Re B – Fact Finding (Use of AI for Judgment Summary for Parents with Learning Difficulties)

This judgment concerns B, a young girl aged 2. Her parents are the mother and the father.

This judgment is structured as follows:

The application before the court is the Local Authority’s application for a care order which was issued on 24 January 2025. This case is presently at week 64, against the target of 26. It will remain unresolved for several more months. I will address the reasons for this delay in section X.

This was listed as, and indeed initially commenced as, a combined finding of fact and welfare hearing with the court tasked with determining whether B had suffered non-accidental/inflicted injuries and if so, then to determine the perpetrator of the injuries if possible. Depending upon my findings (if any), I was then to consider B’s welfare and decide where she should live. Counsel for the Local Authority provided a helpful and detailed written opening as well as a Schedule of Contact Logs and both Counsel for the Local Authority and the father produced chronologies. As the medical evidence was agreed, the hearing commenced with the social work evidence but on day 2 a decision was taken to cease dealing with the welfare aspects of the hearing for reasons that I will address later, and thus the hearing became fact finding only.

The mother and Father were both known to the Local Authority as children and spent time being looked after. Both parents have learning difficulties. They both have extremely low cognitive abilities in most areas including memory, verbal and literacy. The mother has significant issues with her physical health that impact her mobility, including a heart condition which has required surgery and will likely need further surgery, and fibromyalgia which means her mobility can be limited and she is often in pain. Both have anxiety and potentially depression/trauma issues although there is no formal diagnosis. They are married and have been in a relationship for over 5 years.

B lived with her parents during her early months. It is reported that they worked well with a number of agencies to improve their parenting skills and meet B’s needs, however, developmental delay has been noted and it now appears likely that they were struggling to meet all of B’s needs to a good enough standard. Further, it is clear that despite their efforts, B had significant issues with poor feeding. There had been a previous Child Protection Medical in October 2024 following bruising being found to her thigh, albeit no action was ultimately taken.

B was taken to A&E with visible bruising to her head, a boggy swelling to the right parietal area of her head and bruising to her eye. The parents advised that the day before, they heard B scream and when they went to her, they noticed an unexplained red mark near her ear, and she vomited. They did not seek medical attention at that point. The following morning they noticed B had an unexplained swollen eye and they attended hospital. They were unable to provide an explanation as to how any of the injuries occurred. The nurse completed a full body check and noticed that B became very distressed when her parents were near and undressing her. The following injuries were found by the nurse:

B then underwent a CT scan and the following injuries were reported to a strategy meeting thereafter:

B was placed under Police Powers of Protection and the parents were arrested for Section 18 Assault and Neglect. Due to concerns about the parents’ capacity to consent to B’s medical examination, the Local Authority made an urgent application to court. An interim care order was granted and ultimately B was placed in foster care following her release from hospital.

The Child Protection Medical confirmed “B is an immobile 8 month old infant who has a significant skull fracture and multiple unexplained bruises on a background of previous concerns about unexplained bruises. The skull fracture suggests a significant injury, which is unexplained and would be consistent with nonaccidental injury. There was also a delay in seeking medical assessment.”

Since proceedings commenced the parents have been assessed by psychologists, intermediaries and an independent social worker. B has been the subject of reports by a Paediatric Radiologist, Paediatric Neuro Radiologist, Paediatric Neurosurgeon and a Paediatrician. B has remained in foster care and contact takes place regularly. The conclusions of the medical experts are not challenged and they were not called to give evidence. The parents have vacillated as to whether they intend to separate but remain living in the same house together, although the mother states that this is for convenience and there is no longer an intimate relationship. The father’ statement does not suggest that they are separated, indeed he seeks for them to care for B together. There are no alternative carers who have been positively assessed or able to care for B. The father’ contact is presently suspended as he is under investigation in respect of his alleged inappropriate online communications with a child.

This case has been allocated to HHJ Hesford throughout and has benefitted from judicial continuity. This hearing took place as an attended hearing over 5 days including submissions, which were done remotely for the convenience of the court. The bundle exceeded 2600 pages.

Both parents have been the subject of a cognitive assessment by Dr Allen. The mother’s cognitive functioning was assessed by Dr. Allen. He concluded that she is a woman of extremely low cognitive ability, with full scale IQ in the range 64-72, placing her at the 1st percentile. Her working memory is also at the 1^st percentile. Shehas very basic literacy, and her reading comprehension age is approximately 11 years. He recommended an advocate for oral evidence, a specialist parenting assessment and also provided several steps the court could take to enhance her capacity to participate. The father’s cognitive functioning was assessed by Dr. Allen. He concluded that he is a man of extremely low cognitive ability, with full scale IQ in the range 60-68, placing him at the 1^st percentile. His working memory is also at the 1^st percentile. Hehas very basic literacy, and his reading comprehension age is approximately 7.5-8 years. His verbal comprehension is at the 2^nd percentile. He recommended an intermediary assessment, a specialist parenting assessment and also provided several steps the court could take to enhance his capacity to participate. An updated assessment in August 2025 confirmed the earlier assessment and that he had capacity.

Both parties have been assessed by and are supported by intermediaries. Ground Rules were established and applied throughout this hearing. They are attached at the end of this judgment as an appendix.

The Local Authority sought findings against the parents in relation to the injuries, including a failure to seek medical attention and in relation to domestic abuse, mental health and neglect issues. The Local Authority plan for B is adoption without direct contact and the Local Authority accordingly issued an application for a placement order.

The mother accepted the medical evidence but denied causing any of the injuries. She stated that she was no longer in an intimate relationship with the father (although they remained living together) and sought for B to be rehabilitated to her care, and for direct contact if the plan for adoption was approved.

The father accepted the medical evidence but denied causing any of the injuries. He sought for B to be rehabilitated to their joint care or to the sole care of the mother and direct contact if the plan for adoption was approved. His final statement did not suggest that their relationship was over, indeed he refers to them as “us” and of course seeks to care jointly.

The Guardian agreed with the plans of the Local Authority.

The Local Authority initially sought findings concerning injuries as set out in the Final Threshold as follows.

None of the medical evidence was challenged. It is accordingly accepted and established, however both parents sought to persuade the court that the injuries must have been accidental and not inflicted, likely caused by the father’s blackout. The court was assisted by four experts – Dr Fionnan Williams, Paediatric Neuroradiologist, Dr Olsen, Paediatric Radiologist, Dr Tim Lawrence, Paediatric Neurosurgeon and Dr Jonathan Cardwell, Consultant Paediatrician. Each prepared a detailed report and all bar Dr Olsen answered additional questions. I do not intend to set out their evidence in detail, but I will address the most relevant evidence in my fact finding analysis section. There are no areas of disagreement. Taken together, the experts were clear that the injury required significant force to B’s skull, was unusual in a domestic fall, but could not exclude an unusual accidental mechanism whilst picking up or carrying B as the cause.

The detail of the injuries is contained in the report of Dr Williams dated 19 May 2025 as set out in the threshold and her addendum. He reviewed the records from the hospitals as well as the parents’ initial statements. He confirmed his opinion that the injury had happened within the preceding 14 days before the CT scan and confirmed that “ It requires considerable force to break the bones of the infant skull…infant skull vault bones do not fracture with minimal trauma. We do not see skull vault fractures from minor domestic impacts or rough play/rough handling. The force needed to cause them is considerable and would be inappropriate for small children if witnessed by an independent bystander.”

He confirmed that the cause was trauma and not a birth injury. There was no minimum height for a fall to cause a fracture but they were uncommon in low-level falls. The commonest accidental fracture was a simple linear fracture, whereas this was a highly complex stellate fracture and the more complex a fracture, “the more suspicious it is unless there is a clear, unambiguous history which would satisfactorily account for the injury…Stellate fractures are typically encountered when there is high force point contact.” From the father’ description of events he concludes “a fall from adult standing height/carer’s arms can cause a skull vault fracture but the pattern seen here is highly complex and would be a very severe and unusual outcome from such a fall, if the fall is onto a flat surface”. He also noted that the mother did not report hearing any noise and there was no account from either parent of B being distressed after the incident from either parent, as he would have expected unless she had been knocked out, which was not suggested. He was satisfied that “… there is no clear, plausible accidental explanation for this fracture”.

The incident, he said, was caused by blunt force trauma and the perpetrator would be likely to realise that they had caused an injury, with B in pain and distress at the time although a non-present carer may not have been aware until later. Despite this, he suggests “this injury is so severe with significant soft tissue swelling and a highly complex skull vault fracture that I would expect B may not have been herself and this, coupled with the extensive soft tissue injury would mean it is likely to have been obvious to any reasonable carer that B had sustained a significant injury.”

In his addendum he confirmed that the injuries seen would be unusual and severe for a fall from arms to a carpeted flat surface and that they were more consistent with point impact trauma than a crushing mechanism, particularly noting that the father had not described falling onto B and waking up not on top of her but next to her, making a crushing injury unlikely.

The Executive Summary of the report of Dr Olsen dated 6.7.2025 stated:

Dr Lawrence, in his report dated 21.6.2025 summarised:

In his addendum report dated 11.10.2025 he confirmed that whilst it was “not possible to rule out a fall from the father’s arms as a possible cause of B’s injuries, the injuries suffered (comminuted displaced and depressed skull, subdural haematoma and an acute traumatic effusion) would be considered an unusual consequence of such a mechanism.” He also confirmed that “if the father had fallen whilst holding B resulting in B’s head being crushed between her father’s body and a hard unyielding object on the floor, she could have suffered the injuries identified.”

Dr Cardwell’s report noted the threshold injuries and some bruising which does not form part of the threshold. He confirmed that B has normal bone biochemistry and no propensity to fracture. When B suffered the skull and scalp injuries, she “would have experienced significant pain, discomfort and distress. She is likely to have displayed this by crying and being difficult to settle in a way that is different to typical episodes of upset and unhappiness, for example when she is hungry or needing to be changed. In my opinion, this would be apparent and memorable to her carers at the time she sustained these injuries.”

In addition to the expert medical evidence, the bundle includes other relevant medical evidence which I will summarise. The hospital discharge records show that the mother declined offers of support, including the Early Help/Thriving Babies scheme, a Hospital Passport, and assistance from a Disability Midwifery Advocate, stating she did not feel she needed them. She was advised to seek support from her community midwife or health visitor once home. In July 2024, records note referrals for her for physiotherapy and review at a fibromyalgia clinic. On [date], the mother contacted the health centre to report that B had developed a red mark on her head after waking the previous day, which she believed was from banging the cot. She also reported that B had been sleepy and that, on waking from a nap, she had swelling to her eye on the same side. By [date] 2025, nursing notes recorded that child protection procedures were underway. The parents had been interviewed and bailed, there was no account for how the injuries occurred, and it was recorded that only the father had attended B during the night and again at around 7.30am, when she was found screaming. The parents attributed the injury to B banging her head in the cot.

The father’s GP records from August 2025 record ongoing complaints of dizziness on standing and blurred vision, alongside significant anxiety relating to court the proceedings. He expressed concern that he may have blacked out and caused injury to B, although he denied any history of fainting or blackouts. He was noted to be under learning disability and mental health services.

There was a significant bundle of police evidence including interview transcripts. In her police interview, the mother said that on Wednesday morning at around 7.30am, B was screaming and she woke the father, explaining that she was occupied dealing with her medication. She said he went to B and, although she could not clearly recall the detail, he would ordinarily change her nappy. He then brought B to her, at which point she noticed a slight red mark on the right side of B’s head, above her ear. She asked the father whether he had noticed it and he said he had not seen it until she pointed it out. The mother said she assumed B had bumped her head in the cot. Later that day she discussed the mark during a video call with her stepmother, who advised keeping a close eye on B overnight and seeking medical attention if concerns arose. The following day she put B down for a nap at around 11am and, when she woke at approximately 12.15 – 12.30pm, she noticed swelling to B’s eye which she said prevented her from opening it properly. She contacted C, who works alongside the health visitor, and explained about the earlier red mark, that the father had attended to B when she was unsettled, and the new swelling to her eye. C advised that, given the possibility of a head injury, B should be taken to A&E, which the mother did.

The mother told the police that the father later said to her that he thought he might have knocked B’s head on the side of the cot when taking her out. She said he repeated this account again later while they were together in custody. When asked what she believed may have caused B’s injuries she said she could think of no explanation other than the father’s suggestion that he may have knocked B’s head while rushing to her, or the possibility that B had bumped her head herself. She also told the police that the father was stressed and, when asked how he behaves when stressed, said that in the past he had thrown his mobile phone at a wall and, on some occasions, had told B to “be quiet” and “shut up.”

The police evidence in relation to the father includes reference to concern expressed by the father’ GP that he was worried about the father’ ability to manage his anger at home and that he was having physical and verbal outbursts, pushing the mother, throwing a shoe at her and punching walls.

In his police interview, the father described events over the Wednesday to Thursday period leading up to B’s hospital presentation. He said that on Wednesday morning B was screaming and he was woken by the mother. He explained that he experienced blurred vision on waking, which he attributed to being woken suddenly (and needing glasses), and which he said did not clear immediately. Despite this, he went to B’s room, picked her up while half-asleep, briefly placed her on the floor while his vision returned, located her dummy, comforted her and put her back in her cot. He stated that later that day he and the mother noticed a red mark on B’s head, which resolved by the evening, and that B had also been unsettled with a raised temperature for which she was given Calpol. He said that because they did not know what had caused the red mark, they bought a travel cot the following day and placed B in it on Thursday morning. He described that when B later woke from sleep that day, he and the mother noticed swelling to her right eye, prompting them to seek medical advice and attend A&E. He denied knowing how B had sustained the injuries, suggested that a bruise on her cheek was caused by her spitting out and lying on her dummy, and accepted that he did not tell the mother at the time about the earlier red mark or his blurred vision. He also told the police that he was struggling at that stage, caring for both B and his wife, and was in need of support.

I heard submissions and I have carefully considered these when coming to my conclusions and writing this judgment even if I do not specifically address all points made. Very briefly they state the following:

The Local Authority: The Local Authority submitted that B sustained a serious and complex head injury while in the sole care of her parents, and that the evidence demonstrates that one or both of them must know how the injury occurred but they had failed to provide a full and honest account. It was argued that such a significant event would have been obvious and memorable, and that the inconsistencies and lack of clarity in the parents’ accounts cannot be explained solely by their cognitive difficulties. The father’s account of blacking out was said to lack credibility and was unsupported by medical evidence. The court was invited to find that the parents had lied, that the parents did know what happened to B and they were deliberately withholding that information from the court and the local authority for unknown reasons.

The Local Authority relied heavily on the medical evidence, which it submitted strongly pointed to a non-accidental cause. Experts described a highly complex skull fracture requiring substantial force, far beyond what would be expected in a routine domestic accident. While a fall from a carer’s arms was not impossible, it was considered highly unusual in this case. It was further submitted that B would have experienced significant pain and distress, which would have been evident to any reasonable caregiver at the time.

The Local Authority highlighted the parents’ varying accounts across different sources, including police interviews, medical histories, and court evidence. These included discrepancies as to what occurred, the father’s explanation of events, and differences in how the injury was described. It was submitted that these inconsistencies were material and indicative of a lack of candour, suggesting that the parents had not been truthful and may have been attempting to minimise or conceal the true cause of the injury. It was further submitted that, on the balance of probabilities, the father caused the injury and that the mother either knew, or ought to have known, and failed to take appropriate action. The Local Authority also relied on the parents’ delay in seeking medical attention, despite signs such as prolonged unusual crying, vomiting, and visible injury, which it argued would have alerted any reasonable carer to the seriousness of the situation.

Finally, the Local Authority pointed to wider concerns, including evidence of the father’s difficulties managing anger, aspects of domestic conflict, and issues relating to the home environment and care of the child. It submitted that these factors, taken together, supported findings not only of non-accidental injury and failure to protect, but also of domestic abuse and neglect, demonstrating that B would be at risk in the care of her parents.

The mother: On behalf of the mother, it was submitted that she had acted honestly throughout and did not cause B’s injuries, nor does she know how they were caused. Her position aligned with the father’s, including reliance on the possibility of an accidental explanation, which could not be excluded on the evidence. It was emphasised that there was no evidence the mother had any propensity for violence, nor that she was alone with B at the material time. The Local Authority’s approach was said to risk reversing the burden of proof and to proceed with a “tunnel vision” analysis, moving from suspicion to assumption and then to findings, rather than properly evaluating the totality of the evidence.

The Court was invited to adopt a cautious and structured approach, assessing the evidence holistically and in light of the parents’ cognitive limitations. Any inconsistencies or alleged inaccuracies in the parents’ accounts must be viewed in context, including the passage of time, vulnerability, and the risk of confusion or “story creep,” rather than being treated as deliberate lies. The Local Authority’s reliance on peripheral inconsistencies, police interviews obtained without appropriate safeguards, and historic or irrelevant matters (such as alleged domestic incidents or household conditions) was said to add little probative value. The Court was reminded that even if inaccuracies existed, they did not establish guilt and must be carefully analysed in accordance with Lucas principles.

In relation to allegations of failure to protect, it was submitted that these were not made out and must be approached with particular care. The mother’s actions must be judged in their proper context, including her physical condition, cognitive presentation, and the practical realities at the time. The evidence showed that once concerning symptoms became apparent, she acted promptly to secure medical attention. The Local Authority’s case was criticised for applying hindsight and for elevating welfare concerns into threshold findings without sufficient evidential basis or proper legal analysis.

Overall, the Court was invited to proceed step by step, considering the full evidential picture rather than isolated points, and to reject any approach based on speculation or assumption. It was submitted that the Local Authority has failed to prove its case against the mother on the balance of probabilities, and that no findings of causation, failure to protect, or dishonesty should properly be made against her.

The father: The father’s case was that he did not deliberately cause B’s injuries and made genuine efforts to assist the Court by giving an honest account, albeit one limited by his cognitive difficulties and impaired memory. He accepted that he could not fully explain what happened but maintained that he may have lost consciousness while holding B, leading to a fall. He emphasised that he had not attempted to mislead the Court and that his account reflected his genuine recollection as best he can provide it.

It was submitted that the burden of proof rested with the Local Authority, and that the father was not required to prove an alternative explanation. The Court was reminded to consider the totality of the evidence rather than isolating particular aspects, including the father’s cognitive presentation and the known difficulties he has with recall and detail. His consistency in maintaining that he blacked out, despite his limitations, was relied upon as supporting his credibility.

The father further relied on the medical evidence, which did not exclude an accidental cause. While such a mechanism may be unusual, it remained a plausible explanation consistent with the expert evidence. The father submitted that, if his account was accepted, the possibility of B sustaining injury during a fall from his arms could not be ruled out, and therefore the Local Authority could not meet the required standard of proof for deliberate infliction. It was argued that apparent inconsistencies or gaps in the father’s account must be viewed in the context of his cognitive limitations, vulnerability, and the passage of time. Any inaccuracies may arise from confusion, stress, or poor memory rather than dishonesty. The Court was urged to apply caution when considering alleged lies, recognising that errors or omissions do not equate to intent to deceive or proof of wrongdoing.

The father also submitted that there was no evidential basis for concluding that he lost control or had any propensity to harm B. Professional observations of his care had consistently been positive, and there was no history of him acting aggressively towards B. It was argued that reliance on isolated or historical incidents was misplaced and did not support a finding that he would deliberately injure his child. Further, the father contended that the Local Authority had adopted an unduly narrow approach, focusing on deliberate infliction arising from a loss of control without properly considering alternative explanations. He submitted that the evidence must be assessed holistically and that the Local Authority’s case failed to engage adequately with the possibility of an accidental cause.

In conclusion, the father invited the Court to consider all the evidence in the round, including his cognitive limitations, the expert medical evidence, and the absence of any clear proof of deliberate harm. He submitted that the Local Authority had not discharged the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that B’s injuries were deliberately inflicted, and accordingly such findings should not be made.

The Guardian: On behalf of the child, the Guardian submitted that the court must determine the issue of causation by considering all of the evidence in the round, including the parents’ accounts, their credibility and reliability, and the unchallenged medical evidence. The legal framework was agreed, including that the burden of proof rested with the Local Authority and that the Court should, where possible, identify a perpetrator, but may also conclude that the injury was caused by one or both parents within a “pool of perpetrators” or that the precise cause cannot be determined. The central question for the Court was whether it accepted the parents’ evidence as honest. If their account was accepted, an accidental explanation remained open. However, rejection of their account did not automatically justify a finding of deliberate infliction. The Court may instead conclude that the cause of B’s injury cannot be determined on the balance of probabilities, and that the parents may be withholding information, applying the Lucas principles with appropriate caution.

The Guardian highlighted a number of concerning features in the parents’ evidence. These included the unusual and prolonged nature of B’s crying, the lack of intervention by the mother despite hearing it, inconsistencies in the duration of events, and the father’s failure to inform the mother of his alleged blackout. There were also inconsistencies between the parents’ accounts and across different sources, including whether B was settled or unwell, and how events unfolded that morning. These matters, together with the absence of any explanation for the injury and the failure to recognise its seriousness, were central to the Court’s assessment of credibility.

In relation to causation, the Guardian submitted that the parents’ accounts must be evaluated in the context of all the surrounding evidence, including their vulnerabilities. However, there were aspects of the evidence that may be considered implausible, such as the father “blacking out” without appreciating its significance, or the mother hearing nothing of concern despite the baby monitor being on. The Court was invited to scrutinise whether these accounts were reliable and whether the parents’ explanations could properly be accepted.

The Guardian further raised concerns regarding the delay in seeking medical attention. Despite an unusual cry, visible marks, and subsequent symptoms, the parents did not seek immediate medical help, instead monitoring B and seeking informal advice. This was said to be inconsistent with their prior pattern of seeking medical care and may be relevant to the Court’s assessment of their responses and insight into B’s condition.

The legal framework resolving the schedule of findings sought is well settled and I will set out a summary here. All has been applied.

The core principles are summarised by Baker J (as he then was) in Re JS [2012] EWHC 1370 (Fam) and approved in many cases since.

“36.

In determining the issues at this fact finding hearing I apply the following principles. First, the burden of proof lies with the Local Authority. It is the Local Authority that brings these proceedings and identifies the findings they invite the court to make. Therefore, the burden of proving the allegations rests with the Local Authority.

37.

Secondly, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities (Re B [2008] UKHL 35). If the Local Authority proves on the balance of probabilities that J has sustained non-accidental injuries inflicted by one of his parents, this court will treat that fact as established and all future decisions concerning his future will be based on that finding. Equally, if the Local Authority fails to prove that J was injured by one of his parents, the court will disregard the allegation completely. As Lord Hoffmann observed in Re B:

"If a legal rule requires the facts to be proved (a 'fact in issue') a judge must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1."

38.

Third, findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence. As Munby LJ, as he then was, observed in Re A (A Child) (Fact-finding hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12: "It is an elementary proposition that findings of fact must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation."

39.

Fourthly, when considering cases of suspected child abuse the court must take into account all the evidence and furthermore consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. As Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P observed in Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558, [2004] 2 FLR 838 at 33:

"Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the Local Authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof."

40.

Fifthly, amongst the evidence received in this case, as is invariably the case in proceedings involving allegations of non-accidental head injury, is expert medical evidence from a variety of specialists. Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of medical experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. The roles of the court and the expert are distinct. It is the court that is in the position to weigh up expert evidence against the other evidence (see A County Council & K, D, &L [2005] EWHC 144 (Fam); [2005] 1 FLR 851 per Charles J). Thus, there may be cases, if the medical opinion evidence is that there is nothing diagnostic of non-accidental injury, where a judge, having considered all the evidence, reaches the conclusion that is at variance from that reached by the medical experts.

41.

Sixth, in assessing the expert evidence I bear in mind that cases involving an allegation of shaking involve a multi-disciplinary analysis of the medical information conducted by a group of specialists, each bringing their own expertise to bear on the problem. The court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise and defers, where appropriate, to the expertise of others (see observations of King J in Re S [2009] EWHC 2115bFam).

42.

Seventh, the evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. They must have the fullest opportunity to take part in the hearing and the court is likely to place considerable weight on the evidence and the impression it forms of them (see Re W and another (Non-accidental injury) [2003] FCR 346).

43.

Eighth, it is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720).

44.

Ninth, as observed by Hedley J in Re R (Care Proceedings: Causation) [2011] EWHC 1715vFam:

"There has to be factored into every case which concerns a disputed aetiology giving rise to significant harm a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown. That affects neither the burden nor the standard of proof. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the causation advanced by the one shouldering the burden of proof is established on the balance of probabilities."

The court must resist the temptation identified by the Court of Appeal in R v Henderson and Others [2010] EWCA Crim 1219 to believe that it is always possible to identify the cause of injury to the child.

45.

Finally, when seeking to identify the perpetrators of non-accidental injuries the test of whether a particular person is in the pool of possible perpetrators is whether there is a likelihood or a real possibility that he or she was the perpetrator (see North Yorkshire County Council v SA [2003] 2 FLR 849. In order to make a finding that a particular person was the perpetrator of non-accidental injury the court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities. It is always desirable, where possible, for the perpetrator of non-accidental injury to be identified both in the public interest and in the interest of the child, although where it is impossible for a judge to find on the balance of probabilities, for example that Parent A rather than Parent B caused the injury, then neither can be excluded from the pool and the judge should not strain to do so (see Re D (Children) [2009] 2 FLR 668, Re SB (Children) [2010] 1 FLR 1161).”

In Lancashire County Council v C, M and F (Children; Fact Finding Hearing) [2014] EWFC 3, Jackson J, after citing Baker J above, added this:

“To these matters, I would only add that in cases where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding injury and death, the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record-keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account. The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural – a process that might inelegantly be described as "story-creep" may occur without any necessary inference of bad faith”.

These comments are particularly relevant in this matter where the parents’ evidence and credibility are of great pertinence.

I also bear in mind Re U; Re B [2004] EWCA Civ 567 concerning the need for caution before drawing conclusions in cases of serious unexplained injury.

In Re A (Children) (Pool of Perpetrators) [2022] EWCA Civ 1348, King LJ re-emphasised that judges should apply the simple balance of probability standard when determining whether it is possible to identify a perpetrator from a list of those who could be responsible. In coming to a conclusion each person should be considered individually by reference to all of the evidence. Glosses such as 'straining' to identify a perpetrator should be avoided. The unvarnished test is clear: “following a consideration of all the available evidence and applying the simple balance of probabilities, a judge either can, or cannot, identify a perpetrator. If he or she cannot do so, then, in accordance with Re B (2019), he or she should consider whether there is a real possibility that each individual on the list inflicted the injury in question.”

In Y, V and B (Fact-Finding: Perpetrator) [2024] EWCA Civ 1034, Lord Justice Baker stated the legal principles to be applied when considering whether a perpetrator or pool of perpetrators can be identified. Having considered the authorities which explain how the attributability condition is S31(2) can be met by a pool finding, he stated this:

Paragraph 11 of Lord Baker’s judgment summaries the recent guidance on how a judge should approach the task of identifying whether someone is in the pool of perpetrators. That guidance had been given by Peter Jackson LJ in Re B (Children; Uncertain Perpetrator) [2019] EWCA Civ 575. At paragraph 46 of Re B, Peter Jackson LJ explained the purpose of the concept of the pool in these terms:

Then at paragraph 49, Peter Jackson LJ gave the following guidance:

Finally, Lord Justice Baker reminded us in Re Y, V and B that Peter Jackson LJ in Re B added these further observations:

In Re L-W (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 159 the Court of Appeal overturned a finding of failure to protect, where it had not been shown that on the particular facts of that case, a person should have identified a risk to the child. Lady Justice King stated:-

“62.

Failure to protect comes in innumerable guises. It often relates to a mother who has covered up for a partner who has physically or sexually abused her child or, one who has failed to get medical help for her child in order to protect a partner, sometimes with tragic results. It is also a finding made in cases where continuing to live with a person (often in a toxic atmosphere, frequently marked with domestic violence) is having a serious and obvious deleterious effect on the children in the household. The harm, emotional rather than physical, can be equally significant and damaging to a child.

Such findings when made in respect of a carer are of the utmost importance when it comes to assessments and future welfare considerations. A finding of failing to protect can lead a Court to conclude that the children's best interests will not be served by remaining with, or returning to, the care of that parent, even though that parent may have been wholly exonerated from having caused any physical injuries.

Any court conducting a Finding of Fact Hearing should be alert to the danger of such a serious finding becoming 'a bolt on' to the central issue of perpetration or of falling into the trap of assuming too easily that, if a person was living in the same household as the perpetrator, such a finding is almost inevitable. As Aikens LJ observed in Re J, "nearly all parents will be imperfect in some way or another". Many households operate under considerable stress and men go to prison for serious crimes, including crimes of violence, and are allowed to return home by their longsuffering partners upon their release. That does not mean that for that reason alone, that parent has failed to protect her children in allowing her errant partner home, unless, by reason of one of the facts connected with his offending, or some other relevant behaviour on his part, those children are put at risk of suffering significant harm. Similar points were made in G-L-T (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 717.

In Re A (A Child) [2020] EWCA Civ 1230, the limitation of oral evidence was once again highlighted and the courts warned to assess all the evidence in a manner suited to the case before it, and not to inappropriately elevate one kind of evidence over another.

In assessing the evidence, I bear carefully in mind the approach set out in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720. It is well established that a finding that a witness has been untruthful in some respect does not, without more, justify rejecting their evidence in its entirety or drawing adverse conclusions on the central issues in the case. Before doing so, the court must first be satisfied that any apparent untruth was deliberate, relates to a material issue, and is not capable of being explained by mistake, confusion, misunderstanding, faulty memory, or some other innocent cause. The court must therefore exercise caution before treating inconsistencies or inaccuracies as indicative of dishonesty, and must consider whether there are alternative and benign explanations for them.

I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Re H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136, where the Court of Appeal reminded judges in family cases of the proper approach to witnesses who tell lies as originally set out in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720. The case emphasises the need for particular care when evaluating the evidence of witnesses who may be vulnerable, including those with cognitive difficulties, learning needs, or those giving evidence in circumstances of emotional strain. The court in that case recognised that such witnesses may have difficulty in giving a clear, consistent, and coherent account, and that their evidence may contain discrepancies or gaps that arise not from any intent to mislead, but from limitations in understanding, memory, or communication. The decision underlines that credibility is not a single, simple concept: a witness may be honest in their intention to tell the truth, yet unreliable in their recollection of detail or sequence.

There are many reasons for this which do not denote guilt, for example, fear, shame, loyalty, panic and distress. An innocent person may lie to bolster their case. A lie should never be considered as direct proof of guilt. In criminal proceedings, to be capable of amounting to corroboration a lie must be deliberate, relate to a material issue and be motivated by a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The same principle applies here. This point was emphasized again in Re A, B and C (Children) [2021] EWCA Civ 451.

Taken together, these principles require the court to adopt a careful and balanced approach. It is necessary to distinguish between dishonesty and inaccuracy, and to avoid a mechanistic reliance on inconsistency as a measure of credibility. Apparent contradictions must be examined in their proper context, including the witness’s abilities, the nature of the events being recalled, and the circumstances in which the evidence is given. Where appropriate, the court may accept a witness’s evidence in broad terms, whilst exercising caution in relation to detail, particularly where that evidence is affected by recognised vulnerabilities or the ordinary fallibility of human memory.

I have also considered the recent case of Hayden J, Lancashire County Council v M, F, A & J [2023] EWHC 3097 where the judge found the father to be the perpetrator contrary to the submissions of the Local Authority and the Guardian after considering propensity. Hayden J addressed in detail the issue of propensity evidence and criminal matters at paragraphs 37 to 42 and in family matters from paragraphs 43 to 51. Mr Justice Hayden underlined the duty on judges to draw on the totality of a wide canvas of evidence and, where that evidence permits, to identify the perpetrator of significant harm. He reminded us that this evaluation is carried out on the balance of probabilities (nothing more, nothing less) and, while this builds in a risk of error, lawyers and judges should not shirk that obligation out of an abundance of caution. The wide canvas of evidence invariably includes a variety of evidence, including hearsay and evidence of propensity to cause harm. Drawing together that evidence and properly drawing inferences from it assists in building a picture of the family’s life at the point at which significant harm is caused. Identifying the perpetrator avoids tainting the non-perpetrator parent while also providing the foundations for constructive and safe strategies for a child’s future care.

The case of Re O and N (Minors) (Care: Preliminary Hearing); In re B (Minors) (Children) (Non-Accidental Injury) [2003] UKHL 18 is of course also relevant to the welfare stage if I am unable to identify the perpetrator. B would remain considered at risk even if the actual perpetrator could not be identified and my views would still be relevant in considering the welfare stage of proceedings.

I have addressed only particularly relevant matters. Nevertheless, all evidence has been considered and taken into account.

Each of the experts addressed the parents’ evidence where it related to injuries and I will summarise these before turning to the evidence of the parents. B was taken to hospital on [date] 2025 following parental concern regarding right-sided scalp and eye swelling, vomiting, and apparent pain when the right side of her head was touched. The events related principally to the morning of [date] 2025, when B was in the sole care of her father for a short period after waking distressed. The parents’ accounts, as recorded by multiple clinicians, consistently described the father claiming to have experienced blurred or double vision, attending to B in her cot, and later finding her on the floor, crying. The father does not recall a fall but accepted that he may have dropped her. The floor was carpeted, the cot had fixed sides, and there were no reported objects or toys in the vicinity. B was subsequently described as settling and appearing largely normal, aside from a small red mark above the right ear, until more overt symptoms developed the following day.

Dr Williams summarised in her report the history provided by both parents, taken from medical and child protection records. The mother reported that B woke screaming at 7.30am on [date] 2025, and that the father attended to her for 20 - 30 minutes while B screamed. Afterwards the father brought B to the mother; she appeared settled but had a small red mark on her right ear. No loud noises or bangs were heard by the mother. B later developed a low-grade temperature and vomited, prompting the parents to have her sleep in a travel cot in their room. After seeming normal the following day, B developed right eye swelling and pain after her Thursday morning nap, prompting medical advice to attend hospital. Father’s account, as recorded, was that he had double/blurred vision, picked B up, then later realised she was lying on the floor, though he was unsure how this occurred. In his own statement, the father described blacking out, waking on the floor with B beside him crying, then settling her and continuing routine care

Dr Olsen noted specifically that the father reported temporary visual blurring on the morning of [date] 2025, and that he could not explain how B came to be on the floor after lifting her from her bed.

Mr Lawrence set out the parents’ chronology of events for [date] 2025, noting that the floor was carpeted, with no toys or objects nearby, and that no drop was mentioned at the time by the father. B reportedly settled when brought to her mother and appeared fine initially. He noted that on 23 January 2025, B developed right eye swelling and pain following a late-morning nap. In his addendum report dated 11 October 2025, Mr Lawrence stated that the injuries suffered would be an unusual consequence of a simple fall from the father’s arms. He allowed that if the father fell while holding B, causing her head to be crushed between his body and a hard, unyielding surface, such injuries could occur. He emphasised that, given the severity of the fracture and swelling, B would have been expected to be in pain and distressed, with symptoms becoming apparent within 24 hours. He considered it likely that a carer present at the time would have appreciated that something significant had happened, even if swelling was not immediately obvious.

Dr Cardwell noted the history taken directly from the parents on [date] 2025 at the hospital. The mother reported waking at 7.30am on [date] 2025 due to B crying; the father attended but reported blurred vision. The father stated that he picked B up, then next remembered her lying on the floor, accepting that he may have dropped her, though he did not recall doing so. The cot had fixed sides, the floor was carpeted, and there were no objects or toys nearby. Mother recalled B appearing her usual self at 8am, apart from a small mark above her right ear, thought to be a rash, and stated she did not hear any loud noise and was not told of a possible drop. Dr Cardwell highlighted prior concerns about parenting capacity, including the mother’s limited mobility and lack of immediate support.

In her first statement, the mother stated that B slept overnight in her own bedroom and awoke at approximately 7.30am on [date] 2025 screaming, which was unusual for her. B’s last feed had been at 11.00pm the previous evening. The father attended to B and remained in her room for 20 - 30 minutes, during which B continued to scream. He then returned to their bedroom carrying B and a nappy bag. He handed B to her and she comforted her, and B settled. She recalled seeing a small red mark by B’s ear that morning but no bruise. On [date] 2025, B woke from a nap at 12.15pm, at which point the mother noticed that B’s eyelid was swollen. She contacted [name], who works with the health visitor, and was advised to attend A&E, arriving at approximately 2.00pm.

In the father’ first statement he stated that on the morning of [date] 2025, he was woken by the mother after she was woken by B’s crying. He went to B, who was screaming and crying in a manner unusual for her. He recalled picking her up, after which his next memory was waking up on the floor with B beside him. B was still crying, and he picked her up and took her into the parents’ bedroom. His next recollection was going downstairs, placing B in her highchair, and giving her a toy to play with. He stated that on the evening of [date] 2025, B was sick. On [date] 2025, after her morning nap at around lunchtime, they noticed that B’s eye was swollen.

Independent Social Worker, Gemma Williams, carried out thorough, balanced, and child-focused parenting assessments of both parents, including a specialist MALD assessment of the father. While she identified some strengths, she found significant and enduring vulnerabilities in both parents. The father had lifelong learning difficulties affecting his understanding, insight, and ability to retain information, alongside emotional instability and volatility. The mother had serious health issues, and their relationship was assessed as unhealthy, marked by dependency, conflict, and poor emotional regulation, undermining safe parenting.

Although both parents engaged with contact and showed affection, Ms Williams concluded these positives did not mitigate serious risks. The father could not recognise safeguarding concerns and would require extensive, ongoing support with little prospect of improvement; his behaviour posed a risk of harm. The mother was unable consistently to prioritise B’s needs. The home environment was unsafe, and the parents’ explanations regarding B’s injury lacked credibility.

The support network was minimal and insufficient. Ms Williams concluded firmly that B could not safely be returned to either parent, even with intensive support, as no realistic intervention could reduce the risks to a safe level. Her evidence remained consistent; she did not support reunification.

It was evident from the social worker’s evidence that the Local Authority had accepted Ms Williams’ assessment; indeed, it was her report that prompted a change from their earlier position prior to B sustaining her injuries, when they had considered that even a Child in Need plan was unnecessary.

The social worker’s evidence focused on the Local Authority’s assessment of the parents and care planning for B. Although the parents engaged with support, they failed to retain and apply learning consistently. However, the Local Authority’s work fell significantly below good practice. There had been no reassessment of the parents for nine months, and key elements were missing: proper planning for post-adoption contact, contingency planning if adoption failed, and a safety plan for any possible return home. There was also an absence of risk assessments, structured reviews, involvement from adult social care, and adherence to guidance for working with parents with learning difficulties.

The social worker became involved late, relied mainly on others’ reports, and lacked some appropriate training, support, and multidisciplinary input. Important recommendations from the Independent Social Worker were not implemented. Overall, his evidence highlighted serious shortcomings in the Local Authority’s practice and oversight, to the extent that the hearing could only proceed as a fact-finding exercise.

In her evidence, the mother asserted that B was her priority. She denied causing B’s injuries, could not explain how they occurred, and ultimately said that as she did not cause them then the father must have done so. She filed three statements and gave a police interview. I have already addressed much of her written evidence as it relates to the injuries earlier in this section.

My overwhelming impression of the mother when giving her oral evidence was that she was a straightforward and guileless witness. She appeared to be doing her best to assist the court and gave no impression of deliberate dishonesty or deceitful behaviour. This conclusion is based not only on demeanour, but on consistency with the overall evidential picture. On the contrary, her manner was open and unguarded. She did appear to be confused at times. However, I did not gain the impression that she was seeking to minimise or avoid any aspect of the matters under consideration. Rather, she appeared to engage carefully with each question put to her and to think when necessary, before providing an answer as fully and accurately as she was able. Where there were limitations in her recollection, these were expressed candidly. Overall, I found her to be quite a reliable witness who approached the giving of evidence with a genuine intention to assist the court. She became upset and unsettled when commencing her evidence and when the questions were about B herself, showing her love and affection for B which is not in question.

The mother’s oral evidence was consistent as to denial of causing injury or knowing how it occurred, her account of the events immediately before B’s presentation to hospital and the wider context of the father’s behaviour, their relationship, and B’s care. At the outset, she was clear and unequivocal that she had not caused any injuries to B and did not know how they had been caused. That position remained consistent throughout.

As to support and parenting input, the mother accepted that assistance had been offered and demonstrated an understanding of its purpose. Her position was that she preferred to manage independently but would seek help when required, which she had done to some extent through attendance at play sessions and engagement with professionals such as the Health Visitor.

Turning to B’s health, the mother described ongoing concerns including constipation, the passing of blood, feeding difficulties, and distress during feeds. She consistently attributed these issues to formula changes and maintained that she had actively sought medical advice, albeit with some delay in professionals accepting her concerns. This aspect of her evidence presented her as attentive to B’s health needs and willing to seek assistance.

In relation to the father, she described a single episode, occurring some months after B’s removal, in which he was found on the floor having potentially blacked out. He was conscious but confused, with no recollection of how he came to be there. She was unaware of any other such episodes herself but she thought that he may have blacked out once before they met when he had lived in a flat and the neighbours had heard something that could potentially have been a blackout. She couldn't remember when she heard about that from the father. This evidence provided limited but potentially relevant background as to the possibility of transient loss of consciousness from the father.

In respect of her relationship with the father, she described it as generally stable, with some arguments but no physical violence. She accepted that the father could be irritable, had on occasions shouted, thrown objects, and damaged property including walls and phones, but she maintained that such behaviour did not occur in B’s presence and did not lead her to fear for B’s safety. She did, however, acknowledge isolated inappropriate behaviour (such as telling B to “shut up”), which she recognised as wrong, albeit not indicative, in her view, of risk of harm to B as she was too young to understand.

Her account of the critical period preceding B’s hospital attendance was quite detailed. She described an unusual cry from B at 7.30am on the morning in question, which prompted concern, and explained that she sent the father went to attend to B due to her own back pain and limited mobility. The father remained in the room for approximately 20 minutes, which she accepted was unusual, although she stated she was not alarmed to the extent of intervening. She did not hear any fall or other untoward event for the father or B, nor did she observe anything via the monitor, which she accepted she was not watching at the time.

Following this, the father returned with normal demeanour and without reporting any incident. The mother described B as settling thereafter and presenting largely normally through the day, save for a small red mark on her head which later resolved and subsequent swelling to the eye the following day. She consistently maintained that she was unaware of any head injury and that her decision not to seek immediate medical attention for the red mark was based on her understanding that the symptoms reflected minor or unrelated issues (such as infection, temperature or teething). Her account of consulting others, including her stepmother and health professionals, is consistent with that position, albeit her recollection of precise timings and communications was at times unclear.

The mother denied any attempt to protect the father or to fabricate an explanation, and she rejected the suggestion that she had encouraged him to feign a seizure. She accepted some inconsistencies in her recollection, particularly in relation to conversations with others, which she attributed to confusion and the passage of time. She was clear and forceful in her evidence that the father had informed her of two possible mechanisms for B’s injury, being her head hitting the cot or being dropped. The first mechanism, the cot, was told to her both at the hospital and then also at the police station according to her police interview, where she said that the father said “I think that I may have knocked her head against the side of the cot, [as he’s got her out]”. She said that the father would be wrong to deny this and was clear that he had offered both as possible explanations. She was also adamant that she had had to tell him to be careful and less heavy handed when changing B, again his denial of this was wrong. These two issues stand out from the mother’ evidence both in the nature of her insistence but also there are few occasions where she was directly critical of the father where it related directly to B. More broadly, she described the father as a good and involved father, notwithstanding frustrations arising from the proceedings. She maintained that she had never been concerned that he would harm B. Both parents, she said, were shocked by the subsequent diagnosis of a skull fracture.

The father stated that he does not know how B was injured and denied deliberately causing her harm.

The father’s cognitive limitations were immediately and consistently apparent throughout the entirety of his oral evidence. The presence and assistance of an intermediary was not merely helpful but essential in enabling him to engage with the process to any meaningful degree. Having had the opportunity to observe him give evidence over the course of a morning, I readily understand, and indeed endorse, the decision of his solicitors to seek confirmation of his litigation capacity on more than one occasion.

Objective evidence of his functioning was provided by the cognitive assessment. In practical terms, this indicated that his functioning fell below that of 99% of the general population. This is an exceptionally low level of cognitive functioning and provided an important framework within which his evidence must be assessed. The conclusions reached by Dr Allen in his second report accord closely with my own observations of the father in the witness box. As Dr Allen noted, “whilst the father may appear, when his answers are reduced to written form, to demonstrate a degree of fluency and coherence, that impression is misleading. In reality, his oral presentation was hesitant, uncertain, and frequently marked by confusion and a lack of assurance.”

In evaluating his evidence, I am satisfied that the father does not possess the intellectual capacity necessary to engage in deliberate or calculated planning, he did not present as a witness capable of constructing or maintaining a false narrative. Rather, his responses were strikingly simple, often to the point of being rudimentary, and even limited increases in the complexity of questioning led to marked and sometimes acute confusion. This remained the case notwithstanding repeated efforts by counsel, with the assistance of the intermediary, to simplify and rephrase questions into the most accessible terms.

The father presented as polite, compliant, and cooperative throughout. He plainly sought to assist the court and did not appear to be obstructive or evasive. However, his ability to do so was significantly compromised by his cognitive limitations. He demonstrated a poor memory and a very limited level of comprehension of the questions posed to him as well as the subject of the questions. These difficulties persisted despite sustained efforts to adapt questioning to his level of understanding.

Importantly, whilst I did on occasion form the impression that the father was not being completely truthful, usually where inconsistencies arose, of which there were a number, they appeared to me to be attributable to misunderstanding, confusion, or a simple inability to process and retain information, rather than an intention to mislead. He frequently responded that he did not know or could not remember, but notably, he was not inclined to speculate or to fill gaps in his evidence with invented detail. This was a consistent and significant feature of his evidence. At the same time, there were occasions when he appeared to provide an answer simply in order to be helpful or to comply with the expectation that an answer be given, rather than because he had fully understood the question or had reflected on it. This tendency gives rise to a degree of caution in assessing even those answers he did provide. He demonstrated little to no appreciation of nuance or subtlety, and questions requiring any form of inference or interpretation proved particularly challenging for him. Even relatively straightforward questions could result in visible consternation, and his level of confusion increased as the morning progressed, necessitating increasingly frequent breaks.

The father did not have the benefit of a formal intermediary for his police interview and there were a number of inconsistencies in the evidence given to this court and to the police or hospital, such as him telling the police that he picked B up and put her on the floor, not mentioning a fall, saying that he put B in her cot afterwards. It is difficult to know what is the truth, particularly so when you consider the father extremely low cognitive ability being unknown to the police and his own criminal solicitor and the lack of intermediary at the interview. It, like all his evidence, must be approached with caution.

Cross-examination of the father was, unsurprisingly, extremely difficult for all advocates. The mother elected not to ask questions, and there were legitimate and continuing concerns as to whether the father truly understood what was being asked of him and whether his answers reflected his genuine recollection or were the product of confusion or misunderstanding. In practical terms, relatively little reliable detail was elicited from his evidence. That said, certain aspects of his account were of note.

In particular, his description of the events of the morning of the incident was broadly consistent with that given by the mother. He accepted that he had been annoyed at being woken and confirmed that the mother had asked him to attend to B, and that he had initially told her to do so herself because of his irritation. However, he stated that upon hearing B crying, described as an unusual cry involving both screaming and crying simultaneously, his concern was immediately engaged. That account, albeit limited in detail, was coherent and consistent with the mother’s description. I reject collusion as an explanation for reasons which I will address later. Beyond that, his recollection was extremely limited. He was clear that he could not remember the incident itself, stating only that he had picked B up and that the next thing he knew he was on the floor. He resisted any attempt to embellish or expand upon this account. Whilst he suggested at one point that B might have hit her head on the cot, I do not interpret that as an assertion of fact but rather as an attempt to be helpful by offering a possible explanation. In my judgment, that suggestion may well have been prompted by earlier discussions or instructions, including the request from his solicitors that he consider potential objects within the room that could account for injury and photograph them. His evidence in relation to events in the immediate aftermath was at times inconsistent. He thought that after picking B up he may have taken her downstairs and placed her in a high chair, but he could not really remember this. On such matters, the mother’s evidence was both clearer and more coherent, and I therefore prefer her account where there is a divergence.

In relation to his general behaviour, the father accepted certain instances of past loss of temper, including throwing a shoe at the mother (albeit some years previously) and damaging a phone and walls. These admissions were not minimised and broadly corresponded with the mother’s evidence. He did not try to minimise these events. He also accepted that he had received professional assistance in managing his temper prior to B’s birth. However, he denied ever becoming angry with B, including when she cried, and denied deliberately shouting at her or telling her to be quiet, although on at least one occasion he responded that he could not remember doing so. That response was, in my judgment, indicative not of evasion but of his general inability to recall events.

He did not deny having made certain statements in stressful circumstances, such as suggesting at the police station that B may have struck her head on the cot, but maintained that he could not remember saying them. He did recall telling the mother that he may have dropped B, but was clear in denying that he had ever thrown her and caused injuries.

A further matter of note is his account of his failure to inform the mother at the time that he had blacked out or fallen. When this issue was explored in cross-examination, he was unable to articulate any explanation, stating that the answer was “in his head” but that he could not express it. With the assistance of the intermediary, he subsequently provided written responses indicating that he did not believe B had been hurt and that he “thought nothing of it” at the time. This again reflects both his limited insight and his impaired ability to process events and their significance. It remains a surprising and concerning omission, not to mention it at all despite his level of comprehension, particularly when he was happy to explain about his blurred eyes and knowing B had been on the floor.

Drawing these matters together, I am satisfied that the father is a witness whose evidence is significantly affected by profound cognitive limitations. As a consequence, his reliability in terms of detail, chronology, and the accurate recall of events is limited. However, I do not consider him to be a wholly dishonest witness. On the contrary, his evidence was characterised by simplicity, a lack of embellishment, and a readiness to admit when he did not know or could not remember. Where his account is consistent with other evidence, it may properly be accorded weight. Where it is unsupported or internally inconsistent, caution is required: not because of any propensity to deliberately deceive, but because of his clear and substantial difficulties with comprehension, memory, communication and the Lucas factors.

The Guardian did not give evidence and agreed that the fact finding issue only should be considered at this time.

I now address specific findings, based upon a holistic evaluation of the whole of the evidence, application of relevant law including Lucas and H-C, and the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. I address the finalised threshold as provided by the Local Authority, this having been amended prior to submissions. The amendment was to substitute “caused” for “inflicted” in the heading of paragraph 1 and also at paragraph (k) thereof. I will not repeat the threshold again here.

Neither parent accepted the threshold as it relates to the injuries. In written evidence, they accepted the opinions of the experts but each denied responsibility. They each stated that they do not know how B sustained her injuries and both denied causing them. The only significant incident recalled by both was on Wednesday [date] 2025, when B briefly woke crying unusually but settled quickly once with her mother, B having a small red mark near here ear and being sick that evening but no other signs of injury were apparent until [date] 2025, when B woke from a nap with a swollen eye. The parents denied any delay in seeking medical attention. The mother accepted the medical findings but disputed that the injury would have been obvious earlier. She maintained B showed no symptoms prior to 23 January 2025. They accept that B has no underlying bone disorder.

Before setting out my detailed reasoning, I summarise my conclusions in brief. I find that one of the parents was responsible for causing B’s injuries; this must be so, as the injuries did not occur spontaneously. I am not satisfied, however, that the injuries were deliberately or recklessly inflicted. However, given the degree of force required, I am satisfied that they were caused in the course of handling that fell below the standard of reasonable care, although I cannot determine the precise mechanism or identify the perpetrator. Although there are features of the evidence, including the father having had periods of sole care, which might suggest greater opportunity, I am not able to make such a finding to the requisite standard. Whilst the medical evidence demonstrates that significant force was required, none of the experts excluded an unusual accidental mechanism. I have applied the approach in Re B (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator) [2019] EWCA Civ 575:

As well as being unable to determine the precise mechanism, I cannot determine the timing of the injuries clearer than [dates] 2026. There may have been another incident in the evening, or during the night, which has not been explained and which resulted in B’s unusual distress at 7:30am. Alternatively, there may have been a fall the following morning, involving either a blow to B’s head or a crushing-type injury. It is also possible that the injuries arose from some other, as yet unidentified, event.

I conclude that a responsible parent would have been aware of a concerning event involving B, although I am not satisfied that they necessarily appreciated the nature or seriousness of the injury at the time, and may not have communicated this to the other parent. The accounts given by the parents contain inaccuracies and inconsistencies which have had the effect of obscuring what occurred. However, applying the principles in R v Lucas and Re H‑C (Children), whilst some of these matters may have been deliberate and material, I am not able to conclude that they represent a calculated or sustained attempt to mislead. Rather, I am satisfied that they were significantly influenced by the parents’ individual profiles, including their cognitive limitations, vulnerabilities, and difficulties with memory and comprehension. I further find that “story‑creep” and suggestibility are also likely to have played a part.

I do not accept the Local Authority’s case that the parents have deliberately misled the court as part of a conspiracy or coordinated attempt to deceive. On the evidence I have heard and seen, I consider it inherently unlikely that either parent - particularly the father - has the cognitive capacity to devise or sustain such a plan over any period of time. To the extent that there are untruths or inconsistencies, I am not satisfied that they amount to deliberate fabrication, but are more likely to reflect confusion, vulnerability, fear and the pressures inherent in the circumstances.

In my judgment, the more likely explanation is that the parent responsible has not provided a full or accurate account of the incident, influenced by fear, panic, shock, shame, and their own cognitive limitations. In simple terms, something undisclosed occurred to B as a result of the actions of one of the parents; however, I am unable to identify which parent or the precise mechanism. I am satisfied that the injuries were not deliberately inflicted and did not arise from any loss of control. Any inaccuracies in the parents’ accounts are more properly understood within the range of explanations recognised in Lucas and Re H‑C, rather than as clear evidence of culpable concealment.

I will now expand upon my analysis.

I have carefully considered the medical evidence, which indicates that the injuries required a significant degree of force and that, in general terms, such an injury might be expected to be apparent to a reasonable carer. However, I must assess that evidence in the context of these particular parents. Both have extremely limited cognitive functioning, impaired insight, and difficulty processing events and their significance. In that context, I am not satisfied that what might ordinarily be apparent to a reasonable carer would necessarily have been appreciated by these parents at the time. This provides an important part of the evidential framework within which I assess both their accounts and their subsequent conduct.Whilst the medical evidence demonstrates that the injuries required significant force and are highly unusual in the context of a domestic fall, none of the experts excluded an accidental mechanism entirely. In particular, the possibility of a fall involving a point impact or crushing element, although unlikely, remained within the bounds of possibility. Accordingly, the medical evidence, whilst strongly suggestive, does not of itself establish deliberate infliction to the requisite standard.

The mother’s evidence presented as broadly consistent internally and aligned with a central theme: absence of knowledge as to causation and absence of intention to harm. Her account of events was detailed in parts but marked by some gaps and uncertainties, particularly in peripheral matters such as timing of communications. Those deficiencies are not unusual in recollections of stressful events but are nonetheless relevant when assessing reliability. The deficiencies were undoubtedly exacerbated by the mother’s psychological profile and cognitive abilities. Her evidence did not identify a clear mechanism for the injury but did introduce the possibility - albeit limited - of the father experiencing an earlier and indeed later blackout and exhibiting occasional dysregulated behaviour. At the same time, she firmly rejected any suggestion of deliberate harm by either herself or the father or indeed harm to herself by the father. My finding that the mother was a generally reliable witness does not allow me to exclude her from the pool. Credibility or reliability in giving evidence is not determinative of whether a person may have caused injury, particularly where the event itself is not witnessed and the issue turns on opportunity and mechanism.

Her decision-making following the appearance of the red mark and subsequent symptoms is explained by her asserted lack of knowledge of any injury. That explanation is coherent within her account, though it requires careful evaluation against the objective medical evidence and the chronology of symptom development. There is also no explanation as to why she allowed B to cry so hard in a manner which she had never previously heard for 20 minutes, with the father alone with B for such an unusually long period of time and without her even checking to see if all was well. This omission is both troublesome and concerning. Her failure to seek medical assistance when B was crying, had a red mark and even later vomiting contrasts with her seeking medical treatment for more trivial matters in the past and is unexplained. Even if she knew nothing of the injury, as she asserts, then it is notable that these cumulative issues did not result in a visit to A&E or even the GP. This is particularly so when the mother claims to have bought the travel cot due to simply a high temperature.

In assessing the mother’s evidence, I keep in mind the approach in Lucas and Re H-C (Children). he fact that a witness may be mistaken or inconsistent does not mean they are lying, particularly where there may be other explanations such as confusion, stress, or the passage of time. Overall, I found the mother to be a straightforward witness. She gave her evidence openly, accepted when she could not remember something, and did not appear to adjust her account. Her core position, that she did not cause B’s injuries and does not know how they occurred, remained clear and consistent throughout.

There were differences or uncertainties in her evidence, particularly about timings or conversations, but I do not consider many of these to be signs of dishonesty. They are more likely to reflect the difficulty of recalling events in stressful circumstances, which is consistent with the guidance in Lucas and Re H-C. It is also significant that she did not simply protect the father. She was prepared to give evidence that was critical of him, including what he had said about how the injury might have occurred. That lends support to her overall credibility.

Taking all of this together, I do not consider that inconsistencies in her evidence indicate that she was being deliberately untruthful. Rather, they were understandable in the circumstances. I regard her as a generally reliable witness, particularly in relation to the central parts of her account, although some caution is needed when looking at detail.

Her evidence to the police was that the father had told her that he may have hit B’s head on the cot or dropped her although she saw and heard nothing of this. I prefer her version of events as she was a more reliable historian than the father. Her statements were very clear and forcefully made that his denial of saying that B’s head may have hit the cot was wrong and I accept these, that the father gave two possible causes for the injury.

In summary, the mother’s evidence is characterised by a consistent denial, a detailed narrative of events, and a portrayal of both parents as non-violent carers, but it leaves unresolved the critical issue of causation and is subject to some limitations arising from incomplete recollection and reliance on assumption or accepting the father’s explanations rather than any direct observation. Either way, I am satisfied that there is no direct evidence that she was responsible for causing B’s injuries and her appearance and demeanour in the witness box as well as a complete lack of any propensity evidence of anger or abusive behaviour makes it unlikely. However, without a known cause, since I have no explanation as to even when, let alone how the injuries happened and taking into account the inconsistencies in her evidence, I find that there is a real possibility that the mother is responsible and thus she remains within the pool.

In assessing the father’s evidence, I also bear in mind the guidance in Lucas. and Re H-C. H-C highlights the need for particular care when assessing the evidence of a person with cognitive or intellectual difficulties. A witness in that position may struggle to give a clear, consistent account, and what might appear to be inconsistency or inaccuracy may well be explained by difficulties with understanding, memory, or communication rather than any intention to mislead. It is therefore important to avoid taking an overly rigid approach to credibility and to recognise that a witness may be doing their best to tell the truth but still get details wrong.

With those principles in mind, I approach the father’s evidence with great care. As we know, his cognitive ability is extremely limited. He had difficulty understanding questions, his memory was poor, and he became increasingly confused as his evidence went on. This remained the case even with the assistance of an intermediary and when questions were simplified as far as possible. In that context, there is a real possibility that differences or changes in his evidence were caused by confusion or misunderstanding rather than any attempt to mislead. That is precisely the situation contemplated in Lucas, where an apparent untruth may have an innocent explanation, and in Re H-C, where such difficulties are recognised as a feature of evidence given by a vulnerable witness. As mentioned, I am also conscious that the father’ police interview took place when his cognitive abilities were unknown.

I am not satisfied that any of the inconsistencies in the father’s evidence were deliberate or calculated lies. His evidence did not have the features one would normally expect from someone attempting to fabricate an account. On the contrary, he answered questions in a simple way, frequently said when he did not know or could not remember, and did not attempt to fill gaps in his evidence with speculation. He would also have had to maintain lies for over a year, something which I consider to be unlikely given his cognitive issues. Where he gave different answers to similar questions, I consider it far more likely that this was due to confusion or a lack of understanding than dishonesty. Consistent with the approach in Re H-C, I also take into account his limited ability to deal with nuance and sustained questioning. At times he appeared to give answers simply in an effort to be helpful, which again means that caution is needed when considering how much weight can be placed on particular responses.

For these reasons, applying the guidance, I do not treat the inconsistencies in the father’s evidence as evidence of dishonesty. Rather, they are better explained by his cognitive limitations, as recognised in Re H-C. They do not justify rejecting his evidence altogether or drawing adverse conclusions against him. That said, his evidence clearly has limitations. It must be approached with care, paying particular attention to whether it is consistent with other evidence and whether it fits with the wider picture. It is likely to be most reliable where it is simple, direct, and supported by other material. Overall, I regard the father as a witness who was doing his best to assist the court and who was not seeking to mislead. However, because of his cognitive difficulties, his evidence is of limited reliability, particularly in relation to detail, accuracy, and sequence. Any inconsistencies are better understood as a reflection of those limitations rather than dishonesty, but they do require caution when deciding how far his account can safely be relied upon.

Although the father has given two potential explanations for the injury, being from a fall (with or without a crushing injury) or B hitting her head on the cot, I cannot, however, say which, if either, was the cause of the injuries although neither could be ruled out in accordance with the medical evidence of Mr Lawrence and Dr Williams. A direct strike to the side of the cot when falling, a crush injury, or even a fall, however unlikely cannot be ruled out. Mr Lawrence stated “A fall from adult standing height/ carers’ arms can cause a skull vault fracture but the pattern seen here is highly complex and would be a very severe and unusual outcome from such a fall, if the fall is onto a flat surface” and “the scalp swelling, skull fracture and subdural haemorrhage were caused by trauma, likely by impact although a crush injury cannot be completely ruled out.”

During the relevant period, the parents were under a degree of pressure arising from their well‑documented vulnerabilities, including limited cognitive functioning, the mother’s physical health issues, and disrupted sleep affecting both parents. There are aspects of their actions, or inaction, which give rise to concern. In particular, the mother did not check on B despite hearing an unusual and prolonged cry, and the father did not report what he describes as a possible blackout or check whether B had been injured. Both parents noted the nature of B’s distress but did not seek assistance at that stage.

There are also inconsistencies in the parents’ accounts, including differences in their descriptions of events following B’s distress, the absence of reference to the possible blackout in earlier accounts, and a failure to recognise or report certain features subsequently identified by medical professionals. There were several examples of time differences in the mother’s evidence, including the time the father was alone with B in the morning, which may be significant, or may be genuine confusion but it is an inconsistency which is relevant to the timeframe. There are also differing versions of the provision of dummies and how many times the father told B to shut up, with her being adamant at court that it was only once but to the police the impression was more frequent. These matters raise legitimate concerns about the reliability and completeness of the accounts given and do affect their credibility. However, I am satisfied that they are capable of being explained by confusion, limited awareness, and the parents’ individual difficulties, rather than by deliberate deception.

A further matter of concern is the delay in seeking medical attention following the episode of distress, the presence of a red mark, and later vomiting. Taken together, these matters might ordinarily be expected to prompt parental concern. Although the parents did eventually seek advice, there was a delay from the initial events. While that delay is notable, particularly when contrasted with their previous readiness to seek medical assistance, it must be considered in light of their cognitive limitations and level of functioning. It is not possible to determine whether the delay reflects a failure to appreciate the potential seriousness of the situation, confusion as to what had occurred, or some other benign explanation.

The Local Authority relies on a failure to seek medical attention within the threshold. For the reasons given, I am satisfied that there was a delay which was not appropriate in the circumstances. However, I do not consider it possible to attribute that delay to any conscious awareness of the cause of B’s injuries. It is equally consistent with confusion, misjudgement, or the parents’ cognitive difficulties, but yet it is of concern. I remain unable to make findings as to causation or to attribute the injuries to a particular parent and applying Re L-W (Children), I am not satisfied that the mother (or father) had such knowledge, or awareness of risk, as would make a finding of failure to protect properly made.

In relation to the threshold finding sought in relation to domestic abuse/mental health I make no such finding. There is simply no evidence to support the same. To call the parents relationship “volatile” is a overstatement and not supported by evidence. Both parents stated that whilst they argued, they just had disagreements with no violence or fear and there is no cohesive evidence to suggest that this is not true, nor indeed that it is particularly different from many relationships, and more importantly there is no evidence of risk to B by these issues. Relying on isolated incidents of a push 4 years ago and throwing of a shoe (not even thrown directly at the mother according to the evidence of both, although it hit her) 3 years ago - which even predate B’s birth - and “father occasionally shouts and throws things” as the basis for this volatility and calling it domestic abuse is not made out on the evidence. Both parents were clear that if the father became upset, he moved away from the mother and B. There is thus no evidence that B was ever exposed to domestic arguments. I have nonetheless taken these matters into account as part of the overall evidential canvas, but they do not materially assist in determining causation. The threshold does not allege any specific, or even general, mental health concerns; that contention is therefore rejected. In any event, the two issues should not be automatically conflated.

Finally, regarding the Local Authority threshold, the finding regarding neglect does not address any actual risk or particular incident concerning B. Furthermore, the Local Authority themselves did not at the time, [shortly prior to the index events], consider that any statutory involvement with the family was required with knowledge of the home conditions. The Health Visitor reported that the father was listening to advice and reported nothing of concern about this in her report to the court. This issue, and the home conditions in general, are in my judgment more relevant to and would be better dealt with in the next stage of these proceedings when the welfare aspects are considered as part of the overall picture and at this stage I do not make any such finding.

This case is presently at week 64. It is now likely to be timetabled in due course to a date which means the proceedings will have lasted for in excess of 18 months. There are various reasons for this. There was the need to identify and obtain specialist independent expert evidence in relation to B’s injuries, and thereafter to address inconsistencies, ultimately leading to agreement of the medical evidence as well as clarifying the father’s capacity. Police evidence was also delayed.

This matter was originally listed for a composite final hearing on 3 December 2025 for 7 days. The Local Authority were due to file their final evidence on 31 October 2025 but on 30 October 2025 applied for an extension of time as the ADM was not due until 11 November 2025. It was hoped that this would not affect the final hearing, which remained listed. On 13 November 2025 the Local Authority applied to court to vacate the final hearing “due to recent positive viability assessments, which has changed the Local Authorities final care plan. Viability assessments were completed by a different social worker within the fostering team and the outcome was unknown to the allocated SW until after the hearing on 4th November.” A final hearing listing date 5 months later, after 21 April 2026, was sought. No proper explanation was required as to why the local authority was unaware of its own viability assessments or indeed why they had taken place as late as November when the earlier viability assessment was filed in July 2025. In the absence of any family placement or a return to the parents’ care, the likely plan for B would be adoption, so all options needed to be considered. Given the parents’ psychological profiles, there were real concerns that keeping the hearing and using it as a fact finding hearing only and thus having the parents cope with two separate lengthy hearings would simply be too much for them, so their advocates had no choice but to reluctantly consent to the delay. The order records “the reason for the delay is due to repeated litigation failures by the local authority and in particular a failure to make appropriate enquiries of extended family members as prospective alternative carers” and also “In the event of further non-compliance HHJ Hesford shall consider referring the case to the Designated Family Judge for noncompliance.”

There were other non-compliances with orders by the Local Authority. Paragraph 9 of the order of 13 November records that “the local authority final evidence shall address what if any safety plan could be put in place and what could be incorporated in such a plan to safely support the parents manage any identified risks.” It does not. There was a delay in the local authority accessing the ordered and required advocacy services for the parents between June 2025 and September 2025, despite agreed funding, for which the Local Authority accepted a learning need for themselves.

This hearing was to be a composite fact finding and welfare hearing. I have addressed in my very brief summary of the evidence of the social worker, the reasons why this became impossible. In summary, the reasons for the adjournment were those conceded in evidence by the social worker and quite properly and to its credit, by the Local Authority after consultation with management, namely (i) the failure to adhere to the relevant guidance/protocol from both the DoH and the Local Authority itself and (ii) the fact that the care plan failed to suitably engage with post adoption contact in line with the PLWG guidance. These issues together with the welfare aspects will be addressed in a further judgment at the conclusion of the proceedings. Sadly this means a further significant delay which will of course be harmful to B.

For the reasons set out in this judgment, I conclude as follows.

On that basis, I am satisfied that the threshold criteria under section 31(2) Children Act 1989 are met.

The matter must now proceed to the welfare stage. Directions will be given to ensure that the necessary further assessments and evidence are obtained so that the court can determine B’s long-term future without further avoidable delay.

This judgment will be anonymised and published in due course.

I await a draft agreed order for approval.