MA v LA

This is my judgment in respect of Mr A’s application for a financial remedies order following the breakdown of his marriage to Ms A. For the purpose of this judgment and the sake of expedience only I intend to refer to them as the husband and the wife and hope they will not be offended by this.

In dealing with the matter I had access to the court file via the portal and to a trial bundle and supplemental bundle. At the outset of the hearing an application by the husband to rely on further disclosure contained in the supplemental bundle was refused. I heard oral evidence from the parties. Both were represented by counsel, Mr Knight for the husband and Ms Stewart for the wife. They provided me with written position statements prior to commencement of the hearing and made oral submissions following the close of evidence. I thank them for their assistance in dealing with the matter.

The parties began cohabiting in 2002/2003 and married in 2004. Prior to the marriage the parties signed a pre-nuptial agreement (PNA). Both parties agree that the marriage was volatile and that there were frequent arguments between them. The husband says the date of separation was January 2024 although in the ES1 he says July 2023. The wife says it was August 2017 or 2018. An application for divorce was made in July 2023 and a conditional order made on 20^th March 2024. On either party’s case as to separation this was a long relationship of at least 15 years.

There is one child of the family S aged 16 who lives with both parties and is a student at a private School in London. The wife has two adult children from a previous relationship, X aged 39 and Y aged 30 whom the husband regards as his daughter.

The husband issued his Form A in January 2024 and the first appointment took place on 28^th March 2025 when standard directions were given taking the matter through to FDR. The matter did not settle and directions given progressing the case to this final hearing with a PTR which took place on 16^th October 2025.

The husband is aged 64 and a Norwegian national. He is an entrepreneur and economist. At the time of the marriage he owned shares in G said to be worth US$5 million. At one stage during the marriage he says they were worth US$30 million. By 2015/16 he had realised £3 million from the sale of shares before having to step down from the company. He currently has interests in five companies, the main ones being N, A and B. He is living in rented accommodation having vacated the family home in London in November 2024. This was originally in the wife’s name. In 2011 the property was transferred into the parties’ joint names but in 2016 transferred back into the wife’s sole name. The husband’s income is said to be made up of consulting fees from A and put at £53,545pa net. His income needs are put at £76,000 pa.

The wife is aged 64 and a bio-chemist. She is CEO and a company director and shareholder of X a UK biotech start up company . In 2023 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and is currently undergoing treatment. She remains living at the family home. Her income is put at £80,426pa net from employment and she also receives pension via her US and NHS pensions giving a total net income of £84,780pa. Her Form E puts her income needs at £68,572 for herself and £61,330 for S giving a total of £129,902pa.

The parties had filed an agreed ES2 at the outset of the hearing but this had to be amended to correct some mathematical errors and reflect the husband’s correct position in relation to property owned by him in Norway. There are two properties in Norway. The cabin is in the husband’s sole name and has an equity of £48,800. There are four parcels of land which have been consolidated and appear on the ES2 as the H land parcels. One is in the names of himself and two cousins in equal shares and the husband’s share is valued at £13,854. The other three are in the joint names of the husband and S and the husband’s share in all three is put at £17,317.84 giving a total equity, after deduction of costs of sale, of £31,558. The family home, which is in the wife’s sole name, is agreed at £2,218,875. The wife also owns property in Russia jointly with her son, with an agreed equity of £75,952 but both parties agree that given its location it is illiquid.

The husband is overdrawn on his bank accounts and the wife’s have relatively low balances. The value of the husband’s business interests in his own companies are put at between £605,593 by the husband and £593,259 by the wife before payment of CGT. The husband values the wife’s business interests in X at £4,967,903 and his own shareholding in the company at £282,685.The wife says the company has no value. Unfortunately, an application by the husband for a Part 25 valuation of the companies was not processed by the court in time for it to be considered without impacting on the listing of this hearing and in the circumstances the husband, understandably, decided not to pursue it. The husband has chattels agreed at £19,100. He says there are joint chattels of £17,000 which is disputed. The husband claims debt of £228,849 which is disputed by the wife who puts the figure at £164,512. The wife claims debt of £221,540 which the husband disputes and puts at £6,540. The husband has pension of £408.480 and the wife £337,574.

The husband’s Form E in the bundle puts his costs at £68,584.6 of which £63,663.40 had been paid. At the hearing I asked for an updated Form H. This was received on 18^th November, almost a week after the hearing. It shows the husband has incurred costs of £68,584.60 of which £63,663.40 has been paid. The wife’s Form H discloses costs of £153,833.74 of which £145,000 had been paid

In his S25 statement the husband puts forward the following proposals for settlement based on sharing:-

In the alternative if the case is based on needs he seeks a lump sum of £2,255,000 including £1,875,000 to purchase property.

In his open proposals dated 27^th October 2025 he modifies his offer and says that at least £300,000 of the lump sum in respect of his interest in the family home is to be paid by 31^st December 2025 and the balance, together with interest, is to be settled within 2 years. He increases the value of his shareholding to £1,815,264. He seeks a commitment from the wife to spend up to £16,000py on S’s health care and preparations for A-level exams and university during her last 3 years at School and a joint commitment to pay £40,000 towards her university expenses. Alternatively if the court deals with the matter on the basis of needs as opposed to sharing he seeks a lump sum of £1,218,472 representing the value of his contributions towards the property reflected as a percentage, namely 55.4%. He seeks transfer of 25,000 X shares being what he says is 50% of her original investment.

In her S25 statement dated 8^th August the wife offers the husband a lump sum of £170,000 on a clean break basis. In her open offer she additionally offers to purchase his Xshares from him for £80,000.

In reaching my decision I have had regard to the matters set out at S25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. My first consideration is the welfare of any children whilst they are under the age of 18. Thereafter, I have had regard to all the circumstances of the case including those matters set out at S25(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. I remind myself that matrimonial property, that which has been acquired by the parties jointly during the marriage by virtue of their joint endeavours will normally fall to be divided equally unless a party can demonstrate a need for more than 50% in which case the court can depart from equality provided the outcome is a fair one for both parties. Non- matrimonial property, that which has been acquired pre-marriage or post-separation or during the marriage from an outside source will not be subject to the sharing principle but can be used as a resource to meet need provided, again, the outcome is a fair one for both parties.

When conducting the S25 analysis I must determine the weight to be attached to the PNA. In Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 427 the Supreme Court held that when considering the weight to be attached to an ante or post-nuptial agreement the issues the Court should consider are:

At Paragraph 68 it considered that “If an ante-nuptial agreement, or indeed a post-nuptial agreement, is to carry full weight, both the husband and wife must enter into it of their own free will, without undue influence or pressure, and informed of its implications” and at Paragraph 69 it was said that “Sound legal advice is obviously desirable, for this will ensure that a party understands the implications of the agreement, and full disclosure of any assets owned by the other party may be necessary to ensure this. But if it is clear that a party is fully aware of the implications of an ante-nuptial agreement and indifferent to detailed particulars of the other party's assets, there is no need to accord the agreement reduced weight because he or she is unaware of those particulars. What is important is that each party should have all the information that is material to his or her decision, and that each party should intend that the agreement should govern the financial consequences of the marriage coming to an end.”

At Paragraph 75 it advanced the proposition that "The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement." and at Paragraph 78 explained that “The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that there should be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect to the decision of a married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs should be regulated. It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best. This is particularly true where the parties' agreement addresses existing circumstances and not merely the contingencies of an uncertain future.”

In Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 Lewison LJ summarised the relevant law from Granatino v Radmacher as set out at Paragraph 50 of Ms Stewart’s statement which I do not intend to repeat here but which I have considered.

The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The burden of proof lies with the party making the assertion. It is for them to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that it is more likely than not their version of events is correct.

Neither party presented well as witnesses. Both were frequently unable to answer a straightforward question with a straightforward answer, even when asked to do so, preferring to give their own narrative including lengthy responses providing information which they considered to be relevant but in reality did not answer the question being put and did not assist the court in the decisions to be made. Some of the wife’s evidence was conflicting, but she had said at the outset that English is not her first language, and although fluent, I accept she struggled with some of the nuances of words. However, despite this I am satisfied that both gave the evidence with a view to assisting the court, albeit based on their recollection and interpretation of events.

There are numerous allegations in this case emanating from both parties. Whilst I have considered all the evidence I have only made such findings as I consider necessary and proportionate to determine the outcome.

Both parties are intelligent and educated. At the time of the PNA both were mature adults having had failed relationships which had involved legal proceedings described by the husband in his statement in respect of the PNA as being “unpleasant and expensive”. At the time of the PNA his assets were considerably greater than the wife’s and it was the husband’s suggestion the parties have a PNA but it was not resisted by the wife who wanted to ensure that the family home would be protected in the event of a divorce. The husband confirms at paragraph 5 of his statement relating to the PNA that the previous legal proceedings and, presumably, the wish to avoid such a situation in the future, was the main consideration and I accept that is the case. The husband’s evidence that was that the agreement wasn’t done to protect his financial position. He said he entered into it because a friend advised him to. He wanted a marriage based on love not money and the way to ensure this was to have a PNA. I do not find this explanation plausible in the light of his written evidence and the fact that he was the economically stronger party and the instigator of the PNA. Neither do I accept his oral evidence that it did not suit him to have it. It might not now, but I am satisfied that this was not the case when it was signed.

This is perhaps an unusual case in that the parties financial circumstances have changed considerably since the order was made and that it is now the wife who is the economically stronger party. It is the husband, the main beneficiary of the PNA when it was entered into, who now seeks to challenge it, and not the wife who, although the economically weaker party at the time of the agreement, wishes to uphold the PNA. I cannot help but reflect on whether that would be the position for either party if the financial circumstances at the time of the PNA prevailed.

Both parties were represented and advised by solicitors regarding the drafting and signing of the PNA, the husband by Kingsley Napley and the Wife by Shepherd Harris & Co. The husband first met his solicitors in February 2004 and there were negotiations regarding the content of the agreement in August 2004 shortly before it was signed on 24^th August 2004, three days before the parties married on 27^th August 2004. The husband says the agreement was signed in a rush and hastily prepared without either party having the time to properly reflect and consider the terms of the agreement. However, he accepts that having initially instructed solicitors when he first got the draft document he didn’t do anything with it and it wasn’t until his solicitors chased him that he eventually showed it to the wife. It is clear from the email correspondence that the husband was advised regarding the contents of the PNA and had the opportunity to consider the same. On 16^th August he emailed his solicitors to say that he was “pretty unhappy about the proposal” which he considered took everybody else’s interest into account, excluding his own and he re-wrote the proposal. The email exchanges also make clear that the intention was to make reasonable financial provision for the wife in the event of the divorce and so to protect the husband’s assets. For the husband to suggest in these circumstances that the PNA is not enforceable is, again, simply not plausible. He was actively involved in the drafting and negotiations, and any delay or lateness in finalising the document and/or signing it were his responsibility. Given that he was the one seeking the PNA it would have been open to him to delay signing until after the marriage but there is no suggestion by him that he did so. Whilst he told me in evidence that there was tremendous pressure to sign there was no evidence to support this, it is not mentioned in his PNA statement and there is no evidence that he was under any duress or pressure from the wife to sign. In fact the wife’s evidence was that the husband was so insistent on the PNA being signed that she had to travel to St. Petersburg to obtain evidence of her first divorce in order for it to be translated and presented to the Norwegian authorities before the parties went to church to meet the officiate.

The PNA records at Paragraph (f) of the recital that the parties intend that the agreement shall be legally binding upon them in this jurisdiction and in Norway and worldwide, that any divorce proceedings will be commenced in Norway. Neither party sought advice from Norwegian solicitors prior to signing the agreement. The wife’s solicitors made it clear they could not give advice about Norwegian law. It is unclear whether the husband was advised to take such advice and if so, why he chose not to do so. He was the party with the assets in Norway and Appendix A to the PNA shows that this was where the majority of his assets, comprising of shares in his private companies, were. The wife says, and I accept, that this is why the husband insisted on PNA’s being signed under both English and Norwegian law. She also says that in Norway such agreements are binding but I have no expert evidence before me on this point and cannot say whether or not that is the case. However, given that the parties were living and working in England at the time and did not express any intention to live in Norway in the future, I am satisfied that the requirement for proceedings to be commenced in Norway was because the husband considered this would be to his advantage.

In Ipecki v McConnell [2019] EWFC Mostyn J found that the husband could not be said to have had a full appreciation of the implications of the agreement when he had not received legal advice about the impact of New York law, which was said to govern the agreement. In that case the husband was the economically weaker party. In this case not only was the husband the economically stronger party but he was the one who benefitted from the agreement being governed by Norwegian law. In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume the husband was or should reasonably have been aware of the implications of the agreement in Norway and that he had the opportunity to take legal advice should he have wished to do so. I also note that despite the requirement in the agreement for divorce proceedings to be issued in Norway the husband chose to issue them here. His reasons for doing so as set out in his PNA statement, namely that “the parties have lived in London since 1987 and 1990 respectively, their children are born in the UK and the parties are both firmly domiciled in the UK” adds weight to the argument that the reference to Norway as the appropriate jurisdiction related solely to the husband’s assets and, given that he has chosen to issue in this jurisdiction, the impact of Norwegian law on the implementation of the agreement is of no relevance. The agreement envisages that proceedings may take place other than in Norway and at Paragraph (j) of the recitals it states that the parties will ask the court of any subsequent jurisdiction to uphold the terms of the PNA.

The husband says the PNA is incorrect in that it records at Paragraph 6 that both parties intend to make their matrimonial home at the wife’s property in London and further intend to reside at that address. Whilst they did ultimately do so they initially lived at the husband’s property in London. He does not rely on this in his PNA statement as being a reason why the PNA should not be upheld but it is referred to in Mr Knight’s position statement. The parties disagree as to when they decided to live at the wife’s property in London but both parties signed up to the PNA as drafted and it is clear from the emails that the husband was significantly involved in the drafting to the extent that he re-wrote the initial draft. Again, it is inconceivable that he would have allowed this clause to remain if it was incorrect. However, even if the PNA is wrong in this respect and it is a mistake, it is not of sufficient weight to invalidate the whole of the agreement. It does not go to the fundamental issue of how the parties assets are to be dealt with on separation.

The same can be said about the parties decisions not to implement the terms of the agreement relating to confidentiality, reviewing the agreement in the event of the birth of a child, executing wills and referring any dispute relating to the agreement to a mediator at first instance. Individually these do not go to matters or affect the substantive terms of the agreement in respect of the division of assets on divorce. In AH v BH [2024] EWHC failure to review the agreement after the birth of the children did not invalidate the PNA but did not prevent the court’s consideration of the overall fairness of the agreement and the judge determined that the clause “clearly indicates the parties contemplated that it might not be a fair document upon children being born”. That was in circumstances where then, as here, the wife was the economically weaker party at the time of signing the agreement. However, taken as a whole they may support the husband’s argument that from the outset neither party intended to rely on the agreement.

It is not disputed that following the marriage the husband made financial contributions towards the wife’s assets, albeit the amounts are disputed. He contributed towards the rebuilding works at the family home and paid off the mortgages on the property. He made payments to the wife’s mother. He also paid the wife an allowance when she wasn’t working, or working for no salary, and paid the children’s school fees, although I consider these payments are financial contributions to the parties’ general living expenses, offset in full by non-financial contributions during the marriage, and cannot be construed as capital contributions. He also says he made significant non-financial contributions towards X, although this is wholly disputed by the wife.

The husband says at Paragraph 16 of his PNA statement that neither party adhered to the PNA. In oral evidence he said firstly that he thought it was a “crazy” document and that he still thinks so and that he had forgotten about it. Later he said that “he didn’t regard the pre-nup as anything to take seriously”, that he “never entertained the thought that the pre-nup meant he would not get a beneficial ownership” of the family home and that “he perceived that when he put money into the property it became the family home”. The wife’s evidence both in her PNA statement and before the court, was that she took the PNA seriously. In her statement she says that she treated it as binding and has acted accordingly. She said in evidence that throughout the marriage with some exceptions, namely a joint Swedish account to run a property purchased there by the husband and the family home being transferred into joint names for a period of time, they have maintained separate finances and bank accounts. She says that other than the financial disclosure in the PNA the husband never provided any further disclosure of his wealth during the marriage and that she had little involvement in his major financial decisions.

There is no evidence that the wife did not consider the PNA to be binding at all times. The fact she may have failed to make a will or re-negotiate the arrangement to her advantage when S was born does not evidence that she did not consider herself bound by the substantive terms of the PNA. She was clear and consistent that at all times her intent was to preserve the family home as hers in the event of divorce.

Again, the husband’s evidence that he had forgotten about the PNA, or that he didn’t take it seriously, is not plausible. This is a document entered into with both parties having consulted lawyers and it is difficult to imagine a party subsequently “forgetting” about it. The husband made the contributions towards the family home between 2005 and 2007 so shortly after the parties were married. It is inconceivable he could not have been aware of the terms on the PNA in doing so. The fact that he may have regarded the PNA of no effect or convinced himself that despite its existence payments towards the family home would result in him acquiring a beneficial interest does not mean this was the case. He accepted that he did not inform the wife that he did not consider the PNA to be binding until 2020. He never made any enquiry of her as to why she had not made a will, or sought to review the agreement after their daughter was born or that he ever asked her whether she considered the PNA binding or how she viewed the financial contributions he was making.

In 2011 the wife transferred the family home into joint names. Both parties agree this was to enable a mortgage to be raised to fund the cost of further works to the property, the wife being unable to raise a mortgage in her own name as she was not working. However, the husband says in his S25 statement that this was the direct trigger for transferring the house and that they became registered co-owners because it reflected reality, not because they needed the money. At that time he had substantial assets and could have funded the building works. The wife points to this as evidence that the parties continued to keep their finances separate. The husband provides no explanation as to why, if the parties did not need to borrow money, and the transfer was to reflect his interest in the property, the parties borrowed funds by way of mortgage with additional interest costs. The circumstances of the transfer do not support the husband’s case.

In 2015 the mortgage was discharged by the husband and in 2016 the property was transferred back into the wife’s sole name. The wife says this was to reflect the reality of the situation. The husband says it was done to protect the property from his creditors as he was in financial difficulties and his debts exceeded his assets. There is no evidence to support the husband’s position regarding his financial difficulties. Attached to the wife’s PNA statement is an email from the husband at the time of transfer stating that he intended the wife would be the sole beneficial owner of the property. It is difficult to see how the husband can seek to hold out to potential creditors he had no beneficial interest in the family home whilst at the same time maintaining within these proceedings that he has. In relation to the re-mortgage I prefer the wife’s version of events, namely that it was done to enable borrowing to fund the cost of further works and that once the mortgage had been redeemed the property was transferred back to her to reflect the reality of the situation. I do not consider it evidence that the wife did not adhere to the terms of the PNA.

In AH v BH Mr Justice Peel noted that the wife had made significant contributions to assets held in the husband’s sole name and ringfenced by the PNA, including financial contributions which depleted her own asset base. Also that during the marriage the wife’s circumstances had changed significantly. The wife in that case conceded that there were no vitiating factors such that the PNA should be disregarded and the Judge considered this a sensible approach.

In conclusion I am satisfied that are no vitiating factors such that the court should not give effect to the PNA. However, it must be considered in conjunction with the matters set out at S25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 all the circumstances of the case and in whether it meets the parties, and in particular, the husband’s needs, bearing in mind the change in circumstances since it was entered into.

In considering the weight to be attached to the PNA the Court must have regard to the value of matrimonial assets now and the impact of implementation of the terms of the PNA as against fairness. In SC and TC ZZ21D12436 HHJ Hess, in summarising the principles relating to “Agreements” held that “parties are unlikely to have intended that their ante-nuptial agreement should result, in the event of the marriage breaking up, in one partner being left in a predicament of real need, while the other enjoys a sufficiency or more, and such a result is likely to render it unfair to hold the parties to their agreement. Equally, if the devotion of one partner to looking after the family and the home has left the other free to accumulate wealth, it is likely to be unfair to hold the parties to an agreement that entitles the latter to retain all that he or she has earned.”

I agree with Ms Stewart that the Cabin is an asset which is realisable and available to the husband to meet need. However, I do not accept that the same applies to the parcels of land. These are owned jointly by the husband and third parties. There is no evidence the third parties would agree to a sale, or that they have been informed of the intention to raise the issue of sale in these proceedings.

The ES2 shows that there is disagreement between the parties as to the value of the family home although I was not addressed as to the reasons for this at the hearing. For the purpose of asset calculation I adopt the figure of £2,270,000, roughly the mean average. Allowing for costs of sale at 3% of £68,000 in round figures the equity is £2,202,000.

X was established in 2014 and founded by the wife and two other founding shareholders with the wife investing £1,000 which came from funds provided to her by the husband as an allowance. Her current shareholding is 24.5%. The husband’s three companies were all set up from 2018.

In the absence of the PNA Mr Knight accepted that the wife’s shares would be considered as matrimonial assets subject to the sharing principle. If this is the case the same principle applies to the husband’s business interests, which were acquired post-marriage, although his proposals for settlement make no offer to the wife in relation to the same.

Clause (e ) of the recital records that the parties “wish to retain as his or her own separate property such property or interest in property as he or she respectively may later require”. In other words both parties sought to adopt a separate property regime. Clause 5 of the agreement provides that neither party will make any claim against the other in respect of property acquired before or during the marriage excluding clauses 8 and 12.

Clause 8 records that all property purchased for not more than Norweigan Krone 200,000, which is approximately £15,000 at current exchange rates, shall be deemed to be in their joint ownership and Clause 9 provides that property purchased for more than this figure shall belong to them in the shares in which the purchase money were contributed and no presumption of advancement shall apply.

Mr Knight argues that as the initial investment was less than £15,000 the share acquisition comes within Clause 8. Ms Stewart argues that the payment was an investment in the company and cannot be defined as “property”. Also, that this clause was intended to cover smaller purchases such as items of furniture.

I am satisfied that the X shares were purchased from matrimonial funds and that the investment does fall within the definition in Clause 8 as shares are regarded as property. Even within the terms of the PNA they are subject to the sharing principle. However, if I am wrong about this I do not believe that the parties intention at the time of signing the PNA would have been to ringfence an asset to which both parties had jointly contributed, both by direct financial contribution in terms of investment and in the husband supporting the wife to work in the company without drawing a salary, and non-financial contribution simply by virtue of the original investment being less than £15,000. Even if the shares are not governed by the PNA the court needs to consider the significant contributions made by both parties towards the asset. I appreciate the wife disputes what the husband says about his level of involvement in the company and I believe on balance whilst the husband may have made some contribution in this respect he has probably over-exaggerated his involvement. However, he has made significant contribution in funding the family to enable the wife to work without a salary and will have contributed towards family wellbeing in other ways and this cannot be overlooked.

It cannot be fair that if the wife’s shareholding is included the husband’s should not and in submissions Mr Knight accepted that if the husband succeeded in a claim in respect of the X shares then all the businesses should be shared in specie. The shareholdings of both the husband and the wife are subject to the sharing principle.

In respect of the valuations of the companies despite the husband’s evidence that he considers himself a business valuation expert I am not aware that he has any specific qualifications which would enable him to hold himself out as such or that I can rely on his valuations on this basis. What he has done, as he actually says, is to adopt a valuation based on the latest share price and adjusted it for inflation. The difficulty with this is that it is relatively simplistic and highly speculative. X is a bio start-up company. The most recent rounds of clinical trials have been inconclusive and the evidence before the court is that unless it can raise additional funding by June next year it will run out of funds. Whilst the husband is confident the shareholders will continue to invest and the wife is hopeful she will be able to secure other funding there is no clear evidence that this will be the case. I am satisfied that it is not feasible to simply project a current value of the company based on what shareholders were prepared to invest previously.

The husband’s companies are equally speculative and illiquid. Although the husband is hopeful as to their future success and has said that he expects the value of his companies could be more than £10 million within a few years, again there is no evidence to support this or his calculation of their current value.

In the absence of expert evidence, on the evidence before me I cannot be satisfied that any of the companies have any current value.

In respect of the husband’s liabilities it is accepted that he will owe tax on past income but the figure has yet to be calculated. For the purpose of this judgment I accept the figure in the ES2. However, this is tax due on income which he has not made provision for because his outgoings exceed his income and he has not curtailed his expenditure accordingly.

The credit card liabilities are hard debts, but accrued post separation and I take Ms Stewart’s point that some will probably relate to school fees which it had been agreed the husband would be responsible for on the basis that the wife will be responsible for them going forward. To require the wife to fund that part of them will in effect be a form of double accounting. The credit card liabilities total £52,445.

In respect of the loan to L for £37,966 this was only recently borrowed to cover legal fees. The husband had only provided redacted statements in respect of this borrowing although his evidence was that he thought the redactions had been removed. The husband’s Form H shows that he has incurred costs of £67,435 of which £63,663 has been paid. On balance I accept that the sums were used for legal costs but in the absence of any evidence in support it is, at best, a soft loan if it is a loan at all.

There is a loan agreement between the husband and F which provides for interest and for payments to commence as of March 31^st this year. The husband confirmed he has paid the interest but has asked for a twelve month extension to start the repayments which has been agreed. The loan was used to invest in his company B. The husband said that he had paid for the wife to build up her company and the inference I took from that was that he regarded she should pay towards his. However, this is a post-separation debt that the husband has chosen to incur and it is his responsibility.

The liability to K is only to be repaid until a certain level of capitalisation has been achieved and so is clearly a soft debt.

The Director’s loan from X is a hard debt which will need to be repaid. Whilst the wife has had bonuses in the past there is no evidence that the company has funds to make such a payment in the foreseeable future. However, the wife’s evidence was that this is being paid by way of direct deductions from her salary although she could not say how much had been repaid.

The wife accepts that the debt from P for the running costs of X is a soft debt, only to be repaid when certain conditions are met.

It is accepted that there is an error in the original ES2 in that the figure for the loan for legal fees in 2024 should be £15,000 and not £50,000.

The 2025 loan is evidenced in writing by way of a loan agreement although there is an issue as to the date it was signed. P is a very close friend of the wife’s, to the extent that she refers to her as her “English mother”. She has been a mentor to the wife and extremely supportive of the family both emotionally and financially. She lent the wife and her first husband £50,000 to purchase the family home and later wrote off the loan as a gift on the wife’s marriage and being made aware of the PNA. She is now 92 years old and I accept the wife’s explanation that there was a need to put the arrangement on a more formal footing to enable her to require repayment to ensure funds are available for her if required, for example, to fund future care. This is a hard debt which needs to be repaid.

I accept that the wife’s income is as stated by her, namely £84,780pa. The payment she made into her pension scheme was received by way of bonus. She has received two bonuses and there is no evidence that this is likely to be repeated in the foreseeable future, particularly in circumstances where the company currently does not have sufficient funding beyond June of next year. Whilst I appreciate the wife’s wish to continue working for the foreseeable future of course this may be affected by her health and the continued viability of the company.

The husband puts his income at £67,669 gross, £53,545 net. Ms Stewart provided a schedule of credits to the husband’s bank accounts between 1st May and 31^st October 2025 totalling £98,106. Of this approximately £35,000 is accounted for by a payment received from L and two other redacted payments, also said to be from her, in relation to the loan for legal fees which I have already dealt with. I am satisfied these could not be classed as income. Of the balance the husband says that some relate to reimbursement for expenses and some for advance payment in respect of income. Whilst Ms Stewart argues this shows that A is an asset on which he can draw down I am not satisfied that the husband’s income is other than stated.

The reality is that neither party is claiming periodical payments and both parties are going to have to meet their future needs from whatever resources they have available to them, including pension.

Whilst I heard evidence on this point the reality is that on either party’s case this is a long relationship of between fifteen and twenty two years and I do not consider I am required to make a finding as to the date of separation in order to address the issues in this case, which is a needs case.

Contributions made by the parties during the marriage, whether financial or non-financial are treated as being equal, as to do otherwise would be discriminatory to the non-financial contributor. I accept that the husband has made financial contributions from his own resources towards the wife’s assets which are ring-fenced by the PNA and in evidence the wife accepted it was important to reflect the contributions he had made towards the property. The amount of those contributions are disputed and again, I do not consider I need to make a finding as to the quantum in circumstances where I have found that the PNA is not vitiated. However, I take contributions into account when considering the matters set out at S25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

Both parties accept that they enjoyed a good standard of living, albeit I suspect the wife’s evidence that the husband maintained they were asset rich but cash poor was probably true for at least parts of their marriage.

If the terms of the PNA are applied in full the husband will have non-pension assets of £80,358, £31,558 of which I consider unrealisable, as against liabilities of £228,849, albeit some of them are not hard liabilities, and shareholdings in his companies which may or may not be of value in the future. The wife recognises that this will not meet his real needs in terms of housing and that the PNA should not be strictly applied in these circumstances. However, I am not satisfied the wife’s offer of £170,000 is sufficient to meet the husband’s housing needs.

It is clear from the market appraisal at p200 in the bundle that the family home offers spacious accommodation, including four bedrooms. The property particulars proposed by the wife as being suitable for the husband offer less well-appointed property both in size and the number of bedrooms and are smaller and less expensive than the property particulars she has provided for herself. In evidence she said that she would live in the properties she had provided for the husband subject to driving distance. This is because she is due to have an operation for cataracts but she accepted that it would be normal to expect to be able to drive again once she has had surgery. She said the property at M was definitely suitable.

I understand the wife’s wish to remain living at the family home if at all possible. It has been her home for many years. She sought to protect and preserve it from any claim the husband may have against it by entering the PNA and has abided by its substantive terms. However, circumstances change and the fact of the husband’s significant change in circumstances mean that the PNA can no longer be considered fair in terms of the provision it makes for both parties housing.

The purpose of property particulars is not to identify a property which would be suitable for a party but rather to show the type of property which could be purchased in the area at a particular price. In this case I am satisfied that both parties reasonable housing needs would be met be a housing fund of £600,000 together with £30,000 to fund costs of purchase and moving expenses, including stamp duty.

Whilst both parties are said to have a mortgage capacity this must, by necessity be limited in view of their ages and, in the case of the wife, her health, and I consider that it is in their best interests, if possible, for them to be able to purchase alternative accommodation mortgage free.

Neither do I accept Ms Stewart’s submission that the husband can use his business assets, which he anticipates will be worth £10 million in future. In circumstances where the wife has objected to the husband’s valuation of her company as being speculative in is not reasonable for her to then argue that the valuations and future estimate should be taken into account when looking at the husband’s ability to meet his housing need.

Whilst it is possible to make an award that achieves sharing in circumstances where the validity of a PNA is upheld such an award will only be necessary if it is required to meet needs. If the husband’s needs can be met for an award less than 50% of assets in circumstances where, as here, the PNA is upheld, this is fair.

A lump sum payment to the husband of £700,000 will enable him to purchase property mortgage free and make some reduction towards his hard liabilities. These total £92,425 but I bear in mind that some of the husband’s credit card debt has been incurred post separation and will relate to school fees, which I do not consider the wife should be required to fund. He will retain the cabin as a resource to meet any shortfall.

Alternatively, if the husband chooses not to clear his debt, realises the Cabin and takes out a mortgage he will have a housing fund in excess of £826,000 which would enable him to purchase more expensive property closer in price to that which the wife says would meet her reasonable needs.

The wife will be left with £1,52 million to purchase suitable alternative property and clear her debt. On the basis that total realisable assets, excluding pension, are £2,250,000 a lump sum of £700,000 in addition to retaining his interest in the cabin will give the husband £748,800 or 33.24%. This is a fair outcome.

In the event, which appears probable, that the wife cannot raise funds to pay the lump sum within a reasonable time period, the family home will have to be sold. If that is the case it is to be marketed for sale with agents agreed by the parties or, in default of agreement, by the wife providing details of three agents and the husband selecting one. The property is to marketed and sold for such price as is agreed between the parties or, in default, recommended by the agents. Both parties are to have joint conduct of the sale with the conveyancing solicitors to be agreed between the parties or in the alternative selected by the husband providing details of three firms and the wife selecting one. The proceeds of sale after payment of reasonable estate agents and legal fees incurred in relation to sale are to be divided as to £700,000 to the husband and the balance to the wife.

There will be a wells sharing order in respect of the shares of both parties in all three companies to achieve equalisation. Otherwise there will be a clean break between the parties with dismissal of all other claims, including claims in respect of pension.

The matter will be listed for judgment to be handed down and for a further hearing to deal with any matters arising from the judgment. If parties are able to submit a draft order prior to the hearing it can be vacated.