WK v HN

These are financial proceedings concerning the marriage of the applicant wife, WK and the respondent husband, HN, whom I will refer to as the wife and the husband respectively. This is purely as a form of shorthand and no disrespect is intended by it. They are both pharmacists, having met at university in Liverpool.

The wife is 35 and the husband is 34. They have a daughter who was born in 2019 and is now 6. She lives with her mother and spends 2 nights out of 14 with her father. She attends a state school in Wales.

They became engaged in March 2015 and married in June 2016. The wife was 25 and the husband 24 at that time. There is an issue as to whether they cohabited during their final year at university. The wife says that they did, the husband denies this. I note that after graduating, the wife returned to Wales to train and work and therefore they did not live together at that stage so I do not count the period at university as true cohabitation.

The husband’s own father had his own pharmacy business in Liverpool and the husband had worked for his father from his teens onwards. Unfortunately, during the course of the marriage, the husband became estranged from his own family. The wife clearly has an issue with his father and the evidence I have heard is that they separated on 22 June 2022, as a result of an altercation which arose due to the husband’s father being in the vicinity of the family home. The marriage therefore is one of 6 years’ duration and the relationship from engagement to separation lasted 7 years.

Initially, after their marriage the parties had lived in Liverpool close to the husband’s family. They renovated that family home and with the equity were able to buy a substantial home in Wales which they planned to renovate. Some of those works have been undertaken but the work has not been completed due to the marriage coming to an end. The property is on the market and an offer has been accepted subject to contract.

On 19 March 2019 the parties purchased a pharmacy (“Pharmacy 1”) for the sum of £625,000. The husband had a 75% shareholding in the business and the wife 25%. The husband used money from his savings to put towards the purchase of Pharmacy 1 but the husband does not seek to argue that Pharmacy 1 is anything other than a matrimonial asset.

In March 2022 another pharmacy (“Pharmacy 2”) was purchased by another company (“Company B”) for £660,000. This was with funds from Pharmacy 1 and a Lloyds bank loan with the business owned in equal shares by Pharmacy 1 and Company B, the shareholder of Company B being “Mr D”, a friend of the husband.

The parties separated in June 2022. The husband says that whilst there had been some difficulties in the marriage, he did not anticipate a separation until on the date of separation there was an argument between him, the wife and her mother about the fact that his father had been seen in the vicinity of the FMH. At the time the husband was estranged from his father.

The petition is dated 18 August 2022.

The conditional order was made on 9 February 2023.

The wife’s evidence was that the sale of the FMH, was “nearly completed”, with paperwork exchanged but no completion date. She is in the process of purchasing a property in Wales for £485,000 which she hopes to acquire mortgage-free from the FMH proceeds

The wife said that since filing her s.25 statement the husband had opened a British Gas business account in her name (January 2024), having previously arranged for the company (Pharmacy 1) to meet the electricity charges for FMH which, she says, he then cancelled. She added that he stopped paying council tax, notwithstanding that maintenance pending suit (“MPS”) had, she said, been ordered on the basis that he would continue to meet mortgage and utility outgoings. She identified the MPS as £1,000 pcm and the monthly mortgage as about £1,800

She described the loss of the family car, a period of six months without her own vehicle when she had to borrow her mother’s car, and the eventual purchase of an Audi Q3, asserting that Pharmacy 1 was at the time paying for a Polestar for Mr D. She maintained that even if awarded 100% of the FMH proceeds, the net receipt would be diminished by the increased mortgage debt, which she would in any event use to reduce the arrears.

The wife was adamant that the parties, who had met as pharmacy students at university in Liverpool, had cohabited in their final year in 2012/13

She said that the husband was gifted a 25% share in his father’s pharmacy business by his father with the shares sold in 2021 and monies received in September 2021, which she accepted were unconnected to the relationship

On the business structure, the wife’s evidence was that Pharmacy 1 was incorporated in December 2018 and acquired an existing pharmacy in 2019. She said she entered the venture believing ownership would be 50/50, later learning it was 25/75, and that her role was “on paper only”. She maintained she had been told the split was for “tax purposes” and would be changed later, which did not occur. She further accepted that she learned during these proceedings that the initial share split had been 99/1 before moving to 75/25. She said this sequence reinforced her sense of having been misled, although the husband had told her it “did not matter” as “everything is 50/50 as we are married”.

She said that when FMH was purchased she contributed £10,000 towards Pharmacy 1, and she now seeks £42,000 in dividends for 2020–2021 which, she claims, used her tax code but were never paid to her or into any joint account. She disputed the suggestion that drawings treated as dividends would explain matters, asserting there is no trace of her dividends being received, whereas H’s were received by him.

The wife advanced an extensive “add-back” case. She produced a list of 248 transactions which she contends represent dishonest depletion of matrimonial assets or warehousing elsewhere, drawing attention to payments shortly after separation.

She disputed the existence of any profit-sharing agreement with Mr D, saying it was never discussed with her as director or wife; a document said to be a 2021 shareholder agreement only emerged in January 2024. She did not accept the company accountant’s confirmation that such an agreement existed. She maintained that c.£100,000 of expenditure incurred by Mr D (including travel, hotels and other items) should be restored to the company/matrimonial pot. As to Pharmacy 2, she opposed inter-company transactions from Pharmacy 1, including a £245,000 extraction which she said occurred without shareholder agreement and against her advice; in her view, that sum “should have stayed in Pharmacy 1”. She also referred to deposit and loan items which, she said, were not properly justified and ought to be added back. She queried a number of other items which I will address in detail later in this judgment.

Concerning a proposed automation project (“robotic bundle”) said to be linked to premises in Town B (a town in England), the wife’s evidence was that no such project was ever discussed with her prior to separation; she asserted there was “no robot” , and she questioned the claimed progress (including reference to a 2023 letter placing the project on hold and a subsequent visit by Mr C, a friend and business associate of the husband, to a manufacturer of such robots in Italy).

She said that post separation, the husband switched the mortgage to interest-only without her consent and ceased paying certain household outgoings. In re-examination she relied on passages in bundle 4 (paras 2816–2818) to the effect that H had committed to pay property-related bills pending final resolution, and on bundle 2 (para 24) to say he had nonetheless stopped paying broadband, moved electricity into her name, and stopped paying council tax and water. She also said Pharmacy 1 had historically paid her GPhC registration.

The wife said she had not been served with any application for the husband to take conduct of the sale of FMH or to determine its price. She also referred to a schedule showing payments to Mr D totalling over £221,000 across approximately 30 months, which she challenges.

On earning capacity, the wife is a qualified pharmacist with an independent prescribing qualification. She works in GP/primary-care roles which she said are compatible with her childcare responsibilities, with an additional day per week in a local GP surgery and 18.75 hours from home a different organisation. She accepted an advertisement for another pharmacy in the centre of another town in Wales suggested in-pharmacy earnings of c.£77,000 p.a. but said those hours (9.00–18.30) were incompatible with her childcare responsibilities.

She gave evidence of selling a ring back to Boodles for £10,000 around 19 October 2022 to fund legal costs, paying the cheque into her personal account and then into an ISA.

As to open offers and overall approach, the wife characterised the case as one of sharing rather than needs. She recorded that the husband’s offer comprised all net FMH proceeds (which she says would be less than £560,000 after arrears) plus £500,000 with equalisation of capital/maintenance. Her position is that she seeks “half” of the company and the house, and half of what she alleges was stripped from the company, relying on a total figure of £2,588,902.50 derived from her valuations.

She accepted that £30,000 of costs ordered against the husband were paid from company funds as a director’s loan, subject to verification, and indicated that she would resign as a director on standard terms once I have determined the issue of division of assets and all moneys have been paid to her.

The wife was in the witness box for almost an entire court day. She is very angry and is clearly utterly convinced that the husband has dissipated funds with a view to excluding them from the financial remedy proceedings. Indeed, describing her as angry is somewhat of an understatement. She is furious. She is consumed by fury. She was almost shouting throughout her evidence. In my judgment, she will never accept any other explanation for the dissipation of assets from the businesses.

It also appears to me that she has never shown an interest in the business and appears not to have much of an interest in financial matters generally but likes the material items which have been provided to her over the years. I was astonished when she was asked if contracts had been exchanged on the FMH that she did not understand this concept at all even though she and the husband had already purchased and sold their previous FMH in Liverpool.

The husband stated that a profit-sharing agreement was signed with Mr D on 14 May 2021, under which Mr D was to receive 50% of net profits from the COVID-19 vaccination programme. He said this arrangement was necessary to secure Mr D’s commitment.

The husband gave evidence about substantial arrears owed by Pharmacy 2 to a medical supplies business (“PX”), who had instructed solicitors to pursue recovery of sums exceeding £100,000. By early 2026 PX had placed the account on stop, preventing further supply to Pharmacy 2. The husband accepted that Pharmacy 2 was likely to be wound up given the scale of the debts and the lack of ability to meet ongoing liabilities. He described Pharmacy 2 as loss-making in both 2023 and 2024, though with some improvement.

He stated he had been unable to contact Mr D since April 2025, notwithstanding that Mr D continued to have access to the company credit card and the online payments platform which was the main source of work for Pharmacy 2 (this was for online consultations for remote consultations such as weight loss consultations). The husband said he had been withdrawing funds daily from the payments platform into the Pharmacy 2 bank account with Lloyds bank to prevent misuse of that money by Mr D. He accepted that he had not attempted to remove Mr D as a director due to the overwhelming pressures of these proceedings on him.

The husband was questioned extensively about payments involving Mr C and various companies associated with him. He accepted that Pharmacy 1 had made multiple payments to Mr C’s companies in 2021–24, including for a van purchase, repairs, air-conditioning installation, and a contribution towards a proposed “hub and spoke” project in Town B. He denied that these were sham transactions and maintained that they reflected services or investments agreed at the time. He accepted that some invoices were not found in Quill (the bookkeeping system used at the time) but attributed this to the chaotic conditions during the COVID-19 vaccination period. He said that invoices were nevertheless available.

He further accepted that Pharmacy 1 had paid Mr C’s companies significant sums post-separation but said these were valid sums due for work done or services provided by his companies. He accepted there was no V5 certificate for a van purchased by Pharmacy 1 from one of Mr C’s companies but maintained that the van existed and provided photographic evidence to that effect. He explained that Mr C had been unwell for several years, which he said contributed to the lack of documentation as he had not wanted to trouble Mr C for documents.

The husband accepted paying £60,000 to one of Mr C’s businesses for a three-year lease of premises in Town B intended for a “hub and spoke” pharmacy model. He agreed he had no key to those premises at the time of payment and that, when the wife inspected it in January 2024, the building remained a derelict shell. He said the premises had been represented to him differently and that he had made the investment in good faith on assurances that works were imminent. He also accepted paying nearly £80,000 to fit out the premises.

The husband maintained the existence and validity of the profit-sharing agreement with Mr D, although he accepted that the wife was not asked to sign it, no board meeting was held, and no contemporaneous email trail exists. He stated the document was created by Mr D and given to him in hard copy. He accepted it was only produced in these proceedings in January 2024. However, he was subsequently able to provide evidence that it was produced to his solicitors acting in the purchase of Pharmacy 2 in 2022.

The husband acknowledged that Pharmacy 1 made transfers totalling £245,000 into Company B to acquire Pharmacy 2, and that half of this sum was treated as being deducted from Mr D’s profit share. He accepted that much of the spending from the Wise account (operated by Company B) was undertaken by Mr D, including personal-style expenditure, but said these were debited to Mr D’s director’s loan account. He said he had relied on Mr D’s assurances and had expressed concerns at the time but did not intervene effectively. He accepted that the Wise account had been reduced from £100,000 to only a few pence within a year.

The husband accepted significant expenditure on vehicles, including a Porsche Taycan for himself and a Polestar vehicle for Mr D (allocated to Mr D’s profit share account). He maintained that these were tax-efficient or business-justified decisions. He accepted paying £3,000 towards a car for the wife in March 2022, which he said demonstrated his commitment to the marriage at the time.

He was challenged on borrowing from Mr C while keeping personal current account balances above £40,000; he said he had done this because he was anxious about the substantial and escalating renovation costs of the FMH.

The husband accepted that he sought legal advice on removing the wife as a director when she refused to approve the 2022 company accounts on the grounds of alleged financial irregularity. He explained that he believed urgent approval was required to avoid Pharmacy 1 being struck off by Companies House. He accepted he wanted to be sole director after these proceedings end but said his immediate motive was to preserve the company. He accepted that he was ordered to pay £30,000 towards the wife’s costs in relation to this issue and that he used his director’s loan account to meet this.

The husband accepted that Pharmacy 1’s loans to Pharmacy 2 were unlikely to be repaid given Pharmacy 2’s financial circumstances. He accepted that this prejudiced both parties but stated that such risks were inherent in business and that some ventures fail. He denied that the loans should be “added back”.

He accepted that substantial sums—£25k in 2022, £134k in 2023, and £199k in 2024—passed to him from Pharmacy 1, but said most of these represented joint family expenditure, mortgage and bill payments, and necessary living costs in circumstances where he alone was paying for the family’s outgoings post-separation. The only contractual payment which the wife had to meet was her car.

The husband stated he could raise up to £400,000 in commercial lending from Lloyds Bank to fund a buy-out of the wife’s interest, though he emphasised this was dependent on up-to-date accounts and that Pharmacy 2’s performance could undermine this. He indicated that his father may be willing to lend further funds but had given no firm commitment. His parents had confirmed that they were willing to help with his open offer to the wife so he would be able to meet that offer.

The husband denied wrongdoing throughout. He maintained that investments in Pharmacy 2 and Town B were commercially justified at the time and that he had relied heavily on Mr D and Mr C, whom he considered honest. He accepted serious shortcomings in documentation and governance but attributed these to the exceptional pressures of the COVID-19 vaccination programme, the subsequent deterioration of relationships within the business, and the impact of separation. He said he had been overwhelmed by the multiplicity of business, financial and family obligations.

I found the husband to be very different from the wife in his manner. He was calm and collected. He became quietly and appropriately emotional at times. That was clearly genuine. He came across as a man who is exhausted by these proceedings, exhausted by working extremely hard in the pharmacy, particularly over the pandemic period and by the 3 hour commute between England and Wales when he was living at the FMH. He is also very keen to maintain a relationship with the child. He did not come across as a liar. Because he has had so much on his plate running his various businesses and setting up a covid vaccination clinic, he has clearly relied on others to help him. Because he has been so busy running the Pharmacy 1 pharmacy and because his own family has only fairly recently been able to help him because they were estranged prior to his separation from the wife, he has clearly relied on individuals like Mr C and Mr D to do a lot of the work beyond the running of Pharmacy 1 for him. Neither Mr C nor Mr D have given evidence in court and I must therefore be careful what I say about them but I do question whether the husband was right to place so much of his trust in them.

Mr Nicholas John White gave evidence as the wife’s forensic accounting expert. He confirmed that, since filing his report, updatedaccounts had been submitted to Companies House for Pharmacy 1, for one or two of the companies associated with Mr C, and, he believed, for Pharmacy 2. He had reviewed the documents contained in Bundle 4 and considered them to be the complete accounts. According to those accounts, Pharmacy 1’s turnover for 2024 had increased by just over £500,000, but cost of sales had risen in parallel. As a result, gross profit was lower than in 2023, although the company remained profitable, producing a net profit of £134,000, compared with £126,000 the previous year. Administrative costs remained broadly consistent, no dividends were declared, and retained profit rose accordingly.

He accepted that within his instructions from the wife’s solicitor that the words “fraud” and “fraudulent” appeared a number of times. He denied that this had influenced his opinion in any way, stating that he had not allowed himself to become partial and that he gave his evidence strictly as an experienced accountant.

Mr White was asked about passages in his report concerning the timing of invoices from certain companies linked to the COVID vaccination programme. He said that he had merely noted that some of those invoices appeared to begin seven months after his own third COVID vaccination, which in his view was relevant to whether vaccination activity was reducing at that time. He emphatically denied suggesting that the invoices were fraudulent or that their veracity was in question, stating that he was highlighting a contextual point rather than drawing any conclusion.

He was also questioned on a reference in his report to whether Pharmacy 1 might be a beneficial owner of the Town B property. He explained that he had not intended to express a concluded view and accepted that he was not qualified to comment on land ownership. He said he mentioned it because issues had arisen in relation to two companies linked to Mr C—“D Company” and “R Company”—both of which had been inactive, and one of which had been struck off at relevant times. He denied that raising the issue indicated bias, saying that he was responding to his instruction to review companies connected with Mr C.

Mr White gave further evidence regarding several Mr C-associated companies which had filed dormant accounts. He accepted that amended accounts had since been lodged for some of them but said this did not remove the concerns raised by the fact that dormant filings had been made during periods in which the companies were said to be trading.

In evidence led by Miss Huyton, Mr White addressed the profit-sharing arrangement said to exist between the husband and Mr D. He accepted the accountants’ explanation that, because Mr D was not a shareholder of Pharmacy 1, any share of profit allocated to him had to be treated as a creditor balance and recorded as a cost in Pharmacy 1’s profit and loss account. The schedule at p.1711 showed that the amount attributable to Mr D for 2023 was £35,000, and this appeared as an expense in the accounts. In cross-examination, he confirmed that he was not disputing the mathematics of the 50/50 allocation or asserting that the agreement did not exist; rather, his point was that this cost had not been added back in Mr Houghton’s valuation of Pharmacy 1.

In re-examination, Mr White said that D Company had since been reinstated and had filed accounts, and he believed that another of Mr C’s companies had also filed amended accounts, though he could not recall the position regarding R Company. He noted that R Company had previously filed accounts stating that it had not traded, had no staff, premises or bank account, and could only be contacted through an online form. This, he said, formed part of the contextual concerns he had identified when examining the company records.

Mr Houghton noted that some of the companies connected to Mr C had filed dormant accounts and subsequently amended accounts. Whilst he accepted this was unusual, he cautioned that the circumstances in which those filings were made needed to be borne in mind.

He confirmed his valuation of Pharmacy 1 at £1.631 million, explaining that part of the net-debt position resulted from Pharmacy 2 being unable, at the valuation date, to repay loans advanced to it by Pharmacy 1. Although Pharmacy 2’s more recent 2024 accounts demonstrated increased turnover, higher gross profit and a significantly reduced annual loss, he emphasised that the company was still loss-making. He also highlighted that cash at bank had reduced due to increases in debtors and that approximately £45,000 had been withdrawn by a director via the director’s loan account, thereby increasing Pharmacy 2’s indebtedness. Although the loss trajectory had improved, he stressed that the figures would require adjustment for items that should properly be included in the accounts.

Mr Houghton addressed the position of G Company, a company to which Pharmacy 2 owed money. Its accounts were overdue and it risked being struck off. He explained that if the company were dissolved, creditors could still seek reinstatement of the company to the register and pursue claims. He therefore rejected the proposition that Pharmacy 2’s debt to G Company could automatically be treated as extinguished. His conclusion in his report that Pharmacy 2 had no value was based on its indebtedness and the fact it could not, at the valuation date, repay Pharmacy 1.

He confirmed that pharmacy businesses generally sell as whole entities, and that whether a discount should be applied to reflect a 75% shareholding was ultimately a matter for the court. He also noted that Pharmacy 1 had recorded liabilities to R Company and other creditors, and that determining whether any particular invoice was fraudulent required distinguishing between balance-sheet entries and the company’s actual assets. He explained that if a company paid for an asset it did not receive, the value should be added back.

He stated that if the court concluded that certain management charges (particularly those relating to the COVID-19 vaccination programme) were not legitimate costs, they would need to be added back to maintainable EBITDA and would increase the company’s earnings figure.

In relation to staffing costs, Mr Houghton explained that a pharmacy manager would typically earn around £53,000, and that replacing the work of the husband would require an adjustment of approximately £49,000. He assessed H’s stated working hours (80 per week) as excessive, estimating closer to 50 hours would be required. An arms-length purchaser would be expected to appoint a pharmacy manager rather than rely on the proprietor performing all functions.

He noted that Pharmacy 1’s updated accounts showed an increase in retained profit and a reduction of approximately £230,000 in creditor balances, although he was unable to confirm whether any specific creditor (including R Company) had been paid. Withdrawals by the husband via the director’s loan account were, in his view, repayments of sums previously advanced by him, although had the husband limited himself to a reasonable salary level the business would have retained more cash.

Regarding later transactions (2024–2025), Mr Houghton stated he had not been asked to re-value the company and that those transactions could not retrospectively alter a valuation performed at a specific earlier date. Any adjustment would instead operate through a cash/debtor adjustment at the valuation date.

He accepted that while Pharmacy 2’s losses had reduced, the business remained loss-making and continued to owe significant sums to Pharmacy 1. Its continued failure to meet its obligations to another healthcare business indicated ongoing financial vulnerability. He also noted that other creditors would rank equally with Pharmacy 1 in any insolvency unless secured.

Finally, he stated that he saw no basis, on the material put to him during cross-examination, to revise the valuation of Pharmacy 1 set out in his report.

I have heard detailed submissions from Counsel for the parties. I have carefully considered the caselaw referred to by Counsel for the Wife in her note on the conduct issues. I do not find most of them particularly useful to the first issue with which I am concerned, namely determining what a party asserting conduct has to establish in the add back type of scenario. She places great reliance on the case of Purba v Purba (1999) EWCA Civ 1730. That case is an appeal of the judge at first instance which was only allowed to a small degree and it does not touch on the principles which I need to apply in a case of this nature. The more helpful case in her authorities is that of Tsvetkov v Khayrova (2023) EWFC 130) wherein Peel J quoted extensively from the case of OG v AG (2020) EWFC 52, a case upon which Counsel for the husband seeks to rely.

Conduct under s25(2)(g) of the MCA 1973 is to be taken into account if it is “such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it.”

The starting point is therefore set out in AG wherein Mostyn J identifies the four situations where conduct is relevant, the appropriate one for my purposes being the “add back” jurisprudence which he describes as being “where one party has wantonlyandrecklessly dissipated assets which would otherwise have formed part of the divisible matrimonial property. Again, it will only be in a clearandobvious, and therefore rare, case that this principle is applied.”. I have highlighted the words which I consider to be most helpful.

I understand that the term “add back” comes from the case of Norris v Norris (2002) EWHC 2996 (Fam) . In Norris, the husband had invested considerable sums in the stock market and “rode the crest of the dot.com boom”. He then bought shares in a company for £475,000. The company made significant losses and was described as “technically insolvent.”. The wife argued that the investment was cynical or reckless and that he knew that the money would all be used up within a year, ie that he would deprive her of her share. The court rejected the wife’s case, recognising that the husband was “a talented entrepreneur. He takes risks, sometimes big ones. Some pay off, others do not. I reject the suggestion that the investment into Customer Dynamics limited was either a cynical ploy or a reckless investment. The fact is that it is unlikely to be resuscitated until the market improves and nobody can predict when that will be. I cannot possibly put a figure on its future worth.” (I note that the court did go on to add back personal expenditure of the husband, which it held was reckless and should not disadvantage the wife.)

I note that in AP, Moor J referred to his own judgement in MFP v MAO (2015) EWHC 627(Fam) where he said:-

I also note that he considered the decision of the Court of Appeal in Vaughan v Vaughan (2007) EWCA Civ 1085 where Wilson LJ confined the circumstances in which a court could apply such a doctrine, saying:-

In AP , Moor J also noted that one of the issues in the case was whether the Husband had lied to the Court. He said as follows:

“First, I must decide whether or not he did deliberately tell lies. If I find that he did, I have to ask myself why he lied. The mere fact that someone tells a lie is not in itself evidence that the person concerned has undisclosed assets. An individual may lie for many reasons. They may possibly be " innocent " ones in the sense that they do not denote a false presentation of his current financial position. They may be lies to bolster a true case; or to protect someone else; or to conceal some other disreputable conduct or out of panic, distress or confusion.

It follows that, if I find that the Husband has lied to me, I must assess whether or not there is an " innocent " explanation for those lies that does not support the Wife's case that he has hidden assets. However, if I am satisfied that there is no such explanation, I can take the lies into account in my assessment of his case.

In this regard, Mr Peel reminds me of the words of Munby J in H v H [2010] EWHC 158; [2010] 1 FLR 1864 where he said:-

"The Husband was exposed to many, many hours of the most searching cross-examination, an ordeal from which, in my judgment, he emerged substantially unscathed. Almost inevitably, given the mass of complicated financial matters which were being put to him, and most of which he responded to from memory and without going to the documents, the husband on occasions made slips and gave answers which subsequently turned out not to be correct. But having had the opportunity of watching him over many days in court, and not only when he was in the witness box, I am satisfied that the husband was an honest, truthful and, for the vast majority of the time, also an accurate and reliable witness. He did not lie. And on the comparatively few occasions when he was "caught out" it was not for lying but rather, I am satisfied, because, quite genuinely, his memory was at fault."

There are issues as to whether or not B and A are holding assets for the benefit of the Husband. I was referred to my own decision of Young v Young [2013] EWHC 3637 where I said that:-

"Mr Howling asks me to find on the balance of probabilities that various individuals and corporate entities are holding assets on behalf of the husband….it is quite clear to me that I am unable to do so for two reasons, one of which is fundamental. None of these individuals or entities has been joined to the proceedings. Although some of the individuals concerned have given evidence, they have not had any opportunity to be formally heard on the issue. There have been no pleadings, so they would not know the case they faced. They cannot therefore be bound by any finding".”

Based on the relevant caselaw, I have to consider :

In these proceedings, the wife not only alleges that there has been a wanton and reckless dissipation of assets but she alleges that the husband has deliberately “warehoused” money with a view to keeping them out of these proceedings so that he can access them in the future when these proceedings are over. That is in fact what appears to have happened in Purba where, as soon as the parties separated, the husband transferred significant amounts of money to the bank accounts of relatives who were held to be holding that money for the husband as bare trustees.

As the wife is asserting conduct, she must prove;

If the wife establishes those issues, I have to then go onto consider how the misconduct, and its financial consequences, should impact upon the outcome of the financial remedies proceedings, undertaking the usual section 25 exercise which requires balancing all the relevant factors.

The wife has provided at exhibit 3 of her statement dated 10 June 2025 a list of 248 invoices and payments from Pharmacy 1 which she challenges. It would be wholly disproportionate for me to have to address each individual invoice but I will deal with the pertinent issues upon which the parties have focused during the trial by way of the headings set out in that schedule.

The husband says that this was for ripping out fittings at the old bookmakers in readiness for fitting out the vaccination centre. This pre dates the separation by 8 months. I note that wife questions whether this is a genuine invoice as R Company was a dormant company and she says that a lettings business carried out this work. She has provided photographs and argues that R Company have tried to make out that they have done work which has been undertaken by the lettings business. I accept the evidence of the husband on this. He explained that the bookmakers had left the premises in a mess so R Company had cleared the premises and the lettings business had fitted the premises out. This was a situation where time was of the essence. The husband had been approached by NHS England to get this vaccination centre off the ground within 14 days so his explanation makes sense. I find the issue about R Company being dormant to be a red herring. That is a matter for Mr C. From the Husband’s perspective, he would have simply paid the bill.

This was to provide pharmacy consultation services. The wife says that this is another dormant company. The husband that this was in respect of advice from Mr C in setting up and running the vaccination centre. The Husband was clearly under a great deal of pressure at this time. He describes speaking to Mr C sometimes 3 or 4 times a day at this time and that he could not have managed the vaccination programme without his help. Whilst Mr C is not a pharmacist, he does own pharmacies and an opticians so he clearly has or has access to expertise in these issues. I do not query this as an expense. Whilst this payment may have been to a dormant company, that was a matter for Mr C, not the Husband. It was also 8 months before separation.

The husband says that this was for fitting out Pharmacy 1 and that work done to the pharmacy previously whilst he owned it had been minimal. He explains the precise nature of the work required, including the need to create more space and the need for this work to be done quickly because they were operating side by side with the vaccination centre and that this was work was done quickly by the company. I do not query this as an expense.

This is for the purchase of a VW Transporter van for the pharmacy and is dated 3/12/21 – with a specific registration number. Much evidence was heard about this. This is again an invoice predating the separation by 6 months. Unfortunately, in the original invoice, the wrong registration number for the van was quoted which raised the wife’s suspicions. Furthermore, the DVLA confirmed that neither the husband nor Pharmacy 1 were the registered keeper of the vehicle between 26/11/21 and 27/6/23. The husband believes this to have been because the vehicle sales business was taxing and insuring the vehicle initially so it may have been registered in its name. The fact is that the wife does not believe that the Husband or Pharmacy 1 ever owned this van and her Counsel is critical of the husband for failing to provide the V5 for the van which he could have obtained. The Husband has provided photographs of the van parked next to his in the car park next to his Audi in the car park link allocated with his rental flat as well as photos of the van in the service station. Counsel for the wife argues that it is easy to produce such photographs if the husband’s friend owns the van. She makes the point that the husband annotated the V5 for the Citroen Berlingo van when he received it so it is suspicious that the Husband did not do the same with the VW van. However, the husband explained that he did not have the time to go out and source the VW van whereas he had more support in the pharmacy which enabled him to go out and buy the Citroen Berlingo which explained why he had annotated the V5. The fact is that the Wife has lost all trust in the husband and even if he produces the V5 now, she would be likely to question that evidence. I accept the husband’s evidence.

The husband says that this was for storage of PPE for the vaccination centre. It again predates separation. I accept his evidence on this.

A significant amount of evidence was heard about this. The Husband told me that these invoices relate to the proposed setting up of a “hub and spoke” pharmacy which provides for the outsourcing of repeat dispensing of prescriptions and uses advanced AI technology to centrally dispense thousands of items which are then distributed throughout the country. Within the bundle there is an advert for a pharmacy in a town in Wales which uses such a model so this is clearly a model which is in use in pharmacies in this UK. We know that the wife visited the former port office in Town B where the central hub was intended to be located and found it to be in a very poor state of repair. I have seen those photographs and it appears to me that no work has been undertaken by R Company or AM Company, another of Mr C’s companies, to those premises. The wife is understandably suspicious as a result. Counsel for the wife argues that this is a story created after the event to try to justify a payment around the time of separation which is wholly unusual and irregular, citing Purba. A deposit for the R Company pharmacy robot is paid by Pharmacy 1 on 30/5/22, only three weeks before separation and only 6 days later a contribution of £78,990 is made towards the fit out costs of the hub and spoke pharmacy and on 6/7/22, rent is paid for that pharmacy for three years in the sum of £60,000. It is only when the Wife’s legal team asks questions and the wife takes the photos of the former port building in Town B that the wife’s lawyers receive an email from a company in Italy confirming that Mr C visited their factory which manufactures robots. She submits that the Husband and Mr C are in cahoots. The fact that the Husband has taken no legal action against Mr C supports that submission.

I have seen a letter dated 29 February 2024 which Mr C has sent to the Husband on AM Company in which he confirms that “I am pleased to confirm that we have reached agreement with a leading manufacturer of automation systems, [manufacturer’s name], Italy to manufacture the [R Company] 9000 Pharmacy Robot Automation System. During a recent visit we had the opportunity to see the [R Company] 9000 prototype and are very pleased with its development and functionality. I enclose several pictures of the [R Company] 9000 prototype, along with their factory plant for your pursual (sic)”.

The wife has produced an email from a person at the manufacturer’s confirming that Mr C visited their headquarters on 26 January 2024 and that he provided details of the company he works for “Town B Dock, R Company Pharma” and that ” our product named “M[…]” …which he named “R Company 9000” is not a prototype ….Mr [C] told us that he is the owner of various pharmacies spread across the UK and that he wanted to perform the first installation with one of our system in one of his pharmacies in Liverpool….We provided him a project (layout) and an economical offer for one of our product which is still under negotiation with him…..The photos he sent you via email are actually taken in our factory and covering our production site and our showroom, he then digitally affixed the “[R Company] 9000” logo…..”.

So what do I make of that? The key here is the evidence of the wife about Mr C. She explained that she only met him once and that he was “like Delboy and I thought he was very confident”. We also know that as a result of the husband’s estrangement from his own father, who had been in the pharmacy business, that the husband leaned on Mr C a lot. At the time of the pandemic and separation from the wife, it is clear that he saw Mr C a lot and he spent a lot of time discussing matters with him. He trusted Mr C. When I asked him if he thinks that Mr C is honest, the husband replied that he considers that he is.

The problem for me is that Mr C did not attend to give evidence. The wife’s solicitor had written to him but he did not reply. The husband said in his oral evidence that Mr C had not been well and he did not therefore want to trouble him. He has not been added as a party to the proceedings. A witness summons has not been served upon him.

I can appreciate why the wife would be suspicious. The picture portrayed of Mr C is a “wheeler dealer” with his fingers in lots of pies. He is a fixer and there is no doubt that he can get things done. For instance, I have found that his companies did building works on Pharmacy 1 and on the vaccination clinic. However, there is a distinctly concerning side to him. He has clearly exaggerated the situation in relation to the robot and, from the wife’s photographs of the Town B property, he appears to have done no work on the Town B property. There may be an explanation for that but none has been provided. The exaggeration of the position with the robot fits in with the wife’s description of him as like Delboy and being confident. The Husband has relied on him at a time when he has been particularly vulnerable, when he has been particularly busy setting up the covid vaccination centre, when he has been spending three hours of his time commuting from Wales, when he has separated from his wife, been worried about maintaining a relationship with his daughter and when he has been involved in these protracted, extensive, highly unpleasant and fraught financial remedy proceedings. If this is a fraudulent “deal”, I am satisfied that none of that rests with the husband. The questions as to whether there is fraud would have needed to have been asked of Mr C, not the husband. There may be an explanation for the Town B project not getting off the ground yet. I note that the money paid by the husband was a contribution towards the cost of refurbishing the Town B building. Mr C may need more contributions to enable him to carry out the project. Illness may have prevented him doing the work. The husband also says that he put the brakes on the project as “there was talk about legislation changing which would impact the outsourcing of dispensing and it was important to cut Pharmacy 1’s losses.”

The husband has produced a letter dated 20/11/22 which he sent to Mr C at AM Company in which he states :“given the current circumstances that I currently find myself in, that I could like to pause any further investments and progress within the unit, as I simply cannot afford the time to fully invest in making this a success for our Pharmacy business.” On 28 November 2022, Mr C replies on AM Company paper that “ I am deeply saddened to hear about the difficulties that you are facing in you (sic) personal life. It is indeed impossible to give your all to new ventures when you are going through personal work issues. Please let me know when you can recommence with plan, as discussed there are many formalities and applications that we shall have to undertake, these include but are not limited to:

Applying for the relevant planning permissions

Registration of the premises with the GPhC

Finalisation of the internal layouts and positions of the [R Company] 9000 Robot….”. Mr C certainly “talks the talk” and it is clear from that letter that he does have knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry. Counsel for the wife submits that it is inconceivable that Mr C would simply leave things like that but perhaps he has because he realises that he has not fulfilled his side of the deal either in the sense that he does not appear to have a robot or to have refurbished. Perhaps he is entirely genuine and entirely sincere in what he says in his letter to the husband. Perhaps he is too ill to progress matters himself. Whatever the explanation for the lack of progress what I can find that in terms of the husband, there has been no wanton and reckless dissipation of these assets and in becoming involved in this project he had no intention of depriving the wife of these assets. It was a deal which simply did not continue for various reasons. From the husband’s perspective, it was too much for him due to his personal circumstances at the time.

The wife is suspicious of this because the invoice postdates the separation by only a month and the work was undertaken by one of Mr C’s companies. The husband did not know who had damaged the Porsche so he had it repaired by Mr C’s company. I accept his explanation.

The wife makes all sorts of criticisms about the fact that there are no safety certificates for this work. The fact is that this work has been undertaken. There is much criticism of the husband for not obtaining these certificates during the course of these proceedings. This is, in my judgment, overly harsh. The work has been done. The husband has continued to work in the pharmacy during these proceedings and the documentation generated is significant. The absence of a safety certificate when an air conditioning unit has been installed is not going to convince me that this is in some way a fraudulent transaction.

The husband says that he bought this himself as opposed to arranging for someone else to do it which is why he has the V5 and has annotated it. He had more time by this stage as his family were helping him with the business. Again, I accept that he bought the van.

The wife says that when she visited the pharmacy, this work which had been billed for had not been undertaken and she has taken photographs to prove it. I did not find the photographs to be very clear. However, the work has now been completed and there is no dispute about that. The wife will say that the work was only done once she took the photographs. If that is the case, and I cannot really see much from the photographs, it shows Mr C’s company in a poor light. It is not evidence of fraud on the part of the husband.

He is a friend of the husband and the wife. He was in the year below them at university and had undertaken locum work for the husband in the pharmacy with which the husband was impressed.

The husband told me that during the pandemic he was approached by NHS England to set up a covid vaccination clinic. There was very little time to do this and the only way of carrying out this project was to ask Mr D to run it. The only way that Mr D would run the project was if he had a 50% share of the profits. They therefore entered into a profit share agreement which has been provided. Mr D had printed this off the internet. Counsel questions the authenticity of this agreement. She also criticises the fact that the wife, as a fellow director, did not sign the agreement if it is a genuine agreement.

I have seen the agreement. It is not particularly detailed but this has to be put into context of the arrangement being hasty because of the pressures the husband and Mr D were under to set up the covid vaccination centre. Furthermore, there was evidence produced during the course of the trial which showed that in March 2022, 3 months prior to separation, the husband sent a copy of the profit share agreement to the solicitors acting for him in the purchase of Pharmacy 2. The husband says that he told the wife about the project and I accept that he did. However, it does not appear to me that the wife was particularly interested in the business of the pharmacy at the time. Furthermore, she was or had been friends with Mr D and his then romantic partner, Mr O and when she and the husband were living in Liverpool, they would entertain Mr D and Mr O at their home at dinner parties. Turning down this offer from NHS England would have meant missing out on this opportunity as the husband was clear that he could not have run this project alone as he was already running a pharmacy and it was clearly a considerable undertaking which involved refurbishing the old bookmakers next to Pharmacy 1 and co-ordinating the staff and volunteers there. The pharmacy derived a significant income from the vaccination project, particularly in the first year and the husband is adamant that without the input of Mr D, this would not have been possible. He also relied on assistance and advice from Mr C.

I understand that the invoices from G Company (Mr D’s company) amounting to £40,450 are Mr D’s share of the net profits of the covid vaccination service in accordance with the profits of the covid vaccination service. This is a lot of money but there was a lot of work involved and whilst Mr D may have been billing for a significant amount of work, he was bringing in a lot of money via his work for the vaccination centre.

At invoices number 127 to 157 inclusive there are invoices relating to payments by Pharmacy 1 to Mr D for 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 amounting to £221,612.68. The husband explains that these are all invoices from Mr D from June 2021 to February 2024 and represent his share of the net profits from the covid vaccination service under the terms of the profit share agreement. At its peak in the financial year ending 2021 the revenue from covid 19 vaccinations amounted to £1.144m and this is income which would have not been generated but for Mr D’s involvement given that the husband had to run Pharmacy 1.

The wife is irate at the fact that Pharmacy 1 has paid out £15,726.72 for a lease for a Polestar car for Mr D. These payments are monthly and started on 4 January 2022, five months before the separation. She is particularly irate about this because after separation, the husband cancelled the proposed purchase of a Porsche for her and she had to borrow her mother’s car until she could enter in to a PCP for her Audi. Whilst she may be peeved about this, the husband explains that these payments were deducted from his profit share.

The husband says that he and Mr D bought this business in March 2022. He told me that as Pharmacy 1 owed funds to Mr D under the terms of its profit share agreement, he had funds available to invest . The two of them bought Pharmacy 2 through a limited company (Company B) for £650,000 excluding fees. Company B had been incorporated in 2021 when the husband was considering going into business with Mr D. They were each 50% shareholders and directors in Company B. Mr D and Pharmacy 1 each paid £100,000 towards the deposit of £240,000 for Pharmacy 2 with the balance borrowed from Lloyds Bank. The wife has questioned Mr D’s contribution towards the deposit but the husband has explained that it came out of money which Pharmacy 1 owed to him for his work in delivering the vaccination programme.

The husband told me that his involvement with Pharmacy 2 was minimal and that over time, Mr D had developed this from being a traditional pharmacy to offer aesthetics and other clinical services including online consultations which are booked and paid for via an online platform. Mr D is also an independent prescriber pharmacist and can therefore provide private prescription services. Pharmacy 2 now trades under a different name.

The husband provided evidence at the beginning of the trial which indicates that Pharmacy 2is not performing well financially. The husband conceded that he had let Mr D get on with running Pharmacy 2and that he was disappointed in Mr D for some of the things which he had done. Counsel for the wife asked him about a Wise bank account for Pharmacy 2 in which there was £100,000 but which was reduced within a short period of time to virtually nil by Mr D. Some expenditure from that account appears to be legitimate expenditure. E.g. Mr D claims for attending a botox course and this includes a train fare and hotel stay. There is money spent on expensive items such as suitcases and items which may or may not have been used to transformed the pharmacy to a clinic suitable for those visiting for treatment such as botox but I do not know which ones. Certainly, I cannot see how the suitcases would have been used in the pharmacy. There are many more train fares and hotel charges. Again, I question how many of those truly relate to the business. The husband told me that he was disappointed in Mr D, that he understood that he had split from his partner, Mr O and had moved to London. He had failed to speak to Mr D since last year. However, Mr D was still working in the pharmacy and was undertaking online consultations (the practice manager at Pharmacy 2 had confirmed this to him). He described Mr D as a spendaholic. He was satisfied that any of the payments made from the Wise account by Mr D which were not legitimate expenses of Pharmacy 2 would be attributed to Mr D’s director’s loan account. He did feel that he should have monitored Pharmacy 2 more closely but was busy with Pharmacy 1 and the divorce proceedings. He still considered Mr D to be honest.

Whilst the husband has been very unwise in allowing Mr D to spend so much money using the Wise account, I am satisfied that this was because he was simply busy and let Mr D get on with running Pharmacy 2. This is not a case of fraud. It is not a case of wanton and reckless dissipation of assets by the husband.

These payments date from 23/3/22 to 30/1/25 and, whilst Pharmacy 2 has clearly made payments to Pharmacy 1 (in 2024 it paid Pharmacy 1 £416,100), the amount owed by Pharmacy 2 to Pharmacy 1 is £432,590. The husband says that these are intercompany loan payments to and from Pharmacy 2 and that they are all accounted for within the accounts. In his statement of 29/7/25 he says that “these payments are generally made mid-month to coincide with the receipts from the NHS.” Again, I see no evidence of wanton and reckless dissipation of assets here.

These amount to £57,500 and are from February (pre separation), July and September 2022. The husband says that these were always treated as being for Mr D’s profit share and Pharmacy 1’s bookkeeper would deal with them accordingly and that the reference to leaflets was a “wrong descriptor.

The amount claimed for this certainly amounts to a lot of money. However, the husband said that thousands of people were vaccinated at the clinic. I can understand why the wife would be sceptical about this amount. However, the husband essentially delegated the running of the vaccination clinic to Mr D.

If Mr D had been added as a party to these proceedings and a witness summons had been served upon him, I am sure that both the husband and wife would have had a lot of questions to ask of him. The fact is, however, that he was not. He has not engaged with either the husband or the wife. He was a person trusted by the husband. He was a friend of both parties at one time. The husband does not consider him to be dishonest.

The husband appears to suspect that Mr D may be unwell as a result of a relationship breakup. I do not know. What I can say is that the husband has been somewhat in naïve in allowing Mr D to do whatever he wants to at Pharmacy 2 and to spend in what appears to be an irresponsible fashion. However, this is a husband who has been working hard in the other pharmacy and has been going through a very messy divorce himself. He trusted his friend to get on with running the business, a friend who had generated significant income for the business via the vaccination centre. I do not find any evidence of wanton and reckless dissipation of funds on the part of the husband here.

These total £60,295 and are to Mr D’s former partner for his work in the design and development of the website for Pharmacy 1. In his statement of 29 July 2025, the husband says that it was Mr O’s “work on the website that made all the difference to streamlining external traffic and directing it into the NHS appointment system for the vaccination programme.” Mr O was a friend of both the husband and wife as he had been the romantic partner of Mr D. He was trusted by the husband and the husband’s evidence is that Mr O delivered in terms of the website work. I am satisfied that this is a genuine expense and that there is no wanton and reckless dissipation of funds by the husband here.

These span the period 7 November 2022 to 16 December 2024. The husband states that they represent payment in and out of his directors loan account. He says that they have all been fully accounted for and that full disclosure has been provided. What his Counsel says is that substantial amounts have been paid back to Pharmacy 1 as well as being paid out to the husband and that if the husband is “warehousing” money, he is not very good at it. Looking at the schedule provided by the wife, I can see that in February 2024, the husband paid the total of £160,000 back to Pharmacy 1 and I accept the point by Counsel for the husband that if the husband if “warehousing” funds, why would he pay that money back into Pharmacy 1? It makes no sense. There is no wanton and reckless dissipation by him in this context.

A curious matter arose in relation to invoices raised by RD Company dated July August and September 2022. These represent staged payments in respect of extensive refurbishment work at Pharmacy 2. They are made out to Pharmacy 1. As part of these proceedings, the wife’s solicitors appears to have written to Mr R of RD Company and he has provided a statement dated 23 August 2023 (he did not give evidence at trial) in which he confirms that “at the request of Mr D (who I did not know) I had undertaken extensive refurbishment works at [Pharmacy 2]….I was asked by Mr D and “[the husband’s first name]” (Who I have never met) to make my invoices payable to [Pharmacy 1], which I did, I had no idea that this might have been improper. I should mention that I did this after Mr D threatened to cut off dispensing my medications which I get from Pharmacy 2.” What is curious is that the invoices provided by Mr R to the wife refer to them being for works at; Pharmacy 2”,. However, the invoices produced by the husband have the words “For works at; Pharmacy 2” removed from them. What is also curious about those invoices is that the words “For works at; Pharmacy 2” cannot have been simply covered up with a piece of paper or tippexed out and then photocopied because of the way in which the invoice is set out. What was unfortunate was that I did not see the original invoices and Mr D does not provide an explanation about the difference in his invoices within his statements. The husband and wife have clearly been provided with invoices for the same work but the invoices themselves are not the same. Mr R makes a serious allegation about Mr D which does make one question whether Mr D had something to do with the different invoices but neither Mr R and Mr D were at court to explain themselves. It is, however, significant that Mr D confirms that he has not met the husband. He does not even appear to know his surname. In those circumstances, if there is reason for suspicion here, I would look to Mr D for an explanation, not the husband.

It therefore follows that there are no transactions to be added back to the balance sheet for Pharmacy 1. Mr Houghton gave oral evidence and after questioning by both Counsel in relation to the Pharmacy 1 accounts, he maintained the view expressed in his report that he continued to value the total equity in Pharmacy 1 at £1. 631 million as at the year end 2023.

Counsel for the husband submits that I should reduce the valuation of the company by 25% on the basis that, if the husband keeps the business, the wife will be left with the benefit of net proceeds of sale of the FMH and a further lump sum. He describes these as copper-bottomed assets with the husband keeping the risk-laden assets. There is a very small market for potential sale, the husband highlights that the comparables chosen by Mr Houghton have been on the market for some time without a completed sale. The traditional pharmacy market is likely to be adversely affected in the future by automation and online pharmacies.

Counsel for the wife submits that the copper-bottomed assets argument carries no weight as the wife would be content to keep shares in the company. I dismissed this immediately. This is a couple at war and the wife would not be able to keep the emotion out of any business relationship if she were to retain shares in the company. Furthermore, they have a young child and it is important that they concentrate on developing a respectful relationship so that they can co-parent their child. The child’s needs must come first. They would have no hope of co-parenting this child if the wife kept shares in the business, in my judgment. The child’s needs must come first.

Counsel for the husband has referred me in his skeleton to the caselaw dealing with this issue and I note, in particular that in Versteegh v Versteegh (2018) EWCA Civ 1050 Lewison LJ noted various reasons why the matter of valuation of a private company is for the court as opposed to the expert including that “the acid test of any valuation is exposure to the real market, which is simply not possible in the case of a private company where no one suggests that it should be sold.”

It was made clear in HO v TL (2023) EWFC that the caselaw supports the concept of there being two potential discounts; an accountancy discount “to reflect, among other things, a minority shareholding and a “court discount” which reflects the liquid / illiquid nature of the asset.”

I note that in Chai v Peng and Others (2017) EWHC 792 (Fam) Bodey J reduced the valuation by 10% to reflect minority discount and by a further 20% (a total of 30%) to reflect inherent uncertainties in the valuation and the marketability of the shares. In HO Peel J referred to the Chai case and noted that “it is a familiar approach to depart from equality of outcome where one party (usually the wife) is to receive cash, while the other party (usually the husband) is to retain the illiquid business assets with all the risks (and possible advantages) involved”.

Counsel for the wife disagrees with this approach on the basis that if the pharmacy were sold, it would be sold in its entirety, a share of it would not be sold. She too relies on the case of Ho and also refers me to the case of Martin v Martin (2018) EWCA Civ 2866 which appears to endorse the approaches in Chai and Versteegh.

I accept that the pharmacy is likely to be adversely affected in the future by automation and online pharmacies. However, the husband has shown that when he is not distracted by divorce proceedings, he is a dynamic and forward-thinking individual who can adapt to change so long as he is surrounded by people who have his best interests at heart. It seems to me that he has that with his family. Mr Houghton explained that pharmacies have done well on the back of covid and are now returning to the pre covid pattern of income. He was also aware that one of the pharmacies to which he referred had received an offer but the other had not. Nevertheless, there remains the argument that the wife, in having the cash, will have the “copper-bottomed assets”. Having considered all of the factors, I will reduce the value of the business by 15% to address the copper-bottomed assets argument and the other arguments. That brings the value of the Pharmacy 1 down to £1,386,350.

This has been sold subject to contract for the sum of £885,000. There is equity of £548,610 in the property. The husband has agreed that the wife should keep the net proceeds of sale. There are arrears of £23,717 on the mortgage. In addition there are joint debts owed on the FMH in respect of bills associated with the property in the sum of £4,892. The wife says that this is because the husband stopped paying the mortgage and bills. She had made an application for maintenance pending suit and it was understood that the husband would continue paying the mortgage and other expense. He did initially but failed to keep up those payments. He says that this is because he had expected that the matter would settle at FDR but then the matter was listed for a 5 day conduct hearing. The husband did not apply to the court to vary the MPS amount or approach the wife’s solicitors to explain that he could not continue to pay the mortgage. In those circumstances, I propose when dividing the assets up to add the money in respect of the arrears and debts back so that the equity comes up to £577,219. It is that amount which I expect the wife to receive when the property is sold.

Pharmacy 2 – this has been valued at nil. I appreciate the point made by Counsel for the wife that the pharmacy was purchased for £650,000 in March 2022 but Mr Houghton has valued it at nil and given the way in which it appears to have been run by Mr D, I cannot see how I can go behind that valuation.

Company B – this has been valued at nil.

Company P – this has a nil valuation.

Porsche refund – this is £10,000 and should be added to the matrimonial pot. It was something which the husband had the benefit of when he cancelled the wife’s car.

Aga refund - this is also £10,000 and related to an Aga stove which was planned for the FMH. That did not go ahead. Again, that should go back into the matrimonial pot.

Wife’s wedding ring – The wife sold this to pay her legal fees. This should go back into the pot as it is a marital asset.

There are various liabilities including a soft loan to the husband’s father. The wife owes over £100,000 more in costs to her solicitors and there is an argument about that which I will have to consider once the parties have seen this draft judgment.

Each party has liabilities but I consider that, subject to any arguments on costs, that each party should continue to be responsible for their own liabilities and to keep their assets (save for the Porsche, Aga and ring which I have added back in.

I have not included the Company T payment as an asset as, although it was paid into the husband’s personal account, it was accounted for in the turnover of Pharmacy 1 and in the payment to the husband.

I am asked to make orders pursuant to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 . My powers are to be found in sections 23 and 24 . I must apply section 25 . It is the duty of the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case. The child of the marriage is my first consideration.

I have particular regard to the matters set out in subsection (2), namely:-

(a)  The income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity, any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire;

(b)  The financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(c)  The standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(d)  The age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;

(e)  Any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;

(f)  The contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family;

(g)  The conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it; and

(h)  The value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of the dissolution …of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.

In terms of a party’s contribution to a marriage, White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 establishes that there is to be no discrimination in financial remedy cases between the breadwinner and the homemaker, as each, in their respective roles, contribute equally to the family. White goes on to decide that, in the absence of good reason to the contrary, the fruits of the marriage are to be divided equally.

I propose to address each issue in turn.

The child is 6 years of age. She spends 12 nights out of 14 with her mother and the remaining 2 with her father who now lives in England. She goes to a state school in Wales.

The husband earns £42,000 net per annum. The wife earns £25,526 per annum. She does not work full time. I appreciate that she does not want to work full time and that she certainly does not want to work the type of hours which are expected of a high street pharmacy whilst the child is so young. Nevertheless, she does have capacity to increase her earnings by working more hours. I accept, however, that she would not want to work full time whilst the child is still very young.

Both Counsel agree that this is not technically a needs but a sharing case as there is enough money available to meet the needs of both parties.

I am satisfied that all both parties really need is a three bedroomed property to give them some flexibility to work from home in the third bedroom and with both having a permanent bedroom for the child. There is more than enough equity in the FMH (with the add back of arrears) for the wife to be able to achieve that. The husband is renting a flat from his mother and can continue to do that until he builds up his credit score with a view to obtaining a mortgage in the future. He is young and earns a decent salary.

They had a very good standard of living. The wife had high end jewellery and designer handbags. They had renovated a property in Liverpool and had bought a substantive house in Wales with over 8 acres of land which they were in the process of renovating.

The wife is 35. The husband is 34. They were engaged in 2015 and married the following year. I know that there was an issue about the duration of the marriage but given that this is not a needs case, I do not consider that of any great consequence. Taking into account the time the parties were engaged for, I will treat this as a marriage of just over 7 years at the point of separation.

The husband contributed the share which his father had given to him in his own father’s business towards the family home and that afforded the parties a good standard of living.

The husband has worked hard in his business. The wife has also worked and has had their child.

I have not made any conduct findings after this hearing. I found the husband to be an honest individual who gave good evidence despite being in the witness box for two days. Other people, specifically Mr D and Mr C have let him down. The husband is not a liar. He has not wantonly and recklessly dissipated funds here and he has certainly not “warehoused” funds.

I am of the opinion that this is a 50/50 case. The wife should receive the net proceeds of sale for the FMH topped up by the arrears and debt outstanding on the FMH. The rest should be paid by the husband to the wife in cash. On payment of that sum the wife must transfer her 25% share in the business to the husband and she must also resign as a director.

In terms of pensions, the CETV in terms of the husband’s pension is £261,733 and the wife’s is £127,955. The parties agree that a pension sharing order should be made so as to achieve capital equality. I agree with that stance. Whilst both parties are young and still have time to add to their pensions, the wife will continue to work on a part time basis (although she could increase her hours) whilst the child is very young and this is a fair outcome for both parties.

I trust that that is clear but will be clarify any issues when I deliver this judgment. I will deal with any issues relating to costs at that stage as well. If there are any other issues which I need to consider, I will deal with them at the next hearing when I will deliver my judgment. As I explained in court, I am content for Counsel to share my draft judgment with their instructing solicitors and the parties but it is otherwise strictly embargoed.