G & Ors (Care and Placement; Sibling Contact), Re

Neutral Citation Number[2025] EWFC 477 (B)

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G & Ors (Care and Placement; Sibling Contact), Re

Neutral Citation Number[2025] EWFC 477 (B)

IMPORTANT NOTICE

This judgment was given in private. The judge gives permission for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of this judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT WOLVERHAMPTONWV24C50407

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWFC 477 (B)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION AND CHILDREN ACT 2002

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989

Date: 9 July 2025

Before:

HIS HONOUR JUDGE REDMOND

Re: G and Others (Care and Placement; Sibling Contact)

Solicitor for the Local Authority: Rosemary Owen

Solicitor for the Mother: Ben Herbert

Counsel for the Father: Angela Houston

Counsel for G: James Cleary

Solicitor for the Children: Jas Tamber

JUDGMENT

1.

In these proceedings I am dealing with applications for care and placement orders.

2.

I am concerned with G (13), H (11), I (6) and J (9 months). The father is the father of J. The fathers of G, H and I have not played any part in proceedings.

3.

The matter is currently in week 42, with a statutory 26 week maximum, and has been listed before me by the allocated judge for final determination. Having heard the case, these are my reasons for concluding the care orders are in the best interests of all of the children and that a placement order must be made for the youngest child.

Parties’ Positions

4.

The local authority seek care orders for all the children with a placement order for J, enabling her to be placed for adoption and seeking to dispense with the consent of her parents. That final position is supported by the children’s guardian.

5.

The mother seeks return of the children to her care. Both parents, including father’s last known position, object to the placement application for J.

6.

Both mother and father have required interpreters and those have been provided at this hearing. The vulnerabilities of the parties have been in constant consideration and participation directions have been made both for everyone to participate in the hearing but also for the giving of evidence.

7.

The parents did not attend as directed on the first morning of the hearing, though had proper notice of it. Mother attended after 10:30am on the first day, some 1 and a half hours late. The court nevertheless gave her the time asked for with her legal team and started an hour later than planned. The father did not attend, though has been ably represented throughout the hearing and his last known position has enabled challenge to be made where appropriate. His solicitors made efforts on each day to contact him and he has not provided any instructions as to his whereabouts. They remain on the record and he has been able to make them aware of any problem, but has not done so. I am satisfied that he had notice of the hearing and has chosen not to attend. There has been no application for an adjournment by any party or for other participation directions to deal with any situation he may be facing.

8.

The parents are nationals of Country A. They have been informed of the proceedings and recently enquired as to progress. Two orders have since been sent to them identifying the dates of the final hearing. They have not attended the hearing nor has any application been made.

Law

9.

In relation to a factual dispute, the standard of proof is the civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities, and that test does not modify according to the seriousness of the allegations. In this case, the burden of proof is at all times on the local authority. Any finding must be based on evidence, including inferences properly drawn from the evidence, carefully avoiding suspicion and speculation particularly involving a gap in the evidence. Each piece of evidence must be placed into context with all other pieces of evidence; invariably the court surveys a wide canvas of evidence. In relation to that wide canvas, I note the description of Lord Nicholls inRe H and R [1996] 1 FLR 80:

"The range of facts which may properly be taken into account is infinite. Facts include the history of members of the family, the state of relationships within a family, proposed changes within the membership of a family, parental attitudes, and omissions which might not reasonably have been expected, just as much as actual physical assaults. The court will attach to all the relevant facts the appropriate weight when coming to an overall conclusion on the crucial issue."

10.

The first application of the local authority is for a care order in relation to all four children and the second application of is for a placement order to enable the local authority to place the youngest child for adoption pursuant to section 21 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.

11.

The welfare of the children is my paramount consideration, though I carefully note that in respect of J, that a court may only make a placement order if it is justified having given paramount consideration to her welfare throughout her life (section 1(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002). I must have regard to the checklist set out in section 1(4) of the Act and I only need to conduct one welfare analysis, following Re R.

12.

Concerning any orders the court may make, any interference in the article 8 rights of a family must be limited only to that which is necessary and proportionate. Where, however, there is any tension between a parent and child’s article 8 rights, it is the child’s rights that ought to prevail.

13.

I am clear that placing a child for adoption is a draconian order and remind myself of the considerations in Re B [2013] UKSC 33. It is an order of last resort when there is no other order compatible with the child's long-term welfare. I entirely accept that this is because the interests of the child self-evidently require his or her relationship with her natural parents to be maintained unless no other course is possible in the child's interest. Contact post-placement order also falls to be considered, and I remind myself that stopping contact and the legal relationship between the child and his or her family is only justified by the overriding necessity of the interests of the child.

14.

In the absence of parental consent to adoption, I can only make a placement order if I am satisfied that parental consent should be dispensed with. Pursuant to section 52(1), I would need to be satisfied that the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.

15.

The Court of Appeal considered the proper application of Re B above in Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 965 and re-emphasised the stringency of the welfare test when considering whether to dispense with parental consent. There is a necessity for a global, holistic and multi-faceted evaluation of all realistic placement options before coming to a decision and to avoid a linear process whereby each option is looked at in isolation to be discounted leaving only one option remaining.

Evidence

16.

I have read carefully all the evidence filed in this matter to which my attention has been directed as well as my own reading. I have heard oral evidence from a number of witnesses.

17.

Father was due to give oral evidence, and had the opportunity to do so, but did not attend the hearing. However, his advocate has been able to cross-examine the other witnesses and to make submissions on his behalf on the basis of the comprehensive written evidence he has filed.

18.

The allocated social worker, up until a week or so ago when she left the authority, gave straightforward and authoritative evidence concerning her assessment of the parents’ ability to provide care to their children and finding such to be lacking in a number of respects. I have listened to it carefully, including to the challenge put. The social worker was readily able to recognise the positives in the case, but these were observed to be limited and came into conflict with the actions of the parents which I shall describe in the welfare balance below. Overall, I accept the social worker’s evidence generally as well as the parenting assessments of the parents as a proper reflection of their ability to care within the children’s timescales and that prognosis of change is very poor.

19.

The Team Manager assisted the court with some care planning that would go forward from this point. Having reflected on the evolving position of post-placement contact, she accepted that it would be positive for these particular children and maintaining family relationships. Such could be completed in two phases and up to a level of 6 times a year, clarifying why in this particular case it would be at that level rather than that being any form of a blanket requirement. However, there was a need for flexibility with those provisions.

20.

By contrast to that of professionals, the mother’s evidence as to welfare was highly confused and at various points said different things. She has accepted to me in evidence that she has lied to professionals throughout proceedings about the level of abuse in the relationship. She did describe abusive behaviours by the father, though I am still concerned that I do not have a full picture of the full extent of them when I place her evidence against that provided by the police in their logs. In coming to any factual findings, which I will do below, I have taken account of the father’s position that he denies any form of domestic abuse other than some verbal arguments between the parties.

21.

The children’s guardian was highly reflective in evidence. She responded appropriately to challenge put to her that the mother could care for the children and, while recognising the positives, they were significantly limited and called into question by the mother’s own actions. I have read her analysis and heard her oral evidence and I accept it.

22.

I first apply the test in relation to threshold, whether I conclude that the conditions in s.31 CA 1989 are made out. From the evidence I have read and heard together with the concessions made, a risk of physical and emotional harm to the children is made out on the balance of probabilities at the point of intervention:

a)

H and G were frightened of the father and G feels that she is treated differently to her siblings. The children have experienced the impact of domestic abuse with their parents’ relationship.

b)

Mother did not accept or understand the level of risk posed to herself and the children by father and was unable to protect them from harm.

c)

Father’s alcohol and substance misuse placed the children at risk of physical and emotional harm.

23.

However, I shall deal with findings as to domestic abuse and continuing alcohol and substance misuse below separately.

24.

There is evidence suggesting that father may have been domestically abusive, including physical abuse and that such is continuing. I have been cautious when assessing the allegations that I have not heard orally from the father, but he has had an opportunity to do so and declined the same by his non-attendance. I have taken account that he has said he has never been physically violent and such has been consistently said. His statements are comprehensive and speak only of verbal arguments. However, I have also taken account of mother’s evidence not only to me, but also the police evidence where such provides independent support that such events took place, and are contemporaneous in terms of their reports. There is, by way of example, an allegation witnessed by others and the aftermath seen by the police. At various times mother has made allegations to the police or professionals and then retracted the same, sometimes with significant detail as to why. Such has been explored with mother in her oral evidence and I have listened to that challenge. I have been cautious about not having oral evidence from the matters recalled into the police logs, but have assessed all matters with the appropriate weight in that regard and fitted such into the totality of evidence. Despite the detail provided in mother’s retraction, I am struck by her reply to a question that he is romantic, saying that at times he can be, but that he can also be abusive: she put it that he had his moments. She gave me a detail of her experiences that was different in tone and feeling to her other evidence.

25.

Ultimately and on balance, when reviewing the matter as a whole, I am persuaded that it is more likely than not that there has been a high level of physical and emotional abuse perpetrated by the father on the mother and that such took place at least on the following occasions:

a)

7 October 2023 - there was a physical incident at the address where father was found to be intoxicated by the police and there had been reports of smashing glass and arguments from a passer-by on a bus who stopped and exited the bus due to the level of concern. The children witnessed the incident despite what is said by the parents.

b)

11 September 2024 – there was a physical incident where father threatened the mother with an axe.

c)

There was an evening on an unknown date where he was extremely drunk, brandished a knife and made threats to kill, which may be the same or on a separate occasion to the previous two findings.

d)

Recently, father has threatened to throw acid on the mother’s face from car batteries.

e)

I accept that he told her that they would never separate and that if they did he would kill her and he would then kill himself. The father has been coercive and controlling within the relationship.

26.

I have been asked to draw an adverse factual inference as to the continuing problem of father’s alcohol and substance misused in respect of his non-attendance for hair strand testing. I have taken into account all of the evidence in this, including that the social worker accepts not having seen him under the influence. I have also taken account of other evidence, including the children being frightened of their father and of the mother’s allegations as well as the police finding father at the home intoxicated on 7 October 2023. This court determined that such testing was necessary and such has not been complied with. There is a wealth of evidence that he struggles with both alcohol or substances and such impacts on his behaviour to others and there has been recent evidence of continuing abuse which have been made subject of findings where previous allegations were made as being under the influence.

27.

When I weigh all of the matters, it is clear to me that the authority have established that it is more likely than not that there is a continuing issue of excess consumption of alcohol and/or misusing substances and the welfare analysis should be undertaken on the basis of that finding.

Welfare

28.

The realistic welfare options for the children are:

a)

A return to their mother’s care for any or all of the children under any order that could achieve that

b)

Long term foster care for any or all of the children

c)

Adoption for the youngest child

29.

There are a number of options that have been discounted. The father could not reasonably be said to be putting himself forward as of today’s hearing. In any event, I would not find such compatible with the children’s welfare in light of my findings. There are no alternative available options, for example, for me to place with any family members. There are no assessed connected persons. While the Country A agencies have been appraised of this final hearing and invited to attend, they have not done so on any of the days, nor have they made any application within the time of this final hearing. Having reviewed each of those options, I am clear they are not in any event in the children's best interests.

30.

I shall then place all the evidence within the context of the enhanced welfare checklist and understand that my paramount consideration has to be their lifelong welfare.

The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the children concerned (considered in the light of their age and understanding) which I take together with their particular needs and their age, sex, background and any relevant characteristics

31.

G is the eldest child at 13 and gives instructions to her own solicitor. She would ideally wish to go back to live with her mother. Her views are comprehensively set out in the evidence of the children’s guardian and in submissions on her behalf. However, it can be fairly observed she has had at times fairly changing views about what ought to happen in her own care planning at times as may be understandable at the age of 13. An example being that she does give differing views on whether she would wish to change school or not. The court bears in mind that she is 13 years old and caught in the middle of an adult dispute as to her and her sibling’s future arrangements. I have been weighing her views expressed for a return home against whether that is safe when taking a wholistic welfare view.

32.

H is 11 and does not speak English as his first language, but such has significantly improved. Wholistic decisions will need to be made on his schooling in relation to his elder sister's. While he wishes to return to his mother’s care, he has said that he understood if the decision was for him to remain in foster care.

33.

I is 6 years old and is non-verbal, although does mimic others on occasion. She struggles with some aspects of personal space and interaction. She requires a high level of focused support in both social aspects and education to help her meet her potential.

34.

J is 9 months old. There is a significant gap between her and her other siblings in age. She cannot yet express her views in any meaningful way, although I have significant regard to her being presumed to wish to remain in her birth family if that were safe. She has not seen her mother for some time due to the lack of attending family time.

35.

Throughout these proceedings the children have needed to see their parents. Sadly directly after they were removed, the parents departed the United Kingdom for 2 months, such that the children could not see them. I have listened to mother’s response about that and I do not accept it. Particularly, that must be seen in the context of what then happened with contact. After their return the father stopped contact in February 2025. Mother has only attended some 7 out of 15 contact sessions offered, so much so that the children have said how upset and angry they are about it. It is clear to me that the parents do not prioritise contact with their children. I have heard evidence about conflicts with either dental appointments or toothache, but when I am looking at the length of time for which there has been a problem, effectively between September 2024 and June 2025, I am unpersuaded that there is a reasonable excuse for not attending contact at this level and consider it is a lack of prioritisation of the children’s needs over many months.

36.

I accept the local authority evidence, in preference to the mother’s, that G was at times taking on a parental role in relation to the younger children. Such was not in accordance with G’s needs. There is a lack of acceptance of this on behalf of mother and I am concerned that if reunited, the same may occur with G and indeed other children. By way of example of poor behaviour of the mother, there is a sad amount of evidence that the mother has questioned G’s ability to, for example, do simple maths and called her stupid. The mother denied this. I prefer the evidence of the social worker. I take from this that would have a damaging and lasting effect on the child.

37.

However, I have also been taking into account the positives that are put on behalf of mother as to the children's needs. It is recognised that she speaks the children’s first language in the home and could support their culture. She could make them home cooked meals. However, that would have to be set against the risk matters discussed above and below and the children’s overall welfare.

Any harm which they have suffered or are at risk of suffering which I take together with how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs

38.

There were some positives in mother’s assessment, but they by no means could be taken to be comprehensive. By way of example, it is offered as a positive on her behalf that she would be willing to engage with Women’s Aid. However, the social worker was clear that while she had said that in the parenting assessment, she disengaged from those services and has recently said that she would not attend. Intention must be followed by action for there to be a positive effect on the issue of harm. My difficulty is that even despite the findings and understanding them in context as we now understand domestically abusive relationships, I consider that without significant learning and understanding the pattern is likely to continue.

39.

A further example was that it was suggested in cross-examination that mother’s actions in contact as to basic care were good. However, that must be seen in the context of her engagement with it. Despite the children’s need for regular and frequent contact with their mother during proceedings, the mother has only attended 7 contacts between February 2025 and July 2025. That level was already at a significantly reduced level and there were 10 contacts missed with excuses invariably around ‘dental appointments’ and ‘toothache’ stretching over months. It was entirely manageable but not managed. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not accept the level of impact that her tooth issues would have had over such a lengthy period. I struggle with the disconnect between the submission that the court ought to return her children to her full time and that she is ready to resume that obligation when that is placed against the situation where the mother has only made herself available for 7 contacts throughout 2025 and that the contact pattern has had to reduce because of her lack of engagement.

40.

I have made findings as to the abuse above. It was very worrying to hear mother in the witness box taking an issue with and attempting to draw a distinction between whether the children saw the abuse, as to whether they were in the room, or that they heard it being in the house as though one was lesser in terms of its impact. When I look at the impact on the children, such a distinction is without a difference and it matters not. In fact the police recorded how upsetting it was for them. The level of abuse within the household was high and comprised both physical and emotional abuse. Such had and will continue to have a lasting impact on the children and I find that the mother is unwilling or unable to presently reflect upon, and show insight into, the risk of domestic abuse on herself or the children.

41.

Key in the determination of future risk is the status of the relationship of the parents. As recently as in both May and June, the mother and father were clear to the court that they remained in a relationship. That is after not only the domestic abuse suffered, which the court well understands, but also the proceedings themselves having been going on for a period of 8 months and the assessment process having taken place where that issue has been discussed and practically demonstrated in the placements of the children. Final care plans were known at this point. The mother now says that they separated in May 2025. The picture was further complicated by her referring in the witness box for the first time to a potential new relationship she was exploring with an unknown gentleman which was not known to professionals and which she had not previously given in evidence. This is worrying as it is in the context of father not being the first man who has been violent to the mother and that there is a pattern of such relationships. Such opens the children open up to repeated risk when coupled with the finding that mother is unable to appreciate the risk that a perpetrator would pose.

42.

The recent claimed separation is, very sadly, a matter the professionals have heard before. By way of example, she tells an IDVA on 12 September 2024 that she has separated from him. However, by 17 September, only 5 days later, she reports to the local authority that they are back in a relationship and “are living together and will be together forever”. In addition, it was harrowing to read the conversation she had with the police on 21 September where she is seeking to “go on holiday” with the father following the children being taken into care. The police officer having the conversation with her records:

“I have however raised our significant concerns with the INF regarding her going on holiday with her partner who only a week ago she reported as attacking her with an axe (high risk) and previous for harassment. She has denied both of these incidents and said they were misunderstood by police. I have reiterated that they were graded high risk and that professional I would advise against associating with her partner however she has not appeared to take much of this on board.”

43.

The emphasis is mine. Having heard her evidence, I find that she is in the same place now as she was then, that she does not appear to take much of it on board as to the level of seriousness of the allegations. I am not convinced that there is any real appreciation of father’s level of risk other than her saying such in an attempt to be reunited with her children. The evidence given on the matter was, with great sadness, rather hollow.

44.

I am told that there are current bail conditions for the father to remain away from her and that the mother has reported breach of those. While it is positive that she has reported those, it is not so positive that he has attempted the breach of them and such is very recent and when set against the lengthy evidence of making allegations and reuniting, it is not persuasive. By way of example as to actual action, it was mentioned that she would apply for a non-molestation order, but I note that at no time in the 42 weeks of proceedings has one been applied for, including now.

45.

Ultimately, while the positives were explored as well as they could in evidence, I am not satisfied that they were realistically put in this case to mitigate significantly the risk of harm in the children returning home.

46.

Overall, even if there is any change, it is in the very early stages of that change and any progress is minimal at the moment. For example, it has been put that in March she had been watching domestic abuse videos and that such was positive. However, it does not appear that any actual progress has come from it. I am told that although domestic abuse work has been offered, to include engagement with Women’s Aid, this has been declined by mother. The chronology of events over many months bears out her making reports to the police and professionals but then retracting the same. The guardian tells me that this is in fact what G herself observes about her mother’s insight and I accept that evidence. Mother unfortunately moves back and forth repeatedly through the cycle of change. It is hoped that in time there may be real progress in terms of that, but there would have to be a lengthy and assessed period of stability for that to form a meaningful change for the children and such is vastly outside of their timescales.

47.

I have been considering the protective measures put forward on the mother’s behalf, but I have to remark that the suggestion of unannounced visits and the completion of work while the children are in her care is, at best, unrealistic. It is not viable to suggest these are a proper balance on the level of risk coupled with the lack of insight and appreciation that I have recognised in this case.

The likely effect on them (throughout their life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person taken together with the relationship which the child has with relatives and with any other relevant person including (i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so, (ii) the ability and willingness of any relevant person to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs, and (iii) the wishes and feelings of any of any relevant person regarding the child.

48.

The court has identified the realistic alternatives above. Sadly, by way of example of other options, there are no connected persons put forward or assessed. The father has not attended the hearing, but the mother properly puts herself forward to care for all of the children.

49.

Adoption is a draconian measure in terms of its legal effect due to the severing of legal ties between a child and their birth family. It is a lifelong legal shift in a young person’s natural family to a family where the legal orders lasts past minority and throughout their lives. However, it can also be reasonably argued that care orders where the local authority take over the care of a child are also of significance, though not severing the parental responsibility between parent and child and lasting only in minority.

50.

The connections of the children to their birth family are established in terms not only of the bonds of love and affection, but also of culture and language: they are all of a specific cultural origin and English is not their first language. There is a wider family in this country and in Country A. I have also been told that she could provide the home-cooked meals that they are missing, and I entirely accept this. I have been weighing it against the risk of harm that I have explored above.

51.

The court takes into account that neither foster care nor adoption are free from risk. Both types of placements can break down, although usually in terms of the matching process an adoptive placement may be shown to be more secure and permanent than other forms of placement outside of the family. Placement within the natural family could be secure, but carries with it the risks that I have outlined above.

52.

At the moment, there have been some concerns in the older children’s current foster placements. However, any in any event, they are not long-term placements and all of the children will need to move if the court approves a final care order to long-term matched placements.

53.

If there was either return to mother or foster care for all the children, then contact would be maintained at an appropriate level. However, I have at all times been considering contact specifically if I were to make the placement order. I have been balancing whether contact as requested by mother could be put in place, but for all of the reasons I have been balancing above with her level of insight and where she is on her particular journey, I cannot accede to any request other than the post-placement planning of the local authority, which I consider to be appropriate.

54.

In relation to post-placement sibling contact, that has been agreed and properly put into the care plan. The parties have agreed too that such be the subject of recitals to the order rather than a prescriptive section 26 order. The children’s guardian particularly had given thought to post-adoption contact in her evidence, were a placement order to be made. She was clear with me that direct contact post-adoption between the siblings would be in the children’s best interests, but that the mother’s contact ought to be indirect. She was clear that we have to consider the children individually and that if there were an impasse on contact, that it would be the adoptive placement that should take priority. It may be that creativity and lack of rigidity may be what is needed for each of the children's individual needs and that has led her, as well as the social worker, to conclude that there ought not to be a firm and rigid order under section 26 rather than a clear expression of intent, expectation and need within the care plan and recitals to the order that can be adapted and altered as necessary and provide a clear direction of travel while also remaining flexible. I was thoroughly encouraged by the children’s guardian’s specific evidence as to this adoption agency, and indeed others, where the openness and direction of travel is at the forefront of everyone’s mind.

55.

This acceptance of a direction of travel as to sibling contact would go some way to ameliorate the severance of the legal ties with the birth family. The sibling relationship is, as a general proposition, an enduring one and can be lifelong. It would mean that lifestory work could be supplemented in a more natural way, although accounting of course for the differing needs of the eventual placement.

56.

Taking all of that into account, I come to the following conclusions about the positives and negatives of each realistic option in summary only:

a)

Return of some or all of the children to mother’s care would positively allow them to be brought up in their natural family, which would bring with it all the cultural and heritage matters that only family can truly bring. There would also be assistance in that regard with the language that the older children speak as their first language. It would mean, for J and the other children, that there was not a severing of legal ties between her and her birth family. However, it would present a risk that I have assessed to be intolerable in terms of both physical and emotional harm with no ability to protect against this at the present stage.

b)

Long Term foster care for the older 3 children would provide them with the safety needed in terms of the risk that has been outlined and could also meet their respective needs, including by way of example I’s needs concerning her speech and socialization. However, it would mean separation from their family and the need for statutory intervention routinely including for all major decisions as to their education and health. Foster placements can be long term but can also come to an end for a variety of reasons.

c)

Adoption for J could allow her the chance of a family who could be there for her not just in the short term and minority, but throughout her life. Of course, adoptive placements can break down though their stability is generally more readily assured through the matching process than long-term foster care. However, she would not be living with her mother, father and siblings. There would be continuing contact with her siblings on the current plan, but indirect contact only with her parents and a severing of legal relations.

d)

Long Term foster care for J would protect her from the harm that I have evaluated if placing her back with her family. It would mean that her legal ties were maintained. However, it would not provide the stability, security or longevity of the plan of adoption. She would require local authority intervention for her minority, including regular statutory reviews and intervention and decision-making in terms of any major decisions about her day to day activities, health and education.

Decision

57.

My consideration of the welfare checklist and balancing exercise leads me to conclude the following:

a)

It is clear to me that a return to mother now or at any point in the foreseeable future comes with it all of the risk as to physical and emotional harm that I have evaluated above. The risks of that, seen in context, outweighs the positives that I have commented on above.

b)

Long term foster care is the only appropriate permanent plan for the older 3 children due to the risk of that harm needing to be protected against together with their individual level of need.

c)

Adoption is the only option that is properly viable for J at her age and on a global view of the family circumstances: it is both necessary and proportionate. She will be able to maintain connections with her siblings and such will aid and assist her. For reasons I have already given, her welfare looked at throughout her life therefore requires that I dispense with her parents’ consent to placing her for adoption.

58.

In relation to post-placement contact, it is agreed that this is good for both J and her siblings. However, I have been carefully considering whether the aim ought to be achieved by an order or recitals underpinning the thinking within the care plan and setting a flexible tone and roadmap. On balance, I do not consider that being prescriptive in this case is more helpful than harmful. I am satisfied that the care planning for these children will include post-adoption contact being at the forefront of everyone’s mind and such can be adapted to the multitude of different possibilities at this point. This is not a case about there not being post-placement contact, but rather how that should be housed and the flexibility that is needed to achieve it. I am mindful that section 26 orders should be used more widely and flexibly. I have considered whether an order could be more prescriptive at a lesser level, but then I come to the view that is all that will be permitted with someone mistaking the court’s minimum level for all that is necessary to meet the children’s needs. Balancing all matters then I have instead come to the conclusion that the aims of this particular case and for these particular children are better housed in the clear recitals as referred to in paragraph 80 of Re S (Placement Order Contact) [2025] EWCA Civ 823 where we are setting the direction, tone and expectation thorough carefully crafted recitals as to the court’s intention when it approves the care plan. However, those can then be used, as the guardian says, creatively and flexibly to achieve the ultimate aim for the children which is a continuation of their relationship through some form of direct contact that at this stage ought not to be prescriptive. However, and I should note, that this court has recognised that there may be a difficult alignment of circumstances that are not yet appreciated which may call it into question. Any decision today should be caveated by saying that the court can only do the best it can to project forward on the information that it currently holds.

59.

Therefore, in my judgment the following orders are in the children’s best interests and, in light of all the evidence, I consider them to be proportionate and necessary:

a)

I make care orders for all four children.

b)

I make a placement order for J and I dispense with the need for her parents’ consent to a placement order.

c)

I approve the local authority’s care plan, including for post-placement contact, and will record the same in recitals to the order.

60.

Before leaving the judgment, can I pay tribute to the excellent work of all professionals and advocates at this hearing in presenting their individual cases in a focused and collaborative manner and with a keen eye to the competing needs of family members. I recognise that my decision is not that which the parents would have wished for, but I hope in time they can come to understand why I have made those decisions and perhaps begin the journey to fulfilling their own potential.

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