A (A Child) (Refusal of Permission to Appeal: Challenge to Case Management), Re

This judgment follows a permission to appeal hearing heard on 16 December 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, I informed the parties I would be granting permission to appeal out of time but not giving permission to appeal and that the reasons for the same would follow. I have considered the documents contained in both the appeal bundle and final hearing bundle. I have also considered the written and oral submissions advanced at the hearing. The children’s guardian filed written submissions opposing the appeal, but I excused attendance on his part.

This appeal has both a procedural and substantive element. It follows a final hearing at which both care and placement orders were made in respect of the appellant’s two children. The appeal challenges a case management decision made by the hearing judge not to adjourn the matter for a longer listing of the case and then the substantive decisions reached. Although the appellant sought an interim appeal during the hearing this was sensibly wrapped up to be heard at this appeal.

I take the background to this case from the comprehensive judgment under appeal. At outset I note the high level of continuity in this case with nearly all substantive hearings conducted by the District Judge.

The children are [ ] (A) and [ ] (B). At the date of final hearing the children were aged 6½ and nearly 1 year of age, respectively. The proceedings had commenced initially in July 2024 (with B) being jointed on his birth in October 2024. At the date of the final hearing the proceedings were in week sixty-one. At the final hearing, the parties to these proceedings were represented. Neither father of either child played a part in the proceedings.

The concerns at outset related to the mother’s vulnerable characteristics including learning difficulties. She had entered relationships which were considered to leave the children at risk of harm. B’s father has a criminal history including violence and concerns continued into a new relationship. The local authority was concerned as to the appellant being subject to coercive and controlling behaviour, being a victim of domestic abuse and of the impact the same would have on her mental health and the safeguarding of the children. The concerns relating to the new partner were not assuaged by the appellant placing A in his care and the appellant and partner later sought to evade professional oversight. Alongside this the LA were concerned as to A being neglected by reference to poor school attendance and her unstable home life with care moving between the appellant and her partner. In addition, the LA raised allegations around physical abuse of the A, cannabis use by the partner and a failure to engage with ante-natal care relating to B until the very last moment notwithstanding the appellant was at this time within proceedings. Eventually, the appellant attended hospital in a poor state suffering with pre-eclampsia and a viral infection.

This is a significant feature of the appeal. The District Judge detailed the history thoroughly within her judgment. I note the following highlights:

At the final hearing counsel for the appellant urged the Judge to adjourn the listing and provide directions towards a fully contested final hearing with evidence from the parties and experts. The District Judge refused this application and proceeded to hear submissions. This is the basis for the procedural appeal. The appellant contends the Judge also fell into error with regards to her substantive decision-making and particularly failed to have regard to the potential for the appellant to parent with support. This is the foundation of the substantive appeal.

The grounds of appeal raised are:

It is clear to that whilst items 1-5 and 8 raise different points they are all aspects of the same complaint, that the Judge proceeded to determine the matter on submissions. I will accordingly address these points together. Items 6-7 likewise should be addressed in conjunction.

This can be dealt with briefly. Early in the hearing I indicated I was minded to grant permission to appeal out of time. I will not cover that point in this section. Permission to appeal should be granted where the appeal has a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason as to why an appeal hearing should be heard: FPR 2010 r.30(3)(7). There is no need to establish the appeal will be more likely to succeed than not, it should have prospects that are more than fanciful. If permission is granted the Court will uphold an appeal where the Judge’s decision is wrong or there is some serious procedural or other irregularity which undermines the decision. As such it is a real prospect of establishing one of these components.

Appeals against case management decisions must be brought within 7 days of the decision. The appeal courts should give respect to the case management decisions which are made by first instance judges. The court has wide ranging case management powers and a party applying to appeal to overturn a case management decision made within the judge’s discretion must always cross a high threshold Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Ltd v Fattal [2008] EWCA Civ. 427 at [33].

The court has comprehensive case management powers within FPR Part 22 to control evidence, these include.

The Court has power to control expert evidence within FPR 2010 r.25 with r.25(10) providing a comprehensive framework for written questions to be put expert witnesses. FPR 2010 r.25.9(2) stipulates that the court will not direct the attendance of the expert at a final hearing unless it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice. It is incumbent on any party seeking to cross-examine an expert to make an application for the court to direct the attendance of the expert to give evidence at final hearing. This all fits within the general scheme of this rule around controlling expert evidence. I have regard to A Local Authority v X (Attendance of Experts) [2025] EWFC 137.

The Court must have regard to avoiding delay and to the 26-week period provided for by the PLO. Any extension beyond this period, and indeed further extensions require justification as being necessary. The Court in considering its case management must have regard to the provisions of Article 6 which provide an absolute right to a fair hearing. However, the format of that hearing and its component parts will always be set according to the circumstances of the case. The local authority correctly points out that these article 6 rights are held by all parties and important aspects include a determination within a reasonable period.

It is not necessary to fully detail these principles. There is no suggestion the District Judge misdirected herself in this regard. But I do keep in mind the intersection between case management decisions and the substantive need to holistically weigh the realistic options. I remind myself that the issues under consideration were at the far boundary of interference with private family life and thus required a high level of justification. Separately I have regard to the line of case law addressing the obligation to consider support that can be offered to a parent with learning difficulties and other vulnerabilities prior to removing children from that parent’s care: see Re D (Adoption) (No3) [2016] EWFC 1.

I would like to start by recognising the real impact these decisions have had upon the appellant. The evidence clearly sets out her love for her children and her strong desire to have both in her care. These are genuine and heartfelt emotions. I would also want to pay regard to both counsel who appeared before me and who set out their arguments with care, professionalism, and sensitivity. Ms Honeyman ensured every point relied upon by her client was firmly in my mind. The appellant should be in no doubt her argument could not have been put more persuasively.

There can be no doubt the District Judge was entitled to take the approach she took. That is not in dispute. What is contested is whether in doing so she contravened the appellants right to a fair hearing. The District Judge was fully aware of the issues in the case. She had ensured continuity and been central to all significant case management decisions. She had a feel for the case and understood the issues under consideration. She had been directly engaged in setting the case management and then resetting it in clear and robust terms. She had both identified what the appellant had to do and what the consequence would be were the appellant to fail to comply with the directions given. The fact that these proceedings were care proceedings with stark potential outcomes did not mean she was not entitled to take a firm approach to case management. Indeed, the District Judge had an obligation to ensure first that the proceedings were completed within 26-weeks and as here, secondly, if this were not possible that any additional delay was kept to a minimum.

I have considered the orders in the case. The appellant was present and told what would happen if she did not comply. In fact, the District Judge had previously extended the timelines to the advantage of the appellant. However, a point was bound to come where the welfare of the child was inconsistent with further delay. The Judge decided the point had been reached and she was fully entitled to take this view. However, even in doing this she had nonetheless given the appellant relief from sanctions by permitting her statement evidence to be admitted. I will return to this below. But she was not obliged to adjourn the hearing and thus cause additional significant delay in such circumstances.

It is noteworthy the appellant criticised the District Judge for not permitting her to give evidence at the hearing. This argument is misconceived. No party sought to cross examine the appellant and her statement evidence stood as her evidence in chief. In such circumstances what was the purpose of giving evidence at the hearing other than to give additional evidence in circumstances where her final statement evidence had been delayed? To the extent the appellant wished to cross examine experts (including the ISW) this also fell to be considered in the light of the wholly appropriate case management decisions which had been set by the District Judge. The appellant has neither raised questions of any expert nor issued a C2. There was no summary of what was sought to be asked of the experts. The skeleton accepts this as it simply references questioning the social worker and the guardian. For the avoidance of doubt there can be no realistic complaint against decisions relating to the experts given the above.

It is also clear to me the District Judge was entitled to reject the submission as far as it related to the social worker and guardian. The Court should not lose sight of the fact the conclusions reached by both were based on the evidential scaffolding supplied by the parenting assessment from the ISW. Any examination of either was bound to be viewed in the light of their entitlement to rely on this report in all the circumstances of the case. When considering whether to adjourn the final hearing with the consequence of further lengthy delay the District Judge was both entitled and obliged to reflect on this.

The appellant seeks to rely upon the circumstances leading to the delay in the filing of her final evidence. The District Judge had a statement from the instructed solicitor who sought to take responsibility for the delay in complying with the extended filing date. However, on closer examination this can be seen to be only part of the picture. It is clear the appellant working with a case worker had put together a statement on her behalf prior to the filing date. Whilst the appellant draws attention to the solicitor’s failure to have this drafted and sent to her for signing she fails to also note the fact the solicitor also asked the appellant to provide any evidence she wished to exhibit to the statement. In fact, the appellant did want to exhibit evidence, but she did not provide this until after the date for filing had passed. One then had a further undoubted period of 10 days when the final statement was with the appellant before she authorised the same. The argument that the District Judge failed to give proper regard to the appellant’s personal vulnerabilities when addressing this delay carries little weight in the context of the broad ranging non-compliance. It is noteworthy that within her final statement the appellant commented on the delays with her evidence but did not raise the points made by her solicitor. In her judgment the District Judge noted the conflict between the two positions. But I remind myself the District Judge did then admit the evidence and permit the appellant to rely upon it in any event.

The District Judge was entitled to have regard to the full history of the case when considering the application, she was entitled to reflect on the benefits the Court would gain in hearing examination of the social worker and guardian in the context of their reliance on evidence that would not be tested and was entitled to rely upon the position of the appellant only one-week earlier that the hearing should proceed on submissions. In all these circumstances the District Judge was entitled to refuse the application and an appeal against this decision has no real prospects of success. I reach this conclusion with respect to paragraphs 1-5 and 8 individually. I make clear the contention the District Judge made findings of fact with respect to threshold must be understood in the light of the fact the threshold was found proven at the IRH on the evidence before the Court (including the appellants responses). This is clear from the relevant order. This was not a case in which findings were deemed from non-response. It is correct the District Judge made a further threshold finding but this was referrable to a conclusion reached by experts rather than a directly disputed aspect of evidence.

The complaint is linked to the procedural points but is also made on its own merits. It is argued the Judge did not have sufficient evidence to reach the conclusion that nothing other than adoption would meet the needs of the children. More particularly it is contended the Judge did not have evidence to conclude the appellant could not meet the needs of the children absent support akin to ‘substituted parenting.’ The appellant complains the local authority failed to provide a support plan setting out the support that would enable the appellant to meet the needs of the children. There are two problems with this.

First, the evidence provided to the Court was that the appellant could not meet the needs of the children with support but first needed to make changes before the children would be safe in her care. This was the clear recommendation of the ISW who outlined the issues that would need to be addressed before the appellant could safely care for the children. This was the evidence provided to the local authority and to the guardian. The guardian in her analysis fairly reflected on the difficulty the appellant had shown in engaging and co-operating with professionals and understandably commented on the impact this had on any assessment of parenting with support. That the local authority did not provide a support plan does not move the argument forward in circumstances in which the local authority is clear that no support will enable safe parenting and where they have clear assessment evidence to support this conclusion. Whilst they might have filed an alternative care plan based on supervision and support this would plainly not have been something they either supported or considered could keep the children safe. This would almost certainly have led to the common-place and sterile debate in which they were examined as to their case that nothing else, but adoption would do, whilst providing a support plan that suggested the opposite. Their inevitable response would be that this was a construct at the direction of the Court but had no bearing on their calibration of safe parenting. The guardian set out in her analysis why such an outcome was the only outcome that fitted with the evidence.

A second problem is that the appellant did not identify in her statement any support that she argued would enable her to parent with support. Whilst stating she would accept support when dealing directly with this, she indicated this would come from her partner. Further, when I enquired as to the extent to which the appellants submissions had highlighted supports that would enable good enough parenting it was clear no such submissions had in fact been made. In a case in which the local authority is clear that good enough care cannot be provided even with support there is a level of duty on the party suggesting otherwise to make a case in such regard. It is not sufficient to simply hope that by examining the social worker or guardian that something will come up.

In this case the District Judge provided a full and clear judgment in which she weighed all the evidence before reaching the conclusion she did. In no way did she act summarily in the light of only hearing submissions alone. It is clear she applied to this case the same care and judgment that would have been required in a lengthier hearing. Having done so I am clear there are no prospects of success in challenging her substantive decision. I find that grounds 6 and 7 have no real prospect of success.

There is no other compelling reason as to why an appeal should be heard. I give permission to appeal out of time. I refuse permission to appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The time for any challenge to this decision is extended to run from 10am on Monday 22 December 2025. This appeal will likely be published. As such any proposed redactions (save as to names) should be provided by 4pm on 23 December 2025.