The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment (but no other) to be published. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
BETWEEN:
CR Applicant
and
CO Respondent
The applicant wife appeared as a litigant-in-person.
Ms Maria Henty (Counsel instructed by NE Family Law) appeared on behalf of the respondent Husband
JUDGMENT OF HHJ EDWARD HESS DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON 31 OCTOBER 2025 AT THE CENTRAL FAMILY COURT SITTING IN PRIVATE
A few minutes ago, I delivered a judgment in relation to the applicant’s application for permission to appeal against DJ Hay’s judgment of November 2024, and I dismissed that application. I went on to make a civil restraint order against the applicant.
PRO BONO COSTS APPLICATION
It is against that background that a costs application is now made. It is not a costs application in the normal form. It is an unusual application for a pro bono costs order. In the context of that, my attention has been drawn to the decision of MacDonald J in Mahmoud v Glanville [2025] EWHC 2395 (Fam), in particular his analysis of Legal Services Act 2007, section 194, which gives specific power where somebody has succeeded in a case after being represented on a pro bono basis to ask for the payment of an equivalent amount of what might otherwise have been a valid inter partes costs application to a charity called The Access to Justice Foundation, which provides pro bono services for needy litigants.
Section 194 sets out the circumstances in which such an order might be made, and dealing with the facts of that case MacDonald J thought it was appropriate to make such an order. His judgment draws attention to the guidance in CPR 1998 PD 47, in particular that statements of costs should be filed, an N260 should be filed in the case of what the fees would be. Indeed, that is exactly what has happened here. An N260 has been prepared which shows counsel’s fees for the hearing of £4,000 plus VAT, and solicitors’ fees for a different figure, but the total overall being £8,553.
Counsel has also drawn my attention to an email which was sent on 7 October 2025 at which time the wife could have withdrawn her appeal if she had so chosen, in which she was put on clear notice that this application would be made. It was pointed out to her that there was little purpose in pursuing this appeal and it should be withdrawn, warning her that if it was not, then she would make this application. But that plea fell on deaf ears and here we are today, and those pro bono lawyers have had to be here today.
So it seems to me that the factors which justify a pro bono costs order are absolutely made out in this case, and there is more than ample justification for me to make such an order. It should be a reminder to the wife not to make unmeritorious applications, and should also provide some benefit to a charity which does good work. Ms Henty very fairly in her submissions says she is prepared to limit that application to counsel’s fee of £4,000, and she says I should order the wife to pay £4,000 to The Access to Justice Foundation. It seems to me that this is classically a case where the jurisdiction requirements, procedural requirements, and also the merit requirements are absolutely in place here.
I am going to make a pro bono costs order exactly as Ms Henty has asked me to, to the effect that the wife should pay £4,000 to The Access to Justice Foundation, and I am going to say that should be payable within 28 days from today.