Greenwich Royal Borough Council v M & Ors

M

F

J, a child, by LW, her children’s guardian

K, a child, by LW, her children’s guardian

I will begin by stating my decisions about the two children, J and K.

In respect of K, I will make a child arrangements (lives with) order in favour of F, her father.

In respect of J, I will appoint Q as her special guardian.

In respect of both girls, I endorse the local authority’s proposed arrangements for them to spend time with M, their mother. I consider the arrangements should develop organically and not be set in stone. I trust F and Q to ensure that the arrangements will change in accordance with the girls’ developing needs and any other changes in circumstances. I do not consider it accords with the girls’ welfare interests to make any separate order to that effect but my conclusions will be recorded in this judgment and in the local authority’s plans as approved by me.

My reasons in brief summary are these.

I have concluded that at the time the local authority issued these proceedings, both girls were suffering serious harm, that there was a likelihood of further serious harm, and that that was all as a result of the care they were receiving.

I have assessed the girls’ needs and the ability of those around them to meet their needs.

I consider the assessments of the various adults have been fair and I accept them. Mary Cullen was responsible for the parenting assessments, but Matt Grime-Marsh, who has taken a leading role within the local authority in terms of the social work carried out in relation to them, and LW, their children’s guardian, have also carried out their own, separate, considerations of what is in the girls’ best interests. Furthermore, they have, I consider, done so with an open mind. In relation to the children’s guardian, that open mind was demonstrated during the course of this hearing, as she reacted to the evidence as it unfolded and gave her final recommendations only on the final day of the hearing.

I also give weight to the parents’ positions at the end of the hearing. Sometimes judges need to make decisions where one or both of the parents strongly oppose what the professional practitioners are asking the court to do. I will explain the positions each of the parents, and Q, took.

From the start of the hearing, F supported the position taken by the local authority. There was no sense of triumphalism on his part. He has faced difficulties and met challenges in this case and the court ultimately has concluded that he is able to meet K’s global needs.

In this case, the children’s mother tenaciously and with great feeling sought during the hearing to achieve a different outcome. She was a powerful voice for her girls. Her case could not have been more loyally put by Ms Hughes, her counsel. But I also sense that M and Ms Hughes, both of them, were reacting with similar care to that of other professional practitioners to all of the evidence. By the end of the hearing, M had come to the painful but realistic conclusion that she is currently unable to ask the court to return the girls to her care. That shows insight on her part. It also shows great courage, because her love for the girls is without question. And M is not only an individual who loves her daughters dearly but instinctively is able to recognise what is best for them, however hard coming to that recognition has been for her.

For her part, Q has stood up to be counted where others might well have baulked; she, of course, is not present, and I would be grateful if the local authority would pass on my warm thanks to her for her commitment. Her brief appearance in court yesterday reassured me that her eyes are open wide, and her strength of character shone through. While I am sorry to hear that her relationship with M has come under strain, in one sense I am not surprised to hear that; it illustrates that tension between loyalty to a friend and loyalty to the child for whom she is responsible.

It is going to be necessary for me to set out in greater detail the background to these proceedings, the law that applies, and my analysis and fuller reasons for the decisions I have made. But I considered it appropriate to state my conclusions at the start, and to give everyone an opportunity for a five minute break before I explain myself in greater detail. Everyone is welcome to stay in court but I will understand entirely if anyone feels that they would prefer to leave. My judgment will be delivered from detailed notes, but they are so extensive that I will be able to turn them into a written judgment which will be circulated to everyone within a relatively short time after this hearing has concluded. So if anyone does not remain, they will get to see what I have said.

Before I rise, I will say a few further things. I wish all the very best to the girls and their families for the future which I hope will be a bright one following what have been stressful court proceedings. There will be ups and downs in future, no doubt, as in everyone’s lives. Someone referred to M as being on a journey. One of the things that has struck me, particularly as the hearing drew to a close, is that she, unlike many, many others in different cases I have been involved in over the years, has made real progress in developing herself despite real difficulties she has experienced. She has sought help; help has been available; and I encourage her with all the force at my command, to continue that process; she, and her girls, will be the winners.

I will now rise for five minutes.

I am considering the experiences of J, a girl aged nine, and K, a girl aged seven, and plans for their upbringing. In particular, I am considering the issues of responsibility for any harm each of the girls may have suffered, the risks of any future harm, and plans for future arrangements in relation to them. I will refer in this judgment to each girl by her first name, and collectively as “the girls” or “the children”.

The girls’ mother is M. J’s father is D. He has played no part in these proceedings. K’s father is F.

The position now is that J is living with an old friend of M whose name is Q. K is living with F. J is subject to an interim care order and K is subject to a child arrangements (lives with) order in favour of F. For the purposes of the proceedings before me, Greenwich Royal Borough Council is the designated local authority and I will refer to it within this judgment as “the local authority”. It administers the geographical area in London where the girls formerly resided with M.

I have heard evidence and submissions at a hearing which started on 17 November 2025 and will conclude today, and I will decide whether the criteria for the court to consider the local authority’s applications are met and, if so, the future needs of the children and the ability of various others to meet their needs.

The local authority started the proceedings by making an application for care orders in relation to the children. Mr Matt Grime-Marsh is an officer of the local authority who is a practice leader and manages Monique Christian who has, lately, carried out social work on the ground with members of the family. However, Mr Grime-Marsh, who was responsible for preparation of the local authority’s final evidence, has, it is clear, remained actively involved. He attended throughout the hearing. The local authority was represented by Mr William Dean.

There are various respondents to the local authority’s application, some of whom I have already mentioned, who are all family members.

M, the children’s mother, attended throughout and was represented by Ms Mary Hughes.

F, K’s father, attended throughout and was represented by Ms Shaheen Marriott.

The children with whom I am concerned, have a children’s guardian who is Ms LW. The children were represented by Ms Susan Stamford.

I am grateful to everyone for the assistance they have given me. I will say a little about the advocacy I have experienced, which has reminded me of the importance of specialist advocates carrying out this difficult work.

Mr Dean marshalled the case on behalf of the local authority with skill and assurance and what I sense was considerable preparation. His approach was forensic; he followed some of the fundamental rules of the questioning of witnesses which perhaps, are on occasion less evident in the family court than they should be. Examination in chief can sometimes be treated as the less exacting exercise when compared with cross-examination but it requires skills which were evident throughout. While never wavering from his duty to ensure that his client’s case was properly put, he also demonstrated sensitivity in his examination of M, thus ensuring that the court could be confident that her evidence had not been extracted by means of unfair questioning. He also demonstrated flexibility in the way he engaged with the case’s changing landscape, and the court’s questions.

Ms Hughes’s seasoned advocacy greatly assisted her client in ensuring that her case was loyally and realistically advanced. Her questions of the various practitioners in cross-examination were put with appropriate rigour but without rancour. She avoided the pitfalls of asking one – or more – too many questions, focusing throughout on what was material, and thus paved the way for her submissions at the conclusion. Her submissions about her client’s anxieties of marginalisation were well made. It was also apparent – although this clearly happened in private – that she was, throughout, applying the twin duties not only of skilfully representing her client but also advising her, while ensuring at the same time that her client’s position was properly protected. Thus it was that as the hearing concluded, she articulated with great sensitivity her client’s changed position, while seeking to ensure that what her client sought was not treated as peripheral.

Ms Marriott applied a technique deployed by any successful advocate, that of knowing not only what to say but what not to say. Her questions were, appropriately, short in number, but there was not a wasted word. Again, her contribution, in circumstances where it was necessary for her to steer a careful course between supporting a position which had been fully endorsed by some but not by all professional practitioners and avoiding unnecessary acrimony, was skilfully maintained.

Ms Stamford did not simply mop up at the end of the row. She put forward a distinctive position on behalf of her clients and effectively ensured that by the end of the hearing, each witness’s evidence had been thoroughly tested. The absence of complacency in her representations and her efforts throughout to assist the court created in my mind reassurance that the children’s voices were being heard.

I was fortunate indeed in having advocates before me of the calibre I did.

I will now describe the essential background facts, including the history of this court case.

J is now nine years old.

K is now seven years old.

M and F separated the following year, and there were arrangements in place for K’s time to be divided between her parents.

I will now say a little more about the children’s parents. Little is known to the court about J’s father, D. He does not have parental responsibility for J and has no contact with her; his whereabouts are unknown and there was insufficient information to enable the Department for Work and Pensions to trace him.

As I have said, K’s parents were in a relationship and are separated. As I will go on to explain, both parents have strengths – including, in particular, that of emotional warmth. Like all of us, they have vulnerabilities as well. I consider that these proceedings have been a huge strain on both. Despite those stresses, M, for her part, has been able to make real progress in terms of improving her mental health. Difficulties she has experienced in terms of her mental health before the proceedings began led, in turn, to impairment of her ability to meet the needs of the girls. But she is not, of course, defined by those difficulties alone, and has a number of attractive qualities as an individual and as a mum. F, too, has various impressive abilities which have enabled him to step into the role of primary care giver to K. He, too, has had to overcome various difficulties he has experienced in recent months, including separation from his partner and the upheaval and changes to his lifestyle that has meant, inevitably impacting on K herself, who has experienced a change of school, a change of home and losses of a number of individuals important to her. K’s dad has had to assume new responsibilities for her and has, I consider, struggled at times to manage the various demands on him.

On 29 August 2024, over a year ago, the local authority applied for care orders in relation to both girls.

At a hearing on 2 September 2024, the court made the interim care order in respect of J and the temporary child arrangements order in respect of K to which I have already referred. J was initially placed in foster care but moved to live with Q in February of this year.

The proceedings have not run altogether smoothly. There were three case management hearings, and two issues resolution hearings. My survey of the various orders would suggest that the essential reason was to ensure that all realistic options were properly explored. There have also been a number of different children’s guardians appointed, and more than one social worker. This must have been unsettling for the parents in particular, but I have been impressed with the way in which the various new practitioners have risen to the challenge of immersing themselves in the proceedings. Mr Grime-Marsh and the children’s guardian each demonstrated in their written and oral evidence detailed knowledge of the history which underpinned their respective analyses.

There have been a number of assessments which I have considered. Dr Tom McClintock, a practitioner well known to this court, carried out a psychiatric assessment of M. Dr Peter Maggs, another practitioner well known to the court, carried out a psychological assessment of F. Neither expert’s report was challenged. Mary Cullen, an independent social worker, carried out parenting assessments of the three adults who were putting themselves forward as carers for the children, including a recent updating assessment, earlier this month, in relation to M. Mr Grime-Marsh carried out a together and apart sibling assessment and, in his various statements, drew together the extensive history leading to his final analysis and conclusions.

The parties not being agreed as to the outcome of the proceedings, the final hearing came before me on 17 November 2025 with a time estimate of four days.

I will now explain the positions of each of the parties at the conclusion of the hearing. In some cases, that position changed during the hearing’s course.

The local authority’s position was that I should appoint Q as J’s special guardian and, in respect of K, I should make a child arrangements (lives with) order in favour of F.

M’s position – as I have said, at the conclusion of the hearing – was that she did not oppose the orders sought by the local authority, but sought in addition a child arrangements (spends time with) order in her favour, providing for a minimum level of contact between the children and her.

F’s position in relation to K was that I should make a child arrangements (lives with) order in his favour. He was neutral in relation to whether I should make a child arrangements (spends time with) order in favour of M.

The children’s guardian’s position was that she sought permission to withdraw an earlier application she had made for an adjournment, and supported the position of the local authority, subject to seeking various assurances in relation to the detail of the support available.

It has therefore been necessary for me to decide:

I will now explain in greater detail the legal framework that applies to my decision-making. The law I apply is to be found in various sources: first, statutory law (such as Acts of Parliament) and, second, case law (decisions by judges senior to me involving other individuals and organisations which contain principles I am required to follow).

Some of the issues before me were issues of case management. In those circumstances, the overriding objective to the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (“FPR 2010”) applies, that is to say, in exercising my powers given to me by those rules and in the interpretation of any rule, I must seek to give effect to the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly having regard to any welfare issues involved. A number of examples are given of dealing with a case justly and I will consider those when I make my decisions.

I turn to my power to adjourn hearings. Section 31F(1) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, as amended by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, empowers me to adjourn a hearing at any time. My general powers of management of cases set out in Part 4 of FPR 2010 also include the power to adjourn a hearing. My powers are to be exercised having regard to the overriding objective in Part 1 of FPR 2010, which I have already described. I emphasise that a decision to adjourn does not depend on any application for an adjournment having been made.

My power to permit parties to withdraw applications they have made is to be found within rule 29.4 of FPR 2010. Once an application has been made in relation to a child, it may only be withdrawn with the court’s permission. A request for withdrawal may be made in writing or orally, but only orally if the parties are present. The overriding objective applies to any such request, and the authorities tell me that I must consider whether there is any “solid” advantage to the application proceeding: London Borough of Southwark v B [1993] 2 FLR 559 at 573; followed in Re N (Leave to Withdraw Care Proceedings) [2000] 1 FLR 134 at 137.

I now turn to the law applicable to my other decision-making in relation to the children in this case. It is necessary for me to consider and, where necessary, apply various provisions within Parts I to IV inclusive of CA 1989.

Section 31(2) of CA 1989 provides, where material: “A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied (a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and (b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him …” The questions for the court set out at (a) and (b), above, are frequently referred to in relevant case law as the “threshold criteria” since they are matters which must be proven in order to enable the court to go on to consider whether to make a care order. In other words, if the threshold criteria were not found to be met, the applications for care orders would fall to be dismissed at that stage.

In Re A (A Child) [2015] EWFC 11, Sir James Munby P reminded practitioners of the judgment of Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 in which it is said: “…society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done.”

I must resolve any question of disputed fact by applying the civil standard of proof (which means that I must be satisfied that it is more likely than not that the matter disputed in fact happened) and the civil burden of proof (which means that the person seeking to prove any allegation is the person who must prove it to my satisfaction): Re B (Children) [2009] 1 AC 11, [2008] 2 FLR 141, [2008] 3 WLR 1, [2008] Fam Law 837, [2008] Fam Law 619, [2008] UKHL 35, [2008] 2 FCR 339, [2008] 4 All ER 1.

If the court is satisfied that the threshold criteria are met, the court is required:

Finally, the court is required to apply in respect of both children the “no order” principle (CA 1989, section 1(5)).

Most of the specific statutory provisions relating to child arrangements orders with which I am concerned are set out in sections 8 to 11 of CA 1989. Section 8(1) of CA 1989 defines a child arrangements order as an order regulating arrangements relating to any of the following: with whom a child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact, and when a child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact with any person. Local authorities are not permitted to apply for a child arrangements order: section 9(2) of CA 1989. I am able to make a child arrangements order on the application of a person entitled to apply for one or if I consider that the order should be made even though no application has been made: CA 1989, section 10(1).

The statutory law relating to special guardianship orders is set out in sections 14A to 14G inclusive of CA 1989. I will set out only the material provisions. A “special guardianship order” is an order appointing one or more individuals as a child’s special guardian, or special guardians. What are the qualifications for being a special guardian? A special guardian must be aged eighteen or over and must not be a parent of the child in question. I am able to make a special guardianship order on the application of an individual who is entitled to make such an application or has obtained the leave of the court to make the application or of my own initiative. There are provisions for a local authority to investigate the circumstances, and matters which must be addressed in a report for the court. In considering whether to make a special guardianship order, I must apply the principles set out earlier in respect of my welfare and proportionality evaluations. Before making any special guardianship order, I must also consider whether to make a child arrangements order containing contact provision, and whether to vary or discharge any existing order under section 8 of CA 1989: in that respect, I note that there is already a temporary child arrangements (lives with) order, but no other section 8 order, in respect of K, and an interim care order (and, accordingly, no section 8 order) in respect of J. The effect of a special guardianship order is that while it is in force, a special guardian has parental responsibility for the child, and is able to exercise parental responsibility to the exclusion of any other person with parental responsibility – subject to the terms of any other order which may be in force, and subject to any law which requires the consent of more than one person with parental responsibility in a matter affecting the child.

I turn to consider more of the relevant case law in greater detail.

In Re B-S (Children) (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2014] 1 WLR 563, [2014] 1 FLR 1035, Sir James Munby, the President of the Family Division detailed what is expected of me: “The judicial task is to evaluate all the options, undertaking a global, holistic and … multi-faceted evaluation of the child’s welfare which takes into account all the negatives and the positives, all the pros and cons, of each option.” The President went on to quote McFarlane LJ in Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965: “What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared, side by side, against the competing option or options.” The President also referred (again, citing McFarlane LJ’s judgment in Re G) to the potential danger of adopting a linear approach (ie evaluation and elimination of each individual option in turn before selecting the option at the end of the line simply on the basis that it is the only remaining outcome) to the exercise.

My assessment of the risks is one of the key elements of this case: among them, any risks associated with the permanency provisions within the local authority’s plans for the children, and any risks associated with the other options before me. In assessing those risks, I have in mind a recent decision of the Court of Appeal, Re T (Children: Risk Assessment) [2025] EWCA Civ 93. In that case, Peter Jackson LJ set out a series of seven questions to be addressed, adapting the questions as necessary to the facts of the individual case, for the purposes of a structured analysis of risk. In commending such an analysis, Peter Jackson LJ said this: “It must be remembered that risk assessment is about the realistic assessment of risk, not about the elimination of all risks. Likewise, the assessment of actual or likely harm is not the same thing as an all-round welfare assessment.”

I also have in mind throughout my welfare and proportionality evaluations “the longstanding proposition of English childcare law that the aim must be to make the least interventionist possible order”, per Dame Siobhan Keegan in In the matter of H-W (Children) (No 2) (Rev1) [2022] 1 WLR 3243, [2022] UKSC 17, [2022] 3 FCR 46, [2022] 4 All ER 683. There is no presumption or right for a child to be brought up by a member of his or her natural family: see M (A Child) (Placement Order) [2025] EWCA Civ 214, per King LJ, citing earlier case law.

In Re W (Care Proceedings: Functions of Court and Local Authority) [2013] EWCA Civ 1227 [2014] 2 FLR 43, the President commented that the principles in that case and in B-S, to which I have already referred, “will for the future inform practice in all care cases”. There have been a number of other authorities binding on me since those cases were decided over ten years ago. But the key principles from those earlier cases are firmly in my mind. I am required to conduct a “global, holistic evaluation” in relation to the children, and to consider whether the local authority has provided the evidence to enable the court to undertake the welfare and proportionality evaluations.

Mr Dean also referred me to two non-family civil cases, TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 and, more recently, Smith & ors v Campbell & ors [2025] EWHC 3011 (Ch), which I have considered.

Throughout, I must have regard to the rights of the children and other relevant family members to family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the ECHR”) and the rights of all respondents to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the ECHR. I must make no order unless it is necessary and proportionate for me to do so.

That concludes my survey of the law.

I had a bundle which was a little under 600 pages long, a separate bundle containing contact notes, and various loose documents sent to me in advance of and during the course of the hearing. I have not read every page of the bundles, but I have read key documents, and have considered not only documents drawn to my attention by the advocates, but also other documents, to get a full grasp of the issues before me.

I heard oral evidence from the following witnesses: Ms Mary Cullen, an independent social worker who had assessed both parents and Q; Mr Grime-Marsh, the allocated social worker; M, the children’s mother; and LW, the children’s guardian. F did not seek to give evidence and no one sought to challenge him. I also heard from Q, who attended via video link for part of the hearing but, without opposition from the parties, did so without requiring her to take an oath or affirmation.

On 17 November 2025, the first day of the hearing, I heard preliminary submissions. There were no issues in dispute as to how I should proceed. I heard evidence from Ms Mary Cullen and her evidence was completed by the end of the court day.

On 18 November 2025, the second day of the hearing, I heard evidence from Mr Grime-Marsh and from M. Again, their evidence was completed by the end of the court day.

On 19 November 2025, the third day of the hearing, Q joined the hearing via video link. I express my thanks to the representatives and to my court clerk for their efficiency in organising these arrangements at relatively short notice. It meant that it was unnecessary for me to interrupt the hearing of evidence and submissions. Having consulted the advocates, I put various questions to Q which she answered. Once Q had left the hearing, I heard evidence from the children’s guardian. That took until lunchtime, giving everyone a break to prepare their closing submissions which I heard in the afternoon. I then reserved judgment.

Thanks in large part to the efficiency of the advocates in asking their questions and making their submissions, I have been able to conclude this hearing within the time available without any sense of rush. These are important decisions for the parents and for the children – possibly the most important decisions in their childhoods. While the court is required to ensure that cases of this kind are conducted expeditiously, they must also be dealt with fairly in order to ensure that justice is done having regard to the various issues of welfare. I pay tribute, as I have said, to those involved in ensuring that the hearing has happened in a timely way.

On 20 November 2025, the fourth day of the hearing, I give judgment.

I will now say something about my impression of each of the witnesses.

Ms Cullen. She was a robust, straightforward witness who answered crisply the questions put to her, in particular by Ms Hughes in a well-judged cross-examination.

Mr Grime-Marsh. He was equally robust but was also a thoughtful and calm witness. He demonstrated his compassion, a hallmark of a social worker whose abilities go beyond competence. That compassion was visible not only when he was in the witness box but also during the hearing when he displayed thoughtfulness when, at times, M struggled to manage her emotions.

M. The day when she was giving evidence was, as Ms Hughes observed, a difficult day for her, and I could sense that strain when she was in the witness box. She gave sometimes spirited responses to well-prepared cross-examination by Mr Dean. I found it interesting that she described some of the techniques she had learned through therapy – how to manage stressful situations, for example – and I saw what appeared to me to be her putting some of those techniques into effect during cross-examination. There were, towards the end of her evidence, long pauses, thoughtful pauses; and I sensed that these came when she found it stressful to address difficult questions, or perhaps when she realised that something she had said contradicted the impression she had wanted to give, and paused in order to compose herself. She is plainly devoted to both her children.

The children’s guardian. I considered she demonstrated during her oral evidence how hard she had worked in the short time since she had become the children’s guardian. She engaged with the questions asked of her and I could sense her thinking, metaphorically, on her feet.

I turn to the most important part of my judgment, my analysis of the various issues.

The parties agreed that the threshold criteria were met. That does not remove the court’s obligation to decide for itself whether that is so. I have considered carefully the agreed final threshold document. I am satisfied that on the basis of the admissions made within that document, at the time protective measures were taken in relation to each of the children, 29 August 2024, the date of issue of care proceedings, each had suffered significant harm and there was a likelihood that each would suffer future significant harm. I am also satisfied that the harm in each case is attributable to unreasonable parenting. The document should be annexed to my final order and referred to within the recitals. I do not consider it necessary to articulate within this judgment all the factual matters recorded. As Mr Dean observed, it is to M’s considerable credit that she was able to accept what she did, and in such detail. To describe the findings in depth in this judgement, when they are already available for those necessary to see them, would, I consider, be likely to cause unnecessary distress in a case which is already distressing. Having said that, a number of the facts relevant to the question whether the threshold criteria are met are highly relevant to my welfare evaluation, and I will refer to them as necessary later in this judgment.

To that evaluation I now turn. For a conclusion that the threshold criteria are met only provides a legal basis on which the court can go on to consider the children’s welfare needs and the ability of relevant persons to meet those needs. I now analyse the realistic options before me and do so by reference to the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of CA 1989. My paramount consideration is each child’s welfare.

First, I consider the ascertainable wishes and feelings of each of the children in the light of their ages and levels of understanding. K, in particular, has indicated her closeness to her mother who was, of course, her primary carer following the parents’ separation and nurtured her from her early life onwards. It is not surprising, to my mind, that K has on occasion expressed the wish to return to her mother’s care and some feelings of unhappiness about her current situation. But she has also, sometimes on the same occasion as she has expressed unhappiness, displayed cheerfulness and happiness in connection with being with her father. It is necessary to be balanced about this. Some of her experiences since the court decided that she should move from M and live with F have involved significant further loss. Before then a number of her needs were being neglected. I consider there must have been times when she has not known whether she is coming or going. There is also the recent report of her having been smacked by F which I consider is likely to be relevant to her recent expression of her wishes. I will say more about that later in this judgment. Alongside K’s expressed wishes, it is also necessary for me to consider her feelings; and there are a number of examples within the evidence of warmth and affection towards her father as well as towards her mother. J, too, has shown warmth and affection towards her mother, and to her primary carer, Q. I consider that the account of the meeting set out in the children’s guardian’s analysis was both revealing and insightful. I consider that neither child is of an age where their wishes or their feelings are central; to a large extent it is the adults around them who need to make important decisions about how their needs are best met. Not least because I do not consider that either child necessarily has a full appreciation of the nature of the experiences they have had and why it has been necessary for them to be separated from their dearly-loved mother and indeed from each other.

I go on to consider the physical, emotional and educational needs of the children. Many of those needs are ordinary in each case: the need to be physically safe; to have a roof over their heads; to be nourished and nurtured; to experience the warmth of family life; and to go to school to achieve their academic potentials. Not all of those needs have been fully met in the past. I consider each girl’s emotional needs to be more complicated. I asked Ms Cullen whether their emotional needs were elevated in that respect. Ms Cullen thought not, but I am not convinced that she necessarily understood fully the question I had asked: perhaps I might have articulated it better. I consider it highly likely that due to the harm and losses they have experienced, each girl’s emotional needs are heightened. I am thinking here of some of the threshold findings which have, I am satisfied, made each of the children more vulnerable to further harm and more susceptible to reaction to significant change. It is necessary for this court to bear those factors keenly in mind, as I have done.

I will consider the likely effect on each of the children of any change in their circumstances when I compare and contrast the realistic options open to me later in this judgment.

I have considered the children’s ages, the fact that both are girls, their backgrounds and any characteristics of theirs which I consider relevant. There is nothing for me to address under this head which is not considered elsewhere in this judgment.

I turn to consider any harm which the children have suffered or are at risk of suffering. Here, again, I have in mind the harm each child experienced and the future risks of harm identified in the agreed threshold document. Those threshold admissions are highly relevant to my evaluation of risk within this analysis of the children’s welfare. So too is the harm succinctly summarised in the children’s guardian’s recent analysis. I will consider the risks in greater detail when I turn to consider the capability of relevant adults to meet their needs. But they are not the only risks I consider. Some of the risks arise from other matters such as, importantly, the girls’ separation from their mother and from each other. Addressing the issue of sibling separation at this stage, I have considered the together and apart assessment. I have borne in mind the collaborative way in which Q and F between them have kept that sibling bond not only alive but thriving by means of frequent overnight arrangements at weekends. I share the misgivings expressed by the children’s guardian that perhaps these arrangements have been at the expense of K missing out on fun times with her father on “non-alarm days” due to his working commitments, and perceiving her sister’s life during the week as being similar to what she experiences at weekends when she is with Q and with her sister. It is to F’s considerable credit that he is participating in the arrangements for K during the week when, perhaps, there is less time for fun, despite the many opportunities for warmth and affection. I also bear in mind that school nights are, generally speaking, unlikely to involve pleasant outings with family and friends. While those nights are concrete examples of what being a parent is all about, and how that status is demonstrated in practical terms to K, I recognise that some rebalancing may need to occur. I am reassured that the local authority is alive to these issues and I consider that my approval of the arrangements recommended by the local authority coupled with my overall conclusions about the well-motivated instincts of Q and F alike will enable the arrangements to develop in a way which, ultimately, will promote K’s welfare while ensuring that her relationship with her sister is maintained. Such a balanced approach will, ultimately, be to both girls’ advantages. I will say more about the arrangements for both girls to spend time with their mother later in this judgment.

My next task is to assess the capability of each parent of meeting each child’s needs, and the capability of any other person to whom I consider that question to be relevant.

I need say very little about D. As I said earlier, he has played no part in these proceedings and has no role in J’s life. There is no basis for any conclusion that he is capable of meeting his daughter’s needs. Life story work has been mentioned, rightly, in the concluding stages of this hearing, and I consider that it may be appropriate, bearing in mind J’s identity needs and the difference between her and her sister in respect of one having a committed father, for the life story work to include suitable consideration of D so that J has a healthy understanding of the position. I bear in mind another insightful observation by the children’s guardian, namely that J expressed some confusion about K having F as her dad but him not being hers; this was poignant, in circumstances where F has, of course, been heavily involved in her life as well as her sister’s.

M. Gestationally, genetically and socially she is the children’s mother, and her motherhood is indeed a powerful factor for me to take into account in terms of her capability of meeting the children’s needs. I have already drawn attention earlier in this judgment to some of her strengths and weaknesses. Positives are identified throughout the evidence of Ms Cullen, Mr Grime-Marsh, the children’s guardian and her predecessors, which was conspicuously fair. So too are the negative features which have led me to the conclusion that I should accept the recommendations of the local authority and the children’s guardian. I consider that the limitations in M’s care of the girls which led to their separation from her arose in large part from her mental health difficulties; her own health needs were not being met, and she was in turn unable to meet, globally or to a good enough standard, the girls’ needs. Another cogent example of M seeking to meet her own needs at the potential expense of the girls’, skilfully explored by Ms Stamford in her cross-examination of M, related to M’s seeking, prematurely in my judgement, to involve the girls in a blossoming relationship with her partner. I do not consider for one moment that M was seeking, deliberately, to cause the girls emotional harm in that respect; the trouble, indeed, is that it was unwitting, and M did not appear to me, in her oral evidence, fully to have grasped that. I consider that there have been significant strides forwards in M’s case; she has actively sought help with her mental health, leading, so it would appear, to significant improvements; she has also improved the state of the property. I sensed from her oral evidence her keenness to emphasise that she has made the changes that she has, and her wish not to look backwards but to look forwards. That is an understandable reaction by her, but it is important that I have focused not only on the present and future for the girls but also on what has led to where we are now. Perhaps, agonising though the loss of the girls must have been for M, it has enabled her to focus more on herself. She is, metaphorically, on a continuing journey and, impressively, even within the context of a demanding court hearing, has continued to pursue channels to enable self-improvement. She has not always found it easy to engage with those there to help her and it is to her credit that she has done so; and not just to her credit; it has made a difference. The contact notes, including those drawn attention to during the hearing, illustrate some of the strengths and weaknesses well. In a contained environment and for a short period, M has been able to make the arrangements enjoyable and fun for the children, making the most of limited resources within the contact centre. But she is not always able to manage the competing needs of demanding children; her boundary-setting has not always been adequate, and some of the things said to the children have not always been appropriate or likely to underpin the stability of their existing placement; and sometimes, by contrast, she has said nothing when it would have been better for her to have said something. All this is, in one sense, extremely understandable; M has wished to make the most of the sessions and that may account for their sometimes “hectic” quality noted by the children’s guardian in her commentary on the contact notes. I considered the children’s guardian’s analysis of the contact notes to be particularly insightful. Perhaps M has wanted to avoid rifts during the children’s precious time with her. So while there are strengths, my ultimate conclusion is that despite that improvement, her vulnerabilities are such that she continues to be unable to be the primary carer of J and K; but she has much to offer them as their mother.

F. Genetically and socially, he is K’s father and his parenthood is an equally magnetic factor. Again, I record and give weight to the assessment of him by Ms Cullen, which was a balanced assessment. I also consider subsequent developments. They culminated in the local authority maintaining its recommendations and, eventually, the children’s guardian, having considered all the evidence thus far and having sought and obtained various assurances from the local authority about future provisions, also supporting K remaining with him. I was troubled that F became defensive in relation to what K had said about being smacked by him. I was, on the other hand, reassured that K felt able to express her feelings to other trusted adults around her. Not only is that a protective factor but it also demonstrates, to my mind, that F has not sought to undermine K’s ability to express her feelings to professional practitioners; were he to do so, that would be deeply damaging. On the other hand, extremely importantly, in my judgement, F has been willing, including recently, to say to professional practitioners when he is struggling: for example with the stress of the house move, and the difficulties associated with separation from his partner. It is important that F hears loudly and clearly from me how important it is that he seeks help when he needs it. Perhaps his sense, explained to the children’s guardian, that he is not in need of ongoing social work support, is more based on his desire to return to normality, and to concentrate on family life; this is a good ambition, but what is to be avoided is a situation in which due to his understandable wishes, social care involvement later becomes necessary, and amounts to greater interference with family life than would be the case if he were to seek help at an earlier stage. Ultimately, I consider that there is good reason for me to conclude that F has learned from recent experience and also that with finality to these proceedings, realistic prospects of the tension, which may have led to poor management of his emotions, diminishing. I also consider it an important part of my evaluation that he has sought, in concert with Q, to support the girls’ relationships with each other in an imaginative way. Nor do I detect that he has sought to undermine M; on the contrary, he rightly and importantly recognises the central role she has in K’s life. Were it otherwise, his parenting capability would be significantly impaired and the risk of harm to K considerably greater. The trust which this court reposes in him is an important reason why I consider that the best way for the arrangements to develop is organically rather than by means of court compulsion. Ultimately, I am satisfied that F is able to meet K’s global physical, emotional and educational needs. He is a good dad, and clearly loves his daughter.

I must also consider other people to whom I consider the question of capability to be relevant. Here, I consider in particular Q. Many of my conclusions echo what I have said in relation to F. But a feature of hers which she does not share with F is an important one to record, namely her commitment arising out of friendship and long-standing knowledge of the children, since they were born, as opposed to familial ties. The local authority placed on record its gratitude to Q and was right to do so. The family court is so often grateful to individuals who step in to meet the needs of a child where, for whatever reason, that child’s parent is unable to do so. It is comparatively rare in my experience for a non-family member not only to put themselves forward but also to participate fully in the rigorous assessment which is rightly involved; some drop out much earlier in the process, perhaps realising the magnitude of what is involved. Not Q; she engaged fully, was tested, and was found true. Something she told the children’s guardian resonates; Q said she was clear that she has always seen both children as part of the family, and caring for them is just an extension of that. I am satisfied on the basis of the assessment of her by Ms Cullen, of the subsequent considerations by Mr Grime-Marsh and by the children’s guardian, that she is able to meet J’s global physical, emotional and educational needs.

Now I consider the range of powers available to me under CA 1989 in these proceedings. I do not consider this to be a case where I can properly make no order. Manifestly, the children’s interests demand a legal structure. All that said, the “no order” principle applies in respect of all the various orders it is open to me to make; a decision to make one order does not remove the obligation to apply section 1(5) to the other options before me. I will draw the threads together, with the principles set out in section 1 of CA 1989 firmly in my mind.

This is a case where I have sufficient evidence to make decisions. Further delay will, in my judgement, be unacceptable delay.

These are my conclusions in the light of my analysis so far.

I have weighed up all the welfare considerations and reached the following conclusions.

I permit the children’s guardian to withdraw her application for an adjournment because I decided, in agreement with her recommendation, that the court had sufficient evidence to make robust decisions in the interests of the girls. An adjournment would have led to further delay which would in turn have led to stresses and strains on each of the parents, on Q with the absence of certainty, and, ultimately on the children. F and Q’s respective abilities to concentrate on the children’s needs and on their own needs would have been impaired. Sometimes adjournments are necessary in order to ensure that the court can make fair decisions. This was not such a case. On the contrary, an adjournment would have been unnecessary. That said, I do not criticise the children’s guardian in the slightest for having made the application she did; it was a responsible step for her to have taken, and she demonstrated both before and during the hearing a key professional strength: that of being able to keep a genuinely open mind.

M does not oppose the future living arrangements or the orders underpinning those living arrangements. In those circumstances, there is only one realistic option open to me in respect of J and K. I should say that even in those circumstances, it seems to me that on the basis of all the evidence I have heard and read, I am driven to such a conclusion even were it to be opposed. Looking at the advantages for K of returning to a loving mother who has much in the way of warmth and emotional security to give them, and being able to live together under the same roof, and taking into account the undoubted changes M has made to her own emotional health and her home environment, I consider that those advantages are outweighed by the advantages for the girls of each living with a carer who is able to meet, globally and consistently, their physical, emotional and educational needs and is able to devote sufficient attention to that particular child, while ensuring that there is sibling contact.

In all the circumstances and for the reasons I have given, I consider it necessary and proportionate to make as a final order in these proceedings in respect of K a child arrangements (lives with) order in favour of F.

In all the circumstances and for the reasons I have given, I consider it is necessary and proportionate to vest Q with special guardianship for J and the enhanced parental responsibility which such an appointment carries with it. The evidence is overwhelming that she will use it wisely and to ensure that J’s needs are met now and in the future.

For the reasons I have given, I consider that the arrangements for the girls’ contact with their mother should begin as set out within the local authority’s plans, and then develop organically. The best starting point for the girls to have the best of relationships with their mother is a stable sense of place. That means, in my judgement, that it is necessary for the arrangements to reduce before they can stabilise and then develop in accordance with the girls’ changing needs. Furthermore, I consider that there is a need at least in the short term to do some sorting out of the practical arrangements to enable the local authority, in due course, to play less of an active role and eventually, assuming that all goes well, to step away altogether. I noted Q’s expressed apprehension about supervising contact, and this struck me not only as being entirely understandable, but something I would expect those responsible within the local authority to give careful consideration to in terms of the support it continues to give to both girls and those caring for them. In conclusion, I considered the staged process explored with the children’s guardian in her oral evidence to be helpfully detailed, although I recognise that there must at the same time be flexibility to ensure that the arrangements are meeting the girls’ needs and that there are practical arrangements in place to enable them to happen consistently.

I do not consider that the contact arrangements require to be underpinned by an order to that effect; there are a number of good reasons not to do so. I have had no regard to the absence of a written application on behalf of M, but have instead considered the issue on its merits. I do not consider that the rights to a fair hearing of any of the other parties was compromised, since M’s overall secondary position did not really come as a surprise to anyone and, as demonstrated, the other parties, all of whom were legally represented, were perfectly well able to make representations about the issue, and did. My reasons for deciding not to make such an order, flowing from my analysis, above, were as follows. The professional practitioners who have advised me agree that it is unnecessary to make an order; I am not bound to follow those recommendations but I am required to give good reasons for departing from them, and I can see no such good reason. I shared the unease of the children’s guardian about too rapid a transition from the contact centre, leading to potential failure and regression. Ms Hughes was right; there comes a point when these things need to be tested, but I do not consider the time is right for this judge to impose rigid arrangements at the stage that has been reached, when emotions have been running high and when stability now needs to be achieved. I very much hope and indeed expect that in the time lying ahead, there will be opportunities for community-based arrangements, outside the contact centre. The Science Museum was mentioned, showing M’s instinctive knowledge, based on experience, of what the girls enjoy – and also illustrating an opportunity to meet not only the girls’ emotional need to have fun, their educational need to be exposed to interesting things, but also their physical need to be active, and indeed to have hands-on experience, something at which the Science Museum, as I know from my own experience, excels. Finally, the principle that I should make no order unless satisfied that it is better for the child than making an order applies and is of huge significance. Ms Hughes realistically proposed a minimum frequency in any order, but I consider even that proposal to be insufficiently flexible. In my judgement, F and Q can each be trusted to ensure that the mother’s role in the girls’ lives is given proper respect, and that that respect is not merely theoretical but reflected in practical arrangements. There is a particular need in this case, given the absence of stability for a protracted period and uncertainty about the future arrangements for the girls, for there to be proper flexibility. The continuing involvement of the local authority under a child in need plan for at least six months reassures me that there is a further source of support for the arrangements, lowering further the risk of arrangements not happening for no good reason.

I have considered the necessity or otherwise for further protective or supportive orders, including a supervision order. Ultimately, I decided against; Mr Grime-Marsh’s position was a responsible one; his managers have acceded to representations by the children’s guardian; no one suggests a supervision order to be necessary; it would amount to ongoing interference with family life and there is a risk of it slowing rather than building on progress. The local authority will remain involved, I am convinced, for as long as is necessary, and will take a flexible approach given their ongoing duties to both children. A number of matters were explored within cross-examination of the children’s guardian by each of the advocates. I consider that those matters canvassed by Mr Dean should be encompassed within up-to-date plans from the local authority. I would propose, subject to other commitments, that those plans be uploaded within seven days of today, whereupon I will consider them and, in the absence of a need for any further enquiries by me, approve those plans, thus bringing the proceedings to an end. I also warmly endorse the proposals for video interactive guidance (or an equivalent) for F, particularly significant in light of the recent issues which arose in relation to his management of K. While recognising the local authority’s limited resources, I consider there is also much to be said for provision for VIG (or similar) being made available to M, especially given some of the difficulties recorded in the contact notes, including recent contact notes. M has demonstrated a recent willingness (unusual in my experience) to take on board new ideas, and I consider that it would be a potentially valuable investment, entirely consistent with the local authority’s duties to these children in need.

May I end by thanking once again the lawyers who have appeared before me and those who have given evidence which has assisted me greatly in coming to the determinations that I have, and those who have been present in court or otherwise participated in the proceedings. As I said at the conclusion of my earlier summary, I wish both children and their families all the very best for the future.

I would be grateful to be told whether there are any editorial corrections, any matters I have not addressed and should have addressed, and any matters where I am asked to expand on my reasons. I will give a similar opportunity when I circulate the written version of this judgment.

That concludes my judgment.

I circulated the above judgment in draft on 22 November 2025. I have made some minor editorial corrections to this approved version. I am grateful to Mr Dean for having drawn various matters to my attention, and to others for any contribution to the process.