VP v SP

This judgment sets out the appropriate terms of the resolution of financial applications between the parties pursuant to their intended divorce. Pursuant to Rule 29.15 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, this judgment is not to take effect until decree nisi is pronounced in case [number], being the divorce petition lodged by the applicant in respect of the parties' marriage, or a conditional order is made in any divorce application that may proceed in place of that petition, whichever is the sooner.

The applicant, VP, has made an application for a financial remedy order following the breakdown of her marriage to the respondent, SP.

The applicant was represented by Mr. Keyes of counsel. The respondent represented himself. 

I read the court bundle which consisted of 694 pages, albeit I did not read the bank statements or financial exhibits included within the bundle other than when specifically referred to them. I was also referred to some Metro bank statements in a supplemental bundle during the cross-examination of the applicant. I did not otherwise read those statements or that bundle.

I heard oral evidence from each of the applicant and the respondent and submissions from each of the respondent and Mr. Keyes. 

I would like to thank the parties for the way they approached this hearing. They have been involved in litigation for a number of years, with hearings in respect of Children Act 1989 proceedings, Family Law Act 1996 proceedings and, for over 22 months, these financial remedy proceedings. While there are a number of disputes between the parties, they each acted with courtesy, dignity and thoughtfulness in presenting their cases. I would also like to thank Mr Keyes for his assistance in presenting VP's case in robust, yet measured terms.

The applicant is 57 years old, the respondent is 58 years old. The parties began a relationship in or around 2006 and married in 2007. They separated in 2019, so this was a marriage of 12 years to separation. The applicant's petition was dated 2020. There has not yet been a decree nisi, which I return to below in respect of the status of this judgment.

At the time the parties married, the respondent already had a son from a previous relationship, JP, who was 9 or 10 at that time. There is a level of disagreement between the parties as to the extent to which JP saw the applicant as a mother figure, but that is not a matter I need to determine for the purposes of this application.

The parties have a son together, XP, who is now18.

XP has significant disabilities [details redacted]. The parties agree that XP is extremely unlikely to ever be in a position to live independently.

XP left the family home, with the applicant in 2019. He continues to live with her and has not spent time with the respondent for the last several years.

The applicant's divorce petition was dated [date] 2020. The petition was issued under the law in place before the Divorce Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 came into force and so before what is sometimes referred to as "no fault" divorce became available in 2022. The petition was therefore a fault-based petition. I understand that the respondent initially contested the facts relied upon by the applicant in support of the petition and no decree nisi has yet been pronounced. At the hearing before me, the respondent indicated that he does not wish to contest the divorce and there was some discussion about a form of amended wording being agreed so that the petition may move forward as soon as is practicable.

The applicant applied for a non-molestation order in 2021 and an order was made without notice. This was, I understand, extended a number of times, eventually expiring in 2024. On a date in 2021, the respondent issued a C100 under the Children Act 1989. I do not have the documents or orders from that matter, but I was informed that the court made a finding or findings of domestic abuse against the respondent and made a child arrangements order providing that XP live with the applicant in early 2024. The respondent does not currently spend time with XP, although he told me that he hopes to do so in due course.

The applicant issued a Form A in 2023.

The matter first came before District Judge Hay on 14 March 2024. At that time, the applicant had not yet filed a Form E. The respondent informed the court that he had filed a Form E, but the court had no record of having received it on file. The court made directions for filing and exchange of Forms E and for questionnaires.

The matter returned before District Judge Hay for an adjourned first appointment on 23 May 2024. It appears from the face of the order made that the applicant's Form E contained some blank sections, which required clarification. The respondent sought more time to prepare his questionnaire, obtain his mortgage raising capacity information and produce property particulars. There was also a question as to whether either party sought to raise conduct as a s.25 factor. The applicant was ordered to file and serve an amended Form E by 4pm 30^th May, with directions for questionnaires, responses and a valuation of the family home and the matter was listed for a financial dispute resolution hearing (FDR) on 22 July 2024.

The matter came before me on 22 July 2024. Only the applicant and her counsel attended that hearing. The recitals to the order I made on that occasion noted, amongst other matters, that the respondent had been unable to prepare a questionnaire because the applicant had not completed her Form E until 18 July 2024. The applicant's updated Form E is in fact dated 2 August 2024, and so it appears that the respondent had not received it by 22 July 2025. Directions were given for the applicant to ensure that her Form E was filed and served forthwith, that the respondent file any questionnaire and that the parties exchange replies, as well as for a valuation of the family home, property particulars and mortgage capacity estimates to be exchanged and for the matter to be listed for an FDR, with consequential directions.

I understand that the matter next came before District Judge Hay on 21 November 2024, although I have not seen the order made at that hearing. Neither the applicant nor her solicitors attended that hearing, stating that they did not have notice of it.

The matter was then listed for a final hearing on 28 July 2025. Shortly prior to that hearing, on 17 July 2025 the applicant issued an application in Form D11 for that hearing to be reduced to an FDR hearing, on the basis that the respondent had not complied with several of my directions given on 22 July 2024. On 22 July 2025, DDJ Morris directed that the hearing on 28 July 2025 should be reduced to one hour and take place as an FDR. An FDR took place but without resolution being achieved, and the matter was listed for a final hearing, which came before me.

My order of 22 July 2024 contained the heading "Before Deputy District Judge Cassidy Hope at a Financial Dispute Resolution hearing on the 22^nd July 2024"

Pursuant to Rule 9.17(2) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010:
"The judge hearing the FDR appointment must have no further involvement with the application, other than to conduct any further FDR appointment or to make a consent order or a further directions order"

This is an absolute prohibition, even where the parties agree that the Judge can undertake a further hearing (see for example Shokrollah-Babaee v Shokrollah-Babaee [2019] EWHC 2135). In the present case, given the respondent had not been present at the hearing on 22 July 2024, it appeared that an effective FDR had not taken place and this was confirmed by the applicant at the outset of this hearing.

However, even if an FDR had not in fact taken place, had I read without prejudice material prepared for that hearing, I would not have been in a position to determine this substantive hearing. In light of that, I checked the HMCTS portal, the "history" tab of which indicated that the only document filed between the adjourned first directions appointment before District Judge Hay on 23 May 2024 and the hearing on 22 July 2024 was a document titled "draft order". That draft order, uploaded on 19 July 2024, referred again to the applicant's Form E containing blank sections and that the respondent had not been able to prepare a questionnaire, due to the applicant not having completed her Form E. The order provided that the FDR hearing listed for 22 July be adjourned and made further directions similar to those that I ultimately made on 22 July.

Having raised my concern about the order of 22 July with the parties at the outset of this hearing, the applicant confirmed through counsel that I had not carried out an FDR and she had not submitted any offers or without prejudice material in advance of that hearing. Likewise, the respondent told me that he had not made any offers prior to that hearing and that he had not been in any position to, given he did not have the applicant's Form E. He told me that the applicant's solicitors had contacted him suggesting an adjournment and he had agreed, which was why he had not attended on 22 July, believing that the hearing would not be proceeding.

In light of the fact that not only had I not carried out an FDR, but neither party had submitted any material that would be covered by without prejudice privilege, in a short judgment I gave at that stage, I confirmed that the recital to my order of 22 July 2024 that the hearing was "at a Financial Dispute Resolution hearing" was an error on the face of that order and that I was not prevented from hearing the final hearing by virtue of Rule 9.17 or by virtue of having seen without prejudice material. For completeness, I will direct that my order of 22 July 2024 be amended under the slip rule to provide that the recital read "at a hearing listed as a financial dispute resolution hearing, but which took place as a directions hearing, neither party having been ready for, or prepared for, a financial dispute resolution hearing."

During the hearing, it became apparent that decree nisi has not yet been pronounced within the divorce suit. From brief discussion in court, it appeared reasonably likely that the parties would be able to find a set of particulars acceptable to both of them upon which the petition might proceed.

However, this leads to a complication. I cannot make an order for a financial remedy without there being either a decree nisi or conditional order of divorce in place. Any order I might purport to make prior to decree nisi would be a nullity, see e.g. Munks v Munks [1985] FLR 576.

In JP v NP [2014] EWHC 1101 (Fam), Mrs. Justice Eleanor King DBE (as she then was) considered a determination made by a Deputy District Judge in which he gave a judgment indicating the appropriate terms of the resolution of the financial applications, ordering that the wife was to complete her application for decree nisi and that upon pronouncement of decree nisi, the matter was to be listed for mention. King J noted that Rule 29.15 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 provides that "A judgment or order takes effect from the day when it is given or made, or such later date as the court may specify." She considered that this applied not only to orders made by consent, but also to contested hearings. At paragraph 52 of her judgment, she stated:

Accordingly, this judgment is an indication of outcome with an order to be drawn and made after decree nisi has been pronounced. I will, as part of my order following from this hearing, list a mention to take place after decree nisi.

A finding of domestic abuse was made against the respondent in the Children Act proceedings and so the provisions of Rule 3A of the Family Procedure Rules were engaged. Directions for special measures were made at previous hearings and at the hearing before me, separate waiting areas were available and there was a screen in court throughout the hearing, with the parties entering and exiting the courtroom separately. I also invited the parties to consider whether they would prefer to give evidence from their seats, rather than in the witness box, which would potentially cause them to become directly visible to each other. They both agreed to give evidence from their seats.

In terms of cross-examination, since the coming into force of s.65 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which inserted Part 4B into the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, where an on-notice injunctive order has been in place (as in this case), there is a prohibition on the respondent cross-examining the applicant in person (or vice versa). The court must consider whether there is a satisfactory alternative means for the witness to be cross-examined, or for obtaining evidence that the witness might have given under cross-examination in the proceedings.

PD3AB of the Family Procedure Rules sets out that "a satisfactory alternative to cross-examination in person does not include the court itself conducting the cross-examination on behalf of a party." The court should consider the appointment of a Qualified Legal Representative (QLR) to carry out cross-examination.

In the case of Re Z (Prohibition on Cross-examination: No QLR) [2024] EWFC 22, the President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane noted that paragraph 5.3 of PD3AB is not black letter law and that the options facing the court when a QLR could not be found were:  
a) A further adjournment in the hope that a QLR may be found; 
b) An adjournment to allow one or both parties to engage their own advocate; 
c) Reviewing the need for the vulnerable party to give oral evidence and be cross-examined. This will include reviewing the need for there to be a fact-finding hearing in the proceedings; 
d) Considering any other alternative means of avoiding in person cross-examination between the relevant parties; 
e) The court itself taking on the task of asking questions in place of the in-person party.

In the present case, at the conclusion of the FDR hearing, Deputy District Judge Fox had directed that, in the event that the respondent did not have legal representation at the final hearing, he was to send his written cross-examination questions of the applicant to the court in advance of the hearing, on the basis that the Judge would ask the cross-examination questions of the applicant on the respondent's behalf.

At the outset of the hearing before me, consideration was given to whether live evidence was necessary, since the parties are relatively close in terms of proposed outcome in this case. However, the respondent's case in part rests on disputed issues of fact (such as the applicant having access to greater resources representing her inheritance from her father) and each party disputes whether liabilities are matrimonial or not. In light of those matters, I considered that I would be required to make findings on those issues, and that oral evidence would be required.

The respondent had sent his questions to the court in advance of the hearing. I considered that all of the respondent's questions could be asked, although I re-ordered them into groups of questions about similar topics and slightly re-worded some of them, supplementing others with questions of my own where necessary for me to better understand the issues being raised.

As the evidence had finished shortly after 3pm, I offered each party the opportunity to either make brief closing submissions or to put their points in writing and send them in to me, having had the opportunity to consider what they might want to say. Each chose to make short oral submissions rather than submit them in writing.

The parties were not significantly apart in terms of the outcome of this case. However, the differences between them related both to the resources I should take into account in determining what is available to them and in respect of how a number of liabilities should be treated. Their difference of approach in terms of principle means that I must consider a number of issues of both fact and principle, despite the ultimate disparity in figures being relatively narrow.

The parties agree that the family home should be sold. At the hearing, it was further agreed that, in the first instance, it could be sold to SP's son, JP, on the basis of the family home being valued at £525,000.

From the figure of £525,000, the mortgage of £186,372 should be deducted, as well as a charge in favour of A Council relating to a loan for adaptations to the family home to meet XP's needs. That charge currently stands at some £40,287. It was agreed that, in the event of a sale of the family home to JP, costs of sale would not be as high as the 3% conventionally used in financial remedy proceedings although the parties were not fully agreed as to what that reduced figure should be.

The applicant invited me to add to the available assets a sum realised by the respondent from his pension, being a net figure of £12,660.86. On that basis, the sum for division (being the equity in the matrimonial home and the sum representing the pension) would be £309,001.47, which, on the applicant's case, should be divided such that the applicant receives 70% and the respondent 30%. She also seeks a sum of £5,000 to be paid towards her costs.

The respondent did not accept that a figure should be added back to represent his cashed in pension. He further argued that a charge registered against the family home to a debt recovery agency (the "G debt"), standing at £14,933 should be deducted from the net proceeds of sale, as well as a credit card debt in his name redeemable at £6,000 and the applicant's debts of £3,746, before the remainder is divided such that the applicant receives 70% and the respondent receives 30%.

When considering an application for a financial remedy on divorce, the court has available to it the powers set out in sections 23 and 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and must consider the principles set out in section 25 of that Act.

Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act requires the court to consider all the relevant circumstances of the case when deciding what orders to make. First consideration being given to the welfare of any child of the family who has not attained the age of 18. In this case, both XP and JP are adults.

The court must also consider:

 The income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties of the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including, in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would be reasonable to expect a party to take steps to acquire;

The financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties of the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

The standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

The age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;

Any physical and mental disability of either party to the marriage;

The contributions which each of the parties have made or is likely to make in the foreseeable future to the welfare of the family including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family;

The conduct of each of the parties, if the conduct is so bad that it would be inequitable to disregard it; and 

The value of any benefit to the parties of the marriage which a party will lose by reason of the divorce. 

The statutory criteria have been expanded upon by case law, which has stated that the court should be guided by the principles of need, sharing, compensation and non-discrimination.

In practice, this tends to mean that matrimonial assets – namely those accrued during the marriage - are to be shared equally between the parties. If a sharing order meets the needs of each of the parties that will frequently be the end of the matter. If, however, such a division fails to meet needs, or the receiving party has suffered an economic disadvantage caused by the marriage (such as giving up a career), the court may order an unequal division of the assets or that assets acquired outside of the marriage should be used to meet needs and/or provide compensation for economic disadvantage.

In respect of a party's needs, Peel J provided a helpful summary of the position in WC v HC [2022] EWFC 22:

The court has a statutory duty to consider whether a "clean break" can be achieved between the parties, that is to say an arrangement where neither of them has ongoing financial obligations to the other.

The court will carry out a two-stage process. The first stage is "computation", where the court ascertains the level and nature of the assets and income available in the case. The second stage is "distribution", where the court determines how the ascertained assets are to be divided between the parties.

Where parties disagree about whether something is factually correct or not, the burden of proof lies with the person making the allegation. It is not for the other party to establish the allegation is not made out. The standard of proof is the simple balance of probabilities, as set out in Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, that is to say, that it is more likely than not that the allegation is true. Findings of fact must be based upon evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from that evidence, and must not be based on suspicion or speculation. Evidence is not evaluated in separate compartments and each piece of evidence must be considered in the context of all the other evidence. The court has to look at the wide canvas of all of the evidence.

Where there are issues in respect of whether a witness is telling the truth, I remind myself that I must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for various reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, or distress, and the fact that the witness has lied about some matters does not mean he or she has lied about everything, as set out in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720. When determining if someone is telling the truth I have taken into account my impression of the witness, all known circumstances, the context of the assertion, and if an account has been consistent over time. I have also considered any corroboration from any external source, although there does not have to be corroboration from an external source for me to accept the account given by a witness.

The factual dispute between the parties in this case was relatively limited, and not all of the matters disputed between the parties were relevant to the issues I needed to decide to determine the application. I am not going to make findings on all the matters that are in dispute between these parties, as to do so would not bring matters any further forward.

I have considered all the evidence and submissions made. I have not recited every piece of evidence that I read or heard, but I have all of the evidence in mind in making my decision. If I do not refer to a piece of evidence or a submission, it does not mean I have not considered it. 

I first heard evidence from the applicant. She struck me as an eminently capable, resilient woman. She told me about the project the parties had operated from the family home, Business B. The parties carried out significant works to the family home to create a space for children with additional needs. The applicant's passion for Business B was evident. She told me, with great warmth and some pride, that the initial intention had been for them to support families in the community one day a week. They had ended up running it five days a week. She told me that she won awards for the work that she and the respondent did. She acknowledged that they had worked well together in developing Business B. The applicant was clearly very proud of the support she has been able to provide to families who have children with additional needs. She has established friendships and relationships with other families who have children with additional needs and has friends involved in other fundraising activities.

The applicant has tried a number of businesses, which I deal with in more detail below. She has been engaged in fundraising and has secured funding for trips for families. She is clearly resourceful, creative and has the ability to successfully engage in fundraising. However, the reality of the applicant’s life is that she is XP’s carer. She told me that XP will live with her in the long term. She informed me that there is no prospect of him going into sheltered accommodation, unless he wants to. I believe the applicant when she tells me that. I formed the impression that she is absolutely devoted to XP’s care and it is striking how many of the ventures she has been involved in revolve around improving the quality of life of children with additional needs. That said, I think there was a tendency at times on the applicant's part to distance herself from matters that did not support her position – for example, in terms of which assets and liabilities should be considered matrimonial or non-matrimonial.

I then heard evidence from the respondent. He was pragmatic in his approach, making appropriate concessions, including that, by virtue of her care of XP, the applicant will have additional financial needs, and in terms of XP’s likely prognosis. While he asserts that the applicant has access to additional resources, he was ultimately realistic in his proposals as to the outcome of this case. He clearly has a strong sense of attachment to the family home. It was bought by his parents many years ago. He has lived there since. He purchased it from his mother prior to the parties meeting and lives there at present with JP and JP's partner, DG. The respondent's proposal is that JP, possibly with the help of DG, will obtain a mortgage on the family home and provide the applicant with a lump sum. That said, the respondent did not seem entirely clear on the details of how this proposal would work.

The family home, which is registered in joint names, has an agreed value of £525,000. There is a mortgage secured upon it of £186,372, as well as a charge in favour of A Council relating to a loan for adaptations to meet XP's needs. That charge currently stands at some £40,287.

The parties agreed that, in the event of a sale of the family home to JP, costs of sale would not be as high as the 3% conventionally used in financial remedy proceedings. Instead, the applicant sought to attribute a figure of £2,000 to those costs. The respondent did not suggest a specific figure, but accepted it would be lower than 3%.

Even where a sale is not to take place, the court will ordinarily take the net value of an asset into account, on the basis of that being the value that the holder would obtain should they eventually sell the asset. The present case is slightly different, in that it is anticipated that there will be a sale, but to a buyer within the respondent's family, thus saving estate agents fees and potentially reducing the number of enquiries between conveyancing solicitors. However, I must be careful not to reduce the figure deducted for costs of sale below a reasonable figure. At 3%, the costs would be £15,750. A significant proportion of that would represent the costs of the estate agents. At the same time, I consider the applicant's figure of £2,000 to be a little low. Doing the best I can, I am going to take the figure for costs of sale in the event of a sale to JP at £5,000.

It is accepted that this charge registered against the family home representing the G Debt is valid, but there is a dispute between the parties as to whether it should be treated as matrimonial, and so taken "off the top" and paid for from the proceeds of sale before division between the parties, or whether it should be the sole liability of the respondent. I return to this question when considering matrimonial assets below.

The parties each hold sums in bank accounts – the applicant has a little over £450, the respondent told me his bank account was in credit to the sum of about £6,000.

The applicant has an interest in a business, Business A. The business is described in the applicant's Form E as providing disability services and support. The applicant states the business has not been trading since 2021. The value of that business is said by the applicant to be the sum in its bank account, approximately £1.50. The company accounts provided by the applicant for 2022 and 2023 support the proposition that it is not trading and has a nominal value.

The parties each hold liabilities. In addition to the G debt, the respondent has credit card debt in his name. He asserts that this is a joint debt. I have seen no documentation in respect of this liability. In his Form E, the respondent asserts that the liability stood at £12,254.94. The applicant accepts that this debt exists. The respondent informed me he had been told that the finance company would accept a lump sum of £6,000 in payment of the debt, and it was agreed that, as a capital figure, this sum would be used for the purposes of my decision.

The applicant has a number of liabilities, comprising four credit card liabilities and a loan, totaling £3,746. Each party has vehicles, these are of limited value and I do not include them in my calculations. While the applicant's outstanding costs do not appear on the Form ES2, her Form H indicates that these are just under £20,000. The applicant is publicly funded.

The applicant has no pension. The respondent did have a pension, but cashed it in during the course of these proceedings. It had a gross value of £16,662.71 and I was told that the respondent received £12,660.86 after tax.

The respondent is not currently working, although has previously worked as a chauffeur and, more recently, as a HGV driver, with a net income of a little over £29,000. He has also been in receipt of rental income from JP, and JP's partner, DG, in the sum of £15,000 p.a. The applicant is a full time carer for XP. She receives carer's allowance, universal credit and child benefit. XP receives personal independent payments which are paid to the applicant. Her total net income is £37,856.

The respondent asserts that the applicant holds or is due to receive further funds by way of inheritance from her father, TY. The applicant's father had remarried and lived in Country X with his wife, NY. The applicant was not able to tell me the date that her father passed away, but I have seen a letter from, lawyers based in Country X , dated 2018 and referring to the administration of his estate.

TY's will dated [date] 2013, which was in the court bundle, provided that NY was to hold the residue of his estate upon trust for the applicant should she survive him and attain the age of 60. However, should NY predecease TY, the applicant would take the residue immediately.

The letter from the Country X lawyers states that the estate assets consist of a number of items and assets, including intellectual property. There were also three bank accounts held jointly with NY containing approximately [currency]230,000. The letter states that by operation of law, the joint accounts would automatically pass to NY by way of survivorship. It sets out that NY considered that TY intended the proceeds of the bank accounts should form part of the residue. The letter from the X Country lawyers further states that the lawyers are in possession of a memorandum signed by TY providing for certain of the assets to pass to NY. It was therefore proposed that NY obtain a grant of probate and that the applicant and NY enter into a deed of family arrangement which would result in the listed assets passing to NY, a sum of [currency]50,000 from the bank accounts being paid to NY in relation to expenses and the balance of the accounts to be transferred to the applicant in three stages.

The applicant's evidence was that she entered into the deed of family arrangement and, as a result, received three payments – one of £34,000, one of £36,000 and one of a little under £10,000. This, she said, was the extent of her inheritance as per the deed of family arrangement. She asserts that this money was expended, in part on the family home, a breakdown of which she provides in her responses to questionnaire and for family expenses, and in part on costs related to her setting up home in a rented property when she moved out of the family home with XP in 2019.

The respondent does not accept this. He disputes that the applicant has fully expended the funds she received, and that those funds comprise the entirety of her inheritance. He was concerned in particular that the intellectual property assets had apparently passed from the applicant's father to NY. He considered the applicant likely to have benefited on the death of NY, who passed away in October 2022, leaving, I am told, a valuable property.

The applicant's position was that NY's estate, including the items she had received pursuant to the deed of arrangement, had passed to her own daughter, JJ on her death. In support of her position, the applicant had produced a letter from JJ , dated May 2024, confirming that NY's estate had passed to JJ. I treat the letter from JJ with some caution, given it was not accompanied by a statement of truth and JJ was not called to give evidence. There was further a disagreement between the parties as to whether JJ is a legal secretary or not – the documents, such as the grant of probate over NY's estate, support the respondent's position that JJ is a legal secretary. Ultimately, I do not consider that JJ's occupation takes me any further.

The letter from JJ does, however, attach both a copy of the grant of probate on NY's death and a copy of her will, from which it can be seen that JJ was the sole beneficiary.

In light of the documentation produced, I accept the applicant's evidence that the deed of arrangement amounted to a variation of TY's will, that she received sums of money in furtherance of this and is not due to receive more funds when she turns 60. Nor do I find that she has received, or is entitled to receive any assets from the estate of NY. While the respondent asserted that JJ would be likely to help the applicant financially, I have no evidence of JJ having done so in the past, or anything to suggest that she will do, beyond the respondent's suspicions. In the circumstances, I find that the applicant is not due to receive any further inheritance. Nor am I satisfied that the applicant still retains and is concealing funds received by her pursuant to the agreement in 2018.

Separately, the respondent asserts that the applicant is running businesses and generating additional income from them. The respondent has provided evidence in respect of a number of businesses held by the applicant, comprising of Facebook posts, texts and pictures. These include Business A, which I have referred to above and:

Business B – this was a project run from the family home. The respondent stated in his Form E that he had decided to set up a group for children with additional needs called Business B and gives further evidence of works he carried out to the family home in respect of this project. The applicant's evidence was that both parties had worked together on the project and a significant portion of her inheritance monies had been expended on it. She acknowledged that the parties had worked well together getting it organised. The applicant had run it on a day-to-day basis as the respondent was at work and I have referred to the awards she received above. The respondent has provided details of the work he put into developing the business in his written evidence and gave oral evidence of physical work he had carried out. However, the applicant gave up her involvement in this business when she left the family home in 2019. It is not currently operating and given the facilities are situated at the family home, the applicant is not currently financially benefiting from it.

Business C – this was a project the applicant started after leaving the family home. She told me in evidence that a centre in A approached her to design a sensory room for one of their units. She had meetings, created a design and the centre then asked if she wanted to run it. There was a lot of discussion, but the project never went through and the "Business C" was not created. While the applicant referenced this project in a social media message upon leaving the family home, I have not seen evidence to suggest that this is an active business.

Business D This was a business which I understand was primarily established to rent clothes. In her Form E, the applicant states that she never earned any monies from the business. There are a number of Facebook posts in respect of the business and it appears that it was operational at one point and was open for at least a year. The applicant informed me that it was not, however, successful as a business. She then tried to go to special needs schools to offer a shopping experience, as young people with additional needs wanting to go shopping could become overloaded if they went onto the high street. Business D would be a quiet place to dress up and have their nails painted. This would have been a free service, but did not take off either. She ultimately donated the clothes to XP's school for use in school productions. She told me that Business D isn't a registered company or a separate business.

Business E – the applicant told me that this was a fundraising enterprise run by her friend FHG. The applicant has no interest in it. There are a number of social media posts in the bundle in respect of Business E but I have not seen evidence to suggest that the applicant owns this business or is a shareholder in it. The social media posts and pictures provided by the respondent suggest that Business E carries out fundraising activities.

Business F. The respondent has provided documentation to show that the applicant was appointed as a director of this company in 2022. She ceased to be a director in December 2024. She was not asked about this company in evidence and I have not seen evidence to suggest that she holds a current interest in it or assets relating to it.

As regards Business A, the respondent queried sums being paid into XP's bank account from a lady called ERT. The applicant told me that ERT is a friend of hers. The sums coming into the bank account from ERT represented repayment of loans to ERT. ERT had at times faced financial hardship and the applicant had provided her with sums in the region of £50 from time to time. The applicant asserts the payments were nothing to do with Business A.

The respondent further alleged in his Form E that the applicant had taken donations from different people and organisations and had not disclosed the amounts or what the money was used for. He questioned what had become of the money standing to the credit of the Business B account. The applicant appears to have provided documentary evidence of the destination of those funds with her replies to questionnaire, albeit I have not seen those documents.

The respondent asserts that the applicant and her friends are involved in the gig economy. He pointed to transactions in the applicant's bank accounts, although she explained that one of these was part of her inheritance and another represented transfers between accounts.

I have not seen evidence to satisfy me that the applicant has hidden funds. Although she has engaged in a number of business ventures and fundraising exercises, I was not shown any evidence of her having amassed, or in the case of fundraising, retained significant sums from any of these. I have not seen any evidence that she is, for example, living a lifestyle incommensurate with her income. While she received a little less than £80,000 by way of inheritance, she has set out how that was expended and I have not seen evidence to contradict that. Indeed, in the respondent's own open offer dated 11 August 2025, he refers to the applicant's explanations and appears to accept that some of the inheritance monies referred to by her were spent as outlined by her but makes the point that this was largely on Business B, rather than being for the respondent's direct benefit.

My impression of the applicant is that she is a motivated, driven and extremely capable woman, who has successfully raised funds and created a way to support families in the community through Business B. I have little doubt that, in other circumstances, she would be able to run a successful business or businesses. However, I have not seen sufficient evidence to persuade me that she is concealing assets or significant additional income. I do not find that the applicant is concealing valuable business assets or that any of the businesses referred to have significant value. The evidence I have seen in respect of the various businesses support the applicant's presentation that they are small businesses run largely from her home. The reality of her day-to-day life is that she is a carer for XP. They are small businesses, local to the applicant and XP and I accept the applicant's explanations as to the difficulties she has had in bringing any of them to fruition. The applicant told me that she had fallen out of love with her businesses and does not have the "oomph" to push them forward. While I doubt this is correct, given my views as to the applicant's drive and commitment to the causes she is clearly passionate about, I accept that her ability to generate meaningful profit from any of them is extremely limited.

For the applicant's part, she puts her case on the basis that the respondent's pension should be "factored back" into the available assets – i.e. that I should add the sum of £12,660.86 to the funds to be divided between the parties.

That sum is largely gone. The respondent informed me that he cashed in his pension earlier this year. He stopped working for a period of months, having been dismissed from his previous role. He also received a settlement payment in respect of that dismissal, in the region of £12,400. He told me that this money was used on living expenses while he was not working. He continues to be unemployed at present, although he still receives rent from JP and DG. The respondent retains £6,000 in his accounts, representing the remainder of the pension/settlement monies. I was not presented with evidence to suggest that he has retained the sums received other than as currently represented in his bank account.

I do not consider that this is a case in which an "add-back" is appropriate in respect of the respondent's pension. An add-back argument would ordinarily arise where one party has recklessly dissipated assets which would otherwise have formed part of the divisible matrimonial property. In Vaughan v Vaughan [2008] 1 FLR 1108 it was held that there needed to be clear evidence of dissipation with a "wanton element" for an add-back argument to succeed. An add-back would not ordinarily be applied to sums expended in meeting living costs or needs. I have been provided with no evidence that the cashing in of the respondent's pension, and expenditure of that sum, particularly given his loss of employment, was in any sense wanton or deliberate dissipation.

This is a case which both parties accept will be determined primarily on the basis of needs. The question as to whether various assets are matrimonial or non-matrimonial would therefore not ordinarily have the significance that it does in a case where there are surplus assets after needs are met, and I am conscious that there is an air of artificiality in carrying out an assessment as to whether assets are matrimonial or non-matrimonial in such circumstances. However, because of the way that each party puts their case, namely where there is not a defined figure sought to meet the applicant's needs and where they disagree as to how various liabilities should be met, I consider the question as to whether those liabilities should be considered matrimonial or not becomes relevant.

The Supreme Court in Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 clarified that there is a conceptual distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property. Non-matrimonial property is typically pre-marital property brought into the marriage by one of the parties or property acquired by one of the parties by external inheritance or gift. In contrast, matrimonial property is property that comprises the fruits of the marriage partnership or reflects the marriage partnership or is the product of the parties’ common endeavour. "Matrimonialisation" is a process of non-matrimonial assets becoming matrimonial because the parties have treated them as shared. For matrimonialisation to occur, the parties have to have treated the assets as shared over a sufficient period so as to render that treatment as settled.

The family home was owned by the respondent's family for several decades prior to the parties’ marriage. The respondent purchased the family home from his mother several years before the parties first met. For her part, the applicant has given evidence as to financial contributions she says she (and at one point her father) have made to the property and to arrears that had arisen under the mortgage. The respondent disputes some of these contributions, but ultimately, the extent of the applicant’s financial contributions are not a matter I consider I need to make a finding on. The family home has served as a matrimonial home for some 12 years and was adapted to meet XP’s needs. It was further developed to create Business B and both parties clearly worked hard on this project and rightfully take great pride in what they achieved. Although the family home was brought into the marriage by the respondent, it is clearly now a matrimonial property. Nevertheless, I have in mind the history of the property having been in the respondent's family when I consider the outcome in this case.

In terms of the liabilities, the G debt arose from a property owned by the respondent prior to his relationship with the applicant. That previous property had been in negative equity, and proceedings were taken by the finance company with a charging order being made against the family home in 2007, after the parties’ relationship was established. This was not therefore a case in which, at the outset of the relationship, the family home was burdened with that liability. The origin of the liability is pre-matrimonial. The respondent informed me that, by the time the charge was registered, he had paid the debt down to about £3,000, but that after XP was born, his world was "turned upside-down". He failed to make repayments and the debt increased to the level it is now. I have sympathy with the respondent’s position, that the parties’ world changed when XP was born, but I need to consider whether the increase between £3,000 and the current value of the debt should be treated as matrimonial or not.

The Supreme Court in Standish did not explicitly state on whom the burden of proving matrimonialisation should rest, but adopting the approach that they who assert must prove, the G debt having originally been non-matrimonial, I consider the burden lies on the respondent to show that it was matrimonialised. I have no evidence that the debt was ever treated as shared. While I have wondered whether, just as the matrimonial home, having pre-dated the marriage became matrimonialised, the charge upon it should be treated the same way, the charge was not in fact secured against the property until either shortly before or after the marriage at a time when the parties' relationship was established. It related to a wholly non-matrimonial endeavour and the growth in the balance was due to non-payment by the respondent, rather than, for example, a pre-existing overdraft being increased to meet family expenditure. I therefore consider the G debt to be non-matrimonial.

I take a different view as to the respondent’s credit card debt. The respondent informed me that this credit card was taken out in his name in 2009 or 2010. He stated that it was the applicant who instigated the taking out of the credit card and she incurred the indebtedness on it. She was at home and he trusted her with financial matters. For the applicant's part, she told me that the respondent had taken out a card and had spent the money – it was nothing to do with her and she considered that the liability should not be treated as a matrimonial one.

Although the balance on the credit card was said to be in the region of £12,000, the respondent told me that the credit card provider had told him they would agree to him redeeming it for a figure of £6,000. This was the figure agreed to be used for the purposes of my calculations.

This liability was incurred during the marriage. While the applicant’s position was that the respondent’s expenditure was nothing to do with her, neither party took me through what the card was actually used for. As a liability incurred during the course of the marriage, I take the starting position that this is a matrimonial debt. The applicant has not satisfied me that the card was used improperly or solely for the respondent’s benefit in a way that should take it outside of the matrimonial assets and liabilities. I therefore take the view that this is a matrimonial asset and should be redeemed from the joint funds.

In a similar vein, I am of the view that the applicant’s credit card and loan debts should be treated as matrimonial. The source of these liabilities was not examined in evidence before me and I was not invited to treat them as anything other than matrimonial.

In terms of earning capacity, at the moment, XP attends school. The intention is that from next year, he will attend college 3 days per week for one to three years. The applicant told me that if he does not like it, he will be at home. The respondent agrees that XP requires full time care. While the applicant has the skills and the personality to be successful in a professional context, her ability to do will be severely curtailed by her caring responsibilities. Any income she did receive would be likely in the first instance to reduce the means-tested benefits she receives. If, as is contended by the respondent, the applicant were to receive undeclared income, I consider it likely to be very limited and not such as to change my view as to the appropriate outcome in this case. While the applicant may be able to supplement her income through some form of work, for as long as she is the carer for XP, which is currently indefinitely, I consider she has no significant earning capacity.

Although the respondent is not currently working, he has previously worked, most recently as a HGV driver, earning £36,500 gross p.a., £29,034.72 net. He accepted that he should be able to work again and estimated his net income as being £25,000 - £30,000. I consider it likely that he would be able to once again earn a similar amount to his previous employment and have adopted that figure as his earning capacity. However, I note that in his Form E, the respondent stated that he worked 45 hours per week in that role. Given the respondent's age, I bear in mind that he will not be able to maintain that level of earnings indefinitely.

In terms of mortgage capacities, the applicant has produced a letter from a broker dated 17 April 2024 stating that for her to obtain a mortgage would be challenging. The respondent has not produced a mortgage capacity report, but given his previous gross income of £36,000 and the limited working years left to him, his mortgage capacity, while likely to be greater than the applicant's, will not be so much that he would be able to purchase one of the properties appearing in the court bundle.

The respondent has an additional potential housing resource, namely the prospect of remaining in the family home with the assistance of his son, JP. At present, JP and his partner, DG, live in the family home with the respondent and pay rent. The respondent proposes that JP (potentially together with DG) will raise a sufficient mortgage to repay the current mortgage and charge secured on the family home, and to purchase the applicant's interest in the property. I have not heard directly from JP and he is not a party to these proceedings. It was unclear exactly how the proposed mortgage would be arranged – in cross-examination, the respondent seemed to suggest that JP might be added to the current mortgage. In response to a question from me in respect of arrears under the mortgage, he told me that JP would obtain a new mortgage from a different provider. When asked again by Mr. Keyes, the respondent indicated that he wasn't sure what exactly the arrangement would be. Nevertheless, his evidence was that JP was confident that he would be able to remortgage the property at a sufficient level as to provide the applicant with a lump sum to purchase her interest, as well as meeting the liabilities secured upon it.

The respondent stated that he had discussed paying the sum of £40,000 - £50,000 to JP as his contribution to the home (which would presumably be represented by utilising the respondent's share of the equity in the property) and that he would then continue to live with JP and DG in the family home. He would no longer be paid rent.

The applicant does not object to JP purchasing the family home provided she receives a sufficient sum for her interest. If this arrangement can be made to work, it would provide a form of security in terms of housing for the respondent, and permit him to live in the family home. However, I bear in mind that JP has no obligation to assist the respondent. If the respondent's proposal does not come to fruition, whether by JP not being in a position to support the respondent, or choosing not to do so, I have to consider the respondent's housing needs more generally.

Each party in this case has needs. While XP is not a minor child any more and so is not my first consideration, he is the parties' son and they acknowledge that he will have care needs for the rest of his life. They agree that the applicant, as XP's carer, will have greater financial needs than the respondent.

When considering whether to make an order departing from equal sharing of matrimonial assets in order to meet needs, I must be satisfied that there is a proper basis for doing so. While the parties agree that the applicant will have greater financial needs than the respondent due to her caring responsibilities for XP, this is not a case in which the housing needs of the applicant and XP can be met by purchase of an owned home, at least not of the sort within the property particulars shown to me, which included 2-bed properties in the £380,000 - £420,000 range. Any home will need adaptations to meet XP's needs. Given the applicant is unlikely to have any substantial mortgage capacity, even should she receive the entirety of the net proceeds of sale of the family home, she would appear unable to purchase a home for herself and XP of the sort produced for the hearing.

The applicant does not seek to live in the family home – she told me in evidence that XP is afraid of the home, and becomes frightened if they pass the end of the road. She attributed this to the abuse she had received from the respondent. A suitable property may be available in other parts of the country and the applicant told me that she has considered moving to the coast with XP, perhaps to County B. I do not, however, have any evidence before me of what a property would cost in the areas the applicant is considering. Without such evidence, it is difficult to put a specific figure on the applicant's needs. Mr Keyes candidly agreed that the applicant's position is that she needs as much as possible.

The applicant told me that she intends to put money she receives into a trust for XP. She gave me examples of additional expenditure required for XP. She noted that items designed for those with additional needs are always more expensive. She will have a requirement for a wet room and joists wherever XP lives. She was also realistic about the fact that, as she gets older, she will need help with XP. She does not intend for him to move to secure accommodation or independent living unless he wishes to. XP loves gardening and so she would want him to be able to do that. She currently anticipates renting, but would have a substantial deposit. The applicant does, of course, have her own financial needs in addition to those arising from her care of XP.

In terms of the respondent's needs, his primary intention is to remain living in the family home with JP and DG. The applicant does not object to that and it would clearly be a beneficial arrangement for the respondent, who would be able to remain in the home he has lived in for the majority of his life, but also in terms of reducing costs of sale of the family home. If, however, that plan is not successful, the respondent will still have housing needs.

The respondent appears to be relatively settled in the current arrangement with JP and it may be that, even if the family home had to be sold, the respondent would seek to rehouse elsewhere with JP. Otherwise, both of these parties will be in a position where they have to rent. In that event, the respondent will be in a position to earn for the next several years, but in approximately a decade or slightly less, will be looking to retire. I consider that, without the security of a home with JP, he would need to have a substantial sum to assist with his own outgoings and needs, including on retirement.

I have been left in no doubt that the applicant's financial needs are significantly greater than the respondent's, given her caring responsibilities for XP and that these needs justify a significant departure from equal sharing of the matrimonial assets.

The parties lived in the family home, an owned property that they significantly modified to cater for children with additional needs. They appear to have had a moderate standard of living, and there is reference to a family holiday having been paid for from the applicant's inheritance.

The applicant is 57 and the respondent is 58, which is of relevance in terms of their respective mortgage capacities, the length of time that the respondent can be expected to continue to work and the applicant's likely need for assistance in caring for XP in the future. This was a 12 year marriage, so of mid to longer duration.

Each party has health difficulties, but neither appears to be so affected by these that they are unable to work or carry out their caring responsibilities at present.

Each party has contributed during the marriage, both financially and in terms of caring for the home and family. The applicant's care for XP will continue indefinitely, as is reflected in my assessment of her needs.

Each party has referred to the other's conduct within the documents they have prepared for the hearing, but aside from an application for costs by the applicant, which I deal with below, and the respondent's allegations that the applicant has concealed assets, which I deal with above, this is not a "conduct" case within s.25(2)(g) .

The respondent did refer to what he said was an agreement between the parties, that the applicant would retain her inheritance and the respondent would retain the family home. If there was an agreement, it does not appear to have been formalised, or the parties to have received legal advice upon it. Given that I have accepted that the applicant does not have any remaining inheritance, in any event the parties' needs require a sale of the family home and distribution of the proceeds.

There does not appear to be any relevant loss of benefit in this case.

Ultimately, this is a case where the needs of the parties take centre-stage. However, while the applicant has given examples of the additional costs of caring for XP, her needs have not been directly quantified.

Neither S.25(2)(b) of the Act, nor the authorities I have referred to above specify that, for a departure from equality to meet a party's needs, those needs must be measured by a specific sum of money. Nonetheless, I am conscious that a departure from equal sharing of matrimonial assets must be carried out on a principled basis.

With these matters in mind, my conclusions are:

a) the applicant has significantly greater financial needs than the respondent for the reasons I have already set out;

b) the family home shall be sold (whether to JP or, if that does not prove possible, on the open market);

c) from the gross proceeds of sale, the parties shall pay:
(i) the outstanding mortgage;
(ii) the charge secured on the family home in favour of A Council;
(iii) reasonable costs of sale;
(iv) £6,000 towards the respondent's credit card liability. I am capping the payment from the sale proceeds to £6,000. This is the sum the respondent told me the company had said they would accept and that he was willing for me to work from at the hearing. If the sum required to meet the liability proves greater than £6,000, the respondent will have to meet the remainder from his own share of the sale proceeds of the family home;
(v) £3,746 towards the applicant's credit cards and loan. Again, if the credit card debts and/or loan are greater than this, the applicant will need to meet any shortfall from her share of the sale proceeds;
(vi) the remainder to be divided such that the applicant is to receive 71% and the respondent is to receive 29%, save that the charge secured against the family home in respect of the G debt is to be met from the respondent's share. That liability was said to be £14,933 at the hearing before me, but the charge shall be met from the respondent's share whether the debt is more or less than that figure.

In terms of the division of the equity, while each party had suggested it be divided with 70% to be paid to the applicant and 30% to be paid to the respondent, each did so on the basis of different overall figures, and with different payments to be met from the sale proceeds prior to that division. I have therefore considered what division would, in my view, be appropriate, rather than simply adopting the percentage division suggested by the parties without examining the figures.

The respondent's intention is that JP will purchase the family home with the assistance of a mortgage. Should he do so, I have taken the likely costs of that transfer to be £5,000. On that basis, after payment of the mortgage, the charge to A Council, £6,000 towards the respondent's credit card and £3,746 towards the applicant's liabilities, the remaining sum to be divided between the parties would be £283,593. This is a calculation based on the figures as presented to me on the date of the hearing. These figures will be subject to a degree of fluctuation, and other than where I specify that a fixed sum is to be used (such as the £6,000 towards the respondent's credit card liability), I do not intend to suggest that those figures are or should be fixed.

The applicant's needs are greater than the respondent's. The more capital she receives, the better she will be able to provide financial security for herself and XP. As I have said, however, I do not have evidence as to the amount of those needs. It is somewhat easier to quantify the respondent's needs. The respondent has said that he has spoken to JP about contributing £40,000 - £50,000 towards the purchase of the family home. Taking a mid-figure of £45,000 and on the basis that the G debt of £14,933 will come from his share, the respondent's housing needs if JP purchases the home would be a little under £60,000 in order to clear the G debt and pay JP £45,000. However, I bear in mind both that the respondent will have income needs on retirement and that, in the event that JP does not buy the family home, the respondent will need to use his capital to meet his own housing needs. On this basis, £60,000 prior to meeting the G debt is too low.

Should the equity be divided such that the applicant receives 70% and the respondent receives 30%, taking into account the parties' other assets and after payment of the G debt by the respondent, the applicant would be left with £198,968.52 and the respondent would be left with £76,145. The applicant is likely to have to meet her legal costs, which stand at a little under £20,000 from her share of the proceeds. I bear in mind that, while the respondent has the prospect of securing his housing position with the assistance of JP (albeit this is by no means guaranteed), the applicant appears likely to have to rely on rented accommodation for the foreseeable future. In the circumstances, I think there should be a slight further adjustment in the applicant's favour, such that she receives 71% of the net equity and the respondent receives 29%. That would provide the applicant with £201,350.73 and the respondent with £82,241.85, and taking into account the parties other assets and after payment of the G debt, the applicant will receive £201,804.44 or 73.35% of the assets prior to her costs, £181,863 or 71.3% if her costs are immediately met. The respondent would receive £73,309 or 26.6% of the total, 28.7% of the assets remaining after costs are met.

While I have looked at figures slightly greater and lesser than these in each party's favour, I have decided that, in the absence of more concrete figures for each party's needs, this represents a fair division of the assets.

The parties agree that JP (potentially with DG) may purchase the applicant's share in the family home and take over the mortgage. Should he do so, in addition to the sum of £201,350.73, the applicant would need to receive sufficient to meet her liabilities of £3,746 (as these would not be being met directly from the sale proceeds) and so the total sum to be paid to her would be £205,096.73.

I cannot direct a sale to JP, nor for JP to pay any sums to the applicant. However, what I would provide for in any order is that:
a) The respondent is to pay or cause to be paid to the applicant the sum of £205,096.73 on or before 2 March 2026, or 4pm on the date two working days following pronouncement of decree nisi, whichever is the later;
b) simultaneously upon payment of that sum, the applicant is to transfer all her legal and beneficial interest in the family home to the respondent (recording as a recital the parties' agreement that the applicant will, at the respondent's nomination, transfer her beneficial interest to any combination of the respondent, JP and/or DG as notified to her no later than 7 days in advance of the transfer by the respondent in satisfaction of this provision);
c) that, in default of payment, the family home is to be sold and upon sale, the proceeds to be applied as set out in paragraph 116 above.

I consider it appropriate to allow more than three months (four from the date the parties were notified of my decision) for the respondent to seek to arrange a buy-out of the applicant's share of the family home. While this is longer than advocated for on behalf of the applicant, I bear in mind that the family home has been in the respondent's family for decades and it is his clear wish to retain it as a home within his family. It is likely in any event to take some time for decree nisi to be pronounced.

Mr Keyes made submissions on the applicant's behalf in respect of costs incurred prior to the hearing, and so I deal with those costs within this judgment. The applicant had sought a sum of £5,000 in respect of the costs incurred by her due to the respondent's failure to comply with my order of 22 July 2024. She referred to his litigation conduct generally.

When considering costs, I have in mind Rule 28.3 The starting point is set out in 28.3, namely that the court will make "no order" as to costs:
(5) Subject to paragraph (6), the general rule in financial remedy proceedings is that the court will not make an order requiring one party to pay the costs of another party.

Rule 28.3(7) provides:

It is correct that the respondent did not comply with several of the directions I gave on 22 July 2024 and that this ultimately contributed to the hearing listed on 28 July 2025 being converted to an FDR. However, I bear in mind that, in the early stages of this litigation, the applicant had repeatedly failed to file or serve a completed Form E (including by the time of the hearing before me, leading to that hearing not being effective as an FDR), and that she failed to attend a hearing in November 2024, albeit it appears she was not aware of the same. No effective FDR hearing had taken place prior to the July 2025 hearing and given the issues between the parties and the available assets, this was a case that called out for an FDR hearing. While asking for a payment of £5,000 towards costs, Mr Keyes did not provide me with an N260 or other equivalent summary of the costs said to have been wasted and I was provided with no evidence as to what actual costs had been wasted as a result of the respondent's default. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that I should make a costs order in respect of the respondent's failure to comply with my directions. Looking at the litigation as a whole, neither party has been fully compliant with the rules or directions of the court or has furthered the over-riding objective as they should have done.

That aspect of my judgment deals with the application for costs in respect of costs incurred within the litigation prior to the final hearing. Should either party wish to make an application for costs in respect of the final hearing, they may do so, although I would remind the parties that I will have in mind Rule 28.3 and the starting point that there should be no order as to costs in considering any such application.

While I have set out my decision as to the appropriate resolution of the application for a financial remedy, I cannot make a substantive order absent a decree nisi. The order I shall make at this stage is therefore that, upon the parties agreeing to pursue the divorce suit, and upon the applicant agreeing to apply for decree nisi as soon as reasonably practicable, this matter shall be listed for a mention before me on the first available date after pronouncement of decree nisi, to be vacated if, after decree nisi has been pronounced, the parties submit an agreed order disposing of the application and the same is approved.

On circulating a draft of my judgment, I asked the parties for their views on publication of my judgment and, if it was to be published, whether and if so, to what it extent they considered it should be anonymised.

At the hearing for hand-down of judgment on 20 November, both parties agreed that the judgment should be published. On behalf of the applicant, Mr. Keyes sought that it be anonymized, given that it contained sensitive information, in particular regarding XP. The respondent sought that it be published without anonymization, on the basis that the details should be in the public domain and the parties should be able to tell their story.

I gave a short additional extempore judgment at the hearing on 20 November, in which I set out my decision that the judgment would be published, but anonymised to prevent identification of the parties, XP, any named third parties, any addresses and businesses, as well as details of XP's disabilities. While my reasons are contained within that judgment, I took into account the President’s Guidance on publication of Judgments of 19 June 2024. The starting point is the principle of open justice, and there must be good reason to depart from that. Having regard to the competing interests under Articles 8 (respect for private and family life) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights I considered the balancing exercise is set out by Lord Steyn in Re S (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47, para 17, which requires an "intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case" and the need to conduct a proportionality check to strike the right balance.

As per the President's Guidance, being transparent includes allowing the public to understand the range of cases in the Family Court and how they are dealt with. The publication of judgments is an essential part of that process. The right for a party to "tell their story" is also an important aspect of their Article 8 rights. This case is not about the maintenance of a child in the sense of a child under the age of 18. However, XP has significant disabilities, which I had considered at some length in my (unanonymised) judgment. His needs were a key aspect of my decision. These parties are reasonably well known in their community. The public interest in understanding the family court process can still be met by publication of an anonymised version of my judgment. I was persuaded that the applicant and XP's right to a private and family life, given the needs and situation of XP were such that the parties' identities should not be made public, nor should any information likely to lead to their identification or the identification of XP be made public.