C & Ors (ACA s51A: contact order after adoption), Re

On 14 November 2025 I made adoption orders in respect of four siblings in two separate adoption placements:

The two applications were not consolidated, but all hearings in both sets of proceedings have been listed on the same day, with continuity of representation for the local authority, parents and children. The applicant prospective adopters for the two older children attended their hearings remotely by video link; the younger children’s prospective adopters did not attend. Neither set of applicants was represented and I was informed that each was content that their views and position should be relayed to the court by the local authority.

The children’s birth parents (BM and BF) did not have permission to oppose the adoptions, following an earlier refusal of their applications. The sole disputed issue at the hearing on 14 November 2025 was whether orders should be made under ACA 2002, s51A requiring each set of adopters to make the children available for contact with their separately-placed siblings. I heard the cases together to deal with this issue and indicated that I would reserve judgment.

This judgment was circulated to counsel in draft on 26 November 2025 and the final version was handed down in both sets of proceedings on 8 December 2025.

C, D, E and F were removed from their parents’ care under interim care orders in August 2022 following a history of local authority involvement due to neglect. The parents each have some learning difficulties and they had struggled to meet the basic needs of four children close in age. When they were removed all of the children were non-verbal (C was then aged five), underweight and showing classic signs of neglect.

The local authority was unable to find a placement for all four children together and they were placed in two separate foster placements. They had contact with each other twice a week throughout the care proceedings.

In November 2023 BM gave birth to twin boys, G and H. They have remained in their parents’ care since birth.

On 5 March 2024, at the conclusion of the care proceedings for the four older children, HHJ Probyn made final care and placement orders. The parents accepted that the CA 1989, s31 threshold criteria were met on the basis that the children had been seriously neglected in their care. They also accepted that they could not care for their oldest four children, and the issue at the final hearing was whether the long-term plan for these children should be placement in foster care or adoption.

At the time of the final hearing the twins, G and H, were four months old and living with their parents in a specialist residential assessment unit, Symbol. They later moved into the community, with support, and care proceedings for them concluded in October 2024 with a 12-month supervision order. That order has now expired, and it is common ground that the parents are managing the care of their youngest children to at least a good enough standard.

In addition to the care and placement orders HHJ Probyn made an order under ACA 2002, s26 requiring the local authority to “ensure that any prospective adopters with whom the children are living or placed are to [sic] allow and facilitate direct contact, no less than twice per year, between C, D, E and F”. In her judgment HHJ Probyn said that she had been persuaded by the views of the children’s guardian on this issue. The children’s guardian in his final analysis had described ongoing direct contact between the two pairs of siblings as “essential throughout their lives” and recommended that this should take place at least twice annually. It is clear therefore that in making the s26 order HHJ Probyn was (adopting the phrase used in recent authorities) “setting the template” for the ongoing sibling relationships in the longer term.

HHJ Probyn declined to make a s26 order for the children to have contact with their parents and younger twin brothers. It was, however, recorded on the order that the court “expressed the hope that there should, if possible, be an annual direct contact between any child placed for adoption and their parents.” This was part of the local authority’s care plan, and supported by the children’s guardian, who had pointed out in his final analysis that the parents did not present risks in terms of substance misuse, domestic violence or mental health issues, and were unlikely to seek to disrupt the placements; and that the older children in particular would have memories of family life prior to their removal.

C and D were placed with prospective adopters in August 2024, and E and F in November 2024. They are receiving excellent care and, after an initial settling-in period, they are all thriving in their adoptive homes.

Between August 2024 and October 2025, despite the order of HHJ Probyn, no direct sibling contact took place. There was a video call between the siblings in August 2025 – more than a year after each sibling pair had last seen each other, and after the adoption applications had been issued. As I explain below, the local authority has given no adequate explanation for its failure either to comply with or to apply to vary the s26 order.

Both adoption applications were issued earlier this year and were listed on the same date for a first hearing. The birth parents applied for permission to oppose both adoptions and for orders under s51A for contact between the children and their parents, their younger siblings G and H, and each other. On 9 October 2025, after hearing submissions, I refused the parents’ application for permission to oppose the adoptions. In my judgment I indicated that, although I was not in a position to deal formally with the s51A applications until a final adoption order was made, I would refuse the applications in so far as they related to the children’s contact with their parents and with G and H. I adjourned the application for an order for sibling contact and directed the local authority to file a plan setting out the steps it intended to take to support this contact going forwards.

The first direct contact between the two pairs of siblings took place on 11 October 2025. At the hearing on 14 November 2025 I was told that it had gone well. The parents were shown a photograph of all four siblings together, taken during contact.

The parents say that this is a case where the court should make an order under ACA 2002, s51A requiring each set of adoptive parents to make the children in their care available for direct contact at least twice a year with their siblings in the other adoptive placement. The parents criticise the local authority for its non-compliance with the s26 contact order and for what they say is a significant failure, thus far, to provide the two adoptive families with the support they need to ensure that sibling contact takes place. Counsel for each of the parents has emphasised that the parents do not make any criticism of the children’s adoptive parents. They argue however that against that background a s51A order is necessary to preserve the sibling relationships going forwards.

The local authority and the children’s adoptive parents say that no order is required. Both sets of adopters have made clear, via the local authority, their commitment to developing the sibling relationships through direct contact in future. An order would remove the flexibility that both adoptive families need to ensure that the contact arrangements meet all four children’s needs.

The guardian shares the parents’ concern about the local authority’s non-compliance with the s26 contact order, and the adequacy of the contact plans put before the court by the local authority, but on balance considers that the court has sufficient information about the adopters’ commitment to contact to be confident that the sibling relationships will continue without a s51A order.

ACA 2002, s51A was inserted into the Act by the Children and Families Act 2014 and came into force on 22 April 2014. It reads as follows:

An order under s51A is “a decision relating to the adoption of a child” and therefore the welfare principle in ACA 2002, s1(2), the welfare checklist in s1(4), and the “no order” principle in s1(6) apply. Under s1(2), the paramount consideration of the court must be the child’s welfare, throughout his life. s1(4) reads as follows:

As far as I am aware, s51A has been directly considered by the Court of Appeal on only one occasion, in Re B (A Child) (Post-Adoption Contact) [2019] EWCA Civ 29. The key issue for the Court in that case was whether the introduction of s51A had displaced the line of authority, commencing with Re C (A Minor) (Adoption Order: Conditions) [1989] AC 1 and culminating in Re T (Adoption: Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 1527; [2011] 1 FLR 1805, which held that other than in extremely unusual circumstances, the court should not impose on adoptive parents a contact regime with which they did not agree. The Court held that s51A had not changed the law. Its reasons were set out by the President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane, at paragraph 59:

“[59] Section 51A of ACA 2002 has been brought into force at a time when there is research and debate amongst social work and adoption professionals which may be moving towards the concept of greater “openness” in terms of post-adoption contact arrangements, both between an adopted child and natural parents and, more particularly, between siblings. For the reasons that I have given, the juxtaposition in timing between the new provisions and the wider debate does not indicate that the two are linked. The impact of new research and the debate is likely to be reflected in evidence adduced in court in particular cases. It may also surface in terms of advice and counselling to prospective adopters and birth families when considering what arrangements for contact may be the best in any particular case. But any development or change from previous practice and expectations as to post-adoption contact that may arise from these current initiatives will be a matter that may be reflected in welfare decisions that are made by adopters, or by a court, on a case-by-case basis. These are matters of “welfare” and not of “law”. The law remains, as I have stated it, namely that it will only be in an extremely unusual case that a court will make an order stipulating contact arrangement to which the adopters do not agree.”

Since Re B, the issue of post-adoption contact has been considered in a number of authorities dealing with applications under ACA 2002, s26 for contact orders at the placement order stage. Those authorities, in particular Re R and C (Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 1302, record the move “towards the concept of greater openness in terms of post-adoption contact arrangements” referred to by the President in Re B. In Re R and C, in a section of his judgment headed “The changing nature of adoption,” Baker LJ described the reasons for the shift as follows:

“[6] Unlike newborn infants, older children placed for adoption have experiences, memories and relationships arising out of living within their birth families. They need the security and permanency which adoption provides. But in many cases they also need to sustain their relationships with some members of their birth families. All adopted children need to develop an understanding of their background and identity. For infants, that can often be achieved through life story work and letter box contact. But for older children, sustaining their sense of identity will in many cases be best achieved by continuing direct contact with members of their birth family.

[7] It is to accommodate these twin needs that the concept of open adoption has come to the fore in recent years. Not everyone with personal experience of adoption is comfortable with this development. But the preponderance of opinion amongst those working and researching in the field is that, in many cases, it is in the interests of adopted children to continue to have some direct contact with members of their birth family.

In November 2024 the Public Law Working Group adoption subgroup published its report, “Recommendations for best practice in respect of adoption”. The Working Group referred to the substantial body of evidence that suggested that ongoing face-to-face contact with birth relatives helped adoptees develop a sense of identity, accept the reasons why they were adopted and move forward with their lives. (Footnote: ¹) That research did not appear to be consistently disseminated to those involved in the adoption process, and in “the overwhelmingly majority of cases” only letterbox contact was recommended. There needed to be a “sea change” in approach. Experience in other jurisdictions suggested that “a shift in mindset by professionals involved in the process of adoption and strong guidance from the judiciary” could bring this about, without the need to amend primary legislation.

The Working Group identified a lack of support for post-adoption contact, leading to a scenario in which an adopter’s commitment might be very high immediately after training but later fluctuate. A detailed contact support plan should be available in draft form before the making of the placement order, and the final version should be formulated with the input of the adopters before making an adoption order. The adoption social worker should maintain a continued line of communication with the birth family, to ensure that support is available should any contact arrangement begin to falter.

The Working Group’s overarching recommendation (Footnote: ²) was that “there should be a tailormade approach to the issue of contact for each adopted child which includes and promotes face-to-face contact with important individuals in that child’s life if it can be safely achieved and is in the child’s best interests.”

The “no order” principle in s1(6) of the Act has been considered in a small number of first instance authorities, where prospective adopters agree in principle to contact taking place but there is a dispute as to the need for an order. These authorities demonstrate that in each case the decision as to whether an order would bring an additional benefit to the child is welfare-based and fact-specific.

In MF v London Borough of Brent [2014] 1 FLR 195 Ryder J made a contact order in favour of the child’s grandmother, who was caring for his two siblings. He set out his reasoning as follows:

“[33] I have considered long and hard the divergent views about whether a contact order should be made and if so, on what basis. On the one hand an order could expose P-M to instability and split loyalties arising out of the reasonable anxieties that Ms D would harbour with the risk that she would not be able to cope with what she says she can commit herself to voluntarily. A contact order could tend to be antagonistic to the rationale for the adoption order that I intend to make and everyone agrees that nothing must be allowed to put at risk the placement that P-M has with Ms D. On the other hand, Ms D must understand that it is my firm view that provided circumstances do not change for the worse, the contact that I have set out is in P-M's best interests and I expect him to be afforded the benefit of it. In particular, the contact between P-M and his sister is necessary for his welfare to be safeguarded throughout his life, ie in the long term.

[34] As the parties know only too well, I have changed my mind more than once. For what I believe to be good legal and evaluative reasons I intend to hold to the view with which I concluded the proceedings in January. I have decided to make a limited contact order alongside an adoption order. For me, they are inextricably linked on the facts of this case: both orders are necessary and the success of the adoption order is in part dependent upon a minimum level of contact with P-M's birth family, particularly his sister and maternal grandmother. The balance of contact though desirable should not form part of an order as in my judgment that would go too far and be potentially antagonistic to the exercise of Ms D's parental responsibility.

[35] Although this is not a part of the reasoning of the court, it has to be remarked that all too often adoption orders are made with all the best intentions for continuing sibling contact which are then thwarted for no particularly good reason. Too often the lack of post-adoption support or any pro-active communication causes parties to drift so quickly that the absence of contact over time becomes a barrier with the very understandable fear on the part of adopters that its recommencement will be so unsettling that it may damage a placement; a fear that may well be justified. Perhaps more often than hitherto, courts faced with agreed contact post adoption might consider whether an order can give reassurance to the child by keeping an enduring relationship that is important and for some children critical to their welfare throughout their lives.”

In Re N (A Child) (Adoption Order) [2014] EWFC 1491, declining to make an order, Moor J said:

“[53] Mr Macdonald for the Father says, however, that I should make a contact order. I do not agree. I am giving the Applicants sole parental responsibility for N by the adoption order. They become her parents and are to be trusted to do what is right for her as any parent would do for their child. Applying section 1(6) of the 2002 Act, I am quite satisfied that it is not better for N to make such an order. Apart from anything else, there must be finality to this litigation. The ability to apply to vary a contact order would be very deleterious to N’s welfare.

[54] Mr Macdonald makes the valid point that it would not be satisfactory if I made an order based on there being continuing contact if it were, for whatever reason, to stop after the order was made. I have already found that the Applicants are to be trusted in this regard but, in any event, I remind myself that there is still the ability of the court to grant the Father permission to make an application for contact. In this particular case, if the contact was to stop, I have no doubt that a judge would, at the very least, want an explanation from the Applicants. The safety valve of being able to make that application is fatal to Mr Macdonald’s submission that there needs to be a contact order.”

In Prospective Adopters for BT and another v County of Herefordshire District Council and Others [2018] EWFC 76 twins had been wrongly separated and placed in different adoptive families. Making an order for regular and frequent contact, Keehan J said:

“[126] …I do not make a contact order because I entertain the slightest doubt about the dedication of these prospective adopters to ensure this contact takes place, indeed, I am satisfied that the prospective adopters are committed to this contact and recognise that it is in the welfare best interests of BT and GT. I make a contact order (i) to mark for the twins the importance this court places on their ongoing relationship notwithstanding they are adopted separately and (ii) to fortify the adopters in the event that one or other twin is reluctant to the attend contact in the future.”

This hearing was conducted on submissions, there being no factual dispute between the parties. Importantly, the parents accept that the evidence (including the redacted Annex A reports, which have been provided to them) indicates that both sets of adoptive parents are supportive of the sibling relationships and understand the importance of these relationships for the children’s future understanding of their background and identity.

In order to preserve the confidentiality of the adoptive placements, and bearing in mind that this judgment is being handed down in both adoption applications, I do not intend to set out in detail the evidence contained in both bundles about the children’s individual needs and presentation. At the hearing on 14 November 2025 I gave two separate oral judgments on the adoption applications, during the course of which I referred to some of this evidence. For the purposes of this judgment it is necessary only to record that each of the four children, to differing degrees, has some additional vulnerabilities as a result of their early life experiences. It goes without saying that the stability of their adoptive placements is a factor which must be prioritised in any welfare evaluation.

In the Annex A reports and elsewhere in the evidence it is recorded that the children rarely speak about the other members of their birth family. One of them has said that his father is dead. The local authority accepts that life story work will need to take place, but it has, not, it seems, undertaken any analysis of whether some ongoing direct contact could potentially support this process and help the children to form a more coherent understanding of what has happened to them.

In the contact plans filed by the local authority (referred to below), the children’s “lack of curiosity” about their background seems to be relied on as a factor pointing away from, rather than towards, contact. It seems to me that this is a short-sighted approach. C was five when he was removed from his parents’ care and seven when the regular twice-weekly contact with his parents and siblings ceased. It is highly unlikely that he has forgotten them, or that they no longer matter to him. If he does not mention them that may well be because he is struggling to integrate his past life with his present one. My focus is the children’s lifelong welfare; in that context, the local authority’s current approach carries some very significant risks.

In advance of the hearing on 9 October 2025 the local authority was directed to file, in each set of proceedings, a witness statement setting out, amongst other matters, an explanation of the steps it had taken in relation to the children’s contact with their parents and siblings since the final hearing before HHJ Probyn. A statement was filed by the respective social workers in each set of adoption proceedings.

In neither statement is there any acknowledgement by the author of the local authority’s non-compliance with the s26 order, still less an explanation for it, or any account of attempts made by the local authority to support the two prospective adoptive families in arranging the contact which had been ordered. In the statement for C and D the social worker says simply that [virtual] contact commenced on 4 August 2025, “taking into consideration what is in the children’s best interest and their placement stability”. E and F’s social worker says, inaccurately, that “sibling contact has been arranged as directed, subject to children’s [sic] best interest and placement stability”.

Following the hearing on 9 October 2025 I directed the local authority to file, within each application, a plan for sibling contact. My intention was that the local authority would set out in each plan the practical steps it intended to take to support the sibling relationships in future. I made it clear, in the judgment I gave at that hearing, that I was very concerned about the local authority’s failure, without explanation, to comply with the s26 order; but that there was still an opportunity for it to reassure me that it was committed to providing the support these two families were likely to need in establishing secure and long-term contact arrangements.

The document filed by the local authority in each case in response to that direction is entitled “Safe and Meaningful Contact Plan” and has clearly been prepared using a generic template. There is nothing wrong with that, but in this case, unfortunately, much of the content is also generic. I had said in my judgment that what was required was a document which set out the steps the local authority was going to take to support contact, with sufficient detail to satisfy the court that the contact was likely to take place. The plans filed by the local authority do not come close to meeting that requirement. It is very hard to identify which parts of each plan relate to sibling contact as opposed to parental contact; for the most part, the documents refer in very general terms to “birth relatives”. It is correct that in C and D’s plan there is a brief reference to the birth parents being provided on an annual basis with a photograph of all four children together, which at least implies some direct contact, but there is nothing to explain what level of contact is envisaged, or what the local authority intends to do to provide the adoptive families with support around the arrangements.

At the hearing on 9 October 2025 I refused (in advance) the parents’ application for s51A orders for contact between the adopted children, their parents and the younger twin boys who remain living in the birth family. HHJ Probyn had recorded on her order an agreed expectation that direct contact would take place annually, and the evidence in the Annex A reports suggested that both sets of adopters were open in principle to direct contact taking place. It was therefore very surprising to see the local authority state explicitly, in a witness statement in E and F’s proceedings, that “the local authority do not support direct contact with parents”. Consistently with that approach, in the Safe and Meaningful Contact Plans filed in both sets of proceedings there is no mention of any plan for direct contact between the children and their parents or the younger twins, and in fact the wording of both plans strongly suggests that there will be no such contact. For example, in E and F’s plan it is said that “it will be very difficult for E and F’s birth parents to offer supportive interaction with E and F on any direct contact now or if reviewed in future”, and “meeting with their birth relative will not help the child [sic] develop an understanding of their identity. This purpose is not achievable at this stage.”

In submissions counsel for the local authority struggled to explain the shift in the local authority’s approach to parents who had been described by the guardian throughout both the care and adoption proceedings as good candidates for post-adoption direct contact. During the course of the hearing the local authority indicated that in fact the evidence filed in the adoption proceedings might not fully reflect its position on future contact, and instead proposed that the following recital should be included on the final adoption orders:

“The children’s guardian recommended/ court would expect that each annual review undertaken by the post adoption team about the children’s contact will consider:

[…]

g.

the court’s expectations (supported by the guardian and the local authority within the adoption proceedings) that the benefits of direct annual contact with the parents (and their siblings G and H), if possible, should be reviewed by the meeting to further consider the current professional recommendations that such contact may be in the best interests of the children.”

That wording lacks conviction and bears all the hallmarks of a negotiated concession that the local authority has felt obliged to offer. It seems unlikely that any future review of the children’s contact needs will, on the basis of this recital in combination with the Safe and Meaningful Contact Plans, lead to any concrete arrangement for direct contact. I see no reason why HHJ Probyn’s hope that there would be an annual direct contact between the children and their parents, which was recorded clearly on the face of her order, should be watered down in this way.

Overall, the local authority’s approach to the issue of post-adoption contact has been confused and inconsistent. The impression given is that the local authority has paid lip-service at various points in the care and adoption proceedings to the benefits of future direct contact between the children and their birth relatives, but that there is, in reality, substantial and dogged resistance within the local authority to promoting and advocating for such contact.

I remain of the view, on balance and for the reasons given in my judgment on 9 October 2025, that there should not be a s51A order for direct contact between the children and their parents, but find it difficult to feel confident that the local authority is genuinely committed to keeping this issue meaningfully under review. I hope I am wrong.

The views of the children’s adoptive parents are set out in the Annex A reports, the witness statements filed by the local authority and the report of the guardian, who visited both adoptive homes. A3 and A4 have met the birth parents, and the meeting went well; one of this couple is also an adopted person who reconnected with their birth family later in life. There is substantial evidence that both sets of adoptive parents are open to their children having some form of contact with members of their birth family in future, and understand the benefits of this.

In a statement filed by the social worker for E and F on 4 September 2025, A3 and A4 refer to the steps they have taken to form a relationship with A1 and A2. They say, “It’s all very new and we are taking it slow, but we hope to begin in-person contact with [the other siblings] this year.”

It is not apparent from the evidence that either set of prospective adopters had any awareness of the s26 order made by HHJ Probyn (Footnote: ³). If that is correct, that is a significant failing on the part of the local authority.

Although they sought permission to oppose the adoptions, pointing out the significant progress they have made in successfully caring for their youngest children, BM and BF have also made it clear that they bear no ill-will towards the children’s adopters. They are unlikely to present a risk of destabilising the placements through contact, direct or indirect. The submissions made on their behalf at the final adoption hearing demonstrated that their priority now is to ensure that the children’s relationships with each other are maintained.

The children’s guardian, Mr Brackenridge, was also the guardian in the care proceedings. I have read his final analysis in those proceedings alongside his joint analysis prepared within the two sets of adoption proceedings. He has visited both sibling pairs in their adoptive placements and has met the adopters.

Mr Brackenridge’s view as to the welfare benefits of direct contact remains unchanged since the care proceedings. He points out that although direct contact (parental or sibling) may amplify difficult feelings for the children, it is arguable that it is also likely to help them come to terms with their loss of family relationships, and to offer reassurance that their birth family members are safe and happy.

Mr Brackenridge has obviously thought carefully about the issue of whether a s51A order is appropriate in this case. His conclusion that it is not is based on his assessment of the adopters’ willingness to facilitate direct contact, in principle, between the children and their birth relatives. His analysis was filed before the hearing on 9 October 2025 and his focus is on the order sought by the parents at that hearing for contact between the adopted children and their parents and younger twin siblings. He does not specifically address the issue of a s51A order for contact between the two sibling pairs, which only crystallised following that hearing.

The application for a s51A contact order is made by the children’s birth parents, albeit that it is the siblings and not the parents who they seek to have named in the order. Under s51A(4) the parents require leave to make the application. The threshold for leave is not a particularly high one and in circumstances where the order sought relates to sibling contact, and a previous s26 order for such contact has been breached, it seems to me that the threshold is met.

The issue between the parties is an important but narrow one. There is no dispute that direct contact between the siblings on at least two occasions each year is, in principle, in all four children’s best interests. The issue is whether it is right to make an order which would require the adoptive parents to facilitate contact at that minimum frequency. In that respect this case is not entirely on all fours with Re B and many of the older authorities, where the adopters’ opposition to contact orders was grounded in a substantive disagreement about whether, when or how post-adoption contact should take place. The ratio of Re B, in the paragraph set out above, is that it will be extremely unusual for the court to make an order stipulating a contact arrangement with which the adopters do not agree. That is not the position in this case, where both sets of adopters do agree to the arrangements.

I have the no order principle in s1(6) well in mind. However, as the President has observed extra-judicially (Footnote: ⁴), the combination of that principle with the approach confirmed in Re B presents the court with a paradox. If an order is inappropriate when the adopters do not agree to the arrangements, but unnecessary when they do, in what circumstances would a s51A contact order ever be made?

These are four full siblings who share a difficult and traumatic history. They all suffered significant harm in the care of their parents and in future they will have to come to terms with this and with its consequences for the trajectories of their lives. The children were separated into two sibling pairs at the outset of the care proceedings, but throughout those proceedings they had contact with each other on two occasions per week.

It is possible that there were sound, welfare-based reasons for delaying the start of post-placement direct contact between the siblings. The evidence in the Annex A reports suggests that all four children needed time to settle into their new adoptive placements. It is not surprising that each set of adopters would have approached the issue of direct contact with some caution, particularly in circumstances where the two families were, of course, total strangers to each other.

However, the evidence produced by the local authority does not join those dots. In the period between the final hearing in the care proceedings when the s26 order was made, and the first hearing in the adoption proceedings, it does not appear that anyone within the local authority undertook a considered review of the children’s presentation and needs in order to reach a decision that direct contact between the siblings should be deferred. In fact it is not possible to trace the evolution of the local authority’s thinking on the issue of sibling contact at all. Nor, for the reasons I have given, does the evidence provide the court with any real grounds for optimism that, in the absence of an order, the issue of sibling contact will receive any greater attention from the local authority in future.

S51A provides the court with the power only to make an order against each set of adoptive parents. There is no power to make an order requiring the local authority to put in place a framework of support. However it seems to me that it is a legitimate use of the court’s powers under s51A, particularly in light of the steer recently given by the PLWG, to underline to the local authority the need for this crucial aspect of the children’s welfare to be promoted in circumstances where the local authority has conspicuously failed to support the adopters in arranging contact since the placement orders were made.

In the Herefordshire case Keehan J gave two reasons for making a contact order against adopters whose good faith was not in question: first, to mark the importance placed by the court on the sibling relationship, and secondly to “fortify” the adopters against future difficulties in the contact arrangements. Both reasons, adapted to the circumstances of this case, are potentially valid here. In MF v Brent Ryder J suggested that even where there was agreement about contact, an order might “give reassurance to the child by keeping an enduring relationship that is important and for some children critical to their welfare throughout their lives.”

I accept that it may never be possible, or appropriate, for the order which I am contemplating to be enforced. The reality in this case is that the parents, who are currently the main drivers behind a s51A order, are unlikely in future to have the knowledge, capacity or standing to apply to enforce it. Enforceability is an issue to which the court must have regard when making any order, although anticipated barriers to enforcement do not necessarily mean that the order should not be made. In any event, the other side of that argument is that where the parents are unlikely to be in a position to apply to the court if the planned sibling contact does not take place (and therefore the “safety valve” identified by Moor J in Re N is not present) the existence of an order may operate as an important safeguard.

The “no order” principle requires the court to examine closely the benefits of an order, and to be positively satisfied that it would be better for the children to make an order than not to do so. In this case, for the following reasons, I am satisfied that an order is necessary, proportionate and better for the children than making no order at all:

I have explained that I see the circumstances of this case as different from those in Re B because I am not, in fact, imposing an order for contact arrangements with which the adopters do not agree. I acknowledge that an order removes some flexibility but at this level (two contacts a year) I would hope that any inconvenience, or impact on family life, is minimal. In any event, the intention behind the order, for the reasons I have explained, is not to fetter the adoptive parents but to support them.

After this judgment was circulated in draft A1 and A2 wrote an email to the court. In that email they set out the serious problems they have experienced in obtaining support from the local authority for their adopted children, to the extent that, before the adoption order was even made, they had made two formal complaints, both of which were upheld. They say that they were not told that a s26 contact order was in place until halfway through the introductions process, and that they then raised the issue of contact “countless” times, but no steps were taken to support them with it until very late in the process. They were not shown the local authority’s evidence within the adoption proceedings until very shortly before it was due to be filed, and then raised concerns, which have not been addressed, that it did not properly set out how the local authority intended to support sibling contact. They conclude:

“We feel that we have made every effort to do the right thing at every step of this process. It has been made much more stressful and frustrating by the local authority. It is therefore disheartening that we may be made subject to a court order due to their actions and not our own.”