Oxfordshire County Council v M & Ors

This is a final hearing in public law proceedings. Originally the proceedings concerned three children, but I was able to make final orders for the younger two children (B and C) at the Issues Resolution Hearing (IRH) on 14^th November 2025. Those children have fathers to the father of A. It was not possible to conclude proceedings for the oldest child, A, because her father, F who is the second respondent, wanted an order for her to live with him and this needed me to hear evidence. A is separately represented in these proceedings as a result of her age and she is the third respondent. M is the first respondent in the proceedings.

The family has been known to Children’s Social Care for a number of years, with A being subject to a Child Protection Plan from February 2018 to June 2019, and thereafter a Child In Need Plan until August 2021. Concerns were about A’s poor school attendance and neglect in the care of M. A has also experienced trauma in the care of M in the past, having witnessed domestic abuse and as a consequence of M’s sometimes fragile mental health.

M has a diagnosis of an Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder. Following the birth of her youngest child, she experienced a deterioration in her mental health.

On 2^nd September 2024 police attended and took all three children into Police Protection. A was sent to stay with a friend of her mother’s, and from there moved to F’s care.

These public law proceedings commenced with the Local Authority application on 13^th September 2024. They have thus been underway for over a year at this point.

During proceedings M’s parenting capability has been assessed first in a residential setting and then in the community by an ISW. The need for such extensive assessment has largely been the cause for the proceedings taking longer than the statutory maximum of 26 weeks.

F was first assessed as a carer for A in June this year. That assessment was positive, but it did not include his partner who was not willing to be assessed at that point.

After that assessment was completed, there was an unfortunate incident in June as a result of an argument between F and A about going to church.

Following that incident M made an application to vary the Child Arrangements Order so that A lived with her rather than F. M was granted permission to withdraw that application in August this year, and an addendum parenting assessment of F which needed to include his partner was found to be required.

It appears that over the summer F permitted A to have substantial periods of time with M, without anyone informing the Local Authority at the time. On 12^th September 2025 A went to M’s house for the weekend but did not return to the care of F. She has remained there since.

The addendum parenting assessment of F and his partner was completed on 19^th September 2025. It raised concerns about A’s emotional wellbeing in the care of F and his partner.

F made an application for enforcement of the Child Arrangements Order for A to live with him, seeking her immediate return to his care. The Court considered his application at a hearing on 1^st October 2025, and it was refused. The Court instead made an Interim Care Order (ICO) coupled with a section 38(6) direction for A to remain in the care of M.

The Local Authority filed and served its final evidence on 7^th October 2025. That evidence included an update of M’s parenting capacity and recommended that A and C remain in her care under a 12 month Supervision Order (SO). That is still the final care plan for A at this final hearing. The recommendation for B was to remain in the care of her father under a child arrangements order and without a public law order. M, the father of B, A and the Guardian all agreed with the final plans. F did not agree with the final plan for A. By the time of the IRH on 14^th November F had not provided up to date instructions to those representing him, and he had also refused to do any work with the Local Authority to support relationship building with A. He did, however, attend the IRH on 14^th November although he arrived late and his advocate was therefore able to have very little time to take up to date instructions. F confirmed that he opposed the final care plan for A, and he opposed the Local Authority application for the court to utilise the IRH as a Final Hearing (FH) for A with the Court dealing with the contested issues on the basis of submissions only. M, A and the Guardian supported the case being dealt with at the IRH on the basis of submissions only. F sought a listing for a contested FH at which oral evidence could be considered. By the time I had heard submissions about this from all parties concerned, having had a delayed start due to F’s late arrival at court which slightly reduced the time available, and in view of the contested issues about what outcome was in A’s welfare interests, I determined that the matter did need to be listed for a contested FH with some limited oral evidence. I also raised of the Court’s own motion whether a s91(14) order may need to be considered in relation to future private law applications concerning A, and that was another factor that led to my concluding that a contested final hearing was required. Fortunately, in view of the protracted nature of these proceedings, I was able to move other cases to accommodate this FH on 4^th and 5^th December 2025.

F was directed to file and serve a statement setting out his proposals for final orders to include transitional arrangements for how and when A on his case should be returned to his care. His statement was duly filed on 25^th November 2025 and is at C465-C470 in the bundle. The Local Authority was also permitted to file and serve the case note in relation to a visit by a social worker to F on 10^th November 2025. That case note appears at C463-C464 in the bundle.

In this FH I have read the evidence contained in the bundle, which is well over 1000 pages at this point, and heard evidence from the allocated social worker, F and the Guardian. It had been agreed at the IRH that F did not seek to cross examine M or A.

The Local Authority seek an ISO for 12 mths with A remaining in the care of M, with support as detailed in the SOSP at C442-C450 and with A remaining under Child In Need Planning. The Local Authority also supports a CAO for A to live with her mother. The LA is neutral about whether a s91(14) order should be made.

M agrees with the LA application for a 12 mth ISO, asks for the CAO for A to live with F to be discharged and seeks a CAO for A to live with her. She agreed that threshold was crossed in relation to her and all three children including A for the purposes of s31 at the IRH on 14^th November 2025. M is neutral about whether or not a s91(14) order should be made.

F’s precise position has been rather difficult to ascertain at points. He has been clear that he does not want A to live with M because he does not think that is safe for A, but has also proposed that A should transition through the rest of December to live both with him and with M with A spending Monday to Friday with him and weekends with M from 2026. During this FH he also said that he would rather A live in foster care than live with M, though that was not what he subsequently was asking the court to order, and that he wanted “someone neutral” to sit down to explain to A the dangers of living with M, though he did not expect that would change A’s views about where she should live.

A is clear that she does not want to live with F and will run away if she is forced to live with him. She wants to continue to live with her M and, at the moment, is not prepared to spend time with F. Ms Gallagher on behalf of A in closing made it clear that A would ask the Court to make a s91(14) order.

Ms Morreale as A’s Guardian supports the LA final care plan for A, recommends that there should be a 12 mth SO underpinned by the support outlined in the SOSP, and that there should be a CAO for A to live with M. She did not recommend that there needed to be a s91(14) order made to prevent future applications in relation to A, something that I had raised at the IRH as noted above.

The Court in public law proceedings has to first consider whether the Local Authority has proved, on balance of probabilities, that at the relevant time A was suffering or was at risk of suffering significant harm as set out in s31 of the CA 1989. If threshold is found proved, then the Court proceeds to consider whether the final care plan is in the welfare interests of A, by reference to the welfare checklist contained in s1(3) of the CA 1989.

The Court will have regard to the art 6 and 8 rights of A, M and F.

The options for A must be weighed in accordance with the considerations set out in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146.

I have borne in mind the principle set out by Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 that society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting.

The nature of the threshold test is objective (Re D (Care Order: Evidence) 2011 1 FLR 447 CA. Re HL (Children: Summary Dismissal of Care Proceedings) [2019] EWCA Civ 704 is also clear authority that threshold is to be approached from the perspective of the child, not from the perspective of the parents.

The relevant date is either the date of the application or, if temporary protective measures have been in place prior to that, the date when those protective measures were initiated (Re M (A Minor) (Care Order: Threshold Conditions) (1994) 2 FLR 577, HL). A Local Authority does not, however, have to be in possession of all of the information it wishes to rely upon at the date of the application. Evidence gathering continues after the proceedings have begun and later acquired information as to the state of affairs at the relevant date can be taken into account (Re G (Care Proceedings: Threshold Conditions) [2001] 2 FLR 1111, CA). This is the same regardless of whether a court is considering the first limb under s 31(2)(a) of suffering sig harm, or the second limb ie likely to suffer sig harm.

When making a finding of harm it is important to distinguish between sig harm and simply harm, threshold only being crossed pursuant to s31 if sig harm is proved (Re S (Children) [2018] EWCA Civ 1282. The threshold test is also a two stage test. Not only must a court be satisfied that a child is suffering or likely to suffer sig harm under s31(2)(a), the court must also be satisfied that the sig harm or risk of sig harm is attributable to care given or likely to be given to the child, that care not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give.

I have also considered Re A (A Child) [2015] EWFC 11 in relation to threshold pleadings. Re K-H (Children) (Care Orders: proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1368 is also relevant to the welfare considerations and balance of harm exercise that may need to form part of the welfare stage of proceedings such as these, as was submitted by Ms Reynolds for the LA in closing, since any conclusions that a court reaches must be founded on a factual base that has been proven to the required standard.

In relation to section 8 orders, the child’s welfare is paramount, applying the s1(3) checklist considerations that are relevant to the particular case, and the court must not make an order unless it considers that making an order would be better for the child than making no order at all.

A CAO must not extend beyond the 16^th birthday of the child in question unless the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify an order ending after this date (s9(6)), however if the CAO only regulates where a child is to live and/or when the child is to live with any person then subsection (6) does not apply (s9(6A) & (6B)).

In relation to s91(14) orders, these are a protective filter to prevent a person from making specified future applications under the CA 1989 without first obtaining the leave of the court. They impose a hurdle, not a bar. The power to make a s91(14) order is discretionary and the Court must exercise care and caution before making one. Any such order must also be imposed proportionately. The Court will need to weigh all circumstances, including that any such order is a statutory interference with the art 6 rights of the person subject to such an order. The child’s welfare is again the Court’s paramount consideration, though. The guidance provided by Butler-Sloss LJ in Re P (s91(14) Guidelines) [1999] 2 FLR 573 CA is still valid. Such orders can be made of the court’s own motion, though the court must adopt a fair process in so doing including allowing a proper opportunity for representations to be made about the possibility of an order, especially from the person who may be subject to the order if made. The duration of any such order also needs to be proportionate, and orders without limit should only be made in the worst sorts of cases to be seen in the Family Court. Section 91A also allows a court to make an order where the court is satisfied that the making of an application under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the order would put the child concerned or another individual at risk of harm, and this can be a power that is exercised by the court of its own motion. PD12Q is also applicable to the exercise of the court’s powers under s91(14) and requires that the court should consider the duration of any order, whether the order should cover all or only certain types of applications under the 1989 Act, whether service of any subsequent applic for leave should be prohibited until the court has made an initial determination of the merits of such an applic. PD12Q notes that such an order delaying service would help to ensure that the very harm or other protective function that the order is intended to address is not undermined. The court should also consider whether on any subsequent application for leave, the court should make an initial determination of the merits of the application without an oral hearing.

The final threshold document is at A95-A97 in the bundle. My threshold findings made at the IRH in respect of M are at B274-B275 appended to the final orders made in respect of B and C on 14^th November 2025. I adopt those findings for the purposes of this judgment. F’s response to final threshold is at A103a-A103d. Only item 3 of the final threshold relates to F. It was submitted by Mr Macdonald on behalf of F that the LA pleading in respect of threshold was deficient in that it did not refer to significant harm in para 3 and the sub paras thereunder. However, as was submitted by Ms Reynolds, the LA threshold document is to be read as a whole and it is clear from the beginning of that document that the LA alleges that A has suffered and is at risk of suffering sig harm. It is unhelpful to ignore that when considering threshold in my view. Threshold has also been drafted in a manner that is succinct, proportionate and focused as required by cases such a Re A. As a matter of fact, there is no dispute that there was an argument between A and F on 15^th June 2025 which resulted in the police being called, and that both M and F also contacted the EDT as a result of the incident. There is also no dispute from F that A is recorded as telling the social worker that she felt lonely and isolated in the care of F and his partner, nor that she does not currently want to see him. His dispute is that he does not accept that A has suffered or is at risk of suffering significant emotional harm as a consequence of his parenting of her. He also takes issue with A's account of that incident.

No party sought to call A to be xx about this incident, including F. I therefore have her unchallenged written evidence at C332-C334, the EDT initial referral on 15^th June 2025 (C262), case notes 1 through to 12 from 15^th June 2025 at C262-C274, notes of the strategy discussion that took place on 16^th June 2025 at C275-C281, and the statement of F in June this year at C335-C337, as well as the oral evidence of F about this incident. The Local Authority is not seeking to prove the precise facts of the incident beyond that which is pleaded in the threshold document. This is a proportionate approach in my view, especially given the understandable reluctance on the part of all concerned to put M and A through being required to give evidence.

It is clear from the various case notes and the EDT initial referral that M was the one who first contacted social services about the incident. It is also clear from the written evidence that F first told the EDT that he “threw some water on A” and that he had taken her phone away from her and he was advised to give her some space (C263). F told me that he disputed the accuracy of that record in relation to taking her phone away, because there had been numerous calls made by him to EDT during the incident, however the case notes are pretty clear that a subsequent call between F and the EDT show he still had her phone later on (C265). In fairness to F, this was clearly a fraught situation and unsurprising that he might not accurately recall the precise sequence of calls he made to the EDT. It is, however, abundantly clear from all of the evidence including F’s own written and oral evidence that he expected A to attend church, she was not willing to go, he went to into her bedroom with a bowl of water and deliberately sprinkled or threw water on her, causing A to become upset as he accepted in his statement at C336 and in oral evidence in answer to questions from Ms Reynolds. He also accepted at C336 para 3 that he “took A’s phone off her” before ringing EDT. He does not dispute that the police were called as a result of this incident. When questioned by Ms Reynolds F also accepted that what he did caused A to become upset, as he had put in his statement, and he regretted that. I would note that F appeared to find it difficult to answer the questions he was asked at points. Partly this seemed to stem from a desire to tell me what he thought he needed to in relation to his concerns and frustrations about M and social services. However, partly it also seemed to be evading questions that asked him to consider the impact of his actions on A’s emotional wellbeing, I find.

Ms Reynolds also submitted in closing that F gave a very concerning piece of oral evidence about this incident. I had already noted this evidence from F prior to her closing submissions, F telling me in answer to questions from Ms Gallagher that when he and A were in the kitchen A was in danger of falling over and F reached out to hold her and she thought that F was “going to attack her”. As Ms Reynolds submitted, on F’s own account A was in fear at that point. In his statement at C336 paras 7 and 10 it also seems that F accepted he did try to grab hold of A and she was trying to slap his hands away, albeit he said this was in an attempt to stop her falling over. Having considered carefully all of the evidence about this incident, I am satisfied on balance of probabilities that there was an argument between F and A, that F’s actions during that argument were not those of a good enough parent in behaving in the way that he did during the argument, specifically causing water to be thrown or sprinkled on her (the difference matters not from her perspective), causing her upset and fear, and those actions directly caused A significant emotional harm. This means that I am also satisfied that there is a likelihood of a risk of further significant harm attributable to the parenting that F would provide to A if she were to be in his care. This threshold criterion is therefore proved.

In relation to the second threshold criterion that is in dispute, as I have noted the disputed aspect on F’s case is whether there is sufficient evidence to show on balance of probabilities that the fact of A saying that she felt isolated and lonely in the care of F is attributable to his care of her. A’s own evidence at C2014 at the start of proceedings when she had been living with him for a month or so, was that she felt like the odd one out at his house, she kept to herself in her room most of the time, and that “my dad is very different to me, he does like the way I dress, my eyelashes or nose piercing. I feel like he does not want me to be like my mum and judges me because of this”. Subsequently it seemed from the PA conducted by Ms Masters, which was dated 12^th June 2025 but involved A last being seen on 21^st May 2025, as if things had improved for A in the care of her F as that PA noted positive examples of emotional warmth between F and A and did not identify any concerns about A’s emotional wellbeing in his care. However, that PA is not to be read in isolation and must be read in conjunction with all of the other evidence including that in relation to the 12^th June 2025 incident and the other evid of what A has said about her emotional well being in the care of F and the observations of A, F and Ms B that informed the addendum PA. Based on all of that evidence I am satisfied on balance of probabilities that A did suffer sig emotional harm in the care of her F and Ms B and that sig harm was attributable to the parenting provided to her by F not being as emotionally attuned as she required. I have also noted that, as F himself told me in his evidence, A is a child who has suffered trauma in the past. That is relevant to her perspective and emotional needs, including when she was in the care of F. A therefore needs and would have needed emotionally attuned parenting as the Guardian told me in her evidence. It would therefore be reasonable to expect a parent such as F to ensure that she was not parented in a way that caused her the sort of level of upset that resulted in the incident in June this year. I would also note that the details of that incident even on F’s account went far beyond simply an argument between a parent and child as Mr Macdonald submitted in closing. It resulted in A being assaulted by the water, and rapidly escalated to the point that multiple calls were made to EDT and the police had to become involved. It also resulted in A fearing that her father was going to attack her in the kitchen and led to her being injured during that fracas.

I therefore find that, at the relevant date namely 2^nd September 2024, A was at risk of suffering sig harm, that harm being attributable to the care given not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give and threshold is crossed for the purposes of s31 in relation to F in this regard.

The next aspect of public law proceedings that I must consider is what outcome is in A’s welfare interests.

The first relevant wc heading is A’s wishes and feelings in light of her age and understanding. She is 15 yo, turning 16 in Oct next year. Since June 2025 her stated wishes and feelings to all professionals and those who she instructs are that she does not want to live w F and does not want to spend time with him. As I noted earlier, there is evidence of her saying that back in Nov 2024 too. The Guardian also told me that A had told her and, she believed (as did Ms Smith the current ASW in fact) that had told the previous ASW that she was unhappy in the care of her F too. F’s issue with A's stated wishes and feelings at this point is that he does not accept that they should be given much weight in light of her understanding, or more precisely he says lack of understanding of the risks that he says exist for her in the care of M. It is clear to me from A’s final statement at C451-C452 that she is happier at her mothers, she does not want to see her F at the minute and she does not want to live with him. F’s case seems also to be that A has been influenced by M into holding these views, though given the palpable parental acrimony apparent to me through F’s evidence to me at times and what is recorded from M about F in the written evidence at times, it seem likely to me that the views of each parent about the other may well have fed into how A feels now, regardless of whether either parent intended that outcome. At 15 A is entitled to have her views given serious consideration, though they obviously cannot necessarily determine of the outcome of this case they carry more weight than for a younger child because of the potential for her to simply vote with her feet regardless of anything the court may order. The emotional impact of not giving adequate weight to, or even disregarding, the wishes and feelings of an older child is also potentially more significant as the professional evidence, particularly that of the CG to me, shows. There is also the tricky issue of how exactly does anyone, let alone a court, force an older child who is capable of voting with her feet to do something that she is adamantly opposed to doing?

Physical, emotional and educational needs is the next relevant checklist heading. As was accepted by Mr Macdonald in closing, there is no issue with either parent being able to meet the physical needs of A in their care. There is also no dispute that there has been a longstanding issue w A attending school in the care of M, and thus considerable evidence of A’s educational needs not being met when in the care of M. It is also not disputed that, until A left the care of F, her school attendance ceased to be an issue. It also appears to be undisputed that, since the beginning of the current school year, when A has been in the care of M, her attendance has again become an issue. The reasons for her attendance being an issue are disputed. What is clear from the evidence of the SW and CG, as well as A herself at C452, is that A has found the stress and anxiety of proceedings very difficult to handle. She clearly wanted proceedings to end at the IRH and, as both the social worker and Guardian told me, the fact that I could not achieve that came as a shock and has added to her distress. In my view this is clear evidence of the impact that delay can have on a child. The SW also told me that school attendance may be one area where A also feels she is able to have some control at the moment. So, A’s failure to attend school in a way that meets her educational needs may be due to factors that are outside of M’s control. This is also not an overriding factor when considering what is in A’s welfare interests and is instead part of the overall picture when balancing all relevant elements of her welfare.

Her emotional needs are a key aspect of this case, though, in light of my findings above. She is a traumatised child, who requires emotionally attuned parenting as the Guardian told and I have also already noted. Both of the parenting assessments completed of F by the LA also support this conclusion. What is clear from the updated parenting assessment of Fand Ms B is that A was not receiving that emotionally attuned parenting either from Ms B, or latterly from F after the FD incident. It is not in dispute that Ms B chose to distance herself from A as a result of fears about allegations being made against her (C380). It also appears from Mr Macdonald’s closing submissions that Ms B’s own caring responsibilities are accepted to have imposed a practical limit on the care that she could offer to A. Having carefully considered both parenting assessments, the first of F alone and the second of F with Ms B, I am satisfied that the first assessment did result in a gap in the evidence. I have reached this conclusion for two reasons. Firstly, it did not include Ms B because Ms B was not willing to be part of that assessment. With the benefit of hindsight that is something that the Court should have investigated sooner since it meant that the role of another significant adult in the care that was being or could be provided to A was not investigated. Secondly, it was conducted prior to the FD incident. Both of these aspects meant an addendum that included Ms B was necessary to justly determine the issue of where A should live. I know that F does not accept the conclusions of the second PA and prefers the conclusions of the first. As I have said, they are to be taken together. F’s allegations that somehow the SW conducting the addendum is involved in a conspiracy with M against him are, frankly absurd and completely lack any credibility. That he would come to such an extreme conclusion to explain the different outcomes of those two assessments is in itself rather concerning in terms of his thought processes too. Regardless of that, it is clear that both Ms M and Ms S carefully considered the information that they had in front of them and analysed. The problem is that Ms M’s analysis was hampered by the lack of participation of Ms B, but also she could not know and could not take into account what then transpired whilst A was in the care of F during the FD incid. As I have said, both of those aspects necessitated the addendum. The addendum was completed based on interviews with F, Ms B, A and also the observations of Ms S herself. Ms S confirmed that in her evidence to me. It is abundantly clear from that evidence that, as Ms S concluded, Ms B’s engagement with the assessment was not just minimal but offered “little reflection on A’s needs or her role in supporting them” C364. It is also very clear that Ms B also demonstrated very little interest or engagement in A when Ms S was observing them (for example during the visit the SW conducted on 10^th September 2025 when Ms B did not communicate or speak to A C379). This does fit with the evidence from A about how she felt she was treated in the family home when living with F and Ms B, and also fits with the unchallenged evidence about Ms B distancing herself from involvement with A because of fears of allegations being made against her (C380). I also had the evidence of the Guardian who had observed how different the two homes were from A’s perspective, and that there is more emotional warmth towards A in the care of M than in the care of F and Ms B.

The likely effect on A of any change in her circs is the next relevant checklist heading. She is currently living w M and has been since 12^th September. As was accepted by Mr M, making an order that required her to leave M’s care would be a change in circumstances. I accept that if she were to live with F, that would be returning to live with him and Ms B and therefore not a change that involves moving to a wholly unknown placement from her perspective. However, the key aspect of this checklist heading is the likely effect on A of any change. Requiring her to move against her wishes and in circumstances where there is a valid concern about her emotional needs not being met in the care of F does bring the potential to cause an adverse impact on her. Balanced against that is the evidence that, up to the FD incident, F was meeting A's needs in terms of schooling and basic care and, at times given the warm interactions Ms M observed, also her emotional needs too

I have really covered A’s age, sex, background and any characteristics that I consider relevant in my analysis above.

The next relevant heading relates to any harm which A has suffered or is at risk of suffering. In terms of this my threshold findings are relevant. I have found a risk of significant harm relating to F’s care of A as well as in the care of M. F’s case as strenuously put by both F in his evidence and by Mr Macdonald during this hearing is that F contends there is such a risk of harm to A in the care of A that this necessitates making an order that requires A to live with him regardless of the adverse emotional impact on her of doing so against her stated wishes and feelings, and in circumstances where there is a risk of A running away from that placement. I have clear, credible and consistent evidence from the SW and CG that they accept there is a risk in placing A in the care of M. To some extent that is obvious also from the fact that the LA seek a SO for a period of 12 mths and have provided a detailed SOSP to underpin that order. The LA in closing also reflected on the point made in xx of the Guardian (tho not the SW) by Mr M about frequency of visiting under a SO if made and have agreed to amend the SOSP to specify that weekly visits will take place for as long as they are deemed necessary. The Guardian was very clear to me in her evidence that her professional conclusion was that the risk to A of being placed with F against her wishes and feelings, that causing A further EH and placing her at escalating risk of running away to a point where she no longer allowed anyone to know her whereabouts, was greater than the risk of remaining in the care of M. Having reviewed all of the evid, I accept there is a very long and serious history of concerns about M’s care of A. At this point it is not clear to me why neither the LA nor F took any action during that long history, but nothing in my decision making today requires me to investigate that further.

I can also entirely understand, given that history, why F is so concerned about A in the care of M at this point. However, I do find that his evidence about his concern is somewhat contradictory. His case is that M is such a danger to A that A cannot live with her. He has been clear, though, that he also wants A to spend time with M. Whether that is supervised or not at this point is really not clear from his evidence to me, he having said supervised in some of his earlier written evidence, though not repeated in his last statement dated 25^th November 2025 at C465-C470 in the bundle and also not put by Mr Macdonald to the SW or Guardian as being required. F was also asked by Ms Reynolds why he was proposing that A spend weekends with M if his concern about A living with M was about A being able to go out and about as she chose and expose herself to risky behaviours and individuals. His answer seemed to be that he simply thought this was a compromise, and I had the impression that he thought A being with him during the week was because it would enable her to go to school Monday to Friday. I was struck by the way in which F became so concerned at telling me about the risks that A would face in the care of her M in his view, based on the past history, that he seemed almost to focus exclusively on that rather than the question he had been asked at times. It made understanding what he was saying in answer to some questions harder as a result. The most significant thing about this, though, in my view, is I am left with a question about how capable F may be of shielding A from his negative views of her M and protecting A’s emotional wellbeing in this regard. A is clearly aware of those negative views from her statement at C104. I accept that the same may equally be said to apply to M and her negative views of F, though, on the evidence overall before me.

I find that the risk of harm to A in the care of M can be mitigated by the SOSP and the support that work would provide. I also find that M has made changes since the outset of these proceedings and since many of the historical concerns about her were documented prior to that. It is true that she has not yet been able to undertake work with FASS, however that is because of the waiting list for FASS rather than any reluctance on her part as the SW told me. Much was made during this case by Mr Madonald of the fact that the psychiatric assessment of M by Dr Adshead recommended that she should undertake therapy to mitigate the risks posed by her EUPD and that M has not yet completed that therapy. M has completed OXPIP, which was a form of therapy recommended specifically for her by Dr A E88. Mr M also submitted that Dr A had been of the opinion that M had failed to engage with required therapy and that this meant there was a poor prognosis for M’s capacity to engage in therapy in future. In fact, as Dr A noted at E88 M did engage with FASS in the past and had also actively sought out therapy in the past. Dr A also noted that the sort of work undertaken by FASS was potentially particularly beneficial for M in light of her EUPD(E94). What it seems M in fact failed to engage with previously was the NICE recommended treatment for EUPD with is 18 months mentalization based therapy as Dr A noted at E86, though it is not clear why despite attending several sessions M was not able to take that up as Dr A noted (E87). I can take judicial notice from my knowledge of them in other cases of the fact that FASS would potentially be able to offer mentalization based therapy as well as other potential therapeutic inputs, and this was also something confirmed by the CG in her evidence to me.

Parenting capability is the next relevant welfare checklist heading. In this regard I have various and extensive assessments of M throughout the proceedings. Those assessments have actually been completed by an ISW, Ms Sayers, so were not done by Ms S. With regard to M’s ability to parent A, the ISW noted that her recommendations were finely balanced (C291). Again, she noted the historic concerns about A in the care of M, and she was also clearly aware of the FD incident. She concluded “on balance, it if was assessed that A could not remain with her father due to safeguarding issues or placement breakdown I would recommend that A return to her mother’s care with a robust support plan around parenting expectations, engagement with services and school attendance but ideally there should be evidence of get with services due to risk of relapse and A experiencing further adverse childhood experiences” (C291-C292). The SW and CG have also carefully considered M’s parenting capability in relation to A and concluded that she is capable of parenting A to a good enough standard with support.

In terms of F’s and Ms B’s parenting capability, as noted I have two parenting assts of him, and one of Ms B. That evidence and my findings above above risk of harm to A in his care leads me to conclude that F and Ms B are not at present capable of parenting A in a way that is good enough in relation to her emotional needs. F was offered support in re-establishing his relationship with A but has declined that support unless it is delivered by someone from the local authority that he is happy with. It is not, of course, possible for a parent to pick and choose which professionals they work with. Regardless of his rather extreme suspicions about Ms Smith, a good enough parent should be capable of listening to A and acknowledging her views. As the Guardian told me, in her view there is also concerning evidence of F not being able to adapt his parenting style to one that is better suited to A’s needs and in light of her past experiences, and I was struck by the rigidity of F’s views about what A required when he was giving me his evidence.

Finally the range of powers available to the court is relevant to this case under the checklist headings. The court can make no order, or a public law order since I have found threshold to be crossed under s31, or a private law order, and I also have power to made a s91(14) order. An order of some kind to determine where A lives is necessary on anyone’s case at this FH. Mr M confirmed in closing that F was seeking an order for A to live with him, not with M and he was not seeking any public law order to underpin placement with him nor for A to be placed in foster care. It was submitted by Ms R in closing that placement with F under a CAO was not a realistic option, only leaving plct with M as a realistic option. Given my findings above on balance I do find that the only realistic option for A at this point is to remain with M. This is because making an order for A to live with F against A’s clearly stated express wishes and feelings would expose A to risk of further emotional harm in the care of F and Ms B (neither of whom are prepared to do anything to mitigate that risk by working with the LA from the evid before me). It would also expose A to a direct and very significant risk of harm by her absconding from F’s care, ultimately potentially in a way that means she is not just returning to the care of her M but in circumstances where nobody might know where she is. As the SW told me, A is not prepared to have her whereabouts tracked by an app on her phone when in the care of F, whereas she is prepared to have this happen in the care of her mother.

I have ack that plct with M is not without risk. However, making a SO for a period of 12 mths underpinned by the amended SOSP that will include weekly visits for as long as required will mitigate this risk, I find. It will provide A and M with support to ensure that there is no repetition of the harm that has occurred in the past, and enable work and support to be put in to tackle A’s poor school attendance. I appreciate that this will bring with it continued state intervention in both M and A’s lives, but that is necessary and proportionate in light of the risks. Given my conclusions about the balance between the various welfare checklist factors, I am also satisfied that it is in A's welfare interests for there to be a CAO specifying that she is to live with M and that this order should last until she is 18 to provide her with security and stability. The CG and SW both told me that this was what A requires and I have also reached that conclusion from the written and oral evidence at this FH.

Finally, I have considered whether a s91(14) order is required. I accept that F has not made numerous applications in respect of A. I also accept that the Guardian’s recommendation was that one was not necessary. However, I am mindful of the evidence from F about not accepting that the local authority has properly balanced the risks posed to A from M in their decision making, and also of the evidence from A and the SW and CG about the impact on her of these prolonged proceedings. That impact has included an adverse impact on her school attendance. Considering s91(14), s91A, Re P and PS12Q, I am satisfied that there is a risk of harm to A if F were to make an application to court for an order under s8 of the CA 1989. Given my conclusion about A’s need for stability and security until she is 18, and noting that she will turn 18 on 24^th October 2028 which is some 2 years and just over 10 months away, I find that the duration of the order should be until A’s 18^th birthday. This does not prevent an application from F at all, simply imposes a filter, requiring him to show what has changed since the order was made that may justify the resumption of proceedings. Since any section 8 application made subsequent to these proceedings could have the effect of seeking to vary the orders I am making, including the CAO for A to live w M, that would potentially mean that A herself was a respondent to the application since she is a party to these proceedings, considering FPR 12.3. I am satisfied that it would not be in A’s welfare interests for her to be served with notice of any application for leave made by F during the currency of the s91(14) order, and by extension that it would therefore also not be appropriate for that notice to be served on any other party in case A were to be made aware by them inadvertently. That would achieve the mischief that my order is seeking to avoid. I will also direct that any such application for perm to apply during the currency of the order should be dealt with on the papers in the first instance without an oral hearing, and that proceedings should be reserved to me if available.