RKV v JWC (No 2)

The substantive judgment in this matter was handed down on 14 November 2025 (“the judgment”). Reference should be made to that alongside this judgment.

Between paragraphs [304] – [318] of the judgment I made some remarks in the hope that everyone would be spared further arguments over costs. That has proved not to be the case.

Both parties’ counsel have filed further written submissions for which they have the court’s thanks. In the stead of trial counsel, Mr Peter Newman, who has other pressing professional commitments, Ms Perican Tahir appears on the question of costs. Ms Tahir has had some previous involvement in this case, in particular, with her appearance before DDJ Hodson KC on 30 July 2024.

I am grateful to Ms Tahir for stepping into the breach.

I agree with Mr Castle that there is no room for re-arguing the findings/determinations at [305] – [307] of the judgment. I also agree with Mr Castle that the husband’s “Misconduct is so complete and multi-faceted that it may be said to fall under each of the r.28(3)(7) (a) (c) (d) and (e).”

I made plain in the judgment and I repeat here that I have r.28(3)(f) firmly in mind.

With those caveats, I approach the question of costs afresh. I had suggested a way forward to spare everyone further costs and litigation. As my provisional indications did not have their desired effect, I am under a duty to reconsider matters afresh.

Having carefully considered all of the excellent submissions made by Ms Tahir, I arrive at the same destination as I did with my provisional indications. My provisional indications should therefore be read into this judgment, albeit now as a formal determination.

Ms Tahir seeks to persuade the court that there should be no order as to costs, or in the alternative that any costs order should only be on a standard basis. It is further submitted that the quantum of the wife’s costs are too high.

This is undoubtedly a case where a costs order should be made. It would be an affront to justice if it were otherwise.

Having carefully considered Ms Tahir’s submissions, I conclude that this is a case for indemnity costs. I accept that conduct must fall outside of the norm and be exceptional before indemnity costs apply. For reasons already given at length, the husband’s litigation conduct has been so appalling and outside of the norm that I am driven to conclude that indemnity costs must apply. It follows that I am not required to determine the proportionality of the wife’s costs, albeit they must still have been reasonably incurred. Any doubts as to whether costs have been reasonably incurred should be resolved in favour of the wife.

Mr Castle has provided the court with a spreadsheet detailing all the costs orders made during the course of this litigation. He seeks costs of £159,558 on the following basis:

Ms Tahir complains about the quantum of costs. I have all of her points in mind. In particular, she submits that the husband has already paid £400,000 pursuant to two LSPO orders. This misses the point that upon a sharing analysis, half of this figure has come from the wife’s notional share in any event. Hence the 50% adjustment above.

Ms Tahir also complains about the hourly rate and attendance costs at the final hearing. The wife chose to instruct a leading central London firm. In my judgment she was perfectly entitled to do so. Reference can be made to [307] of the judgment.

The level of costs of attendance at the final hearing might have been arguable if the costs were being assessed on the standard basis. That is not the case here. Further, there were numerous significant developments during the course of the hearing. It was right and proper that the wife’s solicitors were in attendance. The husband disclosed − in a manner I have already described and made findings about − bank statements whilst he was giving evidence. The husband only secured relief from sanctions after a substantial redaction of his s.25 statement.

Ms Tahir quotes an alleged comment made by DJ Ashworth at a directions hearing that the costs are “eyewatering”. I attach the utmost respect to the views of DJ Ashworth, but I do not know the context in which this alleged observation has been made. I repeat that I have that unique vantage point of the final hearing judge. I have seen how all of this has played out. With my vantage point I can see that the real cause of the level of costs has been the husband’s conduct and unwillingness to abide by orders of the court.

A comparison of costs between sides is invidious. I pay tribute to all that the husband’s team have done for him. He has been excellently represented. The test, however, is not to compare costs. I am looking at what is reasonably incurred on the indemnity basis, given all the circumstances of this case which I have previously outlined.

My provisional approach to costs had been to allow a notional £160,000 for each party up to an FDR. This was on the basis that even if the parties had each been on their “best litigation behaviour”, this was complex and costs would have been incurred to get to a settlement at an FDR. Ms Tahir invokes the “double the costs” from FDR to a final hearing convention, to highlight how far out of the norm she says the wife’s costs are. First, the “double the costs” mantra is not justified by reference to any hard statistics. It is simply a useful shorthand often used by judges to emphasise to parties how costs may increase between First Appointment and FDR and then from FDR to final hearing in what might be described as a “normal” case. I well understand her point, but it would be dangerous for me to apply it without further support in this case. Second, nothing about this case has been in the norm. The husband’s conduct has taken the case out of the norm. Please see [307] of the judgment.

I accept that the wife was not successful in all of her arguments. See [306] of the judgment.

Whilst I am grateful to Ms Tahir for giving me the opportunity to reflect upon matters afresh, the husband must pay £159,558 for the reasons given in the judgment and herein.

I am also invited to consider “the costs of the costs”. Mr Castle has submitted an N260 for £5,562.50.

Mr Castle questions whether the costs application falls within r.23.3(4), but in any event directs me to r.28.3(6) and (7). I would need to hear more argument before I determine this situation falls within the “clean sheet” category.

The judgment provided a road map to seek to resolve the question of costs without the need for further costs and a contested determination. The suggestion that this is not a case for an order for costs fails to reflect what the judgment is saying about the rights and wrongs of this case. Whilst it is the husband’s right to seek a determination, it was itself yet a further unreasonable step on his part, given all of the circumstances. He was given a way to avoid further costs with my preliminary indication. The husband can therefore pay the costs of the costs.

This will be on the standard basis. The husband complains the quantum of costs are excessive. I will allow 70% of the sum claimed, namely £3,893.75.

The total costs payable are therefore £163,451.75.

The complexities and delays in this final hearing, occasioned by the husband’s relief from sanctions application, necessitated a reserved judgment. I do not suggest that the judgment has any precedential value. However, it may serve as an illustration as to what happens when a party to financial remedies litigation seeks to deceive and then refuses to comply with orders of the court. I therefore propose to publish this judgment. My decision to publish is despite the fact that neither party would wish me to do so. The balance comes down in favour of publication.

When judgments are published by a judge sitting in the financial remedies court, it is conventional that they are done so on an anonymised basis. The starting point of anonymity has been the subject of vigorous debate elsewhere and I am not going to delve into that here.

Whatever the correct starting point, it is my judgment that the sensitivities of this case, and in particular the interests of the children, one of whom remains a minor, are such that the balance of Art 8 and Art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights comes down in favour of an anonymised judgment here. I have adopted all redactions suggested by the parties.

This is my judgment.