F v M & Anor

This is a fact-finding hearing to deal with allegations made in the context of Children Act proceedings. The parties are the two parents, F and M, and the child, A, through her rule 16.4 Guardian.

F and M were in a relationship from 2012. They married in 2016 and two years later A was born. They separated in early 2023.

On 18^th September 2023 F applied for a Child Arrangements Order (CAO) in respect of A, accompanied by a form C1A making allegations against M of physical, emotional and psychological harm towards him and emotional and psychological harm towards A. The application was issued on 10^th November 2023 and listed for a First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointment (FHDRA) before Magistrates on 9^th January 2024. CAFCASS safeguarding was directed to be completed prior to the FHDRA.

At the FHDRA arrangements seem to have been largely agreed in relation to A, including that A would live with M and spend time with F, the parents were directed to complete the CAFCASS Planning Together for Children Programme, and a section 7 report to consider what arrangements were in A’s welfare interests was directed to be completed by 21^st May 2024. Both parents were represented at the hearing. There is no mention on the order made at that hearing of PD12J being considered by the Court, which is somewhat surprising in light of the allegations made by F on the C1A lodged with the initiating C100 application. Statements of evidence from each of the parents were directed to be filed 14 days after the section 7 report was received, and the case was listed for a Dispute Resolution Appointment (DRA) in accordance with PD12B on 10^th June 2024 before Magistrates.

At the DRA it appears to have been agreed between the parties, and endorsed by the Court, that there should be an adjournment of proceedings to 16^th October 2024 to allow CAFCASS to complete an addendum section 7 report after there had been therapeutic input to A and the family.

The adjourned DRA took place on 16^th October 2024. At that DRA interim arrangements for A were agreed, but long-term arrangements were not. The matter was listed for a 2-day final hearing before Magistrates on 19^th and 20^th March 2025.

At that final hearing the case was further adjourned. The author of the CAFCASS section 7 report and later addendum had told the Court that, following receipt of the parents’ final statements and position statements, she had become increasingly concerned. She considered that, if final orders were to be made at that hearing, there was a high risk the arrangements would deteriorate. She was considering whether a rule 16.4 Guardian was required but recommended a global psychological assessment in any event. It seems from the order made at the conclusion of the hearing that parties spent time identifying an appropriate expert, proposed questions and interim contact arrangements. I can see nothing in the order from that hearing to show that anyone realised that instructing an expert at that point in proceedings was contrary to case law and the Family Justice Council (FJC) Guidance issued in December 2024 about case management for cases involving allegations of alienating behaviour. It also seems as if no properly constituted Part 25 application was before the court, but somehow this led to Ms Schoeman being the expert approved by the Court, an HCP registered Clinical Psychologist. Re-allocation was considered, but it also seems from the order that a decision on this was deferred to the next hearing which was scheduled for 17^th, 18^th and 19^th September 2025, though it is not clear why re-allocation was not dealt with promptly at the hearing on 20^th March 2024. By this point the case clearly had elements of complexity and factors identified in column 1 of the Schedule of Allocation in Private Law Proceedings so should ordinarily have been reallocated to at least District Judge.

Ms Schoeman’s report was filed on 2^nd May 2025. On 6^th June 2025 she provided answers to clarifying questions put by the parents. On 10^th June 2025 CAFCASS requested an extension to the date for the addendum report until 29^th August 2025 due to the report writer being unwell.

On 26^th June 2025 a further DRA took place, having been directed by the Court on 20^th March 2025. The author of the section 7 report was not confirmed as being able to return to work, and the final hearing listed to commence on 17^th September was vacated, with the case being re-allocated to either District Judge or Circuit Judge and a Directions Hearing was listed on 17^th September 2025 instead. F was directed to file a schedule of allegations in readiness for that hearing, though I can see no consideration on the face of the order about whether this was appropriate given the issues identified in recent caselaw and the FJC Guidance around schedules of allegations being used cases involving alleged patterns of alienating behaviour.

On 23^rd August 2025 an incident occurred whereby A, who had been staying with F in accordance with interim contact arrangements, left F’s home early that morning and made her way alone to the local railway station. This led to M making an application on 28^th August 2025 to vary or suspend the interim arrangements for A.

On 29^th August 2025 a new CAFCASS officer, allocated to replace the previous author of the section 7 report, filed an addendum report. That report recommended that there should be a Fact-Finding Hearing to determine the parties’ allegations prior to the author being able to make final recommendations for A. The case had been listed for an urgent directions hearing on 8^th September 2025 before me to deal with the application by M to suspend or vary arrangements and a subsequent application on 2^nd September 2025 by F to enforce arrangements, however on 4^th September the parties submitted an application and consent order to vacate that hearing. I therefore dealt with the matter on the papers and directed an update from the new CAFCASS officer in readiness for the next hearing, which was scheduled to take place on 17^th September 2025.

At court on 17^th September 2025 F sought permission to withdraw his enforcement application, A was made a party to proceedings and NYAS invited to act since CAFCASS had indicated lack of capacity to appoint a rule 16.4 Guardian in a timely fashion. However, this was subsequently varied when CAFCASS contacted the Court to confirm that the newly allocated CAFCASS officer, Ms Brown, was in fact able to act as rule 16.4 Guardian. The case was listed for this Fact-Finding Hearing (FFH).

A Pre-Trial Review (PTR) took place before me on 31^st October 2025. The case remained listed for this Fact-Finding Hearing (FFH), and the matter was also listed for a DRA on 16^th March 2026 after the Guardian would be able to file a Final Analysis and Recommendations taking into account the outcome of this FFH.

I have read the evidence contained in the Court Bundle, and heard evidence from F and M. Though I have read all of the evidence in the Bundle, I was not assisted by solicitors for F producing multiple versions of the Bundle after the deadline set for that to be filed and served, and there being no explanation supplied with any of those different versions. It seems ultimately to have been due to some evidence being omitted in error from the first version, and ongoing pagination problems. As it was, the start of the hearing was delayed to enable a complete witness bundle to be printed and to ensure that version accorded with the eBundles being used by advocates and the Court. The final version was not synchronised in terms of the printed and electronic pagination, being out by 3 pages, so that also did not help at times with promptly directing witnesses and others to the correct page. I will use the pdf pagination for the purposes of this judgment since that should make it easier for parties and advocates to quickly cross reference it with the eBundle. Fundamentally the Bundle far exceeded the normal maximum of 350 pages, approaching 900 pages, many of the extra pages coming from overly lengthy and repetitive witness statements (mainly repetitive on the part of M), and the report of Ms Schoeman. Fortunately, much of that evidence will need to be removed from the Bundle for the welfare stage which should then result in a more manageable Bundle for that stage of proceedings and one that accords with expectations around maximum size.

F alleges that M has been controlling of arrangements for A, has not collaborated with him about parenting A, and has engaged in alienating behaviours. As directed by the Court in June, and then amended by my direction at the hearing on 17^th September to remove allegations that predated the commencement of proceedings, there is a composite schedule of allegations which appears at pages 13-33 of the Bundle, the length arising from the responses to the allegations.

M denies the allegations and makes no allegations of her own in respect of which she seeks findings.

The Guardian, as is usual in fact-finding, is neutral in relation to the allegations made.

Whoever makes an allegation has the burden of proving that it is true. They must do so to the civil standard, ie on balance of probabilities (Miller v Ministry of Pensions [1947] 2 ALL ER 372). I have considered both Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2008] 2 FLR 141 and Re Y (No 3) [2016] EWHC 503. As the case law makes clear, an allegation will therefore be proved if the person making it establishes that it is more likely than not that it happened. The seriousness of the allegation or the seriousness of the consequences make no difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. Findings of fact must be based on evidence and not on suspicion or speculation, though can be based on inferences properly drawn from the evidence (Re A (A child) (Fact finding hearing: Speculation) [2011] ECWA Civ 12). Evidence is also not evaluated and assessed separately, “A Judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevant of each piece of evidence to the other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof” (Butler Sloss P in Re T [2004] ECWA (Civ) 556). The court looks at the ‘broad canvas of the evidence’ and “the range of facts which may properly be taken into account is infinite” (H and R (child sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1996] 1 FLR 80). A court considering allegations must take into account all of the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all of the other evidence (Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558). It is, however, not necessary to determine every subsidiary date-specific factual allegation (K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468).

I have taken into consideration the principles outlined in Re H-N and others (children) (domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 which, although specifically considered domestic abuse allegations, also provided helpful guidance in approaching allegations about patterns of abusive behaviour and thus can be applicable when dealing with allegations of alienating behaviour (as acknowledged in the FJC Guidance). Alienating behaviour can be akin to other forms of emotional or psychological abuse. Practice Direction 12J Child Arrangements and Contact Order: Domestic Violence and Harm is therefore also relevant and provides key definitions and guidance in terms of case management.

A Court can take into account the demeanour of a witness or the way in which they gave evidence but needs to be careful in approaching this, noting that in the case of emotive evidence a truthful witness may stumble and struggle whilst giving their evidence, whilst an untruthful witness may give their evidence in a composed manner. The Court may be assisted by internal consistency of evidence and considering how it fits with other parts of the evidence.

The principles outlined in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 may also be relevant. There can be many reasons why someone may lie including shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion or emotional pressure, and that just because a witness may lie about one aspect of their evidence it does not necessarily mean that they may be lying about other aspects.

I have also borne in mind that abusive behaviour may be insidious in nature and requires sophisticated analysis of the evidence. At the same time, a Court has to draw a distinction between abusive behaviour and poor behaviour which falls short of being abusive. Hence the need for the Court to focus upon those findings which will have a material impact on child arrangements if proved.

Mr Bond for the Guardian referred me to the case of Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568, which is in any event one that I am familiar with and is also referenced in the Family Justice Council Guidance I note below, albeit from the perspective of these cases requiring timely determination of the factual matrix in order to determine the appropriate welfare outcomes for children, and there being a real risk of harm to a child if there is delay. In Re S Jackson LJ adopted the CAFCASS definition of alienation: “‘When a child’s resistance/hostility towards one parent is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent.’ To that may be added that the manipulation of the child by the other parent need not be malicious or even deliberate. It is the process that matters, not the motive” (para 8).

I have taken into account the Family Justice Council (FJC) Guidance from December last year on responding to a child’s unexplained reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent and allegations of alienating behaviour. The Guidance references Re C (Parental Alienation; Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam), which pointed out that ‘parental alienation’ is not a syndrome capable of being diagnosed, “but a process of manipulation of children perpetrated by one parent against the other through what are termed as alienating behaviours…what is important is the particular behaviour that is found to have taken place within the individual family before the court, and the impact that that behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child with either or both of his/her parents” (FJC Guidance on responding to allegations of alienating behaviour page 8).

The FJC Guidance reiterated the conclusions reached in Re C as to a court needing to be satisfied that three elements are established before it could conclude that alienating behaviours had occurred:

The FJC Guidance also points out that research evidence suggests that alienating behaviours which actually impact on a child’s relationship with the other parent are relatively rare. Therefore findings will also be rare, and the Guidance goes on to note that reluctance, resistance or refusal to see a parent by a child is not itself evidence of psychological manipulation, and that a child’s reluctance, resistance or refusal may remain unexplained. The absence of a clear explanation does not confirm exposure to alienating behaviours. Whilst psychological manipulation of a child can be subtle and insidious, a parent alleging alienating behaviours must discharge the burden of establishing both that such harmful behaviour has occurred, and that this behaviour has led to a child’s unjustified reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with that parent. The Court’s role is to analyse the behaviour of the adult and its impact on the child in the context of the child’s unique experiences, their resilience and vulnerability.

At this stage it is important to grapple with the issues around the evidence from Ms Schoeman. As I have noted, the point in the proceedings that her instruction was approved did not accord with any best practice guidance in terms of cases like this. It is hard to understand how this situation arose when both parents have been legally represented throughout proceedings, including for the purposes of the litigation overall and not simply by direct access counsel at hearings. As the FJC Guidance makes clear, neither CAFCASS nor any professional or expert instructed in the proceedings can be an arbiter of fact. The Guidance specifically states: “it is inappropriate for experts to be asked to step into fact-finding or determination of alienating behaviours – as such, the timing and type of expert evidence needed is crucial. In determining the welfare outcome, when the presence of such harmful behaviours have been identified, it may be necessary to have expert evidence from a psychologist expert”(FJC Guidance page 26), my emphasis added. What I have been confronted with in this case is a global psychological assessment directed before any factual matrix had either been agreed or found by the court in relation to why A may be reluctant, resistant or refusing to spend time with F. The initial questions that the expert was asked to address are set out at 646-648 and total 27, an unusually high number for a court appointed expert in my experience. It also seems to depart from the Law Society template which suggests sample questions for holistic psychological assessment. More concerningly it appears to me that certain of those questions sought to directly involve the expert in the fact-finding exercise, such as asking her to comment on the extent to which either M or F “appears motivated or inclined to undermine the relationship between the other and the child or to fabricate circumstances for this purpose” (647); the ability of the parents to “work openly and honestly with professionals and give them consistent accounts” (ibid), “please comment on the M and F’s individual ability to emotionally support contact between the child and the other parent” (ibid), asking her to comment on how it is likely that any attachment needs she may have identified in A have been formed (648), and “please provide an analysis of your views as to why A is reported by M to have expressed reluctance to spend time with her father” (ibid). Perhaps unsurprisingly given the number of questions and the length of some of those, the resultant report is also far longer than the normal maximum that a Court would permit. Six further questions in clarification were then asked of her in addition resulting in her responses to those questions at 799-806.

Both parties sought to rely on aspects of Ms Schoeman’s evidence during this fact-finding hearing, and I asked advocates to address their minds to the problems about this evidence raised by its being ordered at a stage in proceedings that departs from the practice guidance and to address that in closing. Overall, I have reached the conclusion that the evidence of Ms Schoeman is fundamentally flawed, though this is not a criticism of her, but an inevitable consequence of the court requiring her to produce a report at a wholly inappropriate stage of the proceedings and in circumstances where she was being asked to address unresolved disputed facts and proffer conclusions about them. I have carefully considered whether I can separate out those parts of her evidence which are not founded on the as yet undetermined factual matrix. However, given the lengthy report and the intertwined nature of her considerations which inevitably flow from her being asked to conduct such a detailed and global assessment, this has proved to be a Herculean task. One, I would note, that is in breach of the expectations of the overriding objective of the Family Procedure Rules, but more fundamentally has added a wholly unnecessary layer of complexity and time to the already difficult task of analysing the parties’ own evidence which is extensive in itself. Her evidence is of limited assistance to a fact-finding exercise such as this, and I have been able to attach little weight to it because of the factors I have noted. At best, as submitted by Mr Bond in closing, it may provide context, however that context must also be approached with caution and can only be given limited weight in light of my concerns about the way in which it was obtained.

F’s allegations are grouped into four aspects with subsidiary findings associated with each. The first is that M is controlling towards F and his parenting, which impacts on A and is controlling of A and of contact between F and A and will often use A as a means of doing so. F accepted in his oral evidence to me when questioned by Mr Green for M that they had agreed a parenting plan prior to separation. He also accepted that since separation, there have only been six days when A has missed spending time with F, all of which were due to illness. I note that this did not take account of the issues around progression of A spending more time with F, M’s position throughout proceedings having been that overnight and then increased contact needed to go more slowly than F was seeking or CAFCASS were recommending. However, it is apparent that, despite the extremely slow progression of A spending time with F, this is not a case characterised by A spending no or very little time with F. Under this heading, F also alleged that M would tell him where he could take A, what to feed her, who she could see, what clothes she should wear and what toilet paper she should use. There is written evidence of communications between the parties which I would categorise as lengthy and perhaps overly detailed in the context of parental conflict. They are certainly not the sort of businesslike communications that CAFCASS and the Court often encourage parents to use, and the early ones are not undertaken via a parenting app but contained in emails and texts. As M accepted in her evidence to me, tone does not always convey in such communications. Whilst entirely possible that she did not mean them to appear controlling and may well have intended to be helpful, such a level of detail could appear to be an attempt to micro-manage what F was doing with A and, in the context of parental conflict about arrangements for A, was not helpful in reducing the potential for adult conflict, I find. However I do not find that this was controlling the way that F alleges.

The above allegation I find is linked to the allegation that M failed to collaborate with F on parenting decisions and techniques. F’s evidence about this was not particularly clear, but M was also not a terribly credible or compelling witness due to her unfortunate tendency not to answer the question she was asked but instead to provide me with lengthy oral evidence about something different that she thought was relevant. The one thing that was clear to me from both of their evidence during this hearing and in their written evidence is that each could considerably improve their means of communicating with each other about issues affecting A, though I do note they are now using a parenting app which may assist with this. I am not clear if they have completed any programme specifically designed to improve their communication skills in the context of parental conflict, apart from the Triple P parenting course, but would suggest that the Guardian may need to consider if there is a resource that would assist with this.

It seems overall from both the evidence of F and M as if there was communication between them on parenting decisions, however I do note that the limit to the time that A was spending with F would have inevitably restricted F’s ability to implement parenting techniques and it also seems clear from the evidence at this hearing and in the Bundle that they each have differing parenting styles with M being more permissive and F more restrictive. It would obviously benefit A if both could learn to moderate their parenting styles to provide less of a contrast when A moves between them. Their apparent difference in approach to pocket money, which is what I find has happened rather than any deliberate use of this by M as a controlling or unilateral approach as F alleged, is a good illustration of both needing to reflect and find a way to demonstrate a unified or consistent approach for A’s benefit, I find.

F’s allegation that M refused to engage in discussion around A’s extracurricular activities is one that is not made out on his evidence, let alone when the evidence of M is taken into account. It seems there was discussion, A has been able to participate in extracurricular activities and no evidence to support a finding that F was excluded from discussions around those, and F accepted this in his oral evidence when questioned by Mr Green. In fact, as F himself told me, it was F who wanted A to join a particular choir, M agreed to a taster session but not to any follow-up audition but F took her to that audition, nonetheless. It also seems as if, as both parties told me during their evidence, in any event A is participating in a choir; this allegation is not proved.

F has also alleged that M has created a very restrictive routine for A making it difficult for A and F to do anything after school and that M refuses this to try to alter it to work for both parties. F’s evidence about this was also not very clear, though it was apparent that the geography requires that it is a longer journey from A’s school to his home and that an early bedtime for A on a Friday night combined with that longer journey inevitably means that it is a rush for A to have a meal, some downtime and then go to bed. Whilst an earlier bedtime may have been required by A’s age when these proceedings commenced, I am by no means clear why she still needs to go to bed at about 6.30pm as M’s evidence (both written and oral) set out. In fact, as both F and M’s evidence demonstrated, this is a good illustration of A having different routines between the two households in a way that is not necessarily helpful to A. I note that A’s proximity to school when in the care of M means that she has a shorter journey to and from school, but that does not mean that her routine cannot be adapted when in the care of M to one that is more akin to that in the care of F, I find. To this extent I find that M has failed to adapt A’s routine to acknowledge that A will have a longer journey to and from school when in the care of F and M has no child-focussed reason for that failure. I find that it would be in A’s welfare interests to make that adjustment so that she goes to bed slightly later when in the care of M and thus has less of an adjustment to make when she is in the care of F and has had a longer journey home from school. Whether either parent is a morning person or not, as both addressed in their oral evidence at points, has no significance, this is about what is in A’s welfare interests and about what may make her experience in the care of both of her parents better, I find.

Also potentially relevant to the overall allegation of M being controlling and failing to parent in a collaborative way is F’s allegation about M not allowing F to complete homework with A (there is a clear typo in the schedule since it says with ‘the Applicant’ when it clearly means A). There is a fair amount of written evidence about this in the bundle, and this was also explored in evidence before me. F was clear in his oral evidence that he asked M about homework for A and to be able to contribute to her doing it. M was equally clear that she did provide F with the opportunity and sent A’s books with her when A was to stay with him, but they were returned uncompleted. Strangely, given the extensive written communications between the parties and detailed instructions from M to F about lots of other aspects of parenting A, M does not appear to have provided that level of detail in relation to homework. In the written communications about this in the bundle which F has produced, M responded to F asking about this in a way that seems uncharacteristically short based on her other communications (p 486). M’s oral evidence was also that she simply sent the books with A without any additional instructions. Again, this is an illustration of the parents’ inability to communicate effectively, I find. F was the more credible witness about this and I find this allegation proved on balance of probabilities.

Linked to this aspect of F’s allegations is the allegation that M has produced extremely detailed spreadsheets and graphs regarding A’s sleeping and time spent with F. It is not in dispute that M has done this and there is a substantial quantity of evidence in the Bundle to corroborate this too. F’s allegation is that M would then analyse and become obsessive over this in an attempt to control A and her time with F, and also that this demonstrates the level of M’s anxiety that is being projected onto A. F accepted in evidence to me when questioned by Mr Green that it was not unreasonable for M to log and attempt to track whatever was going on with A. As M told me, she is used to doing this in her professional life and also in relation to her own health. I would note that, regardless of her professional training, there is an inherent level of subjectivity in what is recorded because it a) purports to assign levels to any anxiety demonstrated by A, and b) is then analysed by A’s mother, someone who on any reading is close to A emotionally and thus cannot be simply objective in relation to either her observations or her analysis. There is also the risk of confirmation bias in what M has produced if she believes that there is a correlation between A spending time with F and any symptoms of anxiety observed. The spreadsheets go back to F moving out in March 2023 when A would have been (p222) 4 years old. It is not surprising for a 4-year-old child to express reluctance at spending time apart from a parent, especially in circumstances where that involves spending time away what has been their main home up to that point. It is also not unusual in my experience for a parent in Family proceedings to produce detailed spreadsheets or graphs showing details that they consider relevant to their evidence about arrangements for the children involved in proceedings. How ultimately helpful those are to the Court in most cases is often doubtful and, if the other parent is not somebody who finds it easy to process information produced in that format, it can at times cause confusion and add to conflict. I’m not sure that is the case here, more that it is something that F does not accept demonstrates the correlation between what M says has been A’s anxiety and spending time with F. Ultimately, as I have noted, I question how objective these recordings are, but on M’s account using her own data things have now improved for A. I am unable to find that these spreadsheets and graphs show what F alleges in terms of M’s anxiety and its projection on to A, though I am satisfied that they show that M may lack insight into her lack of objectivity when it comes to A and A spending time with F.

Finally, in respect of linked allegations about M being controlling and not involving F in parenting decisions about A, there is an allegation that M has not included F in considerations for secondary school and A has repeatedly stated that she will be attending a particular school. F accepted in his oral evidence to me that what A may have said to him could well have come from what A’s peers have been talking about at school. Both F and M accepted that secondary school for A is years away at the moment. M told me that she did not even know the secondary school options for A at this point, though it is odd that if A had discussed what secondary schools she may go to with F that A did not also do that with M. M’s own evidence to me about A was that she was generally a child who talks a lot and it was often hard for M to get a word in edgeways. However, that is not the same as proving on balance of probabilities that M has already been discussing secondary schools with A in a way that excludes F. Again, what I can find about this based on the evidence before me is that there is an issue about the adult conflict here in that neither parent really trusts the other. A may well have stated repeatedly that she thinks she is going to a particular school, and it is more likely than not that she has done this to both parents in fact, but that is likely to have come from what her peers have been saying. It will be important in due course for both parents to equally discuss secondary school options for A and to reach agreement about that, but I do not find that M has started considering secondary schools at this point. This allegation is not proved.

The next group of allegations relate to M making negative comments about F in the presence of A. This seems to be a mixture of things that F alleges have been said by M in the presence of A, for example that ‘A doesn’t like it when people visit’, and things that M accepts A has said, for example that she feared that F would take her and that F did not want her to spend time with her maternal family. Both parties’ evidence to me about this during the hearing was confusing. It seemed clear that, at its highest, A may have overheard things said by others but that this was not intended by those making the comments. It was also clear that both F and M accepted that A has spent time with both paternal and maternal families and enjoys doing so. It seems more likely that this allegation is more about the distrust between the respective parents at this point. I do not find this allegation proved. However, the issues around A’s alleged anxieties and worries about spending time with F are ones that I will return to later in this judgment when I consider the allegations relating to voice recordings and so-called worry notes.

The next allegation is that M cancelled overnight contact sessions due to A being unwell and refused to rearrange them. This is not disputed by M, as is made clear in her response to the allegation on the schedule. That response points out that there was no requirement in the court order to re-arrange contact and that M was unaware at the time of the practice. Of course, from A’s perspective, if she loses spending time with F because she was ill, one would normally expect that a child would want to make that time up and it is somewhat surprising that M needed to be told that this was a practice to consider it. Many separated parents reach that conclusion without any input from the Court or professionals, but it seems to me this is indicative of the level of parental conflict in this case rather than anything more sinister. As a matter of fact, this finding is made out because it is not disputed, though I also find that it illustrates the inability of M to move past the adult conflict and to consider that A may benefit from the missed time being made up later. Ultimately it is not of assistance to the Court in determining whether there have been alienating behaviours, though.

M not facilitating video calls is the next allegation. This seems to boil down to confusion between F and M about what should take place outside of term time arrangements and by reference to the court order. Again, this does not seem to be disputed by either party, though it is sadly indicative of the extent to which F and M seem unable to work together outside of a detailed court order, in my view.

At this point I have turned to consider the allegations relating to M recording voice notes from A, her use of worry notes with A, and the comments made about A’s time with F and F’s parenting in the school comment book. I have linked these allegations because they all involve A or have the potential to involve her since both F and M accept she has access to the school comment book, though M said she did not in fact read it.

The worry notes and voice notes are very troubling evidence in my view. There are, as M accepted in her written and oral evidence, literally hundreds of the worry notes and a fair few of the voice notes. All of the voice notes seem to have been recorded when A had been awake for prolonged periods at night, and when M was herself was probably not in the best frame of mind to be making decisions let alone framing those recordings with opening and closing remarks as the transcribed recordings show. M accepted this in her evidence to me. I find that the recording of these voice notes in those circumstances was not a child-focused action and also one that does not accord with any professional advice on how to handle a child’s anxieties. It ran the risk of validating and reinforcing A’s fears and anxieties without those necessarily being validly held fears and anxieties, and was done at a time when neither A nor M were thinking clearly and calmly.

Whilst M told me that the worry notes were recommended by professionals that she had spoken to, her written evidence about this (p198) was that she had spoken to an unidentified child psychologist about this without A. CAFCASS had queried in one of their reports why M did not simply throw away or burn these notes and M told me that this was because she feared that A would find them in the bin and she had no means to burn them. I did not find M’s evidence about these worry notes credible or compelling. If the worry notes were intended to enable A to remove the worries and fears from her head, to acknowledge that they were groundless and to help A to move on from them, then one would expect M to have destroyed those notes and to have shown A that they were destroyed. Instead, what happened on M’s own account (p198-199) is that the notes were kept, seem to have become part of a concerning pattern of A being encouraged to record her fears rather than being shown that her fears were groundless, and to have fed into A’s fears and anxieties about spending time with F. It is also deeply troubling that, as M accepts, A turned up at her first appointment with the Family Court Adviser (p603) with three jars of these notes and a typed list of worries with dates and times that M had prepared and sent with her. This is not something that one would expect a parent to do, let alone one who was ostensibly saying that she was supportive of A spending time with F and that there were no safeguarding concerns to prevent A spending time with F. M’s actions contrast with her apparent agreement at court hearings to A spending time with F, but more importantly ran the direct risk of influencing A’s views of her father. Like the voice notes, this a sort of subtle and insidious psychological manipulation of A, I find, and one that is not in A’s welfare interests. I accept that a child such as A may well have expressed fears and anxieties about spending time with F, this is hardly surprising in the context of parental conflict about arrangements for her and initially was not surprising given her age as I noted earlier. Whatever professional advice M may nor may not have taken about techniques to manage any fears and anxieties that A may have articulated at points, my finding is that what she did was not appropriate for A in the context of parental acrimony, though it does not appear to have been deliberate and I find was unintentional and may well have started from a genuine desire to deal with A expressing anxiety about spending time with F. The fact is that A has not been able to articulate any reason for her anxieties, not just to M but also to school and the Family Court adviser (pp604-605), though this does not itself prove psychological manipulation but rather shows that A’s fears and anxieties were objectively groundless. M’s evidence to me accepted that whatever A referred to as a reason for her anxiety about spending time with F was very minor to anyone else albeit not to A. One would have thought this would have prompted M to realise that A’s anxieties were in fact groundless, but instead M seems to have taken them as valid and then unconsciously reinforced them with the worry note and voice recording techniques. Whether this amounts to alienating behaviours is a different question, and one to which I will return later in this judgment in light of my findings overall.

In terms of the allegation of negative comments being made about F’s parenting in the school comment book, F accepted in his oral evidence when questioned by Mr Green for M that he may have been “uber sensitive”. M’s evidence about this when she addressed the questions asked of her by Ms Lavelle was that she was not criticising F’s parenting in the comments, however strikingly much of her unsolicited oral evidence to me often circled back to her criticisms of F’s parenting “deficits”, citing Ms Schoeman’s conclusions as evidence of these though not providing much explicit detail beyond this. It was also notable how often M sought to deflect away from answering questions about her parenting by instead referring to criticisms of F’s parenting. Overall, despite her protestations that she was totally positive about F to A unlike F about her to A, I find that M was overly focused on trying to highlight what she felt were the negatives about F’s parenting rather than acknowledging that there may be aspects of her parenting that could improve. Having heard both F and M give evidence in the course of this hearing, I am satisfied on balance of probabilities that both have negative views of the other and it is quite clear to me that a bright child such as A would be able to detect that negativity.

The next aspects of this group of allegations relate to M allegedly questioning A, telling A information and then asking her to keep it secret from F, and discussing adult issues with A. The latter one F accepted in evidence to me was something he could not really evidence. In relation to M questioning A, as M told me, A is a child who clearly talks a lot, and this is corroborated by lengthy discussions she seems to have had with the Family Court Adviser in the preparation of her reports. F’s only evidence about A keeping secrets was the example of a trip to Paris which M accepts she told A that she would not tell F about immediately though she would have to tell him about closer to the time. I’m not clear why M felt it necessary to accede to A’s wishes about keeping this secret from F and did not simply tell A that F needed to know and that she would be telling him. Again, keeping this secret for part of the time risks sending an implicit message to A that it is somehow acceptable not to tell F at first, I find, and not something that is in A’s welfare interests. It also chimes with evidence from M (p196) about A being apparently fearful of things she said becoming known by F – the fears and anxieties A was apparently expressing according to M’s evidence were groundless, ie that F would not kidnap her or about him turning up at school, but were not countered by M adequately on M’s own evidence of A repeatedly raising them.

One other unusual aspect of this case is that M has said that A’s anxiety manifests in physical symptoms. F’s allegation about this was the subject of extensive cross examination of both parties by each advocate. Both F and M’s evidence about this aspect was far from credible or compelling in terms of the case that each sought to make, I am afraid. Though this was not the case F appeared to be putting at times, it seemed as if F accepted when questioned by Mr Green that A had had gastric issues (though I am not clear if that was separate to an episode of gastro enteritis that both parents accepted affected A and M at one point), had had some spots on her skin and also had intimate skin irritation at points. His evidence was that there was no link between these and stress or anxiety, with the skin irritation arising from the way that A handled her personal hygiene at times. M’s evidence was that these issues were directly caused by stress or anxiety and that this had been diagnosed by medical professionals. There is actually no clear diagnosis linking any physical symptoms observed in A with stress or anxiety, I find, the GP notes recording what M told GPs at points but, at best, these simply note a query about coincidental timing of a skin rash when first staying with F (p826), and possibly related to the “stress of social situation” (p827). The history taken for that latter appointment makes it clear that M’s own history to the GP acknowledged that this may be “related to lots of change at home, F has moved out, A then visited his new place” (ibid). Specifically the note of the medical consultation about A’s intimate skin irritation does not diagnose that this is due to stress or anxiety (p516). A young child experiencing the breakdown of her parents’ relationship, changes to where F was living and, I find, exposure to parental conflict, would be very likely to have some stress, though it is not clear to me that this would necessarily result in severe physical symptoms of the sort that M outlined in her written and oral evidence. It is also of concern, as raised by Mr Bond on behalf of the Guardian, that M seems to have taken pictures of various injuries on A that she alleged occurred in the care of F and that her documenting these may well have given rise to A being aware of this recording. A was also present, of course, when she was seen by GPs and when M gave a history that sought to link A’s physical symptoms with anxiety about spending time with F. On balance, I find that A has experienced some physical symptoms, it is not clear that these are a result of M’s anxiety being projected onto her as F alleged, nor it is it clear that these were as a result of any anxiety or stress beyond that associated with the breakdown of her parents’ relationship and their adult conflict with each other. I will return to this aspect later in this judgment when I consider my findings overall.

The final group of allegations relate to M having an enmeshed relationship with A, speaking for A and infantilising her. F accepted in his oral evidence to me that the term “enmeshment” is a precise psychological one that he is not qualified to diagnose, and it is also one that has not been identified by any professional involved in the case. It seems to have been raised as a potential concern by a therapist working with the family in discussion with the Family Court Adviser, who then noted it in her addendum report in October last year (619). As noted earlier in this judgment in relation to Ms Schoeman, a therapist also cannot stray into fact-finding and in any event was proffering an opinion prior to any factual matrix being determined by the Court and in circumstances where he could not provide an admissible opinion in any event as he was not a court appointed expert. At this point I think it is important to note that another concerning aspect of this case is the number of professionals in and outside of proceedings that have become involved with A. I know that F also alleges that the first family therapist agreed and instructed by the parties was then unilaterally rejected by M after family therapy had commenced. M’s evidence about her reasons for this was hard to follow but it seems to boil down to A being distressed after an individual session with him, and M not being happy with the therapist working from an office without a receptionist and having seen A without a chaperone, though it was not clear whether or not she had asked about this at the time. Regardless, the main concern I have about the family therapy undertaken is that it again took place before the factual matrix had been determined, and it is thus not clear to me how the therapist was going to be able to tackle issues from a therapeutic perspective when the issues themselves were not clear. It further seems as if the second therapist engaged by M was not able to offer family therapy, though I appreciate that it seems A did not in fact see this particular individual. However, as M’s evidence makes clear, A has also engaged with Ms Schoeman and a sand therapist, as well as of course the former Family Court Adviser. She has now also met her Guardian who has understandably been cautious about doing much work to ascertain A’s wishes and feelings at this point and prior to the outcome of this fact-finding exercise.

Finally, I have the troubling incident that occurred when A was staying with F on 22^nd and 23^rd August 2025. This is not part of F’s schedule of allegations, but that schedule was produced well before this incident, and I have already noted that a schedule may not be the best vehicle for dealing with allegations of alienating behaviours in any event. It seems not to be in dispute that A started spending longer periods in the care of F over the summer, starting with a longer period at the beginning of the summer holidays, then 4 days with M, followed by what was again supposed to be a longer period of time with F commencing on 22^nd August 2025. It is also not in dispute that at around 5.30am A left F’s house and made her own way to the local railway station, a roughly 10-minute walk away but one that took her along a route that she was familiar with but included walking along a canal footpath. Once at the station, someone at a coffee shop called M for A. M then called 999, having left a message for F. F had by this point left the house on discovering that A had gone and was looking for her as well as having tried to ring M and also ringing 999 himself. F’s evidence about this was that he had no concerns about A when they went to bed, she woke up early at about 4.30am and asked to get into bed with him which he permitted. However, A was restless and this resulted in him asking her to go back to her own bed at about 5.35am. He heard a door but thought it was her bedroom door, though this was likely to be the front door when she left it transpired, and he discovered that she had gone when he went to check on her at about 5.45am. As I clarified with him, from the point that she left his room to the point that he discovered she had gone was a very short period of some 15-20 minutes or so.

M told me that she thought A had planned this from what she told her subsequently, also that A had told her that she was unhappy with F and his family during the earlier longer stay in his care that summer, and that on the evening of 22^nd August A told M that she had asked F to be returned home to M. The evidence of A telling M that she had planned this is not in M’s statement, though the other aspects are (p561). Neither parent disputes that A left F’s home without her shoes, and that A had M’s number on a wristband. M told me that A only had her number because the company that she used to get the wristband didn’t print two numbers, though she accepted that she could have gone to a different company or simply bought one with her number on and one with F’s number on it.

Whilst I note that A is an intelligent child, it is unusual that a child of her age would have planned and executed this sort of thing on her own. However, I have no credible evidence to support a finding that M coached A into her actions on the morning of 23^rd August. I have also borne in mind that, by this point, A is a child who has spent nearly 3 years with her parents unable to agree about arrangements for her. She has also been exposed to their considerable adult conflict and negative views of each other, even though I accept that the latter is more likely than not inadvertent rather than deliberate. A has also had to navigate different parenting styles and differing routines in the care of each of her parents as I have noted earlier in this judgment. Considering all of my findings in the judgment, I am satisfied that A’s reluctance to spend time with F, which includes the incident on 23^rd August, is a combination of a variety of factors including exposure to that adult conflict and her parents’ failure to adequately protect her from that, her parents’ markedly differing parenting styles and routines, as well as the mismanagement of her anxieties by M resulting in the inadvertent psychological manipulation of her by the use of worry notes and voice recordings. All of this points to this being a case of chronic conflict and, at times, high level conflict, and that being a cause of A’s reluctance to spend time with F, rather than M’s psychological manipulation alone being the cause so I am thus unable to find that M has engaged in alienating behaviours. It is also clear to me that both parents will need to adapt their parenting of A and their adult conflict to ensure that she is better protected from this in future to avoid her suffering harm in future.

The Guardian will now need to consider what will be in A’s welfare interests in terms of arrangements for her. Mr Bond mentioned when asked by me about potential consequential case management issues in order to decide practical arrangements for handing down this judgment that there may be consideration of Ms Schoeman being asked some further questions after the outcome of this fact-finding was known. I have concerns about Ms Schoeman being asked further questions given my findings above about her being involved at a stage before the factual matrix was determined and specifically being asked to address questions that trespassed on the fact-finding exercise itself. It would not be fair to her to ask her further questions in light of that, nor would it be likely to result in helpful evidence for the Court in determining what may be in A’s welfare interests. I would therefore suggest that the Guardian consider what expert evidence may be necessary and, if that needs to be from a psychologist, that this is from a different psychologist as well as whether it would be necessary for that to be a global psychological assessment including A given the number of professionals she has seen to date. I would also suggest, given my findings about how far case management in this case departed from the FJC Guidance, that CAFCASS remind all Family Court Advisers of that Guidance and the need to avoid recommencing therapeutic or expert intervention in cases where the factual matrix has not been determined by the Court.

Finally, I was asked to determine arrangements for A over the school Christmas holidays and when terms starts in January. Both parents agreed that F could collect A from school when term ended on Friday 12^th December 2025. F wanted A to stay with him until 19^th December, M wanted A to only stay with him until 16^th December. There are no welfare concerns outlined by M to prevent the longer stay with F, apart from her saying that this is because A will struggle to cope with a longer period. A has by this point resumed alternate weekends with F after the events of August. M’s evidence to me about this was also that she had envisaged A staying to just after court on 16^th December, or possibly the following morning on 17^th December if the court hearing did not end early enough. F also told me that he had leave on 16^th, 17^th and 18^th December, and that his parents were watching A when he was either at work or court. M did not indicate any problem with F’s parents looking after A, and in fact had told me several times in the hearing how much she understood the value to A of that relationship and despite her written evidence expressing concerns about the wider paternal family. I find that it is in A’s welfare interests to spend until the morning of 19^th December 2025 in the care of F.

In terms of the arrangements for January when term resumes, the dispute is about when the alternate weekend periods of A spending time with F resume. M told me at the PTR that she had booked non-refundable tickets to an event that A was looking forward to on the 11^th January. Mr Green’s submissions about this was that this was because historically A had been with M on the last weekend of the Christmas holidays and with M for the following weekend. Sadly, this rather illustrates the danger of making assumptions on the part of M and the concerns I have about the parties’ ability to communicate effectively. Whatever may have happened prior to this Christmas, the order of 20^th March 2025 did not address Christmas this year, and my order of 17^th September 2025 made it clear that A was to live with her father on alternate weekends from 26^th September 2025 and, if the Christmas holidays had not intervened, that would have seen A spending time with her father on the first weekend of January 2026. However, the Christmas holidays have intervened and A will have last seen her father on 31^st December as things currently stand. I am concerned that A should not have too great an interruption to the time she spends with F given the history of this case, however it is clearly not in her welfare interests for her to miss out on a trip on the weekend of 10^th and 11^th January when she is apparently aware of and excited about that trip. The balance that is struck in terms of that and the benefit to her of spending time with F is achieved by her then spending both the weekend of 17^th and 18^th January 2025 and 24^th and 25^th January 2026 in the care of F, I find.