt this was his last chance to encourage the child around the contact issue. In terms of the contact notes it stands out in this regard and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that its terms are reflective of the hearing that closely preceded it.

The evidence from contact is that this is a positive experience for the child and that she wants it to continue subject to her wariness around the adult relationship. It is clear from the report that the Reporter is making her recommendations notwithstanding this point. I bear in mind the age and understanding of the child which limits the weight one places on any views. I note the child does appear to be articulate and expresses views with a level of maturity beyond her chronological age. I suspect her views are influenced by her mother although I do not consider it is likely this is a conscious attempt to influence her. Overall the child wishes to see her father and this is a factor supporting contact.

I consider there is real importance to the child’s emotional wellbeing for her to have a level of confidence that her home life is secure and her mother safe. It is clear from her conversation with the Reporter that she is alive to the impact on her mother of these issues. My sense of the child is that she is more conscious of the adult issues in her life than might be expected of a child of her age. This has likely arisen from the multiple home moves and the dislocation of her relationship with her father that one has seen in the recent past. Of course this is not helped by being the centre of a contact dispute which has now endured for more than 2-years.

She does have an emotional need for a relationship with both parents. I consider the Reporter has failed to provide any assessment of the likely impact on the child should the plan for cessation of contact be agreed. Given it will have been stopped largely due to views around the father’s conduct it is likely the child will come to understand she is not seeing her father due to his behaviour. One does need to think through the implications for her of this understanding particularly as it does not tally with the position found by the Court. I am not at all satisfied this point is addressed by the short explanation of the recommendations given to the child by the Reporter.

She does have a need for an emotionally available primary carer who can provide consistent and sustained good enough care. I bear in mind that for all I say about the fact-finding it is also correct that many matters were not determined on a factual basis and there is within the range of potentials a possibility that the father was historically abusive in the familial relationship. The point of the case management was not as to the truth or otherwise of these points but as to their relevance when considering child arrangements. This means the mother may remain wary and worried about the father’s conduct and this may impact on the child’s care. I consider this means any arrangements have to be safe but also have to be such as to give the mother confidence.

I have regard to the child’s cultural identity. Her parents share a similar background and her culture is likely to be well respected in both households. As such I consider it is likely these features will be largely advanced irrespective of the child arrangements. But I do note the child’s identification of paternal family members as being important to her. This is striking in a case in which there has been significant relationship disruption and is a matter which deserves appropriate consideration when considering future arrangements.

A significant feature in this case is the impact a change in arrangements will have on the child. The father is arguing, optimistically in my view, for arrangements close to shared care. Such a plan would be a huge change for the child and it is difficult to predict the impact this would have on both her and the mother (and thus indirectly on the child). I am more focused on gradual change and the capacity for the same to be managed successfully and without harm to child or mother. I am in little doubt contact could continue as it currently is but this is not a suitable long-term solution for the child and one needs to have a justification for contained contact into the long term. But against this how could contact leave a supervised setting given the need for the parents to manage the arrangements in the context of their relationship? Whilst there are many positives for a child in being able to see parents co-operating around contact there are also many obvious negatives where parents are incapable of doing so. A case like this cries out for a third party who can assist with arrangements as they are tested out in the first instance. I bear in mind the child is not so far away from being able to pass between her parents without any need for them to directly engage (e.g. by travelling between her parents who whilst in sight of each other are not required to speak or come into direct physical contact).

I am also mindful of some of the father’s conduct in contact which whilst insufficient to stop contact is likely to become problematic over time if it continues. Whilst I cannot have any level of certainty around this I would hope that as contact were to settle into a normal routine that the father would pull back from the level of gift giving currently seen. He needs to be mindful of the impact this will have on the mother and to reflect on the fact that a high level of giving is not always associated with a positive relationship but can lead to a relationship based on expectation rather than simple love and warmth. The difficulty with being overly critical is the context in which this is currently playing out which is far from a normal relationship. I must keep in mind the impact on the mother of any arrangements. I accept she is worried about the father involving himself in her life, turning up at her home etc. She is entitled to a private life away from him. Any development of contact may fail if it does not keep in mind the impact of change on her. This means there must be safeguards around the contact to give her the confidence to play her part in making it work.

There are risks in this case. There is the risk of a return to parental dispute and argument with a direct impact on the child. There is a risk of the mother feeling unsafe and this having a consequential impact on the child including a further change of home and all that goes with that. There is a risk of the father pushing for more contact than the child is ready for and harming the contact by his own over-enthusiasm. I appreciate the Reporter’s focus is on risk of abuse. I have dealt with that within this judgment but I bear in mind there is always a risk of abusive behaviours arising where there is a lack of mutual respect and empathy for the other parent. There is within the evidence some support for the view that the father is not as mindful of the mother’s position as he should be. I do not sense he has entirely put to one side how she manages her home life. Whilst he is entitled to have regard to the lived environment in which his child is raised it is clear from the evidence that the child is thriving in her mother’s care and is developing into an articulate and outgoing child. These are strong indicators of good care being provided by her mother and the father should reflect on these positives which address his concerns.

As to capability of each parent. I have nothing of note to add in the case of the mother to that set out above. I can find no basis for criticising or questioning her capability. In the case of the father the evidence indicates he is more than capable of meeting the needs of the child during contact. He appears well prepared for contact, has real interest in his daughter and is resourced to ensure contact progresses smoothly. In the future he will look for a larger role I am sure and with the passage of time it is likely he will be also able to meet her needs over sustained periods if called upon to do so.

I do not intend to stop contact as suggested by the Reporter. I consider that to do so would be contrary to the welfare of the child. It would largely be based on unproven matters and would be positively harmful for the child who both enjoys and wants a relationship with her father. In my assessment contact needs to continue and indeed progress but must do so with care. I do not agree with the father as to a shared care outcome and consider a stepped path towards it at this time is far too ambitious.

In my assessment the most the Court should look to achieve at this time is the progression of contact towards a full day and to do so outside the confines of the contact centre. Thereafter progress should first be through parental discussion and agreement or if necessary a return to Court. As set out below and with the safeguards provided the contact I order can be both safe and managed in such a way as to give the mother confidence. It needs to be gradual to build confidence and to allow the parents and child to adapt to the changes which will arise. I am confident the child will be able to adjust to these changes without a negative impact.

In my judgment contact should develop as follows over the next year (each month being approximately two sessions):

In this way the contact will develop to a full day contact within the year. For the avoidance of doubt the aunt is not required to supervise contact after month 3. I do not intend to timetable overnight contact at this stage. In the first instance this must be a matter for decision making between the parents. It may be the time for consideration of the same is over the summer period 2027. Associated with this and to provide a foundation for successful contact I intend to make three additional orders:

The purpose of this order is to permit contact to develop but to do so supported by a structure that provides the mother with a level of confidence to enable her to engage to make it a success. Whilst PD12J is not directly engaged, I consider this planning can ensure contact is safe for both mother and child.

I will now send this judgement to the parties and will hand it down electronically without attendance on 10 July 2026 at 10am. I would welcome any corrections, requests for clarification and further redactions pre-publication by 4pm on 8 July 2026. I would ask counsel to send to my clerk the appropriate orders by 4pm on 9 July 2026.

If there are any matters necessitating a hearing then this should be brought to my attention and I will look to list a short hearing at the earliest opportunity.