Derbyshire County Council v A Mother & Ors

I am asked at this hearing to make final public law orders in respect of three little girls, [BB], who was born in December 2023, the youngest of a sibling group of four, [CC], who was born in February 2023, the next oldest in age, and [AA], who was born in 2021. The application was originally issued in respect of these three little girls and their older half-brother, [GG], whose proceedings came to an end earlier this year. The mother of these three children, but not of [GG], is [M]. She is present and represented in court. The father of all four children is [F]. He is present at this part of the hearing, and is also represented. The children all have the benefit of a Guardian, Ms Wild, and she is represented too.

The background to this matter is that the local authority had involvement with the family over a reasonable period of time, culminating in an application for interim care orders in respect of the four children who were originally subject to the proceedings in May of 2024.

So that is the background to the proceedings. The history of concerns about the parents, that is [M] and [F] - I am going to refer to them as mother and father - is that there was a number of concerns about substance misuse, serious incidents of domestic violence, and also mental health issues. I have reminded myself in the course of this hearing as to the reasons why proceedings were issued, and matters are summarised and set out within an agreed composite threshold document, dated 26 November 2024, and that appears within the bundle I have before me. It is important to set out that within that document, [M] is referred to as the Second Respondent, and [F] is the Third Respondent.

In relation to events before the issue of proceedings, to which I briefly return, [BB], the youngest of the sibling group, was born in December 2023, about six months or so before the issue of proceedings. In January 2024, [M] and [F] separated, and he moved out of the family home. The trigger incident for the issue of proceedings was alleged injuries to [CC], who was then aged one, although that finding was ultimately not pursued, a matter which the court had oversight of. It is against the background of the concerns that I have already outlined, and in particular, a high level of continuing domestic abuse between the mother and the father, which continued beyond their separation in January.

So interim care orders, as I have said, were made in respect of all four children on 2 May 2024. I remind myself of their ages at that stage. [GG] was seven, [AA] was two and a half, [CC] was one, and [BB] was approximately four months. As I have indicated, [GG] moved to the care of his [MGM], and has lived separately from his half-sisters since then, remaining in that placement, now subject to a special guardianship order. The three younger girls who are the subject of today’s hearing, were placed in foster care, all together, and that remains the case today. A number of assessments, both of the parents and also of connected persons, have taken place along the way of these proceedings, which are now in their 14^th month, week 62, I think it is. The matter has been listed for a contested hearing, with a time estimate of three days, starting on Monday of this week, and then going into Wednesday and today, which is Thursday 10 July.

The positions of the parties are as follows. The local authority seeks care and placement orders for all three girls, and says nothing else other than adoption will do. That is a position which has the broad support of the girls’ Guardian. In relation to the mother’s position, her position throughout all of these proceedings, has been that she has been vigorously fighting to have the children returned to her care, but on day one of this hearing, her counsel asked for an indication from the court, as to the likely prospect of the court ordering a return to her care.

At the request and agreement of all parties, the court gave some preliminary observations, in the presence of all parties, including the mother, and those observations will, of course, stand on the record and on the tape in the usual way. Although the court was clear there were a number of positives, and the mother had sought out help, and made some efforts to try and effect change, she is still someway off being able to provide safe and reliable care for [AA], [CC] and [BB]. The mother was given some time to consider this with her counsel, and on reflection, her position changed to one where she is no longer pursuing a positive case to resume immediate care for the girls, although she has made it very clear that she wishes to be reassessed if a permanent home for them has not been identified within 12 months.

The local authority agrees to do so. [M]’s avowed intention is to continue to build on the changes she started to make. It is a brave, realistic, and child-focused decision for which I have already commended her, and I do so again, formally. I can see from observing [M], not just today, but at other stages of this case, that she has got a huge amount of love for her children, and she is, understandably, emotional in court. [M] has made it very clear she does not agree to a care plan of adoption, and that, of course, is her right. She is not advocating any lesser plan, as we might call it, such as long-term foster care for them. She is of the very firm belief that her little girls should remain together in any placement. So that is [M]’s position.

The position of [F], he accepts, and indeed, accepted at the pre-hearing review of this matter, that he is not in a position to care for his daughters, himself. He is currently facing a trial for dangerous driving, unrelated to any matters before the court today, for which, if convicted, I am told, he may receive a custodial sentence. I do not have a final statement of evidence from him, but I have a helpful position statement, which his counsel confirmed in his presence, with him at court, on Monday, and indeed, that is a position which was known to the court at the pre-hearing review. I am told he was not well on Monday, and so left. He did not attend when the hearing resumed yesterday, and has now attended for this judgment. No one suggested during the course of this week’s hearing, that I should do anything other than continue with the hearing. It is clear to me, and has been well expressed on his behalf, that [F] loves his daughters. He would support a return to the mother’s care, if the court were to agree to that. He considers, like the mother, that the girls should remain together, and should not be separated, and again, he does not agree to a plan of adoption either.

The Guardian’s position. Ms Wild has been a constant throughout these long-running proceedings. She supports, in broad terms, the making of care and placement orders, but with some important matters or caveats which should be outlined. Firstly, the Guardian says there should be a time limited search for placements for adoption of 12 months. The local authority were originally saying six months. Secondly, she is emphatic that the girls should not be split as a sibling group. The local authority propose that if an adopted placement for all three did not materialise, that they should split them, and they have proposed different combinations about that along the way.

Thirdly, the Guardian says that if adoption by way of a placement for all three does not materialise, the plan should change to long-term foster care of all three in one placement. Fourthly, she is firmly in favour of the girls’ maintaining ongoing contact of a direct nature with their elder brother, [GG], post adoption. She invites the court to make a Section 26 order pursuant to the provisions of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, for the girls to have that contact, and says it should be four times a year in frequency as a minimum. The Guardian’s position is one supported by the mother and, as I understand it, also by the father, in the event a placement order were made, notwithstanding that they do not agree to placement orders.

Given the change of position from the mother and those matters being put forward by the Guardian on Monday, the local authority were given some time to consider their position, and I understand that a legal planning meeting took place. The case was not listed to be heard on Tuesday, and so we reconvened on Wednesday, and there was some shift in the local authority’s position. They told me that they would search for an adoptive placement for three children together for 12 months. They would agree to reassess the mother at that point. They also proposed that they would undertake a reassessment of the siblings, namely a further together and apart assessment. However, their plan would be to separate [BB] off, and that was not a position that was resiled from, as I understand it, and to place her separately from her sisters for adoption. The local authority did not agree to a Section 26 order being made, but they have a plan of contact for [GG] and the girls, they would reduce the girls’ contact with [GG] to every two months, and then to six times a year before any placement of the girls took place. They would then invite the adopters, once identified and placed, to explore direct contact between the girls and [GG], twice a year. So it would be an invitation and not an order. It can be seen from that that the issues have narrowed to some extent.

Originally, a number of witnesses were down to give oral evidence, and a witness template had been approved. That envisaged that the social worker, Ms Bellfield, the family finder, Ms Best, who had provided a statement, the mother, [M], and the Guardian, Ms Wild, were down to give oral evidence. After some discussion and the court gaining an understanding of the evolving positions of the parties, the parties agreed that Ms Best, the family finder, was not required, and she was stood down. It was further agreed that the remaining issues could be dealt with by way of submissions. That was a course that the court favoured after hearing from everybody as to the position about Ms Best, in the light of the dispute about post-adoption contact.

I had the benefit of detailed and comprehensive submissions from all parties on Wednesday, largely focusing on the scenario and what the court should do if a placement order were made. So that related to keeping the children together, contingency planning, whether to separate them, and sibling contact with [GG], including whether or not the court should make a Section 26 order in the event that it made a care and placement order.

I turn, now, to the applicable legal principles. The law for making a care order is, of course, set out within Section 31 of the Children Act 1989. If a care order is to be made, the court has to find that the Section 31(2) criteria are satisfied in respect of the children, in other words, that the children are suffering or are likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care of the parents. I have already set out that I previously approved the document which appears at A59 of the bundle, dated 28 November 2024. In addition, I have got to consider the welfare checklist, which, in this case, given that a placement order is sought, is enshrined within Section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. The no order principle set out within Section 1(6) of that applies, which means that when a court is considering whether or not to make an order, it shall not make the order unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child making no order at all. What that means is that the level of state intervention should be no greater than is necessary to secure the child’s welfare, and because this falls within the 2002 Act, it is the welfare of these three little girls which is paramount throughout their lives.

The court’s task, overall, is to evaluate all of the options, undertaking a global, holistic and multifaceted evaluation of the children’s welfare, which takes into account all the negatives, positives, all the pros, and all the cons of each option. What is required is a balancing exercise, and each option has to be considered side by side. Any linear approach would be wrong, and the court’s got to evaluate proportionality. Additionally, I have got to have regard to the Article 8 rights of each of the parents and each of the children, and must endeavour to arrive at an outcome that is both proportionate and in the children’s best interests.

A cardinal principle is that the local authority works to support and eventually reunite the family, unless the risks are so high that the children’s welfare requires alternative family care. I have got to have regard to the no delay principle, and I have got to look at the realistic options. At the start of this hearing, those appeared to be adoption or reunification to their mother. The father had conceded he, himself, was not a realistic option for long-term care of the girls, and the mother, as I have set out, conceded that she does not seek an immediate return to her care, although wishes to be reassessed. No-one has actively recommended to me a primary plan of long-term foster care for these girls, who are aged, very nearly four, in [AA]’s case, two in [CC]’s case, and one and a half in [BB]’s case, albeit I have been addressed as to contingency plan of long-term foster care.

I have been taken, during the course of the parties’ submissions, to the relevant sections of the Public Law Working Group Adoption Subgroup Report headed “Recommendations as to Best Practice in Adoption.” That dates from November 2024. I have also been taken to the relevant case law on post-adoption contact. That is Re D-S (A Child: Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 948, Re R [2024] EWCA Civ 1302, and - hot off the press - the authority of Re S (Placement Order Contact) [2025] EWCA Civ 823. That is a decision of the Court of Appeal, with the President giving the judgment on 1 July, which is approximately a week before this hearing commenced, and some very important matters of principle were set out there, to which I will return.

I have got a large bundle, running to just shy of 1300 pages, and some additional documents to which I referred at the start of the hearing. I have considered all relevant documents. Those include, but are not limited to, a psychological assessment report of [M] by Dr C, dated 14 August 2024, and an addendum dated 22 November; I have got two together and apart assessments of the four children, the most recent of which is dated 4 September 2024; I have got a number of assessments and social work statements, including a final social work evidence template from Ms Bellfield, who has been the allocated social worker throughout, her most recent one, the final statement, is dated 23 May; I have had reference to all of the statements filed on behalf of [M] and [F]; and I have also seen a statement from Ms Best from May 2025, of the adoption family finding service; a statement from the independent reviewing officer, which does not, I think, appear in the bundle, but which I have read; and I have seen three reports from the Children’s Guardian, an initial analysis, a substantive analysis in respect of [GG], and her more recent one dated, I think, 4 July, for the girls. I have also had the benefit of having conducted, I think, every hearing in this matter. There have been several hearings along the way, given that they have been lengthy proceedings. I have also been taken to relevant sections of the material and the law by the advocates in their submissions, and reminded of the history of this case.

There have been a copious number of family members who have been put forward and considered. I am grateful to Ms Bellfield for summarising this within a useful grid in her statement, dated 4 July. It is accepted that there are no viable family placements. I have reminded myself that when I concluded [GG]’s proceedings on 30 January of this year, there were a number of important recitals, which I approved in relation to his order, and they also were pertinent as to the girls, and in particular, at B146, the court recorded that the local authority would continue to facilitate sibling contact between the three girls and [GG], in line with the recommendation of the Children’s Guardian, and that [GG]’s [MGM] and special guardian would be invited to join such contact once a month, at least, to experience the quality of the relationship, and that she had confirmed her commitment, and accepted the importance of that. There was also a confirmation that the plans for long-term sibling contact would be set out in final evidence in respect of the girls, and that [NN], as [GG]’s special guardian, would be consulted on that matter. That was in the context of the parties having some reservations about [GG]’s proceedings concluding separately from the girls, a matter which, therefore, the court took care about, and considered at that hearing, given that he would no longer be a subject child.

I now just turn to the position on the ground, because it is important just to set out for context, that [GG] sees his mother, who is not the mother of these children, of course, and his father, [F], who is the father of these children, once a fortnight, as well as seeing his sisters once a fortnight. I have been taken in her submissions, by the solicitor for the Guardian, to some relevant entries from the contact logs of the sibling contact between the little girls and [GG]. I will not summarise those, save to note the following. They are simple recordings, but convey the delight that the girls have in seeing their brother, and painted a very warm and loving picture. So those were helpful excerpts.

I turn, now, to the submissions advanced by the parties. There is no need for me to rehearse or set out every single point that was advanced, just as there is not the need, and indeed, it would not be practicable, for me to refer to each and every item of evidence that I have read and considered in coming to my decision today. The local authority reminded me in their submissions, as to why there was a need, they said, for full care and placement orders. They said there have been elements of a lack of honesty by the mother. There has been some engagement with professionals and with professional services for the issues she faces in life, but they say there has not been enough such engagement, and there is a troubling history of substance misuse, which she has continued. I pause to observe that an email from the Derbyshire Recovery Partnership was sent to the court on Monday, at the outset of this hearing, which shows minimal engagement, sadly.

The local authority say they need a care and placement order, but they are not ad idem with the Children’s Guardian as to how this should operate. They suggest that the Guardian has been putting all of her eggs in one basket, by saying that after a 12-month search for all three children together, the plan should change to long-term foster care for all three remaining in one placement. The local authority say that adoption would bring positive benefits to the table for the three girls. Long-term foster care carries many disadvantages, no guarantee it would be the current foster carers, who, themselves, have not been able to present as prospective special guardians, due to finances. There are considerable insecurities presented by long-term foster care, which is precarious, and there are no guarantees; you could end up with a split of the siblings if there were moves in foster care, the very thing the Guardian does not want.

Adopters are subject to a process of rigorous assessment, and matching is done with huge care. Adoption was described as a priceless gift. It has an enduring quality that you do not get with long-term foster care. I was told about the local authority having contacted [NN], [GG]’s special guardian, and asked about her position regarding supporting ongoing sibling contact from [GG]’s perspective. The court was informed that she does not drive, and of course, the children, if a placement order is made, could be placed far away. I was also told that Ms Best, the family finder, is very aware of the 2024 Public Law Working Group report, and is alive to the sea change that is predicated there, and reminded that her statement refers to the report.

It was submitted by the local authority that the principles which emerge in Re S, handed down on 1 July, and the scenario there, is a very different scenario from that presented here, and I was reminded that Re S says that there is a need – and this is a central principle which emerges from it – for a case specific bespoke analysis in every case where post-adoption contact falls to be considered.

I was told that it is clear from Ms Best’s written evidence that identifying an adoptive placement for a sibling group of three is a significant task. Because they are a group of three, there would be a reduction in the pool of adopters able to take them on. I was told by the local authority that Re S refers to the ability of the local authority adoption team to work without an order, and that is what I need to consider. They say that that is better than what they call an enforced order, which is what Section 26 would be.

I move on to the submissions advanced on behalf of [M]. I was reminded that the sibling relationship is the most enduring one of our lives. There should not be any severance of this sibling group of four, with [GG] being cut off. The girls do not regard him as their half-brother. He is their brother, and they love him. Detailed submissions were made about the nature of the children’s interactions with each other, as a group of four. I was reminded of the history of the proceedings, and what happened at the hearing on 30 January, and taken to important recitals at B154, as a number of orders were made on that date, and B155, which set out that all parties recognise the importance of the relationship between all four siblings, and that it will be addressed further within the final care plans for the girls, at which point the special guardian for [GG] will be consulted upon the same.

The local authority had accepted at the hearing on 30 January, that the girls should have meaningful contact with [GG], but the mother pointed out that what is now proposed by them in their written final evidence and written care plan, is not meaningful. The proposals were very limited, limited, really, just to letterbox, not even a mention of video messages or prerecorded video messages to pass between the siblings. This would be meaningless for [BB], who is 17 months old.

I was taken to relevant section of the Public Law Working Group report, and counsel said this was very much the right case for a sea change. The purpose of post-adoption contact is to help an adopted child develop their sense of identity. Separating siblings can lead to an enduring sense of loss. It was submitted there has been little or no analysis by the local authority of this, or of siphoning the children off, later on down the line, if adoption for all three did not materialise, into a group of two and one. It was submitted that the Guardian had got it absolutely right. The girls have been together all their lives, including for 15 months since separation from their mother. After one year of a search, which would take us to July 2026, what point would there be in doing a re-assessment of the sibling bond, it would only get stronger.

I was taken to relevant sections of the September 2024 together and apart assessment, and reminded that this had come about because Ms Wild, the Guardian, felt that the August assessment was materially wrong and flawed, so that is why it had come to be amended or updated in September. It highlights the flawed thinking of the local authority, even though it was accepted on behalf of the mother that, at that point, the local authority was considering family placements, rather than care planning towards adoption. But I was taken to deficiencies, as the mother perceived them to be, in the social work evidence template, the final SWET of Ms Bellfield, and the care plans, and it was said that there was a lack of any proper analysis.

I was also taken to the case of Re S, and the specific facts of that case, which concerned a sibling group of two, where the elder child would be in foster care and having contact with his parents, and the younger child had a plan of permanency by way of adoption. It was submitted that this case was pretty much on all fours within the principles of Re S, setting out when a defined order should be made under Section 26. The contingency plan should be long-term foster care after a 12-month search, and the mother wanted to be re-assessed. I was taken to the positives.

I pause at this point to say that I have considered and noted the mother’s efforts, and I accept that there is evidence of the green shoots of change, albeit she is not as far on as anyone would have hoped her to be, and I remind myself, although I do not need to go over it, that Dr C considers some real deep therapeutic work was required. Nevertheless, she has had some engagement with DRP, she has undertaken a number of courses, including intuitive thinking and addiction desire recognition, and she has also undertaken some CBT with Trent PTS, and some of this she has very much sought out and tried her best with. She has also, of course, played a full part in these proceedings, and made a child-focused and realistic decision, as I have already acknowledged. It is positive to note that she has not sat back, she has come up with her own proposed transition plan, and she has tried her best to let the court know about her new, and she says better, support networks.

On behalf of the father, I also heard detailed submissions. I was taken to Ms Best’s evidence in the form of her written statement, and I was taken, in particular, to paragraph 15, where it was submitted on behalf of the father that direct contact proposals, with a birth family member having an impact on the number of available adopters. That was submitted by the father to be a bare assertion, and there could be evidence of confirmation bias, as it was not backed up empirically by Ms Best within her written statement.

It was pointed out on behalf of [F], that neither parent has disrupted the placement through the medium of contact or other means. The father has a reasonably high level of contact with his son, [GG], twice a month, and I was taken to sections of the sibling assessment from September, where it was said that in terms of contact between [GG], [AA], [CC], and [BB], the local authority would highly advocate for contact between them to be facilitated and maintained. That is set out at C192. This is felt of paramount importance for the sibling relationships and their identity. The planning of this would need to be in a way which is in the best interests of the children, should they be separated on a permanent basis at the conclusion of proceedings.

It was said that the local authority were now watering down what their own evidence had indicated at that time. It was submitted that when the local authority said contact should not be forced, this was an inaccurate characterisation. The evidence is clear, the children, all of them, do want ongoing contact with [GG], and it was not impressive to say that just because a child was not asking for contact, that was something that could factor into the court’s reckoning, given that [BB] is only aged 17 months.

I was addressed in relation to Section 26, and the factors which emerge from Re S. In particular, it was pointed out firstly that on the facts of Re S, the level of contact for the two siblings was agreed. The issue was whether or not that should be enshrined into an order. Number 2, that the younger child who was going to be placed for adoption, had neurodevelopmental and other difficulties, which narrowed the pool of adopters, so that would have a detrimental effect on finding a placement for him, whereas, here, it is the size of the sibling group, as opposed to any inherent characteristics or needs of these three little girls. And thirdly, in Re S, the first instance judge who was upheld by the Court of Appeal in declining to make a Section 26 order, said he had full confidence in the professional social work team, and the adoption team’s approach to contact, and their ability to work with adopters. It was said on behalf of [F] that in this present case, the court cannot have such a level of confidence because the local authority have, effectively, backtracked, and not undertaken a sufficient analysis in their evidence. And I was reminded that Section 26 has been around for over 20 years; just because it is rarely used, does not mean that what I am being asked to do is radical or cutting edge. It is fundamentally a welfare evaluation.

I then heard submissions on behalf of the Guardian, who echoed and endorsed what those representing the mother and father have said, and made succinct and helpful observations. Adoption should not be at the cost of the sibling relationship, so the Guardian was pleased that the local authority had reviewed their position, and said it would be a 12-month search. She thought about things really carefully, and did not consider there should be any separation of the children. She knows that these particular foster carers are committed to providing long-term care.

The sibling relationship is essential between the girls, and it would have a real impact on each of the children if it was severed. She agreed that the mother should be re-assessed if the children are not adopted. However, the children should not be split if the plan for adoption does not proceed. Again, I was taken to the history, and it was pointed out within the initial care plans, there was no reference to contact for the girls with [GG]. In the Guardian’s first substantive report for January, she urged for a higher level of contact between them all, upon [GG]’s proceedings concluding, and I was taken to the recitals in the orders, to which I have already referred.

I was also taken, as I have observed, to selections of the sibling contact logs, which are not disputed, factually, by anybody. Two times a year, expiration of direct contact with adopters was not enough. The sibling relationship had been disregarded in many ways within the local authority’s written evidence, and I was taken to C400 of the bundle, which is the SWET table of options, pros and cons. Contact was not properly analysed or set out there, with [GG], and the Guardian did not feel, regrettably, assured that sibling contact would be promoted without an order, so this did not match the facts of Re S, and therefore, the no order principle should not operate.

I turn, now, to the welfare checklist set out and enshrined within the Adoption and Children Act. It is, as I have said, the welfare of these three girls throughout their lives that is my paramount consideration. In relation to their wishes and feelings, the girls are very young, and not able to have an understanding of what is proposed for them, and the choices that are put before the court. It is clear that all three children love each other, they are happy and settled in their placement, and they enjoy seeing their parents, and I can safely assume that they would, all three of them, wish to be placed with their birth family of origin, as

In relation to their particular needs, [AA] has some reduced vision in her eye, she does not have any other particular physical needs; [CC] suffers, I think, from eczema, but that is a manageable condition; all three are developing in line with expected milestones, and there are not any particular special needs that have been identified.

In relation to the likely effect of ceasing to be a member of the original family, and to become an adopted person, if care and placement orders are made, the three children will not stay as the legal children of [M] and [F], and would pass into a new family, but there would be an impact on them of that. It would provide them with stability and permanence, but there would be an impact of any relationships ceasing, and I will come onto that.

In relation to their age, sex and background, and any particular characteristics which are relevant, for example, religion, racial origin, and cultural and linguistic background, they are aged three, two and one, they are white British, they celebrate the usual festivals, such as Christmas and Easter. I am not aware of any particular characteristics, although their personalities are emerging and developing day by day.

Any harm which they have suffered or at risk of suffering: there is evidence that they would be at risk of significant harm if they returned to the care of their mother or their father, and that is set out within the threshold criteria document, which I have already referred to.

The relationship which the child has with relatives and any other person to whom the court considers the relationship to be relevant, and that includes a number of matters, including (1) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing, and the value to the child of it doing so: they have got positive relationships with their mother and their father, and they enjoy the time they spend together. There have been some missed contact sessions, but they will, of course, have memories of their family time sessions. There are not any family members who can provide a home to them. The parents, as I have said, do not put a positive case for a return today, and accept that they are not in a position to provide care at this point. They do have a valuable relationship with [GG], and I have set that out.

I am going to turn now to the options and the comparative analysis which Re B-S requires me to undertake. I make it clear that I exclude none of them at this point, and consider them side by side, as I am required to do. The first realistic option is the most draconian, and it is that of adoption. There are a number of disadvantages associated with adoption. It is not a panacea. It is not a cure for everything, particularly for a case where the children – and I have got in mind [AA], in particular, due to her age – will have retained memories of their mother and father, and that children who are adopted can end up, as they come to know more about their life history when they grow up, to feel a sense of loss or rejection, and a feeling that they are different because they have been adopted.

Adoption has the crucial disadvantage of severing bonds between a child and his or her birth family, and in this case, the local authority do not propose any ongoing direct contact for the mother or for the father. It can carry, of course, a number of positives, and that is why it is the local authority’s preferred option, and supported by the Guardian, which are that the children have the chance to form lifelong relationships, to belong in a forever family. It has the advantage of stability and security, and can promote the children’s ability to reach their full potential within the confines of a loving and secure household. In this case, it has the advantage that the local authority agree to place all three children together. So there are advantages to adoption.

In relation to placements with parents or wider family, that is not on the table as a realistic option today. A second option is long-term fostering. It is not proposed today as anybody’s first choice, but it is a contingency plan. There are some pros, in that it would enable the children to keep their ties with their birth family, parents and sibling, open. That would be if the plan changed from adoption to fostering. There may be the possibility of them staying with the current foster carers, which the mother, in particular, accepts is a very positive placement, but that is not certain, and that leads me into the negatives of long-term fostering as a contingency plan, which is that it is precarious. There can be changes of foster care. The children can be under the stigma of having care orders, being the subject of Child in Care or LAC reviews, and intrusion by way of social work visits, and knowing that they do not necessarily belong, in the same way as you would with a birth family caring for you or an adoptive placement. So those are the pros and cons of long-term fostering.

I have considered all of the legal principles within the case law and the statutory welfare checklist, and I have considered the advantages and disadvantages of the options, including the very high test under Re B-S. It seems to me, having considered all of the material in this case, and the options that are before me, which have narrowed, that I am in a position where I conclude that nothing else short of adoption will do, and that it is necessary and proportionate to make care orders based on a plan of adoption for all three girls, despite the quintessentially draconian nature of non-consensual adoption. This represents an interference with the Article 8 rights of the mother and father, and indeed, of [BB], [CC] and [AA], but I find that such interference is necessary and proportionate in order to secure their welfare. The mother does not consent to the making of a placement order. The father does not consent either. I find that the welfare of all three girls requires that I dispense with their consent.

I turn, now, to the issue of care plans and post-adoption contact. It seems to me, having heard detailed submissions about everybody’s position, that it is right that it is a period of 12 months for the local authority to search to identify an adoptive placement. It seems to me, it is abundantly right that has to be for all three, together. Looking ahead, if an adoptive placement were not to materialise, the girls would be aged, respectively, [AA], five, [CC], three, and [BB], two and a half. The Children’s Guardian, supported by the parents, says there should, at that stage, be a reversion to a plan of long-term foster care, with no separation of the children, who should remain together. There was a reference within Ms Potter’s submissions on behalf of the children, that if adopters materialised as a potential match in, say, the last two months of that 12-month period, that the plans should not just automatically lapse to long-term foster care. It is agreed that there should be a re-assessment of the mother if no adoptive home is materialised by then, and I endorse that.

I have thought very carefully about what everybody has said about it reverting to a plan of long-term foster care, which is not something that the local authority agree with, as of today. It seems to me that there are advantages in adoption, which I have already set out and will not repeat. I make the following observation, which I consider should travel with the care plans, and as a recital to the final order in this matter. If, at the end of a 12-month search, adopters for all three children have not materialised, the court would not want to countenance a plan of separating the three girls for reasons of expedience. The court would expect there to be very cogent reasons indeed, to separate the girls, as it is likely that their love for each other and the sibling bond would be even more firmly established in 12 months’ time. So matters would need to be looked at.

I make no observations about a sibling re-assessment. That is a matter for the local authority. What that means is, that I do not go so far as to endorse the position which the Guardian and parents invite me to approve, which is that there should definitively be a reversion to long-term foster care of all three girls, together, but I hope those are sufficiently clear and palpable observations, which I expect the local authority to respect, and work within those parameters. I have taken into account the ages of the children at that point, and the respective advantages and disadvantages of long-term foster care.

I turn, now, to the issue of sibling contact. I am troubled by what I perceive to have been shifting sands within the sibling assessments from August and September, and since then. I accept entirely, this has not been an easy case for any social work team to manage, and that there have been a number of angles and perspectives to look at it from, and a multiplicity of family members to look at and assess, who have been put forward at different stages of the proceedings. The case has benefited from the continuity of Ms Bellfield, and I do not think she has had a straightforward task. I have not heard direct oral evidence from her, nor indeed, from anyone.

I do concur with the views expressed in submissions, that the final social work evidence template contains little analysis of the significance and value of ongoing sibling contact between these girls and [GG]. That is disappointing, given the court’s determination at the hearing on 30 January, and the important matters set out on record at that stage. I agree that the care plans will need to be revised, whatever my decision. Whilst the local authority, to their credit, have reflected and agreed to explore with the adopters, two sessions of contact with [GG] a year, following receipt of the Guardian’s report, I agree that is not in line with what happened for the younger children in the case of Re S, where the judge had a much higher level of confidence in the local authority’s commitment to promoting ongoing sibling contact. I am afraid I am unable to say I have the same level of confidence in relation to these children.

I go back, now, to the Public Law Working Group’s report, which, of course, I am familiar with, and I turn to the heading of general recommendations. It is clear, and clearly set out at paragraph 71, that there needs to be a sea change in the approach to the question of face-to-face contact between the adopted child and the birth family, or rather significant individuals. It is not just an abstract statement of principle which appears there, because there are some important practical recommendations, which follow on, as to how to implement and manage matters within the context of a sea change, but those are set out at paragraph 82. I am reminded that within the territory of family law, and those working in the family justice system, we have got the ability to evolve, to develop, in line with changing mores, and I expect these matters will become more embedded within our current system, and that we are in a dynamic area of practice.

I have considered the authority of Re S, which also summarises the line of recent of authorities as to post-adoption contact, and I have referred to the facts of that case. At paragraph 44, about halfway down, the President of the Family Division said:

“Each case will turn on its own facts. In some cases, the need to preserve contact will be a preference. In others, it may be essential. In all cases, it will be necessary to take account of the impact on family finding of a care plan that includes ongoing contact and/or proposals for a Section 26 order for contact. There will be some cases where the priority to be given to preserving the sibling relationship will be such that the court should make a contact order, notwithstanding that to do so may make the task of finding an adoptive family more challenging.”

We have a group of three sisters who are flourishing in their foster placement. They do not have any identifiable needs which make them a more challenging group to take on. It is the fact that there are three of them. I remind myself that Adoption East Midlands are what I would call a dynamic service, and are very much aware and mindful of the Public Law Working Group’s report. I have looked at Ms Best’s statement, and within paragraphs 10 and 12 of that statement, she expresses that she is cautiously optimistic about finding a match for these three little girls.

I have got to take into account the fact that [GG] is having contact with his birth parents, a different mother, but, of course, the fact that he is seeing his own mother and the girls will not, if they are adopted, see theirs, may leave them to feel sad, and of course, he is seeing his father, and it is the same father, who the girls will not see. I can see that Ms Best is entitled to say from her experience, evidence which was not challenged by way of oral evidence, that many adopters will not choose to put themselves in this position. It seems to me that that is where the section I have quoted from paragraph 44 of Re S comes into it. Some cases, where the priority should be given to preserving the sibling relationship, fall into the category where that the court should make a contact order - notwithstanding that that may make the task of finding an adoptive family more challenging.

Standing back and looking at the differences and similarities between this case and the facts in Re S, in Re S, there were different characteristics for the child to be adopted, which narrowed the pool. Here, it is the size of the sibling group. In Re S, there was an agreed level of contact. Here, that is not the case, of course, and that is in issue. The local authority say they would explore twice a year, the Guardian and parents say four times a year. And in Re S, the judge had full confidence in the social work team. I have dealt with the position as to that, notwithstanding that this is a case where [GG] will see his father, who will not be seeing the girls, and that is something that adopters will need to think about when considering whether or not to put themselves forward if an order is made. I have got to balance that into the equation. I do not see the fact that the [MGM] for [GG] cannot drive is necessarily a determinative factor. Geography may well be a practical consideration in due course, but hopefully, that could be overcome.

I turn to paragraph 32 of Re S, the distinction to be drawn between those cases where continuing direct sibling contact is considered to be necessary for the child’s future welfare, and cases where the achievement of an adoptive home is the overarching goal, with future sibling contact being desirable, as opposed to a prerequisite. Having considered the history of the case over its lifespan, and what is recorded on the orders of 30 January, as well as all of the information I have about the quality of the relationship between the girls and their brother, brought skilfully to life by those exerts read out by Ms Potter, and also considering that in this case, the Guardian has indeed advocated for the sibling relationship to continue and to be meaningful between the four children, I take into account what the Guardian says, that a severance of direct contact would be detrimental for the girls. I have read her written reports, which are of high quality, and I note her commitment to the case. She has undertaken an analysis about contact, and I note that she has endeavoured to secure the right result for the girls.

I reminded myself of [GG]’s love for his sisters. He is not, of course, a subject child any longer, but that was relayed to the court within Ms Wild’s report, at E223, and it seems to me that paragraph 62 of her report may be an appropriate paragraph to be disclosed to any prospective adopters. I will hear about that in due course, from the parties. But it seems to me that within all the evidence I have received since that report, that in the girls’ continued family time with [GG], that that love is mirrored back from them to him.

Stepping back and looking at it all, and considering the application of the welfare checklist in relation to the relationship between them, it seems to me that this does fall into the case where continuing direct sibling contact is necessary. It is not just desirable or even at the upper end of desirable. It goes further than that, in my view. Applying, therefore, the Adoption and Children Act welfare checklist, including the no order principle, I agree that this is a suitable case, where a Section 26 order should be made, and I will make one.

I turn, now, to the frequency. I note that the practice of interpreting Re R to equate to a formulaic level of six times a year is deprecated. The local authority were saying twice a year. I agree it needs to be meaningful, and that the youngest child is very young indeed, not yet two. The court is not in a position to crystal ball gaze. I am going to determine that it should be four times a year, drawing a slight distinction between what I determine and what the parents and guardian submitted, in that I am not going to say that that should be as a minimum. There could be an increase of the relevant adults’ own volition, but that is something which I leave to them, together with the support of the local authority and the adoption agency to help manage this. So that is the judgment of the court.