Mother v Father (Private Law Proceedings; Extended Civil Restraint Order)

The hearing has been listed to consider whether a civil restraint order should be made against the father. The mother is represented by Ms X, the father appears in person. The mother has attended remotely with permission from me to keep her camera off.

By way of background, private law proceedings commenced in July 2024. They were issued by the mother. They relate to two children, aged seven and four. A safeguarding letter prepared by CAFCASS sets out concerns in respect of both parents. Supervised contact was recommended. Many orders have been made by various judges over the course of the proceedings. Contact was suspended on 5 December of 2024.

The father has issued many applications. On 11 June 2025, District Judge Elboz declared the following applications as being totally without merit:

On the same occasion District Judge Elboz allowed two applications made by the father in respect of witness statements.

On 8 July District Judge Campbell considered the father’s application for a non-molestation order which she refused. She also refused his application for a prohibited steps order and declared this to be totally without merit.

On 30 July Her Honour Judge O’Neill dismissed the father’s application for permission to appeal the order of District Judge Elboz.

I made an order on 31 July seeking submissions as to whether a limited civil restraint order should be made. The father has requested an oral hearing which is why today’s hearing has been listed.

On 4 August I made a further order setting out that any requests by the father for an oral hearing following the dismissal of his appeal by Her Honour Judge O’Neill on 30 July would be heard on 19 August. I am not aware of any request having been made. The door is therefore closed for the father to make further submissions in respect of that order. I also put the father on notice that if he continued to make further applications prior to the hearing, I would consider making a civil restraint order on the papers.

On 7 August, I dismissed two further requests by the father for permission to appeal orders of District Judge Campbell. Both applications were declared totally without merit.

On 8 August I made an order confirming that the hearing on 19 August would be used to consider all types of civil restraint order due to the rising number of applications which had been declared totally without merit. It was also apparent that the father had made further applications which had yet to be processed.

Pursuant to rule 4.4 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, where an application is declared totally without merit there is a duty on the court to consider whether to make a civil restraint order. This is the case here.

Rule 4.8 of the Family Procedure Rules gives the court power to make civil restraint orders and Practice Direction 4B sets out the circumstances of the consequences of an order.

The purpose underlying the making of a civil restraint order is to prevent applicants who make applications which have no merit, wasting time and court resources. Such applications consume public funds and divert the court from dealing with cases which have real merit. Of course, an order does not stop access to the courts, it merely requires a judge at the outset to determine whether the application should be allowed to proceed.

The court has available three types of civil restraint order. A limited civil restraint order may be made where a party has made two or more applications which are totally without merit. An extended civil restraint order may be made where a party has persistently made applications which are totally without merit. Unless the court orders otherwise, the party against whom the order is made is restrained from making applications in any court concerning any matter involving, relating, touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order was made without first having obtained the permission of the judge identified in the order. Three unmeritorious applications have been described as the bare minimum needed to amount to persistence. Finally, the court can make a general civil restraint order where an extended civil restraint order would not suffice.

The father has filed three documents, only one of which was ordered, namely a skeleton argument. His witness statement and document entitled ‘Remedies’ should play no part in my determination. However, I touch upon all three documents to assist with the context of this case.

In the father’s statement he refers to legal orders which I think are referring to my orders of 4 and 8 August. He thinks the change from a limited order to an extended order may have come from the mother’s solicitors. It has not. X solicitors, he says —

The father’s skeleton argument refers to it being illegal to threaten charges of contempt of court and an abuse of judicial power. His understanding of today’s hearing and any potential order is wrong. He talks about being an inexperienced litigant in person. He may be right. However, there is one set of rules which applies to those whether represented or not. He refers to tyranny and misfeasance in public office, violation of human rights and in particular Article 6. Again, his understanding of the position is wrong. If such an order is made it does not stop the father from making legitimate applications but it provides for a filter, which is that permission first must be sought. Again, there is reference to an illegal order. There are some references to reasons why his applications ought not to have been refused, which I will address shortly. He then reverts to complaints about judicial misconduct. He talks about his ability to bring individual or group litigation against judges with consequences of imprisonment. The father seeks for the order to be ‘struck off’ immediately. He talks about a claim for damages against many professionals.

Finally, in the document entitled ‘Remedies’ he seeks immediate reunification with his children and consideration of his C2 application in respect of disclosure between X solicitors and the court; a forensic examination of Ms X’s electrical devices; a contempt of court hearing against Ms X; dates of child abduction from 2024 and dates when they were recently removed from the UK; for the section 7 report to be delayed; a psychiatric assessment of the mother; CAFCASS to investigate parental alienation; District Judges Elboz and Campbell to be recused; a written apology from the court; the court to conduct an investigation with the police and the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office; damages to be agreed and the issue of a press statement.

Those representing the mother support a civil restraint order being made.

Today the father tells me that his real concerns are about the judges who have made decisions in his case to date. He just wants to see his children. He cannot even send them a Christmas card. He does not want to be making applications but no-one listens to him. He says no-one will investigate his children being abducted; the mother’s need for a psychiatric assessment; the mother’s methadone use; an order to produce the communications between the court and X solicitors to name a few. Importantly, he says the proceedings should be transferred to Wiltshire where another judge, who has no responsibility for the Bath judges can hear the matter. He is exhausted by the process and it is affecting his life and wellbeing.

First, there is no reason for me not to hear the matter today. Parties cannot choose where court proceedings are heard.

Further, it can be seen that six applications heard by two District Judges have been declared to be totally without merit. The appeal applications which I have declared to be totally without merit (those relating to the orders of District Judge Campbell) cannot be revisited but suffice it to say, had there been anything in what the father had said on the papers or today which I felt justified a change in my order, I would have revisited the position. There has not and therefore the orders of District Judge Campbell remain. I also observe that in respect of the non-molestation order I have real concerns that such is the father’s mindset that had such an order been granted in his favour he would abuse it and seek to enforce it through the police. Today he called the police, and I understand this to have been anticipated, for actions he was going to take against me.

To be completely fair to the father, despite no request having been made for an oral hearing, it seems that he challenges the order of Her Honour Judge O’Neill refusing his application for permission to appeal District Judge Elboz’s order dated 11 June.

The test for granting permission is set out in the Family Procedure Rules at 30.3(7). Permission to appeal may be given only where there is a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason to hear the appeal.

First, I note that in respect of District Judge Elboz’s order, Her Honour Judge O’Neill thought that the father’s application for permission was out of time. She had overlooked the part of the order which extended the time to 18 July. However, the judge dismissed the applications as not meeting the legal test.

By taking what might be considered by some to be an overly generous approach, it does mean that if any applications for permission to appeal were successful, it would call into question whether a civil restraint order should be made.

Taking the applications in the same order as set out in the order, all of which were declared to be totally without merit, the father’s first application is dated 5 March for contempt of court. I do not need a transcript. The application is wide-ranging. It sets out complaints about the mother. It is not in a proper format for her or a judge to understand the allegations. Whilst the father may be of the view that the mother has lied, there has been no determination by a judge. There can be no complaint as to the action taken by the judge. Permission to appeal this part of the order was rightly refused, the test is not met.

The second application is dated 6 December 2024 and relates to alienation. Courts do not make alienation orders on applications. It may be that a party’s behaviour is found at a final hearing to be alienating, but no final hearing has taken place. A transcript of the judgment is not required. Permission to appeal this part of the order was rightly refused, the test is not met.

The third application is dated 15 December 2024 and was for CAFCASS to resubmit its safeguarding letter. Again, this does not require a transcript. If the father disputed its contents, then that is a matter for a final hearing. Permission to appeal this part of the order was rightly refused, the test is not met.

The fourth application is dated 20 December and sought disclosure of the mother’s citizenship application. This has no bearing on orders this court might make about the children. Again, no transcript is required. Permission to appeal was rightly refused, the test is not met.

The fifth application is dated 25 March and was for the court to take action against the mother’s solicitors. Again, it does not require a transcript. Permission to appeal was rightly refused, the test is not met.

That means that all six of the applications heard by District Judges Elboz and Campbell have been declared totally without merit. In addition, two of his appeals have also been declared to be totally without merit.

Against that order I turn next to whether a civil restraint order should be made and if so, what type of order. Many of the matters raised by the father in response to whether such an order should be made have been the subject of applications which have been refused. If there are other outstanding applications then they need to be dealt with in the usual way. Many of the remaining matters need no further comment as they are not matters which this court can or will entertain no matter how strongly the father feels about them.

Proceedings —

The threshold for making an order is plainly met. The father’s stance in respect of the judge’s decisions to date is misguided. I am satisfied that it is an appropriate exercise of my discretion to make a civil restraint order.

There can be no doubt that a limited civil restraint order should be made against the father to stop his repetitive applications. They have required a great deal of court time which also has to be used for those who make genuine, meritorious applications. The financial cost is significant. However, due to the escalating behaviour of the father, I am satisfied that an extended civil restraint order should be made, as it seems likely that otherwise not only will he make applications in the Children Act proceedings but further non-molestation applications, for example.

The making of an extended order will manage future applications in a way that is proportionate to the nature, complexity and importance of the issues raised, balanced alongside the welfare of these two young children and their mother, who is their primary carer. The order will remain in place for one year or until conclusion of the private law proceedings, whichever is the sooner. It also means that the father is required to pay a fee if he seeks to appeal the order or seeks leave to make an application, even if he would otherwise qualify for fee remission. The fee will be refunded if the application succeeds. It is not a breach of his Article 6 rights. There is case law to support the position.

Finally, I hope the father will reflect on his approach to the litigation as it is not helping him to see his children, which is what he desperately wants. That is my judgment.