RKV v JWC

This is the court’s final determination of the applicant’s application for financial remedies dated 17 November 2023.

The applicant wife is RKV. The respondent husband is JWC. I shall refer to the parties as “the wife” and “the husband” respectively. No discourtesy is intended in so doing, this is simply used as a convenient shorthand.

The wife is represented by Withers LLP (Ms Claire Blakemore and Jonathan Lyness) who instruct Mr Richard Castle.

The husband is represented by Clarence Family Law (Ms Helen Wilby) who instruct Mr Peter Newman.

I would like to thank counsel and their legal teams for the manner in which this hearing has been conducted.

The core bundle was 777 pages. The supplemental bundle was 1647 pages. As will become apparent, much has been in dispute. The legal teams have worked impressively in marshalling a narrative out of an unhappy and disjointed factual matrix.

When confronted with a bundle in excess of 350 pages, it is my practice to invite counsel to settle an advocates’ statement of issues with all relevant bundle page numbers cross-referenced per issue. This document was prepared during the course of the hearing. It is an invaluable aide memoire for the court after the hearing has come to a close. Counsel also presented helpful Excel schedules, showing in numerical terms the many moving parts to this case and the financial implications for certain factual findings. I am extremely grateful for all of this assistance.

Each counsel advanced their respective cases impressively and persuasively. Each party should know that nothing more could have been said on their behalf.

The husband is 58 and was born in Country 1. The wife is 48 and was born in Country 2.

Both parties had been married and divorced before they met each other. Unknown to the wife was the fact that the husband had fathered a daughter in 1993 with his first wife. This was only revealed to the wife in 2025, upon the husband’s release from prison (more of which shortly).

The parties started a relationship in about 2000.

In November 2001, the wife’s mother loaned the wife $210,000. In December 2001, the wife used these funds to help acquire, in her sole name, a property known as Property 1. Also in December 2001, the husband purchased a property in his sole name at Property 2.

The parties spent time at one another’s respective properties in London until, in about 2004, the husband moved into Property 1 on a full-time basis.

The parties were married on 10 November 2005.

In 2005, the husband incorporated a business known as Company W. The husband was the sole shareholder. The husband’s business involved supplying security.

There are two children of the marriage. Child 1 was born in 2007 and is now aged 18. Child 2 was born in 2012 and is now aged 13.

In 2010, a property in London was purchased in the husband’s sole name. This became the family home (“FMH”). He also acquired an apartment in City O.

Three investment properties were acquired in the husband’s sole name between 2015 and 2016.

In June 2015, both parties were arrested by the police concerning an allegation [ of criminal offences ]. The investigation into this matter and its outcome casts a looming shadow over the rest of the chronology.

The parties were released on bail in 2017 and later released under investigation until they were charged in 2021. I shall detail in a moment the circumstances of their conviction and sentence.

In 2016, the husband incorporated another company, Company X. He was the sole shareholder. This carried on the business formerly conducted by Company W. Company W was dissolved by a compulsory strike off in November 2016.

Another property was acquired by the husband in Country 1 in 2016. This was Property 3.

There were strains in the marriage. Whilst formally still a family, the wife and children relocated to City K in August 2022. This was with the agreement and support of the husband.

The husband highlights a [ visa ] application, made to enable employment in Country 2. A close friend of the wife wrote a reference stating,

“I have been close with RKV and JWC throughout the course of their relationship and I can whole-heartedly attest to the loving bond and strong partnership that RKV and JWC share. Their strong partnership has been the foundation of their success both professionally and personally and they have gone on to have two beautiful girls, Child 1 and Child 2. I can confirm I know JWC to be a wonderfully supportive, caring and loving father and husband and the strength of RKV and JWC’s relationship continues to triumph over the test of time.”

From [ redacted ], the parties stood trial on the [ criminal ] allegation. The parties were convicted on [ redacted ] 2023.

On 26 August 2023, whilst she was in this country, the wife alleges that the husband assaulted her and Child 2, after the wife told him that she wished to separate. I have not been invited to make any finding of fact about this episode. The allegations are of serious violence. Child 2 is alleged to have witnessed the assault, before trying to intervene.

Social services became involved and their report states:

“The referral incident took place in Child 2’s room. Child 1 was not home. Child 2 did not want to leave her mother. During the referral incident, Child 2 said she was so scared and never thought in a million years her dad could strangle her mum, which could kill her. Child 2 said she did not want to look or be there but felt she had to and told herself not to close her eyes so she can see the evidence and protect her mum. Child 2 said what she saw replays in her mind and she does not want to see her dad again.”

Whilst not making a specific finding of fact concerning this episode, and noting that the husband denies these allegations, the court can make two general observations at this point. First, whatever the granular detail, it was clear to the parties that the marriage was over following this episode. Second, as I will describe in more detail shortly, I have found the husband to be an unsatisfactory witness and poor historian. Where accounts differ as between the husband and the wife, I have generally preferred the wife’s account in relation to the findings of fact that I have made.

The husband withheld the wife and children’s passports for several days following this alleged episode. It was not until 6 September 2023 that the wife and children were able to return to City K, following the return of their passports.

On 8 September 2023, there was [ a natural disaster ] in Country 1. The husband was concerned for his family living in Country 1 and property there.

On 9 September 2023, the husband flew to Country 1.

The wife received a suspended sentence on [ redacted ] 2023. The sentencing judge commented in respect of the wife,

“I am however entirely satisfied that you only did what you did under your husband’s instructions, and because he had asked you and were it not for his getting you involved, I am quite sure you would never have committed this serious crime…While you do not allege that you were coerced by JWC into doing what you did, having observed him give evidence at trial over several days, my clear conclusion is that he would not have been as [sic] easy man to say no to.”

At this point in the chronology, I refer to a Court of Appeal transcript, dated [ redacted ] 2024. This transcript concerns the husband’s unsuccessful appeal against his later conviction and sentence on [ redacted ] 2024, for failing to surrender to bail on the [ redacted ] 2024.

“ [ redacted ]

[7] The appellant gave evidence regarding his movements in the period [ redacted ] …We have been taken to parts of the transcript today…

[8] In short, the judge did not find the appellant to be a convincing witness. He made findings of fact that the appellant:

(1)

Did undergo medical treatment in Country 1. He underwent an operation on 24 October and was in hospital for a week after that procedure.

(2)

However, he exaggerated how unwell he was in Country 1.

(3)

Some “at least” of the Country 1 medical material produced to the court was written with input from JWC, because of self-reporting we infer, “the specific intention on his part of providing him with a veneer of cover” for failing to attend on the [ redacted ].

(4)

Lied in saying that it never occurred to him to inform the court in early September that he was going to Country 1 because he knew the judge would not sanction it.

(5)

Intended in going to Country 1 when he did, to stay there as long as he could and evade, or at least postpone for as long as he could, sentence.

(6)

Did not return to the jurisdiction before the sentencing date ([ redacted ] ). He could have done so but did not.

(7)

Could have returned back to the United Kingdom on the [ redacted ], if necessary, with medical assistance and other practical help in doing so.

(8)

Chose not to return on the [ redacted ] and his decision not to return then related to his mental rather than physical state, as indicated in an email sent to the judge on the [ redacted ] to the effect “he mentally did not feel he wanted to.”

(9)

It was not a good reason not to answer his bail, even considering his physical condition. The judge said:

“My clear conclusion is that the defendant’s intention was to stay in Country 1 as long as he possibly could, possibly forever. That is why he left the United Kingdom on the 9 September and travelled to Country 1, and I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that his failure to appear on the [ redacted ] was in further … intention that he had formed some months earlier. I conclude that he only chose to return to the United Kingdom or returned, because he felt he had no practical choice and that one way or the other, he had run out of road in Country 1. My conclusion is therefore that he has failed to discharge the burden on him, to show reasonable excuse for failing to appear before me on the date in question and I convict him of the Bail Act charge.”

…

[18] The judge explicitly indicated that he found the appellant’s evidence at the substantive trial to be “thoroughly dishonest.” He was at liberty to do so: he had observed the appellant giving evidence over five days and was corroborated in his view by the verdict of the jury. This character assessment may have disappointed the appellant but would not lead a reasonable and informed observer to suspect that the judge was biased bearing in mind his frank appraisal and subsequent self-direction in terms:

“That does not mean he was dishonest necessarily in his evidence to me [today], it would be a lazy assumption to start off on that basis. In addition, although at trial on the basis of the evidence including his lengthy evidence in his own defence, I formed the distinct opinion that he is a manipulative individual, who will do and say whatever he can to get out of a tight corner. I warn myself against the lazy assumption that he must have been trying to manipulate me in these proceedings. And I do not proceed on the basis that anything that he told me from the witness box must have been dishonest or manipulative.”

[19] Neither would the judge’s reprimand of the appellant for his repeated introduction of almost every answer he gave to the judge’s questions in terms of “I’m being completely honest…” give rise to such a view. As the judge openly cautioned the appellant, such introduction could tend to give the contrary impression as to the appellant’s overall credibility.”

I will deal in a moment with the status of the foregoing findings before this court.

The wife issued a divorce application on 3 November 2023. Her Form A commencing these financial remedy proceedings was issued on 17 November 2023.

On [redacted] 2024, the husband was sentenced – in his absence – and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The husband’s conviction resulted in the withdrawal of a business licence which he needed in order to work in the private security sector. He was therefore no longer able to take an active part in the management of Company X.

On 16 January 2024, Company X was dissolved by Companies House due to a failure to file accounts.

On 17 January 2024, a company was incorporated called Company Y. The husband was the sole shareholder. In February 2024, the husband applied to strike this company off the register.

On 23 January 2024, Company Z was incorporated. Initially, the husband was not a shareholder but later he became an 80% shareholder. Company Z sought to continue the business that had originally been run through Company X. The husband denied to the wife’s solicitors that his business was continuing in “any shape or form”.

Having declined to give the wife reassurance that he would not deal in any of the properties in his sole name, the wife applied for a freezing order and the application came before DJ Alun Jenkins on 7 February 2024. A complaint was made by the husband that he was only given short notice of the application. It is further noted by the husband that DJ Alun Jenkins had made the order because of the husband’s absence from the jurisdiction and that he would not “…have dreamt of making an order otherwise”.

I do not see substance in the complaint about short notice, given the background to this matter. DJ Alun Jenkins, indeed anybody – save for the husband and his associates – could not have known at this stage what the husband was about. We now know he was withdrawing funds out of multiple accounts and placing them into third-party accounts.

Several references in the supplemental bundle show that, despite his protestations as to poor health, the husband was frequenting hotels, bars and restaurants in Country 1. One reference in particular records his attendance at the Sofital Lounge, spending about £850 in February 2024. (Whilst giving his oral evidence, the husband mentioned in passing that this was in City P.)

I do not have the exact times and distances, but it appears from Google searches conducted by people in the courtroom immediately following this revelation, that City P is nearly three hours away from City O (where he was living at the time), if the journey is taken in a car.

This excursion sits uncomfortably juxtaposed with a medical letter dated 18 March 2024, in which it is recorded that, “Patient is at this date not yet fully recover[ed] but will be able to travel on a regular flight by April 2024.”

On 5 March 2024, the wife served the husband with an application she had made in Country 2 for sole custody of the children.

On 15 March 2024, a psychiatrist in Country 1 wrote up a short letter, following a consultation with the husband, in which it was stated, “At the present time the patient is in relapse and it is difficult for him to take decisions, as I have concluded from my meeting with him today.”

On about 17 April 2024, the husband returned to the UK to face the music. He commenced his prison sentence the following day.

At 17.16 on 17 April 2024, the husband sent a text message to the wife saying, “Hi RKV, I hope you and the girls are well, AA and his wife will be staying in the house while I am in prison, to maintain the safety of the house. This is his number […] so you can contact him to arrange access if you wish to pick up what left of your clothes. Thank you.” The wife replied, “Ok thank you!!”

At 20.03 on 17 April 2024, the husband sent a further message stating, “Good evening RKV, in London now spending night police station, to tomorrow to prison starting my sentence, take care of yourself and girls, thinking of all of you x Goodbye.” The wife replied, “Thank you for the message. Be strong this is not forever. Despite everything you and I know this sentence is not right. I know how hard this feels but I also know you will find your strength to cope with this. Don’t forget who you are. It feels overwhelming. I’m sending you strength to get through this part. There is life after this. Just hunker down and get it over with. Xx”

It was said by the husband that the tender exchange between the parties on 17 April 2024 demonstrated that the wife’s depiction of him as a controlling and difficult husband whose violence had featured at the end of the marriage, could not possibly be true. The wife gave emotional evidence at this point, stating that this was too simplistic after a 23-year marriage. The wife had felt for the husband in advance of the prison sentence. The dynamics in their relationship had developed “in the wrong way” over time. That did not change what he was going through. The wife had compassion for the husband. Her feelings were complicated. He is the father of her children. The prison sentence was unconnected with the failure of the marriage.

The exchange of text messages was also presented by the husband to demonstrate, on his case, how reasonable he had been about access to the FMH. I simply do not accept this. I am not going to detail the long cat-and-mouse sequence of events concerning access to the FMH. It is a long and winding saga and I do not need to do so for the purposes of this judgment.

In brief summary, despite the quoted text message having given the impression that the wife could easily gain access, the husband caused the locks to be changed unilaterally by “AA and his wife”. “His wife” was in fact the husband’s yet to be disclosed daughter, BB, from his first marriage. Despite numerous attempts by both the wife and her brother to make contact, AA did not answer the phone to arrange access. I accept the wife’s version of events in this regard and found the husband’s evidence in this regard to be dissembling.

Having failed to secure access, the wife – with family home rights – upon advice of her solicitor, caused the locks to be changed so that she could access the FMH. This was after an exhaustive attempt to secure keys both informally and formally through solicitors’ correspondence as well as applications and court orders, which were then disobeyed by the husband.

Upon the wife and her daughters finally gaining access to their home, they were subjected to the indignity of AA and/or BB filming them from outside, as if they were intruders. On one occasion, either AA or BB called the police.

The husband later arranged for the locks to be changed again. This was after some Imerman correspondence, delivered to the FMH, had been returned by the wife unopened – in accordance with protocol – to the husband’s solicitor. Mr Castle suggests this is the length the husband was prepared to go to in order to prevent the wife becoming properly appraised of his financial affairs. This whole sorry episode was completely unnecessary. It reflects extremely poorly on the husband, AA and BB.

On [ redacted ] 2024, as foreshadowed above, the husband was convicted of failing to surrender to bail and sentenced to a further two months imprisonment.

Bearing in mind the date of the parties’ convictions, [ summer ] 2023, and the date of the alleged assault at the end of the marriage, 26 August 2023, it is instructive to consider what the husband was doing with funds in his bank accounts at around this time. It will also be recalled that the husband travelled to Country 1 on 9 September 2023.

I will detail, in summary form, the procedural chronology in a moment. It suffices to note that bank statements were not disclosed in accordance with the husband’s duty of full and frank disclosure or in accordance with his assurances in solicitor’s correspondence that he would provide disclosure in accordance with the court timetable.

English bank statements were only finally obtained following two applications for court orders under the Bankers Book Evidence Act 1879 (“BBEA”).

As I mentioned above, the husband dissipated sums of money from his bank accounts to family members and associates. I now record a number of money transfers from the husband’s bank statements, which I explain below.

Payments from husband’s HSBC account to “Recipient 1”

Payments from husband’s HSBC account to BB, the husband’s yet to be disclosed daughter

Payments from the husband’s Revolut account to BB (as mentioned above)

Payments from husband’s HSBC account to Recipient 2

From the husband’s Revolut account to Recipient 3

From the account of Company X and the husband’s personal Barclays’ account to Recipient 4

From the account of Company X to BB

From the account of Company X to Recipient 5

From the husband’s personal Barclays account to “Tor Currency Exchange”

From the Company X account there are numerous payments to Recipient 6, an employee and trusted friend of the husband. These increase materially in terms of quantum and frequency from 14 September 2023 and conclude on 18 December 2023. The wife accepts that many of these payments are legitimate business payments.

However, at [1557 - 1558] of the supplemental bundle there is an analysis which shows what the wife contends is double counting of a series of these payments amounting to £50,533. This is presently unaccounted for.

The husband was given permission to file a statement from Recipient 6 which might have assisted in clearing this issue up, and indeed others. The husband has not availed himself of that opportunity.

There are also payments of £41,000 to Recipient 7 in January 2024. Recipient 7 is the husband’s accountant.

The overwhelming bulk (£530,050) of the money transfers I have just recorded occur after the conviction and/or alleged assault. It was the wife’s case that the husband at this point had nothing to lose. He was staring at a custodial sentence and his marriage was over. There was nothing left for the husband in England. The payments we see accord with the Crown Court judge’s findings that he intended to leave the jurisdiction permanently or for as long as he could.

I should record here that it is the husband’s case that much of his behaviour – whether substantively or procedurally – can be accounted for by the fact that he is a broken man in light of his conviction, sentence, loss of marriage and, indeed, family.

I am alive to the fact that the husband has never obtained permission to file evidence regarding his mental health. That said, the husband has unilaterally supplied a report from a psychiatrist, Dr Hasanen Al-Tair. This has made its way into the bundle. It makes reference to a “severe depressive episode” and “generalised anxiety disorder”, in addition to PTSD. Dr Al-Tair comments:

On 3 December 2024, the husband’s solicitor wrote to the wife’s solicitor in the following terms:

“Regrettably due to a decline in his mental health he felt unable to provide instructions save to sign a document I had printed and brought to the prison relating to the children act proceedings in Country 2. JWC’s disposition was morose, expressing an inability to cope with discussions around his marriage, finances and the recent proceedings (which he was excluded from attending by the prison establishment). He was highly distressed. I was advised that JWC’s criminal solicitor sought a recent psychiatric assessment for the purpose of those proceedings. JWC provided me with permission to seek a copy of that report, which I have now received. Whilst deeply personal, I believe it is important for your client to be aware of the acute (diagnosed) difficulties JWC is facing, including presenting with features of a severe depressive episode, an anxiety disorder and PTSD. The stark reality is that my client has been unable to engage in any meaningful way in these proceedings, as a consequence both of his mental health difficulties and the constraints of being incarcerated. I do not criticise my predecessors at all. My own experience of taking instructions has been extremely problematic. Appointments are rare and can take weeks to find a 1.5 hour slot (in circumstances where my client has his prison lawyer, criminal lawyer to facilitate as well), the appointments are based in a room without desks and with the distractions of other legal visits taking place in the room, all paper documents must be posted in advance or can only be viewed on a single laptop. Prison L has NO facilities for zoom/remote video calls (I believe it is one of the only prisons unable to facilitate this) and my client has limited telephone call access (a credit of £50 a month which is used up). Taking instructions on significant pleadings simply cannot be facilitated by telephone.”

I have little doubt that the husband has had an extremely difficult time. His mental health will undoubtedly have suffered. I record below how I have dealt with the husband’s relief from sanctions application. It will be apparent that I have sought to weigh his genuine plight appropriately in the scales.

However, the husband does not get a “free pass” to behave with impunity. If he had the energy to be intransigent, for example, about access to the FMH, why did he not also, for instance, have the energy to provide full and frank disclosure of his bank accounts and spare everyone the time, cost and hassle of the BBEA applications?

I also reject the husband’s narrative when he stated in evidence that the wife’s solicitor had no compassion in the manner in which they pursued numerous interlocutory applications. The husband seemed unable to reflect that, to some significant extent, he was the author of all of his own miseries. Non-disclosing parties in financial remedy litigation can expect to be on the sharp end of applications until they come to realise that the law applies to them as much as it does for everyone else.

The husband’s undoubted mental health struggles do not absolve him of the chaos which lies in his wake, and which has cost a very significant sum of money in costs to sort out.

The court had before it a log of visitors which the husband received in prison. He had a number of female visitors who are either family, friends or business associates. Their status is described as friend, daughter and the like. One visitor, CC, is marked as “girlfriend.”

I was treated to a hard to follow account by the husband in his oral evidence. It was said by the wife that the husband had formed a relationship with CC and that one of the children had seen messages and photographs on his phone which tended to support this conclusion. The husband denied this and stated that CC was simply a friend of his who also administered Botox from time to time. He asserted that the messages on his phone were from a “Polish CC” and that the entry in the prison records was simply a way of recording the fact that CC was both a friend and a female. All other female visitors are either referenced as friend or some other designation as appropriate, e.g. daughter. This was a lie, in my judgment.

The suggestion that CC was merely a friend strains credulity. I have the Lucas direction at the forefront of my mind, but this vignette demonstrates neatly the husband’s belief that he might just be able to tough out a nonsense account in the face of formal documents which tell a very different story.

I also note that Recipient 5 visited on 8 February 2025. On 10 February 2025 the husband caused £10,000 to be transferred to him. The husband executed this transaction, notwithstanding his mental health problems and inability to disclose bank accounts.

The husband was released from prison on 21 July 2025.

By this stage he was more than two months in breach of an unless order which prevented him from adducing any evidence, save with permission of the final hearing judge.

Instead of immediately attending upon his solicitor, he allowed himself a “period of rehabilitation in his home” until deciding to “re-engage” with his solicitor on 8 August 2025. I am mindful that the husband states he felt discombobulated upon release. Even allowing for that, I am not sure it was fair on the wife for the husband to give himself a fortnight at home before choosing his moment of re-engagement.

Mr Castle provides a compelling list of matters the husband was able to engage with, including multiple – unsuccessful – appeals in respect of his conviction and sentence, children proceedings in Country 2, applications for adjournment, set side and review of orders made in financial remedy proceedings, managing his bank accounts via third parties and changing the locks on the FMH. I gratefully adopt as my own the “Chronology of H’s selected engagement” appended to the wife’s section 25 statement. It is too long to recite it all here.

The court has had a significant amount of material to sift and consider. This judgment cannot refer to everything. Even if not expressly mentioned, I have had all of the evidence in mind in arriving at my determinations.

This judgment cannot recite all of the extensive skirmishing that has gone on. My summary here is to give a flavour of the progress of the application.

Following applications for freezing orders, MPS and LSPO, the matter came before DJ Alun Jenkins on 7 February 2024. Preservation orders were made against the husband’s English properties and directions were given in the MPS and LSPO application.

On 2 April 2024, the husband applied for a six-month adjournment of the financial remedy proceedings on account of his acute mental health crises, his back surgery and prison sentence (which he had yet to commence).

On 11 April 2024, the wife made her first BBEA application and applied for secured LSPO, keys to FMH and participation directions.

The First Appointment on 17 April 2024 was ineffective. The husband had not filed his Form E. He attended via counsel only as he was en route back from Country 1 on the date of the hearing. The husband’s application to adjourn was refused. The MPS order was made. The LSPO was adjourned.

The next substantive hearing was before DDJ Hodson KC on 30 July 2024. Various case management directions and BBEA orders were made. The LSPO application was further adjourned for want of court time.

The LSPO order of £204,239, to include historic costs of £124,239, was made by DJ Ashworth on 16 October 2024. Further case management directions were given.

By 5 November 2024, there were substantial arrears of MPS and LSPO. The wife made an application for enforcement of arrears by a third-party debt order.

On 13 November 2024, the Country 2 children law proceedings were concluded.

The matter came before DJ Mulkis on 7 February 2025. An FDR appointment was not possible. Various directions were made including interim third-party debt orders, freezing orders over the husband’s UK bank accounts and third-party disclosure was ordered.

On 12 March 2025, having failed to comply with significant case management directions, the husband applied for an adjournment of the forthcoming final hearing.

The application was back before DJ Alun Jenkins for a PTR on 14 March 2025. The husband was granted his request for an adjournment. The husband was given a last chance to comply with an explanation of payments made to an account in Country 1 (more of that in a moment), his replies and his s.25 statement. To prevent the wife being ambushed with non-compliance, an unless order was made. The latest date for compliance was set, at the husband’s request, for 12 May 2025. The effect of the unless order made on this occasion was that the husband would not be permitted to file his replies and s.25 statement if he did not comply by 28 April 2025 (replies) and 12 May 2025 (s.25 statement). The LSPO order was extended to take the wife’s funding through to a four-day final hearing.

The 12 May 2025 came and went without the husband’s compliance. It is his case that when he asked for this date, he expected to be moved promptly to a more open prison and commence home leave. Both would have enabled him to engage more easily with his solicitor. In the event, I was told, the prison move was inexplicably delayed which also delayed home leave. I am willing to accept bureaucratic delays as part of the husband’s evidence.

In the event, the husband served his replies to questionnaire on 21 August 2025 and his s.25 statement on 5 September 2025. His updating disclosure was provided on 11 September 2025.

I was told that the husband’s solicitor worked on the replies and s.25 statement during her summer holiday when out of the jurisdiction. This demonstrates an impressive level of commitment and professionalism, which no doubt came at a cost to her own well-being and opportunity for rest.

The husband’s application for relief from sanctions was made on 9 September 2025.

Helpfully, the wife has supplied a summary of breaches of court orders the husband has made which, again, I consider to be accurate and adopt as my own. Again, it is too long to recite here.

Mr Newman, crafting his words carefully, asked for “understanding, not absolution”.

I lost count of the times the husband caveated what should have been a simple reply with the words “possibly” or “maybe”. He appeared to me to be unable to give a straight answer to anything. He was constantly looking for the opportunity to try and find “wriggle room” as the cross-examination progressed.

Day One was taken up with relief from sanctions arguments (for which, see below). The husband commenced his evidence in the afternoon of Day Two. The wife’s case was that the court should infer the husband has at least £750,000 in hidden assets. This argument in part rested on the continuing non-disclosure of the husband’s Banque Populaire bank account in Country 1.

I was shown an email from Banque Populaire dated 2 September 2025 with an account balance of just over £500,000. Mr Castle, not unreasonably, wanted to know what had happened historically which had resulted in this balance.

I took a careful note of the husband’s replies. He said that it was very difficult to get bank statements from Country 1. He and his solicitor had tried. He said that he would probably need to go in person to get the statements but that he was unable to do so due to his sentence licence conditions. He said he would try again but that when he called, they generally would not answer. I asked why he did not email them. The husband said he was very sorry for the lack of disclosure.

The following morning the husband returned to the witness box, having emailed his solicitor – in breach of the warnings he should not communicate with his legal team whilst giving evidence. The court makes no criticism of the husband’s solicitor who was powerless to prevent receipt of such an email. It became apparent that the husband had, indeed, obtained the Banque Populaire bank statements.

On further interrogation of the situation, it became apparent that he had been in email contact with the bank some days prior. The bank statements were then obtained with ease via an email at the start of Day Three.

The overwhelming impression this left on me was that these were the actions of a calculating individual. The penny must have dropped that the “missing piece of the jigsaw” were the Banque Populaire accounts. A case for an inference of £750,000 was going to be advanced against him by reason, in part, of their absence. In a brazen move, given the evidence I had from him the day before about the need to attend the bank in person, etc., the statements appeared like a rabbit out of the hat. What I had been told the day before was a blatant lie.

The “Polish CC” evidence, recounted above, although a minor issue in the grand scheme of this case, also left with me an impression of someone who was willing to try and brazen out obvious dishonesty in the face of objective evidence to the contrary. Such behaviour with the wife would be experienced by her as gaslighting.

The fact that the husband had a daughter – who remained a secret to the wife until he was released from prison – is nothing short of astonishing. It is tragic that the first time Child 1 and Child 2 encountered their half sibling was when BB filmed them in their own house, as if they were intruders, whilst calling the police on them.

I will detail the legal status within these proceedings of the sentencing judge's findings shortly. Independently of the sentencing judge's findings, I have formed a similarly unfavourable impression of the husband’s relationship with the truth. The off-guard comment about the road trip to City P, whilst claiming he was too unwell to travel to face justice, speaks volumes.

I found the wife to be far more uncomplicated. I am mindful that she too has a conviction, but her suspended sentence and the sentencing remarks provide a context for that.

Her litigation conduct has been straightforward. Criticisms of the timing and volume of her applications do not register with me in light of what she was ranged against.

The wife was thoughtful and considered in her evidence. In all instances of conflict between the parties, I prefer the wife’s evidence over the husband’s.

That said, I have not accepted everything she has had to tell me, especially over the issue of family loans which I shall deal with shortly.

The final hearing commenced with the husband only being able to rely on a poorly completed Form E. By reason of his failure to comply with the timetable of DJ Alun Jenkins, set at the husband’s behest, the husband found himself on the wrong side of an unless order.

On behalf of the wife, Mr Castle stated that the husband was in contumacious breach and fairness demanded that the husband should not be able to spring fresh evidence on the wife.

Mr Castle accepted that the level of the wife’s opposition to relief from sanctions varied between different classes of documents. If I was against a blanket refusal to grant relief, there was a difference in kind to the husband being permitted, on the one hand, (a) to produce documents which elucidated and confirmed figures, to (b) being permitted to advance active assertions which the wife contends are outrageous.

Mr Newman, as I have already noted, asked for “understanding and not absolution”. He realistically accepted his client was beyond the pale (my summary phrase, not Mr Newman’s language) in terms of compliance and that there would no doubt be a judicial urge to let the husband lie in the bed he had made for himself. However, such was the scale of the husband’s non-compliance, that a refusal to grant any relief would make the hearing meaningless, as the husband would have nothing outside of his rather sorry Form E to advance his case. This was not a case of relief from sanctions over one issue in the case; by his own default the husband had, in effect, debarred himself from advancing any meaningful case at all.

Mr Newman compared a refusal to grant relief, on the facts of this case, as being comparable or at least analogous with a wholly exceptional Hadkinson order, the conditions for which were not met. Mr Newman also reminded the court of its quasi-inquisitorial duty to take “all the circumstances of case” into account. How was the court to do that if it refused to admit the husband’s case in its entirety?

The debate about relief from sanctions took much of Day One. Each side presented important and persuasive factors which weighed in their respective client’s favour.

The court was faced with a genuinely difficult conundrum. Orders are to be obeyed. The husband’s contumacious default could not simply be ignored. That said, the court was mindful of all the criticisms of proceeding to hear only one side of a case when the defaulting party was trying, albeit someway beyond the eleventh hour, to correct their default. How was the court to be fair to both sides?

The court checked with Mr Castle that he would be able to continue if relief was granted. With appropriate caveats, which the court was reminded to be ever mindful of, Mr Castle confirmed that he could proceed with the case. I commend that stance.

As the argument ground on, it also became apparent to the court that there were aspects of the husband’s s.25 statement, which I had not seen, which the wife found totally objectionable.

The court’s suggestion was to give the parties a short amount of time to see if they were able to come up with a solution, where the husband would agree to redactions dictated by the wife. The husband, in that way, would suffer a proper penalty in being unable to put all of his case before the court. However, by allowing the parties to agree some redactions, I would get the more neutral facts and figures, which would be the building blocks of the husband’s case.

I accept that Mr Newman was, in effect, invited to negotiate with a metaphorical gun to his head. That is entirely the fault of the husband. I made plain that if the wife’s requested redactions could not be agreed, I would continue to determine the application.

Very sensibly, in my judgment, Mr Newman was able to return to court with a batch of agreed redactions. Mr Castle made plain that he still objected to any relief being granted, however, with his redactions duly extracted, the heat had, to some extent, gone out of Mr Castle’s objections.

DJ Alun Jenkins’ order had required the husband’s replies by 28 April 2025; his s.25 statement and updating disclosure by 12 May 2025. These were extensions on dates which had already been missed. In the event, the replies were served on 21 August 2025, the s.25 statement on 5 September 2025 and updating disclosure on 11 September 2025. As I have stated, the application for relief was dated 9 September 2025 and prayed in aid the husband’s practical and psychiatric difficulties, which I describe above.

I am required to consider “all of the circumstances” including the factors at FPR 2010 r.4.6(1), entitled “Relief from Sanctions”:

I also have in mind the well-known test in Denton v White [2014] EWCA Civ 906. The breach of the unless order is extremely serious. I have set out my views on the reasons for the breach, which is a mixed bag. I have all the circumstances in mind, as set out above. I am mindful that the “civil approach” is often less forgiving, but I sit in a quasi-inquisitorial jurisdiction with particular duties under the statute. I do not consider that I am in any way being disloyal to the mantra that court orders are there to be obeyed. This relief application has been determined on its unique and exceptional set of facts.

Overall, standing back to review fairness in the round, granting relief on terms is my determination as to the fairest way to proceed. That is the balance I come to, weighing all of the competing and countervailing forces, when considering the checklist at 4.6(1).

At one point in evidence, the husband appeared to complain that he had been stopped from putting the case he had wanted to. This was due to the redactions he had agreed to his evidence. I invited him to consider a different perspective, namely, he arrived at this court not entitled to rely on anything at all and by reason, in significant measure, of the efforts of Mr Newman, he was able to advance much of what he had wanted to say.

The appearance of the Banque Populaire bank statements at the start of Day Three, in the circumstances I have already described, can only be described as extremely provocative. They were also on the wrong side of the unless order. Having allowed the luxury of a day debating relief from sanctions on Day One, there was simply not the time for more fine arguments, many of which would have simply been repeats from the earlier relief application. I am not going to trawl through r.4.6(1) verbatim again. Many of the features recited above also apply here.

Additionally, the husband had clearly lied to the court the day before as to how difficult it would be to obtain the documents. He acquired them when he could see that the risk of a £750,000 inference turned the litigation advantage to his favour in now producing them.

Notwithstanding the husband’s provocations, again reassured by Mr Castle’s calm confirmation of his ability to adapt and move on, I granted relief. It seemed to me that it would be wholly unfair to potentially embark on an inference case, based in part on the non-production of bank statements, which would otherwise have been available for the court’s review, had relief been granted.

This time the metaphorical gun was directed at my head. It seemed I had little choice but to proceed in the way in which I determined.

The burden of proof rests on the person seeking to establish a fact. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The decision on whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all the available evidence.

Findings of fact must be based on evidence not speculation. Evidence-based findings of fact may include inferences that can be properly drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation. The decision on whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all of the available evidence and should have regard to the wide context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors.

In determining whether a party has discharged the burden upon it, the court looks at what has been described as “the broad canvas” of the evidence before it. The court takes account of a wide range of matters including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and inferences that can be properly drawn from the evidence. The role of the court is to consider the evidence in its totality and to make findings on the balance of probabilities accordingly. Within this context, the court must consider each piece of evidence in the context of all of the other evidence.

The evidence of the parties is of utmost importance. It is essential that I form a clear assessment of credibility and reliability. I am entitled to place weight on the impression that the parties have made upon me.

I remind myself that demeanour is an uncertain guide in assessing the reliability of evidence and that far more important is the substance of the evidence given, its internal consistency with contemporaneous documents and inherent probabilities. That said, the court is still permitted to have regard to the demeanour of witnesses when there is little by way of other contemporaneous documents. I remind myself to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of the parties’ behaviour when giving oral evidence.

I also give myself a Lucas direction and remind myself that a witness may lie for many reasons such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything.

I must have regard to all of the circumstances of the case (MCA 1973 s.25(1)) when applying the checklist at MCA 1973 s.25(2). The minor child of the family is my first consideration.

s.25(1) provides:

“It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 23, 24, 24A, 24B and 24E above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all of the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen.”

s.25(2) provides:

“As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24, 24A, 24B and 24E above in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters:

s.25A(1) provides:

“Where on or after the making of a divorce or nullity of marriage order the court decides to exercise its power under s.23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24, 24A, 24B or 24E above in favour of a party to the marriage, it shall be the duty of the court to consider whether it would be appropriate so as to exercise those powers that the financial obligations of each party towards the other will be terminated as soon after the making of the order as the court considers just and reasonable.”

s.25A(2) provides:

“Where the court decides in such a case to make a periodical payments or secured periodical payments order in favour of a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular consider whether it would be appropriate to require those payments to be made or secured only for such term as would in the opinion of the court be sufficient to enable the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence on the other party”.

The modern case law is helpfully distilled by Peel J in WC v HC (Financial Remedies Agreements) (Rev 1) [2022] 2 FLR 1100 at [21]. I do not propose to quote the list of well-known factors, all of which I have firmly in mind.

In Crowther v Crowther and Others [2022] 2 FLR 243 Peel J stated

“Non-disclosure alleged by W against H

[56] In NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1211, at para [16], Mostyn J enunciated the proper approach to take as follows:

‘Pulling the threads together it seems to me that where the court is satisfied that the disclosure given by one party has been materially deficient then:

(i)

The Court is duty bound to consider by the process of drawing adverse inferences whether funds have been hidden.

(ii)

But such inferences must be properly drawn and reasonable. It would be wrong to draw inferences that a party has assets which, on an assessment of the evidence, the Court is satisfied he has not got.

(iii)

If the Court concludes that funds have been hidden then it should attempt a realistic and reasonable quantification of those funds, even in the broadest terms.

(iv)

In making its judgment as to quantification the Court will first look to direct evidence such as documentation and observations made by the other party.

(v)

The Court will then look to the scale of business activities and at lifestyle.

(vi)

Vague evidence of reputation or the opinions or beliefs of third parties is inadmissible in the exercise.

(vii)

The Al-Khatib v Masry [2004] EWCA Civ 1353, [2005] 1 FLR 381 technique of concluding that the non-discloser must have assets of at least twice what the claimant is seeking should not be used as the sole metric of quantification.

(viii)

The Court must be astute to ensure that a non-discloser should not be able to procure a result from his non-disclosure better than that which would be ordered if the truth were told. If the result is an order that is unfair to the non-discloser it is better that than the Court should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the claimant.’

[57] In Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, [2020] Fam 160, [2020] 1 FLR 225, the Court of Appeal did not dissent from those propositions, save in respect of (iii) where it concluded that the court is not required to reach a specific determination as to the figure, or bracket, of undisclosed resources.

[58] Usually, in my view, the evidential platform for a finding of non-disclosure is established by one or more of the following:

(i)

Direct evidence of an asset which the alleged non-discloser has not revealed (the classic example being the revelation of the existence of a bank account or accounts which feature nowhere in his/her financial presentation, and holding large sums of money).

(ii)

Failure to comply with court orders and/or provide adequate or complete responses to questions asked, from which failure the court feels able to draw inferences adverse to the alleged non-discloser.

(iii)

Evidence of a lifestyle which is wholly inconsistent with disclosed financial resources.

In Mahtani v Mahtani [2025] EWFC 35 Mr James Ewins KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge stated:

“[34] Because the respondent has not made any financial disclosure whatsoever, I must consider what if any adverse inferences I can reasonably and properly draw concerning his financial resources, as was forewarned by Peel J in his 14 May 2024 order – see … above. The court’s duty to consider drawing adverse inferences can be traced back to the decision of Sachs J in J v J [1955] P 215, in which he stated:

“In cases of this kind, where the duty of disclosure comes to lie on a husband; where a husband has – and his wife has not – detailed knowledge of his complex affairs; where a husband is fully capable of explaining and has had opportunity to explain, those affairs, and where he seeks to minimise the wife's claim, that husband can hardly complain if, when he leaves gaps in the court's knowledge, the court does not draw inferences in his favour. On the contrary, when he leaves a gap in such a state that two alternative inferences may be drawn, the court will normally draw the less favourable inference – especially where it seems likely that his able legal advisers would have hastened to put forward affirmatively any facts, had they existed, establishing the more favourable alternative. The obligation of the husband is to be full, frank and clear in that disclosure. Any shortcomings of the husband from the requisite standard can and normally should be visited at least by the court drawing inferences against the husband on matters the subject of the shortcomings insofar as such inferences can be properly be drawn.”

[35] In the Court of Appeal case of Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, Moylan LJ stated as follows:

[86] My broad conclusions as to the approach the court should take when dealing with non-disclosure are as follows. They are broad because, as I have sought to emphasise, non-disclosure can take a variety of forms and arise in a variety of circumstances from the very general to the very specific. My remarks are focused on the former, namely a broad failure to comply with the disclosure obligations in respect of a party’s financial resources, rather than the latter.

[87] (i) It is clearly appropriate that generally, as required by s 25 of the 1973 Act, the court should seek to determine the extent of the financial resources of the non- disclosing party.

[88] (ii) When undertaking this task the court will, obviously, be entitled to draw such adverse inferences as are justified having regard to the nature and extent of the party’s failure to engage properly with the proceedings. However, this does not require the court to engage in a disproportionate enquiry. Nor, as Lord Sumption said, should the court ‘engage in pure speculation’. As Otton LJ said in Baker v Baker, inferences must be ‘properly drawn and reasonable’. This was reiterated by Lady Hale in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415, [2013] 2 FLR 732, at para [85]:

‘… the court is entitled to draw such inferences as can properly be drawn from all the available material, including what has been disclosed, judicial experience of what is likely to be being concealed and the inherent probabilities, in deciding what the facts are.’

[89] (iii) This does not mean, contrary to Mr Molyneux’s submission, that the court is required to make a specific determination either as to a figure or a bracket. There will be cases where this exercise will not be possible because, the manner in which a party has failed to comply with their disclosure obligations, means that the court is ‘unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources’, to repeat what Wilson LJ said in Behzadi v Behzadi.

[90] (iv) How does this fit within the application of the principles of need and sharing? The answer, in my view, is that, when faced with uncertainty consequent on one party’s non-disclosure and when considering what Lady Hale and Lord Sumption called ‘the inherent probabilities’ the court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome. This is, effectively, what Munby J did in both Al- Khatib v Masry and Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and, in my view, it is a legitimate approach. In that respect I would not endorse what Mostyn J said in NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1211, at para [16](vii).

[91] This approach is both necessary and justified to limit the scope for, what Butler- Sloss LJ accepted could otherwise be, a ‘cheat’s charter’. As Thorpe J said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359, although not the court’s intention, better an order which may be unfair to the non-disclosing party than an order which is unfair to the other party. This does not mean, as Mostyn J said in NG v SG, at para [7], that the court should jump to conclusions as to the extent of the undisclosed wealth simply because of some non-disclosure. It reflects, as he said at para [16](viii), that the court must be astute to ensure that the non- discloser does not obtain a better outcome than that which would have been ordered if they had complied with their disclosure obligations.

[36] In Ditchfield v Ditchfield [2023] EWHC 2303 (Fam), Peel J said at ¶15:

The potential consequences of failure to disclose have been clearly set out in a series of cases summarised in Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482, [2020] Fam 160, [2020] 1 FLR 225. The law is clear. The court is entitled, in the absence of full and frank disclosure, to draw adverse conclusions where appropriate and to the degree of specificity or generality deemed fit. A non-disclosing party cannot complain if the lack of disclosure leads the court to make an order which by necessity is based on less secure foundations than the court would wish; that is the fault of the miscreant party. As Thorpe J (as he then was) said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359, at 367:

‘… if in consequence the obscurity of my final vision results in an order that is unfair to [the husband] it is better that than that I should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the wife.’

[37] In Hersman v De Verchere [2024] EWHC 905 (Fam), Moor J stated, at ¶25:

The second point, however, is that I do not have the benefit of any up to date evidence from the Wife. Mr Amos KC, who again appears on behalf of the Husband, has not had the chance to cross-examine her as to her earlier statement or what has happened since then. I have already made it clear that this is deliberate on her part. She could easily have attended by video link and I am clear that she has the resources to be represented if she wished to instruct a lawyer. In these circumstances, I am entitled to draw adverse inferences against her, but this does not mean I can draw any inference I like. An inference must be properly drawn.”

The law relating to add backs is well known. Following Norris v Norris [2002] EWHC 2996 (Fam) and Vaughan v Vaughan [2007] EWCA Civ 1085, Mostyn J stated in N v F [2011] EWHC 586 (Fam),

“Similarly, where there is ‘clear evidence of dissipation (in which there is an wanton element)’ the dissipated sums can be added back or re-attributed.”

When “penalising” a party by adding back, the court must act with great caution bearing in mind that an add back does not recreate any actual money. It must be applied very cautiously indeed: BJ v MJ (Financial Remedy: Overseas Trusts) [2011] 2708 (Fam) per Mostyn J.

In Evans v Evans [2013] EWHC 506 (Fam) Moylan J (as he then was) stated that there are two aspects to the “add back” exercise, “…an evidential element – is there clear evidence of wanton dissipation – and a legal/discretionary element – would it be inequitable to disregard it or, to put another way, is notional reattribution required in order to achieve an outcome which is fair?”

In A Local Authority v C [2019] EWHC 1782 (Fam) at [18] and [19] Lieven J discussed the status of determinations in a criminal court in the context of issue estoppel. Whilst accepting that a species of issue estoppel might read across into the family court, “The problem in this regard – with a criminal verdict – is that there are no findings of fact and it is not known what matters asserted by the prosecution were accepted by the jury.”

The position is different here in that the sentencing judge has articulated a very particular set of findings about the circumstances of the husband’s Bail Act offence.

Counsel were agreed that it was permissible to rely upon the facts as determined by the sentencing judge, but that it would be impermissible for me to rely upon the sentencing judge's general unfavourable impression of the husband in coming to my own assessment of the husband.

I make plain that I have not cut and pasted the sentencing judge's unfavourable impression of the husband into my own decision making. My unfavourable impression is arrived at by reference to the evidence before me in this family case. However, the specific findings of the sentencing judge, beyond general impressions, are facts which can, and do, stand in these proceedings as well.

There are a number of computational issues to wrangle with.

The wife contends there should be a full 28% reduction for the capital gain made during her period of ownership. The wife arrives at a CGT reduction of £72,587. The husband has not provided a figure, marking his part of the ES2 “tbc”. He makes the argument that the wife has not taken off the period of occupation which is about 10 years. This would benefit from PPR. I have not been furnished with an accurate calculation and so, on a rough and ready basis, I simply reduce the figure to £41,500 to take into account the 10 years’ occupation.

The husband failed to comply with attempts to obtain SJE reports for the UK investment properties. DJ Mulkis gave permission for the wife to rely on desktop valuations obtained by her alone in the event that the husband did not co-operate.

The wife has produced those valuations and they are the ones which I will apply in the asset schedule which shall form part of this judgment. By his failure to comply with orders of this court, the husband has lost the opportunity to advance his case as to valuation in respect of these properties.

The husband has not complied with orders of the court in respect of the valuation of his Country 1 properties.

DJ Mulkis gave permission for the parties to adduce evidence of these properties in the event that the husband did not comply with previous orders for single joint expert evidence.

The wife has produced sales particulars for what she submits is a comparable property to Property 3. She was cross-examined as to whether it truly was a comparable. The husband denied that it was comparable. I did not find his protestations in this regard well made. I accept the evidence of the wife.

The husband produced his own valuation in his replies. He states in evidence that the valuation will have gone down post the Country 1 [ natural disaster ] in 2023. It would be wholly unfair to allow the husband to ambush the wife with this evidence. If he had wanted a joint valuation, it would have been very easy for him to co-operate a long time ago so that these issues, which he now raises, would be dealt with in a procedurally fair manner. I am simply not prepared to allow the husband to do so now. I shall adopt the wife’s figure on my schedule for Property 3.

The wife asserts that there was an offer pre-2020 on Property 2. She submits that this was in the order of €180,000 gross. She submits it is now worth £180,000 gross (the switching of € to £ at this point is intentional). The husband states that it has suffered extensive damage in 2023 and is now only worth £35,000. On the basis of the pre-2020 offer, the wife says that the property would not be worth £35,000 some five years on. If the husband had wanted to advance this point in a procedurally fair manner, he was free to engage with the directions many months ago. I am going to adopt the wife’s figure. I also note that little turns on this as the property is conceded to be non-matrimonial in character in any event.

The figures in the accounts are now agreed. The real issues between the parties in this respect is whether the husband has “warehoused” funds with trusted family members and associates and whether I should also further infer that he has hidden wealth. I shall deal with these issues shortly.

This is not an easy question.

The predecessor company to Company Z, as already stated, was Company X. This was once a successful company which funded the parties’ comfortable lifestyle.

The accounts of Company X to 30 June 2020 show a turnover of £1.7m, with a gross profit of £405,423. Administrative expenses amounted to about £300k. The net profit before tax was £103,856. The previous year, being 30 June 2019, had a gross profit of £561,944 and net profit before tax of £196,076. The last year of accounts I have is to 30 June 2021, which shows a significant drop off in turnover, down to £222,772, with a gross profit of £38,684. Overall, there is a net trading loss of £73,390.

In the questionnaire posed by the wife she asserts a table of profit figures between 2018 and 2023. The accounting period is different to the year-end figure in the accounts. It appears the wife’s table is dealing with gross profit, with “door pay” being a proxy for “subcontractors cost” in the accounts, but without administrative expenses being deducted. These suggest different figures – for periods which include the same calendar year, but which is not the same accounting period as the accounts I have – with gross profit being £698,151 to December 2019, £201,633 to December 2020 and £207,063 to December 2021.

The husband was asked – by reference to the wife’s profit table, said to be taken from Company X “profit summaries” – whether these figures were agreed or, if not, to provide his own stated figures.

The husband’s reply is opaque, “The figures are not agreed. The Respondent’s accountant holds the view that the figures are wrong, and he had not been provided with this information (which appears to be data from an accountancy software package). The company is insolvent.”

No alternative like for like figures are posited. It will be recalled that these answers were supplied on 21 August 2025, leaving no time for challenge or the instruction of a SJE, even if one were to suppose the husband, would have co-operated with any such appointment, if there had been more time.

I have a heavily caveated letter from the husband’s accountant dated 13 March 2025, describing the woes of Company X. Other than the Form E, this is the only document to have been served on the right side of the unless order. It makes plain that the accountants had not been in regular communication with the husband since about 2021, as the husband appeared overwhelmed with his legal case and personal family matters. VAT returns have not been submitted since 1 November 2022.

Also included within his replies are what purports to be a “consolidated” profit and loss and balance sheet for the period 1 July 2021 to 24 January 2024. This profit and loss account on its face appears wilfully misleading, with dividends deducted before arriving at a net profit. I accept Mr Castle’s submission that this is not the place to show dividend drawings. To arrive at a before tax position, I have added back in Corporation Tax and the dividend declarations. This leaves me, on the husband’s figures, with a consolidated net before tax figure of £750,531 over a period of two and half years. It is hard to square these figures with the much-reduced trading accounts to June 2021.

The consolidated balance sheet for the same period arrives at a figure of £482,842 for shareholder funds. This is very hard to make sense of.

The notes also suggest a figure of about £300,000 by way of an IR35 provision allowance.

Standing back, I am being invited to survey a morass of complex data which, it seems to me, is being presented by the husband in a format which is deliberately opaque and hard to follow.

In one sense, it matters not what Company X’s figures say. It has been struck off. But in another sense, a proper understanding would assist me in trying to extrapolate, at a high level and in a general way, what the trading position of Company Z – or at least its potential – might be.

Mr Castle, doing his best to pick through the weeds of all of this, suggests that the Company X consolidated accounts appear to be presented in a way which maximise the profits and therefore the tax liability asserted. The consolidated accounts over a trading period of about two and half years show total business expenses of £568,345. He then contrasts this with the expenses shown on the profit and loss account for Company Z. Between January 2024 and February 2025 the expenses are significantly higher at £1,349,008. This resulted in a negligible profit.

Mr Castle says that Company Z is a reincarnation of Company X, or a “phoenix from the ashes”. The business is not capital intensive, its main business is placing private security. It can be inferred that Company Z will trade with comparable success to Company X in the foreseeable future.

Mr Newman says that, by reason of his conviction, the husband has lost both his good reputation in this sector and also the licence required to conduct such a business. The new business is hamstrung with the damaged reputation resulting in the loss of some key clients, as well as the fact that it is managed by associates of the husband.

Mr Castle simply invites me to remove from the Company Z balance sheet a provision for a liability of £175,444. This is the provision made for potential IR35 liabilities, which Mr Castle says is at present unevidenced. It will be recalled that over the longer trading period in the Company X trading accounts the IR35 provision was asserted at “approx £300,000 plus”. With the £175,444 added back in, this leaves a figure of £179,419 on the balance sheet. Mr Castle then says that £129,182 (£143,535 less notional 10% CGT deduction) should be attributed to the husband’s side of the ES2, reflecting his 80% shareholding in Company Z. He says I should treat this as, in effect, the Net Asset Value of the company.

I canvassed with Mr Castle whether the court had to determine whether the business was a capital asset or an income producing asset. V v V (Financial Relief) [2005] 2 FLR 697 was referenced. Mr Castle submitted that V v V is not apposite here. The husband in that case was an optician. He had to work to earn the income. This contrasts with Company Z, which can run without the husband’s active management, whether by reason of his imprisonment or on release, or by reason of his loss of licence to be active in this sector. The business has its own capital value, says Mr Castle, and a purchaser may well be interested in acquiring its contacts.

This is not straightforward. I am confronted with a dishonest husband who, by his non-compliance with the court timetable, has prevented the court from being able potentially to benefit from an analysis by a SJE which might be considered conventional in a situation like this. The husband compounds his provocations with the presentation of difficult to follow consolidated figures, for which there is a respectable argument to say they have been trimmed to suit his purpose. The difference between the costs of Company X and Company Z are stark.

Mr Castle invites me to adopt what is, in effect, a rough and ready figure to capture a net asset valuation. The husband’s chaotic and opaque presentation should not be successful in denying the wife her due share of the matrimonial assets. Company Z is simply a continuum of Company X which is squarely matrimonial in character.

The wife does not seek spousal periodical payments and seeks to treat the business as having a capital value.

On the other side of the scales, it is not difficult to imagine that the husband’s business will have taken a downturn in light of the reputational damage caused by his conviction and him no longer having a licence to be directly involved. He is also 58 and therefore has a limited number of active years left to try and turn his luck around, albeit with one arm tied behind his back. There may or may not be a looming IR35 problem in this sector. The business would also need some free cash as a reserve to cope with trading fluctuations.

Such is the mess I am confronted with that any figure I am going to alight on is almost necessarily not going to be an accurate one. That this is the case lies in the lap of the husband. This part of the computational exercise appears to the court as having features of an inference exercise rather than a considered valuation determination, although I accept there are elements of both. Inferences must be cautiously approached, but non-compliers must not benefit from their default.

Despite all of the husband’s provocations, I do not consider it fair to ascribe the full £129,182 contended for by the wife. There will need to be some working capital which should not be shared. I am mindful that there might be an IR35 issue but, balanced against that, the burden is on the husband to prove this. The husband cannot just dump a pile of figures on the court and expect them not to be critically reviewed, given the background to this case.

Pulling all of these threads together, and conscious that this is regrettably and inherently a ‘rough and ready’ exercise, I determine that £65,000 is the appropriate figure to place on the ES2 in respect of the husband’s shareable interest in Company Z. Different iterations of this business have been successful. I am reflecting that in this finding, whilst also recognising likely problems given the recent history and the need for cash flow.

I am asked to consider to what extent, if any, sums spent by the husband or transferred to third parties be considered to remain beneficially his (“warehousing”) or, if not, should be notionally re-attributed to him in any event (“add back”)?

This aspect of the computational exercise requires me to review the sums I noted above, which are summarised thus:

This round of argument has been labelled the “add back/warehousing” debate. On the facts of this case, “add back” and “warehousing” are simply different ways of describing the same unacceptable behaviour. They are two sides of the same coin. I make plain that I am not making findings against the third-party associates, who have not appeared before me. It will be for the husband to sort this mess out and to recover the funds from the parties who he has placed his money with.

It follows, by way of executive summary – save for the Recipient 7 monies – that I am going to treat nearly all of these sums as having been warehoused or wantonly dissipated by giving the money to third parties for no apparent good reason, save to hold for him; or to convert funds into cash to make less visible to this court.

This behaviour was, on the balance of probabilities, a combination of planning his permanent, or very long, sojourn in Country 1 and/or with an intention of defeating the wife’s claims for financial remedies. I am very firmly of the view that the court should ensure that these sums are back on the balance sheet so that the wife can have the half share due to her.

Turning to the individual batches of transactions:

In addition to the add back claim, the wife seeks that I infer (a) that the husband has bank accounts that he has not disclosed and (b) that he has a large sum of money squirreled away. I am invited to infer a sum of £750,000.

Mr Newman says that the husband’s finances have been so successfully turned over that the add back claim really undermines the inference claim. He says there is no substantial evidence to point towards the kinds of figures Mr Castle contends for by inference, or at all.

Mr Castle advances his claim in part by referencing the fact that the husband has been dishonest in all kinds of ways in these proceedings. I accept the fact that he has been dishonest, whilst also bearing in mind the Lucas direction. I am not going to rake over all the instances of dishonestly which I have already referred to. I shall mention however, that the husband gave the impression in pre-action correspondence that he intended to comply with the court timetable and disclosure obligations. This was another lie to add to the scoresheet.

Mr Castle tries to advance a case that the husband’s second round of lock changing (after some Imerman documents were sent to his solicitor) demonstrates the absolute determination he had to hide assets. I am not persuaded that I can make that evidential leap. The husband’s behaviour in keeping his wife and children out of their own home is deplorable but in my judgment, is equally consistent with him simply being an unpleasant and controlling individual.

I have carefully taken into account all of the points made by Mr Castle but reference here only the ones which, in my judgment, have weighed most heavily upon me. Just because I have not expressly mentioned something here does not mean that I have not considered it.

In the Tor Currency Exchange, there are payments which amount to about £108,000. It has not been possible to track down a destination account from all the others which have been produced (further to the BBEA orders). The £108,000 has, however, been captured by the add back exercise.

On 2 December 2022, there is a reference in the husband’s Banque Populaire account marked, “Achat Devises Par La Banque”, which I translate in a rough and ready way as meaning “Purchase of foreign currency through the bank”. This shows a credit into the account which amounts to just over £3,000. What does this confirm? As it is a credit into the account it appears to be incoming funds from an account which has not yet been identified.

I note that the husband is in the habit of moving money around and using broking accounts and so it can be difficult to follow the money. Even if this were evidence of another account from which money was advanced in 2022, it amounts to a sum in the order of about £3,000.

There are three additional payments in March 2023 into the husband’s Banque Populaire account. Together they amount to just over £3,000. It has not been possible to identify where these payments have come from. Each entry is marked, roughly translated, “Transfer in your favour”. I simply have no idea where or who they emanate from.

On 11 September 2023, there is a payment into the husband’s Banque Populaire account for a sum which amounts to about £51,000. It is marked (roughly translated), “Transfer received from Deutsche-Bank-AG”. There is a reference number. Given the fact that the Banque Populaire accounts were only disclosed mid-cross-examination of the husband, it has not been possible to chase this reference down. This is a more substantial sum of money to the others I have referenced on the question of inference, but it is a credit and so the money is captured in the balance showing on the ES2.

In 2021 and 2022 there are some payments passing between the husband and Business M. It appears that one payment is about £10,000 to Business M, but there are two payments of £10,000 back in. The husband’s reply in this regard – that the two payments are from a friend who owns a hotel in City N and that the sums were gifts – I find to be a lie. In oral evidence he stated the money was a gift to the girls. This appears to also be a lie.

It seems to me much more likely that there was some kind of commercial transaction going on here. Mr Castle invites me to say that the receipts are a return on an investment and suggests that I assume a 5% return. This is pushing it too far. I must approach any inference with caution and this feels unjustified on this evidence before me.

The husband also said in evidence that his Banque Populaire account increased in value month on month since 2016. The husband produced bank statements from 2021. They do not evidence general increases and so, says Mr Castle, the husband’s oral evidence is inconsistent with the documents. This may be true but, bluntly, the husband has told so many lies I am not sure he can even keep up with himself. But the husband’s undoubted dishonesty is only one part of a complex constellation of issues I must consider, before I could infer that the husband has any significant undisclosed wealth. In my judgment I simply do not have the evidential straw to make the bricks Mr Castle invites me to make.

I am open to the possibility that there may be some stray bank accounts lurking out there. The husband’s finances are complicated and he is dishonest. But I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that I have the evidential foundations that mean I could infer that a significant sum has been put beyond the purview of these proceedings.

There is real force in Mr Newman’s observation that, such is the comprehensive nature of the add back review following two sets of BBEA orders, virtually no stone has been left unturned.

This is mischief by the husband. I reject it out of hand. In brief, the wife has an investment fund in trust which has been the case for many years. This emanates from family wealth (more on this in a moment). The parties’ daughters also have investment accounts, albeit not in trust. The husband seeks to persuade me that as the wife’s account is in trust and relative to the time she has held it – in comparison with her daughters – there must be other money hidden away. First, I cannot make such an evidential leap. I simply do not know the investment history of any of these accounts. Second, save where expressly indicated otherwise, I have found the wife to be a truthful witness. I believe her when she says she does not have any other account.

Company X has been struck off the register. However, it is asserted in the Recipient 7 letter dated 13 March 2025 that HMRC may seek to reinstate the company in order to seek to recoup outstanding VAT and Corporation Tax which amount to sums in the order of £800,000. An additional potential IR35 liability “could exceed £300,000”.

The husband asserts that he has an unpaid director’s loan – money he owes Company X – in the sum of about £1m. He asserts that the wife owes the company in the order of about £250,000 on account of a loan which paid her legal fees. The wife had understood that a significant part, but not all, of her criminal legal defence had been paid by the husband and/or the company and was not in the nature of a loan.

It is difficult to know what to make all of this. I have before me a thoroughly dishonest husband whose only timely disclosure, beyond his purported and variable Form E compliance, was what tends to read like a self-serving letter from his accountant. The husband seeks to say that the £1m director’s loan is a live issue which should be factored into the computational exercise.

I am not prepared to sanction immediate accounting for the husband’s alleged liability. Mr Castle says it is not properly evidenced, and I should simply ignore it. I am not sure that would be fair either. This case will be determined on a sharing basis and the business, then in the guise of Company X, funded the parties’ lives together. It is only fair that a possible liability associated with the creation of wealth should be accounted for in some way.

It seems to me that a reverse contingent lump sum would capture the fairness of this situation. If Company X is in fact reinstated, and HMRC go after the husband for his director’s loan account, then the wife should, in fairness, be required to pay an amount.

The sums likely to be owing, if pursued, are likely to have significant elements of interest and penalties. The interest and penalties sit in the husband’s lap. This is a mess of his creating. I am also mindful that much of the director’s loan account comes about for criminal defence fees from eminent London solicitors. I have in mind the sentencing judge’s apportionment of blame, reflected in the sentencing remarks and outcomes (recorded previously).

A contingent lump sum payable by the wife in the event of HMRC demands in respect of Company X, which cannot be reasonably resisted, should be one third of the HMRC primary liability being settled by the husband capped at £350,000. This is to include loans posted for either the husband or the wife. In any event this should not include any element for interest or penalties, which shall be for the husband alone to settle. It should only be payable in the event that the husband was also meeting the full liability due to HMRC at the same time.

I would like counsel to consider the fine drafting of this to ensure that it is only ever to be payable by the wife on account of a genuine HMRC demand where the husband is also paying his full dues at the same time. The drafting should ensure that any payment to the husband is to a professional acting on his behalf, with no options for further flights of cash or personal absconding to City O, City P or indeed anywhere else.

With this mechanism in place, apportioning the liability – which is said to be largely due to criminal legal defence fees – in a manner which has in mind the sentencing judge’s view of things, I am not inclined to include the debt as part of the computational exercise at this stage. My willingness to order a reverse contingent lump sum comes with a caveat.

There was a debate in the hearing about whether the husband would offer an indemnity to the wife. I am not totally clear to what extent she may have a primary liability for Company X, but she was the company secretary and has a loan recorded against her. The wife would like an indemnity in any event. Not unreasonably, Mr Newman stated that the husband would not offer an indemnity unless he had some comfort by way of a sharing of the liability. Given all the circumstances, I hope that the husband can see that the court has done what it can to be fair to apportion the potential liability, which I find to be largely of the husband’s making. I therefore will require the husband to give an indemnity by way of undertaking, as a condition precedent for the ordering of the reverse contingent lump sum.

If the husband had wanted to assert a serious claim for this liability to be taken into account at this stage, he should have engaged properly with these proceedings and complied with court orders. By his own words and actions, I am in a position where I cannot trust that which he asserts to me.

There are a number of discrete arguments about how the wife’s sharing claim is to be constituted. I deal this those here.

The husband says that Property 1 was the parties’ first matrimonial home. Despite having been acquired by the wife in her name and with her capital and/or finance in the first instance, it has become matrimonialised. The matrimonialisation of the family home is a common occurrence.

I have in mind Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26. I must bear in mind how the parties treated this asset over time and how they intended it be understood as an asset in the marriage.

In evidence, the wife accepted that the husband had been involved in some decoration to the property, both before he formally moved in and after. Whilst she paid the bills in respect of the property from the outset, she also accepted that he later made some contributions. She could not recall how the mortgage was paid and whether the husband informally took this on, as between the parties. She did accept that he was the breadwinner. When they moved out, he did the “landlord stuff” with tenants. Over time, both whilst living in the property and thereafter, the husband replaced items and appliances, as well as fixing water damage in 2020. Mr Newman submits that the global picture amounts to this asset having been matrimonialised.

The wife says that the property ceased to be their matrimonial home in 2010. It is well known that the management of an asset during the course of a marriage, per se, does not necessarily result in matrimonialisation. The parties’ intentions must be scrutinised. The wife says that it would be unfair for this property to be on the balance sheet as part of a sharing claim, but for the husband’s property, Property 2 – which has been conceded to be non-matrimonial in character – to escape the same treatment, even though the properties were each bought by the respective parties at a similar time.

The wife always used the rental income of Property 1 as she pleased, which was paid into an account in her name. It was seen as her money. I am alive to the fact that the treatment of the income from an asset will not be definitive about the status of the underlying asset.

The matrimonialisation of an asset does not have to be an all-or-nothing outcome. In my judgment, upon reviewing all of the evidence in regard to this asset, it is appropriate to say that 30% of Property 1 should be on the balance sheet as having been matrimonialised. This will capture the time the parties used the house as their family home and the other features I have referred to.

As noted above, Property 2 has been conceded not to be matrimonial in nature. I do not consider this an asset.

Property 3 was acquired with matrimonial funds and used by the parties on a regular basis when they visited Country 1. I accept Mr Castle’s submission that it is matrimonial in nature.

Company Z is a continuum of Company X. In my judgment, it is squarely matrimonial at this stage of its evolution.

In his statement, the husband asserts that at least 50% of the sums in the Banque Populaire account were saved prior to the marriage. The present balance is £511,854. This would mean, by reference to his written statement, about £250,000 would be non-matrimonial in nature. He has been unable to evidence this point.

When giving oral evidence, he said that he had about £100,000 in the account prior to cohabitation.

I am afraid that in the absence of supporting evidence and with his own evidence being internally inconsistent, he has failed to discharge the burden of proof on him that he had pre-acquired funds in the account.

These two questions were separately posed on the statement of issues, but it is convenient for me to deal with them together as there are some common features.

The wife has produced a promissory note dated 20 November 2001.

Its operative clause is one sentence stating, “I, RKV, promise to pay on demand the sum of $210,000 (two hundred ten thousand dollars to DD).”

There is a glancing reference in the wife’s LSPO statement to, “clear obligations for Country 2 tax purposes” when referencing the need for the wife to repay a different loan to her brother.

In oral evidence, the wife accepted that there had not been a demand for repayment of the loan to her mother for the last 24 years. The wife accepts that her mother is an extremely wealthy lady. The wife developed her point in oral evidence that there were Country 2 tax laws which meant that her mother would suffer a tax penalty if the loan was not repaid.

In addition to the 2001 loan, the wife’s mother advanced a further sum of £100,000. This is covered off by a more ornate promissory note dated 30 September 2023. It includes provision for interest. It is repayable 30 years from the date of the execution of the document. DD would be comfortably over 100 years old at that point.

I do not have chapter and verse as to how the Country 2 tax provisions works in this regard. It sounded like a set of provisions analogous to the UK IHT provisions on the gifting of capital, but I really am not sure.

It is of note that there has never been a demand for the repayment of the 2001 advance and in 2023 a further advance has been made in any event. It was suggested by Mr Newman that the promissory notes were merely a device to give the appearance of loans which were not going to be called in during the wife’s mother’s lifetime.

I was not fully appraised of how the Country 2 tax provisions would work. I am not suggesting that the wife or DD have necessarily done anything wrong with their creation of these documents. However, on the balance of probabilities, I am not persuaded that the wife is going to have to repay a loan made 24 years ago or, indeed, another which has a contractual repayment date, which, and I mean no disrespect in so saying, is likely to be beyond DD's actuarial life expectancy.

This sum was advanced by the wife’s brother as a crisis payment to the wife, on a short term basis, in order that the wife could keep up with the legal fees of her solicitor. It will be recalled that this case has become somewhat more difficult by reason of the husband’s behaviour. It was essential, in my judgment, that the wife was in a position to keep her solicitor in funds when called upon to do so.

I have at the forefront on my mind the learning of HHJ Hess in P v Q (Family Loans) [2022] EWFC B9. This is now endorsed by Peel J as a formally citable authority, further to paragraph 6 of the Practice Direction on the Citation of Authorities [2001] WLR 1001 and The President’s Practice Direction on the Citation of Authorities: Judgments of Circuit Judges and District Judges) dated 25 February 2025.

Whilst having the P v Q factors in mind, it seems to me that I still retain a discretion as to how I treat this alleged loan. Money alleged to be a loan from a sibling, in the judgment of this court, often stands on a different footing to money from a parent. Will the sibling expect the money back? Is it reasonable for them to expect it back, even if they are not actually going to take their sibling to court to enforce it? In my judgment this family loan should be repayable to the brother.

There is a trust which holds about £640,000 for the wife. The wife derives an income from the fund and will be entitled to the income upon her retirement. This was set up by her wealthy grandparents and advanced sums to several family members.

These monies are non-matrimonial and not subject to any sharing claim. The court does not need to invade them to meet any needs-based claim. They are presently illiquid. They are not relevant to my determination, save that I am mindful, in a general sense, as to how the parties will have respectively fared at the end of this judgment.

Sadly, earlier this year, the wife’s father passed away. The wife is due an inheritance which is presently to be determined exactly, but likely to be in the order of $1.5m to $2.5m. The husband alights on a figure of “at least £1.5m” which is good enough for my purposes.

These monies are non-matrimonial and not subject to any sharing claim. The court does not need to invade them to meet any needs-based claim. They are not relevant to my determination, save that I am mindful, in a general sense, as to how the parties will have respectively fared at the end of this judgment.

This is hard to fathom precisely because of the manner in which the husband has presented his business interests.

The husband has made it impossible for me to make a considered judgment as to his likely gross income. By reason of the husband’s seriously dishonest behaviour, I cannot trust much, if anything, of what he says. He is a dishonest person and he has told the court a pack of lies in order to try and reduce the orders I am going to make. By his non-compliance and apparently self-serving presentation of his business affairs (for which I have previously referenced), I am left floundering for accuracy.

I must therefore reach for inferences, but must do so reasonably and cautiously. The husband should not be able to profit from his failure to provide full and frank disclosure.

The best I can do is to infer that he will not earn less than £60,000 gross per annum. I have in mind historical records, such as they are, and the likelihood that his business will have suffered by reason of his criminal convictions.

I am therefore satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that he will certainly be able to adjust to financial independence without undue hardship.

I have been given a tight textual analysis of the wife’s statements and submissions as to what is said to be relevant or not.

The court does not rummage in the attic of a failed marriage. It is not a court of morals or an arbiter of good of bad behaviour, save where it would be inequitable to disregard, and that it will clearly make a difference to the financial outcome. The wife is the better historian of the parties, but I do not need to rake over all the alleged marital disquiet in a judgment which is already, of necessity, very long.

The key issues for the substantive outcome are the warehousing/add back arguments which I have already dealt with. I therefore do not need to consider ‘conduct’ separately.

The outcome in this case will be on a sharing basis. Neither party can advance a needs-based claim which would be greater than the sharing-based outcome. On a needs-based analysis, the husband will be left with over £1.5m. The exact amount will only be known once costs have been determined (for which see below). He will be able to use this to purchase accommodation for a single person and provide for modest retirement income needs in due course. How he structures this will be a matter for him.

The primary sum which the husband must pay by 4pm on 16 March 2026 to the wife is £1,902,537. This is on account of her claims. I deal with the MPS arrears and children’s claims below.

The mathematics as to how that figure has been constructed is set out in a schedule to this order, which reflects the determinations I have made in this judgment. The schedule is adopted from a helpful summary of the figures supplied by Mr Newman in closing. The £1,902,537 is arrived at on the schedule by a transferring of the FMH and a lump sum of £447,537, resulting in an equal outcome for the parties, based upon the findings and determinations I have made.

Given the history, I have low confidence in the husband’s easy compliance with any order I make.

I understand that the husband would like to retain the family home. He said in evidence that he might try and borrow some money from a friend in City N. That is just not good enough. I cannot see how the husband can reasonably expect to retain the FMH.

I have not dwelt on the parties’ open proposals. The final hearing has been too fluid for them to have kept pace with developments. However, the wife does suggest in her open proposal that the FMH be transferred to her in part payment of her settlement. That simple expedient removes further opportunity for the husband to engage in mischief. He only has himself to blame. If the husband does not sign the relevant documentation, the court will step into his shoes and do it for him.

I am making a final order. I have the power to require the husband to vacate the FMH within 56 days from the date of the handing down of this judgment.

The net value of the FMH is agreed at £1,455,000. This will leave £447,537 to pay by way of a lump sum.

The husband has transferred money to third parties (discussed above) and to his Banque Populaire account. It is not clear to me how straightforward it will be to return/repatriate any of this money. That is the husband’s problem. It is a problem of his own making. There should be orders for sale against two of the husband’s three London buy to let properties, until such time as all of the sums due to the wife have been satisfied. The properties to be marketed for sale shall be at the wife’s election. If the lump sum and costs are not settled by the sale of the two properties, I order the sale of the third. My looking at the figures presently, the equity in the two properties should satisfy the sums due.

I agree with the wife’s proposal that she should have sole conduct of sale, save that the husband’s interests should be protected by a requirement that the wife will reasonably abide by the marketing and sale price of an agent of repute, and that all exchanges shall be shared with the husband. The advice to the agent should be a sale within three months, if possible.

A separate order can be made with permission for it to be disclosed to any estate agent so that they are clear that it is the court’s direction that they are to pay no heed to anything that the husband may communicate to them with regard to the sale, unless endorsed by the wife in writing. It can also record the marketing aim to achieve a sale within three months.

Interest at the judgment rate will accrue in default of payment. But for the husband’s shenanigans, there would be much easier access to liquid capital.

The husband shall deliver up to the wife and/or her agents keys to the FMH and sale properties. The keys to the sale properties shall be delivered up within seven days from the date of this judgment. The keys to the FMH shall be delivered up within 56 days from the date of this judgment. If he fails to do so by the dates I have ordered, the wife shall be at liberty to arrange for the locks to be changed and the husband shall pay the costs of so doing by way of lump sum payment.

The husband shall deliver up the properties in good order. If the husband is shown to have damaged the fabric of a property, he shall pay an additional lump sum equal to the cost of reparations.

The husband shall provide such documents as are necessary for the wife and/or her agents to communicate with the tenants in the sale properties. If the husband fails to do so by within seven days of this judgment, then any additional costs the wife and/or her agents are put to in establishing the position shall be paid by the husband by way of lump sum payment.

In the event that the husband settles the lump sum, all outstanding MPS arrears, the costs order in full, and any lump sums in respect of lock changing and default tenant management, then the order for sale of the buy to let properties can be discharged.

Pending settlement of the primary lump sum and costs liability as well as MPS arrears, MPS shall continue. The court has previously adjudicated this to be payable, despite all of the husband’s complaints. Prompt compliance with the court’s orders will result in the MPS being discharged sooner rather than later.

The husband’s income and capital claims shall be dismissed forthwith. The wife’s claims will be dismissed upon the husband’s compliance with the terms of the order which will reflect this judgment.

The wife seeks on behalf of the children:

The husband offers $1,000 pcm for each child until the conclusion of secondary education or the children respectively attaining the age of 18.

The CMS does not apply as the children live in Country 2.

I must therefore determine quantum, term and capitalisation. I have determined the husband’s gross income to be not less than £60,000 per annum.

Child 1 is 18 and Child 2 is 13. Financial support for children post-18 is something about which different views are taken. In a high value case, such support may go through on the nod. Although, even in the high net worth bracket there are some who consider children may make more of a success of themselves if required to stand on their own two feet.

In cases where there is less income, the position requires more anxious consideration. Some people earning in the order of £60,000 gross per annum would wish to make financial sacrifices to support their children in tertiary education; others will not.

I also have in mind the respective different financial positions the parties will be in at the end of the case. The wife will have access to significant funds which, while not part of the sharing exercise, will be resources at her disposal.

Each daughter has a sizable fund held in their own right, although I was told that the money was not accessible until they are 30. I do not have details on the alleged illiquidity position here. In particular, even if capital is not accessible until 30, I am not clear about income distributions on sizeable investment funds.

I do not need to know the granular answer to all of this. Standing back, the impression I have is that the wife will, at the end of all this, be wealthy and, in any event, she comes from a wealthy family where there has been generous provision made from grandparents and the like.

On the balance of probabilities, the wife does not make out a claim for child support for either child beyond the age of 18.

The online family law resource, AAG Cloud (Class Legal), steers the user away from a James v Seymour style calculation if exigible income is below £156,000. I am not bound to follow the CMS formula, but it is as good a guide as any in this case. Using AAG Cloud, based on £60,000 gross income, the CMS formula for one child produces an income of £8,895 per annum.

I accept that the capitalisation of child maintenance is vanishingly rare. The jurisdiction is not disputed. It is a rare case where the court must contend with dishonesty at this scale. Might the husband abscond to Country 1 again? Might he hide any money he has in other people’s bank accounts? Might he contumaciously fail to comply with court orders? Who knows. But I am left in no doubt whatsoever that if there was ever a case for the capitalisation of child maintenance, it would be this one.

I do not provide any discount for accelerated receipt. A term as short as five years does not demand that treatment. The husband will have included in the capital sums he must pay 5 x £8,895 = £44,475. This sum can be added to the spousal orders made above.

All of the husband’s properties will remain on the market for sale until all sums outlined above, and this one, have been settled.

I have also been invited to make an additional award of £100,000 on account of counselling and tuition provision. It is plain from the social services report that the children have been in receipt of counselling. I have no doubt that the counselling and tuition provision are important staples in the lives of these teenagers.

However, for similar reasons to the tertiary education fees above, I am not going to make further provision. I have no doubt whatsoever that the wife will be able to fund this provision from her own wealth in due course.

Here I outline my suggested approach to costs. The parties will need to calculate the precise figures. If need be, I will have to determine exact amounts in due course.

I apply FPR r.28.3(5) – (7). I am not going to slavishly rake over the individual factors. Overall, the husband’s litigation conduct has been absolutely appalling. It really is at the top end of the scale, even allowing for the miseries he has been through. There can be no question whatsoever that the wife has rebutted the presumption of no order as to costs.

The wife has not won on every point. In particular, she has not succeeded in her argument that I should infer that the husband has hidden wealth of £750,000. I remind myself that it was only on Day Three that the husband, whilst in the witness box, produced his Banque Populaire accounts. He had gone into some detail the previous day as to why it was impossible for him to do so. The husband was astute enough to see the potentially high price he was going to have to pay for non-disclosure and he can count himself lucky that he was given relief from sanctions to produce them. So, Mr Castle and his team had to deal with a case which was literally unfolding in the witness box. I make no criticism for the fact that the inference argument was made in these circumstances. There are some other minor points the wife has not succeeded on, but they really do pale into insignificance when compared to the husband’s scoresheet.

The wife’s costs are £577,468 in total. The modern law reports have numerous examples where excessive costs are criticised. Beyond making some conventional observations about assessment, I do not criticise the scale of these costs, although they are substantial. The wife’s legal team have had a titanic battle on their hands. But for the professionalism of the wife’s legal team, the husband might have got away with gross injustice. The wife has needed lawyers of repute to see this through. It comes at a cost.

My approach is to deduct a notional reasonable amount to get the parties to an FDR appointment. There were enough complexities in this case, even if the husband had been of good behaviour, to justify an FDR. I do not disagree that this would have been in the order of the suggested figure of £160,000 each for a case such as this. If the husband had behaved in a reasonable fashion, the case could have settled on a no order as to costs basis at that point. So, £160,000 will come off the £577,468.

There have been LSPO orders which have assisted the wife fund this litigation. LSPOs are not proxy costs orders. They are for equality of arms. The wife should give credit for 50% of the LSPO funding she has received. I am not totally sure of the pure LSPO amount as DJ Ashworth made an order for £204,239 to get the wife to the FDR. Later DJ Alun Jenkins made a further order of £204,000. However, this latter figure appears to contain an element of “unpaid costs” and I am not sure what this means. It reads as if there is an element in the second order which is covering off unpaid LSPO payments from the first order. This will need refining by the lawyers.

There are some orders which have already been made. I have not reviewed them all. There are apparently some “no order as to costs” orders and some reserved costs orders. The financial impact of the “no order as to costs” orders will have to be accounted for.

So far as reserved costs go, without getting lost in the weeds of interlocutory skirmishing, my preliminary approach will be to say that the husband should pay them all. I have the unique vantage point of the final hearing judge. I can see with clarity how this case has unfolded. There would need to be compelling justifications for the court to take a different approach.

There is a £34,270 difference between the parties’ unpaid costs. The husband’s unpaid costs are £85,451 and the wife’s are £51,181. These are baked into the calculations for the sharing calculation in the schedule to this judgment. From his share of the matrimonial pot, the husband must therefore pay the wife a further £17,135 which will be added to the overall provision I am making. I will leave it to counsel to determine exactly how this is drafted, but my intention is plain. This is in addition to the £1,902,537 above.

I want to spare the parties further litigation which would be necessary with a detailed assessment of costs.

With the final figures calculated, I would approach a summary assessment of costs on the indemnity basis.

Before an indemnity costs order can be made, the losing party’s conduct has to be unreasonable to a high degree such that the case is taken “out of the norm”. I am clear that this case is comfortably within that exceptional category such that indemnity costs are justified. This means that the costs will be assessed on the basis that, where there are doubts as to the reasonableness of the costs, this shall be resolved in favour of the receiving party. The requirement for proportionality is disapplied on the indemnity basis. For what it is worth, I do not accept the husband’s narrative of unreasonable interim applications by the wife in any event. The husband heaped all of this in his own lap. Non-disclosing, non-compliant parties should expect nothing less.

An expensive detailed assessment process could sift through the costs of all of this on a line-by-line basis. It is not uncommon in a family case to see the court apply the “broad brush” and suggest a fixed percentage. Whilst this approach may horrify the costs lawyers, it is expedient in a situation, such as the present, where I doubt anyone has the appetite for yet more litigation.

If the parties can apply my approach above, and then deduct 20% by way of a notional costs assessment, this aspect of the case can be finalised in a simple fashion without further ado.

If further hearings are required to resolve costs, the costs of those proceedings will be a live issue as well.

The questions of publication and anonymity will be considered separately to this judgment.

This judgment was handed down in draft on 20 October 2025. I gave time to allow the parties to comment upon the draft, within the well-understood parameters of such an exercise. The time given accommodated for the fact that the husband’s solicitor was out of the jurisdiction for the week of 20 October 2025 and I required the husband to be taken through the judgment in person by his solicitor. I was asked by Mr Newman for some additional time and I granted some of the requested extension.

I confirm that I intend the freezing/preservation of property order made on 7 February 2024 to be extended until the terms of my order have been complied with. Provision can also be made in the draft order which amends the 7 February 2024 order (as extended) so that the relevant properties can be transferred or sold and that the wife will be entitled to receive the net proceeds up to the amount I have determined the wife should be paid.

I do not accept that by requiring the husband to pay an additional £17,135 on account of the unpaid costs’ differential, I am double counting in favour of the wife. In addition to the costs order I have made, I consider that I am entitled to order this sum of money so far as capital division is concerned. It is an adjustment, in addition to the costs order, to reflect the court’s censure. I have added this to the schedule at the end of the judgment.

I am not persuaded, however, by Mr Castle’s invitation for the court to add back all of the husband’s costs over the notional £160,000 reasonable sum. Of necessity the wife’s costs have been much higher than the husband’s costs. The wife has had to do the running about. Her increased costs are already a feature which has had the effect of reducing the overall post for division and the husband shares in this burden via the sharing exercise. I have made a relatively modest adjustment on account of unpaid costs. I am also making a substantive inter partes costs order. In my judgment that is enough in all the circumstances.

I agree that the deduction of “no order as to costs” orders should relate to the post FDR period only. The pre-FDR costs position is wrapped up in the £160,000 I have notionally allowed to each party.

I agree that my “rough and ready” 20% notional across the board assessment should be on the figure to be paid.

Mr Newman asks me to confirm the “starting point” of my costs order at paragraph [7] and [8] of his clarification submissions. I agree that I start with the wife’s global costs, deduct £160,000 and then 50% of the global LSPO award. The resulting figure is then reduced by 20%. It may be that further refinements are required if there have been post FDR “no order as to costs” orders. I would invite the legal representatives to check this for me and hopefully agree a figure.

Mr Newman reserves the right to make further submissions in respect of my costs’ indication. I accept that by suggesting a blanket approach there is a rough and ready element to the outcome I suggest. The alternative is a further hearing, further expense and further costs’ peril, where all costs issues will be at stake.

I would like the parties to see if they can use the preliminary determinations that I have made to agree a costs figure for insertion into the schedule at the end of this judgment.

I have taken FPR 28.3(7)(f) into account, in respect of the effect of any order I am making. I make plain at paragraph [305] above I have in mind all the relevant factors. At paragraph [270] the ultimate net effect of my orders is also expressly considered in respect of how the husband’s future needs are to be met.

Mr Newman has invited me to re-consider my approach to the transfer of the FMH in some further written submissions.

This is my judgment.

The husband wishes to make further representations about costs. That is his right. I have carefully reflected as to whether I need a further oral hearing in order to provide for this. Upon reflection, I am persuaded by Mr Castle that this can be done on paper alone. I will invite representations on paper and determine costs in a supplementary judgment.