A Council v The Mother & Ors

This case concerns M who is now aged almost x months.

This case has taken place over two days, as a hybrid hearing via CVP due to the incarceration of the father Mr J. Ms C initially sought the return of M to her care. Mr J supported the mother. The first day was mainly an administrative day with limited court hearing time and negotiations to see if the threshold could be agreed. It was then expected to take a further three days with contested evidence and submissions. During the evening of the first day the court was informed that the mother no longer intended to actively contest the applications of the local authority although she did not consent and sought post adoption contact. Mr J had intended to make submissions only but at the start of the second day, after hearing Ms C’s position, he no longer contested the making of the orders. The threshold was conceded by both parents.

There is a significant level of previous local authority involvement with Ms C and her children; these are the fourth set of care proceedings involving Ms C:

M first became known to the local authority prior to his birth on [a date] 2024 following hospital staff making a referral in respect of him when Ms C was 12 weeks pregnant and in an abusive relationship with her partner, Mr J. Concerns were raised with Ms C missing appointments and further concerns given her past history of social care involvement. Upon referral, Ms C was residing with Mr J in his flat. Ms C did not engage with ante natal care, she did not attend her scans or antenatal appointments. Both social care and police attended to check on Ms C’ welfare on a number of occasions.

M was made subject to Child Protection planning in October 2024 under the category of emotional harm. Ms C made allegations of emotional, sexual and financial abuse from Mr J and alleged that he had been preventing any engagement with social care or attending appointments. There was an ongoing police investigation and Ms C was supported to move to a refuge in October 2024.

The local authority commenced pre-proceedings in January 2025 due to concerns around drug use, domestic abuse, mother’s mental health and chaotic lifestyle.

Care proceedings were issued by the local authority following M’s birth and an Interim Care Order was granted by the Court on 7 March 2025. On 10 March 2025, the Court deemed the criteria for removal was met and M subsequently placed into foster care. Ms C application to be placed in a residential unit was refused by the Court on 10 March 2025.

Ms C resumed her relationship with Mr J and DNA testing confirmed that he is M’s father.

A further ParentAssess (and addendum) assessment was completed and did not recommend that M return to the care of his mother.

On 10 October 2025, the Agency Decision Maker approved a plan of adoption for M. On 13 October 2025 the Local Authority issued an application for a placement Order.

M is currently placed in local authority foster care where he has been since 20 March 2025 and has supervised contact with Ms C up to four times per week. Mr J had been attending some of the contact sessions prior to his conviction and the imposition of a custodial sentence.

The local authority reported that has been a notable change in Ms C’ engagement in contact sessions following Mr J’s custodial sentence being imposed. Since September 2025 there was a repeated pattern of non-attendance, including occasions where Ms C had confirmed her attendance and then cancelled at the last minute.

This is the final hearing and the local authority sought final care order and placement orders for M. Their plan was for indirect contact only post adoption. He is in prison having been convicted of a sexual offence against a child. He pleaded not guilty but was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 33 months imprisonment as well as being registered on the sex offenders for an indefinite period. Despite the conviction he still maintains his innocence. This obviously has a detrimental effect upon his credibility in this matter.

The Guardian supports the position of the LA, in her detailed analysis.

The threshold was ultimately agreed and is as follows:

I will now set out the relevant law. The founding principle is that the child’s welfare is my paramount consideration. Given the issues in the case I am obliged to reflect on this throughout his life and my reference checklist should be section 1(4) Adoption and Children Act 2002.

I am only empowered to make the orders sought if the applicant can establish the crossing of the legal threshold found in Section 31 Children Act 1989 . This requires proof that the child has suffered significant harm or is likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care likely to be given to him if the order is not made. The proof of any matters in dispute is on the balance of probabilities and it is the responsibility of the applicant to prove such matters. In this case, the threshold is conceded and I do have the power to make appropriate orders to protect M.

There is a significant bundle of evidence, I have read the whole bundle. Bearing in mind the President’s guidance in relation to time management, I have tried to keep this judgment relatively short, giving reasons and analysis for my decision without setting out a detailed recital of the evidence (which whilst not all accepted, was uncontested). None of the evidence was actively challenged and I am satisfied that I should find it established and proven to the civil standard and burden of proof.

The crossing of the threshold is no more than a prelude to making the orders sought. It is a step that empowers the Court but does not mandate the making of final care orders. If the threshold is found to be crossed then the Court must carry out a qualitative assessment of the all the evidence. This assessment should reflect the broad canvas of evidence before the Court, I evaluate the evidence as a whole, making clear why more or less weight is to be given to key features relied on by the parties. I have reminded myself that when writing a judgment the task facing a judge is not to pass an examination or to prepare a detailed legal or factual analysis of all the evidence and submissions he has heard - Sir James Munby P in Re F (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 546 para 22.

Ultimately the Court does not expect perfection from parents. Rather it asks whether the parents can provide ‘good enough care’ for the child. This concept is somewhat elastic in covering a range of children with differing needs. It is wrong to think in terms of some children requiring more than good enough parenting. Rather this reflects the fact that an individual child may require parenting with additional attributes and skills – but this will be good enough parenting for that child. The Court must further accept different standards of parenting to include a range of approaches. There is no role for the court to seek to socially engineer family life and it must be willing to tolerate ‘very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent’. Ultimately the Court is restricted to intervening only where significant harm is established, where the welfare of the child supports the outcome and where the outcome reached is a proportionate response to the circumstances found.

One of the central tasks for the Family Court in these cases is the evaluation of risk to the child in the care of the mother or father in the context of the history. A judgment should judgment include a summary and assessment of the evidence of the parents, the allocated social worker and the guardian about the issue of risk.

In considering whether parents can provide good enough care regard must be had to forms of support that might be available or which should be offered and which might fill the perceived deficits in care otherwise arising. This needs to be particularly borne in mind in cases in which a parent is impacted upon by a disability (physical or otherwise) which may impact on parenting but which may be capable of being addressed and ameliorated by appropriate support.

The notion of a proportionality assessment derives from the application of article 8 EHCR. This principle restricts state intervention only where necessary and limits the intervention to only that which is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances found. The impact of these principles is that court must consider whether in the circumstances of the case there might be a different form of intervention that would be less interventionist in the family life of the parties whilst still meeting the identified risks of the case. Plainly it would be disproportionate to intervene beyond the level required to meet the perceived harm. It would also be wrong to consider a plan of placing for adoption simply because it was felt adoptive parents might provide the child with a better standard of life. This would offend against the ‘good enough parenting’ test and the parents right to respect for their private family life.

In this case I am additionally asked to consider the making of a placement order with a plan for adoption. This is the most draconian of plans in severing family life with lifelong implications. This requires a particularly high level of justification which has been encapsulated in the notion that such a decision can only be reached ‘if nothing else will do’. Consequently, the court must identify the realistic options and subject each of them to a full assessment identifying both the positives and the negatives of each option. The options must be further weighed against each other in a holistic fashion to ensure the Court does not reach a ‘last man standing’ conclusion by assessing and rejecting each option in turn and without any cross comparison. The danger is that the final option may be accepted without the robust analysis applied to the earlier options. The notion of nothing else will do is succinctly summarised by Ryder LJ 1 as involving:

“a process of deductive reasoning. It does not require there to be no other realistic option on the table, even less so no other option or that there is only one possible course for the child. It is not a standard of proof. It is a description of the conclusion of a process of deductive reasoning within which there has been a careful consideration of each of the realistic options that are available on the facts so that there is no other comparable option that will meet the best interests of the child”.

There is considerable guidance from the senior courts concerning these decisions, in particular the cases of Re B and Re B-S. These cases confirm that reaffirmed that social workers must show they have explored all viable options and all placements that may become realistic with additional support.

At the end of its assessment the court may be minded to make a placement order which the parents are wholly opposed to. In such circumstances the court can only make the order after having dispensed with their consent to the same, but it can only do so if the welfare of the child requires the court to dispense with such consent.

It is also important to record that any delay in concluding these proceedings is likely to prejudice the welfare of this child/these children.

Included in the evidence was a pre-birth assessment and afterwards an addendum assessment as well as a cognitive assessment of Ms C together with drug and alcohol testing of both parents. The cognitive assessment confirmed that ‘there was no evidence of serious and acute mental illness’ but that Ms C had experienced complex/developmental trauma. She appears to have had a difficult childhood, whereby she was a looked after child herself, resided in foster care, experienced homelessness, and saw her younger siblings being adopted.

Ms C engaged with the ParentAssess assessment. The addendum parenting assessment of Ms C featured Mr J, but he only attended one session and was then sentenced.

Sadly, the parenting assessment dated 22 July 2025, assessing the parents together and separately, concluded with neither of them being unable to care for M together or alone. The local authority and the guardian shared the concerns of the assessor in regard to the parents lack of insight and them being unable to provide safe care for M.

Mr J disputed much of the evidence but conceded that he was unable to care for M and opted to deal with the matter on the basis of submissions rather than actively challenging the evidence. Until the evening of the first day, Ms C intended to challenge the evidence and plans. Her position was that she believed that she has done all that had been asked of her and wished to be further assessed in a family assessment centre. Neither the Independent Social Worker nor the local authority believed this to be a safe option for M, as there remained a number of outstanding needs for Ms C that need to be addressed such as her substance misuse. For example, in the summer Ms C admitted to use of cocaine and cannabis and that she had not disclosed this to either the social worker or the substance misuse service but yet continued to attend the “abstinence sessions”. Ms C also has unresolved needs in respect of her mental health that sadly have not been addressed within this set of proceedings. The Guardian agreed with this analysis.

Ms C missed many scheduled contacts with M. Since September 2025, there had been a repeated pattern of non-attendance, including occasions where she confirmed attendance and cancelled at the last minute. This raised concerns about her lack of insight into the emotional impact on M. She provided multiple and inconsistent reasons for her absences including illness (cold, sickness, back pain) and a claim of having contracted COVID-19. These explanations have not been substantiated and raised concerns about her reliability and transparency. During a contact session on 7 October, Ms C disclosed to the family time worker that she was in a new relationship with a female partner. She inappropriately informed M that he would now have “two mummies.” While Ms C’ is fully entitled to any personal relationship she chooses, the disclosure further highlights the importance of consistent and open communication, especially regarding significant changes in M’s life.

The local authority remained highly concerned about Ms C’ current level of engagement and her overall commitment to M’s wellbeing. Her lack of responsiveness, avoidance of professional contact, and failure to attend scheduled sessions suggested she was not working openly or honestly with professionals involved in M’s care. This pattern of behaviour raised serious questions about Ms C’ ability to prioritise his needs.

Ultimately no formal evidence was called or challenged during the hearing but I did hear from Ms C directly on an informal basis. She spoke very bravely and eloquently and told me that she accepted that she needed to change things, was starting to do so and that she felt that M would be at risk with her due to the father’s behaviour. She asked me to let her see M after the adoption.

Section 1(1) Children Act provides that when the court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child, the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration. In determining what is in a child’s best welfare interests the court must have regard to each of the factors set out in the welfare checklist in s.1(3) CA and in s.1(4) ACA. I have had such regard throughout this judgment. I have read and agree with the respective analyses of the social worker and the guardian in relation to the welfare checklist and child impact analysis.

In accordance with Re B I now turn to a consideration of the options available to me. I approach the Local Authority’s applications on the basis that the best place for any child is within his family of origin unless there are clear welfare grounds to prefer an alternative. My task is to consider whether M could be cared for by a member of his family to a satisfactory standard within an appropriate timescale, not whether he might be “better off” being adopted.

The local authority does not seek for M to be placed in long term foster care. Their plan for him is adoption. The Guardian supports this position. It is usually not an appropriate option for a young healthy baby.

There is no evidence to support the propositions of the parents that Ms C is able to care for M at home, whether under a care order or any other order.

The Local Authority has, in their evidence and threshold document, set out the risks and concerns they have for M. There is a history of Children’s Services involvement with Ms C dating back over 8 years, with three previous sets of proceedings and none of her children have remained in her care. There were concerns around drug misuse, domestic abuse issues, homelessness, dishonesty and minimisation of concerns, bail breaches, lack of engagement with professionals and mental health issues. Ms C maintained her relationship with Mr J despite his conviction although they are now no longer in a relationship.

Ms C’ vulnerabilities have been displayed within these proceedings. For example, at the start of these proceedings, Ms C initially shared that she was in a relationship with a celebrity from a television show and the local authority were concerned that she was potentially being financially exploited online. Additionally, in December 2024, the maternity ward considered Ms C to have had a psychotic mental health episode during her pregnancy. Poor parental mental health can negatively impact children’s development, particularly around their emotional and behavioural patterns. Children being exposed to poor parental mental health can increase the risk of neglect.

Ms C drug use continues, she does not appear to accept that this poses any risk to herself or to M. Ms C continued to suggest that Mr J was wrongly convicted for the sexual offence and she retracted previous reports of domestic abuse against Mr J. She appears to wholly lack insight into risk. She claims that she has not attended contact due to lack of financial support from the local authority but that is contradicted by the evidence of the local authority that she has made various different excuses for not attending, including at short notice.

If M were to return home to his mother’s care, he would need to remain on a care order with a very detailed protection plan and remain visible to services to ensure he was safe. Ms C would need to fully engage with agencies and support services to address her own issues and this would require complete honesty and openness. Sadly this has been missing throughout. Her attitude needs to change. On the basis of Ms C failure to engage with services and often the social worker, guardian and contact during these proceedings and to effect change despite significant encouragement, I, like the Guardian and the social worker, do not have confidence that she would work with agencies to ensure M was kept safe.

Both parents appear to lack insight into the impact of their behaviour. Ms C has had almost 9 months during proceedings to make changes, and time before that prior to M’s birth. Sadly she has not done so, and the evidence is that there is little if any change since the previous care proceedings concluded with final care orders and adoption. There is no evidence of any ability to change or to sustain changes. The Guardian has struggled to engage with Ms C. In my judgment there is no evidence that Ms C has been sufficiently motivated and capable of making meaningful lifestyle changes for the benefit of M at this time and although she appears to accept that some things need to change, it is too little and too late for M. Delay would not be in his best interests.

Whilst there are gaps in terms of Mr J’s assessed insight into the identified risks, his conviction for sexual offences against children is significant and is evidence of harm before the Court. He is considered to pose a high risk to children, which includes M. There also remains concern surrounding drug use and potential domestic abuse in respect of Mr J. These are fully unassessed risks, I agree with the local authority and Guardian that I could not support M being placed in his father’s care even upon his release from prison.

The realistic or possible placement options for M are placement with his mother, under a care order if necessary, placement in long term foster care or adoption.

The Local Authority have assessed the mother as being unable to provide safely for M. Both parents have been assessed as unable to provide safe, consistent care due to unresolved trauma, substance misuse, and denial of risk. The risk to him of being placed in the care of his mother is simply too high. There is no effective support which could be put in place which would protect him, overcome the risks posed by these parents. I am entirely satisfied that the evidence does not support placement with the mother and that the local authority and Guardian have evidenced that I must rule out that option. Given M’s age, there are seemingly few difficulties which would complicate the process and prevent his early placement. Mr J does not put himself forward to care and his incarceration makes this impossible in any event. The local authority’s analysis is accepted and supported by the Guardian. I accept and concur with the analyses of both the local authority and the guardian

I must rule out rehabilitation to the mother or father. The risks are simply too high. This is a sad case and I do this with a heavy heart as I do not consider that Ms C would deliberately harm M and I know that she truly loves him.

Other relatives, including paternal and maternal family members, declined to be assessed or were deemed unsuitable. Mr J put forward his sister, sister’s partner and his ex-partner as alternative carers for M, all of which were contacted and confirmed they did not wish to be assessed as carers for M. There are no relatives who can care for M.

Long-term fostering could be an option for M, however when compared to adoption, this would subject M to a more intrusive level of local authority involvement, possibly until he has reached adulthood and beyond as a care leaver. In addition, a foster placement could expose him to a risk of placement moves as he grows older and is therefore not the preferred option. There is a wealth of research on both long term foster care outcomes and on adoption. Neither is without the risk of breakdown, but there are far fewer changes for most adopted children. Sadly, long term foster care can and often does lead to multiple changes of placement, more criminality and worse educational outcomes. Accordingly I must rule out long term foster care as an option for M

That therefore leaves me with only the option of Adoption for M. Although there are of course negatives of adoption including ceasing all contact with his natural family and this affecting his identity, there are more positives. These include him ceasing to be a looked after child subject to corporate parenting, being placed with carers who have effectively chosen him and will care for him throughout not only his childhood but also the rest of his life and the possibility of having his own new family and family unit. This is the only option that offers M the option of secure and safe family life according to both the local authority and the guardian and I accept that assessment.

I have considered all of the options in accordance with Re B and B-S. The best place for any child is within a child’s birth family unless there are clear welfare grounds to prefer an alternative. I have considered the detailed analysis of the options, by both the LA and the Guardian. I endorse their recommendations and accept their analysis. The fact is that there are occasions when nothing else but adoption will do and it is essential in such cases that a child’s welfare should not be compromised by keeping them in their family at all costs.

In my assessment the combination of welfare and holistic analysis points firmly in favour of a care and placement order. I recognise this brings with it significant negatives but it is the only option which at this time on the evidence available can provide M with the security and permanence his welfare demands. Sadly, other options will simply not meet his welfare needs.

The plan is for only indirect contact post adoption, twice yearly. This is similar to the previous plans for M’s half siblings. Ms C seeks direct contact post adoption and sought the making of an order for this. It is open to the future adopters to consider direct contact with the parents if they choose to do so and I am happy for this judgment and the court order to reflect the positions of Ms C and Mr J that they would like to have some direct contact. Contact with his mother has been a pleasant experience for M and he has benefited from it. There are well understood potential benefits that can flow from open adoption. In particular this can help to address the issues as to emotional baggage. Long gone are the days when children were raised not knowing they are adopted. M will need to come to understand this feature of his life. An ongoing limited direct relationship with his mother may help embed him into his adoptive placement. In any event I would promote the idea of a meeting between the adopters and the mother. This will allow the adopters the opportunity to satisfy themselves as to any residual doubts.

Although the court has the power to make orders or give strong indications in these cases, this is not in my judgment a case where an order is appropriate. Legally this issue will be substantially determined by prospective adopters in due course. The Guardian agrees with the plans of the local authority and does not support the making of any contact order. She and the local authority agree that a suitable recital should be recorded on the final orders. The lack of commitment to contact by the mother, the father’s sexual abuse conviction and the many other issues in this matter together with parental instability makes the risk of any direct contact too great in this matter at this time. The reduction plan to 6 weekly contact for Ms C until placement is approved as is the option of Mr J writing at the same frequency. I agree that there should be a suitable recital setting out Ms C’ commitment and request for contact

There are obvious benefits in establishing a level of contact between M and his siblings. This will be a matter for the sets of adopters but it would bring very important welfare benefits. The precise details for proposed sibling contact will be addressed in the final plans for any adoption and it is understood that the adoptive parents of M’s siblings are open to the possibility of some direct contact in the future,

Upon considering the evidence before me, I have undertaken a balancing exercise of all the permanence options available for M. I have also considered case law and accept that as a society, we must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including barely adequate and inconsistent care. I have also considered Re B (A Child), which reminds us that it is in a child’s best interests to be brought up by their parents or wider family, unless the overriding requirements of the child’s welfare makes that not possible. I fully accept and endorse the comments of Black LJ in Re V. M’s immediate needs are for stability, security and permanence. In my judgment this can only be achieved by way of adoption and his welfare requires this, and accordingly I dispense with the consent of his mother and father. I accept that this interferes with the rights of M and his parents to a family life together but in my judgment the making of such an order and the interference are proportionate given that there is no alternative which would meet his needs.

I make a final care order. I make a placement order, having dispensed with the consent of the parents.

If, in later life M ever comes to read this judgment, I hope that he will appreciate that his parents loved him and wished to bring him up.