B E T W E E N:
X
Applicant
- and –
F
Respondent
IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published, but no other. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. |
Mr Will Tyzack (Counsel instructed by Dawson Cornwell, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Applicant.
Mr Charles Howard KC (Counsel instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
This case concerns the financial remedies proceedings arising out of the civil partnership dissolution between X and F.
At this hearing both parties appeared before me by Counsel. Mr Will Tyzack (Counsel instructed by Dawson Cornwell, Solicitors) appeared on behalf of X. Mr Charles Howard KC (Counsel instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers) appeared on behalf of F.
The court was presented with an electronic bundle running to 586 pages. I have considered all the documents presented to me, in particular I have considered:-
A collection of applications and court orders.
Material from X including his Form E dated 13th August 2024 and his witness statements dated 11th September 2024 and 8th November 2024.
Material from F including his Form E dated 4th September 2024 and his witness statement dated 15th October 2024.
A properly completed ES2 document.
Selected correspondence and disclosure material.
The application I have heard today was made by D11 by X dated 11th September 2024. It could properly be called an application for ‘Notice to Show Cause’ or a Dean application (see Dean v Dean [1978] Fam 161) or a Xydhias application (see Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] 2 All ER 386). These applications arise in cases where one party asserts that, in the aftermath of a separation, an agreement has been reached and that the other party should not be able to resile from it and that the agreement should be made an order of the court.
These applications come in a variety of shapes and sizes. I want first to say something about my understanding of what the case law tells us in general as to how the court should case manage and ultimately determine these applications:-
In some of these cases there is an issue as to whether or not there is an agreement at all. At one end of the scale the existence of a clear agreement will be pellucid and any opposition to the proposition of its existence will be unsustainable. At the other end of the scale the existence of an agreement will be highly controversial and capable of resolution only by full oral evidence and/or the full investigation of without prejudice correspondence. There may well be gradations between the two points. This issue arose, for example, in S v S [2009] 1 FLR 254.
In some of these cases it may be clear that the parties agreed a good deal of the matters in dispute, but there were some matters which were not agreed. The argument may then be about whether the unagreed matters were of sufficient significance to prevent an agreement being regarded as binding. This issue arose, for example, in Xydhias v Xhydias [1999] 2 All ER 386.
In some of these cases the issue may be whether or not there is a good reason connected to the formation of the agreement which should prevent an agreement being regarded as binding. In these cases the dicta of Ormrod LJ in Edgar v Edgar [1980] 3 All ER 887 at p.893 still provides the most authoritative guidance.
In some of the cases the issue may be whether or not an agreement which it is established has been made should be enforced at all as a matter of fairness in considering all the factors under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25. This issue arose in X v X (Y and Z Intervening) [2002] 1 FLR 508 and similar considerations arise to those which are encountered by the courts in dealing with pre-nuptial agreements after Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42.
Case management decisions on these issues are governed by a need to find a sensible compromise (consistent with the overriding objective under FPR 2010 Rule 1) between the principle that a financial remedies order can only be made after a proper evaluation of all the factors set out in Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25 (in the present case the equivalent provisions in Civil Partnership Act 2004, Schedule 5, Part 5) and the principle that in some circumstances the full court procedure can be abbreviated in the context of the objectives of “dealing with the case proportionately”, “allotting to a particular case an appropriate share of court resources” and “excluding from the trial lists unnecessary litigation”. These thoughts emerge, for example, from the judgment of King J (as she then was) in S v S [2009] 1 FLR 254. An abbreviated procedure is likely to be suitable where the identification of whether or not there was an agreement is likely to be achievable reasonably rapidly and where the agreement (if it exists) is likely to be a dominant feature of the overall assessment. The court must, however, be careful not to treat the identification of an agreement as a preliminary issue in isolation from a consideration of the section 25 (or Schedule 5, Part 5) factors: see Thorpe LJ in Smith v Smith [2000] 3 FCR 374.
The present case appeared essentially to fall into a combination of the categories referred to in paragraphs 5(i) and (ii) above and, with the above case management considerations in mind, I decided at the First Appointment on 17th September 2024 that an abbreviated procedure was appropriate in this case to consider the ‘Notice to Show Cause’ application and listed the application for a one-day hearing on 3rd March 2025. I made some directions for a limited amount of disclosure and valuation and for witness statements targeted at the ‘Notice to Show Cause’ application. I had in mind that a decision on the case could be made fairly on submissions without the need for any oral evidence. Indeed, the time estimate for the hearing did not allow for any oral evidence to be given.
I heard the application on 3rd March 2025 and had the benefit of full submissions from each counsel in their respective comprehensive notes and their oral submissions.
To understand the context of the alleged agreement I shall set out a very brief summary of the background facts:-
X is in his late forties. He was originally from Country A but moved to Country B in 1999.
F is in his late fifties. He was originally from Country C but moved to Country B in 1988.
They started a relationship of cohabitation in about 2005 in F’s property in City A and entered into a civil partnership agreement on 22nd February 2012.
In 2014, S, who was by then a fairly elderly (mid-80s) and wealthy lady in her twilight years, suggested to F that she would like to leave a substantial amount of money to him when she died. She suggested, as a means of avoiding Inheritance Tax, that they should marry each other. She was aware that he was in a relationship with X but may have been unaware that they were in a civil partnership. F discussed this with X and they agreed that it would be financially advantageous (though the extent to which a promise of sharing was made is in dispute) to dissolve their civil partnership to allow the marriage to S to proceed but to carry on their relationship. The civil partnership was duly dissolved on 2nd September 2014 but (it is common ground) the relationship of cohabitation carried on until it broke down in March 2018, when F and X went their separate ways and both of them formed new relationships with other men.
For whatever reason, the plan for F and S to marry never proceeded to execution, but they remained on friendly terms until S died in late 2018. As promised, she did leave a substantial sum to F. In very broad terms F received on his case (after the payment of Inheritance Tax) a large sum and he became a wealthy man in his own right. X believes he received rather more than he says; but nothing very much turns on this difference on this application and it may be that the higher figure does not properly account for Inheritance tax.
X always indicated that he wished to pursue a financial remedies claim against F, but such conversations as took place about its resolution did not reach a conclusion and the issue dragged on for a number of years until it came to a head in 2023. In the course of that period (2018 to 2023) the relationship oscillated between friendly and unfriendly, but it is common ground that F gave X approximately £450,000 (€506,260) in early 2023 to allow him to purchase a property in Country A and this was expressed in writing to be “part of the financial settlement” between X and F.
In the period between August 2023 and April 2024 there were a number of communications between X and F and it is, in essence, the case of X that these communications evidence a Xydhias binding agreement between them which should be made into an order of the court and from which F should not be allowed to resile. It is F’s case that these communications amount to a sequence of without prejudice offers which should not be interpreted as having given rise to a Xydhias binding agreement. I will need to analyse these in a little detail, which I shall do below. In any event, by April 2024 the parties’ positions had hardened and, in so far as they had previously been ad idem, they ceased to be.
The limited disclosure which has so far taken place suggests that, subject to a future argument, disclosure and valuation, the financial positions of X and F are broadly as follows:-
X | F | |
Total Net Capital Wealth | Somewhere between £318,800 and £421,176 | Somewhere between £10,413,119 and £15,204,142 |
Earned Income | £15,416 per annum gross | £27,500 per annum gross |
In analysing whether or not there was, at some point between August 2023 and April 2024, a ‘Xydhias binding agreement’ between X and F, I first need to identify what that expression means.
It emerges, of course, from the case of Xydhias v Xydhias [1999] 2 All ER 386. In that case the parties were negotiating via Counsel in the run up to a listed trial (due to start on 2nd September 1996) and the state of negotiations looked promising enough for the solicitors to write to the court listing office on 27th August 1996 to say that: “Heads of terms have been agreed between the parties and subject to agreement as to the terms of the proposed consent order and the giving of security by Mr Xydhias, the respondent, to underpin his proposals, matters are agreed. The three days will not now be required and, subject to Mr Xydhias’ counsel approving the final version of the order we will only need a short appointment next week to place the order before the court for consideration.” By the time of the now abbreviated hearing on 2nd September 1996, during which time the issue of security for the lump sums was never resolved, the husband changed his mind and withdrew his previous offers and indicated that the case would now be fought. There followed three years of litigation on the issue of whether he would be permitted to do that. Throughout that litigation, until the matter reached the Court of Appeal in 1999, it was assumed by both sides that in deciding whether the husband should be held to be bound, ordinary contractual principles applied.
The Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, which is recorded in the judgment of Thorpe LJ as follows (my emphasis included):-
“My cardinal conclusion is that ordinary contractual principles do not determine the issues in this appeal. This is because of the fundamental distinction that an agreement for the compromise of an ancillary relief application does not give rise to a contract enforceable in law….the purpose of negotiation is not to finally determine the liability (that can only be done by the court) but to reduce the length and expense of the process by which the court carries out its function. If there is a dispute as to whether the negotiations led to an accord that the process should be abbreviated, the court has a discretion in determining whether an accord was reached. In exercising that discretion, the court should be astute to discern the antics of a litigant who, having consistently pressed for abbreviation, is seeking to resile and to justify his shift by reliance on some point of detail that was open for determination by the court at its abbreviated hearing…Litigants in ancillary relief proceedings are subjected to great emotional and psychological stresses, particularly as the date of trial approaches. In my opinion, there are sound policy reasons supporting the conclusion that the judge is entitled to exercise a broad discretion to determine whether the parties have agreed to settle…The court has a clear interest in curbing excessive adversariality and in excluding, from trial lists, unnecessary litigation. A more legalistic approach, as this case illustrates, only allows the inconsistent or manipulative litigant to repudiate an agreement on the ground that some point of drafting, detail, or implementation had not been clearly resolved. Ordinarily, heads of agreement signed by the parties, or a clear exchange of solicitors letters, will establish the consensus…There are perhaps two lessons for specialist practitioners. The first is to distinguish clearly between the two stages of negotiation. The first stage is to establish what the applicant is to receive. That should be expressed in simple terms in heads of agreement signed by both counsel and their clients. All who appeared with, or against, the late Mr Jackson QC will remember that was for him a cardinal rule. The formality marks the conclusion of that part of the negotiating process, which the parties dominate. The subsequent task of expressing the heads of agreement in the language of an order of the court is one to which they ordinarily make little contribution”.
In the years since 1999, this statement of the law has become the established norm, and it cannot be doubted that this is the governing authority for the decision I now have to make. Ward LJ in Soulsbury v Soulsbury [2007] EWCA Civ 969 expressed some obiter doubts about the Xydhias decision by saying “one has to say that there are some who are critical of the cardinal conclusion that ordinary contractual principles do not apply to determine whether or not the parties had reached a concluded agreement” and he also expressed misgivings that the decision “has now given the Family Division a different and unique test for establishing the very formation of the underlying agreement itself. I mention these doubts, and I feel bound to say I share them, but the correctness of that part of the decision is not a matter which arises in this appeal and I need say no more”. Notwithstanding these expressed doubts, no other or later decision has sought to challenge the Xydhias orthodoxy.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no clear guidance from any reported authority of which I am aware as to the extent to which the Xydhias principles extend beyond the scenario of two lawyers negotiating in the run up to a court hearing, but there is no reason to believe that the principles do not apply in all scenarios, including to two litigants-in-person engaged in a scenario where there has not even yet been a court application, though perhaps in such circumstances the court will be more cautious about reaching the conclusion that the parties have “agreed to settle” and have “reached an accord”.
Perhaps equally surprisingly, there has been little analysis in any reported authority on what sort of issues remaining outstanding do or do not prevent the court concluding that an accord has been reached between the parties. In the Xydhias decision, it was suggested that things which do not prevent a conclusion that an accord has been reached are “points of drafting, detail, or implementation… the first stage is to establish what the applicant is to receive”. Further, in Pierburg v Pierburg [2022] EWHC 2701 Moor J noted:-
“[43] Xydhias is authority for the proposition that, in relation to agreements reached in the family law context, ordinary contractual principles do not apply. As the final award was always fixed by the court, the purpose of negotiations was to reduce the length and expense of the legal process. The court has a discretion in determining whether an accord has been reached. Moreover, even where an overall settlement had been agreed, there might well be issues remaining, for example as to the drafting or exact terms of the order, that the court would be able to determine without undermining the overall agreement”.
Gathering these together, the questions which need answering are:-
(a) Has it been established what the payee is to receive?
(b) Have the terms of the agreement been sufficiently clarified so that all that it is left to decide falls into the category of ‘drafting, detail or implementation’?
(c) Have the terms of the agreement been sufficiently clarified so that the court can determine the remaining issues without undermining the overall agreement?
Against this legal background, I need to look carefully at what happened in this case between August 2023 and April 2024 and make an assessment as to whether there is a Xydhias binding agreement here or just a series of without prejudice communications which never reached fruition.
In the period leading up to 19th and 20th August 2023, the negotiations between the parties had revolved around the payment of a headline lump sum (X wanted £3,000,000, F was prepared to pay £2,000,000) against which there would be some deductions representing certain payments that F had made directly to X (for example the £450,000 paid for the purchase of the Country A in the first half of 2023, but not necessarily limited to this) and certain expenses which F had incurred on X’s behalf (for example in raising a bridging loan to enable him to pay the £450,000).
It is common ground that there were oral discussions between F and X at Property A in County A on 19th August 2023 and again on 20th August 2023 in which the parties united around a headline figure for payment of £2,500,000 (as it happens, halfway between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000). The written statements differ as to whether there was a discussion on these occasions about the deductions from the now agreed headline figure. X says: “there were no further discussions on this day”. F says that there was a discussion about deductions but that “we did not agree any deductions”. Neither version suggests that there was a specific agreement about what the deductions would be, whether zero or a definite sum.
Things went quiet for a while after this until the parties met again on 30th September 2023 when F picked up X from Airport A. In a discussion in the car on the way back to County A, X asked F to put something in writing about what had been agreed in the August 2023 discussions. F was content to oblige and wrote a manuscript card on 5th October 2023 which he left for X to pick up at Property A . It reads:-
“Dear [X,] I agree to pay you a total sum of £2,500,000.00 two and a half Million pounds as a full and final settlement within the next three years ending 30 October 2026. This will include the monies provided for the purchase of Property B in [Country A] and other agreed amounts, and payments made, again mutually agreed. To be drafted and signed by both”.
This note is described by X in his witness statement in the following terms: “This, I accepted, accurately summarised what we had agreed”, meaning what they had agreed at the August 2023 meetings. If this was what they had agreed in August 2023, the wording used suggests that they could not have agreed in August that there would be no deductions and nobody has suggested that they agreed a positive and definite figure for what the deductions would be.
I remind myself that these were not lawyers talking to each other. Whilst both F and X had engaged Solicitors at an earlier stage, Dawson Cornwell for X and Raydens for F, they were not involved in the period between 19th August 2023 and 5th October 2023 and specifically not involved in the production of the 5th October 2023 card.
Not long after that, X re-involved Dawson Cornwell. On 24th October 2023 Dawson Cornwell wrote to Raydens saying:-
“Good news. We understand that following mediation with Philippa Donlan earlier this year, [X]and [F] have now agreed a matrimonial financial settlement. [F] has agreed to pay to [X] a sum of £2,500,000.00 in satisfaction of his financial claims against [F] ancillary to the dissolution of their civil partnership. The sum will be paid by way of a series of lump sums over the course of the next three years with the full sum having been paid by 30 October 2026. [X]would like this agreement to be formalised in a consent order and submitted to the court for approval and sealing. We are not asserting what your instructions are but we assume they coincide with ours because this email is based on a written communication from [F] to [X] If we are ad idem, we are happy to prepare a first draft of a financial remedy consent order and send to you for your consideration”.
After a number of chasers which did not prompt a substantive response, X became impatient and on 25th January 2024 texted F, saying: “Hello [F], I have nothing left in me to discuss. Please facilitate the details of your lawyer of choice otherwise my lawyer will go ahead on Monday”.
This did prompt some action and a response on 5th February 2024 as F texted back: “I am also meeting with Sarah Lucy Cooper at 10.30 on Wednesday morning and hopefully we can conclude things as quickly as possible after that. I am sorry it has taken so long and for the anxiety this and for the anxiety this has caused you. I hope you are feeling better”.
On 13th February 2024 F emailed X in the following terms, again not drafted by lawyers:-
“With the agreement, the advice Sarah has given me is to keep this as simple as possible. The agreement should have the agreed sum to be paid, the time frame and schedule of payments, and the % interest to be paid on the amount owing. The most important starting point is the agreed sum. This should be a fixed figure and not one which has unknown or still to be agreed deductions…We agreed on a sum of £2,500,000, to be paid in instalments by 30 October 2026, and that the purchase of the Property B was to be deducted from this amount …In order for you to have this amount last April, for you to purchase the property, I incurred the following additional…Total £77,830.28. I am not suggesting you should pay these additional costs, but I did incur these, and they should be considered. In 2023, I made additional cash payments to you of £33,980.00, which included £7,500 for your mother’s dental work, and £15,000 in November and December to pay for the transport and purchase of the stone floor tiles. I also purchased specific items for Property B at auction including, Buffet a deux corps, Curtains, Brass chandelier, White painted bed, White painted linen press/cupboard, Painted cupboard, Four poster bed, Pink rug, Paintings. Again, I am not expecting you to pay for any of the above or the rest of the items that were shipped to Country A. I would suggest and hope that as my costs above are in the region of £120,000, we can agree that £50,000 costs, together with the £450,000 I transferred to Country A, giving a total of £500,000, can be subtracted from our agreed figure of £ 2,500,000. This will give us a settlement figure of £2,000,000 to be written into an agreement. This would be paid in instalments of not less than £500,000 per year, with the final payment to be made by the 30 October 2026. I would hope to do this sooner if I am able to. In addition, 2.5% interest per annum will be paid to you. On £2 million, this is £50,000 per year, and can be paid
monthly or quarterly, whichever you prefer. Please let me know your thoughts on the above, and if agreeable, the agreement can be drafted”.
On 19th February 2024 Raydens followed up the email from their lay client which purported, under the cover of a formally headed without prejudice letter, to put forward a properly drafted ‘Heads of Agreement’ document formally reflecting what had been informally set out in the email.
On 28th February 2024 Dawson Cornwell responded formally in the following terms:-
“Thank you for your letter of 19th February together with the draft Heads of Agreement. We are unclear why you mark it as “Without Prejudice” when plainly all the discussions about the fundamental terms of the agreement have been open and essentially we are dealing with timing and implementation which [F] has also covered in open emails. Accordingly, we will conduct the exchange in open correspondence.
…
there does seem to be an element of salami slicing with the change in designation of
certain types of payments and indeed ascribing to [X] responsibility for certain expenses that [F] incurred (in raising the monies for making the first instalment payment for example) which are not [X’s] responsibility. The expenses associated with the arrangements [F]makes to fund the payment of the settlement fall to him.
…
The heads of terms does therefore need some thought because:-
a) The lump sums will be:-
I. £700,000 by 1st October 2024;
II. £700,000 by 1st October 2025; and
III. The balance being £667,300 by 1st October 2026.
b) [X] will continue to reside at [Property A]e until the first lump sum of £700,000 is paid.
c) The agreement [X] and [F] reached after many months of delay was made in
September 2023. You are saying that interest on outstanding sums due should only run
with effect from the making of any Order. [X’s] view is that when they reached the
agreement in September 2023 [F] obliged himself to pay these monies and that he
should not benefit from the delay, concerns about which we have raised on various
occasions, in the meantime (and for which [F] has actually apologised about to [X] directly). Accordingly [X]says yes but interest should run from 1st October 2023;
d) The proposed interest rate of 2.5% is probably half of what [F] would earn for putting the money on deposit or even at a building society. The Bank of England rate is 5.25% the Judgment rate would be 8%. [X] therefore seeks a rate of interest which matches the Bank of England rate. For the avoidance of doubt, interest will run as follows:-
i) On the outstanding balance of £2,067,300 at a rate of 5.25% per annum until 1st
October 2024 when the first lump sum is paid.
ii) On the outstanding balance of £1,367,300 at a rate of 5.25% per annum until 1st
October 2025 when the second lump sum is paid.
iii) On the outstanding balance of £667,330 at a rate of 5.25% until 1st October 2026
when the final lump sum is paid.
If any of the lump sums are late, then interest on that specific lump sum will be payable at 8% per annum from the date of default until it is paid Interest of 5.25% will continue on the remaining lump sums until paid.
e) Therefore, despite when this agreement was reached, as [F] proposes it means there is no payment in 2024. [X] is saying, not unreasonably, the first payment of £700,000 should therefore be made by 1st October 2024, the 2nd payment by 1st October 2025 and the balance sum which would be £667,300 to be paid by 1st October 2026.
f) When substantial payments are being made over an extended period, it is common to identify some security for those payments for a variety of reasons, one being what happens in the unfortunate event that [F] pre-deceases [X] and significant sums are still outstanding. [X] therefore seeks that [F] agree to both of the following:-
I. to take out a life insurance policy. It would only have to be for a limited term.
II. provide security over one the three properties which he does not own jointly with
his co-beneficiary.
In terms of chattels:-
(a) [X], in addition to retaining the furnishings that he now has had transferred to [Country A], would like to retain the contents of [Property A]. He understands that [F] has a particular affection for the red sofa which he is happy to swap with the brown sofa at [Property A]
(b) Also, [X]would wish to retain the Range Rover at no cost to himself which he uses in the course of his employment, indeed his view is that the parties have always had an understanding that the car would be his to keep for this reason.
(c) have returned to him his three cartier watches and his wedding ring.
Accordingly, we return the draft Heads of Agreement annotated in tracked together with a clean copy.”
Raydens’ response dated 12th April 2024 made it clear that F rejected the X proposals and had substantially changed his position, now offering only approximately £1,000,000 rather than the £2,000,000 previously offered. On 19th April 2024 Dawson Cornwell responded, asserting that F was Xydhias bound by the agreement “reached on 5th October 2023”. Ill-feeling broke out, and proceedings under the Family Law Act 1996 in the Family Court were taken and cross-undertakings given, including in relation to the occupation by X of Property A. Sadly, such goodwill as had existed in August to October 2023 was gone and it has not returned.
Mr Howard has, on behalf of F, invited me to analyse these events in one way and Mr Tyzack, on behalf of X, has invited me to analyse them in a contrary way. My conclusions are as follows:-
In answer to the question “Has it been established what the payee is to receive?” my answer is a clear ‘no’. At no stage has the sum to be paid reached the point where an objective observer could say with certainty that it is agreed that F will pay X an identified or identifiable sum. The headline figure of £2,500,000 was agreed, but the deductions from it were never agreed. Indeed, it is plain from the correspondence that there was a substantial difference between the parties’ views on what the deductions should or might be. F was prepared to compromise at £50,000; but had done calculations suggesting that he could have contended for more than £300,000. X was not prepared to deduct anything.
In answer to the question “Have the terms of the agreement been sufficiently clarified so that all that it is left to decide falls into the category of ‘drafting, detail or implementation’?”, again my answer is a clear ‘no’. Thorpe LJ in Xydhias thought, arguably controversially, that the issue of security was merely an implementation issue or a detail, but in this case the correspondence reveals that the parties were significantly apart on a number of issues: the timing of instalments, the rate of interest pending payment, the commencement of the payment of interest, the date for X to vacate F’s property at Property A, Chattels, and the execution of a life insurance policy to secure the payments in the event of GW’s death. I do not accept Mr Tyzack’s submissions that these, certainly cumulatively, but perhaps also indeed individually, fell into the category of ‘drafting, detail or implementation’.
In answer to the question “Have the terms of the agreement been sufficiently clarified so that the court can determine the remaining issues without undermining the overall agreement?”, again my answer is a clear ‘no’. My view is that F is entitled reasonably to say that if the disputed issues were resolved against him that would, certainly in his perception, undermine the attractiveness of the overall agreement.
It follows that I have reached the conclusion that I must dismiss the application by X for ‘Notice to show cause.’ I am willing to receive submissions in writing from Counsel on the costs consequences of this decision. I would hope that the parties might take the opportunity to see whether this can be agreed and, if not, to make the submissions reasonably promptly.
This leaves the question of what should happen next in this case.
I take the view that the appropriate next step is to hold an FDR and I am inclined to think that this should be done at the earliest opportunity without another bout of questionnaires and valuation directions and no doubt escalating costs. My feeling is that there is enough known about the facts, and with sufficient clarity, to enable an FDR tribunal to give a clear steer as to how the case should be settled. This could be a private FDR if both parties agreed. I am thinking that in any event this should not be before me as a fresh pair of judicial eyes is probably appropriate given that I have made a substantive decision in the case. I am willing, however, to receive written representations on any of the above if there are contrary views on the merits of proceeding in this way. Again, I would hope that the parties might take the opportunity to see whether this can be agreed and, if not, to make the representations reasonably promptly.
If the case cannot be settled at FDR then there will almost certainly need to be a post pFDR directions hearing. My view is that all the negotiation correspondence (save where it is expressly marked as being open) should be regarded as being without prejudice and should not be admissible at an open hearing (this would not apply at the FDR). Even though F did not, for example, mark the 5th October 2023 card with the words ‘without prejudice’ it is still a without prejudice communication as a matter of law. Thus, whilst it was appropriate for me to see the without prejudice correspondence to determine whether an agreement had been reached, the majority of the correspondence I have referred to above should not be admissible before the judge dealing with the post pFDR directions hearing or the final hearing itself. The authority for this proposition is the House of Lords decision in Rush & Tomkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280. It follows that I should not be involved in the case again and some careful editing of the bundle will be necessary to ensure the judge dealing with it is not made aware of the privileged material.
I will be sending out this judgment by email on the afternoon of 7th March 2025. This should be regarded as the handing down of the judgment for the purposes of calculating the appeal period.
This is my decision and I invite Counsel to produce a draft order which matches these conclusions.
After receiving representations on this from the parties’ legal representatives, I have decided to arrange for the publication of this judgment on TNA / BAILII with some anonymisation and redaction agreed by both sides. I can only do this when the case has reached its conclusion and a final order made. (Footnote: 1)
With the approval of Peel J, I certify that this judgment may be cited in accordance with the Practice Direction on the Citation of Authorities [2001] WLR 1001 and Guidance given by the President of the Family Division dated 24 February 2025 under the heading Citation of Authorities: Judgments of Circuit Judges and District Judges.
HHJ Edward Hess
Central Family Court
7th March 2025