W v A & Ors

This is the father’s application to spend time with his two children, who are aged nine and ten respectively. They live with their mother. At the outset, he sought direct contact by way of a ‘Spend Time With’ Order.

There were disputed allegations in relation to domestic abuse. Mother initially raised this as a bar to contact. Father accepts he has a criminal record. He says he has changed his lifestyle. He says he believes the children have been affected by the mother’s views, and he has attended a domestic abuse awareness course. There has been no contact since November 2023.

A safeguarding letter of 17 May 2025 points out and records Father’s criminal history in relation to the period 1998 to 2022, There are police referrals including a Protection From Harassment Order against a non-party and social services involvement in relation to domestic abuse between 2015 and 2023. In the safeguarding letter, the author felt unable to recommend contact in light of the domestic abuse allegations.

There were disclosures made that the father had hit his elder stepsibling and was verbally abusive. Suchdisclosure came from his nine-year-old child. It is said that the children are scared of him.

A subsequent section 7 report recommended indirect contact, albeit this conflicted with the children’s wishes and feelings. There was an addendum report which set out no changes to those recommendations. The father did not accept this. He believed the children were being influenced by the mother.

Dealing with the detail of the section 7 report, it records that when the parties separated, the father did not see the children for three years until October 2023, due to the children witnessing arguments and abuse of the mother. Contact started again in November 2023. Thereafter there was an incident at school in July 2024 and the allegation of physical abuse of his older son.

It is noted that Mother had apparently informed the nine-year-old that she witnessed Father slapping and punching his older son and was shouting and screaming in a serious altercation. He also shouted abuse over the phone to his younger child.

His ten-year-old child records that his father shouts and screams, he does not want to see him, and the father hit his eldest son. The children are clearly upset when talking about their father and it is apparent that this retraumatises them.

There have been no formal findings, although there has been longstanding police involvement which the author of the section 7 report states shows a pattern of abusive behaviour which Father minimises, albeit there is no formal evidence of abuse of the elder child.

The author of the section 7 report is aware that she is going against the wishes of the children, but suggested indirect contact monthly then supervised contact thereafter by a professional and, if positive, it would progress further. She accepts that the children do not want to have indirect contact and do not want to see their father and perhaps should not be forced.

The addendum report records an incident in November 2023 as to a verbal dispute which ensued on school grounds, with Father shouting and swearing. Police had to be called. Ultimately, he apologised. The children said that they did not want to go with their father as he shouts and hits their older stepsibling. It records that the mother shared this information in front of the children.

With regards to the school incident, the children would have heard the altercation from where they were in the library.

The order before this Court on 6 December 2024 records that the father’s domestic abuse course was rescheduled for 21 January 2025 and that the Court needed more detailed information to enable it to decide whether a Finding of Fact Hearing was necessary. It directed indirect contact on a weekly basis with the sharing of school reports and photos and updated medical information and periodic updates on a monthly basis. Police disclosures and PNCs were also ordered.

It was directed that the mother should file a witness statement in response to the section 7 report recommendations and the allegations that she sought to be relied upon with the father providing a response, and for Cafcass to consider a rule 16.4 guardian, with a report from the school in relation to the incident in November 2023 and any other incidents between the parents.

On 3 February 2025, the children were added as parties to the proceedings and a children’s guardian appointed.

On 20 February 2025 it was directed that indirect should continue with disclosure of the previous non molestation proceedings and a report from the Children’s Guardian as to direct work with the children, examination of their wishes and feelings, enquiries made with the parents, and whether a Finding of Fact Hearing was considered necessary as well as recommendations for the progression of contact.

The matter came back before the Court again on 29 April 2025.

At that hearing the court determined that there should not be a Finding of Fact Hearing. It was recorded in that order that the father did not agree with Cafcass recommendations in relation to writing a letter of apology to the children, or indirect telephone or video calls prior to progression to face to face supported contact. Mother, on the other hand, supported the arrangements for indirect contact, but letters only, and opposed any directcontact.

At that hearing I raised concerns as to the father’s behaviour in court. It was at that hearing that he became a litigant in person. The reason being is that, due to his behaviour, his solicitors no longer felt they were able to act for him. Due to his behaviour, which are recorded in recitals to that order, I determined that for all future hearings the father should attend remotely. Indirect contact was ordered to be continued as per my order of 20 February 2025 and the matter listed for a final hearing.

A further order was made on 21 August 2025, whereupon the Guardian identified numerous safeguarding concerns in relation to Father’s anger management and behaviour and therefore was only recommending indirect contact at that stage. Mother agreed to those recommendations; she opposed direct contact. The father did not agree.

At that hearing, which the father attended remotely as directed, I again expressed further concerns in relation to the father’s conduct and his interventions throughout the hearing which was similar to his behaviour during the attended hearing in April 2025.

The matter remained listed for a final hearing to allow the father to challenge the Children’s Guardian recommendations in relation to the issue of spend time with arrangements, again with the father to attend remotely. It isrecorded in the order that the father refused to provide the mother’s solicitors with his email address so as to facilitate indirect contact.

I gave the father a further extension of time to 11 September 2025 in which to file his evidence.

That evidence has not been filed or served on the other parties. Due to the fact that the father was in person and, in accordance with the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, I appointed a qualified legal representative for him on the basis that he may well wish to seek to challenge the mother’s evidence, but to be dispensed with if he chose not to.

A formal order appointing a named qualified legal representative was made on 9 December 2025.

Sadly, there is an application made today to discharge that order, the reason being is in order to assist the father, the Qualified Legal Representative made contact with him only to be met by aggression and abuse. There is no excuse for such behaviour. There is now a trend developing in relation to the father being unable to regulate his emotions which creates significant concerns in relation to the application before the Court.

My order of 21 August 2025 also provided that there should be indirect contact between the father and the children via the maternal grandparents’ email address on two occasions between the hearing in August and the hearing today. It is of also some regret and concern that the father has not at all abided by that order.

The mother made an application to adjourn the hearing today due to a medical appointment in relation to the children. I refused that, this hearing being a fixture for some time, and involving one day of the Court’s time.

As directed, the Court has sent a link to the hearing to both the Qualified Legal Representative and the father. The father has disengaged with the Qualified Legal Representative and the Qualified Legal Representative, due to his behaviour, feels unable to act and I can quite understand that, and therefore I have discharged the order appointing the Qualified Legal Representative, albeit I did so prior to giving judgment in order to see whether or not there was an outbreak of common sense in so far as the father was concerned. Sadly, there has not been.

Furthermore, he has also not joined the link, despite it being sent to him and despite the court staff phoning him in relation to joining the link to which he promptly put the phone down. This hearing was listed at 10am, my judgment commenced at approximately 10.40am, at which point I closed the link. By then, he still had not joined.

In so far as the evidence before the Court is concerned, I have read the report from the school in relation to the incident that I have referred to. It records that the father was shouting and swearing and the police were called due to his hostile presentation. He continued swearing but subsequently apologised. The children said that they did not want to go to their father’s as he shouts. It was disclosed that their stepbrother was hit by their father.

I have also read a report from the Local Authority.

It provides a chronology as follows:

Mum, in her statement in relation to allegations of domestic abuse, cites the fact that there are two Non-Molestation Order that have been made, one on 8 December 2020 and the other 31 December 2021.

She said that in August 2023, the children disclosed that the father threw his son, from a previous relationship, down the stairs. She makes a further allegation that in July 2023 there was verbal abuse and aggression in front of the children at the school, and the school was placed in lockdown until the police arrived, and in August 2023, she received verbal abuse over the phone.

She states that she is concerned as to the father’s ability to manage his behaviour and control his emotions. The children do not wish to have contact with him. She accepts the Children’s Guardian’s recommendations. She believes that proceedings should conclude by way of indirect contact only, with letters and cards via paternal grandfather, and possibly future progression to be considered in light of that after about three months, but she fears that the father should address his behaviour first before direct contact can commence.

The father, in response to the mother’s statement, and this is the one statement that he did provide, says he had no knowledge of the Non-Molestation Orders and denies the allegations with regard to his eldest son.

In relation to Mother’s other allegations, he says that the incident at the school is incorrect and the school report itself undermines that allegation, although the school information paints a different picture. He accepts he is upset and frustrated, but the school was not put into lockdown. He also denies the further allegations raised by mother and believes that she is influencing the children. He denies he is aggressive but accepts he is an extremely emotional person. That, in my view, is a gross understatement and a significant minimisation.

He believes the mother is negatively influencing the children. Based upon the evidence, again, I have to say there is no evidence in relation to that, and it appears from the evidence before the Court that the children’s concerns are genuinely held.

He says in his position statement that he accepts the Children’s Guardian’s proposal but would like face to face contact albeit supported. He raises the question of professional bias.

The Guardian throughout this case hasmade a number of recommendations.

Firstly, that the father undertakes further work with the children now that contact has been set up. With regards to theincident at school and questions of proportionality of litigating this incident as a discrete finding. The incident at school was clearly documented and she therefore did not support there being a Finding of Fact Hearing.

With regards to the nine-year-old child, he did not want to see his father as he hurts people and hit their older stepsibling. He also believes that the father hit his younger sister. He saw him throw his half-brother down the stairs, and he shouted but not necessarily at him. He does not want to see him face to face but is prepared to speak, perhaps on the telephone or via video calls.

The ten-year-old does not believe that father is a nice person. He shouts at her and smacks her. She does not want him to be mean. She does not want contact. She recalls the incident at school when she could hear the father and is concerned that he has not changed.

Father has also been verbally aggressive towards the Children’s Guardian his excuse is that he is emotional.

Notwithstanding that, the Guardian gave consideration to moving the arrangements forward in relation to video calls supported by the Guardian and supervised contact. Sadly, the father did not accept that and became agitated. He later says that he only wants to see his nine-year-old child because the other child posted negative comments about him.

The Guardian states that the father clearly struggles with managing his behaviours and emotions. When she spoke to him, he ended the call. She is concerned that the father is not able to manage his behaviour. He does not accept that there should be telephone or video calls.

She proposed that the father should write an apology letter and offer reassurance, and then following on from that phone calls, supervised by the Children’s Guardian, and then a further few calls fortnightly and thereafter to consider progression to video contact and potentially face to face after three months, or in the alternative, a final hearing to determine the progression, the issue being one of Father’s ability to regulate his emotions, all of which seemed eminently sensible.

The Guardian says she has witnessed a video of the father shouting at the mother in front of the children, as well as behaviour towards professionals if he disagrees with their views.

If the father’s not amenable to supervised contact, then indirect contact only should take place on a monthly basis.

For the purposes of this hearing, the Guardian’s updated her this. The children are currently spending no time with the father, and the father sadly is adamant he will not engage in indirect contact despite the Guardian encouraging and recommending this.

His behaviour at previous hearings raises significant concerns with regards to his ability to regulate himself. She reports that the father has since apologised but was unable to understand how bad his conduct was and the impact on others. That sadly remains a common thread even up until now.

The children do not want to see their father or speak to him but are open to receiving a letter, and therefore the Guardians’ final recommendations, given the current concerns, is that there should be indirect contact only at this stage. Mum to retain the letters and support the children to respond and provide updates via the paternal grandfather or a PO Box or email.

As a belt and braces approach, I have also received the police disclosure. I will not go through this in detail. It adds little to the information already before the Court.

In summary, the father has not filed his evidence despite being given a further extension. He has not taken up indirect contact as I have previously ordered. He has been aggressive and abusive towards the Qualified Legal Representative appointed to assist him, such that she has sought discharge which has been granted. He has failed to join this hearing or accept a call from the staff, and I remind myself that this is his application.

I am aware that time and time again, courts have stressed the importance of contact as a fundamental element of family life, and that all alternative means of someone spending time with a child should be explored and should only be stopped where it is detrimental to their welfare, and that face to face contact should not be denied unless the child’s welfare demands it. Children will normally benefit from having a full and meaningful relationship with both of their parents as they grow up.

These matters are not controversial, as set out as long ago as ReP (Contact Supervision) [1996] 2 FLR 314:

“Overriding all else, as provided by section 1 subsection 1 of the Children Act 1989, the welfare of the child is a paramount consideration, and the Court is concerned with the interests of the parents only as far as they bear on the welfare of the child. It is almost always in the interests of children whose parents are separated that they should have contact with the parent with whom they are not living.

However, cases do unhappily and infrequently occur in which a court is compelled to conclude that in the existing circumstances, an order for immediate face to face contact should not be directed because to do so would be injurious to the welfare of the child. But in those cases, it is ordinarily highly desirable that there should be indirect contact so that the child or children grow up knowing of the loving interest of the absent parent with whom in due course direct contact could be established.”

This was further expanded on in the case of Re C (A Child) (Suspension of Contact) [2011] EPCA 521:

“Contact between a parent and a child is a fundamental element of family life and almost always in the interests of the child. Contact between a parent and child should only be terminated in exceptional circumstances when there were cogent reasons for doing so and where there is no alternative and only when it will be detrimental to a child’s welfare.

There is a positive obligation to take measures to maintain or to restore contact. The Judge must consider all available alternatives. Contact can be stopped only as a last resort and only once it has become clear that the child does not benefit from continuing the attempt.

The Court has to take a medium- and long-term view and must not accord excessive weight to what appears likely to be short term or transient problems. The key question is whether all necessary steps have been taken to facilitate contact as can reasonably be demanded in the circumstance of the particular case, at the end of the day, the child’s welfare is paramount, and the child’s interests must have precedence over any other consideration.”

And finally, Re T (Contact, Alienation, and Permission to Appeal) [2002] EWCA 1736:

“The Court should consider whether the fundamental need of any child to have an enduring relationship with both parents is outweighed by the depth of harm to the particular child that might thereby be caused by the Child Arrangements Order.”

In this particular case, the Guardian, in my view, has explored in detail all the various options in order to progress a relationship with the father which the children are reluctant to for the reasons that I have set out and the history of this matter, yet Father has done little or nothing to help his case. He has been volatile to suggestions of professionals; he has presented a case on the basis that it is his way or the highway and adopted a stance which is the complete antithesis of being child centric. He reacted, in relation to one of the children posting something he did not like; by saying he did not want to see them, but he would see the other child. If he is offered something which he does not like such as indirect contact, he does not take it up.

I am afraid this father does not see the bigger picture. He is consumed by his own emotional dysregulation, which is a grave concern going forward and a safeguarding risk. He says that he is an emotional person. I am afraid, as I have indicated, that this a gross minimisation. He clearly has significant anger issues which need to be addressed.

This is his application. I could accede to the fact that he should have only indirect contact with the children, but he has not taken it up on the basis that he does not agree with it. It is his application. He has not filed evidence and has not attended today. Accordingly, I believe the appropriate order in this case is for his application to be dismissed, and that is the order that I will make.

I also raise concern as to whether I should make a section 91(14) direction, being fully aware that this is raised for the first time today at a hearing the father has not attended and without notification that one was being sought by any party. I do not make that suggestion lightly.

Section 91(14) provides that on disposing of any application under the Children Act, the Court may order that no application for an order under the act of any specified kind, and by that I have in mind a Child Arrangements (Spend Time With) Order, may be made with respect to the children by a named person, that is the father, without permission of the Court.

The seminal case, subject to some amendment is Re P (Section 91(14), Guidelines, Residence and Religious Heritage) [1999] 2 FLR 573:

“Section 91(14) should be read in conjunction with section 1 subsection 1 which makes the welfare of the child the Court’s paramount consideration. The power to restrict applications to the Court is discretionary and the court must weigh in the balance all the relevant circumstances. An important consideration is that to impose a restriction is a statutory intrusion into the right of a party to bring proceedings before the court and to be heard in matters affecting their children.

The power is therefore to be used with great care and sparingly, the exception and not the rule.

[Although this now needs to be revisited in light of further developments.]

It is generally to be seen as a useful weapon of last resort in cases of repeated and unreasonable applications. However, in suitable circumstances and on clear evidence, a court may impose the restriction in cases where the welfare of the children requires it, although there is no past history of making unreasonable applications.

In such case, the Court will need to be satisfied first that the facts go beyond the commonly encountered need for a time to settle to a regime ordered by the Court and the all too common situation where there is animosity between the adults in dispute, and secondly, that there is a serious risk that, without the imposition of the restriction, the children or the mother will be subject to unacceptable strain.

The Court may impose the restriction on making applications in the absence of a request from any of the parties, subject, of course, to the rules of natural justice such as an opportunity for the parties to be heard on the point.

A restriction may be imposed with or without limitation of time.”

“The degree of restriction should be proportionate to the harm it is intended to avoid. Therefore, the Court imposing the restriction should carefully consider the extent of the restriction to be imposed and specify, where appropriate, the type of application to be restrained and the duration of the order. It would be undesirable in other than the most exceptional cases to make the order without notice.”

I am concerned that if I do make this order that the father has had no opportunity to address the Court upon it. However, he himself has not attended today.

Although the father has notice of the hearing, he has no notice as to the potential for there to be a section 91(14) direction. The Guardian originally suggested a short order of say six months. Mother would have preferred longer, 12 months, but on reflection, the Guardian indicates that a restriction until 4 September 2026 may be appropriate as that is when the children start their new school term, which will allow them, effectively, the residue of the school term as from now in order to settle, bearing in mind, that the father has had no contact now for a significant period and his behaviour.

I am of course aware of Re T (A Child) (Suspension of Contact, Section 91(14)) [2015] EWCA 719, but given the significant implications of intrusion into a party’s ordinary ability to access justice by the making of a section 91(14) order it is imperative that the Court is satisfied that the parties affected are firstly fully aware that the Court is considering making such an order, and secondly they understand the meaning and effect of such an order, thirdly theyhave knowledge of the evidential basis on which it is sought, fourthly they have had a proper opportunity to make representations in relation to making such an order which may mean adjourning the application for it to be made in writing and on notice, and finally, any judge considering such an order will be bound to consider its duration so as to impose an order within the period necessary, reference also to be had to the case of Re A (Children) [2019] EWCA 903.

However, I believe those sentiments now have to be read alongside the subsequent statutory and case law developments in relation to the use of section 91(14) orders.

In Re A (A Child) (Supervised Contact, Section 91(14)) [2021] EWCA 1749 the Court stated that there was considerable scope for the greater use of these orders to protect children’s interests. The Court’s jurisdiction to make them is not limited to cases where a party has made excessive applications and it extends to situations where a party’s overall conduct merited intervention.

The guidelines do not say that such an order should only be made in exceptional circumstances.

“In my judgment in many cases, but particularly in those cases where the judge  forms the view that the type of behaviour indulged in by one of the parents amounts to ‘lawfare’, that is to say the use of the court proceedings as a weapon of conflict, the court may feel significantly less reluctance than has been the case hitherto, before stepping in to provide by the making of an order under s91(14), protection for  a parent from what is in effect, a form of coercive control on their former partner’s part.

. . . Of importance when considering the effect of an order under s91(14) is the need to have in mind that it is only a filter . . .”

Furthermore, the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, section 67, supports the Court’s approach to give statutory effect to permitting orders to be made where an application would place a parent or child at risk of physical or emotional harm.

As set out in the case of F v M [2023] EWFC 5:

“The provisions within section 91A [as provided for in the Domestic Abuse Act] are transformative. Itprovides a powerful tool with which Judges can protect both children and the parent with whom they live, from corrosive, demoralising and controlling applications which have an insidious impact on their general welfare and wellbeing and can cause real emotional harm.

This amended provision strikes me as properly recognising the very significant toll protracted litigation can take on children and individuals who may already have become vulnerable, for a variety of reasons. It also dovetails with our enhanced understanding of the nature of controlling and coercive behaviour. When all other avenues are lost, too often the Court process becomes the only weapon available. Lawyers and Judges must be assiduous to identify when this occurs, in order to ensure that the Court is not manipulated into becoming a source of harm but a guarantee of protection.”

A further helpful summary is provided in Re M (Children) [2023] EWFC 212:

“While such an order may be the exception and not the rule, it does not follow that the case or its circumstances must somehow be adjudged to be exceptional before such an order could be made. It represents a protective filter, not a bar, and there is considerable scope for its use in appropriate cases. Whether to make an order is a matter for the Court’s discretion. There are many and varied circumstances in which it may be appropriate to make such an order. It is not a necessary prerequisite for there to be multiple applications. It includes cases in which the Court considers that an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm without the need to find the risk to be serious or the likely harm to be significant or serious. The ReP guidelines continue to apply.

If the Court decides to make an order, the Court must consider its duration, as to which, any term imposed should be proportionate to the harm the Court is seeking to avoid, and in relation to which decision the court must explain its reasons, whether it should apply to all or certain types of application under the Children Act, whether service of any subsequent application for leave should be prohibited pending initial judicial determination of the application.

In all of this, the welfare of the child is paramount. That said, any interference with a parent’s otherwise unfettered right of access to the court, including the duration of any such prohibition pending permission, must be proportionate to the harm the court is seeking to avoid.”

Again, as set out in Griffiths v Kniveton & XX [2024] EWHC 199:

“Section 91(14) order is a filter, not a bar. If the father can show the Judge that there is a real change of circumstances and a change in his mind set, then he will be permitted to make a fresh application.”

I now deal with the issue of whether I should make such an order.

Firstly, on the basis that I am making it without notice. I appreciate making an order without notice is an exceptional order to make. However, in the circumstances of this case, I am persuaded that such an order should be made.

The father is aware of today’s hearing, although not to the full extent of this order now being made, but it is being raised because of his extreme conduct which has not abated during these proceedings, but only escalated, particularly in relation to his attitude towards the Qualified Legal Representative, his refusal to partake in the hearing, or indeed to answer phone calls from the court staff, or to have the courtesy to listen to what they have to say.

In my view, the balance in this matter when looking at the potential risk of a further application coming before the court to the children, outweighs any prejudice to the father in making an order which he is not aware of.

Under rule 27.5, he can apply to have this order set aside, being a hearing he has not attended. But he will have to show justification as to why he has not attended, he will have to make his application promptly, and he will have to show a realistic prospect of success. That is his protection should he have anything to object to with regard to that order in any event. But the onus, I believe, should be on him.

With regards to what I have indicated as to his behaviour, I do believe that there should be a filter before this father pursues a further application. There needs to be a real change in mind set for which the father will need to convince both the court and those who undertake safeguarding.

If this application comes back, it will go to through the pathfinder process, and will follow the usual process as to aninitial filter, a child impact report, a Safeguarding Gatekeeping Hearing, and thereafter a Decision Hearing; but the process will be something different, in fact considerably different in relation to there being limited attended hearings and matters being dealt with on paper, the focus being on the impact on the children.

I accept the revised view of the Guardian that theproportionate bar would be less than 12 months but more than six months to provide for the bar to continue until midnight on 4 September 2026, which will allow the children the remainder of the school term to focus upon their studies and to have a breathing space, bearing in mind the number of professionals that have been involved with them. It will also give the father some time to reflect and undertake any necessary management of his anger in order to show significantly more insight as to his behaviour than he has up until now.

I will direct that service of any subsequent application for permission from the mother should be prohibited pending the initial judicial determination on that application within that timeframe, and any such application within the duration of the section 91(14) order or indeed thereafter should be reserved to me.

So that future court hearings can be aware of the difficulties in this case, I will direct a transcript of my judgement at the court’s expense, and I will direct that the judgment be published in anonymised format in accordance with the transparency project.

That is my judgment and the reasons for it.