London Borough of Hounslow v Mother & Ors

These proceedings concern 4 children, AB aged 7, EF and CD twins aged 5, and GH aged 1.

The parties and their representatives are as follows;

The parents are not married. F shares parental responsibility the Children by virtue of being named as their father on their birth certificates.

M has 5 older children, all of whom were the subject of public law proceedings between 2004 and 2013. All five older children were removed at birth / shortly after birth, made the subject of care orders and adopted.

M is known to be vulnerable and suffers with depression. M has a documented learning disability, Dr Maggs having assessed M’s cognitive ability to be in the extremely low range (1st percentile) in 2018. F has a history of drug and alcohol misuse. Their relationship has been turbulent. F has twice non -fatally strangled M, resulting in two separate convictions of Common Assault and Battery (2018, and January 2022 this second strangulation taking place whilst Supervision Orders were in place). A non-molestation order was made to protect M in November 2022.

Following AB’s birth on 22/03/2018, Richmond Children’s Services placed M, F, and AB in the Orchards Residential Unit. They entered the Orchards for a second time following the birth of EF and CD. On both occasions the parents received a positive assessment from The Orchards Residential Assessment Unit.

There were at least four domestic incidents involving the parents in 2023, one of which occurred while a Non-Molestation order was in force against F.

The pre-birth assessment identified that M’s parenting has been inconsistent and highlights the strained environment that the parents and children were living in. It concluded that even with support M was not able to safely meet the children’s needs and the home conditions were unhygienic and cluttered.

On 17.01.2023 a CP medical was carried out for EF and CD due to bite marks and bruises found, the number of bruises raised concern for doctors. The Doctor’s opinion was that some were likely caused by an adult, maybe in changing. Doctors and police were concerned there were indicators of sexual abuse due to passiveness of EF during the check, and an unexplained line around EF's anus.

On 13.02.2023 a CP medical was carried out on AB No concerns raised and no injuries to show physical or sexual abuse.

On 21.02.2023 a children Sexual Abuse medical was conducted for EF and CD. The doctor found signs that could be attributed to historic constipation, the findings neither confirm nor deny sexual abuse. The social worker notes in her evidence in the largest study of children to date, only 4% of all children referred for medical evaluation of sexual abuse had abnormal examinations at the time of evaluation.

The London borough of Hounslow became the designated local authority under a 6 month Supervision Order granted on 11.11.22. The Supervision Order was subsequently extended by Hounslow Children’s Services on 30.05.2023 for 6 months and further extended on 15.12.2023 for 12 months due to the ongoing concerns the Local Authority had for the children’s welfare.

During the course of previous public law proceedings for the older three children, the court has made findings to include domestic violence and abuse in the parents’ relationship, lack of parental insight, dishonesty with professionals, risk of sexual harm from family members, poor home conditions, breaches of court orders, and poor supervision. Working Together Agreements have been put in place on numerous occasions but have failed to improve the lived experiences of the children in the care of their parents.

On 15.02.2024 the LA applied for Interim Care Orders in respect of these four children. This is the fifth set of public law proceedings in relation to AB, the third for EF and CD and the first for GH.

Concerns for the children continue to centre around the dangerous and abusive relationship between the parents, Mr ’s use of cannabis and alcohol, lack of insight, inability to work openly and honestly with professionals, and exposure to risk of sexual harm from other adults within the maternal-family.

Sexual abuse - In a Fact-Finding Hearing that took place on 20.06.2020 before HHJ Oliver Jones regarding other children of the family the court found that M’s younger twin sisters; were sexually abused by their brother. Findings were also made against the Maternal Grandparents as they failed to protect their daughters and the granddaughter from sexual abuse within the family network. As a result the children’s contact with their maternal grandmother was supervised.

The LA care plan is for the four children to be placed for adoption. With AB and GH to be in separate single families and EF and CD to be together, in line with the recommendations of the together and apart assessment. There is an application for care orders and placement orders. The LA recommended at final hearing once a year face to face contact for each parent and 6 times a year sibling contact, but oppose the making of orders. The LA’s position is supported by the Children’s Guardian who has a long running, significant involvement with this family.

The parents’ have accepted they are not able to care for the children, and they have not advanced a case for their return. This is a brave and child focused decision.

Their case with regards to each of the children is as follows;

The matters which are uncontested are:

The issues for the Court to determined are:

I can confirm that I have considered and applied all of the legal principles required by virtue of the applications before me. I will go on to consider specific principles and their application below. I have also considered two bundles of evidence, with the main bundle comprising of 1964 pages. I have also heard evidence from the Social Worker (SW), KR, the Kinship Assessor, the family finder and G. If I have neglected to mention in this judgment something which the parties consider relevant, it is not because I omitted to consider it, it is for the sake of brevity.

Burden of proof is on the LA and they need to prove the allegations on which they rely on the balance of probability. I note that it is not for KR to prove anything.

James Munby, President of the Family Division (as the then was) in RE A (Child) [2015] EWFC11 sets out the approach I must take to this

I also direct myself to R v Lucas [1981] QB 720, not just when considering threshold but all other matters, and remind myself that;

I also apply the enhanced Lucas direction and direct myself to Re A, B and C (Children) [2021] EWCA Civ 451 where Macur LJ states at paragraph 58;

“That a tribunal’s Lucas self-direction is formulaic, and incomplete is unlikely to determine an appeal, but the danger lies in its potential to distract from the proper application of its principles. In these circumstances, I venture to suggest that it would be good practice when the tribunal is invited to proceed on the basis , or itself determines, that such a direction is called for, to seek Counsel’s submissions to identify: (i) the deliberate lie(s) upon which they seek to rely; (ii) the significant issue to which it/they relate(s), and (iii) on what basis it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt. The principles of the direction will remain the same, but they must be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the witness before the court.”

I begin by asking myself whether the LA have discharged their burden of proof in respect of the finding of fact. They seek a finding that KR allowed MGM and MGF unsupervised contact with AB and the twins on 14^th December 2024.

It is important to note the chronology of this allegation.

There are so many flaws with the LA’s case that it is startling to me they sought to rely upon it, especially when they continued to pursue it in the face of evidence which was provided by KR during the course of the hearing.

As a starting point, the delay over of 2 weeks for such young children is likely to have a significant impact on their memory. I do not criticise the LA or the FC’s for this delay, owing to the Christmas period and the SW being on holiday. However, the fact remains that I have no information as to what occurred during that 2 week period which may have impacted on their recollection, retelling or the reasons for the allegations. I am completely in the dark as to context or if there were any intervening events. Everyone involved in the family courts is aware that the weight given to allegations made by children is significantly impacted by the manner in which allegations are made by children and the way in which they are treated after making those allegations. In this case I have no information about how this was managed, if the children were asked leading questions, how many times they were asked about the allegations or if they were well-meaningly “reassured” as to the truth of the allegations without stepping back and looking at the full picture. It is my consideration that the LA’s case falls at this first hurdle, as I can put no weight on the allegations which the children have made.

I go on to consider the other evidence or, lack thereof, both to ensure matters are fully considered but also to highlight to the LA the approach that needs to be taken in future.

The LA seek to rely solely on case notes, while the SW can give evidence to these, they remain a record of conversations and in this case the notes regarding the FC’s are of conversations about hearsay evidence, thus weakening it even further. If the LA seek to rely on case notes then the notes must be detailed and precise, there should be speech marks used to identify the exact words said where possible. Furthermore, the exact phraseology of the questions asked should be noted, especially when dealing with allegations made by children. Often this would require two SW to be present, one to have the conversations and the other to ensure full and detailed note taking. This was completely lacking from the case notes in this matter.

The LA have not provided statements from FC or MK and the only evidence from them is the SW evidence about what they said during her conversations with them. This means that the LA’s evidence is triple hearsay and there has been no efforts to obtain the evidence required. The lack of primary evidence from FC as to the children’s first accounts prevents the Court from being able to explore;

The LA do not appear to have conducted any investigation at all into the truth of the allegation. I would expect that the LA would have a second, more detailed, conversation with KR setting out exactly what the children said, giving her a chance to fully explain. This conversation should have been preplanned and KR given notice that she should provide any evidence about what they were doing or names of people who could corroborate her version of events. The LA then should have followed up by speaking to any people KR put forwards as able to support her alternate explanation. It was accepted that KR said the SW could speak to her ex-partner or her daughter to confirm what occurred on that day, however they refused to do so. Instead labouring under the wholly mistaken impression that it was KR’s responsibility to provide this information, despite them having not communicated with her as to what information she needed to provide.

While I have sympathy for the over-worked SW team, I cannot fathom how the LA considered it was appropriate to rely on this approach at a fact-finding. Further, they didn’t seem to appreciate that they were asking the Court to reverse the burden of proof.

While it is said the children are not known to tell lies, there has been no consideration by the LA that lies are not the only explanation for this allegation being incorrect. The LA invited me to speculate about why the children may lie about KR but it is a common legal principle I must not speculate and should base my decisions on the facts. I acknowledge there are many reasons why children may lie, but in this case I am not saying that they are. We are dealing with young, traumatised and developmentally delayed children. There are myriad reasons why they may say something that is not true without them genuinely meaning to lie, it is just as likely that they are caught up in confusion, which is especially prevalent around Christmas, or that the questions asked of them, by well-meaning but inexperienced family members, caused them to give answers which turn out not to be the truth of what occurred.

While the LA and G say that KR hasn’t provided photos of the time after the visit to Father Christmas and also seek to criticise her for not providing the evidence she has produced on day 2 of this hearing, sooner. I consider this is an attempt to reverse the burden of proof. It is not for KR to prove she wasn’t at the MGP home, it is for the LA to prove she was there and they have not provided me with any evidence which can be relied on. Moreover, I must bear in mind that KR is not a party to proceedings, she doesn’t have legal representation and was not aware of the significance of the children’s allegations until the negative assessment was received. She had a phone call with the SW about the allegations and then heard nothing further. We as professionals cannot expect lay people to automatically know either the seriousness of allegations or what would be necessary to allay professionals’ concerns. It was incumbent on the professionals to work with KR so they could formulate a final plan that was properly informed and in the best interest of the children.

Given what I have already said about the allegation, it is my determination that there isn’t a case for KR to answer and therefore it follows that her evidence doesn’t require scrutiny. However, I will deal with KR’s evidence in relation to the allegation to ensure all matters are addressed. I considered KRs evidence to be truthful and believable. She was not defensive or avoidant. She provided photos of seeing Father Christmas, receipts for Burger King and the soft play bank transfers. She also offered for the SW to have discussions with her ex-partner who was with them all day. The LA did not follow this line of investigation at all.

What causes me considerable concern is the way in which the LA ran their case during the hearing. I consider they decided to pursue an allegation on little evidence, and I do not accept the LA’s argumetns as set out above which in my view amounted to reversing the burden of proof, that I should speculate as to why the children would lie and they objected to fundamental evidence which wold assist the court in making determinations.Their active opposition to KR being able to put forward evidence which would have assisted this Court and by extension the other parties to establish the truth on the balance of probabilities is also a concern. The LA, in their oral arguments during the hearing, gave no reasonable explanation of their opposition. All these considerations combined gave me concern there is a bias against KR in these proceedings.

I find that the LA have not provided any credible evidence of the allegation and therefore they have not proved on a balance of probability that KR took the children to MGM house and left them there unsupervised with their Mother – therefore this did not happen.

M has made a Part 25 application for a further assessment of KR, in doing this she has argued that the current assessment of KR as a carer for only AB, undertaken by the LA is not adequate or sufficient.

When determining this matter I consider the Overriding Objective (FPR Part 1 s1), the principle of delay (CA 1989 s1(2)), the PLO relaunch as of January 2023 and Children and Families Act s13(7) which sets out;

For the purposes of this application I am only considering the impact of AB, the other children will not be affected by the application. I have given very careful consideration to this point because either decision will have a considerable impact on her timescales and her future. The plan for AB is adoption, however given her age and difficulties all parties accept that finding an adoptive family will take time and the window for finding a match for her is closing. Any delay for further assessment is going to reduce the possibility of her finding an adoptive family. However, KR has already had a previous positive assessment and she is the only chance of AB remaining in her birth family. This is, perhaps, especially important where there is a significantly reduced chance of her finding an adoptive family.

It is the second and third elements of consideration where the force of M’s application lies. As already stated KR previously had a positive viability assessment, however at that time she didn’t feel able to pursue a full assessment. Since then she has separated from her previous partner and wishes to be considered as a sole carer for AB. Correctly, given the change in KR’s circumstances the LA undertook a further viability assessment. The result of this was a recommendation that KR should not be progressed to a full Special Guardianship Assessment.

Reading the viability assessment raised a number of questions. The assessor gave evidence and it was to his credit that he was able to be so honest and accepted that it was fundamentally flawed. The reason it is flawed is due to the assessment being based on the events of 14^th December being an established fact. Which I have now found to be incorrect. The G in her evidence accepted that if I did not make the finding against KR then it followed that the assessment could not be relied upon. Therefore, it is only the LA who are seeking to argue that I can rely on the assessment.

Further difficulties with the assessment were;

For these reasons I cannot rely on the current viability assessment as I accept it is fundamentally flawed and contains bias. From this finding it clearly follows that I currently do not have any recent and reliable evidence as to KR’s ability to meet AB’s needs. Therefore, there is a clear gap in the evidence which would impact on AB. The result of this gap is that the LA would be unable to show that “nothing else will do” with the secondary result being the LA cannot meet the test for making a Placement Order.

I found that KR gave very persuasive and balanced evidence. She accepted that previously she has made mistakes. I question the weight being given by the LA to the occasion where KR allowed F into her home after he had an argument with M. I query how she was expected to know the extent of this argument and what had occurred. There appears to be an element of professionals looking at this incident through hindsight instead of natural reactions at the time of the event.

It is evident that KR is committed to the children and specifically AB.

I accept that the LA raise genuine questions about if KR can meet AB’s needs now and in the future. At the moment they are speculation as they have not been properly investigated and KR must be given the opportunity to discuss those concerns and respond to them. She must give her explanation as to what she would do in certain circumstances and assessed as to if that is reasonable or realistic. At the moment there is no evidence to support the LA’s concerns other than they “think” this may be the case, thinking something does not make it true and the LA’s conjecture is not something I can, or will, base a decision on.

I cannot say if KR is able to meet AB’s needs for that a proper, balanced, and unbiased assessment is required. The grounds on which I consider one to be necessary and proportionate are;

The viability and or Special Guardianship assessment of KR goes to the issue of the correct care plan for AB and answers the questions of if KR can meet AB’s needs. There is no other expert evidence available on this point and there isn’t another person who could give evidence on the matters.

I accept that the impact on the timetable for the proceedings will be considerable and especially for AB this has to be weighed very carefully (for the reasons set out above). However, KR would be a known family placement for AB and that option must be properly explored. There was a gap between the evidence concluding and handing down of judgment and I suggested that a viability assessment was undertaken by an ISW during that gap to avoid delay. One of the reasons I considered this a proportionate approach was KR’s evidence that if the assessment had been fair and came to a negative conclusion then she would have accepted it. This suggestion was supported by M but opposed by the LA and G as they didn’t feel a viability would be sufficient given the complex family dynamic. I accepted the argument of the LA and G and have only given consideration to a full assessment at this stage.

The cost of the assessor is within LAA rates and I have set out in considerable detail why the family and KR could not have a fair assessment if it were undertaken by the LA.

For all of the reasons set out above I consider a full Special Guardianship assessment of KR to be necessary and proportionate.

I am not going to consider if AB’s welfare demands adoption as I have already determined that her welfare requires a full assessment of KR before any final orders can be made. The care plan for GH is not opposed. Therefore I am only considering the care plans for CD and EF and if I should dispense with M’s and F’s consent to make a Placement Order for GH.

The established law for care proceedings involves two principal questions. First, are the threshold criteria for making a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 satisfied? Secondly, if so, what order should the court make?

Section 31 (2) provides:

I have been provided with an agreed Threshold and all parties are in agreement with that document. Therefore, threshold has been met.

Therefore, the court turns its attention to the second question – what order should I make? In answering that question, I apply well-established legal principles. I bear in mind the rights of the parents and the children under Article 8 of ECHR to respect for family and private life. Under section 1(1) of the Children Act, the children’s welfare is my paramount consideration in the care proceedings. Under section 1(2), any delay in making decisions concerning his future is likely to prejudice their welfare. Section 1(3) provides a checklist of factors to be taken into account when determining where their welfare lies, and what order should be made. In this case, the particularly important elements are: the children's individual needs; the capacity of the parents to meet those needs; the children’s background, and any harm they are at risk of suffering.

On the application for a placement order, the court applies section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. On such an application, my paramount consideration is the children's welfare throughout their life: section 1(2). Again, I take into account the fact that delay in coming to a decision is likely to prejudice their welfare. There is, again, a checklist of factors to be taken into account, in this case set out in section 1(4) of the 2002 Act. In this case, the important factors are the children's needs, the likely effect on them (throughout their life) of having ceased to be a member of their birth family and becoming an adopted person; their background; any harm they are at risk of suffering; their relationship with their birth relatives and, in particular, with their birth parents and siblings and the value of those relationships continuing; and both parent's ability and willingness to provide them with a secure environment and meet their needs. In addition, both section 1(3)(g) of the 1989 Act and section 1(6) of the 2002 Act require the court to have regard to the range of orders available.

Under section 21(3) of the 2002 Act, a court may not make a placement order unless satisfied either that the parent has consented to the child being placed for adoption or that his or her consent should be dispensed with. In this case, neither parent consents. Under section 52(1)(b), the court may dispense with the parent's consent if the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.

These provisions have been subjected to analysis in a number of important decisions by the higher courts, the Supreme Court inRe B [2013] UKSC 33and in a series of decisions in the Court of Appeal culminating in Re B-S (supra) and Re W (supra). I have had those decisions firmly in mind at all points during this hearing.

In Re B, the Supreme Court, having reminded itself of the European jurisprudence, reiterated that the test for severing a relationship between a parent and child is very strict so that, in the words of Baroness Hale of Richmond at paragraph 198, it should occur:

This interpretation was reiterated by the President, Sir James Munby, giving the judgment in the Court of Appeal in Re B-S. The statutory language in the 2002 Act imposes a stringent test. What must be shown is that the child's welfare 'requires' parental consent to adoption to be dispensed with.

At paragraph 34 and following in his judgment, the President identifies two essential things required where a court is being asked to approve a care plan for adoption and/or make a non-consensual placement order.

All parties agree with the making of Care Orders for all three children (CD, EF and GH). I have scrutinised the evidence and the need for these orders and I accept that a final Care Order is the only option which will allow the children to grow up safely and with stability. Therefore, I make final care orders for CD, EF and GH.

The step after making final Care Orders is to consider if I should leave the decision there for CD and EF, or if I should go on to make Placement Orders for them, thereby enabling the LA to place them for adoption. In making this decision I have given consideration to the re BS analysis in the LA’s and G’s evidence. I adopt this but set out, for completeness, the relevant considerations. The two realistic options which have been placed before me are long term fostering or adoption.

The positives in the proposal of CD and EF being placed in a long term foster placement are;

On the other hand, the following are negatives of this option.

In reaching its recommendation, the local authority through the SW and the G who both gave evidence and in their written statements expressed the view that the children’s needs would not be sufficiently met in long term foster care. They were concerned about the psychological impact on the children given their ages, the length of time they would be looked after children and their need to feel “claimed” and as if they “belong to a family”.

The advantages and disadvantages of making an order placing the children for adoption are as follows.

The disadvantages or negatives of a placement order and subsequent adoption are as follows.

In addition, I remind myself that adoption should only be considered when absolutely necessary and in the child's best interests. Furthermore, I remind myself that there is no absolute guarantee that adoption would meet the children's needs although, with a careful and sensitive matching process, there is no reason why a suitable family would not be found. Both the local authority and the guardian reach a firm recommendation that CD’s, EF’s and GH’s welfare requires the court to approve the plan for adoption.

The Supreme Court has reminded us that adoption is the last resort. Wherever possible, children should be brought up by their natural parents, however in this case all parties, including the parents agree this is not a possibility. Adoption is not a panacea. It has advantages and disadvantages, as analysed by the social worker and guardian.

In this case, however, having conducted the balancing exercise, I unhesitatingly conclude that there is no realistic prospect of the children being safely returned to their parents' care, and that their needs for not only stability and permanence but also their psychological needs to be claimed and have a sense of belonging, can only be met in an adoptive placement. I therefore make a care order and, concluded that CD's, EF’s and GH’s welfare requires me to dispense with the mother's and father’s consent to placing them for adoption. As such I make placement orders authorising the local authority to place all three children for adoption with CD and EF being placed together and GH being placed on her own.

The law regarding post adoption contact is concisely and helpful set out in the leading Court of Appeal case of R &C (Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 1302. This case in not only helpful as to the law but the facts of which are strikingly similar to the matters which I have to consider in this case. In R &C the LA care plans “contemplated that the children will only be placed with prospective adopters who are prepared to agree to continuing direct contact between he siblings” in a case where the plan was for the younger two siblings to be adopted and the older two were to remain in long term foster care. The children were also of similar ages (all under 10 years old) and the children had been through multiple sets of public law proceedings.

The sibling assessment in that matter was supported by the LA and G and it echo’s the assessment and professionals approach which is before me. In short the recommendation in both cases was that the children have a clear sense of being part of a sibling group, that sibling relationships are likely to be the longest in anyone’s lifetime and if they can be maintained, despite separate placements, this will ensure the long term psychological wellbeing of the children and their sense of identity. In this case these points are considered to be exceptionally relevant to the eldest three children with all professionals stating that continuing the sibling relationship was “imperative” to the success of any future placement.

Even the recommendations as to the frequency of contact between the children was the same, with professionals in both cases setting out that contact should be six times a year. Although in this matter the G’s evidence was that some of those should be in person and some video contact. The Care Plans reflected the LA’s commitment to this approach. Additionally the LA’s position is there should be once per year contact between each of the children and their parents, with certain caveats to F’s contact.

The main basis of the appeal in R&C was the trial Judge’s refusal to make Placement Orders as he felt the children’s sibling relationships were of such fundamental importance they needed to be preserved and this need was greater than the need for stability which can be offered by an adoptive placement. As you can see from above, I do not agree with that approach, and neither did the Court of Appeal. I have already considered that Placement Orders are in the youngest three’s welfare interests however, I am clear this is only on the basis of the evidence and Care Plans which recognised the importance of the sibling relationship and that the LA will only look for placements which will facilitate sibling contact.

While it would be unusual that a court will make an order stipulating contact arrangements to which the adopters do not agree, it is still my responsibility to set the template for contact at the placement order stage. In this case, the local authority is committed to search only for adopters willing to accommodate sibling contact, although they did not wish for there to be an order to that extent. All professionals agreed with the general approach and the parents invited the court to make an order for contact under ACA s.26, both to meet the children's short-term needs and to set the template. There is of course a possibility that the search for such adopters might be unsuccessful or that adopters might subsequently refuse to agree to contact. But in the circumstances of this case, that possibility is not a sufficient reason to refuse to make the placement order.

I have given consideration to the availability of placements as required in Re T (Placement Order)(CA) [2008] EWCA Civ 248. I have heard evidence from the family finder, the SW and the G. While the family finder was more circumspect, I note that she was relatively new to her role and this resulted in her being unsure. This was in contrast with the SW,but especially the G who has considerable experience, who were clear that there was the possibility of finding placements for the children and given their ages it was more likely those placement would be willing to consider contact between the siblings and between the children and the parents. This informed me there seems to be a change in approach, with adopters now being more open to contact, especially where the specific benefits for the individual children they are considering can be openly discussed with them. The SW and G were concerned about forcing an order on adopters regarding contact and that this may reduce the number of placements.

Having considered all of the above in detail, pursuant to s.26(2)(b) of the 2002 Act, I make an order requiring the person(s) with whom CD, EF and GH live, and any other person(s) with whom they are to live while they remain the subjects of placement orders, to allow them to spend time with their siblings AB, CD, EF and GH six times per year, with no less than three of these being attending in person contacts, in accordance with arrangements made by the local authority. I would include in the order a recital, recording that;

Finally, in line with the suggestion made by the President in his second lecture "Adapting Adoption to the Modern World – Part Two" (quoted at paragraph 39 above), I would propose adding a recital that

“it is this Court's view that after adoption CD, EF and GH should continue to have contact with each other and their sibling AB six times a year, with no less than three of these being direct in person contacts.”

However, when I consider if I could make an order for post adoption contact between the parents and the children I deem this is likely to reduce the number of potential adoptive placements and to cause unnecessary and undue delay to findings placements for the children. While I understand this will upset the parents, I consider that;

Instead I propose the following recital

“It is the Court’s view that after adoption the children should have once per year direct contact with each of their parents. The LA will use their best endeavours to identify placements which will facilitate this.”

I make Care Orders, Placement Orders and s.26 Orders for CD, EF and GH. I have also dispensed with the parents consent to Placement Orders.

I do not make the findings against KR and, as a result, I do not consider I can rely on the viability assessment of her. Therefore, I make no orders in relation to AB (case for s.26 orders for sibling contact) and instead order a full assessment of KR which is to be undertaken by an ISW.