M v M

This is the judgment in the case formerly called M v M. In fact, during the course of this hearing, as is often my practice, I have referred to the parents by their given names. That is not out of any sense of disrespect to them; that is because I prefer a slightly more informal atmosphere in some family cases, and because both parties indicated no objection to doing so. I shall, in various places, use given names in this judgment. It also has the advantages of making anonymisation easier should the need arise.

I am concerned with two children: L and C. They are twins, both being born in 2013. In general terms, L attends mainstream full-time school. He enjoys his chosen sport. He is described as sociable and generally positive in outlook. He has some medical support but is managing well in school and activities. C attends mainstream school, also. She, I understand, is active in her chosen sport also, is described as sensitive and thoughtful and has no significant health concerns impacting on her daily life.

The children’s two parents are their mother, B, and their father, K, known as N. Their mother is the children’s primary carer. She works. She is supported by her mother in terms of childcare, and, throughout this hearing, has been represented by Ms Gallagher. Their father, N, at present, in circumstances that I will describe in a moment, spends time with L, but does not see C face-to-face. He has been represented by Mr Bickerton throughout this hearing. Also relevant to this hearing has been Z, who is the Cafcass officer and author of two section 7 reports that I have read.

To put everything in context, I am going to give a potted history of these proceedings. The initial application came in February 2025, and was, in fact, made by B. She applied for a child arrangements order and, indeed, a prohibited steps order, not relating to the issue that I have to decide, with respect to L and C, and that application came with a number of concerns being raised and, I think it is fair to say, allegations being raised, in particular, about things that had happened during N spending time with his children. The case was issued and allocated in the usual way and was allocated to the Magistrates’ Court, sitting as part of the Family Court, and safeguarding checks were undertaken.

Statements were filed, which detailed the list of allegations that, in particular, B was making around the issue of domestic abuse, and the father to respond, and, also, there was medical evidence obtained with respect to both parties’ GPs, in fact, relating to any relevant health issues, either physical or mental, for themselves or the children. The parties duly filed witness statements, and the magistrates ordered a section 7 report which, of course, was prepared by Z.

The Court made an order by consent on 12 June, providing for the fact that the children would live with their mother, that there would be contact, accompanied, for L and his father, a minimum of one hour, twice per month, indirect contact for C in the form of letters, cards and gifts and a prohibited steps order preventing N removing the children from B’s care. There was a recording on that order that I will refer to in a bit more detail later, which recorded, in essence, the following: that the father had explored his gender identity for two decades and was in the process of coming out as a transgender woman. It also recorded that the mother intended to inform the children of that fact after the final hearing and that the father was going to seek advice from the gender clinic with respect to informing the children. There is some dispute about that recording, which I will return to later in this judgment, although it does not form a particularly relevant aspect of my decision.

There remained after the order made on 12 June an issue about supervisors, that is to say, the identity of the people who were going to accompany L and his father when contact took place. That was determined by the lay justices on 15 July. My understanding is it was not particularly controversial. There was agreement about who was going to be involved in that process.

However, also on 15 July and then repeated subsequently afterwards, the Court made an interim prohibited steps order preventing the mother from disclosing the father’s gender exploration to the children pending further consideration, and the magistrates ordered an addendum to the Cafcass report prepared by Z examining that issue. As a result of the nature of the issue with respect to the issue of disclosure of the father’s gender dysphoria diagnosis and exploration of his gender, the matter was transferred to me, and, ultimately, I gave directions preparing the matter for a final hearing, the consequence of which is, of course, this judgment.

There have been, at various points in the intervening time between the matter coming for final hearing and it being transferred to me, an application for an independent social work assessment that the father applied for. That has not been pursued at this hearing, and it is has been agreed that there should be permission for that application to be withdrawn. In addition, the parents have filed further statements addressing, in particular, the issue of if, and, indeed, what the children should be told with respect to their father’s exploration of his gender. It was listed before me originally on other dates but, in the end, yesterday, 11 November and, and today, 12 November.

At the start of the hearing, the parties’ advocates very helpfully told me that there was no pursuit of the independent social worker application. There had been discussion about if, and I stress the word “if” the Court considers that the children should be told something of their father’s gender exploration, what that narrative should be, but it is clear, and was clear in the statements and, indeed, helpful position statements/skeleton argument, that the father’s primary position was that he wanted a prohibited steps order to persist, preventing B from disclosing or instructing anyone else to disclose to the children that N had explored his gender identity or any information relating to his gender save for the fact that he is male.

In the event that the Court decides that the children should be told something, the parties, in fact, discussed over the course of the time before the hearing yesterday and overnight prior to today’s resumption of the hearing, what has been referred to as “an agreed narrative” or “script” in the event that the Court determines that the children should be told, and that agreement covers the following points:

If the Court says that the children should be informed of their father’s history with respect to the issue of gender identity, about which I will provide more detail below, the father says that a therapist should be appointed to assist with that process. The mother’s position is that she is happy for the father to tell the children, effectively, following the agreed script and, indeed, for the father to answer any consequential questions that the children may have, and she says that although C is not seeing her father at present on a face-to-face basis, she has sometimes sat in on some of the times that L has been speaking to his father by video and that she also would support and be able to tell the children as well. The father considers that the children might need therapeutic support if the Court directs, in essence, that the prohibited steps order should be discharged.

This hearing has involved difficult issues, and I would like to thank both counsel for the way in which they have dealt with it. Both have submitted very helpful position statements. Mr Bickerton, I know, is acting pro bono via Advocate as, indeed, are his instructing solicitors, Dawson Cornwell through Pro Bono Connect. I am very grateful, as I am sure the father is, to them, for doing so. Ms Gallagher, I know, because of a listing difficulty and, indeed, error with respect to this case, was meant to be on leave this week but has, nevertheless, dealt with this matter as she has had ongoing involvement, as, indeed, has Mr Bickerton. I am very grateful to her as well.

I have a 418-page bundle, which I have read. In addition to that bundle, there is also a more recent statement from the father dated 6 November, which I permitted him to rely upon, and position statements/skeleton arguments prepared by both counsel. I should make it clear that I have also read the research referred to both in the Cafcass report and, indeed, in Mr Bickerton’s skeleton argument.

Let me outline some of the background to put the decision I have to make into context. I do so first by referring to the written material, and then I will deal with the oral evidence that I have heard from the parties and, indeed, Z. As highlighted from the procedural account of these proceedings that I gave above, the contact that currently takes place between C and her father, that is to say, indirect contact, and between L and his father, was a situation that was reached by consent in circumstances where both parties were represented.

I think it is important for the purpose of this judgment to clearly identify that that contact is, of course, not particularly extensive. It would be wrong for me to give any impression that the reduced nature of that relationship is consequent upon anything to do with the issue that I have to decide. It is fair to say, and there has been no factual determination within the proceedings in front of either myself or, indeed, before the Magistrates’ Court as to the precise details of some of the events that have taken place, but the proceedings started because the mother reported that the children had been subjected to what she referred to as “verbal abuse by the father”, including swearing and aggressive language directed at them.

There were incidents that were cited and, indeed, a video that happened to be recorded by one of the children, which is referred to in transcript form in the bundle, that shows the father speaking to the children in a, frankly, wholly unacceptable way, using entirely unacceptable language. Without going further than that and acknowledging that, beyond that, the father accepts swearing at the children, but does not accept being abusive to them, it perhaps does not matter that the detail of those allegations has not been determined, because both parents accept that, at present, the children’s wishes and feelings, given their age, are significantly important when it comes to those arrangements.

C, in particular, has expressed that she does not want to see her father, especially after her perception of the way that she believed he behaved. She stopped seeing him overnight in September 2024 and, at the moment, only sees him, as she has, on occasions, sat in on video contact that L has with his father. Of course, the order, as provided above, provides for indirect contact by way of cards, letters, etc. In fact, L also spent a period of time where he stopped seeing his father in January 2025, following his perception of various incidents, although it is right to say that L has expressed enjoying seeing his father and, indeed, in particular, enjoying his involvement with his father in relation to L’s like of rugby.

The mother, in fact, stopped contact after what she referred to as “an instance of abuse”, after she contacted the safeguarding hub and blocked the father’s number on the children’s phone. As a result of that, the mother made an application to court, and Z reported in her original report, effectively, largely on the issue of contact, and that resulted in the agreement for the contact order as I have already outlined.

The father was clear before that agreement was reached that he did not want to force contact on the children if they did not want it, but, of course, feels the loss of the far more extensive relationship that he had with his children particularly acutely. Putting it bluntly, whatever has happened and whatever has given rise to the current restricted nature of the contact, I have little doubt that both parents love their children very much.

In relation to the issue that I have to determine, that is to say, the issue of what the children are told about the father’s gender identity, it is important, I think, that I relate what the evidence shows in relation to that issue. In the early 2000s, it is fair to say the father began exploring his gender identity, including, as is obvious, before the children were born. In 2004, he received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and, for example, took some steps to present as a female. He obtained, for example, a passport in 2004 with his gender identified as female, and there is a letter in the bundle from a psychiatrist confirming treatment for gender identity or gender dysphoria at that time.

The parents did, in about 2006, separate due to issues around the father’s gender exploration, but they later reconciled. However, the issue was not, at that point, resolved, and it is fair to say that B discovered, and I heard some evidence about this, a letter from a gender clinic, with reference to the father’s attendance at a gender clinic, confirming that the father was still engaged with gender services and receiving hormone treatment, contrary to the position that the mother understood the situation to be. The letter indicated that the father was considering surgery and had discussed this with medical professionals, but had not discussed that in detail with the mother.

That discovery led to the breakdown in the parents’ marriage. After 2016 and confirmed by a letter from the father’s general practitioner dated May 2025, the father continued to explore his gender identity, including receiving hormone treatment and consultations with the gender clinic. He had not publicly come out as transgender or non-binary, and had not, in general terms, informed friends and family members or colleagues, except for a small group at work whom he had to provide information to by reason of the security status of the work that he undertakes.

The father’s gender identity at any point in this continuum had not been disclosed to the children, and the children have only ever referred to their father as “Dad”, or if they use a given name, it is “N” or “K”, and use the pronouns “he” and “him.” It is fair to observe that there was a period of time, including within these court proceedings, when the father used the name of “Y”, being a more gender-neutral name.

The letter from the GP reports that the father was considering gender reassignment surgery and was referred to assessment, but did not pursue it after being told that he did not qualify. The father was on weight-loss medication, but not, the father says, as a result of that being a requirement for surgery. The last appointment that the father had at the gender reassignment service was in March 2025. My understanding is that hormone treatment and/or blockers were discontinued at around that time.

Certainly, from the perspective of the father’s GP, the letter from the GP I have referred to indicates that, from a medical perspective, the GP considered that the father had been living and presenting as a female since about 2012, and the GP, at the time of writing that letter, used both gender-neutral and feminine pronouns, reflecting the situation in the father’s medical records.

On 21 October 2025, the father filed a statement, his fourth in these proceedings, indicating that he considered that he classified his gender as questioning. In that statement, he identifies himself as Y. He accepts that he has questioned and explored his gender identity for many years, including medical exploration with respect to such treatment. He indicates that he is no longer being treated with hormone blockers and does not currently, that is to say, at the time of the statement, identify as a transsexual woman or a trans woman. He indicates his belief, his concern that the proceedings have forced him into a position of having to come out with respect to a particular gender identity, which he does not feel is accurate.

He indicates in that statement that because his gender identity is not settled, that it is clear or accurate to tell the children. He certainly indicates that he does not want the children to be told that he is a transwoman because that would be misleading and likely to cause confusion and upheaval, and that he considers the issue of gender identity has been blown out of proportion in the proceedings, and is not relevant to the child’s welfare. He expresses the view that he thinks the mother is using the gender identity issue to bolster her case, and that the matter has been manufactured into a crisis and that he is critical of the Cafcass officer’s use of terminology in her report. In addition, he notes that neither the mother nor Cafcass, as he puts it, clearly articulate what specifically the children should be disclosed.

He indicates that if the children are to be told anything, then that should be undertaken by an independent third party, and he expresses his doubts about B being able to do it, or, indeed, Z, the Cafcass officer, being able to do it. He indicates a wish to be involved in any disclosure himself, and proposes that disclosure should only occur if his gender identity is confirmed, and he consents to the disclosure or if the children ask questions, and a jointly-agreed narrative is provided. He wishes the Court, in that statement, to continue the prohibited steps order preventing them from telling the children about, as he puts it, his “gender identity”, until one of those conditions is met. In the alternative, he proposes a family assistance order, and, in that statement, he attaches a number of identification documents in which he is registered as male.

In the father’s most recent statement, he indicates that he is currently presenting as male, that he is known as K or N and refers to Y as a nickname that he has used in a private context. He confirms that his gender identity exploration has been long-term from the early 2000s and has, in the past, involved hormone treatment, consideration of medical options, but has never involved him in identifying himself as transgender or, indeed, non-binary. In essence, he has only told a group of relevant people at work due to his role and, of course, medical professionals were aware. He does not currently identify as transgender. He is not receiving hormone therapy and does not intend to pursue any form of transition.

He indicates that, of course, it is an issue that is deeply personal to him and of a private nature, and he likens it to forcing someone to come out as gay, that he feels pressured by the proceedings to define his identity, and objects to being labelled as a “trans woman”, which, of course, is not accurate as far as N is concerned. He does not believe the children should be told about his past gender exploration as it is not current; it is not part of his relationship with them, and he is worried that it can cause confusion or harm, especially in the context of the current contact situation and, indeed, with respect to his job situation where there is a risk that he might be posted to a different country next year.

He makes it clear that his presentation to the children has always been unchanged, and, therefore, there is no evidence for them to see of the issue, and that the children have never asked him about it, and are unaware that it might be an issue. He is concerned that B has, effectively, sought to put him in a box and expresses some concern that B had in her possession documents that were private to him and has produced them in these proceedings. He also refers to some of the recordings on previous orders as being, to some degree, inaccurate.

He asserts, for entirely understandable reasons, that pursuant, in effect, to Article 8 of the ECHR and his right to private and family life, he objects to what he would consider to be forced disclosure. If he were to identify as transgender or non-binary or have a defined identity in the future, then he would agree to the children being told, but if there were to be a situation in which the children were told, then he should do it ideally face-to-face or by letter, and, as he suggests, with the support of a therapist or counsellor. That statement concludes that he does not consider it is necessary for the children to be told anything, and that the prohibited steps order should remain in place, although, never clearly defining how long for.

The mother’s position sets out in her statements is also clearly discernible from those statements. She denies using the father’s gender identity to in any way bolster her case and, indeed, refers to the fact that her original application had nothing to do with that, in essence, but was related to allegations about the father’s behaviour vis-à-vis the children, as I have already referred to earlier in this judgment.

She, of course, points out the arrangements were agreed by consent in June 2025, and she relates how the issue for her with respect to their relationship was not, in essence, the father’s gender exploration per se, but the fact that she felt as if the father had not been open and honest about it when she later discovered by accident that he had resumed treatment and legal changes, for example, to some documents without telling her. This led to the breakdown of her relationship. She emphasises that she did not raise the gender issue in her initial application; that was entirely child-focused.

She asserts that the children need to know about the father’s gender exploration because it is a significant part of the parents’ and children’s joint family history. There is a risk that the children would find out from others which could damage their trust both in their father and her, that there is a risk of accidental disclosure as a result of past changes on official documents, and that she considers that honesty would be in the children’s best interests and that they have coped with other sensitive information, for example, the fact that they were born by IVF; a fact that the parents have never hidden from them at any point in the past.

She indicates what she would be proposing to tell the children. That was in similar terms to the outline agreed narrative that I started or set out at the beginning of this judgment, although that agreed narrative has been slightly augmented as a result of discussion between the parties at this hearing, and she sets out in her statement that she would be happy for the father to be involved in the process. However, she did not think that the children being told of the situation should be delayed indefinitely or, in essence, be solely on the basis of the father’s consent.

Her statement highlights her concern that the father’s position on his own gender identity has changed a number of times from her perspective during the proceedings, and she points out, effectively, that the prohibited steps order appears, at present, to be without end, and denies any intention to distort the narrative or act against the children’s interests, or, for want of a better way of putting it, to borrow a word that the father used in his evidence, to “weaponize” the issue.

She points out that she has spoken to Cafcass, has attended diversity training, etc., and that she is, of course, willing to involve another professional at Cafcass if needed, but does not herself think it is necessary, in essence, because, as she put it, she knows her own children. She invites the Court to allow her to tell the children about their father’s gender exploration in, as she put it, “a sensitive, age-appropriate way”, with input from the father if he wishes. She argues that the continuing secrecy is not in the children’s best interests and that the prohibited steps order should be discharged.

In order to determine this issue, I heard evidence from the mother, the father and, indeed,Z. B told me that the children have not, save for one occasion consequent upon an oblique reference I do not need to relate when they were much younger, asked her directly about the father’s gender or any issues such as this. However, she did tell me that recently, they have been asking general questions such as whether they know any gay or lesbian people or transgender people, and this has been as a consequence of the school taking a very open and positive approach to both the issue of sexuality and gender.

She effectively understood that the children had awareness of the concepts of gender fluidity and non-binary at an age-appropriate level as a result, in part, of their education, and the children have asked about questions arising out of what they have learnt at school. She told me that she has some really good friends who are gay, and she is able to say to the children, “Well, so and so are gay”, and she appreciates that N is very guarded. She acknowledged when it was put to her that maybe telling the children of their father’s gender exploration could burden them. She indicated that the school had a very good anti-bullying policy, a very good support system and that the school is very on top of things like that.

Indeed, she referred to the risk of them finding out accidentally and felt that it was better that they know in advance of any accidental discovery so that they could be, in essence, prepared for any difficulties that arise. She indicated that she thought the children could relatively easily be told that their dad had explored his gender. She did not think that it would have a detrimental impact on their relationship with their dad, and she was very firmly of the view that, in the sense that it would not have an impact, the information was unlikely hugely to burden the children commenting that he was still their dad, and she was confident that they would react, in essence, in a somewhat curious but not negative way.

She denied any suggestion that she was wanting to tell them out of some sort of weaponisation of the issue, pointing out that if she had wanted to have been vindictive, or if she had thought that they needed to know the truth in order to, in some way, score a point, she could have told them well before these proceedings or, indeed, at any time up to the prohibited steps order made in these proceedings in July 2025. She considered that they had the right to know the truth about their father. She was happy for that to be told to them by N himself. She indicated that, although at the moment, C does not want to speak to her father, she had relatively recently sat in on a video conversation between L and N and that, that way, it would be possible for discussion to take place, that C could listen to. Alternatively, of course, it could be done by way of him writing to her.

She indicated that if the children had questions, if she were to tell them, she would be happy to make a special arrangement and unblock the children’s phones in order that they could ring their dad to ask questions, and she was very concerned that the children might find out another way. She gave a couple of examples of areas of risk. For example, she indicated that a neighbour had indicated to her that he had seen some evidence of, in effect, an indication, which I do not need to detail in this judgment, of N, in a way that might indicate that he is transgender by way of wearing female clothing, and that that was an example of rumours starting and the children possibly finding something out. She also indicated that, as a result of her disclosure to the school of one of the orders, as I understand it, by consent and with the permission of the Court, Father was referred to in that order as Y, and that a member of staff had commented to her about it.

She is concerned that if there are discussions between adults, the children might overhear accidentally, and, in general terms, if someone says something when the children are in earshot, without people realising, it would cause the children to find out about it in a way that was not appropriate. She thinks, in fact, that the children are very likely to take it well and will be completely fine with it, given their own characteristics and the circumstances they find themselves in. She has no particular direct issue with it. He will always be their dad; nothing will change that, but she did not think it was fair to put her in a position of either lying or, indeed, lying by omission because that would affect her relationship with the children.

She explained in a way I found completely genuine and obviously with some emotion, that she, herself, had the experience of finding out something when she was older, but still a child, that her family had always kept secret and that it had been considerably upsetting, and she had felt betrayed because no one had told her, and that she vowed to herself that that was not how she was going to parent her children. She did not want to feel that her relationship with her children was interfered with by way of her not being able to answer questions honestly from the children or, indeed, be open and honest with them about, in essence, what she considered to be an important characteristic of their father. She pointed to, in essence, the openness and honesty there had been with respect to the nature of the children’s conception and their biological parentage.

N gave evidence and indicated that the children themselves have never asked him about the issue of the father’s gender. He confirmed that there is a possibility of him working in a different country. It seems like that is a very high possibility, the real issue being whether he is allowed to come home to the UK at an appropriate frequency. As a result, in essence, I gained the distinct impression that if his employer considered that he was needed in that Country, then he had little choice but to go. He is taking a trip to that country in January with the hope of finalising an advantageous contract that allows him to return relatively frequently to the UK.

He expressed considerable concern that he felt that the sequence of events involved, in essence, B bringing up the issue, and that if it had not been brought up by B, that is to say, the issue of his gender exploration, if it had not been brought up by B, he would not have brought it up. It was not an issue that he would have raised during these proceedings or, indeed, raised with the children.

He indicated that he had sometimes presented as female within a community, but not the local community where he lives, and there were a considerable number of questions about the attitude that N had taken to questions that Z had answered. I think, in essence, I can summarise it as N being particularly reluctant to answer questions about the issue. I think it is fair to say that Z, in her report, makes it clear that she considered that perhaps N was being a little evasive about the issue. I doubt, having listened to N’s evidence, that that was entirely deliberate. I suspect it arises out of N’s consideration that his gender exploration is private.

He feels that the issue has, as he referred to it, been “weaponised.” I did ask him in what way it has been weaponised, and he considered, effectively, as I understood it, that he was worried that the issue had become the focus of the proceedings, and he was worried that it might be used against him vis-à-vis the children. He was worried that he had a poor relationship with the children at present, and was worried that telling them about his gender exploration might make things worse, as he did not know how they were going to take it. He told me that he felt pressured to put himself into a box that he did not fit into; in other words, to define himself by one specific term in circumstances where he did not feel that he “fit easily into any particular box”, as he put it, indicating to me that he might never understand or, indeed, come to a particular definition of how he considered his gender.

Z, the Cafcass officer, confirmed her reports, in particular, her recommendation for the reasons set out in her addendum report, why she was of the view that the children should be told. It is fair to say that Z was cross-examined at some length, and that is not a criticism, on the references that Z made within her reports to N being, in essence, a transgender woman or a transsexual. Of course, N does not currently define in that way. However, it became clear as the evidence from N and, indeed, Z unfolded, that the primary problem with respect to that was a lack of communication and a lack of trust. I do not think, on balance, that it is necessarily fair for me to think in any way critically; it was a difficult situation.

Z, however N defines himself, or whether N can define himself or not, continues to recommend and explained in evidence, concomitant with the contents the contents of her reports, that her view was that it as in the children’s welfare interest to understand the truth about their father’s gender exploration, and that she considered that B was well-placed to deal with that, although, of course, she also considered that it would be better if it is was done jointly or if the father could take the lead. She did not think that a therapist needed to be involved in the process, and she opined that she considered a therapist’s involvement would be, in her view, in fact, much more likely to be beneficial to the father than to the children, whom she did not consider would have much difficulty in either accepting or understanding the information.

That summary, which I hope is reasonably full and fair of the oral evidence I heard, has to, of course, be factored into the situation as far as the law is concerned. Both Ms Gallagher and Mr Bickerton have made reference to the law in their position statements, and I am just going to provide a very brief summary. Obviously, this is a decision concerning the welfare of the children, and their welfare is paramount. However, I accept that it is not the only consideration, because there are competing rights in this case, in particular, those encapsulated by Article 8 and, to some extent, potentially, Article 14 of the ECHR.

There are issues relating to privacy and family life on both sides of the divide in relation to this argument. The father, of course, on a prima facie basis, is entitled to privacy with respect to his own gender, which, in any event, is a protected characteristic under the Gender Recognition Act 2004. Likewise, the mother’s right to family life is interfered with by a prohibited steps order that prohibits her expression of use of her parental responsibility, especially in the position of being a primary carer, and, in essence, engaged with her ability to have, tangentially, an honest relationship with her children.

The position statements relate a number of cases, none of which are directly on point, but all of which case law I have read “at source”, if I can put it that way. In reality, this is a decision which revolves around what is best for the children, but gives due acknowledgement to the respective competing family life considerations and privacy considerations that affect both parents.

Let me start with my assessment of the witnesses. I am going to be frank; I felt B was an impressive witness. In essence, aware of the issues that were likely to be prominent in this case, I listened to B’s evidence and, indeed, asked questions carefully, with the aim of specifically understanding her motivations and her attitude. I was, listening to her evidence, very much alive to a number of possibilities. Was there some negative motivation? That is to say, did she want to tell the children about their father’s gender exploration in order to produce the information with some form of malign intent to further cause difficulties between the children and their father, especially, aware as I was, having read the bundle, of the circumstances and context of their relationship history and the ultimate reason for their separation in or about 2016? Would it be used, in essence, as a way of undermining N to the children?

I have to say, paying careful attention as I was, that I did not detect any inappropriate motivation on B’s part. In fact, she struck me as a sensitive and empathetic individual who, despite her perception, and I discussed with herperception of N’s behaviour in the past and what she perceives to be a lack of honesty with respect to her and their marriage in relation to his pursuit of treatment in a way that she perceived to be not honest vis-à-vis her. She did not give the slightest impression in any sense of someone who wanted to weaponise the issue.

It is fair to say that that is not just a conclusion that I come to as a result of relying on my assessment of B. She, herself, raised the point that, using her parental responsibility prior to the Court making the prohibited steps order in July 2025, she could have told the children of their father’s gender exploration and, in fact, her belief at the time that were times when the father was presenting as female well before the prohibited steps order that was made in July 2025. A closer look at the orders makes it very clear that, from her perspective, she had taken a very sensible approach. The 12 June order recorded, and I realise there was some dispute about the recording, despite the fact that both parties were represented by counsel at both hearings that I am going to refer to, it nevertheless tells me what B’s perception was.

The 12 June order records at paragraph four:

“The mother intends to inform the children of the father’s transition. She has agreed not to do this until after the final hearing. In the meantime, the father has agreed to seek advice from the current gender clinic, from which they receive a scaffolding of support. The father hopes to be involved in informing the children insofar as possible.”

In other words, the mother had in her possession an order on 12 June that had a recital in it, indicating, clearly by implication, not only that the father did not oppose her telling the children, but a clear indication that she had made it clear in court and to the father that it was her intention to do so. She did not do so, she has not done so, and she could have done so well before 12 June.

On 15 July 2025, the following recording is made on the face of the order, again, in circumstances where both parties were represented:

“The father has explored their gender identity for two decades. They are in the process of coming out as a transgender woman. Their name is now ‘Y.”

Nothing in my observations about those recordings is a criticism of the changing approach to his gender identification that N has described in his fourth and fifth statements. I am simply observing that until 15 July, the mother could have told the children and did not. I have come to the very clear conclusion that the mother’s motivation is not to weaponize the information in some way, or to use it to detrimentally affect the father’s relationship with the children, but is, in fact, based on her perception of what is best for the children. That is in the context, and I am acutely aware of it, of this being part of her narrative about why the parents finally separated: a lack of sharing of his exploration and, indeed, candidacy for treatment with her. Had she wanted to allow her feelings about that to overwhelm her ability to understand what was better for the children, she could easily have done so before this decision, or, indeed, before this case even troubled the Courts.

I accept unhesitatingly what B told me about the comments the neighbour had made and the sort of questions the children have asked about general matters relating to both individuals who have non-heterosexual sexuality and gender identifications that are not the same as their biological sex. It seems to me entirely consistent with my experience of the approach that many schools take with respect to discussion of such issues. I detected no element of prejudice or bigotry in B’s approach to these categorisations, and I felt that she was able and, indeed, had drawn a clear distinction in her mind as to what she was critical of the father of from her perspective, i.e. her perception of a lack of openness during their relationship, and having a critical view of the fact that N has a diagnosis and is gender dysphoric. In relation to the latter point, she gave me no indication at all of an attitude that viewed it in a way that considered that to be a criticism of N.

Listening to N’s evidence, I was struck by two things: first, a very deep-seated belief on his part that the issue had become an unwarranted focus of attention, and, secondly, that N genuinely feared the consequence of the children being told about his exploration of his gender or, indeed, about the fact that he is gender dysphoric or has a diagnosis of gender dysphoria. N clearly considers it a private matter. Looking at the history outlined above, it is, perhaps, easy to understand why.

It is only fair to make it clear that I have a deep sense of empathy for what that history tells me about this aspect of N’s life. N has a formal diagnosis of gender dysphoria, which was made in 2004. That diagnosis does not come instantly, so it must be the case that N has had a sense of being uncertain about his gender and how he relates to his birth sex for some time prior to that; in other words, for a very long time. Having explored that, ceased and then resumed exploration and consideration and the implementation of medical, that is to say, hormone treatment, and consideration of surgical intervention in a way that did not include B in that process, it is clear that, for whatever reason, he did not feel able to share with his wife his medical treatment.

Doubtless because B felt betrayed by his lack of openness, the marriage came to an end, and, from N’s perspective, it is entirely understandable; I stress from N’s perspective, that, subjectively, that potentially seems like a punishment for being gender dysphoric; in other words, it may be that his perspective is that nothing very good has come from B’s discovery of his later treatment. I have not, I must emphasise, at this hearing, heard any extensive evidence about this period in the parents’ lives, so my observations are only about the parents’ likely subjective feelings, and I do so acknowledging that the subjective perspective is likely to be different, on both parts, to the objective truth in a nuanced and complex situation.

However, nevertheless, that background, it seems to me, is a setting in which N’s fear must be understood. Now, he faces the prospect of his children being told about, in essence, his diagnosis as gender dysphoric and his exploration or past exploration of his gender. In evidence, he left me with, frankly, a real sense of fear on his part of further rejection from his children should they be made aware. That, of course, is against a background in which many individuals who depart from societal expectations when it comes to issues of gender, find themselves in an environment which is, at the very least to say, one in which not everybody is accepting, and many are actively hostile.

I also have a very strong sense that this issue being raised in these proceedings has, to some extent, been believed by N as requiring from him a retreat from an exploration into a situation where he feels it necessary to define himself as a man and to cease using, by way of example, his preferred nickname of Y or, indeed, more general neutral pronouns. That has certainly not, since my involvement, at the very least, been the Court’s intention, but the reaction is understandable.

There is a very strong air of the evidence that N gave and his fifth statement, which amounts to, “I am no longer seeking to explore my gender, and, therefore, there is nothing to tell the children.” I was far from satisfied that this was, in fact, N’s whole story. Indeed, he was also keen to make it clear that he had difficulty defining his gender and did not wish to be pigeon-holed. N says in his fifth statement:

“Were I to define myself as gender non-binary or transgender or implement changes that would show difference to the children when we are together, and at that stage, and only then would I agree to the children being informed.”

In essence, he said very similar things in evidence. However, it seems to me obvious, and I do not mean outwardly, physically obvious, I mean taking into account the history, that N’s history is not the same as his sex. In reality, he does not like to be defined as a man or a woman, and, in that regard, he is, of course, not alone within society. The fact that he cannot define himself as, or associate with something specific does not negate the fact that he has a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, has explored the possibility in the past of surgical intervention, and, in the recent and previous past, has, at times and in some circumstances, presented as female and chosen to identify himself by pronouns that do not define him as male.

In evidence, he told me that he may never know what gender he is. I do not find that a particularly difficult statement to accept, and neither do I find it a particularly unusual or unique situation for someone to find themselves in. I came, however, to the firm opinion that N was fearful that his children might consider it to be particularly unusual or unique.

Regarding the children, I have borne in mind that the children, at present, have a circumscribed relationship with this father, although as I have tried to demonstrate, that has nothing, at present, to do with the current issue which it remains for the Court to decide. Although it is not as a result of that issue, I understand the fear that N has that it might contribute to it. However, I do note that the concept and idea of gender-questioning individuals is not unknown to the children. The mother’s evidence, which I have said I entirely accept, accords wholly with my understanding of the approach taken in many schools around the issue of sexuality and, indeed, gender. That is to say, one whereby such concepts are no longer swept under the carpet or treated as forbidden or inappropriate, as being hidden or shameful, but are treated as a fact of life to be accepted and, indeed, doubtless, embraced.

Any decision that I have to make has to have at its forefront the concept of the children’s welfare, taking into account the parents’ competing, and, indeed, the children’s competing rights. It is perhaps important that I stress that, of course, what I have to consider is the children’s welfare for the rest of their minority. I am not making a decision based on what is best for next week or in a month’s time, but a decision that takes an overview of their long-term welfare for the rest of their minority.

I accept that the concerns that have been expressed by N about burdening the children or, indeed, asking them, in essence, either to keep a secret or, alternatively, them getting bullied or a backlash from friends if they decide to tell others is a factor in my consideration. I also accept that N is entitled to privacy and I identify and agree that, if the children are told about the father’s gender exploration, in essence if they are told about their father and the way he identifies himself which encompasses the fact that he cannot identify himself as a societally-defined gender, then there is a risk of a further imposition upon his privacy in that his children might tell other people. That is something that I have considered very carefully.

On the other hand, I also have to weigh up the effect on the mother. Their father is, of course, part of the children’s life and the mother’s life, and, not being able to inform the children of the truth about their father, which has undoubtedly had an impact on the mother, is, in my view, a real impediment to her having an honest relationship with the children. I will return, briefly, to that theme in a moment.

I have thought carefully about the risk to the children of the children finding out at some later date. I have to say that when I think of risk in the way that risk should be thought about, I can only categorise that risk as being high, but I should be clearer about what I mean by that. Risk has two elements to it: the first is the likelihood of something happening, and the second is the consequence if that thing comes to fruition; in other words, the thing happens. Risk can be high in relation to one element and low in relation to another, but nevertheless, the overall evaluation of risk remains high.

There is, in this case, clearly a risk of accidental disclosure in the way that the mother’s evidence speaks of and justifies. It may be, and I think it probably is, that that risk is low, but it is not non-existent. What I think is certain is that the children will find out at some point. This Court’s jurisdiction in relation to being able to prevent the children being told, effectively ceases when the children turn 16 and, of course, they will still be minors where there will be exceptional reasons required to allow for the continuation of the prohibited steps order beyond the age of 16. Accordingly, in other words, the Court could not stop the children being informed.

In fact, the idea that, as 16-year-olds, possibly, the idea of even 14 or 15-year-old children not knowing and not being told of, for example, reasonably honest answers to questions about why their parents split up, etc., is, in my view, non-existent. That is why I can say it is certain, in my view, that the children will find out at some point and, probably, before they turn 18. It is part of their narrative, and it is part of their mother’s narrative and, indeed, it is part of their father’s narrative. It begs the question, if not now, then when?

What I am also sure of is that the longer them finding out, the longer that it is delayed, the greater the risk of the consequences when they do find out. They are, effectively, currently being lied to by omission by their mother in relation to a situation where they are likely to, in the future, to ask for more detail about why their parents separated, about what the issues were and about their family history. They are likely, frankly, to ask their father the same questions. They will, as most children of separated parents have to do, balance in their own minds the respectively different answers that they are likely to get because it is highly unlikely that both parents view it from the same perspective. However, they will find out and, in finding out, they are currently, if I can put it this way, not being told the truth.

The answer, “Well, I define myself as a man now”, which is effectively the answer contained in the father’s fifth statement and the reasons why he asserts that the children do not need to be told anything at the moment, ignores the diagnosis of gender dysphoria and gender exploration, and, frankly, everything that N, himself told me about his own uncertainty about the box which he fits into. The longer that stays a secret, the more damage it is likely to do when the children do, as I am sure they will, find out. Are they never to be told? Am I to make the prohibited steps order until they turn 16, when they will be still a minor, and it is very unlikely the order will go beyond the age of 16.

The scenario that then ensues is obvious: they find out, and then they feel that something has been kept from them not only by their father, which they may accept as being a choice, but also by their mother. It is, in my view, fundamental to the understanding of their father that it is not a bad or negative thing; it is who their father is. I appreciate completely the gravity of the suggestion of disclosure to the children for the father. However, as far as the children are concerned, taking into account both the evidence from Z and, indeed, the mother, I do not consider the risk of them rejecting their father for this reason is at all high. In fact, I think it is very low.

I do think the risk of rejection increases the longer the situation is kept a secret, and I think the risk of it resulting in an adverse effect on the children’s relationship with both their father and, indeed, their mother as their primary carer increases with the longer it is kept a secret. The children are at very high risk of feeling, to borrow the mother’s words in her own evidence, “betrayed that they have not been told the truth” by their mother, who is, of course, their primary carer. As long as that truth is shared in a sensitive and age-appropriate way, that risk of rejection or, indeed, adverse impact on both parents’ relationship with their children is, in my view, lessened the sooner that there is no longer a secret.

As primary carer, in my view, it is not fair to put the burden on the mother of, in essence, withholding by omission until later on in their minority if and when the children find out they will know that their mother could have told them and chose not to. They will know, frankly, that their father could have told them and chose not to. In the context of the children’s characteristics and everything that I have read in the Cafcass report and, indeed, the mother’s evidence, which I accept, the children are plenty old enough to know this type of information about one or other of their parents, and there is nothing in their characteristics or their circumstances that preclude them being told as was the case, for example, the situation as it occurred in Re M (Ultra-Orthodox Judaism: Transgender) [2017] EWCA Civ 2164 where there was particular religious objection to having a transgender parent.

There is nothing of that nature in these children’s circumstances that points to a high risk of adverse reaction from the children. Indeed, I have considerable trust in the mother having heard her evidence and listened carefully, and, of course, considered the evidence of the Cafcass officer in her being able to handle the information appropriately, fairly and in a way that supports the father as the children’s father as opposed to undermine it.

This situation is not the same as an adult issue that people keep from their children for beneficial reasons. For example, if a couple break up because of an affair, of course, young children should not be told. They are not old enough to have an understanding of what that means or, indeed, how just because one party or the other was unfaithful does not necessarily mean to say that it was their fault, etc. They do not have the maturity to understand, and so many parents, quite rightly, withhold such information from their children until they are older, although it has to be said, not often, and rightly, until they reach adulthood.

This issue is something entirely different. It is not a bad thing. It is not an inappropriate thing. It is something that I have little doubt that the mother accepts as being part of the father’s life and, indeed, I am entirely satisfied that the mother will not approach it as a bad or negative thing but will approach it in the way that she described it to me in evidence, that the children’s father is who he is, and the children deserve to know who their father is. In fact, there is a potential positive welfare benefit to the children of having first-hand experience as early as possible of somebody, and, in particular, somebody important to them, as I have no doubt the father is, of people who do not easily define their gender. It is much more likely to inculcate in them a viewpoint of tolerance and acceptance than keeping a secret.

In any event, it is not the Court’s job to insulate children from all negatives. That is simply not real life. I acknowledge there is a risk of the children having to keep or deciding for themselves that they will keep the information secret, and their mother, and indeed, their father, can discuss with them. There is, of course, some risk to the father of further disclosure of his past history if the children decide to tell other people, just as there is a risk of the limited (but not zero) number of people who already know or have a suspicion about the situation telling the children themselves. The question is, is the children’s primary carer equipped and capable of assisting the children in coping with the potential negatives? The combination of the Cafcass assessment and the mother’s evidence is that I have concluded that B is.

I acknowledge that the issue ordinarily, in the absence of children, would be private, and I understand and completely empathise with that. However, the father is not being honest with his own children, and that honesty may, in fact, provide a foundation for growth in the relationship between the father and his children and, indeed, empathy, and, indeed, growth for the children. I understand that the father is scared, and I genuinely have a great deal of empathy for that. However, in my assessment, there is very real potential that both he and his children can benefit from openness and honesty about this issue.

If I had concluded there was evidence that the mother was weaponizing this issue or that the children were likely to be unaccepting, that might have changed my ultimate conclusion as to the balance of welfare issues in this case. I have not so concluded, and, I have to say, I have not found it particularly difficult not to so conclude; with apologies for the double negative. I consider that B’s approach to the situation has been, in essence, welfare and child-focused in a way that also has not been negative vis-à-vis this issue with respect to the father.

I completely accept that only the father can answer questions about how he feels and what his experience is in relation to both his past history and the exploration he has undertaken. For that reason, I very much favour, as, I know the mother does, the father telling the children and doing so in line with the agreed script, that being on hand to answer questions the children might have. I do think it should be done as soon as the father is able. I do not conclude that it requires a therapist for the children. I do not think it likely that the children are going to have much difficulty in understanding a child-friendly explanation of the situation. They have already been equipped for some of that understanding by their school. It will require courage from the father, but I know he loves his children, and I know he will do his best. Ultimately, I agree with Z’s assessment that if a therapist is required, that is much more likely to be for the father’s benefit than it is for the children’s.

There is an agreed starting point, the script that I have already outlined, and I will add to that that it is expected that if the children have questions that are not answered by the script, then the mother should invite the children to ask their father, as it is his experience and not hers. Frankly, I think she has the common sense to provide that answer anyway without me needing to tell her. It is, in essence, what she suggested in evidence. I believe the mother when she said that she would be more than happy to make special contact arrangements for the children to ask questions, including, if necessary, unblocking the phones for that purpose, when the children ask.

I do not think that telling the children should be significantly delayed. However, I do accept that the father will need some time to get used to the idea of speaking to the children and, indeed, may himself want to take advice about doing so to help him have confidence in what he expresses to the children. There is, if I can put it this way, no restriction beyond the script on what he can tell the children providing, of course, it is a child-friendly and age-appropriate discussion. He, himself, may want to take advice on that.

Therefore, balancing, as I do, and, as I listened carefully to Mr Bickerton’s submissions about timing, I do not want the children being told and this issue to hang over the situation for much longer, so I think, in my judgment, it should happen prior the children breaking up for the Christmas school holiday; in other words, at some point in about the next month. I am not going to stipulate that it should be on the next contact for the children or even the second contact for the children, because I do want to give N the opportunity, should he need to come to terms with this decision and talk through it with anybody with experience in this area, then he has the opportunity to do so. That will better equip him to have the discussion with the children.

Doing it before Christmas has the advantage of it taking place before the school holiday and the children having the school holiday to think about and ask questions. It also means that it will take place before the father’s visit to a different country and before it is known how long the father will be spending in that country and spending in the UK. The date I am identifying is the date when their official school holiday starts, as in not when the children are taken out of school, but by the time they break up for their official school holiday. If it can happen before they go on the family holiday, which, for some reason, is taking place not within the official school holiday, then more is the better, but I am not going to say that I am going to force the father into a situation whereby it happens that early.

I certainly think it is in the children’s interests for it to happen before the father goes on his trip to a different country. It is a situation where the father needs to be, in my view, readily available to answer questions, not when there is a risk that the father is in a completely different time zone and when communication becomes so much more difficult because it is morning here when it is evening there or vice versa. I am allowing sufficient time for N to come to terms with this decision and, indeed, seek advice on it should he wish so.

If it has not happened by the date that the children break up for their official Christmas school holiday, then the mother may broach the subject. I am entirely satisfied that she would do so sensitively, and I will deal with that by specifying that the current specific issue order, which, of course, only applies to the mother, will remain in place until the date that the children break up for their official Christmas holiday but will, in essence, end on that date so that if the children have not been told by their father by then, then the mother may do so. However, I hope and trust that that will not be necessary and that it will have happened before then.

In the event that it is B that tells the children, she of course, will use the script, and, with the addition, in effect, of a ninth point that she must make it clear to the children that they can speak to their father about any issues that she cannot answer because she is not talking about her experience and it is only their father who can talk about that experience. However, as I have made clear, I do not consider that is likely a necessary position because, for obvious reasons, I would much prefer that this is a discussion that N has with his children in the spirit of openness and honesty with them.

I endorse the script that the parties have agreed. Of course, they will need to approach it with common sense and flexibility. It is my intention that the script should be recorded as the guidance that the parents have agreed as the basis for any discussion that takes place between them and the children. I make the prohibited steps until 4pm on the date the children break up from school for the Christmas holiday, which I presume is around 18 or 19 December or something like that, but that date can be clarified.

However, I do not make any other order. I do not consider that this is a case where it is appropriate to specify in a specific issue order, the narrative that has been spelt out in the sense that it strikes me that enforcement in relation to such a stipulation would frankly be highly unlikely, but primarily, because I simply do not think it is necessary. My view is that there will now exist after the cessation of the prohibited steps order on 18 or 19 December, whenever it is, both parents will retain parental responsibility for their children, and both parents may exercise that parental responsibility in the way that they consider appropriate for the welfare of the children.

I consider that both parents in relation to this issue are more than capable of doing so, (1) because their primary carer is as I have set out, an intuitive and understanding individual who is very well-placed to understand the welfare needs of their children and (2) because N is and will be talking about his own experience and, therefore, is well-equipped to talk about that and can, if he needs to, seek further guidance on how to do so from individuals with similar experience or organisations that support such discussions of which there are many that are relatively easily accessed.

However, I do not consider it necessary beyond the cessation of the prohibited steps order to dictate to either parent how they should exercise their parental responsibility under threat of order. Both parents strike me as perfectly capable of sticking to the agreed narrative in the way that has been discussed during this hearing.

That is my judgment.