Jessica Vlijter v Cornell Lloyd Vlijter

This is a written version of the extempore judgment I gave earlier today at the conclusion of the final hearing of Mrs Vlijter’s (W’s) application against Mr Vlijter (H) for financial remedies on Friday 19 December 2025. It is not a precedent – I am a Deputy District Judge and am simply applying established law to the facts. This judgment is sent to the National Archive in accordance with the President’s Publication of Judgments Practice Guidance issued on 19 June 2024.

The case was heard in private. I asked whether Mrs Vlijter requested any form of anonymity. Ms Shafei confirmed that Mrs Vlijter did not seek any anonymity for herself but asked that the children’s names and identifying details should be withheld from the judgment. Accordingly, I am not anonymising the judgment generally, but the children’s names, ages and the parties’ address shall not be set out here.

W was represented at today’s hearing by Ms Shafei of counsel, instructed by Walkers solicitors.

H has not participated in these proceedings and has neither attended nor been represented. He did not file a Form E or any evidence at all. He did not attend the First Appointment on 10 January 2025. Nor did he attend the adjourned First Appointment on 18 June 2025. W has had to incur the cost of instructing enquiry agents, who confirmed in May and June 2024 that H is living at a rented address in Hertfordshire. H acknowledged receipt of the notice of First Appointment, writing “101” on the envelope, which W takes to be a reference to Orwell’s 1984. I am satisfied that he has been served with the notice of today’s hearing and the orders made on the previous occasions.

For fulness, I set out that, on 18 June 2025, DJ Ahmed rejected W’s application (which had also been served on H) to treat that hearing as a final hearing and to make final orders. DJ Ahmed ordered that H had to make an application for directions by 9.7.25, otherwise he would be debarred from participating without permission from the court. No such application has been made and DJ Ahmed’s order remains extant. No application has been made by H for permission to participate.

I have been provided with a court bundle of 324 pages, which I have read in full. I heard evidence from W under oath. I have heard no evidence from H. W gave her evidence compellingly, and I found her to be credible.

The starting point is that the burden is on a party asserting a fact to prove it. I must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities. The wrinkle to that rule is that I am able to draw adverse inferences where appropriate. Per Lord Sumption in Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and Others [2013] UKSC 34 at paragraphs 43-45.

W is 50 and H is 53. They began to live together in 2002, married in 2011 and separated in 2020. Decree Nisi was granted on 30 Sept 2021. There is no Decree Absolute yet. I will treat this as a long marriage of 18-years' duration.

The parties have three children. The oldest has just finished university but lives at home. Their middle child is finishing A levels. The youngest is at secondary school and will be dependant for a few further years. They had a good standard of living, with an annual holiday and occasional city breaks. Both parties worked and the standard of living was commensurate with their combined incomes.

Neither party is suffering from any disability. H’s cousin contacted W in the summer of 2025 expressing concerns about his welfare and about threats H had made to harm W. W asked H’s sister to check on him. H’s sister told W that H was well and that he did not repeat any threats to her.

W and the children remain living in the FMH in Hertfordshire. H moved out of that home in 2021 and lives in rented accommodation, also in Hertfordshire. W tells me, and I accept, that she has kept an open door for H to spend time with the children, who are all now of an age to be able to make some arrangements for themselves in any event. H does not see the children and I expect it is unlikely he will do so in the foreseeable future.

During the marriage, both parties worked. W works in education and earns c.£80,000 gross or £50,000 net per year. H works in HR. W tells me, and I accept, that he used to earn at least 25% more than W, putting his gross income at approximately £100,000 gross per year. H used to work on fixed-term contracts, which paid more, but led to periods when H was not working. He did have some permanent roles, too. I find it likely that H is working and that he earns more than W. That is consistent with the history during the marriage and there is no evidence to the contrary.

The parties made an equal contribution during the marriage. The position since separation is that W has been the sole domestic contributor and has also been making the greater financial contribution. I accept W’s evidence that the parties agreed that H would pay £900 per month to W for her shortfall in family expenditure. H has paid sporadically and stopped paying the agreed contribution entirely in December 2024. I accept W’s evidence that the shortfall between what he agreed to pay and what he has actually paid is £20,700 to date. Even if paid, I find that the lion’s share of the children’s outgoings would have been met by W and that £900 reflects far less than a half of those outgoings. I expect that W will continue to make a far greater contribution to the welfare of the family than H until at least the date when the parties’ youngest child is 18 or finishes secondary school.

The only asset of any significance is the former matrimonial home. This has a value from estate agents’ appraisals of £550,000. There is a mortgage of c.£175,000 and, after deducting notional costs of sale, there is equity of £340,000.

W has no savings and has a modest car loan and other debt.

W does not know about H’s financial position other than he is in rented accommodation. She did not know of any savings during the marriage. I agree with Ms Shafei that I can infer that H is able to meet his own needs, including any shortfall between fixed contracts of work. However, there is no evidence before me that H has any savings or investments and I cannot speculate. If it transpires that H does have any savings or investments at today’s date, then I was not aware of them. W may have grounds to apply to set aside my decision so that any such savings/investments could be reflected in the outcome.

W has a defined benefit pension scheme that will provide her with a sufficient income to meet her needs on retirement. W is aware that H had pension schemes from his employment but does not know the detail of those schemes. I will work on the basis that H has equivalent provision. If that is wrong in W’s favour, then H only has himself to blame for failing to provide disclosure. If it transpires that H has far more valuable pensions than W, then I repeat my earlier comment about setting my decision aside.

W needs suitable accommodation for herself and the two minor children of the marriage, one of whom will be dependant for several years yet. W is able to raise a morgage of up to £323,000, which could discharge the current mortgage and also raise a further c.£140,000 after charges are taken into account. In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that W’s needs are met by the FMH and that it would not be appropriate to expect her to downsize either now or in the future.

H needs suitable accommodation for himself. If he were seeing the children, then he would need accommodation that would enable them to stay. However, he has not done so and I find on the balance of probabilities that will continue to be the case. I therefore assess H’s needs at a 1 or 2-bedroom property. I find (from experience of house prices in the area and taking account of the value of the family home) that H’s housing need would be met with a fund of £300,000. If H earns £100,000 per year, then he ought to be able to raise a larger mortgage than W. I put his mortgage capacity at no less than £400,000.

W relies on litigation misconduct. I accept W’s evidence that the parties reached an agreement between themselves after separation. That agreement was reached without the benefit of legal advice. The agreement was that the family home would be transferred to W, that W would pay £80,000 to H on transfer, and that W and that, upon the parties’ youngest child finishing secondary education, W would pay a further £50,000 and 10% of the increase in the property over that period of time. W later instructed solicitors to ask H to agree to a consent order in line with the agreement. H put up a brick wall and did not engage. W seeks a different order to that agreement at this hearing.

W has incurred costs of these proceedings. This is a straightforward case that did not require 3 court hearings. I am satisfied that H’s litigation conduct is such that the ordinary no order as to costs rule should be disapplied. I have considered an N260 and assess those costs at £12,000 inclusive of VAT and disbursements. H should pay those. 

I have taken all of the circumstances of the case into account, including those set out at s.25(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. I must reach a fair and non-discriminatory outcome. I have borne in mind that there are three strands to fairness: sharing the marital acquest, meeting needs and compensation. I do not find that this is a case where the compensation principle affects the outcome.

The equity in the family home is £340,000. A half share would be £170,000. However, I find that it would be inappropriate for H to receive a half share. I have found that W’s needs are met by retaining the family home and she cannot afford to redeem the current mortgage and raise a lump sum greater than £140,000. Further than that, I find that it would be unfair for H to receive 50% (or even 40% of the equity). H has a lower housing need than W, a greater mortgage capacity than W, and fewer demands on his income. W has made greater post-separation contributions and those are likely to continue for several years into the future.

However, I do not accept, as W contends, that she should receive the family home in return for no payment. A fair reflection of the above factors leads me to conclude that there should be a departure from equal division so as to provide H with 25% or £85,000. From that, I deduct the unpaid maintenance under the agreement of £20,000 and costs of £12,000. That leaves a balance of £53,000.

W will be left with the FMH subject to a mortgage of c.£230,000. I find that she can afford to raise that mortgage and meet the ongoing monthly instalments.

H will be left with £53,000 plus his mortgage capacity, which I take to be £400,000. To re-house at £300,000, he would only need a mortgage of £250,000, which I find to be affordable.

I therefore order that H transfer his interest in the FMH to W. Concurrent with the transfer, W shall pay H a lump sum to H of £53,000. This is on a clean break basis in life and on death.

Child maintenance will have to be dealt with by the CMS if not agreed.

W asks me to sign a TR1 transferring the property to her. I cannot do so today. There is no decree absolute and my property adjustment order cannot be implemented until after decree absolute. I will order H to execute all documents required to transfer his legal and beneficial interest to W within 7 days of those being sent to him by registered post. In default, a district judge can execute those documents in his stead.

H has thus far failed to provide his bank details. I hope and expect he will do so when he is told that £53,000 is waiting for him. If he does not do so, then W can retain the lump sum in a bank account in her own name. She will be entitled to retain any interest. I will direct that no interest shall accrue on the lump sum.

I find as a fact that the parties have not lived together or had children together since decree nisi was pronounced.