A (Mother) v R (Father)

I am concerned in these proceedings with the welfare of the child of the family (G). G was born in May 2024. G is now aged [ ]

This is my second Judgment in respect of G. My first was a fact finding Judgment which I delivered on 29 January of this year, at the conclusion of a fact finding hearing which took place before me on 27, 28 and 29 January. This judgment should be read in conjunction with that Judgment.

In my earlier (29 January 2025) Judgment, the background is fully set out, as is the chronology of these proceedings. Importantly, my findings are set out in that Judgment and I will refer to them in summary form a little later on. Those are my findings in respect of the allegations of domestic abuse, made mainly by the mother but also those made by the father.

The parties, as before, are G’s mother, represented as before by counsel, Mr Frost and G’s father who, as before, has represented himself. I will refer again, as I have done previously, to the parties as the mother and the father.

On 29 January 2025 I made a number of findings and it is right that I should set those out in summary form. I made findings that on four separate specific instances, the father had behaved in such a way as to display verbal aggression and abuse to the mother, that he followed her into the bathroom in which she had locked herself and he kicked and punched the door causing it to have a hole or significant damage to it.

I found that in September 2023, when the mother was in the early stages of her pregnancy with G that she again had cause to barricade herself, this time in the bedroom, using a chest of drawers to avoid the father’s aggression and verbally abusive behaviour.

I found that in November 2023 the father, having been using cocaine and been drinking, screamed in the mother’s face, in B’s room, using terrible language towards her. This was in B’s presence. The mother was lying on top of B to protect B. She moved downstairs to the bathroom, the father followed her, she was unable to shut the door before he got to her. He attempted to strangle her, leaving bruising to her neck. There was then a further development of that incident when she managed to leave the bathroom but the father grabbed her again, pushing her to the ground and when she was lying on the ground he kicked her in the back. At that stage the mother was three months into her pregnancy with G.

In February 2024 the father grabbed the mother tightly by the shoulders and was verbally abusive towards her. When, eventually, he went out of the property and she locked him out, he then proceeded to knock on a bedroom window for some 45 minutes or so.

I made findings of controlling and coercive behaviour, on the part of the father. I particularly noted behaviour in June, and then further in July 2024 when he had returned to the home that the parties had previously shared at times that had not been agreed and were unexpected, and was abusive, in the presence, this time of a newly born and very young G.

My findings are appropriately and accurately summarised in a welfare report that has been prepared for this hearing by Ms Anticich of Cafcass following my fact-finding Judgment. They are set out fully in paragraph 15 of her report.

Before I leave my earlier fact finding Judgment, it is right that I should also read out the following passage, because it has significance in terms of what should happen at this point in terms of the arrangements for G’s time with the father. I read from paragraph 105 onwards of my Judgment:

“105.

The fact that these incidents occurred, particularly the two I have gone through, in a way that exposed B to the father’s anger and abuse is very concerning. The fact that the latter three incidents were clearly ones during which the mother was pregnant is also, in my view, of significance. This was a pregnancy in which the father, himself, accepts the mother was concerned about the possibility of miscarriage, and there are messages between the parties which refer to her bleeding and it is clear that it was not an easy pregnancy. In those circumstances, the father’s behaviour is all the more concerning and he did not speak of those issues or those concerns in any way as being his own concerns. He did not speak about the mother’s troubles in that pregnancy as being anything that he was worried about. He did not, in his evidence, express any regret about any specific incident. He expressed no regret and indeed I am unclear how much he accepts that B may have heard but he certainly expressed no interest in B’s position and the impact of those incidents on B..

106.

In his final words to me, because, as is only right, I gave the father an opportunity to say whatever he wished to say by way of closing remarks, what he wanted me to think about, in particular, was something that he had prepared on his phone and which he read out to me. He said he had never wanted it to be like this and all he had wanted was to have a happy family life with the mother. He said he was sorry for the way he had made the mother feel. He said he was sorry but he had never put a child at risk, that G had been deprived of a normal, loving relationship with him and his family, that he had spent thousands of pounds pursuing this and that he would continue to do so because his focus is on G. He said the mother knows that G will be safe with him, so there was no point in all of these issues being raised. He did not want to say anything about the specific incidents or allegations either made against him or that he makes against the mother.

107.

I asked the father what he was sorry for and what, if anything, he regretted. He said that if he made the mother feel in the way that she describes that he was sorry if that was the case but there was, neither in those closing comments or in his evidence, any acceptance of the fact that his behaviour has had the effect on the mother of upsetting her, frightening her, causing her particular worries in her pregnancy, causing her stress and causing her to undergo a scan on an emergency basis on the day following the incident in November 2023.”

I will also read from paragraph 108, because it is a matter that the father has come back to a number of times:

“The mother, by contrast, was able in my view to look back on her past behaviour and the way she had, sometimes, for example messaged the father with the kind of language that she had used and she very clearly did regret some of that. She did not seek to minimise it. She did not seek to deny it or justify it or defend it.”

Elsewhere in my Judgment there is also reference to some of the mother’s behaviour when under attack by the father. I make reference to that because the father, in looking at what happened and in looking at his behaviour, seems unable to talk about that without referencing the mother’s behaviour towards him.

I should also say that in my Judgment, I made clear the reasons why I did not make any findings on the father’s rather general and unspecified allegation of controlling and coercive behaviour by the mother towards him and, in so far as it related to the mother’s behaviour in messages sent to him, I rejected the father’s allegation.

The issues that I am asked to determine in this final welfare hearing before me are as follows:

The father’s position in respect of those issues is, firstly, in respect of the arrangements for G to spend time with him, that there is no reason why his contact with G should have to continue to be supervised. He refers to supported contact as being the appropriate progression and he tells me that he has been informed by the contact centre that supported contact would mean there would still be a supervisor in the room but there would not be the provision of a contact note and that means, for him, a saving and would be about half the cost of fully supervised contact.

In respect of a Section 91(14) order and the application to restrict his parental responsibility, the father opposes both of those applications.

In terms of what has happened since my fact-finding Judgment, contact has continued to take place, by and large, and it has been positive and I note that particularly, and I hope that the father can hear it. There are some issues that the mother has raised about events in the intervening period. She is concerned about the impact of certain steps taken or information shared by the father with others and a post that he has reposted which I will come back to. But her position is very much that she has not been able, really, to settle with G and feel stable and secure since that fact-finding Judgment, and there is much that she still fears and areas in which she considers that the father exerts a degree of controlling and coercive behaviour towards her.

The parties have each filed statements in response to my fact-finding Judgment and I have considered those. I directed a Cafcass Section 7 report, in the light of my Judgment, and that has been prepared by Ms Anticich. It is dated in June of this year. She recommends that contact should continue on a supervised basis only.

The parties have then filed statements in response to the Cafcass report and I have, of course, also read those. The mother’s statement also includes the basis of her applications for the 91(14) order and also in respect of a restriction of the father’s parental responsibility. Finally, the father was given permission to file a statement which responds specifically to those applications, and he has done that and I have read and considered it.

At this hearing special measures have continued to be in place such that the mother and the father have not come face-to-face in the court room, or outside it. That includes when they were each giving evidence. The father, although self-representing, has been assisted by a qualified legal representative, Mr Margima, who put questions to the mother on his behalf.

I heard evidence, firstly, from Ms Anticich. She was questioned by Mr Frost and also, to a limited extent, by the father, limited by his choice. I then heard evidence from the mother, and then from the father, whose evidence finished today, followed by closing submissions on behalf of the mother. By way of closing submissions by the father, although encouraged by me to say whatever he wished me to think about or any observations on the evidence that I had heard, the father did not wish to make any observation or comment.

I turn now to the legal principles that I need to apply. My starting point is that this is a case in which domestic abuse has been found to be proved. Those findings were made for a reason; they were made because of their relevance to the arrangements for G and to G’s welfare going forwards. The father’s approach is one that suggests that actually there is little relevance in those findings, and the court should simply focus on what happens during his contact. He considers that because his contact is positive, there is no need for any restricted or supervised arrangement for G to spend time with him.

My earlier findings do have a bearing on G’s welfare and in an attempt to try to explain why, I am going to move on to look at the provisions of Practice Direction 12J. This is a Practice Direction which is part of the Family Procedure Rules that I need to apply. I read first of all from paragraph 4 of Practice Direction 12J:

“Domestic abuse is harmful to children and/or puts children at risk of harm including where they are victims of domestic abuse, for example, by witnessing one of their parents being violent or abusive to the other parent, or living in a home in which domestic abuse is perpetrated (even if the child is too young to be conscious of the behaviour). Children may suffer direct physical, psychological and/or emotional harm from living with and being victims of domestic abuse and may also suffer harm, indirectly, where the domestic abuse impairs the parenting capacity of either or both of their parents.”

I also refer paragraph 35 of Practice Direction 12J, which provides that when deciding the issue of child arrangements, I must ensure that any order for contact will not expose the child to an unmanageable risk of harm and will be in the best interests of the child in the light of findings of fact, admissions or domestic abuse having otherwise been established. I stress again that this is a case in which domestic abuse has been established by virtue of my findings. I am therefore required to apply the individual matters in the welfare checklist with reference to the domestic abuse which has occurred and any expert risk assessment obtained. I will come back to the welfare checklist in due course.

In particular, I am required to consider any harm which the child, as a victim of domestic abuse, and the parent with whom the child is living, has suffered as a consequence of that domestic abuse, and any harm which the child and the parent with whom the child is living is at risk of suffering if a child arrangements order is made.

I should only make an order for contact, if I am satisfied that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured before, during and after contact, and that the parent with whom the child is living will not be subjected to further domestic abuse by the other parent.

Finally, in every case where a finding or admission of domestic abuse is made or where domestic abuse is otherwise established (as it is in this case), I have to look at the conduct of both parents towards each other and towards the child and the impact of that conduct. In particular, I have to consider: the effect of the abuse on the child and on the arrangements for where the child is living; its effects on the child’s relationship with the parents; whether the parent seeking contact is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or is using the process to continue a form of domestic abuse against the other parent; the likely behaviour during contact of the parent against whom findings are made and its effect on the child; and the capacity of the parents to appreciate the effect of past domestic abuse and the potential for future domestic abuse.

So summarising all of that in just one or two sentences: I have to be satisfied that any arrangements I make for G, going forward, are safe and secure, and ones in which neither G nor the mother, with whom G lives, are placed at any risk. I should stress there is no dispute about G continuing to live with the mother, or that I should make a final Lives With order which crystalises that. The arrangements for G to spend time with the father must be safe, secure and risk free, or as risk free as possible for G, and also for the mother.

In reaching my decision, G’s welfare is my paramount consideration and G’s welfare is informed by the welfare checklist factors set out in Section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. These include a consideration of G’s wishes and feelings in the light of G’s age and understanding. Due to G’s tender age, that is more a question of looking at what G would want, if G could voice it. As to that, I have no doubt that G would want to have peace, stability, security, love and to have a good relationship with the father, as well as continue to thrive and be safe and happy in the mother’s care.

I have to look at G’s physical, emotional and educational needs. G’s physical and emotional needs are the most pertinent at G’s age. I have to consider the effect on G of any change in circumstances, the change here being the one proposed by the father from a supervised contact arrangement, to one that is only supported, and which then progresses into being without any professional intervention. I also have to consider G’s age, G’s background, G’s sex, and any characteristics which I consider to be relevant, any harm which G has suffered or is at risk of suffering, and how capable each of the parents are of meeting G’s needs. I will set out my analysis of the most pertinent welfare checklist factors further on in my Judgment.

In respect of the application for an order under Section 91(14) of the Children Act, Section 91(14) provides that on disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may, whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application, order that no application for an order under this Act, of any specified kind, may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court.

So in this case I am able to consider whether I should make any order that no application for an order under the Children Act should be made by the father without permission of the court, and I would need to determine the period of time for which that should be in place.

Section 91(14) is supplemented by Section 91A of the Children Act which makes further provision about such orders. It makes clear that the circumstances in which I can consider whether to make an order include, among others, where I am satisfied that the child concerned or another individual would be at risk of harm if I did not make that order. It is clear that I am able to make such an order of my own motion even without an application, but I stress that in this case the application has clearly been made by the mother in July this year. The father knew from Ms Anticich’s report that it was going to be an issue at this final hearing, and he has had a full opportunity to consider it and respond to it both in a statement and in his oral evidence.

In deciding whether to make that order, I also bear in mind the provisions of another Practice Direction specifically about such protective filter orders and that is Practice Direction 12Q, which specifies that Section 91(14) orders are available to prevent a person from making future applications under the 1989 Act without leave of the court. They are a protective filter made by the court in the interests of the child. I stress, an extension of that further down in paragraph 2.7, is that they are a protective filter only - they are not a bar on applications and I stress that because they are sometimes wrongly referred to as barring applications and that sends very much the wrong message and that is not a proper descriptor of what these orders are.

There is considerable scope for the use of these orders in appropriate cases. Proceedings under the Act should not be used as a means of harassment or coercive control, or further abuse against a victim of domestic abuse or other person. The court should therefore give due consideration to whether a future application would have such impact. There is discussion in the Practice Direction about cases in which there has been repeated and unreasonable applications made to the court, where a period of respite may be needed following litigation and, importantly, where a period of time is required for certain actions to be taken for the protection of the child or other person, or a person’s conduct, overall, is such that an order is merited to protect the welfare of the child directly or indirectly due to the damaging effects on a parent carer.

Such conduct could include harassment or other oppressive or distressing behaviour, beyond or within the proceedings including via social media and email and via third parties. Such conduct might also constitute domestic abuse. I go back to where I started this consideration of the applicable legal principles, Practice Direction 12J, which makes clear that under Section 91(14) there are orders available to prevent applications without leave, and that there should be consideration given to the merits of such an order being made in cases where there is the possibility of a future application being part of a pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour, or other domestic abuse.

In respect of the father’s parental responsibility, I have been referred to a number of cases. The most pertinent that I will quote from is the Judgment of Ms Justice Henke in the case of Re: D & E (Children: Assessment and Management of Risk)[2024] EWFC 162 and it is, in particular, paragraph 122 of her Judgment that is of direct relevance. She was, in that case, considering an application for a prohibited steps or specific issue order relating to a mother’s ability to make decisions about the child’s health and education without consulting the father and she says this:

“122.

I have considered the application for prohibited steps orders/specific issue orders relating to the mother's ability to make decisions about E's health and education without consulting the father. I accept her point that the requirement to consult him about such issues puts the mother into direct contact with the father who has been found to have abused her. The impact of that on the mother and thus, its likely impact on E who lives with her mother cannot be underestimated. The father tells me he has never interfered with her decision making and would not do so now. The problem is that the father has, I find, no insight into his behaviours and their impact on others, particularly the mother.  I factor in the father's past controlling and coercive behaviours towards the mother. Given his lack of insight into his behaviours on the mother, I find that without prohibition, there is a real possibility which needs to be guarded against that he will behave in a controlling and coercive way in the future towards the mother. Having heard the father give evidence, I agree that he acts as if he is superior to those around him and for whom he has no respect. If such behaviour did reoccur, I find that would be to E's significant detriment. I therefore consider that it is in E's welfare interests for orders to be made which limit the father's parental responsibility in the terms summarised in paragraph 67 of this judgment. However, they too should be time-limited and should expire at the same time as the s.91(14) orders.

In those circumstances, Ms Justice Henke concluded therefore that it was in the child’s welfare interests for orders to be made limiting the father’s parental responsibility in the terms summarised, time limited, to expire at the same time as the Section 91(14) protective filter.

I also bear in mind what is said in the case of Re T and another (Children: Specific Issue Order) [2024] EWCA Civ 793, a Court of Appeal decision in which Jackson LJ surveyed the statutory framework and relevant authorities and said the following:

“41.

By its clear terms, the Act provides the court with the broadest and most flexiblepowers to make welfare decisions. The powers, which are themselves a welfare checklistfactor, can be used individually or in combination. No two cases are the same and, whereorders are needed, judges should use the powers that Parliament has given them in theway that they think best meets the needs of the case.

42.

At the same time, court orders represent an interference with the freedom of parents tomake their own decisions and must be used in a way that is proportionate to thepresenting problem. The interference must be no more than is necessary to achieve thedesired outcome for the child.”

I now turn to the evidence I have read, heard and considered.

Ms Anticich has provided a thorough, detailed, comprehensive Section 7 welfare report. In the preparation of that report she had the benefit of reading the parties’ statements in response to my Judgment, as well as my fact finding Judgment. She met with the father in April this year on Teams, and then with the mother on Teams 2 days later.

Ms Anticich was able to visit G, and, as she explained in her oral evidence, it is always a requirement, on the preparation of a report, that she should see the child about whom she is giving advice or making recommendations to the court and that was the purpose of her visit, to see G in the mother’s care in May. Had G been older, the possibility of G being seen at a Cafcass office might have been explored, but at the age of X months or at the time that G was seen G was, in fact, only a year old, it was entirely appropriate and that was the only way in which G was to have been seen.

In her report, Ms Anticich records the views expressed by the parties about the court’s Judgment and about where things should go now. About the father, she makes clear, a number of times in her report, that he does not accept my findings and that he does not consider that he has been heard within these proceedings. He has expressed that he does not trust the system. He has highlighted that he has never been charged with anything and that my findings are simply my views.

In terms of other relationships in which there have been allegations made against the father, I should have said and highlight now that I did make a finding that there had been similar allegations made by the father’s ex-partner and the mother of J. I further found, however, that even without the police material which revealed that those allegations had been made, and even without making any findings on the specific allegations themselves, that I would in any event have made my findings on what was alleged by the mother against him. But that material, it seemed to me, did demonstrate that the father had a propensity for abusive behaviour, coercive and controlling and harassing behaviour in personal relationships.

Ms Anticich made clear that the father does not consider himself to have any issues in so far as his behaviour is concerned, or any issues with drugs or alcohol, and I mention that, specifically, because there seems to be a discrepancy between the information given by the father to Ms Anticich about when he last used cocaine and that given by him to Lextox who did a test by way of a nail clipping sample. To Lextox he said that June 2024 was the last point at which he had used any cocaine.

What he said to Ms Anticich, in interview, was that he has not used any cocaine since the end of 2023. That is important because to Ms Anticich, it highlights an uncertainty, and therefore an uncertainty is a continued risk that, in fact, the father may be using cocaine, that he may have an ongoing issue with it that he is not facing or addressing and she rightly raises the question about why there is that discrepancy. The father, in his evidence, says no more than it was a mistake. I take from his evidence that he gave what he says is the right date to Lextox and the wrong date to Ms Anticich.

The dates are of some relevance because he was interviewed by Ms Anticich in April 2025 and his Lextox test is October of 2024. The suggestion is that he has, in effect, tried to portray a longer period of abstinence. But I digress, I am going to go back to Ms Anticich’s report. The father, clearly, does not consider himself to have any issues with drugs or alcohol. In terms of contact, the father has stressed that it is very positive contact. That is borne out, as I have already said, by the notes and Ms Anticich makes reference to some of those notes specifically. She says he provided her with a number of supervised reports, all of which reflect a positive and nurturing interaction between him and G with no concerns raised. She quotes from the visit in February this year, where there was clearly a lot of praise from the father towards G, they were playing together, he was carrying G around, showing G things out of the window and different toys, and G was smiling back at him.

Then in March, again, G was kicking legs excitedly to see the father, he gave G a big cuddle and G seemed to be very settled, snuggled into dad’s shoulder while he spoke to and rocked G. It is of note, and it is not an issue that was explored in the evidence, that in May Ms Anticich records that the father shared with her that he was concerned about G being in the company of G’s maternal uncle because, he alleged, had a serious drug problem. That is something that Ms Anticich discussed with the mother who said yes, she knew about it, that there was a struggle with addiction and he was addressing it. In any event, she made clear that he had migrated abroad and there was no contact with him.

I will return to the issues that the mother raised with Ms Anticich about the father’s continuing behaviour and the impact it has on her shortly, save to say, at this point that the mother discussed directly a post that the father had placed on his Instagram account. She made clear that it was something she found to be humiliating and something which shows a complete disregard for herself and of G, a demonstration that the father takes no responsibility for his actions or how serious these proceedings are by posting things like this and how she does not understand why anyone would want to publicly humiliate the mother of their child. That relates to something the father says he did not create but he saw on somebody else’s feed, thought it was funny and reposted on his Instagram. It is something he describes it as a meme of a woman in what looks like a doll packet and there are various component parts of that with a major heading saying, Bitter Baby Mama. I will come back to some of the specific things in that post and the issue a bit later on.

G was observed by Ms Anticich to be very happy, to be very curious and boisterous, exploring the environment and thriving in the mother’s care. She refers to G not attending nursery at the moment but there being some childcare in place for when, and if, the mother is working. It would be right also to reference the strong family support network that the mother and G clearly have, which is also noted in Ms Anticich’s report.

Ms Anticich makes clear in her report what the risks in this case are and that those risks come from domestic abuse perpetrated by the father towards the mother, and concerns raised in relation to substance misuse. She expanded in her oral evidence on what harm G had herself suffered in the past. She was quite clear that because of the father’s abusive behaviour, G has suffered direct harm when G was still in the mother’s womb, by virtue of the father’s behaviour. That behaviour, as made clear in my findings, was significantly physically violent, and significantly abusive verbally, at various stages during the mother’s pregnancy.

In her analysis of harm, Ms Anticich was clear that G had also suffered harm indirectly through the impact of that abuse on her mother and the impact of these proceedings and the abuse following her birth. I have already made findings about the father returning to the property in June and July of 2024, and what was said in G’s presence. Ms Anticich sets out her consideration of Practice Direction 12J, and also the Safety of Spending Time Arrangements Indicator Tool, which she says identifies that the current arrangements between G and the father are safe. It is an arrangement that allows G to maintain a positive relationship with the father and promotes G’s identity. However, the father denies being a perpetrator of domestic abuse. He does not agree with the findings. He does not trust the system. He denies any harm caused to either the mother or G, and shows no insight into his behaviours and the need for personal change. She says it was evident from her interview with the mother that she remains afraid of the father and worried about the outcome of these proceedings.

In those circumstances, Ms Anticich says she is prevented from considering or promoting a staged progression to unsupervised contact between the father and G. She has considered the impact on G of ceasing direct contact because G’s safety remains the highest priority, without recognition of the risks of domestic abuse and a demonstrated commitment to addressing them, it is not possible to ensure that any changes to the contact arrangements would continue to promote G’s safety and wellbeing.

Ms Anticich concludes that, in the light of my findings and the father’s ongoing failure to acknowledge or take any responsibility for his behaviour, and the mother’s expressed fear of him, that the only appropriate and safe arrangement for facilitating contact is through a supervised contact centre. Such an arrangement provided the necessary safeguards to protect both the mother and G, whilst allowing G to continue to have a relationship with the father. Importantly, she goes on to say that her analysis leads her to the conclusion that until the level of risk is evidenced to have lowered significantly, G will be at risk of significant harm in the father’s care, outside of a professionally supervised setting.

Ms Anticich therefore recommends that: a Lives With order should be made to the mother; that a Spend Time With child arrangements order should be made in terms that G continues to spend time with the father on a supervised basis for a period of one hour every other weekend; and that communications should be via the parenting app, regarding G’s needs, particularly any health, education or contact issues. She says that the father would benefit from engaging with support around his abusive behaviours but the first step must be acknowledgment of what has happened and his wanting to address that in himself. Should the father reach that point, Ms Anticich recommends he should approach local services and search out the proper support he might engage in. In terms of travel abroad, she recommends G be permitted to travel, that this is something in any event that will be possible under a Lives With order for up to 28 days at a time, but notice and details should be given to the father at least 28 days in advance.

Ms Anticich further recommends that the father should give the following undertakings: not to consume alcohol 24 hours before any contact with G; not to take any drugs a minimum of two days prior to any contact with G; and not to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol whilst caring for, in other words having contact with G.

Finally, Ms Anticich recommends a Section 91(14) order for a period of two years in order to allow the father time to reflect, and if he so chooses, to address his behaviours with professional support.

In her oral evidence Ms Anticich did not depart from any of her recommendations. She emphasised the risk, as I have already highlighted, of harm, that risk remaining at a high level for as long as the father continues not to acknowledge the findings made about his behaviour and if he remains unable to look at himself and have any understanding of the impact of his behaviour on G and on the mother.

In terms of where the father is along any journey in this respect, Ms Anticich says it is hoped it might be a journey but at the moment the father does not even acknowledge the findings that I made or give them any credence at all. I understand what the father says, that he respects and accepts the court’s findings, but that to me says no more than his acceptance that he is not going to be able to change those findings but he makes clear that he does not consider that in my findings I have got to the truth of what really happened. He says he was there and that I was not so I can only give my views. He knows what really happened and even as I say this he is nodding again now to confirm that position.

Ms Anticich said in evidence that the father has no understanding of how or why his abusive behaviour happened. Why did he behave that way? What did he do? What was the impact of that behaviour? There is no acknowledgment or acceptance and that is, she said, where it ends. That is the obstacle, in her view, to any progress being made beyond a supervised contact arrangement.

Ms Anticich was asked questions by Mr Frost about motivation and empathy. This is, in her view, a case in which there is clearly no empathy and I certainly did not have from the father any evidence, or any sense, of his empathy or understanding of the way that his behaviours have made the mother feel.

In terms of the father’s attitude towards the mother now, Ms Anticich accepted that there does appear to be hostility, or at the very least a strong dislike, and that is something which also raises a concern. As to whether he was in some sort of pre-contemplation stage, and that is sometimes referred to as the preliminary step to being able to start on any journey of change, she accepted that the father was in fact maybe not even at that stage and agreed that he is at, I think Mr Frost put it this way, Ground Zero. He remains now, in Ms Anticich’s view, where he was at the fact-finding hearing itself.

That said, Ms Anticich accepted that the father does genuinely want to have a relationship with G.

In terms of a Section 91(14) order, Ms Anticich had recommended two years. She maintained in her oral evidence that this was the appropriate period to give time for the father to do the necessary work.

In terms of limiting the father’s parental responsibility, Ms Anticich was unsure what it was specifically the mother was seeking to restrict. She accepted that there could be a risk if the father used his parental responsibility in the ways that examples were given to her of possibilities for the future. Reference was also made particularly to what the father had observed of clicking knees when he changed G at the contact centre and the way he had responded to that, which very much suggested to the mother, through the contact supervisors, that she had not taken appropriate steps to resolve that issue. This is something G has had since birth. It is a hypermobility or hyperextension issue the father’s implication was that the mother had not reacted appropriately or cared appropriately for G, which does not seem in any way to be the case.

The father asked Ms Anticich whether there were any concerns about his relationship with J. He understood that Ms Anticich had been obliged to make a referral because of the findings in this case, but she was able to inform me of the outcome of that, which is that no action was taken by the local authority and it is right to say that there were no concerns that Ms Anticich pointed to in respect of J.

To the father, that is of significance because, obviously, he says he can be a loving, good, positive father and that he has a positive relationship with J and that is what he wants to achieve with G. He also said to Ms Anticich, less a question and more a summary of his frustration, that ‘they,’ and he does refer to the mother very much as a ‘they,’ meaning the mother and her family, have spent a lot of time and money on preventing contact between himself and G, that is what he thinks and really he did not have anything more to say than that. The father was quite clear to Ms Anticich, as he has been to me, that had he been able to afford legal representation, had he had an advocate speaking up for him at the fact finding hearing, the outcome would have been quite different.

I asked Ms Anticich whether she could give the father any clear pointers about what he might be able to access in order to begin to think about his behaviour differently. I will mention again, a little further on, that the father is having some therapy, that is something that might be an avenue of help. But he cannot be referred by Cafcass to effectively what he needs to do, which is to complete a Domestic Abuse Perpetrator Programme. The likelihood of there being a successful completion of any such programme, let alone the father being accepted on to such a programme when he is not only in denial but he is also still in a position of blaming the situation, entirely, on the behaviour of the mother towards him, that does not seem to be a likely prospect. It is very bleak for as long as the father’s mindset remains the same.

I heard then from the mother. She, importantly, explained to me that she continues to have trauma-informed therapy and that this is going well. It is more regular now but she has found it very hard to go through, very hard to speak about the experiences that she has had and the father’s behaviour towards her. She is at a stage now where she is able to reap the benefits of continuing with that therapy and she said she now has better tools which help her to manage her anxiety.

As far as the mother’s anxiety is concerned, she says that there are specific geographical areas that she will avoid, that cause her to be anxious if she is near them, in case she bumps into or sees the father. She is still frightened in her own home and she does not like being upstairs without the children, that is G and also B, being upstairs with her. She is still worried that the father may try to gain access through a window or may bang on the window, as he did before.

The mother has referred to sharing a bed so that there is that security with both G and B and how she explains that without exposing or trying not to expose them to her anxiety by saying this is a fun, sleepover sort of experience. She refers to a number of aspects of the father’s behaviour, which, since the fact-finding Judgment, she says, have caused her particular difficulty.

The first is that the father, as I have already referenced, posted on his Instagram something which on her reading of it refers, or she thinks the father would have posted to refer, to her and to the court case, and that is the post that has the heading ‘Bitter Baby Mama.’ There is a speech bubble saying, “You cannot live with your dad, I need child support.” There is a little pile of papers labelled court papers. There is a box that gives scores, drama 99, gaslighting 93, entitlement 91, narcissism 90, co-parenting 02, and also a box that says, “I want all control.”

I have observed that the face, although not perhaps the other features, but the facial features of the doll, represented twice on this post, are not dissimilar, by any means, to the mother. This has come to her attention and she has instantly thought that this has been posted by the father with a reference to her, that she is indeed the bitter baby mama. This has made her feel humiliated, and a degree of shame.

The mother has been spoken to by a mutual friend of the parties about difficulties that there are in G’s relationship or time with father, and how G should be allowed to have that time. Even if this person did not give details of the proceedings, what he did say has made it clear to her that the father has been discussing what has been going on in these proceedings, or the state of play between them.

The mother also considers that the father has made irrational decisions about the property that is going up for sale. The mother, of course, wants to move. She wants to move on from the home in which these abusive experiences took place and she says that, unreasonably, and in a further demonstration of exerting control and power, the father has demanded that an extra hundred thousand pounds be added to the asking price. This is something that causes her additional anxiety and strain.

On behalf of the father, a number of questions were put to the mother. They were mainly about how the father cannot have any control over what other people say and how this cannot be something that the father put his friend up to saying, and also whether there was anything in the Instagram post which actually named the mother. The mother, of course, accepted that directly it does not name her. She was asked about the arrangements and whether in fact they were too restrictive or detrimental to G, and what G would feel as G grows older and how G would ask why G is not able to go out with the father, and so on. The mother, I have to say, countered all of those questions with a high degree of focus on G’s welfare. She was very sensitive to G’s need, in amongst all of this, to still have a relationship with the father. She certainly seemed to me to be somebody who was not only reflective in her answers but, in the months since my fact-finding Judgment, has clearly been reflective about what is in G’s best interests.

The mother certainly did not, either at this hearing, or in the hearing which took place before me in January, present as the father sees her, as someone who wishes to prevent a relationship between G and the father. I do not accept that criticism which is levelled repeatedly and consistently by the father against her. I add that if she had wished to act with this as her goal, she need not have agreed any supervised arrangements in this case. She need not have agreed that supervised arrangements should continue. I would have expected, if her wish was to prevent contact, that she would have adopted a position of arguing against any contact taking place whatsoever. As discussed in the course of submissions, this is exactly the kind of case where that sort of position might have been taken and where, if it had, there might have been a very different recommendation from Cafcass, given the serious findings that I made and given what has been assessed by Cafcass as a complete lack of acknowledgement and insight by the father.

The father then gave his evidence. He confirmed the three statements that he has filed since the fact finding hearing and I will refer to them briefly. He says, as far as the fact finding is concerned, that it was an unfair fight due to the financial support available to the mother for legal support, and that is something that has been completely overlooked. He says that I entirely overlooked how positive his contact had been in my fact finding Judgment, that I had not read the contact notes. I merely stress this, that in my Judgment I made absolutely clear in paragraph 27 that the father urges me to bear in mind the nature of contact, and that it has been a positive experience for G, and that he has behaved very well during all those contact sessions. I made clear that I had not read any of the contact recordings, indeed I had not been provided with any in the fact-finding bundle but I had not been told anything at all that contradicted what the father said about his positive contact. I stress, again, that having read those notes, there is nothing that has been raised of any concern about the father’s behaviour during contact, or, importantly, about how good a time G has with him or G’s reaction to him.

The father has referred to a switch of Judge from Her Honour Judge Kushner to His Honour Judge Newport, a number of times. He implies that there was a clear direction of travel from one Judge that was reversed by another. He has referred to that today, in his evidence, as being suspicious, which is something I wanted to understand better. I interpret his subsequent answers to mean that perhaps he thought better of the use of that word, and what he really meant to say was that it was surprising for him and it was a shock that there should be such a difference, particularly in terms of his responsibility to pay for supervision.

The father makes very clear, in that first statement, that he feels G has been wrongfully prevented from having a normal relationship with him and G’s paternal family, and that the mother has used G to hurt him and his family because their relationship, that is the mother and the father’s relationship, did not work out. He further says that, fortunately, he has built an amazing bond with G during supervised contact, and he wants to progress this through unsupervised contact going forward.

In response to the Cafcass report, the father repeats that the Instagram post had nothing at all to do with the mother, that nothing, and I quote this from his evidence, “Nothing is ever targeted at anyone specifically.” He says about the mother, “As I have said before, what they are doing is just stopping me and my family from having a relationship with G because she is bitter that things did not work out between us.”

In terms of the Section 91(14) and parental responsibility applications, the father has set out, clearly, that he opposes those, that there would be a serious restriction of his rights as a parent if I made a Section 91(14) order, that parental responsibility is a fundamental right and duty and that it is not in G’s best interests for one parent to be excluded from decision making about G’s health, G’s education or G’s general welfare. He said this, importantly, and I quote it, “There is no evidence before the court that my involvement in these decisions places G’s at risk of harm. To the contrary, my continued involvement in G’s life provides G with stability, consistency and the benefit of both parents being engaged.”

The mother’s position, he says, appears to be based on her wish to avoid communication “personally” with him, rather than on G’s welfare needs. He says there are alternatives available if she does not wish to communicate directly, rather than removing his parental responsibility.

The father denies any continuing coercive or controlling behaviour. He says he is engaged fully with the court process and there is no behaviour that would justify either of those two orders being made. The father added little to that in his oral evidence but, of course, he answered a series of questions both yesterday afternoon and this morning by Mr Frost. He was questioned, at length, about the Instagram post. Whether it is 600 or just several hundred people, I think the father accepts that there are several hundred followers of his Instagram account. He has referred to the account being a private or locked one. His followers will clearly have access to it, they will know when he has posted, they will see his post.

The father referred to a number of people, I believe he said they were dads, who had reposted that. He said he thought it was funny, that is all, and hence he had re-posted it with a laughing emoji. I asked him what it was about this that was funny because it seemed to me that if someone came across it who did not know anything about the father or his circumstances, or his battle in court to see his daughter or his battle against the mother, it would have been odd. It would not have meant anything and that it certainly would not have been funny and, surely, the point of this is the irony because it is a reference to the mother.

It is not lost on me that the title of ‘Bitter Baby Mama’ chimes exactly with the vocabulary used by the father and the way the father has described the mother as being bitter because the relationship between them did not work out. Indeed he cites her bitterness as her motivation for the stance that she has taken, the allegations that she has pursued and her position at this final hearing. It is something that, objectively, I do not accept could be considered funny. The father was very coy and evasive with me because he would not accept that there was a link between the words on this post and his predicament and his situation. Everything about it chimes with his experience, the things he finds difficult and frustrating: court papers, ‘you cannot live with your dad’ and ‘I need child support.’ I have heard a lot about child support, there being difficulties in maintenance payments being made and having been taken directly from the father’s wages or his company, and ongoing difficulties with that. Further from the meme, in terms of ‘drama’, ‘gaslighting’, ‘entitlement’, ‘narcissism’ and ‘control’, these are, I accept, all views that the father has of the mother, as well the near zero score on coparenting.

Therefore, even if it does not directly name the mother, even if it makes no specific reference to these court proceedings, this post will have been recognised by anybody, and potentially hundreds of people, who might know about the fact of these court proceedings, who might know from the father his version of events that he is being prevented by the mother’s bitterness from having a relationship with his daughter. They will, potentially, only think this is funny by way of an ironic reference to the mother and these proceedings.

The father, I also find, will have known that this post was likely to have reached the mother’s attention in one form or another. She might not follow him on Instagram but it would not take much for that to come to her attention. At the very least, he was entirely reckless about that, which fits in with his complete lack of any understanding of how the mother feels. It demonstrates a complete lack of any understanding or even attempt to understand, because what he does is simply say he found it funny. He does not actually, for even a moment, think about what it might mean to the mother to come across or be sent this post, how it might make her feel.

The father clearly, in my view, does not in any way acknowledge that the court has made findings of domestic abuse against him. It is a fact that the court has made those findings. I consider that unless there is some acceptance of the fact that a court has made that decision about his behaviour, the father is not going to move on and his arrangements for contact are also not going to be able to progress.

I find further that the father is not able to understand not just the fact that the court has made findings but also that Cafcass, as an independent advisory body, through Ms Anticich, has made recommendations about what is in G’s welfare interests. As part of that, he cannot take on board that concern has been expressed not just by me but also by that expert professional about the risks to G, and, very clearly, about what the father needs to do. He considers, no doubt, that we are all wrong.

I refer to something as simple as undertaking a further drug test. That is something at the Dispute Resolution Hearing in June, I raised with the father, because it seemed clear, not only from Ms Anticich’s report, but the issues raised and that I had made findings about, that there remained uncertainty. As I have already said, uncertainty means, in this case, risk for G about whether he does continue to use drugs. He is adamant that he has not had any cocaine since June of 2024. If that is the case, I cannot understand why it is that he would not submit to a further drug test, because it would have been capable of proving that point. Instead, what the father says consistently, and repeatedly, what he said at that hearing and what he said today, is that as a matter of principle, ‘no, why should I?’ That is the way he put it, “Why should I? I know that I have not used drugs and that is really all there is to it.” In the same way he says that I do not know because I was not there, whereas he was there, and he knows what actually happened.

There is still no reflection by the father on how his behaviour has affected not only G but also B. I know I am not concerned with making decision about B, but he is, and at the time of these incidents, was a vulnerable young child. The mother tells me that he is still, to some degree, coping, adjusting and recovering from his experiences. They must have been frightening for B, and I see nothing in the father’s evidence to suggest he has thought about that in any way.

When asked about what he does accept, the father simply says he accepts the arguing, the toxic relationship and that there were arguments and things said in both directions. I asked the father what it is he takes any responsibility for and he said this, “It takes two to tango. She has openly admitted spitting, kicking and punching me, these behaviours have been overlooked.” So, in the very breath in which he says he takes responsibility, and in which I gave him an opportunity to explain what it is he takes responsibility for, he turns that entirely on the mother’s behaviour and says that those have been overlooked.

When pressed again he said that it was his behaviour, in the face of how the mother had behaved towards him, shouting and screaming at each other. That to me is an extremely limited form of taking responsibility. It is more a case of self-justification. The father’s answers seek, in my view, to do no more than justify his previous behaviour rather than take any responsibility for it.

The father’s approach to holidays abroad was explored with him at length, and it is instructive for a number of reasons. These proceedings started with an application by the mother to take G on holiday abroad. The father, of course, knew that this is something the family undertake regularly, and that the mother’s family have a holiday home. The father obstructed that trip on two occasions because an application had to be made by the mother on two occasions. On the third occasion an application was drafted and it was sent to the father. I have been referred to three emails sent by the mother’s solicitor in February this year, seeking the father’s approval for the trip in the Easter holiday. He did not answer those until right at the last moment when he gave his agreement.

As to all of that, and his approach generally, the father says this was due to the fact that his contact had not been given to him or agreed by the mother and that is more important than the holiday, and that is why he refused. “I refused because she refused to let me see G.” That is my note of the father’s evidence. “I felt that G spending time with me was more important than a holiday.”

In terms of future court applications, regardless of what I decide at the end of this Judgment, the father made it clear that he will make an application, he will apply when he thinks the time is right. I take that to mean he will certainly make an application to progress his contact. He very much thinks things should move on because for a year or so there has been good contact, supervised at a centre, so it is time to move on. I very much have a sense that nothing I say in this Judgment, and no decision I make is going to prevent him from, quite quickly down the line, saying well at that stage it was 12 months, now it is 14 months, 16 months, whatever it is and I am returning to court because I think that matters should move on.

Throughout all of this I understand and accept that the father loves G, but he is entirely blind to the impact that his behaviour has had on the mother and also on G. He says he is fighting for G to have a relationship with him and J, and that he will continue to battle for shared custody.

In all of this, there is a superiority. The father clearly feels a superiority that surpasses anything that the court might decide, anything that an expert professional like Ms Anticich of Cafcass may advise, and, any of the guidance and the literature surrounding the impact of domestic abuse on a child and on a parent, such guidance having been explained to the father. It is not something that the father appears able to accept, even objectively and aside from his own behaviour, as a concept, that abusive behaviour does have a harmful impact on a child and on the parent who has experienced or continues to experience that abuse.

It is right, and I so find, that the father’s position is as described by Mr Frost, entrenched. He is absolutely no further forward than he was in January of this year. I quoted from my Judgment, particularly, for that reason, because I made clear that I found no acceptance, or even ability to look at or consider the impact of his behaviour at that stage. That is still precisely where the father is. The fact that the father has had a Cafcass report to consider since June, which is for roughly three months now, has made no difference whatsoever to his thinking.

As to the father’s conduct, there are two other things I should say. Firstly, it seems clear to me that the father, in quite an unbridled way, will talk to people about his experience of being a victim in these proceedings, of not being heard, of not being understood, and of having to fight for his daughter. It is not about whether he can control what other people say, it is about a repeated narrative given to other people.

Secondly, in terms of the conduct, or decisions about the sale of the house, I am not able, without further information (and I am not inviting it) to make a finding that the father’s request that there be a higher marketing price is an act of wilful, coercive and controlling behaviour. But the fact that it is interpreted that way, in the context of everything that I have found about the father and how entrenched he is, is of some relevance.

I come back to the welfare checklist in the Children Act. I apply that checklist with my findings in mind and with my further findings in respect of the father’s conduct since the fact-finding Judgment. I have already said, in terms of G’s wishes and feelings, I have no doubt that if G were able to voice a view, it would be that the parents should get on, should have respect for each other and that G should be able to pass happily between them and have a good, strong, positive relationship with both of them. In terms of G’s needs, G clearly is having her physical needs met, G has emotional needs for security and stability. G needs not to experience any instability or any abusive behaviour by the father towards the mother. G needs not to experience the mother’s anxiety caused by the father’s behaviour. The likely effect on G and G’s circumstances are all linked very closely to my findings and to the mother’s experiences and what I have made clear is the harm that G suffered in the past, both directly and indirectly. My decision boils down in many ways to two specific questions: the risk of harm in the future and the ability of G’s parents to meet G’s needs, and I am going to take those in reverse order.

There is no question of the mother’s ability to meet G’s needs. There is, in my view, a significant concern, for as long as the father remains in this entrenched position, that he will not be able to meet G’s needs for emotional and psychological stability and safety. I say that, in particular, with regard to the father making clear, in two of his statements that he will explain everything to G, when the time is right. Whilst he says this will be in an age appropriate way, underlying all of that is his wish to make sure that G knows the obstacle to them having the sort of free and easy relationship that he would like with G, the reason they are in a contact centre, the reason they are not going out for day trips or spending whole weekends, that the reason for all of that is the mother. He wants G to know this is all due to the mother’s decision making, and I take from that, by extension, that it is just part of the mother wanting to prevent that relationship from developing because she is bitter.

The father cannot even see how, quite apart from what he might think himself, and of course he is entitled to think whatever he will, but he was not able to even countenance that there would be a harmful impact on G of being given that sort of view by the father, as G grows up. There is also, in my view, absolutely no reassurance to be gained by any reference to when G is old enough, or when G is 18, that is not something that the father spelled out in his statement. I consider that as soon as maybe G is able to think about, or understand his words, the father will have no hesitation in saying them. I can only hope that by that time he will in fact have managed to look at things differently, and think about things differently.

The father told me that he had set up an email account for G, and was sending G messages that G would be able to find and look at when G is older. I am grateful to the father for allowing me to see those messages, and there were two in January this year, one in December and one in March last year. The one in December also makes reference to being able to explain everything to G in due course. So whilst there are some lovely photographs sent to G, that I hope G will be able to see these in due course and be able to treasure them, there is the same underlying current that the father will explain what is going on, and that that will be by reference to the mother.

I turn to the future risk. For as long as the father continues to be in absolute denial of his behaviour, for as long as he remains unable to acknowledge how his behaviour has made the mother feel, and the impact that it has had on G, there remains a clear risk that such behaviour might be repeated. In an unsupervised setting, that risk, in my view, is clearly greater. There will be no monitoring of anything that the father chooses to say. Whilst in a supervised setting the father clearly demonstrates that he does not use any inappropriate language. G is still very young, but the father needs to have that third party presence so that he does not start making comments which become part and parcel or, and a habit during his contact time.

Children pick up on things very, very quickly. It might not even need a specific form of words but an attitude of blame and a hostility towards G’s mother is something that G will very quickly pick up and that will cause G difficulty. Without the arrangements being specified to continue in a supervised way, I am also concerned that this is a father who, because of the superior view in which he holds his own opinion and his own analysis of what has happened, superior to either the court or Cafcass, that he will continue to push boundaries. He will want more contact time than he is given, and there is a risk that he may in fact attend at the mother’s home.

Just to summarise, for the record, the father has now left this hearing. He has, apparently, a car sharing situation difficulty. He has had a message, he has had to leave and the recording will have picked up the discussion about undertakings. He has referred to only being here because I persuaded him to be. I should just say, at the dispute resolution appointment, he said there was no point and that he was going to effectively give up. I said to him that he should go away and think about it, that I was not going to act on what he said that day. That is as far as my persuasion really went and I just said if he has issues he wants to pursue or ask Ms Anticich about, then this hearing would be his opportunity to do that, and I saw that of course he continued to engage and he filed his statements as directed.

So with that I go back to my Judgment and in terms, I think I was addressing future risk and those risks remain very high in my view, that if there is not a controlled environment in terms of timing and supervision, that the father will push boundaries and will demand contact at other times or on other days.

The way the father puts his case today is that really, although he would like shared custody and he is going to continue to fight for that, the progression that he wants at the moment is a move to supported rather than supervised contact. His interpretation of whatever he has been told by the centre is that if contact is supported, this would mean it is still supervised but there will not be any contact note provided. Be that as it may, and whatever my experience of what supported contact might mean is, which is simply that there is a place provided for contact rather than a supervisor being available, it is, in my view, essential that there continues to be information about those visits, provided to the mother. That is also as much for G’s and the father’s own interests in demonstrating, or being able to demonstrate that there continues to be positive contact.

So for all those reasons that I have set out, I consider that the appropriate arrangements, applying the welfare checklist in the light of my findings, is that contact should proceed on a supervised basis for a period of up to two hours, fortnightly. The two hours may, indeed, not be possible if the funding proves to be a problem.

In terms of the funding, I bear in mind, particularly, the guidance set out by Mrs Justice Arbuthnot in the case of Griffiths v Griffiths & Another [2022] EWHC 113 (Fam). In this case, applying that guidance, and on the basis of my findings and my further findings today about the father’s approach, it is right that the father should continue to bear the cost of the supervised contact sessions.

I turn then to the Section 91(14) application. Ms Anticich highlights the need for a period of time for the father to undertake the necessary work to shift and evidence meaningful change. It does not seem to me that a two year period is necessarily going to be sufficient for that. A three year period is not, on the basis of what the father says now, necessarily going to be sufficient for that but taking everything into account, it is my view that firstly a Section 91(14) order is warranted in the circumstances of this case. It is warranted not just because of the time period which it will allow, it is also warranted because if one looks at G’s tender age. G has been the subject of proceedings in this court for very nearly X out of G’s X months. In amongst the allegations that have been discussed in these proceedings and the repeated hearings, it might be a situation that G is not directly aware of but these proceedings have placed a significant demand on and have been very challenging and anxiety provoking for the mother.

I also bear in mind that in terms of the trip abroad, that has been something that the mother has had to make applications to the court about. Now in terms of how that might work in the future, with a Lives With order she is, of course, able to travel for up to 28 days at a time. She will provide notice of that to the father. The ball will then be in his court to make an application to prevent the trip if he wishes to do so. Without any protective filter on any such application, previous experience and there being obstacles placed in the way of that holiday on three occasions now, it is quite possible, if not likely, in this case that the father may consider that the mother should not just be able to do as she pleases even if she has a Lives With order, and that he will try to prevent that trip. If he has a proper basis founded in G’s welfare for doing so or for making any application at all, then that will be recognised by the court and he will be permitted to pursue his application.

So a section 91(14) order is only an interference to the extent that the father is prevented from making an application which then instantly places the mother and G right at the heart, again, of court proceedings without the court finding that there is a sound welfare justification for the application. There will only be notice given to the mother of any application if permission is given to the father to pursue it and that should be made clear in the order.

I do consider that for the reasons of respite, a clear period in which there can be recovery and healing from the experiences of the past for there to be an opportunity for the father to undertake work, and take a different approach and demonstrate meaningful change, is necessary. For all those reasons and overall because the welfare of G demands it, I make a Section 91(14) order for a period of three years.

In terms of the restriction on the father’s parental responsibility, I consider that for very similar reasons and because of the ways in which it seems to me the father has sought to exercise his parental responsibility or to communicate about his parental role with the mother, it is right that there should be an interference with the degree to which he is able to do that. It seems to me that G and the mother need protection from those unbridled and ill thought out communications and any decision making by the father that might be motivated by his anger or his hostility, that might be motivated by or through the perspective of somebody who views the mother as always trying to prevent his relationship with G from developing. It seems, as has been the case already, that the father’s decisions may well be retaliatory and may be difficult and may not be focused on what is right and best for G.

So there should be, in my view, some restriction on the father’s exercise of parental responsibility to this extent. In terms of health needs, in terms of education, and that clearly includes any nursery placement as well as school, and in terms of renewal of G’s passport, those are the three areas of parental responsibility decisions that are to be the mother’s and the mother’s alone for a period of three years.

That said, there should still be information provided to the father. He should know where it is that G attends nursery or school. This is not an order that will prevent him from getting information about G’s welfare and progress directly from, be it a medical professional or a school or nursery. But what I will also say is that in addition to those restrictions on parental responsibility, for a period of three years, any attendance by him at a medical appointment or at a school or nursery, that must be with the agreement of both the school or nursery and by appointment made with the professional but also with the mother’s agreement in writing, because the situation that must be safeguarded against is that the father will simply turn up.

I should go back just to clarify that in terms of the Section 91(14) order, it will relate to any Section 8 applications made by the father. I am not going to extend it to an enforcement application under Section 11J, but I will say that it also extends to any application within an enforcement application for a variation of these arrangements. That must remain, whether it is in the context of other proceedings or not, a matter which requires the court’s permission.

That concludes my judgment.