
Swindon Combined Court
The Law Courts
Islington Street
Swindon SN1 2HG
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE RICHARD CASE
Re Charlie (a Child)(Fact Finding and Welfare: Fracture)
Between
WILTSHIRE COUNCIL
Applicant
and
MOTHER (1)
CHARLIE (THE CHILD) (2)
Respondents
Representation
For the Applicant:
David Josty, counsel instructed by the Applicant Council
For the Respondents:
Neelo Shravat, counsel instructed by the First Respondent Mother
Andrew Grime, counsel instructed by the Second Respondent child by her their Child’s Guardian, Natalie Morgan
Hearing dates: 23-25, 30 June, 1 and 10 July 2026
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given permission for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
APPROVED JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down at a hearing listed at 9.30am on 10 July 2026.
Contents
15: Pain and significant injury would have been evident at the time 25
16: Inconsistent accounts given by Mother 26
17: Rolling off bed discounted as likely cause of injury 30
Propensity/Mother’s disposition 37
14: Failure to act protectively by Mother 41
13: Failure to engage openly and honestly by Mother 42
18: Lack of risk awareness by Mother 42
Physical, emotional, educational needs and age, sex and background 45
Relationship with relatives, prospective adopter and their wishes and feelings 46
Any harm suffered or at risk of suffering 53
Holistic balancing exercise 54
Realistic Option 1: Placement Order 54
Realistic Option 2: (Interim) Care or Supervision Order with Mother 54
Narrative Summary
Charlie (anonymised) is now 15 months old. These proceedings began because of longstanding concerns about the Mother’s parenting history, mental health, housing instability and previous involvement with her older children. In October 2025, whilst Charlie and the Mother were living together in a mother-and-baby foster placement, Charlie was found to have sustained a spiral fracture of his right arm.
The medical evidence establishes that the fracture was a significant injury caused by a twisting force and that Charlie would have experienced severe pain at the time it occurred. I accept the expert evidence that any reasonable carer present would have realised that Charlie had suffered a serious injury.
Having considered all of the evidence, I have found that Charlie was using both arms normally during the afternoon of 15 October 2025 while he was with the foster carer and social worker. I have decided that the injury was most likely caused later that afternoon when Charlie was alone upstairs with the Mother after the social worker had left.
The Mother gave a number of different accounts about how the injury might have occurred. Initially she said she did not know how it had happened and denied any fall. Later she described Charlie rolling from a bed. During her oral evidence she altered the timing of that alleged incident. I have found that the Mother had provided inconsistent accounts to professionals.
I considered whether the fracture could have been caused by Charlie rolling from a bed. Having reviewed the medical evidence and the observations of those caring for Charlie during the day, I concluded that the suggested fall did not provide a likely explanation for the injury.
I have been unable to decide the precise mechanism of injury. The evidence does not permit me to conclude whether this was an undisclosed accident, resulting from negligence or recklessness, or an undisclosed inflicted injury. However, I am satisfied that the injury occurred whilst Charlie was in the Mother’s sole care and that she either knows, but has not disclosed, how it occurred or is unable to provide any satisfactory explanation.
In addition to the injury itself, I found that the Mother has continued to demonstrate significant limitations in risk awareness, decision-making under pressure and in her ability to recognise potentially unsafe situations and relationships. Those concerns were supported by the psychological and parenting assessment evidence and were reflected in her handling of events surrounding Charlie’s injury.
I have concluded that the threshold criteria under the Children Act 1989 are clearly met. Charlie had suffered significant harm and remains at risk of future harm if returned to the Mother’s care. Although I accept that the Mother loves Charlie deeply, attends contact consistently and is able to meet many of his needs during supervised family time, the risks identified in the evidence cannot safely be managed in the community without an exceptional and unsustainable level of professional intervention.
After carrying out the required welfare evaluation, I conclude that only adoption could provide Charlie with the safety, permanence and stability that he requires throughout his childhood. I therefore make a final Care Order and a Placement Order, dispensing with the Mother’s consent because Charlie’s welfare requires it. I endorse ongoing direct contact between Charlie and the Mother, but conclude that it is not necessary to make a contact order under section 26 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.
Findings Summary
The agreed facts are:
The child had suffered and/or was at risk of suffering significant emotional and physical harm as a result of:
The Mother has two older children from previous relationships, and they do not reside in her care. The Mother was a party to other proceedings involving the half-sibling of Charlie and accepts that a PAMS Parenting Assessment of her was negative. The court made a final care order with the half-sibling of Charlie being removed from her care and placed in local authority care following concerns of exposure to domestic abuse, poor parental mental health and physical and emotional neglect.
The Mother accepts that her two older children both sustained unexplained injuries due to lack of adequate supervision whilst in her care and there were delays in the Mother seeking medical treatment for the children.
The child had suffered and/or was at risk of suffering significant harm in the form of neglect and emotional harm as a result of:
The Mother’s poor mental health affects her ability to provide safe and consistent care [to] Charlie.
The Mother accepts that Charlie is at risk of neglect arising from being unable to sustain her own tenancy following being evicted from her housing association property due to rent arrears. The Mother has failed to prioritise finding a stable and suitable home for Charlie and at the relevant date has no fixed abode.
Between 10pm on 14 October 2025 and 4.57pm on 15 October 2025 Charlie sustained an acute non- displaced spiral fracture of the lower end of his right humerus.
The expected mechanism of the injury identified in paragraph 3 is sharp twisting of the right arm by some force acting on the right forearm, or rotation of the arm around the back and the traumatic energy required is unlikely to arise out of reasonable normal handling of a child of Charlie’s age.
Charlie does not present with any underlying medical conditions to explain the injury, nor the propensity to sustain the type of injury referred to in paragraph 3.
The injury referred to in paragraph 3 would have caused Charlie severe pain immediately after the injury was sustained.
The Mother was the only person other than professionals having unsupervised contact with Charlie at the time he sustained the injuries referred to in paragraph 3. The Mother is not suggesting that anyone else was responsible for the injury to Charlie.
The Mother placed Charlie with the foster carer on her own for a period of time on 15 October 2025 for about an hour, the foster carer had Charlie on her own downstairs and the Mother was checking Charlie at regular intervals and could hear if he screamed.
The Mother’s account that when rolling Charlie would sometimes catch one arm under his body and twist to try and get himself moving has been discounted as the likely cause of the injury referred to in paragraph 3 and on the available literature evidence it is not possible to reasonably support the plausibility of the rolling over mechanism being the cause of the injury referred to in paragraph 3.
The Mother is under investigation by the police for assaulting Charlie, namely causing him grievous bodily harm with intent. The Mother exercised her right to silence when interviewed under caution and refused to disclose her mobile phone PIN code which has unreasonably delayed the investigation.
Dr Mohamed in his addendum report opines given that the exact mechanism was not sufficiently witnessed, which leads to a number of unknown parameters that could potentially relate to the injury it is not possible to completely exclude a combination of factors primarily led by the fall from a height being the cause for the fracture.
I make the following further findings (as set out in bold in the course of my judgment):
It would have been evident to any reasonable carer present at the time Charlie sustained the fracture that he was in pain and he had sustained a significant injury.
The Mother has provided inconsistent accounts to professionals about how Charlie suffered the fracture.
The Mother’s account that the Child rolled off the bed and fell on the floor on the morning of 15 October 2025 is unlikely to account for the fracture.
The injury is likely to have occurred when the Mother was upstairs with Charlie after the visit from the social worker on the afternoon of 15 October 2025.
It is not possible to identify the precise cause of injury on the balance of probability, only that it occurred in the Mother’s sole care on the afternoon of 15 October 2025 and that it was either an undisclosed accident which might have been the result of recklessness or negligence on the part of the Mother or an undisclosed infliction of injury.
Charlie suffered significant physical harm in the form of a fracture as a result of the failure of the Mother to act protectively by either inflicting the injury or failing to supervise him such as to prevent an accidental injury.
Because Charlie was, at all times relevant to the injury, in the care of the Mother she either knows the cause of Charlie’s injury but has failed to disclose the same or is unaware of the cause and has not disclosed why she cannot say what happened to cause the injury whilst he was in her care.
The Mother’s failure above puts Charlie at risk of significant physical and emotional harm.
The Mother has ongoing limitations in reflective functioning, emotional recognition and risk awareness, including difficulty identifying unsafe adults and a continued vulnerability to abusive or risky relationships, creating a real risk that she will be unable to consistently recognise and meet a child’s needs without sustained support.
Parties
I am concerned with Charlie (anonymised) who was aged 7 months at all material times and is now aged 15 months. I have referred to his mother as the Mother and to his former foster carer at the time of injury as FC. Charlie’s father has not been identified by his Mother.
Background
Chronology
Charlie has two half siblings, the oldest was subject to a Care Order and has lived in long term foster care since March 2021 (SN20C00089) and the younger has lived with their father since October 2019. Previous psychological assessments of the Mother in proceedings concluded she “will have difficulty adapting to new or novel situations” but did not have a formal learning disability and she showed “a number of emotionally unstable and avoidant personality traits”. It was thought that “she will find all close interpersonal relationships, including a relationship with a child, challenging”. Therapy was recommended with some good effect noted but the updated psychological assessment remained as before. The outcome of previous Children’s Social Care involvement is accepted by the Mother in the agreed facts set out below under the “Findings” heading but include:
The Mother has two older children from previous relationships, and they do not reside in her care. The Mother was a party to other proceedings involving the half-sibling of Charlie and accepts that a PAMS Parenting Assessment of her was negative. The court made a final care order with the half-sibling of Charlie being removed from her care and placed in local authority care following concerns of exposure to domestic abuse, poor parental mental health and physical and emotional neglect.
The Mother accepts that her two older children both sustained unexplained injuries due to lack of adequate supervision whilst in her care and there were delays in the Mother seeking medical treatment for the children.
In relation to Charlie the Local Authority case summary (which I do not understand to be in issue in this respect) records:
The mother presented to services late in the pregnancy with Charlie (at 27 weeks and 6 days
pregnant). At the time, she was homeless, having been evicted from her previous accommodation and living with a friend.
…
Charlie and the mother moved to a mother and baby foster placement in [] on 14 March 2025, the mother agreeing to such placement pursuant to s.20 Children Act 1989.
Proceedings were issued promptly on 19 March 2025.
At the case management hearing on 11 April 2025 the court placed Charlie under the supervision of the local authority…
…
45...the parties agreed a consent order vacating the FCMH on 3 July 2025 agreeing the extension of the placement of mother and Charlie with the foster carer to enable the housing application to be submitted and inform planning for transition back to the community. The proceedings were timetabled to a FCMH on 6 August 2025 (B74 [160]).
At the hearing on 6 August 2025, founded on the tentative positive assessment of the mother and a plan to transition mother and child into the community, the court timetabled through to an Issues Resolution Hearing before District Judge Humphreys on 26 November 2025.
Very sadly and despite the positive trajectory that was seen as the precursor to the order of
DJ Humphreys on 6 August 2025, events in October 2025 (whilst Charlie and his mother continued to reside in the local authority foster care placement) significantly changed the focus of these proceedings.
On 15 October 2025 at 17:57, Charlie was presented to the Emergency Department at Southampton General Hospital with a spiral arm fracture.
…
In light of the significant events that led to Charlie’s presentation to hospital on 15 October
2025, the local authority sought urgently to return the matter to court.
At the hearing on 17 October 2025, the local authority invited the court to make an interim
care order and to sanction Charlie’s immediate removal from the care of the Mother. The children’s guardian supported that position. HHJ Wright duly made the order sought and approved the interim care plan of separation of Charlie from the Mother.
Charlie is now placed with alternative foster carer.
The most recent social work evidence is that the Mother is seeing Charlie three times a week [C217].
Parental responsibility
The Mother has parental responsibility shared with the Local Authority under the Interim Care Order.
Positions
Local Authority
The Local Authority seek findings against the Mother as set out in Allegation 11 to 18 below. In any event they seek Care and Placement Orders. The contact step down plan is from 3 times a week to weekly for 2 weeks, fortnightly for 4 weeks and then monthly until potential adopters are found when it will reduce to 2 direct supervised contact visits and 2 indirect letterbox contacts per annum. It is proposed that Charlie’s half-siblings attend the direct contact at the same time. Further, it is proposed that there is annual letterbox contact with the maternal grandmother.
The Local Authority say they “will therefore prioritise identifying adoptive carers who are willing to support the level of contact recommended in this care plan. However, if a suitable match that supports direct or indirect contact cannot be identified within sixteen weeks, the Local Authority will consider a placement that does not propose ongoing contact, in order to ensure permanence and stability for Charlie” [D24].
The Local Authority oppose the making of an order for contact under section 26 Adoption and Children Act 2002.
Mother
The Mother denies the allegations as set out below. She opposes the making of a Placement Order. She would agree to a Care or Supervision Order but wants Charlie to be returned to her care. In the event of removal she seeks 3 direct contacts per year pursuant to an order under section 26 Adoption and Children Act 2002.
Children’s Guardian
The Guardian supports the making of findings sought by the Local Authority and supports the Local Authority’s care plan save that in relation to post-Placement Order contact (she refers to it as post-adoption contact but we are not at that stage) she said:
[Paragraph 68]
Mother wishes to have three times a year direct post-adoption contact if the Court makes a Placement Order. I would not necessarily oppose this, but with the caveat that the priority for the Local Authority will be to identify the right adopters for Charlie in timescales compatible with his needs. If the pool of potential adopters reduces significantly because a high level of post adoption birth family contact is proposed, this could cause delay in achieving permanency for Charlie.
[Paragraph 92]
I support the Local Authority’s recommendations for twice a year direct and twice a year letterbox contact between Charlie and the Mother, and as already stated, would not stand in the way of her having [three] times a year direct contact, if adopters can be identified who will actively support this.
To be clear, she did not support the Mother’s request for an order under section 26; she suggested the Local Authority should prioritise potential adopters who would agree to contact twice a year for a search period of 6 rather than 4 months.
Evidence Summary
I have had the benefit of considering the core bundle (“[X00]”), medical bundle (“[MEDX00]”) and Placement Order bundle (“[POX00]”). Within those are expert reports in relation to injury (Dr Olsen, paediatric radiologist, and Dr Mohamed, paediatrician), a psychologist’s report (Mr Marshall, chartered psychologist), social work statements from the former social worker and current Assistant Team Manager (Ms Porter), parenting assessments (Ms White), care plan and analysis, primary evidence in relation to injury including mobile phone, police and hospital disclosure and statements from the Mother and FC. Separately I have seen the Guardian’s (Ms Morgan) final analysis.
I heard oral evidence from:
Dr Mohamed;
FC;
Ms White;
Ms Porter;
Mother; and
Ms Morgan.
Law
I remind myself that the burden of proving the need for a public law order rests with the Local Authority on the balance of probabilities.
Threshold
I must consider if the Local Authority has proved that the threshold test set out in section 31(2) Children Act 1989 is met. It provides:
A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied –
that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and
that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to –
the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or
the child’s being beyond parental control.
I remind myself that the relevant date for the purposes of making the assessment is the date on which the Local Authority initiated the procedure (Re M (Care Order: Threshold Conditions) [1994] 2 FLR 577) but subsequent events and behaviour are capable of providing relevant evidence about the position before the relevant date (Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050).
I also consider Hedley J in the same case at para 49
“…society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done.”
In relation to failure to protect King LJ in Re G-L-T (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 717 said:
Unhappily, the courts will inevitably have before them numerous cases where there has undoubtedly been a failure to protect and there will be, as a consequence, complex welfare issues to consider. There is, however, a danger that significant welfare issues, which need to be teased out and analysed by assessment, are inappropriately elevated to findings of failure to protect capable of satisfying the s 31 criteria.
Fact Finding
I remind myself of the fact-finding self-directions that I must give myself adapted from the helpful summary of Munby P in Re X (Children) (No 3) [2015] EWHC 3651:
…The principles are conveniently set out in the judgment of Baker J in Re L and M (Children) [2013] EWHC 1569 (Fam), to which I was taken. So far as material for present purposes what Baker J said (and I respectfully agree) was this:
“First, the burden of proof lies at all times with the local authority.
Secondly, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
Third, findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation …
Fourthly, when considering cases of suspected child abuse the court must take into account all the evidence and furthermore consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. The court invariably surveys a wide canvas. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.
Fifthly, … Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of … experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. It is important to remember that the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. It is the judge who makes the final decision.
Sixth, … The court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise and defers, where appropriate, to the expertise of others.
Seventh, the evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability.
Eighth, it is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 ).” [I address this further below]
Munby P continued:
To this admirable summary I add three further points.
First, that the legal concept of proof on a balance of probabilities “must be applied with common sense”, as Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said in The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds , Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 948, 956.
Secondly, that the court can have regard to the inherent probabilities: see Lady Hale in In re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11, para 31. But this does not affect the legal standard of proof, as Lord Hoffmann emphasised in the same case (para 15):
“There is only one rule of law, namely that the occurrence of the fact in issue must be proved to have been more probable than not. Common sense, not law, requires that in deciding this question, regard should be had, to whatever extent appropriate, to inherent probabilities. If a child alleges sexual abuse by a parent, it is common sense to start with the assumption that most parents do not abuse their children. But this assumption may be swiftly dispelled by other compelling evidence of the relationship between parent and child or parent and other children. It would be absurd to suggest that the tribunal must in all cases assume that serious conduct is unlikely to have occurred. In many cases, the other evidence will show that it was all too likely.”
Thirdly, that the fact, if fact it be, that the respondent … fails to prove on a balance of probabilities an affirmative case that she has chosen to set up by way of defence, does not of itself establish the local authority’s case. As His Honour Judge Clifford Bellamy recently said in Re FM (A Child: fractures: bone density) [2015] EWFC B26, para 122, and I respectfully agree:
“It is the local authority that seeks a finding that FM’s injuries are non-accidental. It is for the local authority to prove its case. It is not for the mother to disprove it. In particular it is not for the mother to disprove it by proving how the injuries were in fact sustained. Neither is it for the court to determine how the injuries were sustained. The court’s task is to determine whether the local authority has proved its case on the balance of probability. Where, as here, there is a degree of medical uncertainty and credible evidence of a possible alternative explanation to that contended for by the local authority, the question for the court is not ‘has that possible alternative explanation been proved’ but rather it should ask itself, ‘in the light of that possible alternative explanation can the court be satisfied that the local authority has proved its case on the simple balance of probability’.”
In relation to experts in Re B (Care: Expert) [1996] 1 FLR 667 at 674 Butler-Sloss LJ said:
I agree with the judgment of Ward LJ. Family judges deal with increasingly difficult child cases and are much assisted in their decision-making process by professionals from other disciplines: medical, wider mental health and social work among others. The courts pay particular attention to the valuable contribution from paediatricians and child psychiatrists as well as others, but it is important to remember that the decision is that of the judge and not of the professional expert. Judges are well accustomed to assessing the conflicting evidence of experts. As Ward LJ said, judges are not expected to suspend judicial belief simply because the evidence is given by an expert. An expert is not in any special position and there is no presumption or belief in a doctor however distinguished he or she may be. It is, however, necessary for a judge to give reasons for disagreeing with experts' conclusions or recommendations. That, this judge did. A judge cannot substitute his views for the views of the experts without some evidence to support what it is he concludes.
In his President’s Memorandum on Witness Statements dated 10 November 2021 McFarlane P said:
Parties should understand that the court’s approach to witness evidence based on human memory will be in accordance with CPR PD 57AC, Appendix para 1.3.
This states that human memory:
is not a simple mental record of a witnessed event that is fixed at the time of the experience and fades over time, but
is a fluid and malleable state of perception concerning an individual’s past experiences, and therefore
is vulnerable to being altered by a range of influences, such that the individual may or may not be conscious of the alteration.
I also direct myself to the judgment of Peter Jackson J (as he was) in Lancashire County Council v The Children [2014] EWHC 3 (Fam):
To these matters I would only add that in cases where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding injury and death the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account. The possible effects of delay and questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural – a process which might inelegantly be described as “story creep” – may occur without any inference of bad faith.
That should be borne in mind when considering perceived differences between accounts over time and generally when considering a witness’ recall.
As regards demeanour I have regard to Peter Jackson LJ in B-M (Children: Findings of Fact) [2021] EWCA Civ 1371:
No judge would consider it proper to reach a conclusion about a witness’s credibility based solely on the way that he or she gives evidence, at least in any normal circumstances. The ordinary process of reasoning will draw the judge to consider a number of other matters, such as the consistency of the account with known facts, with previous accounts given by the witness, with other evidence, and with the overall probabilities. However, in a case where the facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents the assessment of credibility can quite properly include the impression made upon the court by the witness, with due allowance being made for the pressures that may arise from the process of giving evidence. Indeed in family cases, where the question is not only ‘what happened in the past?’ but also ‘what may happen in the future?’, a witness’s demeanour may offer important information to the court about what sort of a person the witness truly is, and consequently whether an account of past events or future intentions is likely to be reliable.
I therefore respectfully agree with what Macur LJ said in Re M (Children) at [12], with emphasis on the word ‘solely’:
“It is obviously a counsel of perfection but seems to me advisable that any judge appraising witnesses in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute should warn themselves to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box and to expressly indicate that they have done so.”
…
28…There will be cases where the manner in which evidence is given about such personal matters will properly assume prominence. As Munby LJ said in Re A (A Child) (No. 2) [2011] EWCA Civ. 12 said at [104] in a passage described by the Judge as of considerable assistance in the present case:
“Any judge who has had to conduct a fact-finding hearing such as this is likely to have had experience of a witness - as here a woman deposing to serious domestic violence and grave sexual abuse - whose evidence, although shot through with unreliability as to details, with gross exaggeration and even with lies, is nonetheless compelling and convincing as to the central core… Yet through all the lies, as experience teaches, one may nonetheless be left with a powerful conviction that on the essentials the witness is telling the truth, perhaps because of the way in which she gives her evidence, perhaps because of a number of small points which, although trivial in themselves, nonetheless suddenly illuminate the underlying realities.”
Still further, demeanour is likely to be of real importance when the court is assessing the recorded interviews or live evidence of children. Here, it is not only entitled but expected to consider the child’s demeanour as part of the process of assessing credibility, and the accumulated experience of listening to children’s accounts sensitises the decision-maker to the many indicators of sound and unsound allegations.
In relation to electronic messages I remind myself of the observations in Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17 in which Lord Kerr cautioned against “elaborate analysis of a tweet; it is likewise unwise to parse a Facebook posting for its theoretically or logically deducible meaning. The imperative is to ascertain how a typical (i.e. an ordinary reasonable) reader would interpret the message. That search should reflect the circumstance that this is a casual medium; it is in the nature of conversation rather than carefully chosen expression; and that it is pre-eminently one in which the reader reads and passes on”.
Lying
I remind myself of the Lucas direction from R v Lucas [1981] QB 720, elaborated on by Macur LJ in Re A [2021] EWCA Civ 451:
That a witness’s dishonesty may be irrelevant in determining an issue of fact is commonly acknowledged in judgments…in formulaic terms:
“that people lie for all sorts of reasons, including shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion and emotional pressure and the fact that somebody lies about one thing does not mean it actually did or did not happen and/or that they have lied about everything”.
But this formulation leaves open the question: how and when is a witness’s lack of credibility to be factored into the equation of determining an issue of fact? In my view, the answer is provided by the terms of the entire ‘Lucas’ direction as given, when necessary, in criminal trials.
Chapter 16-3, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the December 2020 Crown Court Compendium, provides a useful legal summary:
“1. A defendant’s lie, whether made before the trial or in the course of evidence or both, may be probative of guilt. A lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against D if the jury are sure that:
(1) it is shown, by other evidence in the case, to be a deliberate untruth; i.e. it did not arise from confusion or mistake;
(2) it relates to a significant issue;
(3) it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of D, or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to D’s guilt.
2. The direction should be tailored to the circumstances of the case, but the jury must be directed that only if they are sure that these criteria are satisfied can D’s lie be used as some support for the prosecution case, but that the lie itself cannot prove guilt. …”
What I have said above in relation to memory applies to a consideration of whether a person is, in fact, lying; that is to say, whether they are dishonestly not telling the truth.
I also remind myself of the comment of Munby P in Re A (Application for Care and Placement Order: Local Authority Failings) [2015] EWFC 11:
Lies, however deplorable, are significant only to the extent that they affect the welfare of the child, and in particular to the extent that they undermine systems of protection designed to keep the child safe.”
Injuries
Peter Jackson LJ summarised the questions to be answered in Re S (A Child: Adequacy of Reasoning) [2019] EWCA Civ 1845 at paragraph 3:
Had the local authority proved that the injuries were inflicted as opposed to being accidental?
If the injuries were inflicted, who had the opportunity to cause them?
Of those people, could one person be identified on the balance of probabilities as having inflicted the injuries (a conventional 'known perpetrator' finding)?
If only two people…could have caused the injuries, but the one responsible could not be identified it necessarily followed that there was a real possibility that each of them may have caused the injuries (an 'uncertain perpetrator' finding).
The Local Authority do not put forward anyone other than the Mother who might have caused injury and the Mother does not suggest anyone else caused the injury. I do not consider the self-directions on list of perpetrators is therefore relevant.
Welfare
So far as the law on welfare issues is concerned my paramount concern is the child’s welfare throughout the rest of his life. In assessing whether to make an order I must take account of the matters set out in section 1(4) Adoption and Children Act 2002 . I must then have regard to the realistic options put forward taking a holistic and balanced as opposed to linear approach to them consistent with the guidance given in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146.
I remind myself I must also have regard to Article 6 and 8 ECHR rights. Pursuant to Re B (Care: Interference with Family Life) [2003] 2 FLR 813 I must not make a public law order unless I am satisfied it is both necessary and proportionate and no other less radical form of order would achieve the need to promote the welfare of the child.
I note that section 21(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 requires parental consent or parental consent to be dispensed with. Pursuant to section 52 Adoption and Children Act 2002 I may only dispense with the required parental consent to a child being placed for adoption if the welfare of the child requires it. In the words of Baroness Hale in the Supreme Court in Re B [2013] UKSC 33 it must be that, “nothing else will do” or in the words of Lord Neuberger it is seen, “as a last resort-when all else fails”.
Contact
By section 27(4) Adoption and Children Act 2002 I must consider the arrangements proposed to be made for allowing any person contact with the child.
I must consider whether to make an order under section 26 Adoption and Children Act 2002. That provides that an order for contact may be made on the making of a Placement Order. Guidance has been provided by the Court of Appeal in Re S (Placement Order Contact) [2025] EWCA Civ 823 in which McFarlane P gave the following judgment:
Standing back from these three authorities, there is a distinction to be drawn between those cases where continuing direct sibling contact is considered to be necessary for the child’s future welfare, and cases where the achievement of an adoptive home is the overarching goal, with future sibling contact being desirable as opposed to a pre-requisite. In the former circumstances (as in Re P and Re R) the court has ‘a responsibility’ to make a s 26 contact order.
The reasoning applies equally to parental contact. The judgment continued:
From a range of perspectives, it is possible to discern a clear shift over recent years in the direction of travel in understanding the approach to be taken to the issue of post-adoption contact. This shift has been driven by research (from a social work and psychological perspective) into arrangements that best meet the complex and life-long needs of children who are to be placed for adoption. The direction of travel is well delineated in the detailed analysis given by Baker LJ in Re R. It is underpinned by the extensive research of Professor Neil and others (both domestically and internationally). It was described in detail and taken up in the recommendations of the PLWG, and, importantly, it is endorsed by CoramBAAF, which has recently enhanced the focus on arrangements for a child to ‘stay in touch’ with family members post-adoption.
The question of how this shift in understanding should be reflected, if at all, by the court in making orders under ACA 2002, s 26 is at the centre of this appeal, and it is a difficult one. The difficulty, in part, arises from the binary nature of a court’s decision whether to make, or not to make, an order, where the underlying factors are in essence subtle and, to a large extent, involve looking into the future when a key element of that future, namely the attitude of specific potential adopters, is a known-unknown. It is easy to understand how courts may opt to play safe and decline to make a s 26 order, when faced with the ‘default opposition’ identified by the ALC, but, as was submitted, a court should consider whether the evidence in the case before it establishes grounds for holding that would-be adopters are likely to be deterred or whether, as the ALC submitted, research does not, in fact, support that conclusion.
…
74...The position of potential adopters should not, to use Baker LJ’s words, obviate the court’s responsibility to set the template for contact at the placement order stage. There will be cases where the importance of preserving a measure of direct sibling contact is such that the court should stipulate that that is so in an order, rather than leaving it to the adoption agency and adopters to negotiate. In other cases, the comparative importance of maintaining contact will be secondary to achieving an adoptive placement, and making a formal order may not be justified.
…
Finally, in terms of general observations on this issue, I wish to endorse Ms Conroy Harris’ valuable suggestion that a form of s 26 order which recognised the importance of continuing contact, but allowed for a significant degree of flexibility, might be the most appropriate means of meeting a child’s needs in some cases. An express order for finite contact arrangements, specifying the number and circumstances in which it is to take place, may not be apt in some cases. Given the number of uncertainties in play at the time that a placement order is being made, a more flexible statement of the road map for future contact that the court has determined for the child may well be more appropriate. In such cases, rather than having an order for contact in concrete terms, the court might record its views, and its endorsement of the future contact plans, in a recital to the placement order.
Risk of Harm
When assessing risk of harm I must ask (by reference to the summary in Re T (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 93 at paragraph 33):
What type of harm has arisen and might arise?
How likely is it to arise?
What would be the consequences for the child if it did?
To what extent might the risks be reduced or managed?
What other welfare considerations have to be taken into account?
In consequence, which of the realistic plans best promotes the child’s welfare?
If the preferred plan involves interference with the Article 8 rights of the child or of others, is that necessary and proportionate?
Findings/Threshold
Credibility of Mother
General observations of demeanour should never form the sole basis of any finding of fact but they are part of the broad canvas of assessment of credibility and they feed into the assessment of the allegations. When the Mother gave evidence she did so clearly although was obviously, and understandably, upset at times.
The Mother has given inconsistent accounts of the cause of injury. I have explored this in more detail below under Allegation 16.
There was some inconsistency in the Mother’s oral evidence as well. She said that when Charlie was asleep on her chest on the afternoon of 15 October 2025 she was looking for bank statements on her phone, “I wasn’t texting anyone”. Yet there is evidence she was texting a male she was in contact with (see under the welfare analysis below) at 14.53 (twice) and when this was put to her she agreed her earlier evidence was incorrect.
She was asked if she had fallen asleep with Charlie on her on the afternoon of 15 October 2025 and he rolled off, perhaps causing injury. She said, “I don’t know, I can’t remember. I had on a couple of occasions fallen asleep with Charlie”. I was really quite staggered she could not remember if this had happened; if it had it must have been very memorable. I asked her later in the course of her evidence if it was a possibility that Charlie rolled off her and she then denied it.
There was also an inconsistency in her evidence about why she failed to tell staff at the hospital about the roll off the bed. She initially said (in answer to questions put on behalf of the Local Authority) that she was “worried about the consequences of me leaving him on the bed” and said she had not told the truth in saying she did not know how the injury happened (see the hospital record at [MEDB254]). However, she had told the parenting assessor that “it was not until she left the hospital that she remembered” [F166/3.18]. She could not explain the different accounts.
Agreed Facts
It is agreed that (and I find proved on the basis of the admissions and the evidence referred to in the Schedule of Findings):
The child had suffered and/or was at risk of suffering significant emotional and physical harm as a result of:
The Mother has two older children from previous relationships, and they do not reside in her care. The Mother was a party to other proceedings involving the half-sibling of Charlie and accepts that a PAMS Parenting Assessment of her was negative. The court made a final care order with the half-sibling of Charlie being removed from her care and placed in local authority care following concerns of exposure to domestic abuse, poor parental mental health and physical and emotional neglect.
The Mother accepts that her two older children both sustained unexplained injuries due to lack of adequate supervision whilst in her care and there were delays in the Mother seeking medical treatment for the children.
The injury to the youngest half sibling was a spiral fracture to the leg and there was a delay of 2-3 hours on the part of the Mother seeking medical treatment and the oldest had areas of redness and lacerations to the neck which could not be explained and the Mother delayed seeking medical (see the composite threshold in previous proceedings [I22]).
The child had suffered and/or was at risk of suffering significant harm in the form of neglect and emotional harm as a result of:
The Mother’s poor mental health affects her ability to provide safe and consistent care [to] Charlie.
The Mother accepts that Charlie is at risk of neglect arising from being unable to sustain her own tenancy following being evicted from her housing association property due to rent arrears. The Mother has failed to prioritise finding a stable and suitable home for Charlie and at the relevant date has no fixed abode.
Between 10pm on 14 October 2025 and 4.57pm on 15 October 2025 Charlie sustained an acute non-displaced spiral fracture of the lower end of his right humerus.
The expected mechanism of the injury identified in paragraph 3 is sharp twisting of the right arm by some force acting on the right forearm, or rotation of the arm around the back and the traumatic energy required is unlikely to arise out of reasonable normal handling of a child of Charlie’s age.
Charlie does not present with any underlying medical conditions to explain the injury, nor the propensity to sustain the type of injury referred to in paragraph 3.
The injury referred to in paragraph 3 would have caused Charlie severe pain immediately after the injury was sustained.
The Mother was the only person other than professionals having unsupervised contact with Charlie at the time he sustained the injuries referred to in paragraph 3. The Mother is not suggesting that anyone else was responsible for the injury to Charlie.
The Mother placed Charlie with the foster carer on her own for a period of time on 15 October 2025 for about an hour, the foster carer had Charlie on her own downstairs and the Mother was checking Charlie at regular intervals and could hear if he screamed.
The Mother’s account that when rolling Charlie would sometimes catch one arm under his body and twist to try and get himself moving has been discounted as the likely cause of the injury referred to in paragraph 3 and on the available literature evidence it is not possible to reasonably support the plausibility of the rolling over mechanism being the cause of the injury referred to in paragraph 3.
The Mother is under investigation by the police for assaulting Charlie, namely causing him grievous bodily harm with intent. The Mother exercised her right to silence when interviewed under caution and refused to disclose her mobile phone PIN code which has unreasonably delayed the investigation.
Dr Mohamed in his addendum report opines given that the exact mechanism was not sufficiently witnessed, which leads to a number of unknown parameters that could potentially relate to the injury it is not possible to completely exclude a combination of factors primarily led by the fall from a height being the cause for the fracture.
The Local Authority seek further findings which I address below but in a slightly different order.
15: Pain and significant injury would have been evident at the time
The Local Authority allege that a reasonable carer present at the time of injury would have realised Charlie was in pain and had suffered a significant injury. The Mother accepts pain but does not “fully accept” that it would have been evident that the pain was due to the injury as Charlie “would cry for other reasons”.
The medical evidence of Dr Mohamed is clear and there is no evidence to undermine it. He said:
[E89]
Fracture of the humerus would have resulted in severe pain immediately after the injury was sustained, and it would have caused Charlie to scream/cry uncharacteristically for at least a minute or two. This would have been a memorable event and would have caused considerable alarm to any carers who were in the vicinity.
His oral evidence was that, “the cry with teething or hungry baby would be gradually building up, to a crescendo and the carer would know it was not a cry from an acute process” by contrast with a fracture, “what would be clear to observers was he was in extreme distress, something causing serious pain that was presenting acutely within a matter of seconds or minutes so they would have been able to see an abrupt change in behaviour and that would be noticeable.”
I accept that evidence and find the allegation proved on the balance of probabilities:
It would have been evident to any reasonable carer present at the time Charlie sustained the fracture that he was in pain and he had sustained a significant injury.
16: Inconsistent accounts given by Mother
The Local Authority allege the Mother has provided inconsistent accounts of how the injury was sustained. This is “not accepted” by the Mother.
In her statement to police FC reported “Mother replied that Charlie had been asleep on her” ([H114] and [H115]) at the time when I consider that the injury must have occurred (see my analysis below). In her statement for these proceedings FC expanded on this saying “I asked Mother “What’s wrong with his arm?” Mother replied “I don’t know, he might’ve slept on it. He was asleep on my chest”” [C82].
When the Mother attended at hospital on 15 October 2025 it was recorded at 21.01:
[MEDB254]
Mum reports she is unsure how this could have happened - has not had any falls, rolled off anything, or had any injuries today. Has not had any difficulties dressing him etc has not left him alone so does not know how this has happened
The foster carer reported to police that when x-rays were being taken “I can’t remember the exact wording Mother used but she said something words to the effect of ‘it’s broken isn’t it?’ and I replied “How would he get a broken arm?” and Mother said she did not know”.
Charlie’s former social worker recorded that at around 09.51 on 16 October 2025 he spoke to the Mother:
[H110]
Mother then volunteered her account to me, I did not ask any questions but she told me that she went to the bedroom with Charlie once I had left the address yesterday, Charlie fell asleep on her and woke a couple of times but settled himself. Then the third time Charlie woke, he was crying and wouldn’t settle.
At 11.11 on 16 October 2025 the Mother sent a Facebook message to a named individual saying “I haven’t hurt him or he hasn’t had a fall or anything” [A63] and at 11.23 to the same person “he was literally just asleep on me and then woke up screaming and I have no idea how it’s happened! Xx” [A65].
At 12.53 she texted the Local Authority saying:
[A68]
I've spoken to my solicitor and there's information that I've not given you and my solicitor has said I need to share with you and the police. Could you call me back or ask someone else to call me back please?
At around 13.20 on 16 October 2025 the former social worker recorded:
[H110]
…I attended a legal planning meeting with our solicitor X. During the meeting X had an email come through which she read out to me, she had received the email from Mother’s legal representative. The email explained that Mother has told her legal representative that Charlie
rolled off the bed on the morning of Wednesday 15th October 2025 but she did not tell anyone
because she knows he should not have been on the bed by himself and was worried about getting into trouble.
When she was arrested at approximately 17.30 on 16 October the arresting officer recorded (my emphasis):
[H102]
During conversation at around 17:40 hours whilst under arrest, Mother said words to the affect of “I TRIED TO SAY THREE TIMES I WOULD COME IN” “IS THIS WHY THE SOCIAL WORKER WOULDN’T TALK TO ME” and “THERE IS SOMETHING THEY DON’T KNOW THAT I NEED TO TELL
THEM”. Mother signed this significant statement in my e-pnb at 18:42 hours when at the police station [see H99].
The Mother gave a no comment police interview on 17 October 2025 [H64].
In her statement dated 24 November 2025 the Mother said:
[C75]
32… Charlie fell asleep on me.
Charlie napped for about 45 mins/1 hour. When Charlie woke, he started crying as soon as he woke up. I tried to settle Charlie and after about 10 minutes, FC came up and knocked on the door, offering to help.
However, for the first time she also gave this account:
[C75]
Charlie had fallen asleep on me but my phone was on the other side of the room, so I put him down on the bed and walked across the room to get my phone. The duvet was not on the bed as I had put it on the floor ready to change the covers. As I turned around, I saw he had woken up and he was rolling off the bed. I accept I completely froze in shock, and watched as he fell off the bed onto the floor… He cried for about a minute or so, but I was able to comfort him.
…
I accept I did not mention Charlie falling off the bed to anyone until 16th October, when I told my solicitor and the Social Worker. I regret this but I was worried that I would be in trouble for letting him sleep on the bed on his own. I also didn’t think that the fall was the cause of his painful arm...
In summary the Mother either gave no explanation or denied a roll and fall until around 13.20 on 16 October 2025. Her explanation for this is that she was “worried about getting in to trouble” having left Charlie unattended. I remind myself of the Lucas direction; this seems a plausible explanation for the earlier misinformation or lies. However, the explanation does not fit the timing of the likely injury as it is clear from the Mother’s statement that the incident described in paragraph 28 of her statement was before 10.30 on 15 October 2025 (see [C75/29]) and for the reasons given below I do not accept that could have been the cause of injury. Nor is it a development of the initial explanation of Charlie having been asleep on her before the intervention of FC on the afternoon of 15 October 2025 which was the first explanation the Mother gave. The Mother has described, as I find it, a completely different incident, even if it did occur it was not the likely cause of injury.
The Mother has provided these accounts:
He was asleep on her chest;
He might have slept on his arm;
He had not suffered any falls or rolled off anything;
She did not know how the injury occurred;
He woke a couple of times and then on the third occasion was crying and would not settle;
He had not had a fall;
She did not know how the injury occurred;
There is information she has not disclosed;
He rolled off the bed;
No comment;
He cried when he woke up; and
He rolled off the bed.
When she gave oral evidence there was a wholesale change in her case in that having previously said the rolling off the bed incident was in the morning she now said it happened after the social worker had visited. She said this:
I’ve retraced my steps and there was time between injury and writing my witness statement. Andy Collins [former social worker] came to speak to me and then says I went to get a phone charger to get bank statements and surely he told me that when he came, must have been there to get bank statements
I can’t say for certain, I think that could be a possibility
And later:
I always thought it was 10am but once I heard [foster carer’s] evidence heard him crying at 8am and later in the afternoon I retraced steps and came to conclusion likely it happened afterwards but I’m not saying for definite because I don’t know
Andy came to speak about bank statements and my first statement says I was going across room to get bank statements and Andy hadn’t had conversation about bank statements until that afternoon.
Effectively she gave the explanation that she was “scrolling on her phone” looking for bank statements which the social worker said she needed to send again to the housing department at the Local Authority. He had not said that until the meeting in the early afternoon so she thought the rolling off the bed must in fact have happened in the afternoon. I do struggle to understand how just the day after the injury she recalled in fact it was in the morning.
A more minor point is that up until the addendum parenting assessment the Mother had said she left Charlie on the bed to retrieve her phone but told the parenting assessor at the end of March 2026 that it was “my charger” [F165/3.17] and in oral evidence said it was her charger.
I find the allegation proved:
The Mother has provided inconsistent accounts to professionals about how Charlie suffered the fracture.
17: Rolling off bed discounted as likely cause of injury
The Local Authority allege that the Mother’s account of Chalie rolling off a bed and falling on the floor on the morning of 15 October 2025 has been excluded as the likely cause of injury. Whilst the Mother accepted this was the expert medical evidence she did not accept it was accurate.
The radiological evidence from Dr Olsen, paediatric radiologist, is of no radiological sign of underlying pre-disposition to fracture [E67] and Dr Mohamed, paediatrician, said it was “extremely unlikely for Charlie to have any clinically significant bone health problems that would increase the susceptibility to fractures” [E89/7.1.17]. In terms of mechanism Dr Olsen said (my emphasis):
[E69]
It is generally agreed that a fracture of a long bone in an infant most likely is caused by forceful, unnatural shearing, twisting and/or bending across the level of the fracture, or by direct impact[1].
Being spiral-shaped Charlie’s fracture must have been caused by a twisting force. There must have been some force acting on the right arm which produced a torque in the upper-arm bone. Bowing, sharing or direct impact would not produce a helical fracture line.
The types of forces that are relevant:
A force acting via the forearm to twist the arm while the elbow is bent; and
A force that rotates the arm around the back while the elbow is straight.
[E70]
Hence, long-bone fractures are unlikely explained by any manoeuvre that conveys the energy that is produced by reasonable handling.
Self-infliction of fractures in infants must be very rare but not impossible. For example, mobile infants can push themselves to fall off furniture. The following may also be of relevance to upper-arm fractures.
Somers and coworkers[4] reported seven cases, all children from 4 months to 7 months old, where they considered it possible that an isolated fracture of the shaft of the upper arm bone could have been self-inflicted by the child rolling from a front-down to a back-down position trapping the arm behind them during the roll. But the authors of the study stress that "this case series alone should not be used in the court process as indicative of any form of proof that this mechanism is a credible explanation for a humeral fracture". The Somers study has been criticised, but only from theoretical vantage points. Specifically, it has been claimed that the magnitude of force arising from rolling would be insufficient to cause a fracture. However, there is no firm scientific proof either way.
It is not possible radiologically to prove exactly how any fracture was sustained. Accidental fractures are very rare in infants, which is why the likelihood of non-accidental causation is high in any case of infantile fractures. However, accidental fractures do occasionally occur and each case therefore needs to be assessed by its own evidence. It is therefore in my opinion important for the Court to be aware of the Somers study. The study may be controversial, but it does in my opinion show that fractures of the upper arm may possibly be self-inflicted by rolling albeit a rather unusual fracture mode.
…
The far most likely cause, a-priori, is the application of such force by external agency; however, one cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that a solitary spiral fracture of the upper-arm bone may have been self-inflicted through rolling and/or falling. I cannot provide any differential likelihood for any specific fracture by way of its radiological features. I believe that to be the province of the Court, and the opinion of the Court’s paediatrician will clearly be valuable.
[E71]
According to the mother (C75), Charlie had rolled off the bed on 15.10.2025, either onto the floor or onto some bedding that was on the floor.
Since the fracture was caused by twisting, whether he landed on the floor or on some bedding probably makes little difference. The important question is whether his right arm had twisted, be it when he rolled or when he landed. If it did, then this event needs to be considered a viable explanation for the fracture, in my opinion.
Dr Mohamed’s evidence was:
[E93/7.10.1]
There is no mention of any ongoing distress following this incident. Subsequently, I note from the statement of the foster carer that Charlie was able to use both his arms until he went back with his mother upstairs. Considering this information, the likelihood that the fracture was caused by the fall at 8 AM can be excluded.
And for completeness:
[E93/7.10.2]
…the potential explanation of Charlie getting his arm caught under his body would not be compatible with the injury.
He was asked to review the Somers paper:
[E105/7.2.1]
the humerus is unlikely to come under any stress or strain when rolling over from supine to prone position as there would be no natural restriction of the shoulder movement in this manoeuvre. Therefore, while this selective case series does raise an important question regarding the possibility of a humerus fracture occurring from such a mechanism, the authors had themselves acknowledged that without definitive proof, this concept remains a contentious issue in that it is an unproven theory rather than accepted fact. Furthermore, as explained in my previous report, prompted by the Somers paper, a computer model assisted study that was undertaken to experimentally assess the possibility of fracture occurring in cadaveric humerus of infants of similar age found that the maximal strain generated by this manoeuvre was less than the equivalent force required to cause fracture. Therefore, based on the available literature evidence, it is not possible to reasonably support the plausibility of the rolling over mechanism being the cause for the fracture.
However, he continued:
it is not possible to completely exclude a combination of factors primarily led by the fall from a height being the cause for the fracture.
I accept that evidence but rely upon what he said at [E93/7.10.1], that is to say there is no evidence to support this theoretical hypothesis, “Charlie was able to use both his arms until he went back with his mother upstairs”.
In his oral evidence he said that a delay between an hypothesised fracture in the morning and the noted behaviour in the afternoon (cry and reduced movement), a period of some 5-6 hours, “is highly unlikely, extremely unlikely”.
Dr Mohamed said he, “would give more weight to the observation of Charlie using his right arm normally, that would not be in keeping with fracture being sustained beforehand”.
In his evidence-in-chief he said:
If the account provided by FC, if that is accepted as true by the court then it would narrow the time window for fracture. FC says using both arms, equally says gave some cheese and bread, fed him and subsequently put both arms up and that would not be consistent with having sustained a fracture at that time, it was on the right upper arm and if sustained within the previous 12 hours he would not have been able to lift that arm.
It seems to follow that for the alleged morning fall to have caused the fracture the Mother, FC, her partner and the social worker would have had to have all missed the reduction in movement of the fractured arm but even in that scenario there is no explanation for how Charlie could have been positively observed using both arms normally. Nor would it be consistent with the Mother’s own evidence:
[C76]
39...I also didn’t think that the fall was the cause of his painful arm, because he had been fine after the fall and only started to get upset later in the day after the Social Worker had visited and he had napped.
In coming to this conclusion I also take account of the complete absence of any evidence of a scream or uncharacteristic cry having been witnessed by the Mother or FC in the morning before breakfast. The closest the Mother comes is that Charlie “cried for about a minute or so, but I was able to comfort him” [C75/28].
I only have to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities but collecting this evidence together makes it, frankly, inconceivable that the fracture was sustained in the morning.
I find:
The Mother’s account that the Child rolled off the bed and fell on the floor on the morning of 15 October 2025 is unlikely to account for the fracture.
12: Caused by Mother
The Local Authority allege the injury was caused deliberately or recklessly by the Mother or through a lack of adequate supervision by her.
Timing of injury
To assist in reaching a conclusion on this allegation it is important to consider if the time of injury can be more accurately assessed. The expert radiological evidence of Dr Olsen was of a spiral shaped, non-displaced fracture of the “lower third” (I understand this to be distal end) of the right humerus [E67] and in terms of dating he said:
[E68]
The most important observation is that there was no sign of healing on 15.10.2025. The fracture was only partially included in the imaging on 17.10.2025, but there was no evidence of healing where the fracture could be observed.
Hence, the last date on which no sign of healing could be observed was 17.10.2025.
It follows both from clinical experience, and from the Prosser model that
The fracture was recent at the time of presentation, so it could have occurred as recently as 15.10.2025; while
The fracture was unlikely more than 2 weeks old on 17.10.2025.
My opinion is therefore that the fracture more likely than not had occurred on or after 03.10.2025.
Dr Mohamed narrowed this down to “within the preceding 24 hours” based on the clinical records and his clinical experience that “even with significant fractures, pain related behaviour tends to disappear completely within about 24 hours in infants and toddlers” [E90/7.2.3] and narrower still that it was after 22.00 on 14 October 2025 in light of photographs depicting no abnormality suggestive of a fracture at that time ([E83] and [E90/7.2.4]).
There is a handwritten note prepared by FC on 15 October 2025 which recorded:
[H180]
C crying upstairs offered help. Fed C yoghurt as seemed hungry. Not using (R) arm when sat in highchair. Screamed when I sat him up. Offered celery to chew. Called 111 @ 16.55
Taking it from (L) hand
M reports C has been asleep on her chest.
At hospital FC was recorded saying:
[MEDB254]
Today, sat with social worker until 3pm, seemed well. Mother went upstairs with Charlie, FC heard him crying, went up after 10 minutes. Charlie crying ++, brought him down and sat in high chair, screamed on touching right arm, not moving it
In her statement to police FC recorded Charlie’s social worker visiting and, importantly, that (my emphasis):
[H114]
Charlie was grabbing at everything with both hands and was happy and content. He was grabbing my sandwich and bringing both hands up to his mouth without raising any concerns. At some point during the conversation, [FC partner] popped downstairs and came into the kitchen, when he did he spoke to Charlie and Charlie raised both of his arms as response to seeing [FC partner] which is a normal thing for Charlie to do when he is around people he is familiar with and Charlie loved [FC partner].
This apparent absence of any issue is corroborated by Charlie’s former social worker:
[H109]
During the visit, Charlie showed no signs of discomfort, he was seen sitting on [FC?]s knee with his right side up against her and showed no sign of being in pain, Charlie was also seen using both arms freely.
FC went on (my emphasis):
[H114]
[Charlie’s social worker] left the house at about 1445hrs.
Mother took Charlie back upstairs after [the social worker] left. I had the baby monitor downstairs in the kitchen, whilst I was in the lounge. The monitor was on loud so I could hear it from the lounge. Just after 1600hrs, Charlie had been crying and it went on for about 10 minutes before I went upstairs and checked on Mother and Charlie. There was something different about his crying and I cannot explain what it was. It just made me get up and want to check on him.
I knocked on the bedroom door and Mother came to the door with Charlie on her left hip. I asked Mother if she needed any help and Mother replied that Charlie had been asleep on her. I looked at Charlie and he was bright red, crying and taking sharp intakes of breath, the kind people do when they can’t catch their breath. I have never seen Charlie get like this before and it worried me.
…
I then carried him downstairs and he settled a little bit with some rocking, but kept taking the sharp intakes of breath for a while afterwards…I thought Charlie might be hungry so I put him in the highchair. When I placed him into the highchair, I had my left arm around his tummy and right hand on his bottom to guide his body into the plastic high chair seat. At this point I had still not touched his arms.
…
It was while he was eating that Charlie slipped to one side. I straightened him by putting my open palms on each of his shoulders and gently moving him to sit upright. Charlie made a piercing scream and I instantly let go wondering what I had done. I initially tried to soothe him, the noise was awful, I have never heard him make this noise before, I will never forget it.
[H115]
I washed a piece of celery and he took it with his left hand and started chewing on it. I took it off his left hand and moved it towards his right hand and he did not make any attempt to use this arm. He will usually always grab things with both hands to go in his mouth but on this occasion he only used is left hand.
Dr Mohamed’s evidence was that (my emphasis):
[E89]
Fracture of the humerus would have resulted in severe pain immediately after the injury was sustained, and it would have caused Charlie to scream/cry uncharacteristically for at least a minute or two. This would have been a memorable event and would have caused considerable alarm to any carers who were in the vicinity. Subsequently, he might have continued to have intermittent low-level crying/wincing for a variable period of time that would have lasted at least 20 to 30 minutes. There might have been loss of function of the affected limb…
[E91/7.5.1]
His carer would have also been able to notice a difference in the movements between his upper limbs with a reduction on the right side or the unusual way the right arm was being kept such as being extended (straightening of the elbow) and being floppy and less active whenever he was picked up. These symptoms would have been noticeable for about 24 hours..
I take account of the evidence referred to in relation to Allegation 17 above and my analysis. That coupled with the evidence above indicates that, on balance, there had been no injury until after the social worker left but there had been an injury by the time FC heard the scream and observed reduced movement.
I find on the balance of probabilities that:
The injury is likely to have occurred when the Mother was upstairs with Charlie after the visit from the social worker on the afternoon of 15 October 2025.
Propensity/Mother’s disposition
There are no “red flags” in the form of substance misuse, no evidence of domestic abuse by the Mother, no evidence of anger or violence on the part of the Mother.
However, in terms of propensity to cause harm I note the following evidence:
FC’s written evidence was that she had no concerns about the Mother’s care of Charlie before 15 October 2025 save for an incident on 25 September 2025 (a small bruise treated as accidental). Although, of course both the Mother’s older children suffered injury in her care and there was, in relation to both of them, a delay in seeking medical attention (see under Agreed Facts above).
The Mother’s own evidence was:
[C72]
Charlie was not a baby who cried a lot, but I accept that on the odd occasion if I was unable to settle him for a while, I would start to feel a little bit stressed. I think it is normal for most new parents to feel a little stressed when a baby won’t settle, and I had the added pressure of being monitored in a foster placement. I would never get to the point where I was getting
angry with Charlie.
…
On 29th September, having looked at the foster care logs, I note it says that Charlie was unsettled and that I had a discussion with FC about this. I do remember having discussions with FC about feeling a bit stressed when Charlie was unsettled, but as I have said above, I don’t think my stress levels were anything out of the ordinary, given the situation.
The Mother sent a text message to Charlie’s former social worker on 14 October 2025 (my emphasis):
[A58]
Can you ask your manager if I'm allowed any time away from placement for example I go and stay at my mums or sisters for a weekend? I've been in placement 7 months now and its starting to make me overwhelmed and stressed and I need a break from placement can you ask if it's a possibility please
In her statement to police FC said:
[H112]
I would described Mother as occasionally being overly confident with Charlie and can be a bit rough when holding or handling him. By this I mean that her handling would be appropriate for a toddler but Charlie is still only 7 months old and therefore needs to be handled more gently [sic].
In fact in her oral evidence FC said being a “bit rough” was not something she put in the foster care logs, if she had been worried about it should would have done so.
[H113]
Charlie is currently teething and so he is a bit more unsettled than normal…On Tuesday 14th October 2025 Mother had, what I would describe as an emotional wobble. I have seen Mother like this before, however I wouldn’t say this is a common occurrence.
…
Social services are looking at placing Mother and Charlie on a housing list for her to live independently with Charlie. Because of this I had found her a TV for sale and had collected it from a neighbour for her. I told Mother what time she needed to be ready to go and collect the TV. She wasn’t ready so I ended up going to collect it myself. When I got back to the house, Mother was getting ready to head out and Charlie was in the buggy.
I came back with the TV and handed it to Mother. She took the TV upstairs and I walked upstairs in front of her to open her door. When I opened the door, Mother said “I don’t want to be in this placement anymore, I can’t do this anymore”. Mother walked back downstairs with the TV and was clearly dysregulated.
The Mother’s own evidence corroborates this:
[C74]
I do remember offering to carry the TV upstairs and when we went up, I remember getting upset and saying to FC that I wasn’t sure I could do it anymore. What I meant was that I wasn’t sure I could stay in placement anymore. It had been a very busy time as I had been trying to get paperwork up together for housing, as well as other admin tasks and caring for Charlie. It was difficult being in a placement and feeling monitored and this was with the Court proceedings in the background, and the worry that goes with that. I recognise now that I was just having an off day.
…
FC was gone for about half an hour and it was enough time for me to get myself together. When FC got back, I was feeling better.
I remember speaking to FC about my mental health on this day and questioning whether I should go to the GP. We discussed whether this was just stress because of the situation in relation to housing, or whether it was a deeper issue. Reflecting back, I think I was feeling overwhelmed and stressed at the time because of the extra things I was having to do, rather than it being anything more than that…
The Mother subsequently told the parenting assessor that “I was stressed I’ll be honest. I felt a lot of pressure was being put on me, not enough to intentionally hurt Charlie, I wasn’t extremely stressed, but I was experiencing some stress.” [F162-3].
In her statement to the police FC said (my emphasis):
[H113]
The following day, Wednesday 15th October 2025, Mother came downstairs much later than normal, between 1000hrs and 1100hrs. Mother usually comes downstairs between 0900 and 1000 hours but this is dependent on other factors.
Earlier in the morning I heard Charlie crying around 0800hrs which is not unusual. At this time, I was upstairs in my bedroom, which is the room next door. The crying was heard via the monitor and through the bedroom wall. X came downstairs and into my bedroom and asked if I could hear Charlie crying and then the crying stopped.
Charlie cried for about 10 minutes in total which is about the amount of time it roughly takes for a bottle to be made and cooled. I would have expected Charlie to have settled once he had the bottle, which he did.
…
When Mother did come downstairs with Charlie, she was unable to tell me how many feeds Charlie had had during the night or what quantities he’d had. This was very unusual. Each morning we normally have a chat about the night feeds and how Charlie was and Mother can usually tell me the timings and the quantities. This can be seen in the daily notes I have given Police. Mother said she’d had a very disturbed night and that Charlie did not sleep very well but had eventually gone back to sleep. I thought this was a bit odd because when Charlie does cry during the night, I hear him. Our bedroom is next door to Mother’s and I am very in-tune with Charlie’s cries and noises. I did not hear him overnight.
Around lunch time, Charlie was a bit unsettled so I offered to take him downstairs. Mother stayed upstairs. Mother doesn’t cope too well with Charlie crying for prolonged periods of time. When this happens, Mother can become slightly irritated and use phrases such as ‘oooh Charlie’.
It is apparent from this evidence that Mother was a little out of sorts in the lead up to the afternoon of 15 October 2025 and, again, it is broadly corroborated by the Mother:
[C74]
I remember having had a bad night with Charlie, he didn’t sleep very much and was refusing his bottle.
[C75]
At 8am I was trying to get Charlie to have his milk but he was crying and refusing it, which is unusual for him. I thought he might have been teething…
She described the roll from the bed I have considered above under Allegation 17 and comforting Charlie before going downstairs for breakfast at a time that was “later than usual” and she could not remember times and amounts of feed during the night “as he had been up most of the night” [C75/29].
In her oral evidence she said that looking back to October 2025 anxiety for her meant “it affects how you think, stops you thinking clearly, mind in a different place…I was sad more than anxious”, she agreed being sad affected how she focused on things and that there may have been things that distracted her. When asked if it affected her ability to look after Charlie she said “I don’t think so, maybe in part”.
I conclude from this evidence that the Mother was under stress at the time and, on her own account, that had an affect on her ability to care for Charlie, it meant she might have been distracted at times.
When the Mother was taken to the WhatsApp messages to the male she was in contact with (see below) at 14.53 she was asked if she had fallen asleep with Charlie on her and he rolled off in those circumstances and she said, “I don’t know, I can’t remember. I had on a couple of occasions fallen asleep with Charlie”.
When she changed her version of events to say it was possible the roll off the bed occurred on the afternoon of 15 October 2025 it was put to her it would have made “no sense not to tell the foster carer he’d just fallen whilst her back was turned”. She could not explain why she did not do so, saying “I had no reason why, no reason why I wouldn’t have said that, I don’t know why”.
Conclusion
In light of the Mother’s changing evidence and the credibility issues raised above it is really very difficult to come to any clear view of what happened.
The plausibility of rolling off the bed in the afternoon was the reason for the injury is thrown in to doubt by the Mother saying that “when he fell from the bed he didn’t cry for 10 minutes, it was more of a whingey cry and he could be settled quite quickly”. That is not consistent with Dr Mohamed’s evidence (above) that the injury would have caused “Charlie to scream/cry uncharacteristically for at least a minute or two. This would have been a memorable event and would have caused considerable alarm to any carers who were in the vicinity”. It was not that and I discount this as a cause of the fracture.
Charlie may have fallen off the Mother’s chest whilst she was sleeping, there may have been a wholly different accidental cause and there may have been an inflicted injury perhaps provoked by the stress that the Mother felt under. I simply cannot determine this. On the evidence before me I conclude on the balance of probabilities that:
It is not possible to identify the precise cause of injury on the balance of probability, only that it occurred in the Mother’s sole care on the afternoon of 15 October 2025 and that it was either an undisclosed accident which might have been the result of recklessness or negligence on the part of the Mother or an undisclosed infliction of injury.
14: Failure to act protectively by Mother
The Local Authority allege Charlie suffered or was at risk of suffering significant physical harm as a result of a failure of the Mother to act protectively.
The fact that Charlie, a non-mobile child, came to the harm he did in the Mother’s care evidences a failure to protect him either inflicting injury, failing to supervise him to prevent such injury or failing to disclose an accident that occurred. In light of my finding he came to harm in the Mother’s care I conclude:
Charlie suffered significant physical harm in the form of a fracture as a result of the failure of the Mother to act protectively by either inflicting the injury or failing to supervise him such as to prevent an accidental injury.
13: Failure to engage openly and honestly by Mother
The Local Authority allege the Mother failed to engage openly and honestly with professionals putting Charlie at risk of significant physical and emotional harm.
I rely on my findings above but also note the parenting assessor recorded:
[F166]
Mother did not ring the hospital or FC despite remembering [the rolling off the bed incident] and instead spoke to her solicitor the next morning. Mother said she wasn’t sure why she didn’t tell the hospital that evening despite remembering.
In view of my findings above logically I must conclude on the balance of probabilities:
Because Charlie was, at all times relevant to the injury, in the care of the Mother she either knows the cause of Charlie’s injury but has failed to disclose the same or is unaware of the cause and has not disclosed why she cannot say what happened to cause the injury whilst he was in her care.
Self-evidently the Mother’s failure to disclose the cause puts Charlie at risk of significant physical harm as he may suffer injury again in similar circumstances. If he suffers injury again he would be at risk of emotional harm from the effects of the injury and its treatment and investigation. Accordingly, on the balance of probabilities I find:
The Mother’s failure above puts Charlie at risk of significant physical and emotional harm.
18: Lack of risk awareness by Mother
The Local Authority allege the Mother has ongoing limitations in reflective functioning, emotional recognition, and risk awareness, including difficulty identifying unsafe adults and a continued vulnerability to abusive or risky relationships, creating a real risk that she will be unable to consistently recognise and meet a child’s needs without sustained professional support.
The Mother accepts this is what the expert medical evidence says but she has not been in a relationship for over a year and has shown an ability to care for Charlie to a good standard prior to the injury. I do not think the Mother’s assertion is in issue. She was positively assessed by Ms White in her first parenting assessment and as a result of that a plan was put in place for her to transition into the community with Charlie. That in no way diminishes the risk identified by Mr Marshall which is set out at [E3] (my emphasis):
There do remain a number of concerns, including that Mother does experience some difficulties in being able to recognise her emotional state, and indeed concerns as highlighted in the case documents regarding her friendship with an individual who may pose a risk to children, with her also reporting that Charlie’s father was a casual encounter, describing that she considered there were ‘no red flags’, despite having met once and returning to his residence. In the context of her history, this does indicate that Mother may continue to experience difficulties in recognising and understanding risks that may be posed by others.
The expert psychological analysis chimes entirely with the parenting assessment of the Mother’s response to the alleged roll onto the floor on the morning of 15 October 2025. I will consider this in more detail below when considering welfare but Ms White said (my emphasis):
[F165]
Given Charlie’s level of vulnerability as a young infant, the failure to seek reassurance or assessment represents a missed opportunity to ensure his immediate safety and wellbeing and
suggests that Mother’s understanding of risk and thresholds for medical intervention may be compromised when weighed against her fear of professional involvement.
Further, Ms White noted the Mother sharing that she was stressed when she left Charlie unattended so she could get her phone charger and commented:
[F165]
it is clear that she already understood both the risk and the potential consequences of her actions. Despite this awareness, she made a conscious decision to proceed, indicating that the concern lies less with knowledge and more with judgement.
In her oral evidence the Mother said that getting the phone or phone charger was a “stupid decision” but her thought “process was I needed to get the phone charger so I could get my bank statement…I didn’t think about the risk when he was on the bed, that wasn’t in my thought process.” Sadly that sums up the real risk.
In relation to relationships, there was evidence on Mother’s vulnerability (and by default Charlie’s) to risky relationships. First, Charlie was conceived on a “one night stand”, by a father that the Mother had met and to whose home she travelled knowing little about him. Her evidence in relation to that was troubling. She agreed she had completed the therapy recommended by Dr Marshall in 2021. Charlie was conceived after that and when it was put to her she had completed the recommended work but still engaged in that risky behaviour she said “many people do”. I can take judicial notice of that but as she conceded, that does not make it safer.
Secondly, she was asked about a relationship with another male who she met on Instagram. She does not know exactly where he lives, she agreed she knew very little of his background and when it was put to her she “let her guard down” she said, “I guess so”. Despite saying that he “was kind of a friend” there are WhatsApp messages in which she professed to love him in early October 2025 [not in the bundle]. In the course of her oral evidence the Mother said that the male asked about her eldest child whose photos appear on her Instagram feed and she said she acted as if they were still living with her “and I didn’t want him to know my business”. I asked her why she stayed in touch with him at all in those circumstances and worryingly her response was, “I don’t know to be honest”.
The risk was abundantly evidenced when the association with the male was explored further on behalf of the Guardian. She said the association arose about 5 years ago when “he approached me on Instagram…he asked for my number and I gave it to him”. She said they never met, just talked, she had only seen one picture of him on his WhatsApp profile and then most troubling she volunteered (to her credit):
He would talk about problems and he was a man, slightly older than me I think and he was a man that probably is well off, I know he is, would talk about problems and he would send me money
He sent £4,000-£5,000 over 5 years
That was continuing up to October 2025
He would send me money and then the conversation would stop for a couple of months and when I spoke to him I would say I loved him.
Whilst admittedly there was no safety plan in place obliging the Mother to disclose the nature of this relationship, given the extreme risk it is right to note the first time this evidence was given was in cross-examination. I asked her about it and she said she was not in a relationship with him, he did not know where she lived, he did not know many details about her at all, he was someone she spoke to and maybe he was lonely, there was no risk of him bumping in to her. It was put to her he may have been grooming her and she said “when you put it in that light I see it differently, that is the first time I’ve thought about it”. The Mother’s failure to appreciate that risk was probably the most concerning element of her oral evidence. Whilst I acknowledge she completed a domestic abuse course 12 years ago to have no inkling that an effectively unknown male sending her money was a risk to her and her child is shocking.
The Guardian’s oral evidence was that the association had been maintained over 5 years so this was not something that could be put down to being in a stressful situation, it was maintained on a regular basis for a sustained period.
As the Guardian observed in her final analysis, this “calls into question her priorities at the time. It also reinforces Dr Marshall’s view that she remains vulnerable to entering risky relationships” [Paragraph 41].
I find the allegation proved on this evidence and make this finding:
The Mother has ongoing limitations in reflective functioning, emotional recognition and risk awareness, including difficulty identifying unsafe adults and a continued vulnerability to abusive or risky relationships, creating a real risk that she will be unable to consistently recognise and meet a child’s needs without sustained support.
Threshold
Clearly threshold is met on the above findings and agreed facts.
Welfare checklist
I now turn now to the considerations under section 1(4) Adoption and Children Act 2002.
Wishes and feelings
Charlie is too young to express his views. It is to be assumed he would wish to be in the care of his Mother if that was safe and the Guardian accepted that Charlie had a very warm relationship with the Mother.
Physical, emotional, educational needs and age, sex and background
The team manager said that Charlie was “left in a state of discomfort and distress” as a result of his injury [C219], the incident would have been “inherently distressing and may have been [I find must have been on the medical evidence] accompanied by fear, pain and confusion” [C222] and was “exposed to emotional harm” from the Mother’s presentation in the lead up to injury (the heightened presentation described above) [C220].
She said that Charlie needs consistency in having his basic needs met, including the “availability of his primary carer” [C221], his “safety and development depend on the ability of his caregiver to provide consistent, emotionally attuned, and protective care” [C222] and the impact of “absence of responsive caregiving…is that children [this child] are more likely to develop insecure attachments and experience difficulties with their emotional and social development” [C222].
The Guardian said he is generally physically healthy and is meeting his milestones. The fracture has now healed and there are no signs of this being an ongoing concern [Paragraph 48]. However she also said:
[Paragraph 56]
Charlie will likely have enhanced emotional needs as he grows up, because of his early childhood experiences, and he may need therapeutic support in the future to support his emotional recovery. This is something his long-term primary carers will need to be alert to, as his needs evolve.
Likely effect on the Child throughout his life of ceasing to be member of family and becoming adopted person
Under the Local Authority care plan Charlie’s physical separation from his Mother would continue and be enhanced by the much-reduced contact he would have with her. There is a risk that even those reduced arrangements would, over time, diminish because of the difficulty in continuing them. If in due course an Adoption Order is made the legal bonds to his birth family would be severed; that will likely impact his outlook on the world, his life story, he may feel a sense of abandonment or disconnectedness.
Charlie’s current foster carers are unable to offer him long term care and a further move will be required under the Local Authority plan.
Relationship with relatives, prospective adopter and their wishes and feelings
I have considered this in relation to the Mother and then others below. Whilst considering the relationship with the Mother I have also considered the Mother’s capacity and consequent risk of harm.
Mother
Psychological profile
Mr Marshall recorded (my emphasis):
[E3]
Mother is functioning in the borderline range of adult intellectual ability and, whilst not meeting the criteria to be described as having a learning disability, may experience some difficulties relative to her peers in performing certain daily tasks and adapting to new or novel circumstances.
Mother has demonstrated evidence of significant improvement relative to her history regarding her ability to regulate herself emotionally, as well as to communicate in a more effective manner and to draw upon support provision. There do remain a number of concerns, including that Mother does experience some difficulties in being able to recognise her emotional state, and indeed concerns as highlighted in the case documents regarding her friendship with an individual who may pose a risk to children, with her also reporting that Charlie’s father was a casual encounter, describing that she considered there were ‘no red flags’, despite having met once and returning to his residence. In the context of her history, this does
indicate that Mother may continue to experience difficulties in recognising and understanding risks that may be posed by others. At this stage, there remains a real risk that at times she may experience difficulties in recognising her own needs, including a deterioration regarding her mental health, and therefore difficulties in her emotional availability for Charlie.
…
[E14/23]
…there are ongoing difficulties in addressing life stressors in a proactive and adaptive manner at times.
Therefore, in my view, there is a real risk that during periods of a deterioration regarding Mother’s mental health, a child in her care is exposed to inconsistency in Mother’s ability to respond to their needs or indeed to recognise their needs at times. There is, however, a reduced risk that a child in her care would be exposed to significant emotional dysregulation and in particular Mother is better positioned to be able to express her needs and draw upon support relative to her previous difficulties. However, I would also raise concerns that Mother may expose a child in her care to other individuals that may pose a risk, although to some degree
this is untested, given that she reports that she has not been in an abusive relationship for around two years..
Mr Marshall recommended a shorter-term programme focusing on mentalisation skills, concentrating on her ability to recognise, label and then communicate her emotional state and to improve coping skills for each stage of difficulty. He also recommended that the Mother engage in a one-to-one domestic violence course [E15].
The team manager’s oral evidence was that in the time she has worked with the Mother she has not had concerns about her emotional regulation, “she’s been very balanced”.
Pre-15 October 2025 assessment
The parenting assessment dated 7 July 2025 recorded variously:
[F41]
Mother’s history of parenting her older children is complex and deeply concerning. Those children experienced significant neglect, exposure to frightening experiences, and a lack of consistent, emotionally attuned care, which contributed to their emotional and behavioural difficulties. This context cannot be overlooked when assessing her current parenting.
It is also important to recognise that Mother is a vulnerable adult with a history of trauma, including a difficult childhood and abusive relationships. These experiences have impacted her ability to understand and meet the needs of her children in the past. However, in the context of her parenting of Charlie, this assessment has considered whether it is now safe and proportionate to recommend that Mother and Charlie be given the opportunity to live together in the community with ongoing support. The evidence suggests that, with the right level of structured, sustained intervention and monitoring, this may be a viable option.
…
10.6…Throughout the Parent Assess scoring, Mother is evidencing good knowledge across the areas, but needs to implement this into daily life.
[F42]
10.7…she has applied learning from the carer and professionals involved, and at present, Charlie’s needs are being met in this structured and supportive environment.
…
While there is evidence of meaningful progress and a foundation upon which to build, any recommendation for Mother and Charlie to live together in the community must be approached with caution and underpinned by a robust, multi-agency support and safeguarding plan, with clear contingencies in place.
Whilst Mother appears to be in a more stable and reflective place, it is important to acknowledge that her childhood trauma, ongoing anxiety, and difficulties with emotional regulation are likely to be tested further once she transitions into independent living.
…
10.12…I recommend that Charlie continues to live with and be cared for by Mother, and that they transition into independent living with the ongoing involvement of the safeguarding team.
Post-15 October 2025 assessment
The updating parenting assessment has been prepared taking account of five alternative scenarios. I have decided above that the fourth scenario applies, that is to say:
[F160]
A finding that the injury occurred whilst Charlie was in the care of the mother, that the mother’s description of an accident [i.e. rolling off the bed in the morning on 15 October 2025] does not adequately account for causation of the injury and that it is not possible for the court to determine whether it was either in the circumstances of an undisclosed accident or by some other, undisclosed non-accidental mechanism.
Ms White’s evidence was:
[F161]
…there are no concerns with Mother’s family time with Charlie and that it is a positive experience where she is able to meet his needs.
[F162]
… if the Court decides Charlie can return to her care, she will need housing support again, similar to the support offered at the end of her mother and baby placement.
[F163]
While it is recognised that caring for a baby who is crying is inherently stressful and that most parents will experience periods of heightened pressure, this was an identified area of concern within my first assessment regarding how Mother manages stress. At that time, I expressed worry about Mother’s ability to cope during periods of sustained pressure, particularly when caring for a young baby. Despite Mother being placed in a mother and baby placement, which provides a significantly higher level of support than would be available to her in the community, Mother reported feeling stressed and overwhelmed and stated that she felt she was not getting a break. This was despite Mother having told me that FC, the foster carer, would provide her with breaks and practical support when needed…This is particularly significant as the level of support available within the placement exceeds what Mother would realistically have access to in the community, raising ongoing concerns about how Mother would manage stressors independently and the potential impact of this on her ability to safely care for a child during periods of increased pressure.
When Ms White gave oral evidence she agreed the reference to the Mother reporting feeling overwhelmed could have been a summary (I took her to mean her interpretation) rather than the word actually used by the Mother and when the Mother gave oral evidence she said that she was “a little bit stressed but not overwhelmed” but in fact used the word “overwhelmed” in her text of 14 October 2025 [A58] and in her witness statement [C74/25]. She also agreed that there is no record of the Mother getting angry or physical when she has been stressed but the Mother did recognise it impacted on her parenting.
[F164]
3.15…I asked Mother how much of the response to Charlie’s first injury [a bruising injury identified in May 2025], and social care knowing that he fell off the bed, prevented her from telling anyone what happened through fear of being persecuted. Mother told me “quite high. But if I had any suspicions he was hurt, I would have told someone. I regret it.”
When considering this in the way in which Mother recalls events, I am concerned that Charlie did not receive any medical advice, professional reassurance, second opinion, or even a precautionary check following the fall [in the morning on 15 October 2025] as Mother describes, particularly given his age and subsequent unsettled presentation.
[F165]
3.16…Mother has acknowledged that her previous experience of statutory intervention following Charlie’s earlier injury had a ‘quite high’ impact on her decision-making, indicating that fear of further scrutiny or perceived punitive responses from professionals influenced her judgement. This raises concern that Mother’s anxiety around social care involvement may act as a barrier to her seeking timely medical advice for Charlie, even when there is a clear incident or indicators that would warrant this to be in his best interests. Given Charlie’s level of vulnerability as a young infant, the failure to seek reassurance or assessment represents a missed opportunity to ensure his immediate safety and wellbeing and suggests that Mother’s understanding of risk and thresholds for medical intervention may be compromised when weighed against her fear of professional involvement.
[F167]
4.2…observed throughout the assessment is an ongoing difficulty with decision-making under pressure. While Mother demonstrates some insight in hindsight, particularly in acknowledging responsibility and expressing regret, her ability to apply this knowledge consistently in real-time situations remains a concern. This aligns with earlier findings that identified judgement, rather than knowledge deficits, as a central issue.
When considering the finding that I have now made Ms White’s opinion was that:
[F171]
The absence of a clear and reliable explanation for the injury, combined with delayed disclosure and Mother’s acknowledged difficulty prioritising safeguarding responses and parenting decisions when under stress, limits professionals’ ability to fully assess risk. The uncertainty surrounding causation, alongside concerns about judgement and seeking support and advice as required, has implications for Charlie’s safety. In this case, I would not recommend that Charlie is returned to Mother’s sole care.
Even if that were not the case, Ms White’s conclusion in the event the roll to the floor was the cause of the injury she said this would demonstrate an inability to prioritise Charlie’s safety and care transparently and honestly and would not recommend Charlie’s return to her care.
That was echoed by the team manager’s oral evidence that “we’d have to rely on the Mother raising the alarm to us which she hasn’t done in this case”.
On the positive side it is acknowledged that time with Charlie is positive and that the Mother loves him very much [C218/3.6].
The Guardian concurred and said that the Mother has shown “excellent commitment to attending family time” and she “has continued to show she can meet Charlie’s needs during family time, although accepts that occasionally she needs direction and that she has more learning to do in some respects” [Paragraphs 32-33]. When the Mother gave oral evidence she did not accept direction was needed to meet basic needs but did accept it was in respect of calming Charlie at nappy changing and extending mealtimes to allow Charlie time to explore the food.
In terms of mitigation of risk the Guardian observed that by reference to the half-siblings’ experiences (set out in the agreed facts above) there is, in Charlie’s presentation with this injury, “a pattern of acute neglect that would be difficult to mitigate against in the future because the ability to see and anticipate risk and act protectively before an incident happens is not something that can be easily taught, and particularly when the Mother is someone whose responses and reactions to her children have been impacted by her emotional state” [Paragraph 38].
The Local Authority evidence on what mitigations may be put in place in the event of a return to Mother’s care was daily visits from a parenting worker spending “prolonged time at the home” and daily social work visits including announced and unannounced visits at evenings and weekends [C227]. The team manager said it would be, “an extremely high level of support…would see us there all the time or for prolonged periods of time and that’s not sustainable and not right for Charlie to have professionals in the home all the time”. Further, the mitigations would need the Mother to engage with professionals openly and honestly [C228]. There is of course concern about the latter given what I have said above in terms of the Mother’s credibility. The team manager said, “Mother has said she’d like a second chance but that would be on the basis that Mother would share concerns and she didn’t share concerns about how Charlie had potentially hurt his arm” and in relation to further courses there was this exchange in answer to questions put on behalf of the Guardian:
Q The parenting assessor highlighted Mother’s decision making under stress rather than lack of knowledge A Yes, Mother was aware Charlie could roll but left him on the bed |
Q So doing more courses will not necessarily address the issue A No, it’s not lack of knowledge |
Further, as noted above, the Mother has accepted falling asleep with Charlie on her and appeared to accept it was at least a possibility that he might have rolled off her and onto the floor whilst she was sleeping. In addition to being prepared to leave Charlie on the bed whilst she retrieved her phone or charger this is a second example of not appreciating risk of harm or if appreciating it not acting on it.
Relationship vulnerability
I have set this out at length under Allegation 18 above.
Others
No alternative carers have been identified [C226].
Proposed adopters have not yet been identified.
Any harm suffered or at risk of suffering
I have already considered this when considering the allegations above and when considering the relationship with the Mother. Charlie’s previous social worker identified risk at the outset of proceedings as being:
Significant Children’s Social Care involvement with older half-siblings [C8];
Concerns about the Mother’s attachment style and its impact on parenting capacity [C8];
Risk of neglect arising from the Mother struggling to cope with the challenges of full-time parenting [C9];
Risk arising from lack of settled housing [C9]; and
Risk arising from unsafe adults [C9].
To this I need to add the risk arising out of my findings against the Mother on Allegation 12 (causation of injury), 14 (failure of Mother to act protectively), 13 (failure to engage honestly with professionals) and, overlapping with the above list, Allegation 18 (lack of risk awareness). As the social worker said in her oral evidence, “the concern in this case is that the outcomes for Charlie when there’s a failure are acute”.
Range of powers
The team manager said this of a Placement Order:
[C229]
A Placement Order would enable the Local Authority to progress with an adoptive placement, offering Charlie the opportunity to grow up within a safe, secure, and nurturing family environment that is committed to meeting his needs throughout childhood and beyond. Adoption provides the highest level of legal and emotional permanence, reducing the risk of future placement disruption and offering a clear and stable plan for Charlie’s future.
The Guardian considered whether there might be an interim placement in a Mother and Baby foster care placement but concluded that even if such a placement could be found (and given the history this might be difficult) it “would be incompatible with Charlies’ timescales, because Charlie has been the subject of these proceedings for 66 weeks and requires a decision to be made about his future as a matter of priority” and she did not consider the outcome of a further parenting assessment would be likely to be any different given the nature of the Mother’s difficulties (set out above) [Paragraph 74].
Holistic balancing exercise
I come now to consider the balancing exercise that is required by B-S and take some of what follows from the care plan analysis of the team manager at [D31]:
Realistic Option 1: Placement Order
Factors in favour | Factors against |
Safe and consistent parenting | Separation from birth mother |
Permanence | Separation from birth family |
No longer a looked after child | Permanent severing of links to birth family and disruption to life story (mitigated to some degree by arrangements for contact with half-siblings and Mother) |
Avoidance of placement breakdown risk associated with long term foster care | Placement move |
Realistic Option 2: (Interim) Care or Supervision Order with Mother
Factors in favour | Factors against |
Return to care of birth mother | Risk of physical and consequent emotional harm arising from lack of awareness of risk and as demonstrated by the agreed facts and findings |
Natural contact with birth family | Risk of emotional harm in lack of availability |
Sense of belonging | Continuing as a looked after child (if Care Order) |
Ongoing and intrusive Children’s Social Care involvement (under either order) | |
Placement move | |
Delay in final decision and permanence (if there is an Interim Care Order and adjournment to allow rehabilitation to Mother’s care) |
Comparison of Options
Sadly only a Placement Order can adequately meet Charlie’s needs, it is an extreme order but one that is necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm. I come to this conclusion primarily because he suffered harm in the care of the Mother which cannot be accounted for but even if I was wrong about that the fact he rolled from the bed on Mother’s own account, the fact that she admits to falling asleep with him on her chest despite her knowing the risk, the fact that despite completing work recommended by Mr Marshall she has continued an association with a male who pays her money and to whom she professes love without any real knowledge of who he is or what his motivations are amply demonstrate an inability to safely assess risk. This puts Charlie at an intolerable risk of harm. When that is weighed against the various advantages of return to Mother’s care and the disadvantages of a Placement Order the balance comes down overwhelmingly in favour of a Placement Order being made.
Contact
There is no dispute that direct contact at least twice a year would be in Charlie’s welfare interest. The dispute was between whether there should be an order or not and whether the search for adopters should prioritise those willing to agree to post-adoption contact twice a year for a period 4 (Local Authority) or 6 months (Guardian).
When the team manager gave evidence she said that she did not feel that an order for post-Placement Order contact was required “because the conversation is clear” and she had never had a case where the recommended contact had not been adhered to. The Guardian’s evidence was that contact 2-3 times per year would maintain a sense of identity for Charlie. She did not think an order was necessary because she had confidence this Local Authority would emphasise the importance of contact in its search.
The Guardian summarised the balance required by saying, “The overriding priority is finding a place for Charlie, it is important for him to have direct contact with Mother and it would be sad if they couldn’t get that but Charlie shouldn’t wait indefinitely”.
I remind myself of the provision of section 1(6) Adoption Children Act 2002, “the court must not make any order under this Act unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so”. I am not persuaded it would be better to make an order under section 26 than not. The absence of an order does not mean there will be no search for adopters who are willing to engage with contact twice a year. By contrast an order runs the risk of putting off adopters who may otherwise consider Charlie. The imposition of an order for contact would remove the flexibility for the Local Authority to change its prioritisation of potential adopters as time progresses. The court’s endorsement of the benefits of contact in a recital will emphasise the importance of this priority without the removal of flexibility. Given the loving relationship described between the Mother and Charlie and the Mother’s commitment to contact and Charlie’s relatively young age my judgment is that the prioritisation of potential adopters willing to consider direct contact should be for 6 rather than 4 months. I do not criticise the Local Authority for adopting 4 months but there is no clear evidence that is better than 6 months or that 6 months would unduly restrict the likely success of a placement search. I invite the Local Authority to agree a recital to that effect.
Conclusion
In light of the above analysis I make a final Care Order pursuant to section 31 Children Act 1989 and approve the care plan. Having concluded that the Charlie’s welfare requires me to dispense with the Mother’s consent to placing for adoption I do so pursuant to section 52 Adoption and Children Act 2002 and make a Placement Order pursuant to section 21 of the Act.
I approve the care plan in respect of contact arrangements save that I invite the Local Authority to agree a recital they will prioritise potential adopters willing to consider twice yearly direct contact for the first 6 months of the search.
I finish with this message for the Mother:
I was struck by your commitment to and love of your son which everyone agrees upon. Whilst I do not think it is safe enough for him to return to your care you will always be a very important person in his life. Never lose sight of that and focus on what is best for him as he grows and develops. I hope that in time you will be able to reflect on what I have said and whilst you may not agree with my decision you will come to understand why this is the best plan for your son.