A Child (No 3: Enforcement, False allegations of abuse and transfer of residence), Re

Once again, I am required to determine matters relating to this young child of the family, who I shall refer to throughout this judgment as “A”. She is preschool age and A has been subjected to proceedings between her parents for the vast majority of her life. On this occasion I was tasked with determining an application for enforcement of a shared lives with final order made last October following a contested fact finding hearing and subsequent welfare hearing. The shared ‘lives with’ order included a suspended order for the transfer of residence from the mother to the father in the event of 3 consecutive breaches of the time A spends with her father, or other unreasonable behaviours by the mother. Within the previous proceedings I had appointed a Rule 16.4 Guardian (“CG”) to represent A, and she has been represented by Simon Cooper in this hearing.

A’s mother is “M”. She has been represented by Elisabeth Traugott at this hearing. She denies having unreasonably breached the final Child Arrangements Order, and pursues an unspecified variation of the final order.

A’s father is “F”. He has been represented by Hayley Manser on a pro bono basis, as throughout previous hearings. He seeks enforcement of the order by way of immediate transfer of residence.

M has had the benefit of screens throughout this hearing, and as with previous hearings gave her evidence remotely from the vulnerable witness suite. The Father also has vulnerabilities and has required the support of a lay advocate throughout each of the hearings before me. This enabled them both to give their best evidence, taking into account PDs12J and 3AA.

The issues to be determined are therefore:

There is also an application by an accredited member of the press who has attended parts of some previous hearings and the majority of evidence in this hearing to vary the operational terms of the transparency order, which at present delays the reporting permissions until the conclusion of these proceedings and the conclusion of any criminal investigations. CG and the father argue against that, in light of the risk of prejudice both to ongoing criminal investigations and the sensitive balance between protecting this family’s privacy and the need for transparency within family proceedings. M does not oppose any reporting subject to effective anonymity.

It is necessary to provide a relatively brief summary of the background to this matter, although this judgment should be read alongside the substantive judgments made in previous hearings for a full and proper understanding.

Proceedings were commenced by F in 2022 due to M refusing to permit him to spend reasonable time with A. M obtained an ex parte non-molestation order against F, and made developing allegations that F had sexually and physically abused her. Due to delays with pleading the allegations of sexual abuse and other issues the fact-finding hearing could not take place until mid-2023. At that hearing I made the following findings:

The other allegations were dismissed. It is plain from these findings that PD12J is engaged, as I have made findings of domestically abusive behaviour, notwithstanding the vast majority of M’s allegations being untrue.

Following the fact-finding hearing in 2023 a careful programme was set up with the support of A’s Guardian to introduce A to F and to start to develop a relationship with him (F not having spent time with A since her birth). Despite overwhelmingly positive reports from professionals about the progression of supervised contact, the matter came before me for final hearing in autumn 2024 to consider final living arrangements and an application for enforcement in light of a number of failed contacts. M accepted that contacts had been missed but argued that there were reasonable explanations.

Within my judgment from that hearing I found that contact had been unreasonably withheld, and that M’s default position was that when there is a reason to prevent the progression or continuation of contact she has done so, without being able to balance the various harms to A of doing so. I noted the Guardian’s concerns about the M’s willingness to promote a relationship with F and found that “It is also of concern that M is now so entrenched in her pursuit of criminal sanctions against F that she has been entirely unable to reflect upon the harm that her own actions have caused A”. On balance I was persuaded that (provided M was able to make changes to promote A’s relationship with F) A’s welfare required continued primary residence with her mother with a significant amount of unsupervised, overnight time with F. The concerns were such that the order was made subject to a suspended transfer of residence order.

By February of this year, 4 months after that order, both parties agree that issues had arisen with handovers.

The parties have agreed a lengthy document of applicable law, which I adopt and summarise here. Where factual matters are disputed, I remind myself that it is for the party pursuing findings to prove what they allege, on the balance of probabilities, save for the alleged breaches which must be proved to the criminal standard. There is no pseudo burden on any other party to disprove what is said against them. I must make my findings based on the broad canvas of evidence, considering each piece of evidence in regard to other pieces of evidence. Although hearsay is admissible, I must place the appropriate weight on it in light of the factors set out in the Civil Evidence Act 1995. I cannot look at pieces of evidence in isolation, and an overview of the broader canvas is required to help me to consider whether the allegation has been proved.

The evidence of the parents is of the utmost importance, and I must necessarily form a view as to their credibility and reliability. Parents often lie within the course of proceedings such as these, for many reasons – shame, misplaced loyalty, or fear for example but that does not mean that they have lied about everything, and most importantly does not on its own mean that they are guilty of what they are accused. The court should identify deliberate lies, the significant issue that they relate to and why it is found that the only explanation for that lie is guilt. In consideration of the sexual abuse component I have been assisted by the judgment of Macdonald J in Re P [2019] [EWFC 27].

When I make decisions about A’s upbringing her welfare is my paramount concern, with particular reference to the factors set out for me at s1 of the Children Act 1989. I must make the least interventionist orders possible to achieve that aim. I must only make orders for A that are better for her than making no order.

I have heard evidence over 2 days from M, Maternal Grandmother (“MGM”), F, Paternal Grandmother (“PGM”), F’s partner (“D”) and a maternal aunt (“E”). I have read the bundle of papers and watched/listened to the audio/video recordings undertaken by both parents at handovers, and from the mother’s ‘babycam’. I have also watched the recording of A’s ABE interview. I am not clear why this video was shared by the mother’s solicitors rather than the police as per the direction, nor why it is that the mother says to have been provided with updates from the police about their investigations into A’s allegations when the court has not been.

The alleged breaches can be split into 2 categories:

I am not satisfied that it is appropriate (or indeed possible) for me to consider each allegation, or even each category in isolation. The broad canvass of previous findings and the manner in which these alleged breaches arise require a holistic overview of the evidence available to me. Parties agree that although no party pursues a finding before me that F has sexually abused A, it will be necessary for me to determine whether A did in fact make the allegations to M and MGM as they say, and if so, why, because it is a central plank of M’s argument of reasonable excuse that she properly reported genuine allegations made to her by the child. This necessitates an evaluation of the evidence to substantiate any abusive behaviours by F.

M’s Evidence: There can be no doubt that M comes before me with a number of findings made, over 2 hearings, which damage her credibility. I cannot start from the position that this is a witness who is not willing to lie under oath because I have (twice) found otherwise. It is vital however that the weight of these previous findings does not unduly cloud my assessment of her evidence before me in respect of the current allegations. I also remind myself that I found that 6 years ago F took a non-consensual explicit image of M and as such I need to consider the extent to which her demeanour was impacted upon by her previous experiences. As a general observation, M’s presentation remained assertive, confident, and able to disagree with or pursue the opportunity to fully answer questions put to her. She was able to maintain her disagreement with findings I have made previously (which had been unsuccessfully appealed) and took the opportunity on several occasions to try to reargue her case.

I did notice patterns of behaviours I have previously observed, for example the delegation of her own decision making to professionals: She was at pains to tell me that she hadn’t accused F of harming A sexually or otherwise. She did not tell me she thinks that he has done so, but told me that once she had reported it to the police and social services they (predictably and appropriately) advised her to stop contact. In my last judgment, considering a previous false allegation made to police that F had physically hurt A I found M’s “attempts to deny that she was accusing F of hurting A to be unconvincing: in her reports to CSC she says that she wouldn’t point the finger at him because she wasn’t there. In that case what was the purpose of her report to CSC? Again, I find this is a further manipulation of the reality, designed to make M appear reasonable.” I also noted, when considering M’s reliance on professional advice for previously missed contacts “This manipulation of facts is a pattern I have observed throughout these proceedings with references to professional advice M has received in order to support her reasonableness in responding to such professional advice: for example reporting A has been sick and therefore triggering the 48 hour policy meaning that she is not responsible for cancellation of contact.”

Another recurring pattern is the mother’s failure to give professionals all relevant information. An example of this is her MG11 to police in respect of A’s allegations in which she goes through a detailed rehearsal of the allegations she makes against F during their relationship (unnecessarily), makes reference to a fact-finding hearing but fails to set out that her allegations were found to be untrue. She gives a misleading account of the professional observations of the contact and states that the shared care pattern has never worked, despite having told the court that it was working well enough until February 2025.

Whilst this is relevant to my assessment of M’s credibility, it is not decisive.

MGM’s evidence similarly faces the challenges of my previous findings that she had lied under oath, which she relied upon to explain large gaps in her evidence which she now asserts as relevant facts. I found parts of her evidence to be unconvincing: She was determined to present herself as reasonable and keen to support A’s relationship with F, telling me in her statement that she had offered to undertake handovers directly with F when PGM became unavailable but that he had declined, when it can be seen from the transcript of ‘appclose’ messages that it was F who had offered to do the handovers with MGM. M’s explanation in evidence for why that hadn’t happened was that the MGM wasn’t happy to do it, although she couldn’t explain why, which is when the difficulties at handovers began.

I also did not accept the portrayal by this MGM as having a relatively ‘hands off’ relationship with M and A. The maternal family is extremely close, as has been demonstrated throughout the evidence I have heard in these proceedings and the last. They not only live together, but provide support and care for each other and A, such as on the morning A was alleged to make allegations, MGM noting that A was awake and collecting her from M’s bedroom to go downstairs for breakfast. I did not accept the benevolent view of F and paternal family the MGM sought to portray, telling me that if I say it’s ok she will hand A over to him tomorrow: On her case this is a man who has sexually and physically abused her daughter and may have sexually abused her granddaughter on more than one occasion. Her true feelings are more easily identifiable by the hostility she is recorded to have demonstrated at the initial police decision to NFA A’s allegations on 27 June (the police then changed their position on this and an ongoing investigation persists). Although she now denies being hostile, the police log at [297] records her saying that “[The] police have failed M and have now failed A. She asked if F would be allowed contact”. She went on to say “This will be one of those cases where the police have failed the child and the child would go on to be raped and murdered.” I do not accept her explanation that she was speaking generally, and not about A. She is then recorded as asking “Why the investigation could not remain open for a further 6 months to a year to allow A to continue disclosing and to do additional VRI’s”. Again, I found her explanation that she wanted A to receive therapeutic support rather than further questioning inconsistent. Finally, MGM went on to advise that she will be contacting the BBC and the Chief Constable as she feels that they are “putting A in danger”. I am satisfied that this is her real and genuine sentiment surrounding F and the paternal family, and that she dishonestly portrayed otherwise to counter the argument that these allegations and breaches are prompted by the maternal family’s hostility to contact.

I also note from this review of the police log that it was after the initial NFA decision was communicated that M provided additional information to the police, which has prompted the prolongation of the criminal investigation, similarly to in previous proceedings.

MGM tells me that she has received a diagnosis of bone cancer, and as such suffers from physical discomfort at times. Efforts were made to ensure that she remained comfortable and was able to give her best evidence. Again, I remind myself that whilst there are relevant issues for me to consider in relation to MGM’s credibility, it is the entirety of the evidence which will help me to make decisions in this matter.

F’s evidence was characteristic with my previous experiences of him giving evidence. He continues to struggle with dates and specific details in light of his learning profile but continued to benefit from the support of his lay advocate. He presented as exhausted and emotional, describing that every time there is positive progress M does something to set it back. He has recently lost his father, an experience which plainly impacted him gravely now and then. I found him to be a straightforward witness, and I did not detect any deliberate attempts to mislead the court. He accepted reluctantly that he could and perhaps should have shared more detail with the mother – important details such as where he was living and where A would spend her time overnight, and the fact of his father’s illness and death, but set this against a context where every communication led to difficulties and intrusive behaviours from M. As with each substantive hearing, my assessment of F is not unimpeachable. He has failed to share important information with M. He has failed to openly engage in dialogue which would properly enable exercise of shared parental responsibility. But, as with all aspects of this matter, I must place that in its proper context: One where I have found that for the majority of A’s life M and her family have sought to prevent a relationship between F and his daughter based on extremely serious and false allegations.

PGM’s evidence was also straightforward, I am satisfied. She was honest about her difficult feelings surrounding M and maternal family in the context I have already outlined. I note that she too has recently experienced significant loss in the death of her husband. When alerted to a discrepancy between her statement and the F’s partner’s statement to police about where A had been on 18 April 2025 she immediately responded to say that wouldn’t be correct as A would have been returned at 9am. She did not try to tailor her evidence or change it to fit with someone else’s conflicting recollection. She resisted the baseless suggestion put to her that there was some sort of informal protocol within her home that F would not change A’s nappies without someone else being around, or the unfounded suggestion that there were concerns within the paternal family about him changing A’s nappies with a convincing air of outrage. She recognised her son’s shortcomings in not openly communicating with M, but placed this in the context of it not being a ‘normal situation’ and described compellingly the family’s awareness that anything could happen to prompt M to make a complaint about them and stop contact.

The next witness I heard was F’s partner, “D”. Her evidence was most unhelpful, although I put that in the context of already having been notified how nervous she was about giving evidence. She has made a prepared statement to police, some months after the relevant date, in which she plainly makes a mistake about where A was on 18 April 2025 (Good Friday). The fact that A could not have been with F and D on 18 April is not in dispute: A was with M that day. Ms Traugott points to this as evidence of a material lie, designed to mislead the police and professionals. I am not satisfied that this is a lie, rather a mistake. D gave a context for this mistake, although the amount of time and exploration with her before she could recognise this as a mistake shows the lack of reliability that could be placed on her evidence. She explained that whilst at the police station she had looked through her phone in order to try to jog a memory of where they had been on the relevant date. She said that when she found photographs of A and F in the park on 18 April she mistakenly thought that this ‘metadata’ answered the question of where they were, and thus this is what she put in her prepared statement. I have been unable to identify an explanation for this mistake which makes it more likely to suggest a deliberate untruth, or any potential benefit to her or F of this, and when considering the enhanced Lucas direction I am unable to link it to any material issue within these proceedings. In her prepared statement she also made unhelpfully sweeping generalisations which suggested a significantly greater knowledge than she in fact possessed, such as F “normally carries out the nappy change of A in my presence or other family members…” when in fact she thinks she has only been present for around 5-10 nappy changes. Her evidence was guarded and she occasionally attempted to refuse to answer questions. Overall whilst I understand her wish to provide evidence to support her partner I am afraid that the effect of that on her evidence has been to render very little weight indeed to be placed on her evidence.

The final witness who gave evidence was the maternal Aunt “E”. She was taken out of turn due to concerns raised by Ms Traugott that E has been diagnosed with a learning disability, was largely illiterate and would struggle to give evidence. A local lay advocate, very kindly agreed to make herself available during the course of day 2 to meet with E, undertake an assessment and give advice to the court about how her evidence should be facilitated, which was observed. It was somewhat surprising then that E’s evidence was given with certainty, particularly surrounding specific dates on which MGM had told her that A had told her that “about tickle fingers near A’s bottom”, which she said was on 19 or 20 March 2025. Of course, this is quite different (and significantly less serious) than MGM’s reported allegation of tickle fingers “in” A’s bottom, and may explain why no urgent action was considered necessary by E. She expressed significant shock at this but could not explain why she had not told M about this or reported it to anyone else. Similarly, she describes having herself viewed A imitating oral sex on her doll on Monday 21 April, but didn’t tell anyone. She thought she must have “missed that out” of her witness statement. Apart from those ‘headlines’ she had very little contextual recall around conversations or allegations. She could not recall anything about the conversation where she told M about A’s allegations a few weeks after she had been told. She said she could remember M’s reaction, that she was “shocked” but it is difficult to reconcile this with the MGM’s evidence that she had told the mother about this by then. I did not find her to be a dishonest witness, rather one (with regards to her reported vulnerabilities and learning profile) who was easily manipulated and prepared by the M and MGM to observe and repeat ideas which had already been told to her, leading her perhaps to misinterpret normal childhood games with interpretations of sexual abuse, which she had twice been told had been reported by A.

It is necessary to construct a brief chronology around these allegations. Going right back to my judgment last Autumn I was concerned by a report recorded in the police log [18/7/24, G56] that M and MGM “worry [F] will sexually harm the child and they mark her nappies so they know if he has changed her. They are worried because he said in family court that female genitalia sexually aroused him.”

In her evidence to me last August M denied having made that report and said that the officer had entered it wrongly. Whilst noting that the police have not been able to answer to the suggestion that they have fabricated serious allegations and recorded them contemporaneously in their logs as reports that the mother made, I was satisfied that on the balance of probabilities M had in fact made that report.

It is notable that within that report M tells the officer that A refers to F as “nasty man”. On 1 July 2024 M described A calling him “man”. Professional reports from supervised contact in the period approaching that final hearing record A as calling F “daddy”, which is also the observation of the F, PGM and D, although the maternal family now say that A routinely refers to F as “daddyman”. There is no explanation or corroboration for this outside of the allegations A has been asked to repeat, although I note in the log recorded by the officer on 25 April 25 [275] although he is informed that A calls her father ‘daddyman’ the allegation recorded is “When daddy licks by (sic) bits I say no”.

Alleged breach 28.2.25: On 28 February 2025 PGM was unavailable to assist with handovers due to the diagnosis of terminal cancer received by her husband around this time. F attempted to substitute the PGM for his brother to undertake the handover (as permitted within the final order, subject to agreement) but M informed him that MGM is not willing to accept that substitution. Within minutes M suggested swapping weekends rather than proposing an alternative adult. F responded to ask who MGM would be happy with, saying that if MGM was happy then he would attend himself, as long as they were in front of the shop so that the cctv would capture the handover. He says “if your mum don’t agree who she is happy with then I will have no choice to swap weekends because your mum can’t agree”. I have already set out my concerns about the inconsistent evidence from MGM that she had in in fact said that she would be happy to handover to F but he had declined. M does not suggest any alternative adults. She suggests waiting until the next day to allow his family a little bit of time. F responds that he will swap weekends. M maintains that because he has agreed to swap weekends he has agreed for this contact not to go ahead, and therefore although it was breached it was reasonable. When the ‘swapped’ handover approaches and F suggests that his brother’s partner (with whom A is familiar) is available to undertake the handover, M responds that if his mother continues to be unavailable they should revert to a contact centre, and goes on to say that MGM is not comfortable handing over to the person suggested or “any other family members of yours”. She then goes on to say “Also having checked our court order it doesn’t state I have to make up any missed contact time. As it was your circumstances that changed this weekend I am under no obligation to agree to any additional contact time. So contact will remain how it is in the court order. Just so it doesn’t cause any confusion for A.”

The effect of this exchange is that having failed to make any reasonable attempt to agree an alternative adult to facilitate the original handover, the mother gave the father no option but to agree to her alternative suggestion of swapping weekends. Afterwards, when this offer was pursued, M withdrew it, saying that she had no obligation. By giving a blanket refusal to agree to any alternative supervisor she essentially prevented future handovers going ahead. When asked to explain this in evidence M said that she was just trying to stick to the order, which is what F does. She agreed that “there does need to be flexibility but F sticks to the court order word for word”. I’m afraid that I found this approach does not prioritise A’s time with her father, but indicates a petty, disingenuous and pedantic approach to the operation of an order designed to provide A with a regular meaningful time with both of her parents. Ms Traugott’s suggestion that by failing to make the MGM available to facilitate the handover in fact F has fallen into breach is fundamentally misplaced. The order provides for the agreed substitution of handover facilitators, but this requires reasonable engagement from both parents to reach an agreement. In light of the conflicting evidence of M and MGM I prefer the contemporaneous record of the appclose messages which shows that F offered to undertake the handover directly with MGM. If MGM was happy to do so as she says in her evidence, M cynically refused to communicate this and frustrated the handover. If M’s evidence is correct that MGM refused to undertake the handover with F despite her evidence that she was (and remains) happy to undertake handovers and has never had any problem doing so, MGM has frustrated the handover going ahead for no justifiable reason. This unreasonable breach occurred at a time where neither MGM nor the mother report a reason for seeking to prevent the contact going ahead, but I am satisfied that M seized on an opportunity to prevent contact happening because it is not an arrangement she has ever agreed to, and indeed had reported to the police “had never worked for A” [305]. Her account within her statement at [152] that “[F] declined to collect A and cancelled contact himself” on this occasion is deliberately misleading. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this was a breach: Contact did not go ahead as per the order due to the failed handover. I am not satisfied that it was reasonable for M or MGM to refuse to try any reasonable alternative means to effect the handover

I have taken into account M’s case that better communication may have eased this situation, but I note that F does specifically inform M that PGM “has requested her personal matters be kept private at this time.” That is not unreasonable. Whilst fully open communication is better for parents seeking to navigate co-parenting, there is a relevant context. M is not entitled to know this information: F holds equal responsibility for A, and he has been assessed as capable of making decisions for her in her best interests. It is not for M to seek to substitute her own views of what best meets A’s needs for contact with F based on the limited information available to her. It is not sufficient reason to withhold contact.

On 3 March, when F has indicated that he is now not comfortable with a handover directly between himself and MGM due to the change in tone of messages from M, only then does M say that MGM is in fact happy to do handovers directly with him, outside the shop where there is cctv, and because there have been no previous issues. Again, absent any alternative adult being proposed by M, F is put in a position where he realistically has no option but to agree. It is plain from the regularity with which M messages F for more information about the ‘family emergency’ and when PGM will be available again that it is causing her concern and occupying much of her time. There is however no reason at this stage for A to be aware that anything was different in F’s home or life, other than that A had not seen him for the previous contact.

Alleged Breaches 5.3.25 and 6.3.25: Handover is attempted between F and MGM. Despite having provided F with reassurance that the handover would be covered by cctv, M has produced a short video recorded clip of this handover, which shows that she is sitting in the car directly alongside the pavement where the handover is taking place, holding her phone so that she is able to record out of the window, high enough that she only captures a small part of the car door. I was unpersuaded by M and MGM’s attempts to suggest that M was further away so that A would not have been able to see M or that she was filming. A can be seen to be clinging to MGM, saying “no no” and resisting the F’s attempts to gently remove her while he speaks calmly to her.

The contemporaneous messages between the parents following this attempt are helpful to consider. F describes it as “disappointing and upsetting that your mother refused to hand A to me today. The fact that A was crying was not a reasonable excuse to breach the order which you have now done.” M goes on to describe MGM’s 3^rd party report of what happened, saying that he had agreed not to take her. F responds to dispute the account, repeats that this is an unreasonable breach and asks how he will be allowed to collect A that day. M’s response confirms that she was “right by the shop and could see what was happening”. She says “I don’t see how I am in breach as I made A available and you were the one who said you would try to take her one more time from my mum…”. She says that she will “be at the shop in a minute. she is shouting, crying and screaming but I’ll bring her back round.” There is no recording produced from that second attempt but the result is that she is not handed over. M describes attempts lasting over 50 minutes, and says that at that point she got out of the car as A was so hysterical. She repeats her belief that she has not breached the order “I’ve brought her twice today and made her available for contact as per court order…”.

The outcome is a further attempt at a handover the next day. Again, M has produced recordings from this handover. Again, M is sat very close to the handover, between the road and the shop. She is video recording through the window, and A is plainly able to see her as she looks directly at the camera and points her finger towards M repeating that she wants to go home. F can be stood calmly waiting a metre or so away from A and the MGM, who is holding A in her arms. It can be seen that A is not holding MGM around the neck at times, and MGM is shifting her from hip to hip. It would have been possible for A to be placed on the ground at that point to be collected by F, notwithstanding her distress. No attempt is made by M to reduce A’s distress, or to effect the handover. Following this further unsuccessful attempt M writes a long message to F, suggesting a reduction in contact and what amounts to supported contact within a local soft play facility. She could not explain in evidence why a reduction in contact length would assist with handovers.

I have considered what the parties told me about this weekend. M tried to distance herself from what was going on in the handover and said (when asked why MGM wouldn’t put A down on the ground) said “I’m not sure, I’m not part of handovers” despite having given F a very long explanation of the safety risks to A of placing her down near a road in the message directly after this further failed contact, describing this as “a massive safeguarding risk”. This was echoed by MGM who told me she was “appointed by the court and had responsibility for the welfare of that child and I don’t want her to run out onto that road”. I found both of these explanations unconvincing, and not in fact something that M herself believes to be true. She told me repeatedly in her evidence that the finding I made previously about her hiding in the bushes could not be correct because “if a child sees their parent they will run to them” so I am unclear when A can plainly see her mum and is pointing to her why she would randomly run off into the road, particularly when F was stood right beside her and could have stopped her. There is a wholesale failure to make any reasonable attempts to reduce such a risk even if it did exist, such as moving back towards the shop, or even inside the shop which may have provided a distraction for A, away from her mother.

I have taken into account MGM’s description of the physical discomfort she experiences in putting A down, but by choosing to hold her during handovers she has created this difficulty over each of these attempts. M could have got A out of the car and placed her on the ground to stand and wait holding MGM’s hand until F arrived. The physical discomfort is not visible when MGM is shifting A from hip to hip as is seen in the video recording, although I acknowledge that bending to place a child down is a different mechanism. Whilst I can see (and hear) that this is a difficult situation where A is plainly exhibiting distress, the failure to consider and attempt reasonable ways to enable this handover does mean that the failed handovers this weekend constitute an unreasonable breach of the order. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this was a breach. I am not satisfied that it was reasonable for the maternal grandmother to refuse to try any reasonable alternative means to effect the handover

Alleged breach 14.3.25: On 14 March 2025 M reports to police that “nanny has scratched me” and that “F and PGM have previously smacked A” although this has not been repeated or pursued within these proceedings. The time of this report is not recorded in the police log. M was extraordinarily vague about this report, saying she couldn’t remember the date she made that allegation, she thought she may have been talking to her own officer about things A had said.

Both parties have provided recordings from this handover, both audio and video. A can be heard throughout shouting for “mummy”, highlighting the impact on A of M being so close by. It would without any doubt have been confusing and distressing for A that M was sat in the car so close by, refusing to interact with her or support her during this episode. PGM certainly attempts to approach the handover with a ‘no-nonsense’ attitude, and notes that A is having a tantrum rather than crying, and as adults they should make it easy for her. MGM says that she has “been told not to put her down” (by whom has not been clarified). PGM notes that “she’s coming with me now” but MGM at that point can be heard asking for her bag back. M and MGM can be heard describing PGM as being rude, and A being terrified rather than comforting A (as echoed in the appclose messages from M immediately afterwards). This description is not supported by the recording of PGM who is reasonably encouraging MGM to put A down to allow the handover to go ahead more quickly and easily. F can be heard at times, calmly and playfully trying to interact with A to help her to calm down. This attempt was abandoned, and a further attempt went ahead later that afternoon when the paternal uncle was able to intervene to effect a transfer to F’s care. The most compelling recording provided to me is the conclusion of the F’s audio recording of this handover which shows that very quickly after being handed to F, A is calmer and able to engage with him. She can be heard still grumbling and saying she wants “uncle” but within moments she is chatting with F about what they’re going to do. She refers to M being “still here”, noting that she can see her mummy still parked by the shop. There is no hint of distress at being in her F’s company or returning to daddy’s house, and notwithstanding what must have been a horrible experience for them all F remains playful and engaging and calm.

I am not satisfied that this occasion was in fact a breach, because despite being delayed it did go ahead. Despite the eventual success of the handover, M’s priority on appclose is to respond to F’s reassurance that A has settled by asking him to read his emails “as there should be emails from solicitors about this weekend contact being 2 nights until 5pm Sunday which is best for A as she’s had a long gap between her last contact.” I am satisfied that it was reasonable for the father to disagree with this proposal, noting that she was settled and happy and asleep by 8pm. I am worried that this variation request wasn’t raised prior to the contact because M had no intention of the handover being effected over that weekend.

Alleged breach 19.3.2025: This handover reverted to the original pattern for PGM to collect A from MGM. In order to avoid the difficulty about being able to remove A from MGM’s arms F requested in advance that she is put in her reins when he comes to collect her at 4. M viewed this message at 3.59pm [113] and responded at 4.35 to say that she was on the way, she was on the phone. This appears later than expected (The final order provides for Wednesday handovers at 3pm but this has not been raised as a breach by either party). M accepted in evidence that she had read the message before leaving the house but said that she was in a rush so she had forgotten to bring the reins.

I have video recordings from M and audio recordings from F of his occasion. PGM can be heard kindly and calmly approaching A. She suggests they move towards the shop so A is further from the road. A continues to shout for mummy, who is sat in the car close by, recording. PGM reassures MGM that she calmed very quickly after she left the handover last weekend. MGM continues to refuse to put her down, saying that she “has been strongly advised not to”, not referring to any physical pain or discomfort as has otherwise been suggested, and says it was described as a safeguarding risk for which she would be liable. PGM suggests stepping inside the shop door so it wouldn’t be possible for her to run off, but MGM declines, saying that it would embarrassing for ‘the child’. F indicates he’s happy to do handover with the maternal uncle again in an hour or so. It is arranged that the maternal uncle will get in touch to arrange another attempt at handover. When F says to A “I’ll see you in an hour” A can be heard to reply “yeah”. PGM notes MGM has manipulated F’s words to suggest that he had agreed to it. Instead, M contacts F later to say “I’m under the understanding that you agreed with my mum to meet at [the garden centre] tomorrow morning as A was very distressed today” which in fact was not what was agreed, and was not the basis upon which the father agreed not to pursue the original handover with A.

F says that when he returned to the shop an hour later MGM still did not release A to the floor, and instead suggested that they handover at the garden centre the next day.

I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this was a breach: Contact did not go ahead as per the order due to the failed handover. I am not satisfied that it was reasonable for the maternal grandmother to refuse to try any reasonable alternative means to effect the handover.

I note that handover did take place effectively at the garden centre the next day, and it appears that thereafter until 25 April handovers took place there without significant concern. The appclose entries show M chasing F on 27 March 2025 about responding to an email from her solicitors suggestion a further variation to contact for mother’s day. F responds within moments to say that he will agree to a variation to enable A to spend mother’s day with M.

During this period, the paternal grandfather passed away. The M and maternal family were not aware of this, and it is regrettable that F felt unable to share any information about this with M. It must have been very difficult for M and the maternal family to respond to statements from A that her grandad was ‘in the stars’, and it is exactly the kind of information that should be shared between parents, regardless of how difficult that would have been. On 2 April 2025 M messaged to ask if A still has her own room at PGM’s because she says she’s sleeping on the floor in a different room. It is now known that at some point prior to 1 April 2025 A spent the night with F, D, paternal uncle and his wife at the paternal uncle’s flat for the night, where they stayed due to the difficult and emotional circumstances surrounding his father’s illness. Whilst it appears that F made a child focussed decision that it was not best for A to be in his PGM’s home at that stage, it is regrettable that he didn’t share this with M, in fact he deliberately avoided telling her. It is well within the proper exercise of his PR to stay with trusted family members with his daughter for a night, but it is regrettable that when given the opportunity to explain A’s strange comment he still did not. These are very difficult and complex circumstances, but these adults will need to co-parent A for the rest of her minority.

On 4 April 2025 F and D rented a new property. This meant that from that date onwards A would be staying away from PGM’s home with F and D for some nights during his time with A, and in fact A would regularly stay in PGM’s home overnight whilst F stayed in his own property, as a result of the early handovers and F’s even earlier work. There is nothing within the final order which suggests that F cannot delegate overnight care of A to PGM, particularly in circumstances where she formed part of the assessments and recommendations within the previous proceedings, however I am satisfied that this was a change of circumstances for A that F should have made M aware of. By the conclusion of his evidence I gained the impression that F accepted this now, but had simply found it too difficult in light of losing his dad, and the difficulties surrounding any communications with M, which provides a reasonable context for his thought process at the time.

On 11 April 2025 F sent M a message to say he was running 30 minutes late. M responded to suggest F collect A in the morning instead. M was unable to explain this in evidence, suggesting that she didn’t want F to feel he had to rush. I found this explanation unconvincing and disingenuous. As with many of the less material lies it was told in the course of seeking to appear reasonable and child focussed when I am satisfied the real motivation was to reduce the time A spent with F. M very soon afterwards complains that D was in his car, saying “this isn’t a reasonable excuse to be 30 minutes late”. When asked about this in cross examination, F explained that he was running late, knew he had to go to the garden centre for pick-up but was filthy in his work clothes so he went home, showered and changed, collected his partner as they were all planning to go to PGM’s home straight after collecting A. I found his evidence on this to be truthful, with absolutely no basis for the speculative cross-examination that he was planning to go on a date with D and leave A with PGM. This is a further example of M making simple adjustments to handovers more difficult than necessary.

Alleged breach 25.4.25: On 18 April M reports in her statement at [209] that A returned from contact very unsettled, spent the day tired and lethargic and had a very distressed night. M has chosen not to provide baby cam footage from that night. In her closing submissions Ms Traugott describes the confusion over where A was staying on the night of 17 April as being key. I am satisfied on the information available to me that A stayed at PGM’s home on the night of Thursday 17^th, as she routinely did, both prior to and after F obtained his own rental property. There is no meaningful evidence to suggest otherwise. The prepared statement provided to the police by D was demonstrably wrong, and PGM’s evidence on this issue was clear and compelling, as well as consistent with her written statement. The events of this period require scrutiny and comparison as they form the basis of the initial accounts of allegations of sexual abuse.

At [209] M says that MGM offered to wake with A on 19 April to enable a further hour’s rest for M the next morning. She reports that whilst MGM was trying to change A’s nappy A stated she did not want her nappy changed. When asked why A told MGM that “the daddy man licks her bits.” She says that MGM immediately came to get her for assistance, and when she was told what A had said M went straight down to A who told her “daddyman hurts me with lots of wet wipes when he changes my bum. I tell daddy man no, no I don’t like it I’m going home I want mommy.’ When I asked A why she stated that ‘daddymanlicks her bits’ whilst she covered her private area A said ‘[D] tells him to keep going and laughs”.

At [220] MGM says that she heard A was awake and went into her room to bring her downstairs so M could get some more rest. She put the tv on for A and made her some breakfast. She noticed her nappy needed changing but A refused to let her change her and when asked why A told her “’the daddyman hurts me with lots of wetwipes’ and ‘he licks my bits’. She put her hands down by her private are and she became very distressed….I woke [B] up and explained that A is wet and does not want me to change her. [B] got straight up and came down to the living room…[B] asked why she didn’t want to get changed A replied ‘the daddyman hurts me with lots of wet wipes’…’daddyman licks my bits’ and ‘D say keep going and laugh at me.”

In the initial account to police recorded at [260] it is reported that when MGM was changing A’s nappy she became distressed and said “Daddy uses lots of wetwipes”, “daddy hurts me with wetwipes”, MGM asked her what she meant and A responded “Daddy licks my bits” and pointed to her vagina and tummy, as well as saying that F’s partner “laughs and states ‘keep going’ while [F] licks her vagina”. MGM went to get M immediately and A stated the same to her. The account goes on to record MGM’s description that A’s anus had been red and sore a month or so earlier which MGM now denies, and which I will address later in this judgment. M reported that A has started to self-punish by taking herself off to stand facing a wall or placing herself on the stairs. She says that there are concerns that F hasn’t been at his home address whilst having A in his care as “people have seen that his car hasn’t been at the home address”. MGM and M report that A had shown them on dolls where she has been touched by [F]. The report records that M did not want this account recorded on BWV, and in evidence she explained to me that she had been told she didn’t have to, which is not the same as explaining why she did not want to. It is hard to understand, as it has been a repeated complaint by M that the police have wrongly recorded many of her statements to them which caused her difficulties with inconsistent statements in previous proceedings, which could have been avoided by engaging in the video recording.

At [210] M reports that A told E that “daddy man licks her bits”. M says that on 23 April 2025 A was playing with dolls and ‘changing their bums’. She used a large amount of wetwipes and forcefully pushed their legs into the air, telling them to stay there, then licked the dolls between the legs, telling her mother “its what the daddyman does”. At [223] E states that on 20 April when they had gone away for the weekend A would not let her change her nappy and said “Daddyman licks my bits, no no” and that she repeated this on 22 April adding the detail that “ D laughs”.

On 24 April M reported this to the officer investigating her allegations against F, who advised her to report this formally. At [220] MGM says that M “reluctantly” contacted her solicitor on 23 April, who then emailed on 24 April to say she would need to report it to the police and Local Authority. M told me in evidence that she had undertaken child protection and safeguarding training to qualify as a nursery assistant, so it is hard to understand why she would have needed that advice from her solicitor, or why she did not report it to the Local Authority on 23 April as advised.

The C& F assessment records the referral date as 25 April and records that MGM reported that “daddy used lots of wetwipes” and “daddy licked me down there”. It is recorded that A told E that “she has a secret”, which E had not included in her statement. The C&F assessment also records that A told the M “at some point this week (it is not known when) that ‘daddy put his finger up my bottom ‘ and that [father’s partner] said ‘keep going keep going’ and that she did not like it”. The document records the partial history provided by M (as already outlined), and the assessment contains no mention of the risks arising from M’s prior fabrication of allegations designed to prevent a relationship between A and F. The assessment is unable to consider the delay in reporting the allegation allegedly made to MGM on 23 March 2025, and so reaches unreliable conclusions about the protective capacity of the maternal family (although this is raised as a concern by CSC in the strategy meeting). The document records M’s concern that A is being taken to stay where D stays, although the basis for this is not clear.

On 25 April 2025 a social worker and 2 police officers visited M and A at home by way of joint visit. They engaged in what is described as rapport building with A. One of the officers asked A “’If she had any worries to which she replied ‘not at the moment no’”. “I asked her what she had told her nan to which she replied ‘I don’t know’”…”I then said to A that her nanna had told me that A had said to her something about ‘licking’ to which A immediately replied ‘When daddy licks my bits I say no’”. I pause to note that from this first professional interaction A has been prompted and led to repeat something she has said to her PGM, rather than to describe her experience. A is then recorded to point to her “vagina area” when asked where her bits are, responds to whether this was once or more than once by saying ‘more than once’, and confirming that she would want to tell him or someone she worked with more about this.

The notes from the other officer present at the joint visit are recorded at [277] and note M as having reported that she is a victim of DV, that she had been advised by the police (not Nextlink) to move away from the area but the family court had ordered her to return, again failing to provide an honest or full context. She records M as reporting that A told her that “daddy would lick her tummy and bits” (“tummy” is not reported elsewhere) and that D would say keep going and laughs whilst he is doing it.

The officers then travelled to the garden centre to tell F that contact would not be going ahead. I have no statement from the social worker who attended that joint visit to confirm her account.

MGM told police on 24 April 2025 that 2 months earlier (so February 2025?) “[she] had noticed that A’s anus was swollen and red. [She] described it as something being inserted up there. The anus area seemed stretched and open. [she] was concerned about this however A stated “Daddy had placed his fingers up there.” A has also had pain in her stomach for sometime however M confirmed no blood has come from A and there has been no blood within her stool”.

The police disclosure has not included the MG11 prepared by the MGM but includes a summary of it at [294] which records “A was returned to their care on 21 March after spending a few days with C. On the 23^rd March A said to [MGM] ‘Daddy Man hurt me with his tickle fingers in my bum.” [MGM] did not tell M about this but did tell her other daughter, [E]. She did not tell any professionals…”

MGM did not tell me that A made this allegation on more than one occasion, and so it appears that this allegation was either made in February or at the end of March. E said she was told around 20 March, so it seems this is when I am asked to consider A made this allegation. On 20 March 2025 A would have still been with F, the garden centre handover having successfully taken place that day, the 23^rd being the likely return date. I pause to note that I find it extremely unlikely that if MGM observed what appeared to be an injury to A’s anus, accompanied by an apparently coherent explanation from A of a sexually or physically abusive act perpetrated upon her by F that she would not have told M or professionals immediately, or sought medical advice. I am also mindful about the inconsistency in this striking allegation in that E says she was told about “tickle fingers near A’s bottom”. In evidence, M told me that she could not remember when MGM had told her about this allegation. This is particularly unlikely when set against the chronology of apparently inexplicable distress demonstrated by A at handovers, and in the context of MGM subsequently effecting a number of effective handovers at the garden centre without issue.

When MGM was asked about this in cross-examination, she vehemently denied having said what was recorded in the police logs. She said that she had told them that A was “sore” but not any of the other detail. She specifically denied saying that it looked as though something had been inserted, that it was stretched or open and said that she had “definitely not” told police that A had reported that “Daddy had placed his fingers up there.” Once again, I am required to consider the likelihood of the officer recording such specific, extremely serious detail when it has not been reported. On the balance of probabilities I do not accept that, and once again I am drawn to the conclusion that M and MGM have manipulated the information given to professionals in order to create greater concern, and then have sought to withdraw from those reports when faced with the impossible task of explaining convincingly why such a serious incident was not reported at the time. Both M and MGM thought that she had told E at the time (who had not told M), but couldn’t remember when she told M, both settling on “maybe a few days later”. When attempting to put context around telling M a few days afterwards, MGM said that she had offered to make A a bath whilst staying away at a caravan, and A “had turned around and touched her toes. I said why are you doing that, she said daddyman tells me to touch my toes, daddy man tickles me and hurts me with his fingers. I didn’t know what to say.” This was not reported elsewhere. M in her evidence said that she could not recall whether MGM had told her about this, which I find extremely unlikely, and rather than being a genuine lack of recollection is an attempt by M to avoid being tied down on evidence other witnesses may give which may indicate discrepancies in a fabricated account.

It is not consistent with the summary of MGM’s statement at [294] that “On Friday 18 April A returned home and this is when the most recent disclosures were made. [MGM] said this was the second time she had made disclosures she could not keep it to herself and told [B]”.

It is also absent from the statements both M and MGM made to the court in these proceedings. MGM’s explanation for gaps in her statement were that she didn’t know what she was allowed to put in her statement, that it had to be a statement of what A told her, that she thought the court needed an outline and that she was giving this evidence truthfully now. MGM said that she wasn’t advised to put it in her statement. Of course, this court needs to be mindful of an intrusion into legally privileged conversations but it is extremely hard for me to accept that it was not considered relevant to make any mention of this significant allegation in a statement where the issues the court has to consider include why A was so distressed at handovers from late February onwards, and the basis of A’s allegations against the father. I note that neither M nor E claim to have heard A say this themselves. If MGM’s account of this is true, then since March A has told her exactly why she does not want to go to spend time with her dad, and MGM has observed a contemporaneous injury to support it. I am satisfied that it is beyond unlikely that this was neither acted upon at the time, nor reported within a statement within these proceedings. I do not accept this as true, and I must go on to consider why MGM has told this lie and whether it is material what I need to decide.

It does not appear that MGM fabricated this account for the first time in April when reporting the allegations to the police as whole, as there is some level of corroboration from E that this was shared with her Mid-March. This is at a time where I have found that a number of contacts had been unreasonably breached and A had presented as hysterical at handovers. F and PGM had by that stage both confirmed that they consider M to be in breach of the order, and the maternal family must have been aware that an enforcement application was likely to be made. I am concerned that by fabricating this allegation and reporting it to E, but maintaining that she had not told M, MGM aimed to plant a trail of explanations for why A was presenting so hysterically at handovers whilst protecting M from the inevitable accusation of failing to protect if she was aware of such a serious allegation apparently backed by consistent physical injury.

On 27 April 2025 MGM is in the background of a call between M and police and says “A had become upset with one of her dolls, had used a wet wipe to wipe the doll’s vagina area and then licked the same area before throwing the doll across the room and saying F’s partner hits me in the face.”

On 30 April an officer attended at M’s home to undertake a preplanned ABE assessment of A and determined that A would benefit from a registered intermediary.

On 12 May 2025 A attended an ABE interview with M and maternal grandparents. I have reviewed the video of this interview with enormous concern. No notes of an interview plan have been provided by the police, and confirmation has been received that there are no additional notes which suggests that this complex procedure was entered into without appropriate planning, contrary to best practice guidance.

The process starts badly, when it is established that A cannot understand the ‘truth or lies’ exercise, a video which shows one child eating another child’s sweet, then denying having done so. Despite watching it twice A cannot identify whether the child is being truthful or lying. There is no attempt by the RI to explore her understanding in a different way, nor any attempt to use another method to examine her understanding of truth and lies. She is told at the outset that she is able to go and see her mummy whenever she wants. In Evidence M said that she did not know the difference between truth or lies.

The officer introduces the topic of ‘daddy’, without attempting any form of open questioning, which prompts A to say that she has forgotten her ‘secrets book’ which she leaves the room to collect from M. A says this book has about ‘daddyman’ in it but she can’t remember which page it’s on. A then appears to act reading out “Daddyman licked my bits, it’s not nice coz…I don’t know” (She is not reading it out – the police tell me there were no legible notes in the book, only scribbles), but her affect whilst reading this is playful. She then instructs the officer to “Copy me” and mimes reading out “I don’t know. Daddyman licked my bits. It’s not very nice and…” at which point she looks extremely unsure, putting her palm to her forehead gets up and leaves the room saying “I’ll come back… mummy”. The officer tries to encourage her to stay and tell her what she knows, but A insists that she needs to “listen to mummy about daddyman licks my bits and” [A’s speech is unclear at this point]. She is asked where she was when daddyman licked her bits and she says at daddy man’s house. She is asked in which room and eventually says in daddyman’s room. She appears frustrated and says “you have already asked me this” (it is not clear who has previously asked her this: This question is not recorded elsewhere). When asked where her bits are she points under the table and repeats that she has already told this. A is unable to answer where her bits are. When asked “when daddy licked you, what did he lick you with” she answered “with a spoon”. When asked ‘what did he do’ she repeats that it is in writing in her book “daddyman licked my bits, it’s not very nice. I don’t know the other part. Let me ask mummy.” When asked if there is anything else to tell before she speaks to mummy A repeats in a confused tone “daddyman licked my bits, not very nice and that’s it.” When asked if there was anyone else there A pauses and doesn’t answer, repeating she wants to ask mummy. When pursued she says “I don’t want to talk about it anymore”. She is then permitted to leave the room to speak with her mother for some 11 minutes and returns confirming that she will answer 3 questions, go on the slide then go bowling.

The interviewing officer then, despite the obvious indications to the contrary persists in asking A questions starting with “you said daddy licked your bits. Show me how he licked you” and A appears frustrated, saying she’s left her book again, returning to M to retrieve the book. This is inconsistent with the reports by M, MGM and E that A regularly acts out what has happened to her: In her ABE it is plain she cannot. A looks vaguely through her ‘secrets’ book but says she can’t find it. The RI unsuccessfully invites A to show the officer. No drawings or dollies are available for her for the RI to use as tools to support A. A repeats she has to find the answer with M. A is then asked whether he did it more than one time or one time (“more than one time”) then a leading question “who else was there”, then rapidly ‘did he say anything to you’, ‘did you say anything to daddy’ (both no). When asked “how do you feel about daddy” A does not answer, and she leaves the interview happily.

This is not only not evidence capable of supporting an allegation of sexual abuse, it is an interview which actively supports the suggestion that A was coached to make false allegations. She acts out the process of being taught what to say (“Copy me! Daddyman licks my bits..” etc). She is unable to demonstrate her lived experience. She is unable to provide any additional age-appropriate context, (limited to “at daddyman’s house, in daddyman’s room”). She provides an incongruous answer (“With a spoon”) and repeatedly tells the interviewing officer that she can’t remember details and will have to ask her mother. I have taken into account her age and linguistic ability, the non-linear manner in which children may speak about their experiences, and the risks of placing too much weight on a child’s demeanour whilst describing traumatic events, but her presentation is not consistent with M and MGM’s descriptions of how she makes allegations, which was described as very distressed and unsettled, with context and additional detail she is unable to recall in this interview.

On 4 June 2025, after this interview, another social worker visited M and A at their home for a planned assessment session. By this stage A must have known very well what professionals wanted to speak to her about: She has been questioned about it repeatedly and led to the topic when she has not volunteered it. In her MG11 this social worker says that she asked A if there was anything that made her unhappy. She records A looking at her and then at M in a way that suggested she was not comfortable answering. She walked over and whispered something in M’s ear and M replied to her “you need to tell the lady”. In her evidence M said that A had asked her to tell the social worker. After a pause A then said “daddyman”, when asked why he make her unhappy she responded “daddyman licked my bits”. It was noted she did not appear distressed and showed no change in her emotions.

There is no evidence available to me that on the balance of probabilities A has experienced sexual abuse. I have undertaken a review of my findings in respect of breaches of contact prior to the report to police on 24 April 2025 to consider whether abuse may have been perpetrated to A before she reported it which explains her distress at contact handovers, but there is no evidential foundation for such a finding: M and MGM directly connect in time A’s changed behaviour with the making of allegations in April 2025, long after the handovers became difficult. I am satisfied that A’s distress at handovers can be explained by her knowledge of the maternal family’s feelings about contact and handing over directly to the father, which she has either perceived or been directly exposed to, by the disruption to her time with F caused by the first breach of the order and the unusual and confusing situation of M sitting close by and video recording whilst not interacting at all with A.

In order then to consider then the reasonableness of contact being curtailed after A’s allegations, I must consider whether A did, in fact make the allegations reported by M, MGM and E and subsequently repeated to professionals, and if so why, when I am satisfied that she has not experienced the abuse she now reports.

No witness has been able to suggest anything that A may have watched, heard or misinterpreted by way of explanation. For me to so find would be impermissible speculation.

I am mindful of the capacity for young children to imagine apparently persuasive fantasy situations, and to speak about them with convincing detail, but that isn’t the case here: A has not imagined and shared a constructed fictional narrative, because she has been unable to expand her account to independent observers beyond the repeated baseline allegation of “Daddyman licks my bits, it’s not very nice, I say no” beyond saying that it was at Daddyman’s house in DaddyMan’s room. She has not repeated words or actions reportedly observed by the maternal family, in respect of tickle fingers, wet wipes, E’s presence, encouragement and laughter, or demonstrated actions to demonstrate what she is saying she has experienced, even when directly asked to.

I am unable to disregard the findings that I have made in these and previous proceedings in relation to M and MGM’s credibility and motivation for telling lies to this court. The chronology and the broad canvass of evidence demonstrates a consistent and expanding campaign to frustrate, reduce and prevent A from spending time with F. They maintain the truth of the allegations made by M against F and portray him as a harmful and dangerous man, despite the evidence to the contrary. The evidence available shows that there has been no sustained or meaningful shift in M’s view of the lack of value to A of having a relationship with F since I made findings last October and I am satisfied that the maternal family still seek to bring that relationship to an end.

I find that with that aim in mind M did coach A to repeat the phrases she told to the police, in the way that she showed the ABE interviewer: “Copy me: Daddyman licked my bits. It wasn’t nice. I said No.” The fact of also having made comments about things which did in fact happen in F’s care does not assist me (for example staying with F at a strange house): No one has suggested that A only says things that are either untrue or she has been coached to say, and it is notable that M and MGM do not say that A has linked staying at a strange house to the allegations. I note that A specifically seeks reminders from M during the ABE when MGM was also present which indicates who has provided her with the details she has been asked to repeat.

I am satisfied that these allegations were reported in the knowledge that such a report would prompt advice to cease contact and would once again provide M with the shield of professional advice that she has previously relied upon. It follows that it was not reasonable for M to follow that advice, having made the report to police knowing that the allegations had been fabricated, and all missed contacts since 25.4.25 constitute unreasonable breaches of the final order.

I must consider my welfare determinations as a consequence. I will not simply trigger a transfer of residence on the basis of the breaches alone: I will only make such an order if it is in A’s best interests for me to do so. Such an order must be necessary and proportionate, and the least interventionist order necessary to meet her welfare needs, mindful of the interference in this family’s article 8 rights.

S1(3) Children Act 1989: A is a young child. She has spent the majority of her life in the primary care of M and MGM. I have no doubt that if asked she would tell me that she would want to stay in their care, as well as continue to spend good quality time with F and her wider paternal family. Her age and understanding however, and her exposure to the fabrication and manipulation perpetrated in the maternal home mean that the weight I can place on that is limited, and I need to balance what she would wish for against the risks to her if that wish were to take priority: the ongoing harm and erosion of a relationship with her father.

A is wholly reliant on adult carers to meet her physical and emotional needs. She needs to be kept safe, clean, warm and fed. She needs her emotional and psychological needs to be prioritised so that she can recover from what I consider to have been a wholly unnecessary disruption to the relationship with her father, and unnecessary and harmful exposure to professionals in the criminal justice process. She will need careful evaluation of the emotional impact of having been made to repeat untrue allegations about her father (albeit from her repetition it is not clear that she understands the meaning of what she says). She will need to be protected from further harmful interventions in her welfare. She needs relationships with both parents and wider maternal and paternal families to be valued and promoted. She needs to be enrolled in an educational provision as soon as is possible to provide her with exposure to socialisation and wider experiences. She needs to have her relationship with the non-resident parent promoted and protected in a way that the mother has not.

A change in residence will have an enormous impact on A. I adopt the Guardian’s view that in the short term it will be extremely confusing, disruptive and upsetting for A to move from M’s to F’s primary care. If I accept the recommendations of the Guardian that in this situation she should attend supervised contact with M this will compound the impact of the change. I do not underestimate the impact such a change would have on A, which parties had sought to avoid at the final hearing.

I have already set out A’s characteristics which I consider to be particularly relevant, and I repeat that this is a child who only met F after she was 2 years old. The majority of her life has been spent as a subject in family law proceedings. She needs decisions to be made which protect her from ongoing litigation, hostility and disruption and for her parents to respect those orders of the court. She will need support and stability in order to enable her to recover from this confusing and distressing period of her life.

I have no doubt that she has suffered significant harm as a result of M’s behaviour, both assessed previously, but particularly with reference to the findings I now make about the fabrication and coaching of allegations of sexual abuse against F. The psychological and emotional harm to her is significant and is likely to manifest itself throughout her life as she develops an understanding of her lived experiences. In the event that she remains in the care of her maternal family she will continue to be at risk of further encouragement to make increasingly serious accusations, as presaged by the maternal grandmother’s request to keep the criminal investigation open for a further 6 months so that A can “continue to disclose”. The pattern so far is easy to recognise: at the point any of the currently live criminal investigations are about to be filed the mother provides further evidence and the investigation is extended. F was arrested for her allegations against him in 2022: In August 2025 the best update this court has been provided with is a reference contained within the strategy meeting minutes which suggests that the investigation is likely to be NFA’d due to ‘evidential difficulties’. It is unthinkable that A could be subjected to a restricted relationship with F if the investigations relating to her allegations follow the same trajectory. She is likely to become enmeshed in the maternal family’s distorted beliefs and narratives about the father and paternal family, causing untold emotional harm. I accept the F’s evidence that he will still do all he can to promote a relationship between A and M, subject to safeguards and professional recommendations.

It is plain that both parents are able to meet A’s basic needs. M is unable to meet A’s need for emotional safety and a relationship with F, and the MGM, who I find is a relevant person in the care provided to A is incapable of protecting her emotional and psychological wellbeing. Whilst F has been assessed as able to meet all of A’s needs, this was in the context of living in the home with PGM who was able to provide him with additional support (upon which he continues to rely in terms of advice, handovers and to support his care of A around his work commitments). I have identified some limited areas of risk around the father’s capacity to meet all of A’s needs (for example in terms of his willingness and ability to communicate important information to M), and I do not have the benefit of an updated assessment of his new home or partner. I consider his openness to advice from professionals to be a strength rather than a weakness. I have no concerns about PGM’s ability to protect and promote A’s welfare.

The range of powers available to me include the making of public and private law orders in light of the s37 direction made shortly before the start of this hearing. I have considered these options holistically and have set them out to explain my analysis, but it has not been approached as a linear process.

I could make an order that (notwithstanding my findings) the terms of the final order remain in place and A continues to live with M for the majority of the time. This would, I am certain, provide the least disruption to A’s life in the short term: her basic needs would continue to be met by M who she loves and knows and she would avoid the distress and harm associated with an unplanned and urgent transfer of residence. On the other hand it is likely that she will continue to be exposed to the harm of M fabricating allegations. She would, in all likelihood be prevented from enjoying a full relationship with F and the paternal family and would continue to be exposed to a hostile, negative and false narrative about her life and lived experiences. I am not satisfied that this would meet A’s immediate or longer-term needs as it is clear that the current arrangements are not working.

I could make an order that transfers residence to F in line with the suspended order I made last year, with or without any conditions. I have reminded myself of the case law relating to transfer of residence, including Re A [2010] which describes it as a ‘judicial weapon of last resort’, Re L [2019] in which McFarlane P reinforced the principle that the test must be based on a comprehensive analysis of the child’s welfare, and I must therefore consider all the circumstances in the case that are relevant to the issue of welfare including the factors set out in the welfare checklist and balance them in order to reach my determination. I am concerned that a simple transfer, albeit into the care of F who is assessed as able to safely meet her needs, does not adequately address the unknowns in the F’s new living arrangements, and would not provide F with the support he will require in light of the long period since he last saw A, nor account for A’s therapeutic needs in light of the harm she has suffered in her mother’s care.

I could make, as proposed by the guardian, an order that places A in the care of her PGM, the attraction of which is that it safeguards A’s safety in circumstances where there are ongoing criminal investigations into the serious allegations of sexual abuse A and M have made. I have not made findings that F has harmed A in any way, and as such I am satisfied that this is not justified or necessary in light of the extremely limited concerns about the F’s ability to care for A in an unassessed scenario. It would risk leading to confusion for A about who is her primary carer, and why it isn’t F. I am concerned that it may have the negative effect of reinforcing in A, and in the maternal family’s minds that there is something assessed to be unsafe about F’s care of A, which is not the case.

I could make an order transferring A’s residence to F, subject to the condition that as an interim measure whilst further assessments are undertaken he resides with A at PGM’s home, and does not delegate any caring responsibilities to any person other than PGM. This would require A to go through the short-term upheaval and emotional impact of an unplanned change of primary carer, after a long period of not spending time with F as a result of the M’s breaches, which will be very difficult for her. It will however secure A the care of F and PGM, both of whom have been assessed by this court as capable of meeting her needs, and also promoting a relationship with M and the maternal family. It will provide for A’s immediate safety within her paternal family, which cannot be assured in the care of the M and enables a proportionate enquiry into the unassessed elements of the F’s new circumstances, including his new property and partner. It will ensure that the F remains supported in his as yet untested primary care of A over longer periods, and A will have the benefit of living in a familiar environment with familiar family members in order to meet what is likely to be an increased need for emotional support following a transfer of residence. I note that F agrees to be bound by these conditions, as explored in evidence. On balance I consider this to be the best option for A and to best meet her welfare, which is may paramount concern.

I could also make an interim public law order to accompany the s37 direction. I am satisfied that interim threshold is met under s38 of the Children Act 1989 and that A has suffered significant emotional and psychological harm as a result of M and MGM’s fabrication and coaching surrounding sexual abuse allegations against F. I am satisfied that there is a realistic possibility that a public law order may be necessary to protect A from ongoing harmful behaviours by M and maternal family, and I am satisfied that it is necessary to provide this family with the benefit of the wealth of support available via the local authority if they are to befriend, advise and assist the parents, not least to support the transfer of A into her F’s care. I accept the Guardian’s analysis that this would be beneficial to A, and I place A under the interim supervision of South Gloucester council until the conclusion of the s37 investigation. Such an order is both necessary and proportionate.

I could vary the shared care arrangements, either to reverse the arrangements currently in place for F to spend time with A to M, but I repeat that these arrangements and handovers do not work. I am also extremely concerned for the potential significant further harm that M is likely to perpetrate to A if her contact is not professionally supervised, in light of the risk that M becomes fixated on ‘proving’ A’s allegations against the F by encouraging new and escalating allegations. The time that A spends with M and the maternal family in the immediate future is therefore to be balanced to ensure that A spends time with M who she loves, to know she is safe and well, against the need for her to settle into her F’s care and to be protected from further fabricated allegations. I accept the Guardian’s recommendation that A’s time with M should be professionally supervised, 2-3 times per week, after a period of settling back into her F’s care, which I am satisfied appropriately balances A’s needs. A should be able to spend time with both parents, as long as this is safe. This arrangement will ensure that A’s relationship with M is not disproportionately interrupted whilst protecting her from the risk of harms from M’s behaviours.

I therefore make the following orders:

It is likely to be necessary for a full psychological assessment to be undertaken of this family before there can be any significant change to these arrangements. The Guardian should file and serve a part 25 application at the earliest opportunity and submissions made in order for the application to be considered on the papers to avoid delay.

The Guardian will need to undertake an updated assessment and provide recommendations taking into account the conclusions of the psychological assessment, and the parents should provide updating statements. The matter can then be listed for a final hearing.

I am mindful of how difficult this will be for M. I have no doubt that she loves A very much, however she must recognise the need to effect this transfer with the minimal emotional harm to A and without the need for professional involvement which I will have to consider if my order is not followed.

Press Application

, An accredited press journalist has made an application to lift the reporting restrictions currently in place until the conclusion of these proceedings and the conclusion of criminal investigations involving these parties. Her application refers to her view that the issues before the court are of the utmost public interest, and that to continue the restrictions until an unknown date was a breach of her Article 10 rights. She states that by reporting restrictions being limited in time the court has engaged in “editorialisation under the guise of the assertion that any reporting might impinge upon a criminal investigation”. Prior to this application no disagreement has been raised with the operational clause, and the journalist has been provided with documents and an agreed bundle by the parties.

She raised concern that it is not clear whether there will be any criminal proceedings in this matter, and I acknowledge that it had not been envisaged by any party at the time of drafting the operational clause that there would still be no charging decision following F’s arrest in 2022 by this time.

M does not object to immediate reporting as long as there is no possibility of identification of the child (including by way of jigsaw identification). F opposes the variation on the basis of the complexity of these proceedings (for which no reporter has been present throughout, his concerns that if reported prior to the conclusion of the criminal investigation it may lead to serious risks for himself and A, the threats already levelled by the maternal family to go to the press and the risk that any public reporting at this stage would lead to his identification and thereby exposing him to a serious risk of harm. The Guardian opposes the application on the basis that the application does not provide justification for the assertion that the public interest in the reporting of the case now, rather than at the end of family/criminal proceedings trump the risks to privacy that reporting at this stage would cause the parties and the risk to any potential prosecution of F. None of the parties have sought to engage in or assist the court with the legal framework in which this application should be considered.

The journalist has confirmed that she does not take issue with the substance of the reporting restrictions, it is simply the operational clause she seeks to challenge. In support of this she cites the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Griffiths v Tickle [2021] and the High Court in Tickle v Father and others [2023] EWHC 2446 (fam).

Griffiths v Tickle was an appeal involving an application for publication of a judgment including the names of the parents. I pause to note that all parties in the case before me support the anonymised publication of the series of judgments made within these proceedings. In the substantive hearing which was the substance of this appeal, the accredited press members had relied on the “overwhelming public interest arguments” for publication in the terms sought, specifying the need for transparency of decisions of this sort to inform society better on the subject of coercive control and how courts approach allegations of that sort, and to inform public debate. Secondly the role of the Father (an MP) meant that it was in the public interest for voters to know of his behaviours. Thirdly it was argued that the father had used the media to deceive the public about the state of his family life, and so there as a public interest in correcting the record. It is worth noting that there is no argument for lifting the reporting restrictions to permit identification made in this application, nor do the second or third aspects considered by Lieven J hold any relevance here.

The journalist did not specify the reasons for stating that the issues in this matter are of “the utmost public interest” but later expanded this to say that “there is a significant public interest in enabling reporting, especially in cases where there are parallel investigations or police involvement. Transparency in such proceedings help to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice and the conduct of law enforcement. Open reporting allows for public scrutiny, particularly where decisions in the courtroom may impact or intersect with ongoing police investigations. In contexts involving police investigations, it is even more critical to ensure that the public is informed, unless clear evidence demonstrates that reporting would prejudice the course of justice or ongoing enquiries”.

My analysis of the application is assisted by the summary of the applicable law taken from the Court of appeal in Griffiths v Tickle [2021] and Lieven J in Tickle v Fathers [2003]. I have summarised it here as it simply would not be possible to include the full quotation within a reasonable length judgment.

The jurisdiction to restrain publicity to protect a child's private and family life is now founded upon the Convention Rights. In a case where the child was not a party or witness and the interference with their Article 8 rights was indirect there was no justification for creating any new category of exception to the normal rule of open justice or otherwise interfering with free reporting of the trial. Lord Steyn identified four key propositions as to how the court should address a conflict between Articles 8 and 10 as follows: "First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test."

The "intense focus" must be brought to bear on the particular facts of the case.

The nature of the exercise to be undertaken, and the issue requiring ‘intense focus’ was summarised in the following terms: “The critical question, therefore, is whether the best interests of the child, treated as a primary consideration, are weighty enough to justify maintaining that fetter, during the course of the proceedings under s 97(2) Children Act, and indefinitely as a consequence of s 12 AJA. Put another way, do the child's best interests make it necessary and proportionate to impose those restrictions on the Article 8 and 10 rights relied on by the applicants and the mother? …”

I have considered the guidance produced by the President of the Family Division, issued on 3 October 2019, ‘Guidance as to Reporting in the Family Courts’ which highlights the summary of the balancing exercise required.

Lieven J identified 9 principles in determining such applications, which I will address in turn, after I have identified the particular relevant facts in this case.

The application is not to report any details which may identify the family members, and indeed the journalist repeats her agreement not to give details which may encroach on the privacy of this family through jigsaw identification. The journalist’s description of the public interest arising from the intersection between family and criminal investigations suggests that specific details of the allegations made (and those not made) within family proceedings but pursued by the police are likely to be reported upon, and I note that the combination of specific allegations made in these proceedings, including details such as the orders required to require the mother to return from a non-consensual internal relocation and findings made in relation to ‘out of jurisdiction’ acts of abuse, and indeed the extraordinary and unusual delay between the police arresting the father and reaching a charging decision, mean that there is a risk of M and the maternal family, who dispute the findings and have threatened to raise their dissatisfaction with the media, would find it relatively easy to identify the parties to these proceedings if they so choose.

Identification of these proceedings prior to a charging decision by the police on either investigation has the potential to impact those decisions and potentially the fairness of any criminal trial. The potential risk to article 8 rights within the family proceedings arise at a particularly sensitive time for this family: Within this judgment I have ordered a transfer of residence and restrictions in the time and manner in which M and MGM can spend time with A. This will cause them enormous distress and may lead to hasty and unwise responses already envisaged in their threats to go to the BBC and Chief Constable. Any sharing of the false narrative which sets the maternal family out as ‘victims’ and F and the paternal family as ‘abusers’ with the risks of identification significant would put the paternal family and A at risk of very significant repercussions within the community.

Prior to the conclusion of this set of family proceedings the risks to A’s article 8 rights are also clear: In the event that this family can be identified with reference to contemporaneous media reporting there is a significant risk that the options available for A at the conclusion of this process are restricted, either by way of the paternal family needing to move locations, or through a significant impact on their wellbeing and availability to support A.

When I balance those risks against the article 10 rights, I accept at the outset the benefit to the public interest of reporting cases in the family courts. It is vital that the public gain confidence in the family courts which have been described as operating in secrecy, with generalised allegations of unfairness or prejudice. It would be of benefit to the general public to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the care and time taken to reach difficult decisions in the best interests of children. I also acknowledge the benefits to the public of gaining a better understanding of the tension between a family court, statutorily tasked with determining outcomes for children without delay where many of the same issues are also being considered in lengthy criminal investigations and proceedings, although the journalist is right to note in her application that this is not unusual.

Lieven J’s observations at para 46 are relevant in this particular case: “…it will rarely, but not never, be appropriate for the Court to inquire as to why the journalist is seeking to report, or how s/he became aware of the hearing. In general, as Mr Barnes submits, this will be a matter for the journalist who would not be expected to reveal a “source”. However, if the Judge becomes concerned that one party is seeking to use reporting as a litigation strategy, particularly in the context of issues around coercive control, the Judge may wish to inquire into the background to the application to report. This can only be considered on a case specific basis.”

In her evidence at the final hearing last year, unprompted, M expressed that she had been in regular telephone correspondence with the journalist including over the lunch adjournment whilst she was under oath. The maternal family are recorded as having made threats to the police to contact the BBC. I am concerned that the manipulation of information shared with professionals and to the media by the maternal family has been a litigation strategy present within these proceedings, and the distorted narrative that M has sought to promote to police and professionals of herself as a victim of sexual and physical assault at the hands of the father and at the hands of an unfair court process (where an incomplete narrative is provided) make it more likely than not that this is a scenario where reporting is being used as a litigation strategy.

A’s best interests are critical. The Guardian cautions against early lifting of the reporting restrictions and warns me of the “disproportionate risks that the court ought not to countenance”. M does not oppose, F does: these positions are relevant but not determinative. A’s article 8 rights for respect to her private life require, I am satisfied, protection of her right for decisions to be made without the risk of jigsaw identification or manipulation of the family or criminal process such as I have satisfied myself exist here.

On balance, having considered the specific facts within this case I am satisfied that the reporting restrictions should remain in force until the conclusion of the family proceedings on the basis that A requires decisions to be made for her best interests without risks of identification or publication interfering with that process. I am satisfied however that this is the point at which the balance shifts, and the operational clause should be varied so that it no longer refers to the conclusion of criminal proceedings. I accept the journalist’s argument that the incomprehensible delays with the criminal justice system mean that such restriction is in effect open ended and may well outlive the article 8 concerns for this family which I accept would be a disproportionate interference with her article 10 rights.

I approve the variation of the transparency order only as follows: