Cheshire East Borough Council v Mother & Ors

The child with whom I am concerned is Child A born in late 2023. He is nearly 21 months’ old. He was born prematurely weighing 0.9kg (1.984 lbs) and was placed in the special care baby unit at birth. He spent time in 3 different hospitals until he was fit for discharge on or about 8 April 2024. When he was fit for discharge, he was placed in foster care - where he remains - and has been subject to care proceedings since 21 November 2023.

He is currently having supervised family time 4 times a week (with his mother from 09.30 to 12.30 every Monday, Tuesday and Friday and with his father every Thursday from 10.00 to 12.00). He manages this well but can be quite clingy when returned to his foster carer. He attends toddler groups 2 days a week and also enjoys soft play.

He has a good attachment to his foster carer.

Child A has severe eczema and has creams and ointments to treat this, however, this can flare up and is worse in the areas of skin his foster carer cannot cover up and prevent him from scratching, such as his neck.

Over the winter, Child A had monthly immunisations to protect him from respiratory illnesses.

Child A’s personality is shining through and he is able to communicate his likes and dislikes and when he is happy with something or not. Child A’s parents and carers all report that he is doing well.

He no longer needs oxygen and had a paediatric review appointment on 2 July 2025, which was positive. He has been discharged from audiology. He remains under the physiotherapy service but they will not see him again until he is 2 years’ old due to the progress he is making.

Child A loves pretending to read books and will happily portray himself reading a book to himself, cover to cover, providing his own version of what the words say.

Child A loves to talk and will babble all day to make sure his views are known, even though he does not use proper words. He does have some regular words such as, “oh dear”, “hiya” and “bye.” He understands a lot of what is said to him. Child A is reported to be quite bright as he will pick up things very quickly after only having been shown once.

Child A also loves playing outside, in a sandpit, on a swing, water play or on a slide. He is not yet walking, but his carer feels this is more about him just needing the confidence to take his first solo steps as he walks holding hands or onto the furniture with ease. Child A also loves to climb on furniture and can move around by crawling. Child A eats and sleeps well, enjoying a wide range of foods. He is reported to have grown well and is now a sturdy boy. Child A is confident with and enjoys the company of people including the other children at his toddler group.

As the Guardian observes, overall, “Child A needs to be with carers who are consistent, attentive and are able to prioritise his needs. Given his additional vulnerabilities, it is essential that he is with carers who are fully focussed on his needs and who can provide him with a better than good enough level of care. He needs unconditional love and nurturing care that will support him to reach his potential in life. Child A needs access to appropriate stimulation, education and health care alongside a safe home environment, an adequate diet and clothing” [C548/ 44].

Child A’s interests are protected by his Children’s Guardian, and he is represented by his solicitor, Adele Schofield.

The Local Authority are Cheshire East Borough Council. The allocated social worker has been allocated since 15 May 2024. The Local Authority is represented by counsel, Amjad Khadim.

Child A’s mother was born in the summer of 1986. She is 39 years’ old. She is represented within this hearing by counsel, Alex Walker. I shall refer to her within this judgment as “the mother”.

Child A’s father was born late December 1990. He is 34 years’ old. He is represented within this hearing by counsel, Mark Garside. I shall refer to him within this judgment as “the father”.

The proceedings have lasted 87 weeks as at 22 July 2025. That is a sobering statistic.

The proceedings were allocated to District Judge Graham and she previously listed the applications for final hearing for 4 days before Recorder Allen on 13 January 2025. Recorder Allen adjourned that final hearing on the first day for reasons which are clear but in hindsight were neither unavoidable nor substantial if the parties had been astute to the issues in the case [B386]. Nothing of substance was achieved by that adjournment.

The matter was then listed for final hearing before me on 11 and 12 March 2025 [B423]. I gave an ex tempore judgment that day, which has been transcribed, setting out both the parlous state of the case and why I acceded to the application made by the Local Authority to adjourn the case after having heard the oral evidence of the allocated social worker. I refer the parties to that judgment [A154] and do not intend to repeat the contents of it.

Having noted the egregious condition of the case, I reallocated it to myself and listed a further IRH on 11 June 2025 and a final hearing commencing on 9 July 2025 for 3 days (not including judgment).

On 13 May 2025, the Local Authority applied to vacate the Final Hearing on account of their completion of a positive viability assessment of a friend of the mother, (“D”) [C429] to care for Child A . Following delay by HMCTS, the application was eventually listed at the adjourned IRH on 11 June 2025 (a draft, non-approved and unsealed order quite different to the terms I approved appears for some reason in the bundle. It should not have been included [B443]). The Local Authority had failed to file final evidence as directed resulting in a rush to prepare it before the IRH so that by the time of the hearing neither the mother nor the Children’s Guardian had filed their addendum evidence (the father had filed a statement, dated 10 June 2025 [C505]).

I did not permit the Local Authority to re-timetable the case, which would have resulted in a further adjournment of the final hearing. I listed the application for hearing at the final hearing in order to consider the impact of further delay in the context of the timetable for Child A. That was in the context of D being identified as a potential carer (as a friend of the mother) but withdrawing from assessment in July 2024 before appearing to change her mind (whether she was bidden or unbidden to do so by the mother I cannot say) on 25 April 2025. Thus, she is a family friend, not a family member, who has had the opportunity to be assessed, withdrew from that assessment but owing to the gross delay in this case appears to have had second thoughts about 7 weeks after the abortive second final hearing.

At the IRH, it was not contemplated that the full assessment of mother’s friend D would be completed before the start of the final hearing.

On or about 2 July 2025, the Local Authority informed the parties that the assessment of mother’s friend D had reached an early conclusion. The Local Authority position statement [C553] explained this outcome on the basis that the assessor had identified “a number of vulnerabilities and concerns in respect of a proposed placement for Child A relating to [D]’s ability to manage the relationship with the mother, concerns in relation to behaviour exhibited by her own son who may have his own additional needs and is on the pathway for autism and [D]’s ability to manage the competing demands of Child A and her own children. The Local Authority can confirm that the fostering social worker has prepared a brief report to fostering panel which is currently arranged for 18^th July 2025.”

Apparently, the assessment had been sent to mother’s friend D along with the dates of the final hearing (it presumably being assumed that she would have sufficient time to take advice, prepare and make an application by way of challenge to the assessment, which would be accommodated within the final hearing). The Local Authority suggested that they had explored obtaining an updated ADM decision but that would not be possible before the assessment had been considered by the fostering panel on 18 July 2025. The Local Authority opined that this would not prevent the Court proceeding with the final hearing.

D signed the assessment on 5 July 2025.

The reality is that the Court did not have the option of allowing the assessment to proceed to panel, the ADM and/or for mother’s friend D to have a fair opportunity to challenge the curtailed assessment of her without adjourning the final hearing. No party demurred to the unfairness of D being expected to turn up and give evidence during the hearing (in the absence of an application, a statement setting out her criticisms, or having the opportunity to be represented or be properly prepared to be questioned or to ask questions of the assessing social worker).

The option of adjourning the final hearing to permit proper consideration of the assessment was an option identified at the IRH and which remains one before me. The question is not whether summarily to dismiss mother’s friend D as an option based on the assessment of her thus depriving her of the opportunity to attend Fostering Panel and make an application to the Court to challenge the assessment of her but whether to adjourn this final hearing to permit any such process to continue with the resultant delay to Child A in the context of my assessment of the parents and the fact that there is a negative assessment of D. These are relevant facts as I survey his current and long term, indeed lifelong interests.

Thus, by the day prior to the start of the final hearing, the position was as follows: -

The Local Authority sought approval of its plan for Child A to be placed for adoption. They had not sought to file the assessment of mother’s friend D and sought to withdraw their application for re-timetabling. They had in fact received an email from D via the mother seeking to challenge the assessment but no application had been made by D.

The assessment of D had concluded early which was discussed within a meeting with the fostering team, the allocated social worker and the Director of Family Help and Children’s Social Care (“DFH&CSC”) on or about 1 July 2025 (the DFH&CSC is also the ADM for adoption – there is a different ADM for fostering approvals). There had, according to the allocated social worker been 2 such meetings, one week apart because the DFH&CSC wanted to ensure that the Local Authority was progressing this case effectively.

The DFH&CSC had recently attended before HHJ Parker, Designated Family Judge for Cheshire and Merseyside at a non-compliance hearing on 17 June 2025 to discuss the Local Authority’s contribution to the delays in the case [B454]. It is hardly surprising that in those circumstances senior management took a keen interest in the progression of this case.

In her final position statement [C560], the mother sought the return of Child A to her care (with or without support from D) and in the alternative, a placement with her friend D or the father. She continued to support her application for a further assessment by an ISW (I have previously dismissed an application by her for a residential assessment).

The mother sought within her position statement sight of the assessment of D although no formal application for disclosure of that was made despite the mother seeking to rely on further third-party reports by an application made in the afternoon of 8 July 2025. Mr Walker, on behalf of the mother, sought a copy of the assessment of mother’s friend D to explore it in cross-examination when “considering whether nothing else would do.” That phrase is not, of course, a hyper-link to a test or a test but a description of a comparative process of reasoning to determine ultimately whether adoption is necessary and proportionate (or, to put it another way, whether the parents’ consent to adoption should be dispensed with on the grounds that the welfare of the Child A requires it) as against the alternative realistic placement options.

Mr Walker raised the issue that the original ADM decision in January 2025 [K49] and the failure to update the CPR to consider the assessments of mother’s friend D(noting that even the CPR updated on 6 June 2025 [K45a] omitted any reference to the positive viability assessment of D) may render the application for a Placement Order non-compliant with the Adoption Agencies Regulations 2005. Although Mr Walker did not develop the argument or file any skeleton argument he sought consideration to be given to submissions about this as a “preliminary issue”.

There was thus no written articulation of the point nor how it would be managed within an established trial timetable in circumstances where the evidence of the Children’s Guardian had to be heard on 9 July 2025 for the final hearing to be effective by the conclusion of 10 July 2025.

The father continued to seek placement of Child A with him. In his position statement [C558], Mr Garside noted that the issue of delay “is of real significance in this case.” The father was neutral regarding the assessment of mother’s friend D. The father did not seek adjournment for the assessment process of D to conclude nor did he seek to call any evidence from D. The father did not advocate for any further adjournment.

The solicitor for Child A filed a final position statement [C556] in which she confirmed that the Children’s Guardian, (“the guardian”) supported the plan of adoption. Ms Schofield referred to “a brief report shared with mother’s friend D which the Guardian and all parties would require sight of ahead of the hearing commencing.” Again, no application was made to disclose this assessment or report.

I describe the foregoing to explain some of the problems emerging at the start of the final hearing, which, in my judgment, were avoidable. It is unacceptable not to have dealt with the issue by making an application to adduce or disclose the assessment of mother’s friend D prior to the commencement of the final hearing. What would have been lost by serving a copy of the assessment report? It is at least relevant to the question of allowing further time for the position of mother’s friend D to be assessed forensically.

In the event, following various provisional observations, made by the Court by email, at

On 9 July 2025, I permitted the fostering assessment to be adduced at the start of the final hearing. I also allowed the mother permission to rely upon further updates from third parties she has been engaging with: My CWA [F123]; Her-Place [B469]; and MHN, Specialist Mental Health Nurse [B467].

What was at risk of being lost in this imbroglio was the interests of Child A. He has waited 87 weeks already. He was in foster care and had been for all of his life after discharge from hospital. Mother’s friend D had turned up late to seek assessment as a carer (having withdrawn from assessment earlier in July 2024) into these delayed proceedings and the Local Authority had reached an early negative conclusion after a positive viability assessment. This is the third listed final hearing and the time has come for the Court to grapple with the difficulties and decide if Child A should experience the impact or risk of further harm through further adjournment and delay (but allowing D’s negative assessment to go to fostering panel on 18 July 2025 and to allow her to seek to challenge it, if appropriate, by application to the Court) or to determine Child A’s long term placement in circumstances where the Local Authority and his Guardian were ad idem in seeking the endorsement of the Court to the plan of adoption. Nothing had changed since the IRH other than the written assessment of mother’s friend D had concluded earlier than anticipated because of the asserted vulnerabilities of D. As both the allocated social worker and the guardian opined, Child A should not have to wait any longer for a decision about where his future lay. Whilst a further delay measured in months may not make him “unadoptable” – an admittedly clumsy phrase which hardly reflects the impact of delay on a child in securing a hopefully permanent attachment as part of a family - given he has largely been protected from the risk of harm since birth and has enjoyed stability of care within his foster placement, the longer the process takes, the more difficult it will be to find an adoptive placement and for Child A to transfer his attachments given he has a secure attachment with his foster carers as psychological parents and has built a relationship with his birth parents on 4 days out of every 7 days. The balance of delay as against waiting for more information or challenge lies at the heart of this case.

The allocated social worker stated that the older the child, generally, the more difficult it is to place but that is amplified with a child such has Child A who has vulnerabilities and may have as yet unknown cognitive needs. This issue is analysed by the social worker responsible for family finding for Child A [C488]. Her best analysis of the national database (Link Maker) suggested that “27 adopters were showing as being able to consider a child of Child A’s age and gender, with 9 of these being of White Ethnic origin” [C491/ 2.10]. This is at best a general picture as the cohort of prospective adopters will change on a daily basis. At paragraph 2.14 she says this: -

“2.14

In my professional opinion, Child A being born so premature could render him likely to wait longer for a placement. However, this is not something that would prevent him being placed for adoption. Furthermore, at Child A’s age, when there appears to be no alternative for him to reside within his family network, the above statistics and possible prospect of him waiting a little bit longer for a family as a result of his health needs should not impact on the decision that is made with regards to his care plan.”

She opines that “it is difficult to say how long any family finding should take place...I would suggest an initial period of 12-14 months, then a formal review at the end of this period. This will give [Adoption Agency] time to profile Child A both internally initially, and nationally as well as giving both the Local Authority and Adoption Counts further insight into Child A’s needs as he continues to grow and develop” [C494/ 3.3].

What does this mean for Child A? He is rapidly approaching his second birthday in foster care. His potential and actual vulnerabilities may become better known over time but may delay him finding an adoptive placement. A further delay measured in months in making a Placement Order - if such is justified - could delay a process which could take over a year to find an adoptive match (although one might hope the right carer may be found sooner than that). That will serve merely to cement further the relationships he has and the impact of severing those to build new attachments with adoptive carers. It also has an opportunity cost. The lost opportunity at an early stage to build memories and relationships within an adoptive or secure family setting. Is it just to have made Child A wait over 87 weeks for that? Is it just to make Child A wait over 100 weeks if (a) he cannot be cared for by his parents, (b) his family and (c) the only friend of the mother (with whom Child A has no pre-existing relationship) considered as a potential option, D, (i) was identified in July 2024 and then withdrew from assessment partly because of issues with the mother, (ii) came forward after the second final hearing had been adjourned and (c) is no longer supported as a viable candidate by the Local Authority (the ADM having been closely involved in the decision making after 17 June 2025)? The answer as I shall explain is “No”.

Before turning to the evidence, the hearing itself was not without problems. The father was due to give oral evidence on Thursday 10 July 2025. He arrived at Court unwell and did not improve over the morning. After hearing from and reading a statement prepared by Mr Garside, I determined to adjourn his evidence for reasons of fairness. That led to the evidence moving unplanned to the following week (15 July 2025 and submissions on 16 July 2025). That left the Court with little to no time to prepare a judgment.

It has not escaped my attention as I have borne the overriding objective in mind that this case is consuming an ever-greater share of a finite resource. This is the third final hearing listed (probably over 10 days of in-court time). There have been about 15 separate attended hearings taken from a perusal of the bundle index.

The issues in this case are stark. The realistic placement options are between placement with the mother, the father, in foster care or a plan of adoption or further adjournment to complete the assessment process of the mother’s friend, D (in other words, panel recommendation, ADM (fostering) decision and any challenge she wishes to make formally to the assessment of her).

The mother submits that the entire process is irregular. The updated Child Permanence Report does not but should have included details of the assessment of D. The allocated social worker accepted that she did not include them by oversight and had prepared an updated CPR which has not been filed by the Local Authority. Further, that the ADM should have reconsidered their approval to the making of a Placement application in light of the assessment of D, which has not been done. The DFH&CSC has been closely involved in two meetings according to the allocated social worker (in their written submissions the Local Authority suggested that the DFH&CSC had attended one care planning meeting) in this case, 1 week apart, but has not formally reviewed the position as ADM.

In summary, both parents have made efforts and to some extent have made progress in their lives. The problem is that they start from a low point with an extensive history of parenting deficits. Having heard them give evidence, I remain unconvinced that either of them could offer a stable and secure life with Child A. Generally, I accept the deficits identified by the allocated social worker, and the Children’s Guardian. Neither of them is currently a realistic placement option for Child A.

Neither of them is a bad person. I think that they love Child A. They have shown commitment to the proceedings and attending contact. However, as I shall explain, I do not think they are capable of meeting his current and anticipated needs as he grows.

Neither, despite the Mother’s case, do I think Child A should remain in foster care long term. The impact of that will grow as he gets older and I do not think that is an adequate placement option simply to avoid adoption.

I do not agree that there are any substantial reasons to prolong the proceedings to await further consideration of the assessment of mother’s friend D. The prospects are too uncertain and the risk of delay to Child A too great to justify further delay as against the need for a decision to inform his future care.

I accept the assessment evidence of the allocated social worker and the conclusions of the Children’s Guardian. There is no basis for the suggestion of the mother that it is necessary to instruct an independent social worker further to assess her. There is no right to a second assessment and in this case no necessity to do so.

In my judgment, further delay in making a decision about Child A’s future is contrary to his welfare, unjustified in accordance with s. 32(5) CA 1989 and would not further the overriding objective.

I grant permission to the Local Authority to withdraw their application for re-timetabling dated 13 May 2025.

In my judgment, the plan of adoption is necessary and proportionate as compared to the alternatives.

I intend to make a Care Order and will thereafter dispense with the consent of both parents to the making of a Placement Order on the ground that, in my judgment, Child A’s life-long welfare requires me to do so.

Child A has spent all of his life outside of hospital in one foster care placement. He needs a decision to be taken as to his long-term future in order to ensure that he is able to build sustaining attachments to his long-term carers, whether that be his parents, foster carers or adoptive parents.

Contact between Child A and each of his parents has been and remains professionally supervised by two family time workers.

The parents have regularly attended contact with Child A. Those that have been missed have been due to Child A being unwell, health appointments, or court dates.

This local authority has prepared an agreed summary of the background [A106] which I have incorporated into this judgment.

The issues which led to the Local Authority issuing care proceedings are encapsulated within the agreed threshold document (as amended on 13 January and 6 February 2025) [A70-A71].

“1.

The mother has had longstanding issues with fluctuating mental health. The mother has been sectioned under the Mental Health Act in 2020, 2021 and November 2023, the latter was following Child A’s birth. When the mother’s mental health is in decline, her presentation and behaviour can become erratic, chaotic, paranoid and defensive towards professionals. Consequently, such issues have impacted, and are likely to continue to impact, the mother’s ability to consistently meet Child A’s emotional, developmental and physical needs placing him at risk of significant harm.

“2.

The mother used cannabis, including whilst pregnant with Child A, and has been dishonest about her usage. Cannabis use is likely to exacerbate mother’s mental health issues and impact her ability to prioritise Child A’s needs, placing him at risk of developmental harm, emotional harm and neglect.

“3.

The father uses cocaine. Such use is likely to impact the father’s ability to provide consistent and stable parenting to Child A and place him at risk of neglect.

“4.

The father is a known perpetrator of domestic abuse and currently has a lifetime restraining order against him to protect an ex-partner and another restraining order which expired in November 2023 to protect the mother of his other child. The father has 10 convictions between 2009 – 2021, including for possession of class A drugs, battery and false imprisonment. In addition, the mother has been a victim of significant domestic abuse in previous relationships. This places Child A at risk of emotional and physical harm.

“5.

The parents’ relationship has been volatile, toxic and unstable. The relationship has oscillated between cross-allegations of domestic abuse (verbal / physical abuse and harassment) to wishing to communicate and co-parent in a relationship.”

The Local Authority’s current involvement originated from a referral by a midwife to social care on 15 August 2023. A Child and Family Assessment was undertaken which recommended a pre-birth assessment [C25]. At the time of the referral, the parents presented as a couple; they were recently engaged to be married and both were reportedly in paid employment. The couple had started to prepare for the baby’s arrival by purchasing clothing and equipment. The mother attended all appointments with midwifery. Their overall presentation is described as positive [C12].

On 26 September 2023, both parents became accusatory towards one another. There were concerns over the mother’s alleged erratic presentation and allegations which she made against the father of using cocaine and making threats towards her [C12-C13]. The parents reported that they had separated.

The mother alleged that, on 20 September 2023, she had been punched in the stomach by the father during her pregnancy. The mother did not report this initially to the police, social worker or the midwife. The mother reported the allegation to her probation officer on 26 September 2023. The mother made police witness statements found at H156-H161 detailing the alleged abuse.

In October 2023, the father was arrested in respect of the allegations and had bail conditions not to contact the mother; both parents continued to have contact with each other notwithstanding the bail conditions [H352]/ C13] (the bail conditions ended on 3 January 2024).

When asked about the previous positive image presented by him, the father conversely described having ‘put on a front’ and feeling threatened by the mother [C12]. The father has made counter allegations and stated that he has recordings and photographs where the mother has threatened him and punched him causing a black eye. The father talked about feeling unsafe and threatened. He was advised to contact the police and report these threats [C12] (the father later made a police witness statement dated 19 June 2024 detailing the alleged abuse at H348-H356).

On 2 November 2023, the Local Authority held a strategy meeting and decided to hold an initial child protection case conference. At the time, the mother’s pregnancy was at 26 weeks’ gestation. [C26]

On the same day, the mother was an inpatient at a hospital when her waters broke. She was advised to remain in the hospital; however, she discharged herself and returned to Cheshire [C13].

On 3 November 2023, the mother called the social worker to inform her she had not felt any movement from the baby and was planning to call the midwife. The mother was advised to go to the hospital and to see a midwife for support [C3/C26].

In early November 2023, Child A was born prematurely and remained in hospital for observation and treatment.

On 11 November 2023, there was an initial child protection case conference, which concluded that Child A should be subject to a Child Protection Plan under the category of neglect.

Following Child A’s birth, there were significant concerns held by professionals regarding the mother’s mental health and her behaviour while in hospital, which was alleged to be impacting her care of Child A [C3].

A chronology of concerns was provided by the hospital, found at E7-E11.

The following examples illustrate the concerns held by medical staff at the time: -

“The mother upset a member of staff KW who was upset and crying (CIF entered). LW and AMc spoke with mother at length, mother apologised for her behaviour toward KW. Mother stated that her mental health had been “heightened” and she felt she needed diazepam… mother stated that… some of the staff from APH are colluding with her ex and one of them in a pale blue uniform had kissed him”.

The mother suggested in her oral evidence that she was relying upon things said to her by the father but denied any reference was made by her to “kissing”. I find it odd that such an entry in a medical chronology would have been mistaken or concocted. It is more likely a feature of the mother’s paranoia, delusion and declining mental health.

“Staff caring for Child A over the weekend were growing more concerned about mother’s behaviour and paranoid thoughts as she was telling staff that she was being followed and that her ex-partner was residing in the accommodation she was staying in next door to her. [The mother stated that] she was going to report staff to the police”.

The mother did accept that the notion of him staying next to her was a paranoid thought.

“Mental health team and psychiatric liaison made the decision a section 2 was warranted based on the behaviour displayed by the mother and paranoid thoughts and beliefs.”

On 13 December 2023 [C97] is it recorded that: -

“The mother attended contact with Child A and told the staff that the baby in the incubator was not her baby. The family time worker tried to speak with the mother however she was adamant that the baby had been swapped for another baby who she named.”

The mother said that she did say this but she was confused as so much had changed in Child A within a short time and her mental health was not “100% at the time.”

The mother was detained under s.2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in a local hospital. This assessment was requested because of the mother’s rapid increased paranoia and delusional behaviours [E7-E8].

Due to the mother being detained and Child A’s paternity being unconfirmed, this created a situation in which Child A did not have anyone to exercise parental responsibility for him. This led to the Local Authority urgently issuing care proceedings and obtaining an interim care order.

It is noteworthy that at the time of her assessment with Dr Shannon, her attitude towards the concerns raised by health professionals at this time was characterised by defensiveness and denial (E107/ 15.27 to 15.28). She denied “…all reports of concerns about her mental health deterioration by hospital staff, including removing Child A from the incubator, that someone had taken Child A’s breast milk from the fridge, and thinking that Child A was not her baby and that he had been swapped. In relation to the latter, she dismissed the reports and stated that she had not seen him for a few days, he had changed so much and it was a turn of phrase ‘this is not my baby’. She maintained that she took Child A’s dummy for DNA testing not to prove that Child A was not her son but because the father denied he was the father and she wanted to prove he was.”

The mother has been involved in previous public law proceedings in The Family Court at Liverpool in respect of Child A’s maternal siblings, Child B and Child C.

Those proceedings were issued by [Redacted] Council. The risks identified were the mother’s poor mental health, neglect, drug and alcohol misuse by both parents, association with organised criminal gangs and instability of living and care arrangements [J71-J72]. The outcome of those proceedings in 2015 was that Child A’s half-siblings remained in the care of Child A’s maternal uncle, and his wife under a care order with the mother to have supervised contact [C2].

The arrangements have not been without problems. In September 2024, it was noted that “the mother …has, in the past, been found to be recording the children to ‘evidence’ they want to return to her care. It is believed this is now why contact has gone back to being supervised by [Redacted] Children’s Social Care” [C172].

The mother did not immediately refer to her actions towards the children when telling me why she was still having direct contact supervised by a family time worker about 10 years after her older children were placed in care. She agreed she had recorded them when asked specifically. This was one of numerous occasions when she gave what I regard as being incomplete or partial answers to questions often avoiding the central point of the question before using her obvious intellect and articulacy to weave a narrative around it. In simple terms, she struggled to answer the question because she sought to argue her case. On a number of occasions, she referred to documents which were not even in the bundle.

The mother also agreed that she had been made the subject of a Restraining Order to protect her brother although she suggested that had ended in 2021.

She referred to making an application for contact to her older children but the progress of that is frankly unclear.

The older children’s social worker from [Redacted is reported to have said the following to the allocated social worker, on or about 2 May 2025 [C354]: -

“8.2…[Redacted] had similar concerns [in] terms of the risks posed by the mother. He advised the mother feels he’s not progressing things for the boys, but advised he seeks their views and makes decisions in their best interests. He said he does not think the mother would intentionally harm her children, but her contact will remain supervised for the foreseeable future due to concerns about her having inappropriate conversations with them, pressuring them to say they want to be in her care, and recording them.

8.3.

On 02.05.2025, the social worker asked me to call him as the mother had contacted him and he needed to clarify some information. The social worker advised the mother had claimed I had been “sacked” and there was an ongoing “disciplinary”. The mother is reported to have told him the judge was “very unhappy” with my evidence and “ordered a reassessment”. He advised the mother has recently sent his manager a recording of her older boys saying they want more contact. The social worker advised this was an old recording from when contact was supervised by the mother’s brother. She had recorded the boys whilst her brother was paying for fuel. He described her as "badgering" them. When I told the social worker that the mother said they were currently in court for more contact – something the mother has said during contact and in her sessions with me - he looked confused and said he is not aware of any application to the court. I explained about the mother saying the judge had told her she had to gather the wishes and feelings of the boys and we both agreed this would be the LA's role in proceedings. The social worker advised the mother is telling him she hasn't got any issues with her mental health and that she has "psychologists" saying she's "not unwell at all". The social worker shared the mother has reported she has only been sectioned because her brother called the doctor and requested this.”

The mother denied saying that the allocated social worker had been sacked but had been found responsible for “gross personal misconduct” and was subject to a disciplinary process.

I find the account of the social worker likely to be an accurate summary of what he was told by the mother. It is consistent with patterns of her behaviour, namely distortion of the narrative, sometimes verging on paranoia and an inability to respect boundaries or assess the impact of her actions on others, including her children.

The threshold for the making of a final care or supervision orders has been resolved. I am satisfied that the threshold criteria are established based upon the agreed statement of facts set out in schedule 2 to the order I made on 14 February 2025 [A70]. The facts provide a starting point for the welfare analysis which remains in dispute between the parties.

Having said that, the mother suggested in evidence, when asked about paragraph 1 of the agreed threshold document that she had been advised that she had to agree threshold by her legal representatives. There has been no application to withdraw the admissions and no waiver of privilege. From my perspective, the facts described within the statement of facts in support of threshold are made out compellingly on the evidence placed before me.

In my judgment, this case has never been about threshold at the point of the issue of proceedings on 21 November 2023. It is a question of welfare and the extent to which either parent has been able to evidence the capacity to care for Child A across his minority without exposing him to an enduring risk of significant harm.

At the commencement of the final hearing, the realistic placement options for Child A were as follows: -

placement with mother;

placement with father;

placement in long-term foster care;

placement by way of adoption;

adjournment for further assessment of mother’s friend D (including an opportunity for her to challenge the negative assessment of her).

The placement plan of the local authority is one of adoption [C213 and C451]. They propose a contact reduction plan including a recommendation that paternal and maternal half-sibling contact continues on an indirect basis at this stage. This case is not one in which there is any issue as to the need to make an order under s. 26 ACA 2002 (see the recent examination of this issue in Re S (Placement Order: Contact) [2025] EWCA Civ 823 per Sir Andrew McFarlane P, King and Singh LJJ at paragraphs 23 - 30, 32 - 33 and 44).

A level of future sibling contact is desirable but must be tempered by the fact that (a) it must be safe given ongoing contact between the mother and the older siblings and (b) is subsidiary in my judgment to the overarching goal, if such be justified on welfare grounds, of the achievement of an adoptive home for Child A. There was no issue raised within the hearing or in submissions as to this.

The mother [C270, C496 and C521] wishes for Child A to be placed in her care. To that end, she made an application for residential assessment under section 38 Children Act 1989, which she invited me to consider at the IRH. I did so and dismissed it. She now seeks assessment by an ISW (application, dated 10 June 2025 [B431]). In the event that she is unable to care for Child A then she supports D or the father in caring for Child A (the father on the assumption that he is safe to do so and not impaired by the use of illegal drugs). Finally, she would rather Child A be placed in long-term foster care than the plan of adoption notwithstanding his young age.

However, tellingly, when I asked Mr Walker about her support for long term foster care as opposed to adoption if the other options were not realistic, he submitted that the mother did not envisage foster care being a long-term option because she intended to prove to the Local Authority and the Court that she was capable of caring for him. She believes that she could safely care for him now. That chimed with my assessment of her: Child A is the magnetic factor in her life and her desire to care for him would be a motivation irrespective of the outcome of the final hearing. In my judgment, finality for her would mean, and only mean, placement of Child A in her care. That is a relevant factor in assessing placement with the father or D. What pressure would be brought to bear? Would there continue to be disputes or pressures on the inter-personal relationships? How would either, the father or particularly D, manage the boundaries and pressures of the roles into which they would be cast? There is a spectre of volatility and unpredictability inherent in the relationships which is a broader factor I have borne in mind.

The father [C246 and C498] adopts the same position as the mother save that he would seek for Child A to be placed in his care with the support of his parents.

Child A’s Guardian [E271 and C537] agrees with the placement plan of the local authority and is not supportive of the application made by the mother for further assessment. She supports the proposals for contact with the parents but observes that any prospective adopters should be open to the potential of promoting sibling contact.

The local authority has the burden of proving the facts upon which it relies. The standard of proof is the balance of probability. I have kept those matters at the forefront of my mind in weighing the evidence in this case.

In Re ADA (Children: Care and Placement Orders) [2023] EWCA Civ 743, Peter Jackson, LJ summarised the issues by reference to three recent decisions at paragraph 40: -

“40.

The proper approach to a decision involving adoption is well established. I have attempted to encapsulate the essentials in these earlier decisions:

Re D (A Child: Placement Order) [2022] EWCA Civ 896

“1.

The recent decision of the Supreme Court in H-W (Children) [2022] UKSC 17 underlines that a decision leading to adoption, or to an order with similarly profound effects, requires the rigorous evaluation and comparison of all the realistic possibilities for a child's future in the light of the court's factual findings. Adoption can only be approved where it is in the child's lifelong best interests and where the severe interference with the right to respect for family life is necessary and proportionate. The court must therefore evaluate the family placement and assess the nature and likelihood of the harm that the child would be likely to suffer in it, the consequences of the harm arising, and the possibilities for reducing the risk of harm or for mitigating its effects. It must then compare the advantages and disadvantages for the child of that placement with the advantages and disadvantages of adoption and of any other realistic placement outcomes short of adoption. The comparison will inevitably include a consideration of any harm that the child would suffer in the family placement and any harm arising from separation from parents, siblings and other relations. It is only through this process of evaluation and comparison that the court can validly conclude that adoption is the only outcome that can provide for the child's lifelong welfare – in other words, that it is necessary and proportionate."

Re K (Children) (Placement Orders) [2020] EWCA Civ 1503

“30.

Finally, in Re F (A Child: Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 I attempted to set out the questions that the court should ask itself when assessing risk of future harm and setting it in context:

What is the type of harm that might arise? What is the likelihood of it arising?

What consequences would there be for the child if it arose?

What steps could be taken to reduce the likelihood of harm arising or to mitigate the effects on the child if it did?

The answers are then placed alongside other factors in the welfare equation so that the court can ask itself:

How do the overall welfare advantages and disadvantages of the realistic options compare, one with another?

Ultimately, is adoption necessary and proportionate – are the risks bad enough to justify the remedy?”

Re B (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 407

“62.

Turning to judgments in cases where a placement order is sought, the sequence of questions that must be asked are:

Are the threshold conditions under s.31(2) CA 1989 satisfied, and if so, in what specific respects?

What are the realistic options for the child's future?

Evaluating the whole of the evidence by reference to the checklist under s.1(4) ACA 2002, what are the advantages and disadvantages of each realistic option?

Treating the child's welfare as paramount and comparing each option against the other, is the court driven to the conclusion that a placement order is the only order that can meet the child's immediate and lifelong welfare needs?”

I shall in due course analyse the matters set out in section 1 ACA 2002 and in particular, the welfare checklist set out in s. 1(4) ACA 2002 with regard to the entirety of what I hope is a long and happy life for Child A.

Of particular importance in this case is the fact that the plan proposed by the Local Authority is one of adoption, which has life-long implications and effects. On the other hand, I remind myself of the impact of delay in coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child as described in s. 1(3) ACA 2002: -

“(3)

The court or adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare.”

Delay is not neutral. It is generally regarded as prejudicial to the welfare of a child. As I shall explain, for Child A, further delay in coming to a decision, which forms merely part of the implementation of a plan of adoption in future, is serious, prejudicial and casts a shadow over any proposal to adjourn for further assessment.

The parties have prepared an agreed framework of the law from which I draw a number of observations. Whilst I am grateful for the industry to produce it, I do not intend simply to adopt it as if it were a “boilerplate” statement of the general law but to explain what I regard as the key factors in this case. The impact of delay and the timetable for Child A are key components of my decision in the context of his welfare across his lifetime.

In determining whether to adjourn the proceedings then in my judgment the overriding objective in FPR 1.1 is engaged: -

“1)

These rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly, having regard to any welfare issues involved.

(2)

Dealing with a case justly includes, so far as is practicable –

(a)

ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;

(b)

dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the nature, importance and complexity of the issues;

(c)

ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing;

(d)

saving expense; and

(e)

allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases.”

The welfare issue in this case is important and involves the prospect of a plan of adoption. Further adjournment will add further delay but there may be grounds to suggest it is important for fairness. However, as I shall explain, I do not believe fairness requires further assessment of any party or D. There is no compelling need to adjourn. The Court has allotted an substantial share of finite resources in the endeavour to ensure that it had the material for all parties fairly to put their cases. This is the third listed final hearing and whilst further delay would always provide further information, it is not necessary to obtain it to deal with the case justly. The welfare issues also involve the Court reaching a decision and not permitting Child A’s life to be placed on hold as it grapples with the evolving contours of the case. He needs and is entitled to expect an answer to the question: who will care for me for my childhood?

Parliament has intervened to address the issue of delay and I remind myself of the requirements of section 32 CA 1989: -

“32 Period within which application for order under this Part must be disposed of

(1)

A court in which an application for an order under this Part is proceeding shall (in the light of any provision in rules of court that is of the kind mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b)) –

(a)

draw up a timetable with a view to disposing of the application –

(i)

without delay, and

(ii)

in any event within twenty-six weeks beginning with the day on which theapplication was issued; and

(b)

give such directions as it considers appropriate for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that that timetable is adhered to.

…

(4)

A court, when revising a timetable drawn up under subsection (1)(a) or when making any decision which may give rise to a need to revise such a timetable (which does not include a decision under subsection (5)), must in particular have regard to –

(a)

the impact which any revision would have on the welfare of the child to whom the application relates; and

(b)

the impact which any revision would have on the duration and conduct of the proceedings.

(5)

A court in which an application under this Part is proceeding may extend the periodthat is for the time being allowed under subsection (1)(a)(ii) in the case of theapplication, but may do so only if the court considers that the extension is necessaryto enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly.

(6)

When deciding whether to grant an extension under subsection (5), a court must in particular have regard to –

(a)

the impact which any ensuing timetable revision would have on the welfare of thechild to whom the application relates, and

(b)

the impact which any ensuing timetable revision would have on the duration andconduct of the proceedings; and here ‘ensuing timetable revision’ means any revision, of the timetable under subsection (1)(a) for the proceedings, which the court considers may ensue from the extension.

(7)

When deciding whether to grant an extension under subsection (5), a court is to take account of the following guidance: extensions are not to be granted routinely andare to be seen as requiring specific justification…” (emphasis supplied).

Extensions can be granted where justice demands it but to adjourn a final hearing at week 87 requires “specific justification”.

The Public Law Outline is the means by which the Courts are required to manage applications such as this (PD 12A FPR) and it reflects the requirements of section 32: -

“6 Extensions to the timetable for proceedings

6.1

The court is required to draw up a timetable for proceedings with a view to disposing of the application without delay and in any event within 26 weeks. If proceedings can be resolved earlier, then they should be. A standard timetable and process is expected to be followed in respect of the giving of standard directions on issue and allocation and other matters which should be carried out by the court on issue, including setting and giving directions for the Case Management Hearing.

6.2

Having regard to the circumstances of the particular case, the court may consider that it is necessary to extend the time by which the proceedings are to be resolved beyond 26 weeks to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly (see section 32

(5)

of the 1989 Act). When making this decision, the court is to take account of the guidance that extensions are not to be granted routinely and are to be seen as requiring

specific justification (see section 32(7) of the 1989 Act). The decision and reason(s) for extending a case should be recorded in writing (in the Case Management Order) and orally stated in court, so that all parties are aware of the reasons for delay in the case (see FPR 12.26C). The Case Management Order must contain a record of this information, as well as the impact of the court’s decision on the welfare of the child.”

The “parents’ response” should be filed in advance of the Case Management Hearing and is defined as follows (PD 12A, paragraph 7): -

“‘Parents’ Response’ means a document from either or both of the parents containing

(a)

in no more than two pages, the parents’ response to the Threshold Statement, and

(b)

the parents’ placement proposals including the identity and whereabouts of allrelatives and friends they propose be considered by the court; (c) Information which may be relevant to a person’s capacity to litigate including information about any referrals to mental health services and adult services” (emphasis supplied).

Allied to proper pre-proceedings preparation, including provision for a Family Group Conference, there should, in almost all cases, be clarity as to the realistic options for assessment or support drawn from the extended family members by the time of the Case Management Hearing. In many cases, the assessment evidence drawn from pre-proceedings work should be complete on issue. The case should arrive ‘match fit’.

There has been a determined effort to refocus on the core principles of the Public Law Outline (“A View from the President’s Chambers: November 2022”). For present purposes Sir Andrew McFarlane wrote that: -

“Parents to be expressly required to identify any family members for assessment at, or within a week of, the CMH.”

Following the refocus on the PLO in 2023, Sir Andrew McFarlane noted that the National Family Justice Board had agreed three priorities in public law (“A View from the President’s Chambers: July 2024”): -

“No open public law case longer than 100 weeks;

Average timeliness for care and supervision cases 32 weeks; At least 81% of all new cases to be completed in 26 weeks.”

To drive the required change in the culture to press down on the causes of delay, webinars were arranged in late 2024 to the highlight key messages in this refocus on the PLO. One of them relevant to this case was described by Keehan, J in these terms: -

“It is ESSENTIAL that parents are asked to identify (realistic) kinship or alternate carers for the child during the Pre-PLO phase. It is ESSENTIAL that this exercise is undertaken or repeated at the CMH.

•

Family conferences play a vital role in identifying kinship or alternate carers and are to be encouraged both in the pre-proceedings phase and during the course of proceedings.

•

Parents should be assured that the early identification of kinship or alternate carers does not undermine their case to care for the child.

•

However, parents should be aware that the LATE identification of kinship oralternate carers runs the risk of coming too late for them to be considered or assessedwithin the child’s timeframe” (emphasis supplied).

In my judgment, there is a requirement upon the Court to come to a decision as soon as practicable and within 26 weeks from issue unless there is a specific justification requiring an extension to deal with the case justly. That must mean that there will be cases in which, even if there is a plan of adoption, further delay in reaching that decision will not be justified by the appearance of a late kinship carer. It will inevitably involve a balance of harm between the impact on the welfare of the child seen in the context of the impact or opportunity cost of (a) further delay in reaching the decision, (b) the prospects of the carer (whether a viability assessment can be prepared and the analysis within it) and (c) the gravity of the proposed placement plan (adoption will bring about a life-long impact for the child and family).

Pausing there, mother’s friend D was not identified until after the (first) Case Management Hearing but in fairness her assessment commenced. The process identified her and gave her an opportunity to be assessed but the result was that she withdrew from that assessment and waited from July 2024 until 25 April 2025 to revive her request. In my judgment, this is not the scenario posited by Sir James Munby P in Re S (a child) (Interim Care Order: ResidentialAssessment) [2015] 1 WLR 925 at paragraph 33 of a realistic family carer emerging late in the day. In any event, the test for an extension of proceedings remains that in section 32(5) CA 1989 (Re M-F (Children) (Care Proceedings: Extension of Time Limit) [2014] EWCA Civ 991).

It seems to me that when the Local Authority sought to adjourn this final hearing on 13 May 2025 [B416] – an application they now seek permission to withdraw – arising out of the positive viability assessment of D they assumed that would inevitably result in an adjournment of the final hearing. They did not seek permission to undertake the viability assessment of D and if they had done so it would have been open to the Court to refuse to permit them to undertake or rely upon the assessment within the proceedings.

Under a revision to the draft case management order approved by the Designated Family Judge in Cheshire & Merseyside, HHJ Parker on 2 June 2025 the issue of further assessment is confronted directly: -

“The local authority must not undertake any further viability assessments without application to the court.

“In the event that any other party or prospective alternative carer seeks assessment as a carer of any relevant child then they must make an application to the Court including:

-

a.

details of the person seeking assessment as a carer (name and full contact details);

b.

an explanation as to why they have not made the application before this point (including whether they participated or had the opportunity to participate in a Family

Group Conference and/or whether they have had the opportunity to seek such assessment by request to the local authority);

c.

an explanation as to when the application could first have been made;

d.

an explanation as to why further assessment is in the best interests of the relevant child;

e.

in the event of a negative assessment being obtained pre-proceedings then the relevant next hearing will be the case management hearing listed after issue of the application.”

In other words, late attempts to seek assessment which may jeopardise the timetable for the proceedings are generally deprecated and may in appropriate circumstances be rejected as incompatible with the welfare of the child. In my judgment, this case is an example in which any further delay to determine if D wishes to challenge the negative assessment and then determine that challenge and if successful, arrange another assessment by an independent social worker, is incompatible with Child A’s welfare. The risk of further delay to him, whether through further consolidation of the status quo and the greater difficulty in breaking and re-making attachments alongside the impact or opportunity cost of delay in establishing a secure adoptive placement (given his age and vulnerability) is compelling. The passage of time may risk a reduction in the pool of prospective adopters willing to consider being matched with him and ultimately a delay in finding an appropriate match for him.

In S-L (Children: Adjournment) [2019] EWCA Civ 1571 Peter Jackson, LJ put the tension inherent in any exercise of balancing fairness with prejudice in these terms at paragraph 12:-

“12.

In cases involving children, there can sometimes be good reasons for adjourning a final decision in order to obtain necessary information. The overriding obligation is to deal with the case justly, but there is a trade-off between the need for information and the presumptive prejudice to the child of delay, enshrined in section 1(2) Children Act 1989. Judges in the family court are well used to finding where the balance lies in the particular case before them and are acutely aware that for babies and young children the passage of weeks and months is a matter of real significance. Sharpening this general calculation, public law proceedings are subject to a statutory timetabling imperative. Section 32(1)(a) provides that the court must draw up a timetable for disposing of the application without delay and in any event within 26 weeks; subsection 32(5) allows an extension only where the court considers it necessary to enable the proceedings to be resolved justly.”

Ultimately, I have sought to conduct that balancing exercise and my decision is clear. Further delay cannot be justified for Child A.

It is appropriate in the context of the assessment of D to address the related issue of realistic placement options. The PLO buttressed by proper pre-proceedings work is intended by the time of the Case Management Hearing to deliver clarity over the realistic placement options for the child. The Court has the right to clear the path of options which can sensibly and fairly be regarded as unrealistic prior to any final hearing. That can include the parents and it can include a case where adoption is the proposed plan. As Sir James Munby P said in ReR (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625 at paragraphs 64 – 67 (see also Re O (CareProceedings) [2024] EWCA Civ 6969 per Baker, LJ at paragraphs 20 – 26 for a reminder of the need for procedural justice): -

“64.

I have referred to the situation where, typically at an early stage in the proceedings, an option, after proper evaluation, can legitimately be discarded as not being realistic. This arises not infrequently with suggestions that various members of the wider family may be suitable carers for the child. The PLO (FPR 2010, PD12A) stresses the vital importance of such potential carers being identified and assessed, at the latest, as soon as possible after the proceedings have begun. Not infrequently some of those putting themselves forward do not secure a sufficiently positive initial viability assessment to justify pursuing them further as potential carers. In other words, the interim processes under the PLO lead to a judicial determination, prior to the final hearing, that they do not offer a realistic option justifying further consideration. This process not infrequently leads to a 'whittling down' of a longer list of possible options to a sometimes significantly shorter list of the realistic options which alone require consideration at the final hearing.

“65.

This process of identifying options which can properly be discarded at an early stage in the proceedings itself demands an appropriate degree of rigour, in particular if there is dispute as to whether or not a particular option is or is not realistic. But Re B-S does not require that every stone has to be uncovered and the ground exhaustively examined before coming to a conclusion that a particular option is not realistic. Nor is there any basis for assuming that more than one negative assessment is required before a potential carer can be eliminated. On the contrary, in Re T (Residential Parenting Assessment) [2011] EWCA Civ 812, [2012] 2 FLR 308, para 93, Black LJ rejected the proposition that:

"a parent facing the permanent removal of their child has a right in all cases to an assessment of their choice rather than one carried out or commissioned by the local authority."

“66.

The simple fact is that no second assessment can be ordered, nor should it be, unless the court is satisfied that it is, within the meaning of 38(7A) of the 1989 Act or section 13(6) of the Children and Families Act 2014, as the case may be, "necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings justly": see Re S (A Child) [2014] EWCC B44 (Fam) and Re M-F (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 991, referring back to Re TG (Care Proceedings: Case Management: Expert Evidence) [2013] EWCA Civ 5, [2013] 1 FLR 1250, and In re H-L (A Child)

(Care Proceedings: Expert Evidence) [2013] EWCA Civ 655, [2014] 1 WLR

1160, [2013] 2 FLR 1434. In determining whether an assessment is "necessary", the court must adopt a robust and realistic approach, guarding itself against being driven by what in Re S (A Child) [2014] EWCC B44 (Fam), para 38, I described as "sentiment or a hope that 'something may turn up'."

“67.

If, in this way, an aunt or a grandparent can be ruled out before the final hearing as not providing a realistic option, there can in principle be no reason why, in an appropriate case, one or other or even both parents should not likewise be ruled out before the final hearing as not providing a realistic option. Re B-S requires focus on the realistic options and if, on the evidence, the parent(s) are not a realistic option, then the court can at an early hearing, if appropriate having heard oral evidence, come to that conclusion and rule them out. North Yorkshire

County Council v B [2008] 1 FLR 1645 is still good law. So the possibility exists, though judges should be appropriately cautious, especially if invited to rule out both parents before the final hearing or, what amounts to the same thing, ruling out before the final hearing the only parent who is putting themself forward as a carer.”

In summary, the Local Authority regarded the viability assessment of D as sufficiently positive to commence a full assessment. The guardian had real concerns about the weaknesses revealed in that viability assessment. The Local Authority commenced a full assessment but reached an early conclusion, with the final hearing in view as was acknowledged by the allocated social worker, that there was no purpose in continuing the assessment. In that sense, what was produced was a “brief report” setting out the key strengths and weaknesses of D.

D was not identified by the mother as an alternative carer in her initial statement due by 12 January 2024 [B115/5c and C52/ 26]. However, she was subsequently identified and in about June 2024 the local authority commenced a viability assessment of D. D withdrew from the process on 3 July 2024 after “falling out” with the mother [C446/1]. The assessment was filed on 10 July 2024 [C123].

D telephoned the allocated social worker on 25 April 2025 and requested to be assessed as a connected carer. The allocated social worker was concerned that her motivation appeared to focus upon protecting the mother’s mental health rather than the impact on Child A of such assessment or further delay [C446/4].

The local authority decided without seeking any approval or consideration by the court to commence a second viability assessment of D. That was filed on 12 May 2025 [C429]. Aside from the needs of her son and her own mental health which were raised as a vulnerability, a further vulnerability was her recognition of the risk posed by the mother [C44]: -

“[D] has been advised of the risks [M] poses, and where she notes that she will do what the LA tell her, it is unclear whether she fully understands the risks [M] poses. [D] did note that previously she took a step away from [M] as she knows when her mental health is bad and she is unable to listen or take advice. She states that this is something she will do again should this be needed.”

A “big concern” was “whether [D] will be able to manage [M]’s behaviour which has previously been harassing with restraining orders needed… There is a concern about whether this will be a long-term option for Child A. There are a lot of vulnerabilities and concerns in regard to parents as well as [D] managing both E [her son] and Child A’s competing needs. This could potentially prevent Child A having a plan of permanence” [C442-3].

Nonetheless, the vulnerabilities set against her strengths were not regarded as sufficient to rule her out as a prospective carer.

On 1 July 2025, there was a meeting attended by the fostering team, the allocated social worker and the Director of Family Help and Children’s Social Care services. I have already said something about the context of this meeting. Mr Walker suggested to the allocated social worker that a degree of pressure must have been felt by the local authority given the delays in the proceedings and the presence of the DFH&CSC to monitor the care planning (a person who also fulfils the role of ADM in adoption cases). The allocated social worker agreed that the participants clearly had an eye to the final hearing listed to start on 9 July 2025 because the local authority were endeavouring to ensure that there was no repeat of the failures which had caused such significant delay to date. She also said that the fostering team arrived at the meeting having formed a view that there was no purpose in the assessment of D continuing because of the vulnerabilities which had thus far been revealed (“I think they came in saying that the assessment would not continue”). She regarded the assessment as “comprehensive” although more detail could have been provided.

The document filed with the court on 9 July 2025 is headed, “Stage II Brief Report to Fostering Panel”, signed on 2 July 2025 by the fostering assessing social worker [C562].

The assessment was signed by D on 5 July 2025 and the allocated social worker said she had seen an email from D to the mother on 9 July 2025 about the assessment.

Mr Walker sought to ask questions of the allocated social worker about the preparation of the report although she is not a member of the fostering team and was not the assessing social worker.

I have to say that Mr Walker appeared to be questioning the assessment as if this was a challenge to the reasoning in the assessment. There is no challenge to the reasoning in the assessment because (a) the assessment process has not been completed formally and (b) D has not yet made an application or filed a statement setting out the basis of any challenge she wishes to make to the reasoning or conclusions in this brief report. I did not find a form of second-hand cross examination on the contents of the report to be helpful or illuminating.

More to the point, I was careful to make clear that I did not propose to impose an unfair procedure on D and am in no position to determine whether she may have good grounds or not in seeking to challenge the early conclusions reached in this assessment. The furthest I can go is to consider in broad terms the nature of the vulnerabilities in the context of my assessment of the behaviour of the mother in order to do my best to give some account of the risk and benefits of an adjournment in the circumstances. To that extent, Mr Walker’s questions were relevant.

There were 4 assessment sessions between 29 May 2025 and 30 June 2025. The first 2 sessions were with one social worker and the last two were with the present social worker. I do not know why that was the case or if the change in assessing social worker had any meaningful impact upon the quality of the conclusions reached.

The assessment identified strengths [C565]: -

The assessment identified concerns [C565-566]. A particular concern was recent volatile behaviour by E involving the use of a knife which raised concerns about the safety and dynamics of the household in the event that Child A joined it. The second concern was D’s ability to manage the competing demands of Child A and her own son. The third concern was the potential influence of the mother including her emotional volatility and past incidents which could disrupt the arrangement. In my judgment, presciently, the assessing social worker noted the “pull factor of Child A in [D]’s care is likely to influence [M]’s behaviours particularly when unwell.”

In my judgment, this is an important point. The mother has not managed the relationship with her brother without the intervention of the local authority and for some time the presence of a Restraining Order. She still has supervised contact with the children. Her ultimate objective, in my judgment, is not for D to look after Child A in the long term but for her to be a stopgap whilst the mother has the opportunity to demonstrate the progress which she suggests she has already made. Child A will be a critical factor in drawing the mother closer to D and therefore Child A. In my judgment, there is a real risk that the mother may provoke conflict or misunderstanding and risk undermining that placement particularly if her actions cause difficulties which begin to affect E. The fact that D appears at least an important part of the mother’s mental health support plan is apt to create “blurred boundaries and an high likelihood of disruption” [C566].

D has not met Child A and there is no existing relationship. She is not a member of Child A’s family although she appears genuine in wanting to offer to care for him. Her motivation appears to be to support the mother.

The reasons for the negative conclusion at C556 – C568 are expressed analytically and on the face of it offer substantial reasons for reaching the conclusion proffered. Without simply repeating in terms the analysis given, the central points may be summarised thus: -

I acknowledge that there may be criticism of or errors in the report which may alter the balance of the factors relied upon within it. It does not, however, read as a flawed document, lacking reasoning or any basis in fact to reach the conclusions set out therein. In many ways, it is a concise expansion of the vulnerabilities which were already identified within the viability assessment.

I have assessed the evidence of the mother and regard her part in the risk analysis set out within the document as well demonstrated. In my judgment, D would occupy a bifurcated role, prone to conflict and divided loyalties. The mother would likely seek to engage with her and Child A wherever possible. Ultimately, there is a real risk that any such placement would be undermined and fail, which would be a catastrophic outcome for Child A.

The option of D to be treated as viable would require (a) an effective and reasoned challenge to the current evidence and (b) if successful a full assessment of up to 16 weeks’ duration by an independent social worker before adding a further 4 – 6 weeks to file evidence in response leading to a further adjourned IRH. In this context, for Child A, I simply cannot countenance that as an option to be further explored given the impact of further delay.

The Local Authority and the Guardian do not regard D as a realistic placement option but if I were to treat her in that way, without reference to the impact of delay, then I would run the risk of unfairness because she has not had a fair opportunity to challenge that assessment within the compass of this final hearing. Furthermore, it is hardly an early pruning of an option properly to be discarded (Re S [2017] EWCA Civ 249 per McFarlane, LJ at paragraph 22: “…if the word "realistic" is to have a meaning as any term of art (and one hopes it is not in these cases), it is to refer to an early pruning of options at a stage long before the beginning of the final hearing. It is simply to clear the decks so that obviously unrealistic options are not further investigated and the subject of evidence before the court...”).

The critical point in my judgment is the broader question as to whether I can justify a further extension of the proceedings for Child A given my assessment of the apparent significant weaknesses in her assessment, the fact that she withdrew from assessment in July 2024 and that it would result in a further adjournment of perhaps around 6 months. I do not accept that any such delay in making a decision is compatible with Child A’s welfare needs notwithstanding the plan for adoption proposed by the Local Authority.

I reject the argument that the Court should await further investigation of the placement option of Child A with D.

The parties prepared a summary of the relevant law regarding the role of the ADM in the context of the Adoption Agencies Regulations 2005 (“AAR 2005”). I am grateful for it and have had regard to it in the following analysis of the issues.

The requirements for and contents of the Child’s Permanence Report is contained in regulation 17. That must include “an analysis of the options for the future care of the child which have been considered by the agency and why placement for adoption is considered the preferred option” (regulation 17(1)(i)).

Under regulation 11 AAR 2005, regulations 12 -17 apply “where the adoption agency is considering adoption for a child.”

The decision maker in this case is the Agency Decision Maker (“ADM”). Decisions must be taken in accordance with statutory guidance, namely, “Adoption for local authorities, voluntary adoption agencies and adoption support agencies” (Department of Education, July 2013). The role of the ADM is described in paragraphs 1.50 to 1.52: -

“1.50.

The agency’s decision-maker is a senior person within the adoption agency. VAAs may also appoint a trustee or director. NMS 23.17 sets out the qualifications, knowledge and experience decision-maker must have. The person does not have direct management responsibility for the adoption panel but has the authority to make decisions on the agency’s behalf as to whether:

a child should be placed for adoption (AAR 19);

prospective adopters are suitable to adopt a child or continue to be suitable to adopt a child (AAR 30B and 30D);

a child should be placed for adoption with a specific prospective adopter (AAR 33); and

to disclose protected information about adults under section 61 of the Act and regulation 15 of the Disclosure of Adoption Information (Post-Commencement Adoptions) Regulations 2005 (AIR) when determining an application.

There may be more than one decision-maker in an agency. The decision-maker may not delegate their authority to another person.

“1.51.

In Hofstetter v LB Barnet and IRM [2009] EWCA 3282 (Admin) the court set out guidance for the way in which the decision-maker should approach a case. The court said that it would be good discipline and appropriate for the decision-maker to:

list the material taken into account in reaching the decision; identify key arguments;

ask whether they agree with the process and approach of the relevant panel(s) and are satisfied as to its fairness and that the panel(s) has properly addressed the arguments;

consider whether any additional information now available to them that was not before the panel has an impact on its reasons or recommendation;

identify the reasons given for the relevant recommendation that they do or do not wish to adopt; and

state (a) the adopted reasons by cross reference or otherwise and (b) any further reasons for their decision.

“152.

Before making a considered and professional decision, the decision-maker will need to consider:

the exercise of powers under section 1 of the Act;

all the information surrounding the case including the reports …; that the author(s) of the reports comply with the ARRs;

the stability and permanence of the relationship of any couple under consideration (regulation 4 of the Suitability of Adopters Regulations 2005)

the recommendation and reasons of the adoption panel and the independent review panel; and

the final minutes of the adoption panel including any minutes from adjourned panel meetings and the independent review panel.

Where a case has not been referred to an adoption panel, references in this paragraph to the panel are not relevant. Where the decision-maker considers that they have insufficient information, or needs medical or legal advice, they should ask the agency to obtain the information/advice and the agency must comply with this request” (emphasis supplied).”

Paragraph 8.15 provides guidance in the context of concurrent applications for care and placement orders: -

“If care proceedings are in progress at the time that the local authority’s decision-maker decides that a child should be placed for adoption, section 22(2) of the Act requires it to issue an application for a placement order. If this decision is made before any care proceedings are commenced, the local authority has the option of applying for a placement order alone, but it will usually be preferable to apply for both a care and a placement order. If this were done, then although the care order will not have effect while the placement order is in force, it would remain in force if the placement order were subsequently revoked. In the case of Re P-B (A Child) [2006] EWCA Civ 1016 the court makes clear that it is not permissible to issue the placement order application before the decision-maker has decided that the child should be placed for adoption. For further guidance on the issue of care proceedings in these circumstances, see the guidance to the Children Act 1989 (Volume 1 Court Orders).”

The original ADM minutes relate to a decision taken on 12 September 2024 [K40] following which the Placement application was made by the Local Authority [K1].

The ADM had the benefit of a Child Permanence Report, dated 4 September 2024 [K22] prepared by the allocated social worker. There is no criticism regarding the material placed before the ADM at the point the decision was made to approve the plan of adoption thereby requiring the Local Authority to issue a Placement Order application in accordance with s. 22(2) CA 1989.

The minutes were amended or amplified as a paper exercise on 20 January 2025 [K49]. This appears to have been done following an Order made by Recorder Allen on 13 January 2025 [B389/ 22]. That appears to have been attributable to the Father’s contention that “there was an insufficient Re B-S Analysis provided by the Agency Decision Maker and [the Father] sought for the ADM to attend the final hearing to give evidence” [B391/ 2].

What is not clear from the narrative is the legal basis (perhaps absent a claim for JR) for suggesting that such a refinement or restatement was required given that the placement application had been authorised in September 2024.

It is to be remembered that the “good practice” of filing the minute of the ADM decision and the Child Permanence Report is to understand in “original form” the pros and cons of each of the realistic placement options and the social care analysis behind the decision to approve a plan of adoption (Re S-F (A Child) [2017 EWCA Civ 964 per Sir Ernest Ryder SPT at paragraph 11).

What the ADM could not have done in September 2024 is to take into account the telephone call made by D on 25 April 2025 or subsequent assessments. The ADM would have known that D had withdrawn from an assessment of her as a connected carer for Child A in July 2024.

An updated CPR was prepared by the allocated social worker, dated 10 June 2025 [K54a] which could have considered the viability assessment of D but did not do so due to an “oversight” which the allocated social worker indicated she had corrected in a further update, which has not been filed with the Court.

The reality is that the person occupying the role as ADM (for adoption) is also the Director of Family Help and Children’s Services and has been fully aware of and involved in developments, including participation in the meeting on 1 July 2025.

The question raised by Mr Walker is whether the Court is required to await a formal review of the position by the ADM for adoption after either (a) having received all relevant information post-September 2024 including a comprehensive revised CPR and/ or (b) after the ADM for fostering has decided whether to approve the recommendation awaited from the Fostering Panel on 18 July 2025 as to the “brief report” on the assessment of D as connected carer for Child A and said revised CPR?

Mr Walker says that the Court cannot rely upon the ADM decision made in September 2024 when there is a wealth of evidence which has been filed since that date. He submits that in fact the Local Authority had discussed going back to the ADM for adoption but that could not be done in time for the final hearing given the fostering panel were not due to meet and make a recommendation until 18 July 2025. Mr Walker submits that the Court cannot make a Placement Order in these circumstances.

Mr Khadim and Ms Schofield submit that there is no requirement for the ADM to re-take the decision. They submit that Parliament has established a duty to make an application for a Placement Order when a plan of adoption is approved and there is a clear process to ensure that the decision whether to approve a plan of adoption is taken properly by the ADM taking into account the relevant evidence at the time. There is no duty to re-take it because things have changed. If there was then Parliament would have stipulated the requirements and circumstances of that. It is inevitable that things can and will change after the decision is made to approve a plan of adoption, even if the decision is made shortly before final evidence is filed in the related care proceedings, but that does not affect the basis upon which the Placement Order application is made.

The Court is able to consider for itself all relevant matters which have occurred since the making of the Placement Order application in accordance with s.1 ACA 2002 and in particular whether to dispense with the consent of the parents to the making of a placement order, in this case, on the grounds that the welfare of Child A “requires the consent to be dispensed with”: s. 21(3) and 52(1)(b) ACA 2002; Re P (Placement Orders: ParentalConsent) [2008] 2 FLR 625 per Wall, LJ.

Beyond the ability of the Local Authority to review the plan for adoption, for example, if there are changes in the child’s health needs or the passage of time suggesting a match cannot be made when further delay in securing a long term foster placement may be prejudicial, I cannot see any basis to suggest that the original decision is vitiated by passage of time and accumulation of evidence. There is no breach of the AAR 2005 in my judgment and the reliance placed by Mr Walker on Re B (Placement Order) [2008] EWCA Civ 835 is misplaced.

In the event that the Court had approved further assessment of a kinship carer then I would not hesitate to suggest that it may be appropriate for the ADM to consider that revised position. It would be a matter of good practice but not one of jurisdiction. The court retains primacy of decision-making within the proceedings and must decide for itself whether the life-long welfare needs of the child require it to endorse a plan of adoption or an alternative placement plan. The filing of an ADM minute of decision and CPR is designed to support that decision-making and not to supplant it in circumstances in which (a) the ADM decision is properly made in accordance with the AAR 2005 and (b) the Court is responsible for deciding whether to permit further assessment of an alternative carer, which would require an extension to the proceedings under s. 32(5) CA 1989.

The decision made in September 2024 triggered the making of an application for a Placement Order. It fulfilled its purpose at that time. It is not rendered improper or invalid by effluxion of time or the existence of post-decision evidence.

A psychological report was prepared on the mother by Dr Karen Shannon, HCPC Registered Psychologist, dated 26 February 2024 [E79]. There is no Executive Summary.

This report was not based upon completion of all relevant questionnaires nor sight of the mother’s medical or psychiatric records.

At paragraph 7.2, Dr Shannon described mother’s presentation as follows: -

“She presented as a polite, confident, and assertive woman, who gave good eye contact. There were some objective indications of anxiety at interview - she became verbose with pressured (rapid) speech and tangentiality. She was able to take guidance to slow down, which was temporarily achieved. However, when emotive issues came up for discussion, she returned to verbosity. When she was asked to reflect on this pattern, she stated that she felt a pressure to convey all the information at once.”

At paragraph 7.4, she described the mother as engaging in psychologically defensive patterns of relating. She noted that the mother repeatedly made “sweeping statements which minimised and/or deflected concerns about her mental health, and which were not accurate. She engaged in denial and had rigid, fixed, overvalued ideas about past events…” She reports that the mother agreed with the suggestion that she “feared a loss of control and therefore rigidly adhered to her own narrative of events including denial of her mental health deterioration and events in her life.”

In my judgment, I would make a similar observation about the quality of the mother's written and oral evidence.

In short, she noted that the mother has psychological and psychiatric difficulties which are rooted in trauma due to adverse childhood experiences [para 20.4 – 20.6]. Accordingly, as a psychological defence, she lacks insight into her patterns of behaviour symptoms and tends to externalise blame which prevents her from acknowledging fully her role in difficulties which have arisen. Such patterns of behaviour have been detrimental to her parenting of her older children and may be for Child A [para 20.25].

The mother at times is unable to manage her mood and at other times, she minimises her mental health difficulties and masks her symptoms, presenting as more stable and functioning than is the reality [para 6.3].

In her opinion, the mother was too psychologically defended to recognise the trauma and emotional harm experienced by her older children in being exposed to her deteriorating mental health and domestic abuse. She suggested that her inability to accept the quality and consequences of her actions impedes her ability to take responsibility and inhibits her in consistently making better choices in the future [para 23.8].

She opined that the mother’s ability to meet the future needs of Child A in the short and long-term is dependent on numerous factors including her ability to comply with her prescribed medication, to follow medical advice for Child A’s care, to maintain employment and geographical stability, to abstain from substance misuse and to remain single in the immediate future whilst importantly demonstrating an ability and willingness to engage fully in psychotherapy [para 30.1].

The mother’s need to control is, in her opinion, rooted in these underlying difficulties: -

I interpose to note that the mother denied in her oral evidence being asked to complete the relevant form and questionnaire after the interview. Her evidence was that Dr Shannon said there was no use filling in the form after the assessment, which is completely at odds with what is recorded by Dr Shannon. I find the evidence of Dr Shannon preferable because it is almost impossible to understand why she would have said this otherwise and the mother’s response is consistent with her psychological profile and my overall assessment of her. This small point rather underlines the type of issue which can emerge in communicating with the mother.

She suggested that the mother would require 4 to 6 months of cognitive analytic therapy by an accredited therapist with experience of working with trauma [para 32.2 - 32.3].

Ultimately Dr Shannon opined that an independent psychiatric assessment was necessary to review the mother’s mental health history, diagnosis, appropriate medication regime and likely compliance with the same [para 36.4].

Dr Shannon provided an addendum report, dated 10 April 2024 [E162] following receipt of the mother’s medical records and further hair strand testing.

She observed that based upon her consideration of the records, the mother had not been “fully honest” about her mental health history, which had started as early as 2011 and was not only triggered by the loss of her mother in 2014 [para 6.2]. Dr Shannon regarded it as unclear whether the mother would comply with her antipsychotic medication in the immediate or longer term. She has a differential diagnosis including bipolar affective disorder, persistent delusional disorder, delusional disorder with mixed personality traits and PTSD [para 6.7].

The opinion evidence of Dr Shannon is not challenged but is not agreed by the mother.

A psychiatric assessment of the mother was undertaken by Dr Janet Meehan, Consultant Psychiatrist, by report dated 2 August 2024 [E213]. She opined that the mother is suffering from a mental disorder, namely schizoaffective disorder with active symptoms such as disorganised behaviour, pressure of speech, formal thought disorder and paranoid delusions [para 15.1]. This is a lifelong mental illness the symptoms of which can fluctuate according to factors including psychosocial stress, substance misuse and reduced compliance with medication [para 17.2].

The mother does not agree with the suggested diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder.

Schizoaffective disorder is similar to bipolar affective disorder (which the mother appears to accept) but psychotic symptoms such as paranoid beliefs are more prominent and can occur in the absence of significant mood shifts (as is the case with the mother). It tends to have a slightly worse prognosis than pure bipolar affective disorder [para 17.5].

When manic, the mother has presented in an erratic, agitated manner and can become angry without warning. She tends to use substances such as cannabis and alcohol when unwell. Her paranoid beliefs may lead her into arguments or confrontations [para 17.6].

Even when relatively well, she opines that the mother would find it very difficult to provide a safe, secure, nurturing and consistent environment for Child A on a daily basis. She would need a high-level of hands-on support and supervision [para 17.10]. It is a feature of her illness that she lacks insight and judgment and tends to minimise the degree of her illness perhaps as a defence mechanism to protect her low self-esteem [para 17.13].

There is a moderate to high likelihood that the mother will suffer further relapses of illnesses in future which are likely to necessitate hospital admission. The risk of this outcome would be reduced but not eliminated if she were prescribed antipsychotic medication in depot form rather than oral form and if her mental health were closely monitored in the community [para 17.3].

In her opinion, childhood adversity has led to low self-esteem and low self-worth. The mother tends to attract and enter into relationships with partners who are abusive. She is at risk of entering exploitative or abusive relationships in the future [para 15.2]

Her use of alcohol, cocaine and cannabis has been used to dampen her emotional distress symptoms of mental illness but has also exposed her to harm [para 15.3].

Her strengths are her survival skills, ability to work and her commitment to Child A.

Dr Meehan opines that the mother would require a “high level of daily support to parent Child A safely” [para 16.2]. She would require daily input and monitoring by a close family member or trained worker from a statutory agency [para 16.3]. There would need to be an early warning system in place to alert professionals to any changes in her mental health, relationship status or level of vulnerability [para 16.5]. She doubted whether the mother would be able to care for Child A whilst living in Cheshire away from close family members who she sought to suggest would become her day-to-day support system [para 16.6].

She recommended a review of drug treatment and in particular olanzapine to be prescribed in an injectable (depot) form once per month although noting that the mother was not willing to consider this option as she was unwilling to increase her dosage of oral olanzapine [para 16.4].

There is a history of the mother being non-compliant with all medication leading to relapse and hospital admission. This risk is likely to remain in the long-term especially as the mother tends to minimise the symptoms of her mental illness [para 17.17].

Critically, Dr Meehan opined that the mother “must be willing to undergo the psychological assessment that has been recommended but thus far declined by her” and “regular hair strand testing to ensure that she remains free of alcohol and illicit substances”. In the event that both of those conditions cannot be met by her, Dr Meehan thought it appropriate for Child A to be placed outside her care, ideally with a suitable family member [para 16.8 – 16.10].

Dr Meehan answered questions in her written response, dated 29 August 2024 [E263].

Dr Meehan confirmed that her diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder is based on the mother having ongoing persecutory delusional beliefs in the absence of significant mood change. She noted that the mother’s delusional beliefs are not limited to ex-partners but included the assertion that her baby had been swapped for a different baby by staff on the special care baby unit [para 3.1]. If she does not have chronic delusional beliefs and her mood is now stable then bipolar affective disorder is a possible diagnosis. Bipolar affective disorder is a serious condition and is classed as a severe and enduring mental illness. The treatment would likely remain the same although the mother may be offered a mood stabilising drug [para 3.5].

I interpose that the persistence of such delusions is described by the allocated social worker in her statement, dated 3 March 2025 [C320]. She notes that since May 2024, the mother has consistently claimed she has been stalked and harassed by an ex-partner who worked with [Redacted] Police and is responsible for her being sectioned on more than one occasion. The mother told me that her ex-partner had not been in direct contact with her since 2021 but that he has sought through bogus Facebook accounts to contact her. That is why she says she is in the midst of seeking an injunction against him.

The mother has referred in various ways to the alleged actions of her ex-partner [C 527/ 27-29 and C535]. There is evidence that he was subject to bail conditions arising out of a report of harassment until 17 June 2025. The allocated social worker endeavoured to understand the mother’s account of the role of the ex-partner and some historical concerns but there remains considerable confusion about that as described at C339, paragraphs 3.8 to 3.10. She states that “it does concern me that there are unknown risks from the mother that may not have come to light yet.”

The allocated social worker compiled a chronology of records at C364 – 365. The entries are somewhat perplexing, reading as a mixture of the factual and fantastical. The boundary appears blurred.

The mother admitted saying on 28 May 2024 that AK has made malicious accusations and is a Police Officer. She agreed with the note that on 9 August 2024 she said that AK had been contacting professionals and that he colluded with the former allocated social worker, “to get her sectioned”.

The mother agreed that on 9 September 2024 she spoke about AK getting her sectioned. She qualified that saying she did not deny that her mental health was spiralling in 2020 but it was an inappropriate referral. I did not understand what that meant. She agreed that she was not mentally well in 2021.

When the mother becomes acutely unwell she loses insight as evidenced by the fact that on each occasion she has been admitted to hospital she has required detention [para 3.7].

Dr Meehan suggested that if the mother were permitted to care for Child A then a necessary condition would be access to support 24 hours a day. She did not believe that spot checks would be sufficient to safeguard Child A. To that end, she observes, that she would be in favour of the mother and Child A’s entry into a residential placement with 24-hour assessment and supervision to inform any parenting assessment [para 3.14].

In my judgment, this latter recommendation must be seen in the context of Dr Meehan describing the mother’s vulnerability in the context of the level of support which would be required to care for Child A appropriately.

The evidence of Dr Meehan was not challenged although it is not accepted by the mother.

In my judgment, the psychological and psychiatric evidence points to a deeply established pattern of behaviour by the mother which is likely to lead to the risk of significant emotional or physical harm to Child A were he to be rehabilitated to her care. The key factors in establishing whether there is any realistic prospect of change so as to reduce the risk to a manageable level is abstinence from drugs or alcohol and verifiable progress in her acceptance of and progress in therapy. There is some progress in both areas but it is not consistent nor sufficient.

I now turn to some related areas, which illustrate some of the challenges in relying upon the mother’s account of events.

The allocated social worker states [C338/ 3.7] that: -

“3.7.

The mother says her section in 2023 was due to being "extremely concerned" about Child A and this was making her "more anxious." The mother claims "[Redacted]" said she can't take olanzapine whilst pregnant and breastfeeding and 2mg of diazepam was okay. Because of this, she chose to stop taking olanzapine. NHS recommendations state olanzapine is safe to take during pregnancy. The mother feels her "detention [in 2023] wasn't warranted" and she "could have been treated in the community". She said she was "sectioned for two days" and "stayed for a further 8 days for assessment for [social worker]". The mother was sectioned from 23.11.2023 - 21.12.2023. The mother states, "the social worker got me sectioned", "I blame the social worker for not working with me", and she "didn't ever believe he [ex-partner] was responsible" in 2023. The mother believed the father was speaking to her ex-partner "as he said he was" and believes "said this to scare me". The mother said she left a [hospital], against medical advice, when in labour with Child A, as her ex-partner knew she was there. She said EP, who was at the hospital “giving birth”, told him. She claims WH told her they had received an anonymous call, and she knew it was her ex-partner as it’s a "pattern of behaviour he's done before", adding "he's the most likely to have done it"”.

There is no evidence that the mother was advised to stop taking olanzapine by Dr [Redacted].

The mother had sought to prove to the social worker at a meeting on 14 April 2025 that olanzapine was harmful if taken during pregnancy [C340/ 3.12]: -

“The mother had a medical book with her on 14.04.2025 – A Hitchings et al (2018) The Top 100 drugs, 2 nd edition. She showed me p81 (olanzapine) and p82 (antiviral medication). The mother believed she was showing me that olanzapine is harmful during pregnancy. It took multiple times explaining to her that the book was referring to antiviral medication being harmful. The mother looked puzzled and confused at this.”

The mother accepted that she was in error in her oral evidence but it is illustrative of the difficulties in working with her on a sound factual basis.

The mother showed the allocated social worker on 9 April 2025 “a letter…from a doctor, whose name I haven’t noted, dated 18.04.2018. The letter states the mother was ‘using THC oil and she uses one drop at night. This is equivalent to 1 joint of cannabis’. The mother said this was evidence she was told it is okay for her to smoke cannabis during her pregnancy with Child A. I advised the letter was explaining her use, not encouraging the use of cannabis” [C343/ 4.4].

The mother denied this account in her oral evidence but I prefer the account of the allocated social worker as more credible. Why would she lie about this and why would the mother show her the letter other than to seek to explain away her use of cannabis? I find it surprising that the mother was still seeking to justify her use of cannabis during pregnancy because of the obvious risk to her mental health and functioning.

The mother was given permission on 9 July 2025 to rely upon 3 additional documents. Positively, she appears to have been working well with a specialist mental health nurse linked to her GP surgery, MHN. Her letter, dated 24 June 2025 [B467; see also entry on C534, dated 10 June 2025] indicates she has met the mother on 4 occasions and she has appeared stable with no signs of relapse “of Bi-polar disorder, secondary diagnosis delusional disorder with mixed personality disorder traits. She has demonstrated capacity and has insight into her mental health.” The mother has completed a Wellness Recovery Action Plan (WRAP). D is part of that plan and has been given a copy.

She reports that the mother is compliant in taking her medication (olanzapine 10mg at night).

She had referred the mother for EMDR therapy on 18 September 2024 but the Community Mental Health Team did not accept the referral because the mother “was reporting stable mental health, and they were not offering EMDR at that time. She has not reported trauma symptoms to me, reporting that she has already (sic.) undertook therapies around trauma, prior to moving to Cheshire.” This outcome may simply reflect what the mother has said as opposed to her therapeutic need for such therapy. That is part of the problem. The evidence suggests that the mother does not recognise nor seek support for trauma symptoms and services do not challenge what appears to be her apparent good health and high functioning. The allocated social worker agreed that the mother is engaging well and “does seem to be in a calmer place” but that there have been dips in her mental health during the proceedings. The problem is that the mother still tends to suggest she does not have mental health needs and is adept at masking them.

There is a letter from “Her-Place”, dated 1 July 2025 from HP [B469]. This gives little detail about the nature of the counselling provided but confirms that the mother has attended 7 sessions in which a variety of issues from the present and past have been discussed. She states that the mother is actively speaking about her personal circumstances and her past mental health issues.

The mother told me that she is due to commence a master’s degree in psychology at [Redacted] University in September 2025. That may well form part of her seeking to progress in her life.

The third letter is a summary of the mother’s engagement with My CWA (Cheshire Without Abuse), dated 8 July 2025 [F123]. This is good evidence of the mother’s engagement with the organisation [detail of her involvement redacted].

The mother has in a similar way shown progress prior to entering into a relationship with the father. The allocated social worker notes that she engaged well and had positive reports from another agency in 2017. The chronology [C371] contains the following entry for 18 April 2017 derived from a “photo of a letter from Women’s Turnaround Project”: -

“States the mother has engaged with the service for 16 months and completed the Freedom Project, showing ‘great awareness of past mistakes’ and ‘was also a good support to other women in the group’. Advises the mother now volunteers for the service. States witnessed ‘vastly improved change’ in the mother.”

Notwithstanding that summary of improvement, the mother still entered into another abusive relationship, encouraged the father to be deceitful about the relationship and her pregnancy to enhance her own interests in spending time with her older children and has failed to evidence that she can apply what she has learned. That suggests that the information from My CWA, limited thought it is, needs to be treated cautiously as evidence of sustaining change. Again, in my judgment, the patterns of her behaviour are well understood and explained by the expert psychological and psychiatric evidence supported by the expert social care analysis of the allocated social worker.

The mother entered into the relationship with the father and sought to “give him the benefit of the doubt” until she had ascertained the level of risk he posed although it appears she planned to conceive a child prior to him completing the Building Better Relationships course in January 2022 (E97-98/ 12.19 – 12.20). The allocated social worker notes that[C145-146/ 5.19 – 5.21]: -

“5.19.

In our discussions, the mother described her past relationship with the father as being positive until they moved in together. She said his behaviour began to change and the “trigger” for the domestic abuse was her finding out the father had been unfaithful. She admitted she had said some “horrible” things to him during the argument but reports he hit her in the stomach, causing her to go into early labour. She believes she was in labour for approximately 5 weeks; medical reports suggest she went into premature labour on, or around, [date]. The mother reports this led her to end the relationship as she feared the father. The mother contradicts herself in the information she has shared as part of her psychological assessment, where she says she was fully aware of the father’s history and gave him the “benefit of the doubt”. The mother also reported the father threate[ne]d to harm her and Child A, in utero, before he allegedly assaulted her. This is very concerning as it suggests the mother was either aware of the risks posed by the father and placed herself and Child A in harms way, or, that despite the knowledge of his past and the threats he had made, was unable to assess the risks he posed to them.

“5.20.

However, throughout these proceedings, the mother has resumed and ended her relationship with the father and changed her stance from being scared of him, to being friends, and back to believing he is a risk of harm. Due to the lack of consistency and honesty of both parents, it is difficult to fully understand the dynamics of their relationship and whether or not they are still together, on speaking terms, or plan to resume their relationship at a later date. I believe, if the parents resumed their relationship, the risk of domestic abuse is still significantly high. Because there is so much uncertainty around Child A’s parents’ relationship, we have to consider the risk they will pose to him which will be high.

5.21.

Throughout proceedings there have been allegations and counter allegations of domestic abuse and harassment from both parents. The father has reported the mother has assaulted him, causing a black eye, has been verbally abusive, and continues to harass him. The mother has reported the father has assaulted her, threatened further assault, and has harassed her. Both parents, at times have said they are frightened of each other. The father went so far as to say he was too scared to attend court without his father and had told me he was scared of leaving his home. Both have then gone on to change their minds. In October 2023, the mother reported the father to the police, and he was arrested and bail conditions set that they were to have absolutely no contact. Both parents breached these conditions and went on to ask to be assessed to co-parent Child A. The mother has shared a recording where she can be heard telling the father that she lied to the police, by telling them he did not assault her so that he wouldn’t get into trouble. The investigation and bail conditions were eventually dropped. Later, in June 2024, the father reported his concerns to the police the mother was arrested and placed on bail on 20.06.2024. The mother reported that the father had told her the local authority had advised him to report her; this is not correct. The investigation and bail conditions ended due to the mother being supported by me and the family time workers to share evidence with the police of the father continuing to contact her.”

Returning to the issue of the mother’s mental health, in her statement made in February 2024, the mother described her diagnosis as “type 2 bi-polar” [C51/ 13] and she did not refer to any secondary diagnosis of persistent delusional disorder.

The allocated social worker notes in her final statement [C458] that “the mother continues to dispute her diagnoses – as recently as last week she told me her Specialist Mental Health Nurse, MHN, was removing persistent delusional disorder from her file. MHN has advised this is not the case and the mother will remain diagnosed with this and bipolar disorder. Whilst the mother claims to have insight into her mental health and says she knows when it is getting worse, her disputes over her diagnosis would suggest otherwise.”

I asked the mother about this about 3 times. She struggled to answer the question directly in a familiar vein of meandering and seeking to justify or argue her case. Eventually, she said that she had said the opposite. She had told the allocated social worker that the diagnosis of delusional disorder secondary to bipolar disorder could not be removed. It is clear that she struggles fully to accept the extent of her needs and her ability to identify when she is becoming unwell.

The position is too uncertain to regard the risk of mental health decline as being managed effectively.

In my judgment, there is a haziness around the mother which, I find, makes it very difficult to get to the heart of her functioning lying beneath the patina of her loquaciousness and general positive affect. She weaves a narrative around her vulnerabilities and struggles to be challenged. Fundamentally, I observed to myself during her evidence that the analysis of the patterns of her behaviour suggested by Dr Shannon and Dr Meehan were evidently correct and continue to be a source of continuing risk to Child A. For the avoidance of doubt, I prefer the evidence of the allocated social worker and accept her analysis of the mother’s strengths but much greater vulnerabilities as a parent.

The mother told the allocated social worker on 9 April 2025 that “she has blood tests with her GP surgery to monitor the effectiveness of her Olanzapine and that she is tested for drugs at the same time.” The latter point is not correct as the mother conceded.

The local authority has prepared with the agreement of the other parties a summary of the relevant evidence [A128 and A179]. I shall highlight a number of matters.

There is no dispute that the mother has used cannabis including when pregnant with Child A.

Her use of drugs and alcohol has been linked to asserting supposed control over her symptoms of mental ill health.

The mother declared last using cannabis in November 2023 (Alphabiolabs report, dated 1 March 2024 [E124]).

The mother declared no illicit drug use in the Alphabiolabs report, dated 8 May 2024 [E186 and E208]. The test results suggest cannabis use from mid-January 2024 to mid-March 2024 indicative of regular and repeated use rather than environmental exposure. The use of hair dye may have lowered the results in the corresponding hair segments.

The mother declared last using cannabis in late June or early July 2024 (Alpha biolabs report, dated 5 August 2024 [E234]).

In her statement, dated 7 November 2024 [C304/ 2], she said that she last used cannabis on 22 June 2024.

Thus, on her own account, cannabis use continued after November 2023 until 22 June 2024.

The mother declared last using cannabis (cake) in December 2024 (Lextox, dated 21 February 2025 [E333, E348 and E394].

However, in relation to her ingestion of cannabis cake, the allocated social worker said this in her parenting assessment [C343/ 4.2]: -

“4.2.

As stated by her barrister, whilst I was under cross examination [within the previous abortive final hearing], the mother claimed she was unaware some cake she consumed on New Years Eve had contained the drug. When I met with the mother on 07.05.2025, I asked again about her drug use, and she confirmed that she [w]as aware that the cake had cannabis in, and she took it voluntarily. I asked the mother if she had informed CGL of this and she confirmed she had finished working with them on 19.12.2024. I advised the mother I have had contact with CGL who have confirmed that, when they tested her for drugs, they did not test for cannabis as they had no tests left. The mother said she wasn’t aware of this. This raises concerns about the reliability of the letter provided by CGL advising the mother had been discharged in December 2024 as she had reached the goal of abstinence. BC, the author of the letter and the person working with the mother at CGL, confirmed his knowledge of the mother’s cannabis use was based on her self-reports.”

The mother said in her oral evidence that she knew the potential of the cake having cannabis in it. She said it was a mistake and she was quite naïve. A lot of people she associated with are cannabis users and she has stopped associating with them. I query why she consumed the cake and continued to associate with them in December 2024?

Environmentally, it is suggested that the mother has attended contact “smelling of cannabis” and that breast milk has been noted previously to carry the same smell [C344/ 4.7]. This is at best an indication and I do not rely upon such to prove such use but it is certainly consistent with a pattern of use of cannabis until at least December 2024.

I ask rhetorically: why consume cannabis at the point of discharge from CGL and why not have taken steps to distance herself from such friends before then? On the mother’s case, it does not suggest sustaining progress in her ability to implement a drug-free lifestyle.

In her statement, dated 23 June 2025, the mother said this [C528/ 37]: -

“37.

I had not used cannabis for months save for the time when I had eaten a cake at new year which contained cannabis and which has previously been referred to. I must admit that I had a relapse with cannabis in May. I had damaged my back and was in a lot of pain. I was prescribed medicinal cannabis from Curaleaf and took this for around 10 days, but I then stopped this as I decided that this would not benefit me in the long run. I am aware that many people use medical cannabis and that it does not affect their ability to parent effectively and although I am no longer using it I want to be clear that I do not feel this would have impacted my own parenting capacity and if it did, I would have stopped using it. This is not really relevant now as I am not using it and have no intention to do so. I self referred back to CGL for support and I am currently engaging with them. I have recently had my initial assessment appointment and I am being allocated a worker who will do 1-1 sessions with me. I have now had an MRI scan and my disks in the lower part of my pelvis have prolapsed and I have been referred to physio. I am continue (sic.) to access support from my GP in relation to this.”

This suggests that she sought, obtained and used cannabis for 10 days in May 2025. In her oral evidence she said that she got advice that medicinal cannabis was available but she decided against that route. In my judgment, she chose to prioritise cannabis use over an approach to conventional medicine notwithstanding her history of drug use and her mental health and the existence of the current proceedings. The allocated social worker notes that “it appears, from her statement, that her first response was to seek medicinal cannabis via Curaleaf, rather than seeing her GP for a more traditional medication, despite knowing the potential impact on her mental health” [C541/ 19]. I remain unclear why she thought this appropriate in the circumstances described.

The mother has engaged with drug services as described by CGL with discharge on or before 24 December 2024 [F105].

There is no significant or settled period of the mother being drug free.

The father was convicted for possession of a class A controlled drug in April 2011 [H16].

He was convicted of an offence of drug driving committed on 11 December 2021 [H19].

It is obvious that drugs have played a significant part in his adult life. They form part of a troubled history involving domestic abuse.

The order of 7 March 2024 [B159] records that “[t]he father’s position in respect of substance misuse is that he used cocaine, ketamine, and MDMA (speed) in October 2023 and has not consumed any drugs since then.”

He appeared to accept the accuracy of that representation to the Court initially in his oral evidence but then retreated from that position suggesting it was wrong. He appeared confused and struggled to orientate himself around the issue. I observe that much of his self-report is unduly vague and I am not confident that is not linked to a desire to minimise the issue of his drug use. His case is that the last time he used cocaine was in November or December 2023.

The father declared cocaine use every 4 weeks until 25 November 2023 (DNA Legal, dated 9 April 2024 [E150]). This testing involved the use of a fingernail. The results were reported to “demonstratethe active use of cocaine during the representative time period. The detected concentrations are indicative of the repeated use of cocaine; the results are higher than what would typically be associated with infrequent use of cocaine, as declared by the donor” [E149/ 1.1].

This is evidence of inconsistent reporting by the father.

The father declared last using cocaine “on a couple of occasions in the last six months (snorted)” (Atkinson Lewis, dated 15 August 2024 [E251 and E253/ 3.3]). Leg hair was collected.

His declaration implied that he had snorted cocaine on 2 occasions between February 2024 and mid-August 2024. That is not consistent with what he had said previously nor with his oral evidence.

The leg hair analysed “represents hair growth and possible cocaine misuse over the period 9 May 2024 and 29 July 2024 approximately.”

The order of 16 October 2024 [B372] directed at paragraph 22 that: -

“The father must not cut or dye his hair prior to the sample collection. The court may draw a negative inference from failure to comply with any drug / alcohol testing requirement.

The father did not provide a sample of scalp hair so body hair and nail clippings were used (FTS, dated 10 January 2025 [E286]).

The father declared use of cocaine on 2 occasions from 11 December 2023 to 11 December 2024. Thus, the window of use from his declaration had been extended from August 2024 to December 2024. His declaration [E325] was as follows: -

“Drug History: Cocaine

Date Last Used: 11/12/2024 +/- 1 year. In the last 12 months (around 11/12/2023 - 11/12/2024) I took Cocaine 2 times over this period. I don't know what I took.”

It is possible that he was being vague, deliberately or not, given the period being tested. However, one might reasonably assume he would endeavour to be careful when dealing with such an important issue in the case.

The testing suggested evidence of: -

The father’s case at the final hearing did not make any sense to me. He denied using the drugs nor being in the company of friends such that he would have been contaminated to the extent suggested by the testing. He said he did not spend time with friends who used drugs and mentioned one occasion with a couple of women. I find that the testing undermines his assertion and he has clearly used and/or been exposed to such drug use on a regular basis contrary to his oral evidence.

The FTS addendum report (PEth testing) dated 20 January 2025 [E327] was regarded as inconsistent with the father’s declaration. His pattern is likely to have been borderline excessive throughout the testing period or excessive from mid to late November with a 2-week period of abstinence immediately prior to sample collection.

The father did not declare any use of illegal drugs within a 12 month period (FTS, dated 24 February 2025 [E355].

Again, a sample of body hair and nail clippings were used because the father did not provide any scalp hair.

Again, the order on 13 January 2025 directed the father not to cut or dye his hair prior to sample collection [paragraph 13 on B388].

Cocaine testing results are likely to represent regular passive exposure to cocaine from late November 2024 to early February 2025. Alternatively, the use of cocaine would likely have been on at least a few occasions during the period from late November 2024 to early 2025 as a possible though less likely explanation for the results. There is some evidence of exposure to cocaine and alcohol although it is possible that regular close and intimate contact with others actively using cocaine and consuming alcohol could explain the testing. Some of the cocaine to which the father has been exposed passively has been in the form of ‘crack’ cocaine.

Cannabis testing results are consistent with either frequent passive exposure to cannabis from December 2024 to early February 2025 or cannabis use averaged at around several days a month from December 2024 to early February 2025.

Again, I do not accept the Father’s account about his drug use or exposure to drugs as full and frank. I find that he has a much closer relationship with drugs than he has sought fit to accept.

As at September 2024, the father indicated an intention to complete work with CGL [C254]. The final report from My CWA, dated 17 February 2025 records that since starting the program - he was referred on 19 June 2024 - the father has reported being abstinent from all substances [E361].

I note that when he eventually referred himself to CGL, it is recorded in the updated CPR, dated 10 June 2025 that he “told them he only self-referred due to feeling pressured to by the local authority” [K54s].

I heard evidence from the allocated social worker, the mother, the father and the Children’s Guardian.

The allocated social worker has prepared parenting assessments on both parents and final evidence. Her final analysis is contained in her addendum final statement, dated 9 June 2025 [C451]. This represents her overall analysis drawn from a significant period of time acting as the social worker for Child A.

The allocated social worker notes that there have continued to be issues caused by both parents. At C454 she states that: -

“Shortly after my previous final evidence, we had to move the location of contact due to concerns about increased risks from the parents to professionals and potentially Child A. The mother had made comments about knowing how to find staff and where they park, asking about what happens if our note pads go missing, and saying she is able to code – raising concerns about workers’ laptops. The mother also made a comment about being able to take Child A as his name was not correct on the court orders as his registered surname is different; this has since been rectified. The father had also made comments about having “other things up our sleeves” and saying he “could have done anything to that yoghurt” when staff had left him in the contact room to collect Child A, leaving their breakfast on the table.”

The allocated social worker identifies the protective and risk factors for each parent building on her parenting assessments at C457: -

“Protective Factors [C457]

Child A has had positive contact with both parents. The father has demonstrated he can offer warm, nurturing, and developmentally supportive contact. The mother has shown affection and prepares well for sessions. She is generally responsive and engaged.

Both parents have good routines. The father is in stable employment and maintains a structured routine with going to the gym and attending contact with Child A; he has identified to other professionals that these are key for him abstaining from substances and unhealthy relationships.

The mother engages in volunteering and fundraising and has begun counselling. She was in employment, but I understand this is no longer the case.

The father has engaged with services such as probation (BBR) and My CWA however, concerns remain about his honesty.

The mother has re-engaged with My CWA and Motherwell and has 100% attendance and has shown some insight into past behaviours.

The father’s parents are emotionally supportive and are willing to have Child A live with them if he is placed in their son’s care. The mother has some emotional support from friends who have been able to identify some of her mental health triggers and how to support her.

“Risk Factors [C457]

The father refused to attend his parenting assessment sessions and attempted to control the terms of how these would take place. The mother attended sessions, but was resistant to challenge and has made allegations against professionals.

The father has had multiple positive drug tests but provided inconsistent accounts of drug use – telling me last summer that he was using cocaine socially and telling other professionals he hadn’t been using or hadn’t been using for months.

The mother has positive drugs tests and offers conflicting accounts. She has tried to misrepresent drug testing and medical advice – claiming that positive results are incorrect and advising that doctors have told her using cannabis is acceptable.

The father has multiple convictions for violence against women; including battery and false imprisonment. I maintain that the father has minimised his history and believes

the custodial and community sentences and restraining orders support this. It is a worry that the father has not engaged meaningfully with domestic abuse courses and there is evidence he has lied to course providers previously and concealed his relationship with the mother and her pregnancy with Child A.

The mother has a long history of abusive relationships – as both the victim and perpetrator. Like the father, she has engaged with various domestic abuse courses and has gone on to have abusive relationships. There is a risk of the future relationships of both parents being abusive as the learning they may have gained from recent work with My CWA has not been tested.

The mother has a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and persistent delusional disorder. She has had psychological and psychiatric assessments as part of proceedings and a possible diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder has been suggested; this is also suggested in the mother’s medical records around the time of previous admissions to hospital under the Mental Health Act. The mother continues to dispute her diagnoses – as recently as last week she told me her Specialist Mental Health Nurse, MHN, was removing persistent delusional disorder from her file. MHN has advised this is not the case and the mother will remain diagnosed with this and bipolar disorder. Whilst the mother claims to have insight into her mental health and says she knows when it is getting worse, her disputes over her diagnosis would suggest otherwise.

According to his parents, the father has misrepresented facts to them. The father has used legal threats to challenge boundaries put in place by professionals in order to manipulate the delivery of his parenting assessment.

The mother continues to share misinformation with professionals and continues to make unfounded allegations and complaints about professionals – to the extent that the local authority have had to issue her a warning due to the level of complaints she is making.

Both parents have a limited support network. The father’s parents minimise risks and are unable to provide the supervision the local authority would require. The mother has limited support in the local area and has spoken about travelling back to [Redacted] to access support. There are concerns about the ability of her support network to safeguard Child A due to the misinformation she shares due to her own views and assessment of risk and her own emotional instability that appears to be increasing recently.

The relationship between the parents has been volatile and full of conflict with both parents failing to follow advice to avoid direct contact. Whilst the mother is reporting their relationship is amicable, this has not been explored nor verified with the father. It is a concern that the parents appear to go through cycles of being amicable before becoming volatile again; it is a concern that their relationship may again destabilise and become toxic again, causing emotional harm to Child A.

Both parents present with serious safeguarding concerns that outweigh their protective factors. While each shows some capacity for warmth and engagement with Child A, their substance misuse, poor insight into risk, volatile interpersonal dynamics, inconsistent engagement with professionals, pose significant risks to Child A’s emotional and physical well-being.”

The mother has an extensive history of relationships (including with family members) featuring domestic abuse both as victim and perpetrator. This is summarised in Police Initial Child Protection Conference Report in November 2023 [C382]. The parents’ relationship has been volatile and both have made allegations of domestic abuse against the other.

The delay in the mother reporting an alleged assault of her by the father in September 2023 was explored by Dr Shannon (E99/ 12.26 – 12.31). They continued to have contact and were suggesting in early 2024 that they would live together as co-parents for Child A but not otherwise in a relationship (C65/ 1.7).

It can fairly be described as a toxic relationship although they both state that in recent months things have calmed. If Child A were placed in the care of the mother or the father, I am not confident that discord would not arise between them nor that they would be open and honest with the Local Authority. My overall impression of them is that they have a number of positive features but they are fragile as parents and the fundamental weakness in their parenting will inevitably arise in the future at a cost to Child A. I am simply not convinced that he would be safe in the care of either or them and suspect he would suffer a difficult and fractured childhood. I would need to see both of them demonstrate insight and acceptance of the issues and that they had addressed them and demonstrated the ability to implement those strategies with appropriate support.

The allocated social worker identifies emotional, physical and developmental risks to Child A if he was placed in the care of his parents [C459]. I would note the following by way of summary: -

“Exposure to emotional dysregulation or adult issues can overwhelm Child A, making it hard for him to learn how to manage his own emotions or understand social cues. As he gets older, Child A may become easily frustrated, hit other children, or isolate himself during play because he hasn’t learned how to express feelings or resolve conflict. He may struggle with peer relationships, have difficulty working in groups, or be labelled as disruptive or withdrawn. Without intervention, this could lead to social exclusion, bullying, or difficulty forming healthy friendships and relationships.

“If Child A is placed in the care of either of his parents, there is the risk of him being exposed to inconsistent boundaries or exposure to aggression which may cause Child A to mimic inappropriate behaviours. If he sees shouting or aggression at home, he may act out similarly in nursery or early school settings, leading to disciplinary concerns. As he gets older, he may develop oppositional or defiant behaviours, especially if he hasn’t learned appropriate ways to cope with stress or frustration. This could escalate into truancy, risk-taking, or involvement with youth justice services in adolescence If Child A is exposed to conflicting narratives or emotional instability, he may feel confused about his place in the world. He might not understand why his caregivers behave differently or why professionals are involved in his life. He may struggle with identity formation, especially if he internalises negative messages or experiences shame about his family situation. This can lead to mental health challenges, such as depression, anxiety, or identity confusion during adolescence.

“Due to Child A being born prematurely, he is at risk of having developmental needs as he gets older. Whilst he is doing really well with his physical development, his cognitive needs will not become apparent until he’s a little older and may not be fully identifiable for a number of years. Whilst it is hoped that Child A won’t experience any additional cognitive needs, these cannot be ruled out. Child A needs to have carers who are able to work effectively and in partnership with professionals, accepting advice and guidance, to ensure that Child A gets all of the appropriate assessments and support he needs. Given his parents’ engagement with the most recent parenting assessments, they have not been able to demonstrate they are able to prioritise Child A’s needs over their own and I would be very concerned that this could be the same as he gets older and if more needs are identified.”

Equally, she goes on to identify the protective factors: -

“Protective Factors

When father and mother show affection and warmth during contact, Child A experiences moments of emotional connection and security. Child A may smile, seek cuddles, or engage in play, showing signs of attachment and trust during these interactions. These positive interactions can help Child A develop emotional resilience, even in the face of adversity and he may carry forward a sense of being loved, which supports self-esteem and emotional regulation.

The father’s regular employment and structured routine can provide predictability, which is crucial for young children. If Child A knows when meals, naps, and playtime happen, he feels more secure and less anxious. Exposure to structure and work ethic may help Child A develop time management skills, discipline, and a sense of responsibility. It may also model the importance of stability and routine in daily life.

If the father’s parents are emotionally supportive, they may provide additional caregiving, emotional comfort, or practical help. Child A might spend time in a calmer, more nurturing environment with his grandparents, which can buffer the effects of instability elsewhere. A strong bond with extended family can offer emotional grounding, mentorship, and a safe space to turn to during difficult times. This can reduce the long-term impact of parental instability.

The mother’s involvement with domestic abuse services and counselling shows willingness to change and grow. If she learns to manage emotional triggers, Child A may experience fewer emotional outbursts and more consistent care. Continued engagement with support services can lead to improved parenting capacity, helping Child A experience a more stable and nurturing environment. It also models help-seeking behaviour, which Child A may adopt in his own life. Volunteering and fundraising gives the mother a sense of purpose and structure, which can improve her mental health and parenting. If she feels valued and connected to her community, she may be more emotionally available to Child A. Child A may benefit from seeing his mother involved in positive social roles, which can influence his own sense of belonging and civic responsibility.

Some recognition of the mother’s mental health needs suggests potential for growth and change. If the mother begins to regulate her emotions better, Child A may experience fewer overwhelming situations. A caregiver who is actively managing their mental health can provide a more stable emotional environment, reducing long-term developmental risks. Unfortunately, given the evidence before the court, the local authority is not convinced the mother is able to make and maintain the changes needed within Child A’s timeframes.”

I have sought to quote extensively from the evidence to demonstrate that in my judgment, overall, the assessment of the allocated social worker is balanced and analytical. I agree with the allocated social worker’s conclusion: -

“The analysis highlights significant concerns regarding Child A’s emotional, physical, and developmental well-being should he be placed in the care of his parents without sustained and effective intervention. The risks associated with exposure to substance misuse, mental health instability, domestic abuse, and inconsistent caregiving are substantial and could have long-term consequences on Child A’s ability to form secure attachments, regulate emotions, achieve developmental milestones, and maintain physical health While there are some protective factors—such as moments of warmth during contact, extended family support, and parental engagement with services—these are currently insufficient to outweigh the risks. The evidence suggests that Child A requires a stable, emotionally attuned, and consistently safe environment to thrive. Without this, he is at heightened risk of emotional trauma, developmental delays, and social and academic difficulties.

“Given Child A’s vulnerability, particularly due to his premature birth and potential for emerging cognitive needs, it is imperative that his caregivers demonstrate the capacity to prioritise his needs consistently and work collaboratively with professionals. At present, the concerns raised indicate that this level of care may not be reliably provided by either parent within the necessary timeframe for Child A’s healthy development.”

The issue of the parents’ respective capacity to care for Child A is addressed at C465.

The allocated social worker was positive regarding the quality of the father's contact with Child A, which she described as warm, nurturing and developmentally supportive. She said that he is attentive and responsive to Child A’s cues and his emotional investment in his son is evident through his consistent presence and affectionate reactions.

She noted that the father had completed the Building Better Relationships course and engaged with My CWA but in her evidence stood firm in rejecting that he had shown victim empathy or insight in terms of his past behaviour.

Within her latter parenting assessment in May 2025 she noted that the father refused to engage in parenting assessment sessions having rejected the presence of another professional with the allocated social worker. She notes his documented history of domestic abuse including convictions for false imprisonment and battery and his pattern of minimising or denying responsibility for his actions. She observes that the number of positive drug tests is a major concern and his explanations have been inconsistent. She notes that the father concealed his relationship with the mother and her pregnancy during the BBR course.

Having had the opportunity within the addendum assessment to speak to his parents as a supportive factor she observes that whilst they are emotionally supportive they lack the practical ability and capacity to provide the level of supervision which would be required to keep Child A safe. That is underpinned by her assessment that they have limited insight into the risks that he poses tending to minimise his behaviour and to rely on his narrative. Thus, there are a number of positives about the father from the emotional warmth and bond with Child A to what the father notes as his structured life involving employment and regular visits to the gym. However, the conclusion reached by the allocated social worker is clear: -

“Overall, while the father shows emotional warmth and a strong bond with Child A, his parenting capacity is significantly compromised by ongoing risks, lack of transparency, poor professional engagement, and an inadequate support network. He is not currently able to meet Child A’s emotional, physical, or developmental needs in a safe or consistent manner.”

The father’s convictions for false imprisonment in [Redacted] and battery in [Redacted] [PNC at H199 – 200] are evidence of the underlying facts. The father received a prison sentence of 18 months for the false imprisonment. There is no copy of the written basis of plea nor of the Judge’s sentencing remarks. The father said the sentencing judge described his offending as akin to kidnap.

The father pleaded guilty to battery of the mother of his older child by hitting her about the head with a toy train but within his evidence suggested that it never happened [C252/ 32]. He said he had admitted it as part of a plea bargain. His case was that he had pushed her, “not hard or with any impact” with a finger.

The accounts of the victims in each case [H523 and H182 – 183] are significantly at odds with the father’s case to this court. His case was that the false imprisonment amounted to no more than verbally telling the victim not to leave the house for fear of causing a disturbance to his parents [C47]. I find his conviction for the common law offence of false imprisonment resulting in a sentence of 18 months difficult to reconcile with his account of what happened. I am satisfied that the conviction for battery is evidence of the facts underlying the offence and given his guilty plea I am satisfied that he acted in the way he accepted he did in accordance with his guilty plea.

In his oral evidence, he was asked about the impact of his behaviour on his victims. He said that the impact on his victims “had not been nice” for them. They might have been “scared and fearful of me”. Overall, I was struck by his inability to articulate any reasonable account of the impact of his behaviour and query whether he has gained any insight despite undertaking work in this area. The fact that both social care experts (allocated social worker and guardian) were clearly of the same opinion that he lacks victim empathy and insight suggests that my assessment of his oral evidence was supported by the social care analysis they had undertaken within proceedings.

The mother is affectionate and effusive in contact. However, she has struggled to take advice within the contact sessions over (a) not continually kissing Child A on the face due to the risk of moving his oxygen tubes [C158/ 6.3]; (b) not wearing wake up given it was thought to be causing an adverse reaction in his skin [C158/ 6.3].

As I noted earlier, the mother has a complex psychological and psychiatric history and continues to dispute or minimise diagnoses often providing conflicting narratives that make it difficult for professionals to assess risk accurately. That is set against a long backdrop of positive tests for cannabis including attempts to provide medical justification for use of cannabis during her pregnancy. She has struggled to manage professional relationships demonstrating a lack of trust in services particularly where they are obliged to scrutinise and

The allocated social worker then analyses the respective pros and cons of each option within her s 31A analysis [C468].

There are no friends nor family able to care for Child A who at the time of her statement had been fully assessed as capable to do so. So far as that is concerned the allocated social worker says this:-

“The mother’s support network is both limited and fragile, with no evidence of a stable, consistent adult capable of providing protective oversight or parenting Child A. None of her friends or family members have been fully assessed and D’s viability assessment identifies a number of vulnerabilities that suggest she would not be a long-term option for Child A.

“The mother’s unresolved mental health and substance misuse issues further elevate the risk. Her history of psychiatric hospitalisations, ongoing denial of diagnoses, and inconsistent accounts of drug and alcohol use remain unaddressed. These risks cannot be mitigated by informal support unless those individuals are trained and capable of intervening in safeguarding situations – criteria that are not currently met. Additionally, the mother has demonstrated poor insight into risk, a pattern of externalising blame, and resistance to professional oversight, all of which would likely persist if Child A is in the care of friends or family.

“There is no evidence of any structured or supervised support plan involving friends or family and the support identified as part of the Family Group Conference would not be sufficient. Without formal arrangements, including safeguarding training, clear roles, and professional monitoring, the risks to Child A remain significant. Moreover, there is concern that emotionally aligned individuals may enable the mother’s behaviours or fail to report concerns, thereby exposing Child A to further harm.”

There was no specific criticism of or cross-examination about her identification of the pros and cons of the placement options, namely return to a parent (assuming the protection of a Care Order to test the hypothesis without assessing whether it would be appropriate to make a Care Order), long term foster care or a plan of adoption. I set them out in full.

At C476, the allocated social worker says this about the preferred plan of the Local Authority:-

“This recommendation is grounded in a detailed evaluation of the parents’ capacity, Child A’s developmental needs, and the long-term safeguarding of his welfare. Adoption is the most proportionate and child-focused option for Child A. It balances his need for safety, stability, and long-term emotional security against the limitations of other options. While long-term foster care offers some benefits, it lacks the permanence and identity security that adoption provides. Parental care – either with or without a care order – poses unacceptable risks to Child A’s wellbeing and development.”

The allocated social worker addresses a contact reduction plan resulting in monthly direct contact for the parents until matching and a final direct contact thereafter with the introduction of bi-annual letterbox contact.

So far as contact with his older half-siblings is concerned, the allocated social worker says this [C477]: -

“After speaking again with the social worker for the mother’s older children, the local authority maintains that direct contact post-adoption would not be in the best interest of any of the children. The local authority would support indirect contact should the older boys wish to do this. Sadly, due to the risks posed by the mother in relation to stalking and harassment, it is not felt that direct contact would be an option for the boys once a prospective adoptive family is found. The mother continues to have direct contact with her older sons, fully supervised by [Redacted] local authority due to concerns she has been recording the children and having inappropriate conversations with them. We are concerned the mother may try to go through her older children to find out information about Child A and possibly destabilise his adoption, if granted. Having said that, the local authority is fully aware of the importance of sibling contact and would recommend this be reconsidered at a later date and direct contact between the siblings be established if it is considered safe. The same would be recommended for Child A’s paternal half-siblings.”

The IRO supports the plans of the Local Authority.

I shall also comment briefly on elements of the parenting assessments although I do not propose to deal with each of them sequentially. That would simply lead to excessive repetition of the issues already identified by the allocated social worker.

At paragraph 10.1 [C361] the allocated social worker opines that: -

“Given the information detailed in my assessment, I believe the mother is unlikely to make the necessary changes within Child A’s developmental timeframe. While there are some early signs of positive engagement—such as her involvement with My CWA, counselling, and affectionate contact with Child A – these are undermined by ongoing concerns including mental health instability, substance misuse, conflicting narratives, and poor insight into risk. The mother has a history of superficial engagement with services and has previously relapsed into harmful patterns despite similar presentations of progress. The assessment highlights that her changes are not yet sustained, not tested in real-life scenarios, and not supported by consistent, verifiable evidence. Therefore, the prognosis for meaningful and lasting change within the timeframe needed to ensure Child A’s safety, stability, and emotional development is considered poor.”

The father did not engage with any sessions during the assessment period as set out in the chronology provided by the social worker [C403-C407]. The allocated social worker explains her thought process in paragraphs 2.10 – 2.11 [C406]: -

“2.10.

The initial decision to meet the father 1:1, despite known risks and previous agreements, was made under emotional pressure following a difficult hearing. While the decision was later acknowledged and corrected, I feel it underscores the emotional toll and ethical complexity of safeguarding work. I feel the proactive steps taken to mitigate risk (e.g., securing safer venues, consulting management) demonstrate my professional accountability and reflective practice. The fathers communication has often been confrontational, inconsistent, and controlling, including, in this instance, attempts to dictate the terms of assessment (e.g., refusing presence of other workers), misrepresenting agreements (e.g., session times), and using legal threats to challenge professional boundaries. I feel these behaviours are consistent with patterns of coercive control and raise concerns about his ability to engage constructively with professionals

2.11.

The decision to reinstate the requirement for another professional to be present was based on the father’s past behaviour, his confrontational tone in messages, and the known risks outlined in previous assessments I felt this was a necessary and proportionate safeguarding measure, and the refusal to engage under these conditions further demonstrates resistance to accountability. Despite the challenges, I made numerous reasonable adjustments to support the father’s participation by offering flexible scheduling, agreeing to Teams meetings, and requiring we record sessions for transparency. I feel these efforts show a clear commitment to fairness and procedural integrity, countering the father’s claims of discrimination or bias.”

Nonetheless, she has sought to examine carefully the work he has done to address the issues of domestic abuse with My CWA and his probation officer, BS. At paragraph 3.9 [C410] she records this discussion: -

“…I asked BS if her view of the father’s engagement and the perceived change in his insight/awareness had altered given that she later found out that he had not engaged honestly – having not told her he was in a relationship and expecting a baby? BS advised, “Had he of shared that he was in a relationship he/we could have used ‘real life’ examples situations to apply skills/concepts too. He reflected on previous relationship and incidents but something current which was kept hidden was disappointing.” BS assed (sic.) they “We had no clue about the new relationship or that there was a baby on the way. I completed his post programme review meeting and I asked him why he didn’t share this to us. He said that she [the mother] asked him not to due to her having CSC involved already and due to his conviction it would lead them to be back involved.” She advised she found out about the relationship and pregnancy from another professional and not the father.”

I add that the mother accepted her part in this dishonesty, which given the training she had undergone, reveals an alarming lack of ability to implement that into her actions.

The mother is also concerned by the Police disclosure and the “significant discrepancies” between the accounts of the victims and that of the father [C414/ 5.2 – 5.3]. What is revealed are “serious violent offences, including allegations of strangulation and a violent sexual offence, with discrepancies between the father’s account and victim statements. These

I have considered the report from My CWA, dated 2 January 2025 [F95], which is generally positive, in that it suggests the father had shown “during sessions he is responsible for previously showing harmful behaviours, but has demonstrated a willingness to learn from his past mistakes and has actively taken steps to improve himself. Since starting the programme, the father has reported being abstinent from all substances and have worked on improving his daily routine by going to the gym regularly.” They could not comment on the risk he poses to his children.

There is a second report [F121] undated but after 12 February 2025. The father completed the sessions as planned on 27 January 2025.

Ms [Redacted] produced a Building Better Relationships post-programme report, dated 5 September 2023 [F69]. She noted the following [F77]: -

“Information has come to light since the report has been written that the father has been in a relationship with someone for around 18 months, this has not been disclosed by the father to his probation practitioner or the facilitators delivering BBR. This is disappointing as the father could have utilised BBR more so with current relationship insights and awareness. This leaves facilitators questioning his genuineness and possible reluctance to make personal contributions in sessions if he was to keep up the deceit…”

The allocated social worker notes the positive report of My CWA but qualifies that by raising concern about the reliability of the assessment given its reliance upon the father’s self-reporting. In her opinion, “[h]e has not demonstrated accountability or insight into his abusive behaviour, as highlighted during the BBR course, where he concealed a relationship and pregnancy with the mother” [C414/ 5.4].

At paragraph 3.10 [C410], the allocated social worker states that: -

“The father’s failure to engage with parenting assessments and his inconsistent honesty (e.g., concealing a relationship and pregnancy) raise serious concerns about his willingness and ability to work openly with professionals. This undermines the reliability of any self-reported progress and limits professionals’ ability to assess risk accurately. While the father acknowledged some responsibility for past conflict, he often deflected blame and showed limited insight into the emotional and physical harm caused by his behaviour. Without genuine insight and accountability, the risk of repeating abusive patterns remains high, especially in future relationships or co-parenting dynamics. Despite the father’s claims of abstinence, positive drug tests contradict his statements. Substance misuse can impair judgment and parenting capacity, and dishonesty about use further erodes trust and raises concerns about risk to child safety…”

The allocated social worker notes at paragraph 4.2 [C411-412] and 4.7 [C413], the inconsistent reports given by the father about his engagement with CGL as against the summary provided by CGL on 24 April 2025. He was given a brief intervention and discharged.

She regards the father’s late offer to complete sessions as “reactive” and possibly “an attempt to shift blame for non-completion. While the offer is noted, the timing and context suggest it is not a genuine effort to engage but rather a strategic move in response to the impending court deadline” [C407/ 2.12].

The key purpose of the updated assessment was to examine the extent to which the paternal grandparents could provide support or mitigate the parenting deficits of the father. This is covered in section 6 [C416 – C424].

They are intelligent and capable people but consistently appeared to minimise the issues of their son. The body of the assessment (for example, paragraph 6.16 [C420]) appears to support the social worker’s conclusion that “their insight is significantly impaired by minimisation, selective memory, and emotional loyalty. This limits their ability to recognise patterns of harm or risk” [6.21/ 422]).

The reality is that any such support as they could provide in light of their existing commitments is eclipsed by what would be needed according to the allocated social worker [423/ 6.28]:-

“The position of the Local Authority is that full supervision is required if Child A is to be placed in the father’s care. The paternal grandparents have explicitly said they are not able to offer more supervision than what is already outlined in the Family Group Conference (FGC) plan. Their work commitments and evening responsibilities further limit their availability. Whilst they are emotionally supportive of the father and have safeguarding knowledge from professional backgrounds, their capacity is limited by work and personal commitments, their insight is compromised by emotional loyalty and minimisation, and their protective stance is inconsistent and not aligned with professional safeguarding standards. It is my assessment that the level of support that can be offered by the father’s parents at this time would not be enough to safeguard Child A from the risks posed by his father.”

The father produced what may be – and is according to allocated social worker – an extract of text messages between them regarding the sessions [C511 – C515]. It appears to me that the allocated social worker proposed on 20 March 2025 that the first session take place on 14 April 2025 at 15.00 and the father neither agreed nor disagreed but confirmed the date. Contact with Child A did not go ahead that day. The father appears to have assumed that the session would take place after contact rather than at 15.00. He did not offer any specific reason for his unwillingness to attend at 15.00 (it appears from his oral evidence that he wanted to be home for his older son).

On 29 April 2025, the allocated social worker spoke to her managers and confirmed to the father that a duty social worker would attend the session planned that day. It had been the norm within her previous parenting assessment of the father that she did not lone work and another professional would be present, such as a family time worker. The father sought to take legal advice about this but in doing so he deprived himself of the opportunity to attend a session when he would have known that there was a finite time within which the update, principally focused on the support available to him from his parents, would require to be written up and filed with the Court.

The allocated social worker endeavoured [C404/ 2.7] to agree arrangements for a session the next day with the father. The father did not agree to meet her in person with another professional present. The allocated social worker agreed with his suggestion of a Teams meeting, which would permit her to arrange 2 sessions but she said that it would need to be recorded to avoid any issues regarding misleading information being provided. The father sought reassurance about the disclosure of the recording but ultimately indicated he did not want to proceed at that stage if the session was recorded and intended to seek legal advice.

On 8 May 2025, after the allocated social worker observed a contact session and spoke to the father, the father sent the allocated social worker a text message suggesting that he would be willing to do the Teams sessions (on the basis they would be recorded) “asap I’m free Monday and Tuesday if you have time” [C406/ 2.9]. The issue of recording the sessions had seemingly evaporated but by then the allocated social worker replied that she would not be able to do so given her filing date of 12 May 2025.

The allocated social worker saw the paternal grandparents, which was the key reason for the updated assessment. She did not complete the planned sessions but I accept her evidence that she had a sufficient evidence base to inform her assessment of the father and the adequacy of the support able to be offered by the paternal grandparents if Child A was placed in his care.

I am incredulous that the father threw away a final opportunity to speak to the allocated social worker simply because she wished to return to an arrangement for another professional to be present during assessment sessions or that she wanted to record the Teams sessions, which would have been a form of protection for her and the father (given he has previously complained about the allocated social worker’s manner during assessment sessions) as to what was said and the manner in which it was said.

In my judgment, the father sought to control the process, although it was not helped by a rather last-minute reversion of approach by the allocated social worker away from the agreed arrangement of one-to-one sessions. The father was entitled to seek legal advice but he must also take responsibility for the time he waited to agree to the Teams sessions being recorded and the effect of losing that opportunity. In my judgment, I would have expected a reasonable parent in these circumstances to understand why the sessions would either need to be conducted with another professional present or be recorded and to realise that there was an impending deadline to the completion of work, which was important for their case. The father did not conduct himself reasonably in my judgment. I am satisfied that overall the allocated social worker tried hard to find a solution.

I note that the purpose of this statement was to review the father’s progress around issues of domestic abuse following the receipt of the report of his progress prepared by My CWA. I would highlight paragraphs 12 to 15 [C310]: -

“13.

I was honest with the father in telling him that it is really positive that he is feeling more focused, that he is working, and that he is going to the gym. All of which will be good for his health and well-being.

“14.

I shared with the father that, whilst his CWA report is positive, it is a concern that it has taken so long for him to engage with the service. The father placed the blame for this on having multiple changes in social worker, however, I am only the third social worker in 17 months. I reminded the father that he could self-refer into services. He shared that he went to CGL but they wouldn’t accept him, saying they “can’t help if I don’t feel I have an addiction” and that his use was “only recreational”. The father also said he tried to engage with CGL when Child A was in [Redacted] but that he was unable to as the course he was supposed to go on had changed names.

“15.

I also shared with the father that, whilst it is positive that he has engaged with the course with CWA, I am concerned about his level of honesty when engaging with the course. I explained my reasoning for this being his lack of honesty when undertaking the BBR course and how it was found, towards the end, that he had concealed his relationship with the mother and that she was pregnant with Child A. The father’s response was to remind me that he had lied because the mother had told him to as she was worried about how it would look to [Redacted] Children’s Social Care and impact on her older boys. The father went on to say that he was told by CWA that he has been “thinking about everyone else and I need to think about myself”. I added that, whilst he does need to prioritise himself, he also needs to prioritise his children.”

I note that in this updating assessment of an earlier assessment of the previous social worker, the father met the social worker on 2 occasions for a total period of 4.5 hours [C187/ 2.1].

At paragraph 4.37 she states that: -

“Whilst the father was able to identify ways that abuse can impact on children, his understanding seemed to be superficial and he didn’t give examples of how Child A would have been, and will continue to be, affected by either his or the mother’s behaviour. When asked about his own behaviours that are a risk to Child A, the father became defensive and redirected the conversation to the mother and the concerns about her. Whilst the father has completed a number of courses, and will have gained a lot of knowledge, he doesn’t appear able to apply this to his own and Child A’s experiences.”

At paragraph 10.1 – 10.2, the allocated social worker states the following by way of summary:-

“10.1.

Unfortunately, I have not been able to evidence any change in the father since the previous social worker’s assessment in relation to his ability to care for Child A. The information I have had available to me has only evidenced the presence of significant concerns for Child A’s safety and wellbeing if he were to be placed in the care of his father at this time. Additional referrals have been made by me as part of this extended assessment period and the father has been advised to refer himself on to services also. To date, [he has] engaged minimally and has more recently disengaged completely.

10.2.

Whilst the father’s family time is, overall, very positive, there remain concerns about his honesty, and I would have significant concerns if his contact with Child A were to move away from the current location as it could potentially put Child A and the workers at risk…”

The assessment concluded that the combination of (a) history of domestic abuse, (b) drug use, (c) relationships featuring domestic abuse (including with the mother) and (d) lack of development of insight and/or honesty remained a bar to the father being able to parent Child A safely (notwithstanding the positives, including quality of contact). He had not “been able to demonstrate he can make, and maintain, the required changes needed to be able to keep Child A safe from harm” [C212/ 11.1].

At times, the allocated social worker was tentative in her oral evidence but overall remained steadfast in her analysis that given the extensive period and background of issues for both parents, she could not be confident for Child A that either parent could care for him safely.

She agreed that a delay of 3 - 4 months (as put to her by Mr Walker) would make not make a plan of Adoption unrealistic but that it could take longer to find an adoptive home for Child A as the pool of adopters may reduce over time as he gets older. She was clear that Child A should not have to wait any longer for a decision to be made. More delay would result in deepening the existing bonds with his carers and a continuation of the status quo, depriving him of the opportunity to find and transition into a permanent family at the earliest opportunity and making the task of transferring his attachments more difficult.

The children's guardian has produced a persuasive analysis. I was struck by her comment at paragraph 17: -

“17.

It is positive that both the mother and the father have undertaken courses in respect of many of the issues identified as risks to Child A. However, it is not just attending such courses, but being able to fully engage, internalise and utilise skills learnt alongside gaining a thorough understanding and acceptance of their own behaviours and the impact upon themselves and others that is essential for Child A and his long-term care. This is then further evidenced through enhanced thinking skills and behavioural changes.”

In my judgment, that is the position in this case. The mother continues to dispute elements of her mental health diagnosis. The mother is adept at impression management and although she appears to have enjoyed a period of relative calm in recent months a number of reports are based on her self-reporting rather than any exploration of her underlying psychology. There is a cyclical quality to her behaviour, which the local authority have been in a position to observe. The guardian is troubled that the mother used cannabis through consumption of a cake containing cannabis. She is also concerned that there is some dubiety over the extent to which the mother was pursuing a cannabis-based remedy for back pain (Curaleaf). The simple point is that drug use is an element of the key risk factors for the mother's health and cannabis continues to be something which appears part of the lives of her and of her friends. It may be that she has sought to distance herself from them as she stated in oral evidence but it is too early to form a reliable assessment of that.

The guardian observes that there is much evidence of the mother working well with agencies such as My CWA but states that: -

“…it is concerning that in contrast she has not been able to form such positive relationships with the Local Authority or professionals who challenge or disagree with her. There has been a consistent pattern of the mother not acting upon the advice of those who supervise her family time in respect of meeting Chid A’s needs, such that the Local Authority has had to seek support from her solicitor to repeat the advice. This has included not wearing strong perfumes or make-up which seems to cause significant irritation to Child A’s sensitive skin and allowing him space to explore his environment, rather than persisting in holding him on her knee for extended cuddles. Given these proceedings have been so extensive it would be anticipated that such issues would not continue to be raised, and that the mother would have accepted and acted upon such advice. When challenged about such issues, there is a pattern of the mother suggesting that concerns about her care have only been raised after she has made a complaint about the person who then expresses concern about her behaviour. In this way she appears to try to deflect or divert attention from herself. Sadly, this does not give confidence, that were Child A to be placed in her care, the mother would be able to consistently work cooperatively with the Local Authority and all other Agencies to ensure that his holistic needs were met” (paragraph 20).

In my judgment, the answer to this conundrum lies within the psychological and psychiatric assessments of the mother. It is difficult for professionals to detect the extent to which the mother may at any point be suffering with elements of paranoia or delusion when her mental health dips. In order to assess that and to understand the extent to which her thinking and understanding has developed, they are obliged to ask challenging or searching questions. The questions pose a challenge to the mother’s sense of herself and she is apt to deflect and to place blame externally for the issue. This form of functioning would appear extraordinarily difficult to manage and produce a positive and effective working relationship or safety plan for Child A. The need to deal with issues of a practical nature such as those mentioned by the guardian or matters of hygiene merely underline the problems of working in partnership with the mother if Child A was placed in her care.

The guardian observes in paragraph 21 that the mother has provided inaccurate information about her older children, which raises further concerns about her ability to work openly and honestly in the future.

The guardian notes that the father has convictions for domestic abuse in two previous relationships and has served a custodial sentence. He currently has a lifetime restraining order against him preventing him from approaching one of those victims. Whilst it is positive that the father has completed work with his probation officer around intimate relationships and My CWA, this must be seen in the context of him having concealed his relationship and the pregnancy of the mother. Notwithstanding that significant element of dishonesty and despite completing that work, the father struggled previously to demonstrate insight into his own behaviours and the impact upon others to the allocated social worker and guardian. At paragraphs 23 - 24, the guardian states that: -

“23…During our discussion on 25 June 2025 the father was keen to explain that his offences were all committed some time ago and that he is no longer “that person” having completed the BBR course and the course with My CWA. Whilst the father is keen to talk about how he has changed and learnt better ways in which to manage relationships, it is notable that he continues to refer to his offences using terms which minimise them, such as suggesting that he “has said some things that weren’t good”. Similarly, whilst he talks about how he has learnt about empathy, his conversation does not reflect this.

24.

It is not possible therefore to be assured that the father has been able to fully accept, understand and internalise all his learning such that his former patterns of behaviour, across several relationships, would not be repeated in the future.”

The fact that the father did not make himself available for the updated parenting assessment (even if there had been “some difficulties in communication”) “is not a positive indicator that he would be able to maintain positive working relationships with professionals if Child A were placed in his care, particularly were any challenge of him required. It is also noted that the social worker felt that the father was trying to be controlling, which is a former pattern of behaviours previously evident in his personal relationships and which the work he has completed with My CWA and BBR had sought to address” (paragraph 25).

The guardian also analysed the support factor offered by the paternal grandparents following the update prepared by the allocated social worker. She noted that: -

“During a discussion with the paternal grandfather on 25 June 2025, he was able to show that he has some knowledge and insight into his son’s behaviours, but he also tended to minimise the father’s actions, using terms such as “only” and commenting that there were no visible injuries after one assault by the paternal grandather. It was apparent that the paternal grandfather has a strong sense of loyalty to his son and this in conjunction with his seeming naivety would likely impact on his ability to be a strong protective factor for Child A. It is unclear how far he would, therefore, be able to identify any further problematic behaviours or be willing to intervene” (paragraph 26).

They are out of the home until at least 18.30 every weekday. They have not sought any contact with Child A.

The guardian, prior to receipt of the assessment report of D, was already troubled by the impact of delay to Child A. When considering the impact of a delay of 12 weeks in completing a full assessment of D, she said this (paragraphs 33 - 34): -

“33…such a delay would have a detrimental impact on Child A who now needs a conclusion to his proceedings. Given the impact of that delay, alongside the considerable vulnerabilities identified, not least, D’s previous withdrawal and only very recent re-request to be assessed, her motivation to care for Child A which appears to be for his mother’s benefit, her own children’s additional needs which are as yet undiagnosed, understanding and ability to recognise and manage the mother’s mental health and complex/demanding behaviours, her own mental health needs and medication, the use of locked doors in her home, her lack of awareness of the detail of the concerns/issues other than the mother’s reporting and her lack of knowledge of Child A’s longer term care needs. It is also unclear how D would be able to manage her current role of providing significant, daily support to the mother as well as prioritising Child A’s needs.

“34.

Given that number of significant vulnerabilities it is not possible to have confidence that even with the positive aspects of her commitment, experience of childcare, good home and desire to maintain Child A’s links to his mother any assessment would have a sufficiently likely prospect of a positive outcome that Child A’s Proceedings should be further delayed.”

She addresses the impact of delay upon Child A from paragraphs 35 to 37. I would seek to highlight the following matters: -

The case was at 85 weeks when it began on 9 July 2025 and the pattern has continued pending this judgment being handed down. The potential problems or risks for Child A and the impact of delay on his placement plan being approved and then implemented are likely to increase as time passes. In my judgment, delay is a significant factor in this case.

The guardian opines (paragraph 44) that overall: -

“Child A needs to be with carers who are consistent, attentive and are able to prioritise his needs. Given his additional vulnerabilities, it is essential that he is with carers who are fully focussed on his needs and who can provide him with a better than good enough level of care. He needs unconditional love and nurturing care that will support him to reach his potential in life. Child A needs access to appropriate stimulation, education and health care alongside a safe home environment.”

It is her opinion that “it is not possible to recommend that Child A could be placed in the care of either of his parents now or in the foreseeable future. There are no further services that could be offered to make placement with either parent an appropriate option for Child A” (paragraph 45).

When comparing adoption with long term foster care she states that: -

“47.

A permanent placement for Child A could be achieved by way of adoption or long-term fostering. If Child A was fostered, he would remain, legally, a member of his birth family, his relationships with them could be maintained through regular contact and he would continue to receive services from the Local Authority as a child in their care. However, Child A would continue to be subject to the potential stigma and label of being a child in foster care, he would be subject to the regular scrutiny of the Local Authority and its processes, which, whilst necessary, can be intrusive and there is an increased risk of a placement breakdown.

“48.

If he were adopted, Child A would gain a heightened sense of legal and emotional security and permanence, he would be able to immerse himself within a new family where he would be able to form positive long-term attachments, he would be free from the regular intrusion of the Local Authority and its processes in his life whilst also being able to enjoy any particular support that he may require in the future, via the Adoption Support Fund. However, if adopted, Child A would cease to be, legally, a member of or have any direct contact with his birth family, possibly for the rest of his life, thus having a significant and lifelong impact on his emotional development and understanding of himself.

“49.

A careful balance needs to be sought between the options available for Child A in the long term. His long term legal and emotional security and stability must be a high priority. However, the impact of his previous experiences may also affect his ability to form appropriate attachments to any carer.

“50.

If he is adopted, Child A and his carers can be offered support in the long term to assist him in understanding why he was adopted and to support him to maintain some form of relationship with his parents, through life story materials and letter box contact, thus minimising the impact of the separation and supporting his identity formation as he matures. If he is placed in foster care Child A would also need support to understand the processes that led to such a decision.”

At paragraph 55, she concludes that: -

“Having carefully considered all the information filed in this matter and from my own enquires it is not possible to recommend that Child A returns to the care of either or both his parents. There are no services or support that could be put in place to enable him to be safely placed with them within an acceptable timescale. I therefore recommend that Child A is made the subject of a Care Order. A Placement Order should only be made where it is necessary to safeguard the child’s interests and where the welfare of the child requires this. It is my analysis that “nothing else will do” and no other option would meet Child A’s best interests. I therefore recommend that Child A is made the subject of a Care Order, his parents’ consent is dispensed with and he is also made the subject of a Placement Order to enable the plan for him to be adopted to be progressed.”

She suggests that direct contact with the parents and Child A’s older siblings should remain under consideration in the future. She emphasises the importance of effective life story work and leaving the door open for direct sibling (maternal and paternal) contact in the future. She states that it is important that Child A has information, including photographs of his siblings to inform his life story. She does not oppose the proposals of the Local Authority and does not regard it as appropriate to make a contact order should a Placement Order be made by the Court.

I shall highlight 3 areas of the guardian’s earlier final analysis, which relate to key areas of parenting deficit: -

The guardian gave careful evidence. She was not moved from her reasoned position. She regarded the assessments of the allocated social worker as sound. She was clear that it was not in Child A’s best interests to delay the decision any longer. She, of course, had changed her position to agree to an adjournment of the last final hearing because of the lack of assessment of the paternal grandparents as a source of support for the father. She has clearly not had a fixed view. She agreed with the analysis of the allocated social worker that even a delay of 4 months would impact Child A. She regarded the assessments of D as evidencing significant vulnerabilities in her offer of care to Child A (whether viewed through the prism of foster care or special guardianship).

Ms Schofield submits that the Court should note that Child A is nearly 21 months’ old. Further significant delay must be seen in the context of a child born prematurely, requiring extensive treatment and use of oxygen; with a parent who has a long history of mental health issues. These factors mean that in several months’ time, the search for an adoptive placement will be more difficult. He will have to sever even deeper current attachments to his carers. He will have a greater understanding of his relationship with his birth parents. He will be older. He has waited long enough for a decision.

Notwithstanding her oral evidence, Mr. Walker submits that the central issues of threshold are accepted. The facts relied upon in support of threshold were agreed and I do not regard the mother’s purported explanation for her dispute with aspects of them given in her oral evidence as justified or evidenced in the least. It is simply another aspect of the difficulty in finding any form of common ground when in the case of the mother it appears to shift on a regular basis.

Furthermore, Mr. Walker concedes that delay is detrimental to Child A specifically. The time that Child A awaits a decision is time in which Child A will not be in a position to adjust to whatever final arrangements are made for him. Furthermore, he accepts that if a Placement Order is made there may be a further period of delay whilst an adoptive placement is identified.

The mother seeks to attack the assessment of her by the allocated social worker as flawed. Whilst acknowledging the impact of delay, he submits that Child A has had one stable foster placement and possesses none of the common attributes suggesting a risk of placement breakdown such that the allocated social worker accepted that even if there were a delay of about 6 months then she could not say he would then no longer be suitable for a plan of adoption. Further, there is the possibility that if further assessment is justified then it would potentially allow Child A to be raised within his birth family or to enjoy an enduring bond with them following placement with D.

Mr Walker's primary submission was that the option of approving a plan of adoption was not available to the court because of what he described as a flawed placement application. I have already rejected that notion and thus his case depends upon the balance of the impact of further delay, most of which he acknowledges, as against his case that there is a need for further assessment of the mother or for the assessment process of D to reach a conclusion. His case is that the mother's circumstances are now significantly improved and that her mental health has been stable for a significant period of time. She has not entered into any personal relationships for a substantial period and thus has not suffered from the impact of domestic abuse.

I do not accept this characterisation of her progress. She has previously engaged in work to address her history of involvement in relationships featuring domestic abuse to little effect. She has always prided herself and demonstrated the ability to maintain employment, to participate actively and to create a strong impression of a person able to cope. However, she is also apt to mask her vulnerabilities. The evidence of the allocated social worker provides a far more accurate and balanced appraisal of her overall functioning. As I have analysed within this judgment, I do not accept that there is any basis to be confident about her ability to manage Child A’s care safely in the future at this stage. I have not seen the evidence I would expect to see of her behaviour and functioning during the course of these proceedings which would persuade me that there had been a marked change in the long-standing issues with her parenting. The issues for Child A are not significantly different from the issues which affected her older children in respect of whom she continues to have supervised contact. It is not a question of there being a reversal of the burden of proof but a determination that the evidence is simply not sufficient to demonstrate the change which the mother asserts she has made.

Mr. Walker criticises the allocated social worker and the guardian for a blinkered approach and essentially making findings of fact adverse to the mother. In my judgment, that criticism is over simplistic and unfair. They are obliged to undertake an expert social care analysis in accordance with an expert methodology by analysing and considering a wide range of evidence. Where there is a significant fact in issue which would have an impact upon the recommendations they make then they are of course obliged to await a determination by the Court and to explain to the court why that finding would result in a difference in their recommendation. What I am satisfied both experts did in this case was to comment on information which they sought to evaluate in determining their analysis of risk. They did not do so by making a finding of fact.

I have sought in different parts of this judgment to describe my analysis of the mother. I take this opportunity to stand back and summarise my conclusions about her. My assessment of her oral evidence was that it was entirely consistent with the analysis described by the psychological, psychiatric and social care experts. She is an intelligent woman with a capacity for hard work and a determination to progress. In an appropriate environment, she appears to blossom and is seen as an asset. She intends to start a master’s degree in psychology at [Redacted] University and hopes that she may one day return to work for My CWA. However, there is a fragility to her functioning because of her traumatic experiences which is reflected in longstanding weaknesses in her parenting. She remains at real risk of recurring dips in her mental health. She struggles to work within a context of challenge. She becomes defensive easily and reverts to a communication strategy of verbosity and tangentiality. Her desire not to appear vulnerable or her inability to realise that her beliefs are becoming distorted tends to result in her inability to work openly and honestly. Absent completion of appropriate therapy (some form of counselling has begun), positive evidence of management of interpersonal relationships (there have been none since her disjointed relationship with the father can be said to have ended) and the development of full insight into her parenting deficits, including a substantial period of disconnection with drug use, which is not yet the case, I am not satisfied that there has been any sustaining change in terms of the future risk attendant upon her parenting of Child A.

My impression is that she cannot and will not avoid militating for Child A’s return to her care irrespective of whether he was placed with the father or D. I think it is almost impossible to create an effective working relationship with her because of the ever-shifting sands of her behaviours. She struggled to answer the question I put to her and tended to manipulate the answer to avoid stating an obviously negative feature. I have detected the manipulation of information as a real risk if Child A was reliant upon the self-report of the mother to assess his development. Unless and until she is able fully to understand why she behaves as she does and take responsibility for finding the solution then I find it likely that her engagement will remain superficial.

The general quality of the father's contact with Child A within the confines of a contact centre is excellent. As the allocated social worker notes in her most recent parenting assessment (having viewed the contact for herself in addition to reviewing contact notes) [C424/ 7.1 to 7.2]: -

“7.1.

The father’s contact with Child A is consistently described as warm, attentive, and nurturing, with no safeguarding concerns noted. The father is punctual and prepared, often arrives early, brings toys, and snacks. He greets Child A with hugs, kisses, and affectionate language and frequently tells Child A he loves him and praises him as a “clever boy” or “good baby.” The father is engaged and interactive during sessions and plays with Child A using age-appropriate toys (e.g., musical books, sensory toys). He encourages developmental milestones like sitting up, crawling, and walking and allows Child A to go at his own pace. The father reads to Child A, plays music, and uses sensory equipment like bubble machines. He is responsive to Child A’s needs and feeds Child A, changes nappies, and soothes him when he’s upset or tired. He watches for cues like tiredness or overstimulation and adjusts accordingly. The father is clearly proud and supportive. This is seen when he frequently expresses pride in Child A’s growth and development, takes photos to capture moments, and shares updates with staff. The father can occasionally show frustration with contact logistics (e.g., missed sessions, scheduling) and once appeared unhappy at the start of a session but was fine once contact began. There are concerns he has communicated with the mother about contact logistics, such as the use of lockers, despite restrictions.

7.2.

The father’s contact is consistently positive, child-focused, and emotionally nurturing. He demonstrates a strong bond with Child A and actively supports his development.”

Again, I intend to stand back from the observations I have made about the father in a number of respects and summarise my assessment of him. In my judgment, he struggled badly in giving oral evidence. He gave often poor or inconsistent accounts. It is obvious that he loves Child A and clearly has some aptitude in relating to him as is evident from the quality of contact. Equally, he is intelligent but I am not at all satisfied that he has been full and frank with regard to his use of drugs. His oral evidence was simply incompatible with the results from the last set of drug testing on either hypothesis postulated by the reporting scientist. He has consistently demonstrated a lack of insight into and empathy for the victims of his abuse. The father’s oral evidence confirmed what I had read in the social care expert evidence about his lack of empathy. It was quite startling to witness. He appeared not to have achieved any real degree of acceptance of or insight into his behaviour as a whole. I suspect that he has made some progress (such as gaining employment and attending a gym) but not at a level which would persuade me he could parent Child A safely.

I propose to address the welfare checklist under s 1(4) ACA 1989 and then address the questions posed by Peter Jackson, LJ in relation to each of the realistic placement options considering the life-long impact upon Child A.

The child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the lightof the child’s age and understanding)

Child A is not able to offer his wishes and feelings with regard to this decision given his age. It is axiomatic that he would wish to be brought up within his family if that is at all possible.

The child’s particular needs,

Child Awas born prematurely and there may unresolved questions as to the impact of that upon his cognitive and physical development. Generally, he appears to be making good progress. He may need parents able to advocate for him should his needs increase and able to work in partnership with third parties with regard to meeting those needs. He will need an accurate picture of those needs and any struggles his carers have been in meeting them in order accurately to ascertain the appropriate support intended to ensure he develops appropriately.

What is the type of harm that might arise?

What is the likelihood of it arising?

What consequences would there be for the child if it arose?

What steps could be taken to reduce the likelihood of harm arising or to mitigate the effectson the child if it did?

The answers are then placed alongside other factors in the welfare equation so that the courtcan ask itself, how do the overall welfare advantages and disadvantages of the realisticoptions compare, one with another?

Parental care is simply too risky and the magnitude of harm too grave to regard it as an option which could meet Child A’s needs.

Long term foster care as a placement option would facilitate ongoing contact between Child A and his parents. It may provide a route for sibling contact to develop via liaison between the Local Authority and [Redacted] Council. I think it likely that the parents will remain committed to contact in the future. Child A’s needs are likely to be well met by trained foster carers, enjoying the support available to them in that role. The placement would be able to last until he was 18 years’ old and possibly longer. His care would be managed by the Local Authority with oversight by the IRO.

Adoption would probably result in a level of contact which would be indirect only. He would not have an opportunity regularly to see his biological parents. There would be a potential for direct sibling contact in the future. Adoption is not a panacea and disruption is a background risk, although there are no particular risk factors identified for Child A. There would be sources of support for his carers from the Adoption Team, including from the Adoption Support Fund. Child A would also as he grows have to come to terms with being an adopted person. He would be given information to inform him of his life story to assist and indirect contact will allow him to retain a sense as he grows of who his birth and adoptive family are.

Child A is young. Foster care means that he will have to move to different carers and there is inevitably a risk that if the circumstances of those carers change then he will have to move again. Being a looked after child will mean that he may spend the entirety of his minority feeling different to his peers. There is the fact that important decision-making will reside with the Local Authority in conjunction with the parents. He will need permission to go abroad. He will need to work around contact arrangements. There will be PEP meetings at school and LAC reviews at which his views will be sought and considered in an age-appropriate way. In my judgment, the prospect of dispute between the parents and the Local Authority is high and he may be subject to further enquiries about his wishes and feelings by professionals as he gets older. I think it is realistic to suggest that the mother will likely apply as soon as she is able to discharge the Care Order. Foster care can be an excellent option for some children in long term placements but at its best it cannot provide the degree of security offered by a successful adoptive placement in which Child A can feel loved and protected from the risks of instability in foster care. Generally, adoption offers the greater security of placement by carers with a high degree of commitment to him. There is no absolute temporal limit on how long Child A could stay within their yoke as a member of the family. Generally, foster care ends at 18 years’ old (occasionally longer). This is a life-long advantage of having a supportive family for life. The critical point is that, in my judgment, Child A is too young for foster care to be an adequate placement option as compared to adoption.

Ultimately, is adoption necessary and proportionate – are the risks bad enough to justify theremedy?

In my judgment, adoption is the only plan at this stage which will provide the security and commitment Child A will need growing up. He will have a family able to work in partnership to meet his needs as they become apparent in future. He will be spared the statutory panoply of review and management under a care order. His transition to an adoptive placement will hopefully be secure and avoid the risk of instability inherent in foster care. For Child A, in my judgment, the answer to the question I originally posed is that he is loved by his birth parents but they cannot care for him safely and he will be given an opportunity to grow up and be loved within an adoptive family. He will know that he has birth parents and he will know that they love and wanted to care for him. He will know of his half-siblings and will be able to ask questions about his birth family. He will know that the Court ultimately decided that across his lifetime, he must be given an opportunity to experience the love and security which it is to be hoped will be found within an adoptive family. Finally, he should receive an apology from the Court and the parties for the time it has taken to reach this decision.

That is my judgment.