CD v EF

This is the final judgment on a Child Arrangements Order application and is an example of the Court departing from the recommendations of Cafcass.

The case concerns the welfare of AB (age 11), the daughter of the applicant Mother and respondent Father.

The Mother has applied to the court to vary the Child Arrangements Order made in June 2024, and the central dispute between the parties centres on whether AB should continue moving between households in a pattern set according to Father’s shift work rota, or whether instead she move to a pattern close to spending alternating weeks with each parent. There are also a number of other particular arrangements that are not agreed between the parties.

This is the public judgment issued in this case following the final hearing that took place in Stafford on 9 December 2025 with judgment, given in Stoke-on-Trent on 8 January 2026, albeit remotely. Various details such as names have been anonymised so as to preserve the anonymity (including by jigsaw identification) of AB. A private version without anonymisation has also been issued to the parties. The decision to issue a public judgment was made on the Court’s own volition, and there were no objections made to it by the parties.

These proceedings are conducted under the Children Act 1989 and I have reminded myself that AB’s welfare is the Court’s paramount consideration; that the Court should have regard to the Welfare Checklist; and that the Court should not make any order unless it considers doing so would be better for AB than making no order at all.

This is now the third set of Family Court proceedings during AB’s life.

Following the party’s separation, the first proceedings began in 2019 following an application by Father and concluded in a Child Arrangement Order made by consent in 2019 which stated in essence that AB shall live with both parties with the time spent with each party set according to Father’s shift pattern.

The second proceedings commenced in 2024 with Mother’s application to vary the Child Arrangement Order and in particular the pattern of the arrangement. These proceedings concluded at the First Hearing and Dispute Resolution Appointment with Mother stating that she could not financially afford to continue with Court proceedings.

These proceedings were issued in May 2025, and have followed a typical Private Law path, with a Cafcass safeguarding letter received in July 2025 and a Section 7 report dated in October 2025. This report recommended that arrangements for AB be changed with the aim of ensuring more consistency and stability for her, whilst still promoting both parental relationships.

A Dispute Resolution Appointment took place before DJ Harrison on 6 November 2025 at which it was ordered that the handover times that were very early (such as 5.30/5.45am) were changed to be later in the morning. An updated letter from Cafcass was also ordered following position statements of the parties.

The updated letter from Cafcass was received on 27 November 2025 which contains a different recommendation to the Section 7 report, namely that there should be no substantive change to the existing Child Arrangement Order.

There were a number of other recommendations in the various correspondence from Cafcass (such as attendance at a Planning together for children course, and engaging with ‘The Solihull Approach’ materials), all of which are not live issues at this final hearing stage.

The matter was listed before me for a one-day final hearing on 9 December 2025. At the hearing the proposed conduct and timing of the hearing was discussed by myself with both counsel. Given the detailed nature of the written submissions, and the number of still disputed areas between the parties, I considered notwithstanding any opposition to adjourning from both parties, whether I nevertheless should adjourn the case due to an anticipated lack of Court time. However such adjournment to a multi-day hearing before a judge would have had considerable drawbacks – in particular delay in the case of a child who is aware of these proceedings which have been going on since May 2025 and in which she has expressed a desire for their resolution, the potential length of delay which could be some number of months, and the financial implications for both parties. I was mindful of the Article 6 rights of both parties, but determined that adjourning the case was not necessary as it was possible to have a fair hearing, with appropriate limitations on evidence and submissions, with the possibility of reserved judgment to be delivered on a subsequent day.

Following submissions from both counsel I determined that I did not need to hear live evidence from mother, and that the live evidence from the father should be restricted to deal with two issues: the issue of the degree of flexibility in father’s annual leave and shift pattern arrangements; and the issue of the circumstances surrounding AB writing a letter to the Court whilst in the Father’s care in November 2025.

I also decided to admit various documents pertaining to these matters that were submitted on the day on the grounds of potential relevance, on the reasoning posited for their not being submitted earlier, and in my view the ability of opposing counsel to deal adequately with the matters contained therein.

Father proceeded to give oral evidence, as did the Cafcass Officer who was the author of the Section 7 report and the updating letter.

These activities used all the available Court time, and by consent, I ordered that closing submissions should be sent in writing by 16 December 2025, with parties to attend for judgment to be given on 8 January 2026.

An application for a short extension on the time to send me written submissions was applied for and granted by me on the papers.

An indication was given in these submissions that counsel for Mother wished to invite the Court on 8 January 2026 to consider further oral submissions on 7 further disputed matters, with counsel for Father indicating that they would not oppose this.

It is to the party’s credit that by the time of the hearing on 8 January 2026, all bar one of these disputed issues had been agreed, and I heard brief submissions on the remaining matter which pertained to a timing matter relating to AB’s mobile phone.

On the central disputed matters, the primary submissions put on behalf of Mother are that the general shared care pattern should be changed from following the complex shift pattern of Father, to a week on/week off basis with handovers on a Sunday, and that summer holidays should be fixed to give AB a block of two weeks and a block of one week with each parent. The full reasoning for these is provided in the written submissions.

The Court was also invited to find by the Mother that Father’s evidence was not reliable, credible, or believable; and that the evidence of the Cafcass officer contained an inadequate analysis and her conclusions should be departed from.

By contrast the primary submissions put on behalf of Father are that the current shared care pattern of arrangements should remain in place, including throughout the holidays. The full reasoning for these is provided in the written submissions.

The Court was also invited to find that Father was a credible witness and to endorse the overall recommendations of the Cafcass officer which she maintained during her oral evidence.

In my judgment the primary factors in this case that are negatively impacting AB’s wellbeing are the parent’s historic and current inability to communicate openly, effectively and constructively; and to compromise appropriately.

This has resulted in emotional harm to AB and in my judgment continues to present a risk of harm to her.

AB has been subject to Court proceedings three times in her short life to date, and for much of her 11 years she has been exposed to the effects of parental conflict. Even though in recent times she has not witnessed directly her parents arguing, she has continued to be exposed to parental conflict – for example regarding a potential medical procedure, and issues to do with a mobile phone.

AB’s emotional wellbeing and mental health has been a concern of professionals at various points in her life, including accessing counselling, and a recent referral to CAMHS. It is of note that in 2025 she was discharged early from CAMHS due to “systemic instability and emergency court order pending”, not because she was assessed to no longer need support.

It is also of concern that AB has exhibited premature sexualisation with issues with both intimate photographs and grooming. She was also subject to bullying in her primary school, although since moving to high school this appears to no longer be a current issue.

Both parents have accessed various courses and materials recommended by Cafcass or ordered by the Court, such as the ‘Planning Together For Children’ course. However it is concerning that these interventions appear to have not yet had the desired effect in significantly reducing parental conflict.

I have seriously considered whether at this stage I should order a Section 37 investigation and direct the Local Authority to consider applying for a Public Law order in this case due to the risk of ongoing emotional harm to AB. In my judgment such a step is not in AB’s interests and is not necessary at the current point in time. This is because I think it is likely that the parents, should they so choose, can adequately provide for AB’s emotional wellbeing and mental health.

As AB grows older and enters her teenage years, the challenges of parenting will change due to factors inherent with her age such as hormonal changes, societal pressures and growing autonomy, and it is likely that AB will need an even greater degree of parental love and consistency.

If the parents are not able to co-parent adequately in the future, there is a risk that the Local Authority social workers will need to become involved and there may be Public Law proceedings.

Notwithstanding all of the above concerns and caveats, it is my judgment that both parents do have the capability of meeting the child’s needs to an adequate standard, and that both parents have the capacity to increase their parental capabilities.

When considering the expressed wishes and feelings of AB, I do so in light of her 11 year old age and of the partial understanding she has of the key issues in this case.

There are some aspects that I can take as wishes of any child, and some that are specific to AB. Any child, including AB, would wish to grow up having safe, loving, peaceful and fulfilling relationships with both their parents.

It is clear to me that both parents love AB very much and greatly value the time they spend with her.

In my judgment it is also in any 11 year old child’s interest, including AB, to be exposed to parental conflict as little as possible and to be afforded a suitable amount of predictability of routine and stability.

A key issue in this case is what weight I should place on the letter written to me by AB in November 2025 which states that “I would really want it to stay 50/50 because I just couldn’t ever think of living with one of my parents. I would be really sad if I couldn’t live between houses.”

In her evidence the Cafcass officer said that her recommendation in her updated letter to the Court dated 27 November 2025 stating that the shared care arrangements should continue to follow Father’s complex shift pattern rather than alter to something akin to a week on/week off pattern are primarily based on this letter and her conversation with AB about it. This updated recommendation is different to what she recommended in the Section 7 report which did recommend the pattern be changed.

This letter was written whilst AB was in her Father’s care, and her conversation with the Cafcass officer also took place whilst she was in her Father’s care and the question thus arises whether AB was unduly influenced by her Father into writing and saying what she did.

Father gave evidence and was cross-examined on the circumstances surrounding the origins of this letter and AB’s subsequent conversation with the Cafcass officer. Many of Father’s responses to questions surrounding these circumstances were variations on “I don’t remember”. Father did say that he did not deliberately influence AB and that she chose to write the letter of her own accord without Father’s input.

I find that it is unlikely that the extent of lack of recall of specific conversations is as great as Father gave evidence of it to be. This is because the issues are likely to be close to the front of Father’s mind when engaging with AB as they are both important to him and involve contemporaneous events (such as the receipt of the Section 7 report). Furthermore, the events took place only a matter of weeks before giving oral evidence and thus memory is less likely to have faded than over a greater time from the incident events. I thus find his evidence on these points to be of only limited reliability.

I considered whether or not I was in a position to make a finding that Father did deliberately influence AB into changing her mind as to her views. I have decided both that I am not in a position to fairly make such a finding, and also that it is not necessary for me to make a finding on this point.

The reason that in my judgment I am not in a position to fairly make such a finding, is that there are other plausible potential reasons for why AB may have changed her position and the evidence that pertains to those reasons has not been fairly tested in Court. For example, the Cafcass officer gave evidence that she thought it was possible that her video conversation with AB explaining the contents of her Section 7 report may have been a cue for her to write a letter to the Court. The Cafcass officer also said in oral evidence that there is some evidence of both parents sharing their views with AB. However the Mother has not been afforded the opportunity to give oral evidence to potentially refute this suggestion, and it is a potentially relevant suggestion as AB was also in Mother’s care shortly before going to Father’s house and writing her letter.

In my judgment there is also the reality whereby an intelligent and sensitive 11 year old who has the lived experiences that AB does, is likely to have picked up to a degree on the desires of each parent and the potential impact on them of substantial changes in her care arrangements. Whilst it may be that much or all of this exposure to adult issues was unintentional on behalf of the parents, in my view it is likely to have occurred and played a factor in AB’s reasoning.

A finding that I am able to make, is that AB does not have a settled and resolute view on how her time should be split between the parental households. The primary evidence I base this finding on are:

In considering AB’s expressed views I also factor in that she is an 11 year old girl and by function of her age, is of limited maturity and insight into what would be best for her in the long term. She is also likely to be conscious to a degree of the effect that any change in arrangements would have on her parents as these are people that she clearly loves and cares for, and thus this impacts on her young ability to foreground the paramountcy of her own welfare, independent of that of her parents.

The Cafcass officer in her evidence several times explicitly expressed that her recommendations favouring the status quo over moving to a week on/week off pattern was a finely balanced recommendation. Although she put considerable weight in her recommendations on the increased exposure to parental conflict caused by frequent handovers, and the instability inherent in an irregular pattern of where she lives, she preferred to follow the expressed wishes of AB and prioritise quality time with both her parents. She indicated that the primary reason for the change in recommendation was the letter and communication from AB.

I find that there are cogent reasons why it would be appropriate to depart from the Cafcass officer’s recommendations. Firstly the Cafcass officer’s emphasis that this was a finely balanced recommendation indicates that both options are plausible and have significant advantages. Thus for the Court to depart from her most preferred recommendation to her second most preferred recommendation does not demonstrate a major departure in the circumstances of this case. This is further the case in light that her previous report recommended the option of change and was dated only a few weeks previous, with few facts and events changing in the interim save for the letter from AB. I have explained above why in my judgment AB’s letter should be weighed with more limited weight than that ascribed to it by the Cafcass officer, and thus I find it is open to the Court to potentially depart from her recommendations.

The effect of changing the arrangements would have an impact on AB both directly, and indirectly via having a significant impact on her parents. One aspect of this change would be the transition period for AB getting used to a new pattern. I do not put significant weight on this factor as I am primarily concerned with her long term welfare and am confident that she has the ability to navigate such a change without significant distress given her strong relationships with her parents, the stability of her schooling, the close locality of the properties, the quality of her relationships with extended family, her resilience demonstrated through her existing frequent moves between homes, and her familiarity with both homes.

Following a transition period I also consider the effect of changing the arrangements on the quantity and quality of time that AB would get with each of her parents. When considering this fully, I take into account my findings as to Father’s evidence relating to his work schedule and leave.

It is Father’s position that his work, where he has been employed for a large number of years, consists of 12-hour day shifts, 12-hour night shifts, and rest days according to a set irregular rota that only repeats over a period of several years. Furthermore his position is that his annual leave allowance is built into this rota, and whilst there is the potential for a limited amount of ‘time off in lieu’ days, this is not guaranteed.

I have considered Father’s evidence on the issue of his work and leave pattern, both all of the documentary evidence and his oral evidence. I make the following findings.

I find that Father has failed to ever investigate with his employer the potential for any change in his employment shift pattern in any way. This finding is based on Father’s oral evidence that he had never done so. This failing is in my judgment a significant one because it demonstrates a lack of intention, sustained over a significant period of time, to constructively seek to explore working arrangements that would potentially better suit AB both in her time with him and in her time with her Mother. This failing demonstrates a lack of willingness to seek to co-parent effectively and compromise appropriately.

I find that Father’s evidence relating to his job and to his leave was evasive, inappropriately selective and not open. I make this finding on the basis of contradictions between his written and oral evidence – such as on the point of whether or not he can change his shift pattern, and that how only limited concessions were made, for example around the possibility for time off in lieu, only after considerable questioning and the presentation of rebuttal evidence relating to regular holidays.

I find that the reduction in quality time that AB would have with her Father if the shared care arrangements are changed will not be as great as claimed by the Father as there are actions that the Father can take that can ameliorate to a degree any reduction.

The career of any parent is impacted by them having a child and their subsequent parental responsibilities as well as desire to spend time with their child. Both parents in this case are intelligent, capable, and have significant experience of the working world. Whilst it is commendable that each parent works in employment making a positive contribution to society as well as to their family, the jobs they hold are not the only jobs that they are capable of obtaining and holding. I find that it is an option, should the Father wish to pursue it, for him to seek and obtain a different job that does not have the shift pattern that his current position does.

I also find that it is open to the Father to seek adjustments to the pattern of work that he does with his current employer and that it is likely that an arrangement could be found that would enable him to continue being employed by his current employer but also have a greater availability to spend time with AB should her care pattern change. This finding is based on a combination of the documentary evidence indicating a range of flexible employment options offered by the Father’s employer from which I infer a desire and ability of the employer to offer such a flexibility for good cause; also secondly on the option raised (albeit rejected by the Father) of moving to ‘family-friendly’ hours which he said would result in a deduction in pay of around 25% from which I infer both that this option is a possibility, and that there may other hybrid compromise options with a lesser reduction in pay; and thirdly on the negative inference I draw from finding that the Father has not sought such adjustments to date and has not been open and forthcoming with the Court in relation to time off in lieu, from which I reduce the weight that I put on Father’s evidence that other working patterns are not available to him as I find this evidence to be unreliable.

In my judgment weighing all of these above discussed factors together, and in line with the guidance of S v W [1981] Fam Law 81, on balance I find that the status quo arrangement is not satisfactory, that the final advice of the Cafcass officer should be departed from, and that it is in AB’s interests for the pattern of shared care to be changed to a week on/week off basis and the summer holiday arrangements to be changed to allow for AB to spend a 2-week block with each parent. Handovers will take place on Sundays at 6.00pm and the new pattern will commence on Sunday 15^th February 2026 at 6.00pm with AB being in her father’s care until Sunday 22^nd February 2026 at 6.00pm whereby she will move to being in her Mother’s care and the pattern then alternating accordingly. The precise arrangements for summer holidays will be as set out in [9] of Ms Hilbourne-Gollop’s supplemental submissions.

This new pattern has the considerable advantages of providing stability and a pattern easily understood and predicted by AB that will better suit her at her current age and over the forthcoming years. It will reduce the number of handovers which are currently a source of parental conflict that effects AB. On the basis of my findings and analysis the new pattern will still result in AB having significant quality time with both her parents. It will likely have a positive effect on Mother’s ability to offer quality time and arrangements for AB. In my judgment it will also reduce the potential for emotional harm for AB over the next few years.

For the reasons discussed above, I have weighed these advantages over the disadvantages that include a reduction in the quality time that AB has with her Father, albeit I do not accept the level of reduction claimed by the Father for the reasons I have given. There is also the possibility of increased informal time between AB and the parent with whom she is currently not residing with, as evidenced by her popping in to have tea with her Father in the days leading up to the final hearing. The disadvantages also include that there will likely be more times when AB is being cared for by her extended paternal family rather than her Father, however this time with her extended paternal family also brings with it its own advantages. A further disadvantage is the impact of the transition period and the Court deciding something that does not reflect AB’s most recently received wishes and feelings. I have considered whether it would be appropriate and in AB’s best interests for me to write to her directly to explain my decisions but have decided that it would be better for her to have a conversation with the Cafcass officer so she could explain this judgment and the impact of it on AB in a child-appropriate way as she has a pre-existing relationship with AB and is trained in how to explain things in a child-appropriate way. I have decided to delay the commencement of this new pattern until the February half-term to allow for an opportunity for AB and both parents to get ready for the change.

In my judgment making an order is clearly better than not making an order as it provides certainty and will reduce parental conflict. Further I find that it is not appropriate to make a Section 91(14) order, a Family Assistance Order, or a referral to ICFA.

It is to the parent’s credit that they have agreed a large number of the ancillary matters to this order, which I have incorporated into the order. Each of the remaining ancillary matters that were disputed, I have determined and included in the Order in line with my findings and analysis above. The order includes a provision for any other contact as agreed between the parties. This means that if both parents agree, it is open for them to alter the contact arrangements between themselves and I would encourage them to do so as new things arise and change over the next few years.

I would like to thank both legal teams for their very helpful conduct and submissions in this case.

Finally I want to communicate to the parents a warning and an encouragement. The warning is that as I have outlined, if you are not able to communicate, compromise and co-parent effectively, this is likely to result in harm to AB, and there is the possibility that the Local Authority will apply for a Public Law order in the future. The encouragement is that you both clearly love AB and want what is best for her, and you both have the capacity to grow and become even better co-parents than you already are. Now that this Court Order is made I encourage you both to look forward and seek to make it work as best you can in AB’s interests.