W v The London Borough of Brent & Ors

The substantive applications before the court are MA’s application for a special guardianship order dated 1^st October 2024 and a subsequent application for a child arrangement order dated 16 April 2025. Both relate to MA’s nephew, H, aged 6. She is his maternal aunt.

The maternal aunt, MA is represented by Ms Robertson (instructed by National Legal Service), both acting pro bono. Ms Samuriwo, represented the Respondent local authority, LB Brent. The child is represented through Ms Sleath, his Guardian, by Ms Howard (instructed by Woodfines Solicitors). Save for Ms Samuriwo, the other advocates have appeared at each of the hearings in these proceedings.

It is thought that Mother is abroad and she did not attend the hearing on 23.9.2025 or indeed previous hearings, Father too is abroad and whilst he joined one hearing remotely and has had notice, he did not attend the hearing on 23.9.2025. I was satisfied that it was in H’s interests to proceed despite the parents’ absence.

At the final hearing on 23.9.2025, the parties all agreed that the Court should approve a Special Guardianship Order in MA’s favour. This reserved judgment is specifically to deal with the circumstances of H’s removal from MA’s care between 23 April - 9 May 2025, the Guardian having raised at the outset her concerns at the manner/method of H’s removal and the need for the LA to understand its’ duties when considering removal in relation to children in kinship placements under final care orders.

There were significant mental health difficulties in relation to the mother, as a result H was placed with MA in September 2021. Care proceedings were issued and a final care order was made on 16 February 2023, on the basis of a care plan that he remain living with MA and her son, K.

Father was assessed positively within the care proceedings, but the final care order and care plan, for H to live with MA was agreed by F at the final hearing in 2023.

London Borough of Brent have been managing H’s placement with MA under a care order, and MA was considered a Local Authority foster carer.

After the LA raised some concerns about MA’s care of H, MA was informed via email on 26/07/24 (following her de-registration as a foster carer) that an alternative placement would be sought for H and the LA invited her to put alternative family members forward.

Later, in August 2024, the Local Authority concluded that the test for removal had not been met and told MA she could continue caring for H whilst she applied for a special guardianship order. [Pg. 287; pg. 325; email dated 12 September]

MA duly instructed a solicitor and issued an application on 1.10.2024, and matters have been progressing in court, albeit with some blips, with a delay in recognising that this was effectively an application to discharge a care order, and thus a Guardian should have been appointed immediately. In any event the Guardian was eventually appointed, and there was a direction for a special guardianship assessment and this was due to be filed in January 2025, but was subsequently extended twice by consent to be served on 21.3.2025. The case was listed for a review hearing on 1^st May 2025 to review that report.

The LA then removed H from MA’s care on 23.4.2025 without notice to CG and justified that decision on the basis of escalating concerns including the failure by MA to sign a WTA and concerns about MA’s friend/partner R.

The SGO report was filed late on 30.4.2025 and was on balance negative in its conclusion

At the hearing on 1st May 2025, the court considered that the Local Authority’s actions may have been contrary to the law set out by Baker J in Re DE (Child under Care Order: Injunction under Human Rights Act 1998) [2014] (‘Re DE’), although not making any findings at that hearing but directing evidence to be filed so that this could be considered at a further hearing before me on 9th May 2025.

The Guardian highlighted that she had not been consulted about the child’s removal into foster care in April 2025 and was only informed of this after he had moved to the placement; and that she would not have supported the child’s removal into foster care pending assessments being considered and knowing the issue was contested, such that she would have expected that issue to have been determined at the existing hearing listed on 1.5.2025. The Guardian noted the concerns raised by the Local Authority were chronic in nature and predominantly centre around poor school attendance, late pick-ups and alleged dishonesty around the MA being in a new relationship. These issues would not have met the test for interim removal if an application for an interim care order were before the Court within care proceedings.

In a short ex tempore judgment delivered on 9.5.2025, I noted the test as set out in Re DE, that, a LA considering removal , when there is a full care order in place, should give proper notice to all parties, and should only remove after a rigorous analysis of all of the evidence, and only remove if the child’s safety and welfare requires immediate removal.

The LA submitted that there was a requirement for immediate removal in this case. They say MA was not working openly and honestly. They point to an incident in 2023; that she failed to provide details of R when asked; that she was not working openly with the LA; that H is frequently late and/or missing school; generalised neglect concerns; and at school H presenting in dirty clothing or inappropriate uniform.

The local authority at the hearing on 1.5.25 accepted that there was no basis for concern relating to MA’s friend R .

At the hearing on 9.5.25, LA submitted that continued separation was in H’s best interests, and that his needs were well met in FC, and that MA could not meet his welfare needs.

CG and MA submitted that the test for separation was not met on 23 April 2025, and that he should not have been removed. They submitted the test for continued separation was not met either.MA candidly accepted there had been issues and set out the significant stresses, that she is a professional midwife; that her son K has significant medical issues; that she self-funded her representation so had to sell her car; that she has been living in a mould infected flat on a high level floor with a lift that frequently breaks down, when K requires a wheelchair when struggling with his severe eczema; that she has a limited support network which the LA have assessed.

Ms Sleath CG identified that these concerns and issues were a reason for the care order being made in the first place. Ms Sleath notes in her position statement for the hearing on 9.5.25, that school records show attendance had in fact improved. She points to absences, being generally authorised by illnesses and recognised that H’s year group had been particularly susceptible to illnesses, and CG was clear the school does not consider this an issue.

Considering all the evidence, I agreed with the submissions of MA and CG. I was satisfied that the concerns were of a chronic nature and did not warrant H’s removal on 23 April. The LA should not have removed H without airing the issue at the hearing already fixed on 1 May and I further noted that the court ordered special guardianship report ( due 21.3.25) had not even been made available to the parties at the time of removal on 23.4.25.

MA’s application dated 16 April 2025 for a CAO was also due to be considered on 1 May hearing.

I concluded that the LA knew that MA opposed the removal of H and she had asked for an urgent hearing just prior to the long Easter weekend, and that despite knowing that, they still did not ask for court approval for their plan and they had failed to inform the Guardian.

I was satisfied that there was no justification to remove H from his MA in all the circumstances of this case. Overall, I was satisfied that contrary to the guidance in re DE, they had failed to give proper notice to all parties, and removed on the basis of chronic concerns which did not warrant peremptory and urgent removal.

I was presented with a number of competing options: leave H in FC under the Care order; a mandatory injunction to return him to his aunt; discharge the care order and substitute a supervision order or make a child arrangement order under a CIN arrangement, or make a s37 direction, with an interim supervision order. That would involve some assessment in relation to threshold.

At the hearing on 9.5.2025, the LA accepted things had changed somewhat, that police checks of R had not raised any concerns; there was now a clear work routine and schedule for MA; and MA had a car which helped with punctuality at school.

I was satisfied when considering the balance of harm, that it was in H’s overall welfare interests to return him to his aunt and that the best legal mechanism for achieving that was to discharge the care order and commute that to a supervision order. H returned to MA’s care on 9.5.2025.

At a further hearing, on 4 July 2025 I made a costs order against the Local Authority in relation to some of MA’s legal costs. By the time of this hearing, there had been a change in solicitor representation for MA who continued to be represented throughout on a pro bono basis.

I then directed further updating assessments and an updating Child and Family assessment conducted by L B X where MA and H now live stated: “In my professional opinion, I do not believe it necessary for H to remain subject to a Supervision Order. The reason being that I do not assess H to be at risk of significant harm. I do assess that H and his family will benefit from ongoing support from X Children’s Services, as detailed in my analysis and the outline plan, but I believe that this can be facilitated on a Child in Need Plan. I believe that this is the least restrictive and appropriate intervention. In addition, should an SGO be granted, H and his family would be supported by the Kinship Team for a minimum of 12 months, and should further support be required beyond that period, H and his carer would be eligible for support, when needed, up until H turns 18 years of age.”

As I say, by the time of the final hearing on 23.9.2025 all parties agreed that I should make a Special Guardianship Order in MA’s favour, and I approved that order.

As the judgment I gave on 9 May 2025 in relation to H’s removal was a brief ex tempore judgment the parties asked that I provide a more detailed judgment for publication, in relation to the circumstances that led to the removal of H from MA’s care, and LA submitted that I should not name the LA or Solicitor or SW, to avoid identification of H, and that even if I considered LA should be named, I should not name the SW and solicitor as it would demoralise hardworking professionals working in difficult circumstances and this was not a case of individual failure but collective failure by the local authority in the communications. MA and CG submitted that the judgment should be published given the adverse findings the court had made against the local authority and the impact of their failings on H. MA and CG agreed the local authority should be named, and MA considered the naming of the local authority’s solicitor and the social worker was a matter for the Court, and the Guardian having initially submitted she was neutral as to naming the professionals, on reflection considered the solicitor should be named if it was confirmed they had failed to take instructions in the way the LA asserted that had at the hearing on 23.9.25.in the judgment.

The following facts are agreed by all parties:

I have considered statements from the Aunt, the local authority solicitor and Head of Service, and detailed submission from all parties as well as the bundle of documents.

I am satisfied now, as I was at the hearing on 9th May 2025 that the LA (i)failed to follow the careful guidance in re DE, (ii) they failed to notify the Guardian, and (iii)knowing that MA opposed the removal ( by her application for an urgent CAO hearing ( rather than an injunction preventing removal ) ), they should have invited the Court to approve their proposed plan for removal at the existing hearing listed on 1.5.2025 given the chronic nature of the concerns.

Given the CG’s opposition to removal and the fact that the “suspicious partner” factor had fallen away at the hearing on 1.5.2025, (which was the only factor, which might have warranted urgent removal) it is unlikely that the court would have sanctioned removal at that stage.

One key issue which was not determined in detail at the hearing on 9^th May 2025, was whether removal was arguably justified as at 23 April 2025, because MA had allegedly failed to sign the working together agreement (WTA) on the 8^th April 2025. The local authority argued that they had asked MA to sign the WTA on 8^th April, and as she failed to subsequently sign the WTA, they were justified in removing H from her care. (The WTA included MA agreeing not to allow R, the MA’s friend/ suspected partner to visit or assist with caring for H until further agreement by the LA).

MA however submits that on 8 April 2025, at 1.19pm, MA confirmed her agreement to the WTA in an email response to the SW. She has provided a copy of that email. The Social worker denies ever receiving that email, although has not shown evidence of her inbox to that effect.

On 8 April 2025, in any event it is accepted that MA’s solicitor at the time confirmed MA’s agreement to signing the ( WTA) to LB Brent’s solicitor. . It is now accepted and agreed that this email was sent on 8.4.25 at 15.03 stating: “I understand that the social worker sent the WTA to the aunt and she has confirmed her agreement to the same”.

On 9 April 2025, 9.44am, the Local Authority’s solicitor acknowledged the email of MA’s solicitor where her agreement to the WTA was confirmed. The local Authority’ solicitor responded to say she was seeking instructions about the agreement.

The Social Worker then confirmed to the local authority solicitor that she had not received communication from the aunt to confirm she was in agreement with the WTA and had not received a signed WTA.

The Local Authority did not then respond to MA’s solicitor’s request for confirmation of whether LB Brent still sought removal of H despite the WTA being signed ( or agreed to be signed). ], and so the MA’s solicitor issued an application for an urgent hearing.

It was originally intended that removal would take place as set out in the “ agreed facts “ section above just prior to the bank holiday weekend on 17.4.25, but it was delayed until 23.4.25. It seems clear now that the local authority did not take steps to clarify after the 9^th April with either the MA directly or with MA’s solicitor whether the terms of the WTA were agreed, and they pressed on with their plan for removal regardless.

At the final hearing before me on 23.9.2025, it was conceded by the LA that there had been some internal failings in this case (which were unspecified), and it was specifically asserted by L B Brent advocate that the social worker instructed them that the SW was unaware that the WTA had been agreed by the MA on 8^th or 9^th April, and had they known this the SW would not have pursued removal at that juncture. It was unclear whether the LA solicitor had therefore been taking instructions ( despite asserting they were doing so in an email) from the SW on 9^th April 2025 when chased by MA’s solicitor, as to whether the LA still pursued removal.

The parties canvassed whether the LA, LA solicitor and/or SW should be named in the judgment for their failings in this case. As aforesaid the LA said the LB Brent should not be named to avoid infringing H’s privacy. The LA submitted that the SW should not be named given it was asserted that they had not known the WTA had been agreed; and the Guardian canvassed whether the solicitor should be named, but given the lack of clarity on this issue, the LA invited the court to allow the LA solicitor to file evidence on this key point as they were on leave on 23.9.2025, before a decision was taken in relation to naming the solicitor.

Subsequent to that hearing the LA solicitor filed a statement in which the LA solicitor confirmed they did tell the social worker that MA agreed the terms of the WTA and that they did ask for updating instructions as to whether the SW still pursued removal in light of that agreement. The Head of Service also filed a short statement accepting that the solicitor did take those actions they said they did in informing the social work team of developments. In other words the LA evidence now accepts that the LA lawyer did tell the SW that MA had agreed the terms of the WTA on 9^th April and asked for updating instructions from them to clarify whether removal was still the LA plan. It seems no such updating instructions were provided.

It is unclear in those circumstances, where MA had agreed to the terms of the WTA, why the SW team then went on to plan a removal in advance of the 1.5.2025 hearing, and particularly why they pursued this path when the MA issued, an urgent application for a CAO to prevent such a removal.

Clearly having asked a carer to sign a written agreement, and the carer having then agreed to sign it, should have resulted in a further SW visit to ensure the carer did physically sign and agree the WTA, followed by a SW review of the plan to consider whether removal the child on an urgent basis was justified, and then communicating any reviewed decision and the reasons for it to the LA lawyer, who in turn should communicate any updated position to all parties.

It would appear that there was no follow up with MA after 9^th April at all, and no review of the decision to remove in light of either (i)the confirmation of agreement of the terms of the WTA, or (ii) the issuing of an urgent application for a CAO on 16.4.25 (iii) the updated information generally surrounding concerns for H. This is clearly a failing with the internal communications of the LA between the social work department and the legal department as well as a failure of the system, to keep under review, a plan to remove a child once updated information has been received, which appeared to obviate the urgent concerns.

These are significant failings, and those failings coupled with the local authority’s failure to notify the Guardian of their plan to remove, resulted in a child being removed wrongly from his primary carer. H, a 6 year old child was unnecessarily removed from the carer he called “ mum” and placed in stranger foster care for 16 days, which was upsetting and confusing to the child and his Aunt.

The paramountcy principle is not engaged in determining this issue but the welfare of the child is a relevant consideration.

The Administration of Justice Act 1960, section 12 and Children Act 1989, section 97(2) establishes automatic restrictions on reporting and publication in family cases concerning children without permission of the court.

In considering the issue of whether the judgment should be published I have had regard to the Practice Guidance (Family Courts: Transparency) issued on 16th January 2014 and the President’s Guidance as to Reporting in the Family Courts dated 3rd October 2019.

The 2014 Practice Guidance distinguished two classes of judgment: those that must ordinarily be published (paragraphs 16 and 17); and those that may be published (paragraphs 18). .Sir James Munby detailed: “16. Permission to publish a judgment should always be given whenever the judge concludes that publication would be in the public interest and whether or not a request has been made by a party or the media. 17. Where a judgment relates to matters set out in schedule 1 or 2 below and a written judgment already exists in a publishable form or the judge has already ordered that the judgment be transcribed, the starting point is that permission should be given for the judgment to be published unless there are compelling reasons why the judgment should not be published. 19. … the judge shall have regard to all the circumstances, the rights arising under any relevant provision of the European Convention on Human Rights, including Articles 6 (right to a fair hearing), 8 (respect for private and family life) and 10 (freedom of expression), and the effect of publication upon any current or potential criminal proceedings. 20. In all cases where a judge gives permission for a judgment to be published: (i) Public authorities and expert witnesses should be named in the judgment approved for publication, unless there are compelling reasons why they should not be so named; (ii) The children who are the subject of the proceedings in the family courts, and other members of their family, and the person who is the subject of proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court relating to incapacitated or vulnerable adults, and other members of their family, should not normally be named in the judgment approved for publication unless the judge otherwise orders; (iii) Anonymity in the judgment as published should not normally be extended beyond protecting the private of the children and adults who are the subject of the proceedings and other members of their families unless there are compelling reasons to do so.”

The transparency guidelines include :

Para 3.14: A balancing exercise is required between ECHR Articles 6, 8 and 10 (and where applicable, other rights). The required balancing exercise is usefully summarised at paragraph 22 of Re J (A Child) [2013] EWHC 2694 (Fam). In short:

Para 5.3: In children cases, if the name of a professional or expert witness is not mentioned in a published judgment, s12 Administration of Justice Act 1960 does not operate to prohibit identification of that professional by others (Re B (A Child) v The Mother & Os [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam). Any specific prohibition on identification of a professional will need specific justification (and a specific direction). Generally, protection of the identity of professional witnesses will be justified only where it is necessary to protect the Article 8 rights of the child/ family concerned. Anonymisation may be justified on other grounds, depending on the specific facts.

Para 5.5: In summary however, the key principles of anonymisation are:

In considering that legal framework, I have decided that I should publish this judgment as I am satisfied that it is in the public interest to know when a local authority’s actions were found to have been wrongful, and what steps the court took to correct those errors.

The local authority, L B Brent must now review their processes for communications between their departments and for reviewing significant decisions in light of updating and relevant information.

In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that a suitably redacted judgment will protect the privacy of H and MA such that, the privacy point provides no solid basis for declining to publish this judgment. I am also satisfied that it is in the overall interests of transparency that the local authority should be named, and thus I have included the identity of the LA throughout the judgment.

I have considered in particular: Herefordshire Council v AB [2018] EWFC 10 when Keehan J said at paragraph 50: “…a public judgment which named the local authority was necessary for the following reasons: (a) the President has repeatedly emphasised the importance of transparency and openness in the conduct of cases in the Family Division and in the Family Court; (b) the public have a real and legitimate interest in knowing what public bodies do, or, as in these cases, do not do in their name and on their behalf; (c) the failure to plan and take action in both of these cases is extremely serious…”

I am less persuaded that I should publish the names of the individual SW and solicitor, as it seems clear to me that this case arises out of a system failure rather than individual failings and I can see little benefit or public interest in naming the key professionals in this case. It is clear that the internal and external communication processes were inadequate and that led to a very significant decision being made, which the Court concluded would not have been made had the system been implemented properly. The Court retains overall discretion as to whether to name professionals, and I am not satisfied that there is any material benefit to naming them in this case.