J (a Child) (No. 2) (Contact Following Change of Residence), Re

The Court continues to be concerned with J. He was born in May 2020, so he is five years old. His mother is M, and his father is F.

This is, I think, the fourth set of Children Act 1989 proceedings in relation to J in his short life. He has been the subject of proceedings almost continuously since August 2022. To put that into context, sadly, that is now more than half of the time that he has been alive.

The first two sets of proceedings resulted in orders that J live with both of his parents. The proceedings which came before these finished on 16 July 2025. The outcome of those proceedings was an order that J live with his father and spend time with his mother. That time was to be supervised for a couple of sessions initially, mainly because of the way in which the mother had presented during the course of the hearing.

I gave a judgment on that day. It […] does need to be considered alongside the judgment that I give today: Re J (A Child) (No. 1) (Change of Residence) [2025] EWFC 490 (B). In summary, during the course of my judgment, I identified that both parents love J and that he loves both of them. I identified, also, that, at his young age, J was reliant on his primary caregivers to meet his day to day needs safely and consistently.

I made findings that both parents were capable of meeting J’s basic needs, but there were risks flowing primarily from parental conflict and the inconsistency of time that J was spending with the father. I made findings that the mother was less able to promote the relationship between J and the father than the father was J's relationship with her, and that she had taken steps, time and time again, to undermine the father's relationship with J, and that she had breached the previous Child Arrangements Order without reasonable excuse.

I identified that the mother had a mental block when it came to co-parenting with the father, something that she herself said in her evidence, but that the ball was in her court to address that. I considered the change of circumstances for J when reaching the conclusions that I did. I also made a Prohibited Steps Order against the mother to prevent her from removing J from the care of the father. I backed that with a penal notice. I adjourned the father's enforcement application generally with liberty to restore.

I am not aware of any appeal against the orders that I made on 16 July 2025.

The father commenced these proceedings, and a separate application for a Non-Molestation Order under case number BH25F00287, on 21 July 2025. That was, therefore, only five days after the previous proceedings had ended. I have had a look at the diary, and I can see that two of those days included a weekend.

The father's witness statement of 18 July 2025 described that, on the previous day, and so the day after the final hearing of the previous proceedings, the mother's partner, Mr T, drove into the side of his car whilst the father was sat in it, he suspected as an act of revenge.

DJ Powell made a Non-Molestation Order without notice to the mother on 21 July 2025, which was served on her on the same day.

At a return date on 1 August 2025, the mother agreed to the Non-Molestation Order remaining in place on the basis of no admissions being made by her and no findings having, at that stage, been made by the Court. A residual issue around the zonal restriction in the order was resolved by me on 27 August 2025, such that the Family Law Act 1996 proceedings were treated as having concluded on that day.

Also on 21 July 2025, in these proceedings, I made an order suspending the direct contact between J and the mother which I had ordered on 16 July 2025, because I was concerned, amongst other things, about the safety of the father with whom J was living before, during and after contact. I set out my reasoning in the recitals to the order that I made, because it was an order that I made without notice to the mother.

The case has since been case managed and timetabled through to a Final Hearing today and the principal Case Management Hearing was on 27 August 2025.

I have read a bundle of evidence produced by the parties. I have been assisted during the course of the hearing by counsel for the parties and, indeed, the legal representatives who have produced the bundle for the Court, and I have heard evidence from each of the parents. The fact that I do not mention something now does not mean that I have not fully considered it, but you will appreciate it is impossible for me to refer to absolutely everything that I have heard and read.

The parties' positions today, in summary, are these. The father seeks that the mother's contact be restricted to indirect contact only until she undertakes certain work. He also seeks an extension of the Non-Molestation Order made by DJ Powell and a Section 91(14) order. The mother's primary position today is that the Court should reinstate the contact ordered on 16 July 2025. It appears also to be her secondary position, though, that direct contact could continue if supervised if the Court were not with her in her primary position.

As I think I probably said last time, the issues for the Court focus primarily on J and his needs. A number of principles come from Section 1 of the Children Act 1989 and the first of those is that J's welfare is the Court’s paramount consideration.

I should make orders in respect of J without delay because delay is known to prejudice children's welfare. I should not make orders unless it would be better for J than not. And, importantly, this: subject to any questions around risk of harm, the presumption is that the involvement in his life of both of his parents will further J's welfare. When coming to the conclusions that I do, I have regard to certain welfare factors, including those set out in Section 1(3).

I remind myself that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged, and so orders that I make have to be weighed against the rights of everybody affected to respect for their private and family life and their home.

Coming back to a point which I have just articulated, when parents live separately, it follows from what I have said about the principles in Section 1 that the starting point is that children should remain in contact with the parent that does not administer their day to day care. Making an order for no direct contact is a serious and draconian order. I should not make an order of that sort unless I am satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate to do so, and that no less radical form of order will achieve the essential end goal of being in J's welfare interests whilst also promoting the involvement of both his mother and father in his life.

It is helpful, perhaps, to touch on some of the authorities which underpin that principle which I have just summarised. For example, in 1995, there was a case called Re O (A Minor) (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124, in which the Court of Appeal referred to the wide discretion that the Court has in regulating contact. It said that it was almost always in the interest of the child to have contact with the parent with whom he does not live and the Court should not readily accept that a child's welfare would be injured by direct contact.

In a case called Re C (Direct Contact: Suspension) [2011] EWCA Civ 521, the Court reinforced those points and observed that contact between the parent and child is to be terminated only in exceptional circumstances where there are cogent reasons for doing so and where there is no alternative.

Domestic abuse is not, in itself, a bar to direct contact taking place but has to be assessed in the circumstances as a whole. That requires the Court, for example, to consider whether contact can take place safely in another way. A case called Re M (Children) (Contact refusal: appeal) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 referred to the need for the Court, for example, to consider supervised contact.

Where direct contact is not possible though, indirect contact remains highly desirable and the Court of Appeal in the case of Re O that I have already referred to, set out in that case the duty to promote that indirect contact fallson both parents.

Those authorities provide information which assists the Court in approaching the issues which are now expressly set out in Practice Direction 12J, in particular paragraphs 35 to 37. The current version of Practice Direction 12J took effect in 2017, and so after all of those cases were decided.

Paragraph 35 refers to the Court ensuring that any order for contact will not expose a child to an unmanageable risk of harm and being in the best interest of a child. Paragraph 36 then comes on to consider more of the specifics and paragraph 36(3) is in these mandatory terms. It says:

“The Court should make an order for contact only if it satisfied -

a)

that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be secured before, during and after contact and;

b)

that the parent with whom the child is living will not be subjected to further domestic abuse by the other parent.”

That is relevant to the circumstances of this case and it is a principle that I had in mind when I made the order that I did on 21 July 2025. Paragraph 37 then goes on to consider other factors that the Court should consider alongside the ones I have just described.

As I have said, alongside the issue of necessity is that of proportionality, and the proportionality exercise involves the Court assessing the impact, essentially, on the Article 8 Rights of the parents and J. There are various authorities including a case called Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013] UKSC 33, Re A(A Child) (Intractable Contact Dispute: Human Rights Violations) [2013] EWCA 1104 and Re J-M(A Child) (Contact Proceedings: Balance of Harm) [2014] EWCA Civ 434, which inform the picture as well as the Strasbourg jurisprudence which goes alongside those.

In resolving disputed issues of evidence in this Court, where a person asserts a particular fact it is that person who has to prove it. The father makes a number of allegations against the mother which he, therefore, has the burden of proving.

The standard of proof is the balance of probability. In other words if it is shown that any particular fact is more likely than not to be true then it is treated as having happened. If it is not proved then that fact is treated as not having happened and that is sometimes referred to as the binary effect. The Court is entitled to take into account inherent probabilities and improbabilities in deciding whether or not a fact is proved but has to base its findings on evidence which can include reasonable inferences but must not include speculation. There is a case called Re B [2008] UKHL 35 which deals with all of that. The Court also has regard to the totality of the evidence and does not compartmentalise it.

It is common for witnesses to lie during the course of an investigation or a hearing. They can do so for all sorts of reasons, for example shame, misplaced loyalty, fear or distress. I remind myself that just because somebody lies about one thing it does not mean they have lied about everything else. That is a principle which is derived from a case called R v Lucas [1981] QB 720.

Witnesses may also be fallible that goes to the reliability of their testimony rather than their credibility and there is a case called Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) which deals with that.

I have heard direct evidence during the course of this hearing of things said, done or experienced by the witnesses themselves. I have also heard what lawyers sometimes call original evidence, for example, things which were said, which are relied upon for the fact that they were said rather than necessarily for the truth of what was said. I have also heard hearsay evidence and that is evidence about things not experienced by the witnesses themselves but which is evidence relied upon for the truth of its contents. Generally speaking, hearsay evidence carries less weight, in particular when it is in competition with direct evidence.

I have reminded myself, also that the witness box is an alien environment for most witnesses who come to Court and, in particular, in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute, I do not make my assessment of the evidence solely by virtue of a witness's presentation in the witness box. I make due allowance for the environment in which the witnesses have found themselves: Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147. I have had regard to the various statements of the parents and I have heard live evidence from each of them today as I have said.

The father's oral evidence was, broadly speaking, consistent with his written statements. His responses to questions were clear, I thought, and measured. He showed, during the course of his evidence, that he thought things through with a focus on the welfare issues.

The mother's evidence, I thought, was largely self serving and sought to deflect blame towards the father. That was particularly evident, for example, in her initial witness statements of 24 July 2025. Her written evidence was also peppered with inconsistency. She told the Court that that was because she had asked ChatGPT to help her with their construction. I did not believe, though, that that was the source of the inconsistencies because, of course, any AI tool that a person uses would have required input, in this case from the mother, to produce the written output. The mother did not present today as dysregulated as she did on 16 July 2025, and she told the Court at the start of her evidence that she was sorry for how she presented at the earlier hearing.

I have not heard evidence from Mr T during the course of this hearing, despite my having given the mother express permission to file a statement from him in the very first order that I made on 21 July 2025. At the hearing on 27 August 2025, the mother said that she did not intend to adduce any evidence from Mr T. The mother did serve a statement from her friend, Ms U, who has not attended Court today and so was not cross-examined about her evidence.

The geography of [a housing estate in Dorset] is somewhat important in understanding the facts of the case.

The mother lives at an address in Road A. By virtue of a Non-Molestation Order made on 1 July 2024 under case number BH24F00286, the father was prohibited from entering Road A or the address where the mother lives until 1 July 2025. After that date, undertakings given by the father on 16 December 2024 came into force in similar terms and those are due to expire on 16 December 2025.

Incidentally, the mother also gave undertakings on 16 December 2024 which included that she would not use or threaten violence towards the father, threaten or intimidate him or a range of other things, whether directly or indirectly. She was prohibited from entering any address where she knew or believed the father to be living, or entering a road in [another town] which is not relevant for present purposes.

The father's now ex-partner, whose first name is V, I think, lives in Road B on the […] estate. By virtue of the Non-Molestation Order of DJ Powell of 21 July 2025, the mother was prohibited from entering any address where she believed the father to be living, including the father’s partner's property, or from entering Road B.

Road B and Road A intersect in two places. In addition, Road B continues beyond the eastern end of Road A to a junction with another road, called Road C.

MrT, the mother's partner, lived, at least at one stage, with his mother whose home is at that junction, so on Road C, as I understand it, opposite the end of Road A. Mr T now, as I understand the mother's evidence, lives with her in Road A.

There is a further road called Road D which runs from the middle of Road B southwards to Road A.

On 27 August 2025, I amended the zonal restriction in the Non-Molestation Order of 21 July 2025 to prevent the mother entering the part of Road B between the intersections with Road D and Road A. What I have now appreciated, whilst looking at the geography more closely in preparation for this hearing, is that for clarity I should have made it absolutely plain that that should be between the intersections with Road D and the eastern end of Road A. I will make that further amendment to the Non-Molestation Order that is currently in place until 18 July 2026.

At the eastern end of Road B, between the junctions with Road A and Road C, there are entrances to a park […] and a primary school called School F. That is not, however, the primary school that J attends. He goes to School G, which is at the southern end of the estate. I think it is probably entered from Road E, although I may be wrong about that.

On 17 July 2025, the father says that he dropped J at his school disco at School G at about 4.15pm and then, at about 4.35pm, drove the short journey to his then partner's home in Road B. He parked outside her property on the right hand side of the road and took a call from the paternal grandfather about something work related.

There is no dispute that Mr T was the driver of a vehicle, which was a Ford tipper vehicle registration […], which collided with the father's vehicle shortly after that. Because there was no dispute about that, it was not necessary for me to make a Third Party Disclosure Order against Mr T'semployer, whose vehicle I understood it was that Mr T was driving, and that was something which we dealt with at the hearing on 27 August 2025.

The father said that the collision took place at about 4.50pm. He saw Mr T's vehicle driving towards him as he was sat in his car. Because the father was parked on the right hand side of the road, he was essentially facing the direction from which MrT’s van approached. The photographs of the father's car show extensive damage to the near side of his vehicle, with deeper damage towards the rear quarter of the car, but damage extending down the majority of the near side to include the front door, and the wing mirror having been ripped off the vehicle completely.

The father says that the vehicle driven by Mr T had travelled towards him and collided with his car, and so had initially removed the wing mirror and then caused, subsequently, the other damage along the side of his car. What that means, looking at the photographs, is that the damage to the father's car appears to have worsened after the initial point of impact.

In my judgment, that tends, on balance, to suggest that Mr T took no steps to avoid the collision or to mitigate the consequences of it. Moreover, in contrast, it supports the idea that Mr T intended to cause the damage that he did.

That is also consistent, in my judgment, with the CCTV footage timed at 4.56pm. That does not suggest that Mr T took any steps to brake prior to the collision, although one cannot see the vehicles at the point of impact because there is a tree in the way. However, the timing of the sound of the collision after Mr T's van disappears from view behind the tree, coupled with the speed at which the van can be then seen continuing on its journey once it reappears, in my judgment is consistent with the van having continued at, more or less, the same speed throughout.

The father has adduced some medical evidence of having suffered a whiplash injury as a result of the incident.

The mother's evidence is that Mr T told her, after the incident, that the collision had taken place.Mr T had accepted that he had been the driver of the vehicle and, on one reading of her evidence, at least, Mr T had said that he had assessed there to be no damage to either vehicle. The mother said in her oral evidence that that was wrong and, in fact, that Mr T had, as she said at another point in her statement, assessed that there was no damage to his own vehicle only.

The mother suggested in her statements that the father had caused the accident, and that he had engineered the timing of it in order to obtain the Non-Molestation Order against her. That, in my judgment, would, in itself, be a fairly extreme way in which to obtain evidence in support of a Non-Molestation Order, but that is not the only evidence before the Court in any event.

It was put to the father that he had pulled out as Mr T was passing. That was something which the father denied. That the father caused the accident is, in my judgment, clearly incorrect. The CCTV footage contains no evidence of the father's vehicle having moved, for example, and it is entirely consistent with the father's statement that his vehicle was parked up and stationary.

The photographs of the damage to the father's car are inconsistent with the father having pulled out from the right hand side of the road into the path of Mr T'soncoming vehicle. If that had happened, that would have been more likely to have resulted in more severe damage to the front of the father's car than to the rear. Additionally, there is no evidence that Mr T stopped to assess the damage, and the photographs show obvious and extensive damage to the father's car.

The mother accepted, as I have said, that Mr T had not, in fact, stopped and that what she had said in her statement in that respect was wrong. There were other inaccuracies in her statement as well, I should say, including about the roads in which she lived, for example. If what the mother says that Mr T told her is a true reflection of what he actually said to her, I would be satisfied that he had lied to her. I have already directed myself in relation to hearsay evidence and the weight which may be attached to it.

For all of those reasons, in my judgment, I can be satisfied on balance that Mr T intended to cause damage to the father's vehicle. The questions which then flow are whether Mr T knew that the father was sat in his vehicle at the time, whether the collision was something which Mr T caused opportunistically or whether it was, to some extent, planned, and what the mother knew about all of those things.

The father says that there was no reason for Mr T to be travelling along Road B at the time in question.

The mother seeks to suggest in her statement that Mr Twould use Road B because it was difficult for him to move his work vehicle if he parked outside the mother's home on Road A. It seems to me that that suggestion though is somewhat undermined by the fact that there is then a photograph of Mr T's van parked outside Mr T's mother's property on the day after the incident, which was just as local to the mother's address as Road B, and which, contrary to the mother's oral evidence today, shows that there was plenty of room for Mr T’s vehicle to manoeuvre outside his mother's property.

Mr T has not, of course, given any direct evidence himself. However, in my judgment, given the direction in which Mr T's vehicle was travelling, the father's vehicle was parked, and the vehicles were essentially facing each other, it is likely that Mr T would have been able to see that the father was sat in his car immediately before and during the course of the collision. However, Mr T did not stop, and he did not check that the father was alright.

The father says that the mother's best friend, MsU, lives opposite V, his then partner. MsU has made a statement to say that she denies having informed the mother that the father was parked outside the house. However, MsU has not attended Court to be cross examined and so her evidence also stands as hearsay.

It is important, in my judgment, that neither Mr T nor Ms U have been made available to be asked questions about the part which they may have played. They have very little to gain, it seems to me, by attending Court and answering questions on oath, but also quite a lot to lose. In my judgment, given that Mr T did deliberately collide with the father's vehicle and, likely, knew that the father was in it, a question which then arises is whether Mr T would have been likely to have done what he did if J had been in the car.

Given that Mr T was in a relationship with the mother, in my judgment, I have reached the conclusion, on balance, that that would have been unlikely. What then follows from that, in my judgment, is that Mr T must have known that J was not in the car with the father or, indeed, that J's half brother was not in the car either. A child in the back seat would not have been as visible to Mr T, as he drove towards the father's car, as the father himself who was sat in the front seat.

The mother said that she, in fact, knew, and Mr T knew, that J was at his school disco. Whether it was communicated by Ms U or whether Mr Thad satisfied himself by other means that the father was alone in his car, in my judgment, there was an element of pre planning to the incident which took place which, likely, also included the mother.

On 17 July 2025 at shortly after 9 o'clock in the evening the father took a screenshot of the mother's Facebook page. She had shared a post from a third party who had said:

“Just got revenge on someone who wronged me nine years ago. Never relax, I am coming.”

The father believed, he said in his statement, that the mother had shared this post on 17 July 2025, although the mother maintained that she shared it on the previous day. She told the Court, in fact, on 27 August 2025, as she did again today, that she had shared that post after the conclusion of the final hearing on the previous day. On balance I consider that the mother is likely to be right about the timing of her post. That is because the screenshot taken by the father states that the mother had posted it one day before rather than the timing having been measured as 23 hours or less before the screenshot was made by him on the evening of 17 July 2025.

The mother told the Court that she was not intending to endorse the message in the post that she shared. I asked her about that, again, at the conclusion of her evidence and she said that she had intended to convey, through her reposting of the post, that karma comes around, or something to that effect.

On balance, in my judgment, it is unlikely that the mother had shared the post in order to announce to the world that she had just got revenge on the father for the reasons that I have just articulated. It was, after all, a third party's post originally, and the mother shared the post before the incident involving Mr T. However, on balance and in my judgment, the fact that the mother shared the post immediately after the hearing on 16 July 2025 tends to suggest that she was, at least, thinking about matters of revenge. The words:

“Never relax, I am coming,”

are, in my judgment, important, particularly given the proximity of the hearing to the post, in respect of her state of mind.

My view in this respect, is fortified by the dysregulated way in which the mother had conducted herself during the course of the hearing on 16 July 2025, which had led me to direct a period of supervised contact to protect J whilst the dust settled, and as a precautionary measure.

It is apparent from the mother's correspondence with the father's solicitors on 17 July 2025 that she did not consider that the Court was right to have done that, and that she considered that the outcome of the hearing was unfair. She told the Court today, as well, that it was the order for supervised contact which had upset her at the hearing. That exchange of correspondence with the father's solicitors concluded, I have noted, a matter of minutes before the incident took place on 17 July 2025.

Taking all of that evidence together, in my judgment, the incident on 17 July 2025 was an abusive incident perpetrated by the mother against the father through Mr T. It was intended to frighten him, as an act of revenge for the injustice that the mother perceived that she had suffered only the day before. The mother's abuse was in breach of her own undertakings given to the Court in December 2024.

As I have said, the Non-Molestation Order made by DJ Powell was served on 21 July 2025. On 23 July 2025, the mother walked down Road B in breach of the order. That is factually accepted by the mother.

On 27 August 2025, the mother sent a message to the paternal aunt within 30 minutes of the hearing concluding on that day, alleging that the father's then partner, V, had been unfaithful towards him. The father believes that the allegation is false. I have not seen the videos referred to in the mother's messages and those, I suppose, may potentially, have assisted me to reach a conclusion as to the truth of the mother's assertions. It is correct, though, that the mother has not adduced those either and, in my judgment, it is, at least, a risk that the mother simply saw this as another opportunity to bad mouth the father's partner.

That comes against the backdrop of the mother having done that before. My judgment on 16 July 2025 dealt with the fact that the mother had called V a “coke whore,” for example. The mother has adduced, rather curiously I thought, a video during the course of these proceedings which appeared to show the mother and V hurling abuse at one another, the mother from the inside of her property and Vwalking past outside with a pushchair. It seems to me that the mother could easily have avoided that situation, for example, by not leaning out of her window and participating in that which she chose to record. What that tends to suggest is that the mother struggles to assess situations and respond appropriately.

On 16 September 2025, the mother sent a message to the paternal aunt saying that she would make an application for a Prohibited Steps Orderif the father were to continue to promote contact between J and members of the maternal family that she had fallen out with. The mother's position in relation to that is that she has concerns that the maternal grandmother and a maternal uncle pose a risk to J due to their substance and alcohol issues. There is no independent evidence before the Court, in fact, of the maternal grandmother's alcohol use or the maternal uncle's drug dealing.

In my judgment, it is difficult for the Court to conclude that the tone of the mother's message on 6 September 2025 was particularly threatening or harassing, in particular if there is any truth to what the mother says about her own mother and brother. So in those circumstances, I am bound to say, that I do not accept that this particular correspondence about the Prohibited Steps Order is necessarily harassment of the father.

On 9 September 2025, the father says that the mother tried to add the paternal aunt and the father’s then partner as friends on social media platforms. It was put to the father that he fraudulently created a fake account using the mother's name to fabricate this evidence. The mother has not adduced any positive evidence of that, and that was something which he denied. I did not really see what the father would have had to gain by fabricating evidence of that sort, and that was, essentially, what he said during the course of his oral evidence. On balance, I am satisfied, that the mother did try to add the paternal aunt and V as friends on social media, and that forms part of my overall assessment of the course of dealings.

On 22 September 2025, the father alleges that he suffered verbal abuse from Mr T. He accepts that the mother was not present, and he accepts also that that was not a breach of the Non-Molestation Order. But the fact of the matter is that the mother remains in a relationship with Mr T, who is somebody who has on multiple occasions levelled threats at the father, even aside from the incident on 17 July 2025.

The father says that his relationship with V is now over. However, he says that he remains friendly with her, and she is the mother of his other son, who continues to live with her in Road B.

The father states that the rationale for his proposals are that there needs to be a period of time when the mother's behaviour stops, whether that is her abuse or her repeated allegations. He considers that the mother needs to undertake some work to address her behaviours, and he points to the fact that the mother had, herself, identified in July 2025 that she was to engage in therapeutic work.

The mother did not consider that it was reasonable for the father to have stopped contact after the incident on 17 July 2025. As I understand it, although the father has extended invitations to her, she has only taken up the opportunity to have indirect contact with J once since the order that I made on 21 July 2025.

Set against those factual findings, then, and stepping back, when I consider the welfare considerations including those set out in Section 1(3) of the 1989 Act, my analysis is in a number of respects, similar to that which I conducted on 16 July 2025.

I have continued to work on the basis that both parents love J, that he loves them, and that he would wish for them to both be involved in his life in a way which is safe. I have worked on the basis also that both parents are perfectly capable of meeting J's day to day basic needs.

Having made the findings I have today though, I do need to revisit my analysis. That is because, in particular in my judgment, the findings that I have made today shed a different light on the risk of harm arising from parental conflict in the light of the mandatory provisions of paragraph 36(3) of Practice Direction 12J. I do also then need to consider, of course, the further change of circumstances for J.

What is clear from the background that I have described today, and in the judgment that I also gave on 16 July 2025, is that there has been a great deal of acrimony directed by the mother at the father which has manifested in a number of ways.

The mother's responses to situations in which conflict arise inform the likelihood of harm resulting in the future. In some situations, children who are exposed to dysregulated behaviour of adults can find themselves at immediate risk of physical harm because they may be caught in the crossfire. In other circumstances, children exposed to parental acrimony or abuse between adults or dysregulated behaviour of a single adult are at risk of emotional harm.

In my judgment, I am satisfied, stepping back, that the mother's conduct has been abusive. It has also been to a great extent unpredictable because of the dysregulated way in which she does present, at least on occasions. In addition, in my judgment, it is likely that the mother's continued campaign of abuse against the father will have caused the father himself emotional harm. That has resulted in her making allegations against the father, for example, and putting a stop to contact when there was no good reason to do so.

She has fabricated evidence to achieve her own aims and she has put the father at immediate risk of physical harm, for example, in the context of the incident on 17 July 2025, and she has continued to harass him. The mother behaves in a way which shows little or no regard for her promises to the Court or orders that the Court makes, something which was also an issue in the previous proceedings and informed the way in which those proceedings concluded, as I have already said.

In my judgment, taking those things together, the risk of the mother perpetrating further abuse against the father remains high.

A parent who is constantly looking over their shoulder, or dealing with false allegations, is likely to be less emotionally available to meet their child's needs. Had the incident on 17 July 2025 resulted in greater levels of injury, the father may not have been physically available to J either. The mother's abuse of the father therefore also has an indirect effect on J's own welfare.

Given the mother's abuse of the father since my judgment of 16 July 2025, coupled with the mental block which she confirmed at the hearing in July that she has in terms of co-parenting, in my judgment, I cannot see how I can regulate the mother having unsupervised contact with J in a way which would be safe for him. The mother has continued to take steps to undermine the welfare of J in the care of the father. Contact directions, undertakings and a Non-Molestation Order have not provided her with sufficient boundaries to prevent risks of harm arising and then eventuating.

When considering whether supervised contact would address the risks, I accept that there is a risk that the mother may say something inappropriate to J during supervised contact and, indeed, she might if it were unsupervised. The parties have been unable to agree third party contact supervisors before, and my focus for present purposes has therefore been on professional supervision.

However, that issue, the mother potentially saying something to J is not an issue which weighs significantly in my decision making so far as the safety of supervised contact is concerned, because the role of a contact supervisor would include recording behaviour by the mother which impacts J's welfare, including any behaviour which undermines the relationship between J and the father.

That can, of course, have a deterrent effect. But if it does not have a deterrent effect, it would provide evidence with which the father would be in a position to come back to Court and revisit the issue around supervision, or revisit the question as to whether supervised contact continues to be appropriate.

However, the mandatory provisions of paragraph 36(3) of Practice Direction 12J would not be met in the circumstances of this case by directing professionally supervised contact, in my judgment, for different reasons. Those are that the father would be left holding the ring in terms of child arrangements, a role which a contact supervisor cannot take over and, of course, there is also then the possibility of further incidents similar to that which took place on 17 July 2025 taking place if the father is waiting outside a contact centre.

For those reasons, I do not consider that the safety of the father with whom J lives before, during and after contact can be secured by making an order for professionally supervised contact.

During the course of her evidence today, the mother showed no remorse, no acceptance, even, of any of the allegations made by the father, and no real sign that she thought that she needed to reflect on her own behaviour and bring about any sort of change. She said that she is engaging in therapeutic work, or is about to, but it was not clear at this stage how that would, necessarily, be linked to the issues that are before the Court today.

Until the mother shows genuine insight, some true introspection, and understands the need to change her behaviours, in my judgment, the risk of abuse of the father and of J being caught up in it continues. What that then means is that I agree with the father's position that, for now, J's safety and welfare means that the mother should have indirect contact only with J until such time that she has taken steps to address her abusive behaviour.

She may, for example, engage in a suitably accredited domestic abuse perpetrator programme, at the end of which, if she successfully engages with it, a report would be provided which may satisfy the father or the Court that she has developed insight and brought about change to her behaviours. She could also engage in other perpetrator work, for example, there is an organisation locally called Up to You.

I will give permission for the mother to disclose to those undertaking work with her around domestic abuse or therapy, transcripts of the judgments that I gave on 16 July 2025 and this judgment that I am giving today, so that that work can be appropriately targeted, and so that the evidence produced at the end of the work shows, I hope, that she has been able to bring about change, so that it is clear that the concerns have been addressed.

It almost goes without saying that a cessation of the mother's abuse or harassment, and adherence to Court Orders, would also form part of the evidence which would be relevant to those issues further down the line.

If the mother's psychiatrist or therapist identifies work which is relevant to her capacity to safely parent a child, the mother should also provide evidence of what has been recommended by that therapist, including if it is that no relevant work needs to be undertaken in that respect, I suppose. But that if work is recommended, there will need also to be some evidence about her engagement with that work and its outcomes.

The mother knows that, in addition, she needs help to enable her to co-parent more effectively with the father in the future. She can source that sort of help herself as well, and I suggest, again, that she does that in a way which produces evidence, at the end of whatever she does, of what she has learnt as a result of the work that she does do.

I do not know how long it is going to take for the mother to undertake this work. I hope that she will get on with it. It may not take as long as 18 months, but it may take longer. Fundamentally, the ball, at this stage, is in her court.

I have considered the change of circumstances for J. He has gone from having a direct and unsupervised relationship with the mother to having no direct contact following my order of 21 July 2025.

The father says that J has managed that change of circumstances but, in my judgment, he is bound to have suffered a sense of loss as a result of the change, which will have been likely to have caused him harm in itself. J's experiences have left him more vulnerable and, therefore, in greater need of the stability of a secure placement.

In my judgment I cannot be satisfied that J's needs for safety and consistency can be maintained by me simply reinstating the Contact Order that I made on 16 July 2025 for the reasons that I have just set out in some detail. In my judgment, the harm that J is likely to suffer by the change to an indirect contact relationship with his mother is less than the harm that he would likely to be suffer if I were to reinstate that contact.

Taking those things together, then, and considering the range of powers available to the courts, today I am going to discharge paragraphs 3 and 4 of my order of 16 July 2025 altogether and, instead, I will order indirect contact only to take place between J and the mother, at at least monthly intervals, in the way proposed by the father in his most recent witness statement.

When I consider the proportionality of that conclusion, in my judgment, the outcome is the same. The order will represent a significant interference with J's Article 8 rights and those of the mother in particular. However, if I were simply to reinstate the contact that I ordered on 16 July 2025, the consequence would be to place the burden on J of addressing the deficits that I have identified in his mother's capacity to promote his welfare and to protect him from harm.

He is only five years old now. He has borne that burden for some of his life already. He has many more years before he reaches majority, and the impact on him of further harm being caused of a similar sort, in my judgment, could stay with him for the rest of his life.

The order for indirect contact only that I make, will, on balance, be more likely to remove that burden from J. It does have a huge impact on the mother's Article 8 rights, but the Court weighs in the balance that, because the concerns pivotal to my decision have been the same throughout all four sets of Children Act 1989 proceedings, it is then correct in my judgment to say that the mother has had a long period of time, and opportunity after opportunity, to demonstrate insight and address those concerns before now.

J needs permanence, stability and security now, in particular given the turbulence of the last three years.

In my judgment, the mother, sadly, remains close to the start of her journey. I hope that she will seek out the sort of support and undertake the sort of work that I have identified so that her relationship with J can progress in the future. I have given her a clear road map, so that she knows what she needs to do and that road map can also be summarised in the recitals of the order I make today.

In the meantime, I do remain concerned about J having been the subject of proceedings now for over three years, more or less continuously. The father seeks a Section 91(14) order which the mother resists.

I have applied my mind to Section 91(14) itself, Section 91A and Practice Direction 12Q. J needs a break from litigation. An order under Section 91(14) does not prevent a meritorious application being made, however it does put in place a filter so that the Court can satisfy itself that any application brought is, indeed, meritorious. In terms of the length of the order, given the history for J of the litigation so far, in my judgment, an order for three years is proportionate.

The Prohibited Steps Order that I made on 16 July 2025 remains in place and will continue to remain in place.

Earlier in my judgment, I identified one amendment needed for clarity to the zonal restrictions in the Non-Molestation Order dated 21 July 2025, as amended by me on 27 August 2025. For similar reasons to those which I have just expressed in relation to the Section 91(14) order, and also because I am concerned that the father, frankly, also needs time when he can focus on caring for J without ongoing abuse or harassment from the mother, I will also extend that Non-Molestation Order so that it will expire three years from today. There is no real objection to that on behalf of the mother.

The father also seeks that he be permitted to disclose the mother's witness statements to the police. I understand that that is because the police have said to him that they have no evidence that Mr T was the driver of the vehicle on 17 July 2025. That is something which the mother admits in her statements and says that Mr T admitted to her. The father's application is, however, resisted by the mother. I have made various findings today in relation to that incident which, of course, the father would be permitted to disclose to the police in any event pursuant to the provisions of Practice Direction 12G.

For that reason, although I do not think that it is, perhaps, strictly necessary for me to direct disclosure of the witness statements, I do not either see that there is any prejudice to the mother in my permitting their disclosure to the police, given the admissions that she makes and the fact that the judgment that I have given can be disclosed in any event. On balance I have taken the view that the mother's statements can be disclosed to the police and I will make a direction to that effect.