MI v RI (Unreasonable Litigation Conduct)

This is an application for financial remedies in which MI is the applicant who has been represented by Ms Rothwell of counsel and instructed by Mr Thom from Maddox Legal Solicitors. The respondent is RI, who has appeared before me as a litigant in person. However, she has not been representing herself throughout these proceedings and for the vast majority of the proceedings she has been represented and, as will be referred to later, she has had no less than 13 different sets of legal organisations to represent her and indeed three other possibles who have been paid. I have heard this matter over the last 3 days and give this judgment on the final day of the hearing.

In addition although the respondent, would say it is only six firms of solicitors, the reality is that the respondent has spent in the region of £200,000 on legal representation and the form H for the applicant sets out his costs at £157,000, so over £350,000 has been spent. Depending on the views of the parties as to the assets that is a disproportionate figure and the main issue is what are the assets?

The parties commenced cohabitation in December 2003 and married in February 2007. There is no agreement between the parties as to when they separated, with the applicant stating it was March 2020 and the respondent saying it was November 2022. I have heard no evidence on that issue as to which date was the correct date, but I do not need to do that. It would make no difference to the decision that I reached as to whether this was a 17-year relationship from date of cohabitation to separation as suggested by the applicant , or a 19-year relationship as put forward by the respondent. Therefore, we did not need to use any time considering that matter. The reality is this was a long marriage.

The parties have one child, Y, who has just turned 18. She is a boarder at a prestigious school in the South-East of England, and she is just about to sit her A-levels this summer. It appears that she did not do well in her mock exams in January, and it may well be that she seeks to take a gap year before attending university. There was some discussion of her attending university in the USA, but it appears now she will be attending a university, if she gets the grades, in the UK. When Y is not at school she spends her time with, in general, with the respondent and at present she is not seeing the applicant, although clearly she has done so in the past. She is certainly in communication with him because he referred to a text he received from her very recently about an offer from a university in Central London.

The divorce petition is dated November 2022 and decree nisi was pronounced in April 2023. The final order has not yet been granted.

The Applicant is aged 52. He had a serious illness approximately 15 years ago when he suffered from cancer, but he has continued to work in what must be a highly pressured atmosphere. He is an actuary, where he manages a team of fund managers in relation to defined benefit pension schemes.

The applicant points out that it is unusual in his business for people to work much beyond the age of 60, bearing in mind the high pressure, stress and long working hours. His gross income was just in excess of £400,000, including his discretionary bonuses in 2024 and similar figures have been shown to be earned in previous years. The net monthly figure that he receives is in excess of £9,000 and he receives his annual bonuses in March of any given year, and the deferred bonus is paid three years later in the May of that year, so as long as he is still working for the same employer as at that date. The net figure for his earnings in the last tax year was in the region of £225,000, which averages out to over £18,000 per month net.

The Respondent is age 50 and she has been the main carer of Y since she was born in 2007. Before that and before the parties met, she owned her own hair salon, but she has not been in gainful employment since the child was born, save for a very short period after the parties separated. She states that she has had health issues, but no medical evidence whatsoever has been provided to support that point. The respondent divides her time between the former matrimonial home in Surrey and a flat which has been purchased in her name recently in Central London . Y spends her holiday time in the main in Surrey with the respondent.

The assets are set out as is usual in the ES2 form and I have got that in full form. The respondent did not contribute towards anything on that form. Partly, I suspect, because she was not represented but she does not agree with what is set out in the ES2. She says there are many, many more assets. However, looking at what is on the ES2, the schedule of assets, there is the former matrimonial home with equity of £1.19m, gross value £1.9million. There is a mortgage of £732,000. There is the flat in Central London in the respondent’s name, which is valued at £535,000 and after cost of sale, the net equity would be £522,000.

The applicant owns four rental properties: one in London, one in Hampshire, one in the East Midlands and one in the North of England. It is fair to say they are not doing well in terms of their costs because the cost of the mortgage exceeds the rent, so it is running at a loss and the net equity, according to the estate agent’s figures as provided for all four properties is in the region of £30,000. Clearly, that is not a good investment, and it is accepted by the applicant that they will have to be sold.

The respondent does not accept the figures as set out. However, the reduction in the value in relation to two of the properties relates to cladding issues and clearly, I am well aware of the impact that cladding issues can have on the value of properties.

On top of that in summary form, the applicant has about £16,000 in accounts. It is stated within the ES2 that the respondent has £162,000. The applicant has a further £7,600 of investments and it is stated that the respondent has £50,000 in investments. Then under “Others”, which effectively is the applicant’s future discretionary bonuses, which is £96,000. On top of that there is the one that has just received and declared but, clearly, those are all future payments, save for the next one of May this year comes out, that is a further £28,000, so almost certain that will be received.

In terms of liabilities, the applicant has set out £81,000 and in the schedule it is £17,000 for the respondent. Therefore, the total comes to a figure of almost something over £2million but that includes the pension, which is £818,000 in the applicant’s sole name. He has got three pensions, two with his current employer and one with his former employer, and so the total of the assets is just over £2million it is said within that schedule.

In terms of the open positions, it is vital, in financial remedy proceedings for each party to make open offers to the other in an effort to achieve an agreement. It is extraordinary, therefore, that there is no offer whatsoever from the respondent. I pushed her at the commencement of this hearing, bearing in mind these proceedings have been going on for over two years, she has spent £200,000 on lawyers, trying to find out what she would accept. She indicated that she would possibly accept a figure of £5million, but no further details were provided.

When the respondent was providing her closing submissions, I prompted her with a number of questions that I wrote down for her to consider to focus her mind on the issues at hand and she alighted upon a position whereby she would accept that the former matrimonial home should be transferred into her name. She should retain the flat in Central London and the applicant should discharge the mortgage on the Surrey property. As I say, that is in excess of £700,000. She did not believe that the applicant would pay regular maintenance and in lieu of regular maintenance she would accept a figure, a lump sum, in the region of £1million on a clean break basis. The totality of that award would, therefore, be in the region of £3.5million.

The offer put forward by the applicant is one whereby the properties would be sold, save for the Central London flat, and that the respondent would retain the Central London flat and £284,000 from the sale of the former matrimonial home. On top of that, it is said she could keep her other assets, which amounted to £323,000, according to the offer letter but that includes a £100,000 of add back figures from the cost that she has incurred. Clearly, that is not money that she has in her hand so when it says that this provides her with a figure of £1.1 million, that is not the true figure. It would be closer to £1million, assuming that she had all of the assets as set out there.

On top of that, there would be periodical payments of £25,000 per annum every year until the applicant is aged 60 and child periodical payments of just over a £1,000 per month, £13,000 per annum, until the end of university, save for any gap year. The pension share that was offered by the applicant by his open offer was one whereby the contributions would only be considered as to the contributions made during the marriage. I raised that as a totally unrealistic position and not in line with either the authorities or PAG2 report. It was accepted that the correct approach would be on a needs basis, taking into account all of the contributions made to those pensions. Therefore, the difference between the parties, in reality, is a difference as to what are the assets.

In terms of the law to be considered, it has almost become obligatory within financial remedy judgments to set out in full the approach set out by Peel J in WC v HC [2022] EWFC 22. I accept entirely it is difficult to improve on his exposition of the law, but it does not seem to be necessary to set it out in full in each and every case.

In short, in relation to this case, the following points are important. First of all, any judgment is a two-stage exercise of computation, which means trying to work out what the assets are, and then distribution, which means how they should be shared between the parties. Secondly, it must be the aim of the Court to achieve an outcome which is as fair as possible in all the circumstances. Thirdly, the Court must consider all of the factors set out within section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, and I shall go through those. Fourthly, in the vast majority of cases, the Court will have to consider the needs of the parties and how they can be met, and that is certainly the case here.

Fifth, the parties are ordinarily entitled to an equal division of the matrimonial assets, and where the needs require it, the non-matrimonial assets must be taken into account. Sixthly, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage must be considered, but it is not an immutable guide to the outcome. Finally, there are cases in which the conduct of the parties must be considered, and in this case it is stated by the applicant that the financial litigation conduct of the respondent should be factored into any overall decision.

The central issue in this case, in terms of what is the dispute between the parties, is as to what is the true level of the assets. It is the respondent’s extraordinarily strongly held belief that the applicant has failed to disclose appropriate documents and has hidden vast sums of monies overseas in investments and in properties. She states that she is unable to quantify these investments with any precision as she is simply kept in the dark as to their true value. She fairly states that it would be inappropriate for her to be able to put a figure on these sums, but it would not surprise her if it was in the region of £10million.

As I have said, she has represented herself throughout this hearing, although she has had the benefit of legal advice for the vast majority of these proceedings, albeit by many different lawyers at different times. The approach of the respondent within this hearing has not always been easy to follow. I accept she is in a very difficult position. Her English is far from perfect, although I am satisfied that her position has been fully understood and she was able to understand the arguments and the evidence as put forward by the applicant.

Further, as she points out, the applicant is a qualified actuary who has full understanding of the financial position and was in charge of the finances when the parties were together. He is represented by an able legal team, and it is not an equal fight, as it were, at this stage.

The respondent has repeatedly sought for further disclosure, which has not been ordered and as recently as February 2025, she made an application before me for a forensic accountant to be appointed. I am satisfied that that was an application to carry out what lawyers would call a fishing exercise. That application was refused with costs.

The cross-examination of the applicant by the respondent was at best rambling. The reality is that the respondent found it very hard to ask any questions, but rather simply make very long statements upon which occasionally the applicant was able to respond. There is no doubt that the respondent was excitable, speaking extraordinarily quickly and is highly suspicious of any document that has been produced by the applicant. As such, it was difficult to follow all of her points as they were simply not based on any factual basis but mere suspicion. Having said that, I did not consider that she was deliberately dishonest but rather had a misconception as to the real position.

The applicant is clearly an individual who fully understands finance and had a strong grasp of the details of the case in terms of the numbers. He had produced himself some very impressive documents to support his points and had gone to great lengths to provide the disclosure that was sought by the respondent and which had been ordered by the Court. As with the respondent, I am satisfied that the applicant was a truthful witness.

Therefore, looking at the computation, what are the assets? It is a central plank of the respondent’s case that the applicant has failed to disclose a very significant amount of assets. There have been many applications by the applicant for there to be further disclosure as she is adamant that he has various accounts and is the owner of substantial investments and possibly properties overseas. As an example, she refers to a sum of £400,000 being in an account numbered 441 in 2008. No supporting document was ever provided in relation to this, and that is not an isolated instance, but there are other accounts, it is said, which the respondent is adamant contain substantial sums of money, which the applicant has simply failed to explain.

The applicant states that he has complied with all orders in relation to disclosure. I am satisfied that that is correct. It has got to be understood that cases of this nature are controlled by the judges, and it is important that judges only permit, only allow disclosure to be ordered, which is required to reach a fair conclusion. The normal parameters are those set out within the form E, which requires 12 months’ worth of bank statements and up to three years for proof of income.

The respondent is extraordinarily frustrated that there has not been further disclosure ordered and that she is completely convinced that the Court could not possibly reach a fair conclusion without disclosing many, many, many more documents than has occurred. I made the decision to permit the respondent to ask questions about all of the issues that she considers remain disputed due to the fact that it is the central point in her case, even though disclosure had not been permitted in relation to many of the issues that she raised.

As an example, the £400,000 that was referred to by the respondent, the applicant says he could not recall any such figure. This is going back to 2008. However, what he did say was that they purchased the property in Hampshire in 2008. There was a mortgage in the region of £440,000 on that property. He wondered whether that might be the figure that the respondent was referring to. He further added that if he did have an extra £400,000 at that stage, he would have put it towards the property rather than obtain an expensive mortgage. I was fully satisfied with the applicant’s explanation in relation to that.

I am not going to go through every single issue of disclosure about which the respondent has complained, but I will consider two other issues just to give an example of what has happened. The first relates to the applicant’s income. One of the regular points raised by the respondent is that the applicant has failed to provide appropriate evidence as to the true level of his income. She has made frequent and repeated statements to say that he has failed to provide his P60s and his tax return, no evidence of bonus payments has been made, and he failed to provide his employment contract.

On that basis, it is her case that the Court cannot be satisfied as to the true level of the applicant’s income. It is very easy to make such statements, and at all times the respondent has repeated the mantra that she has evidence for everything that she says, and the applicant does not. In relation to his income that is certainly not the case.

The applicant has provided a huge amount of documentation in relation to his income. Let me set that out. He has provided P60s for the years ending 2022, 2023 and 2024. These were provided within the disclosure; I am satisfied of that. The respondent states she has never seen them. I simply do not accept her evidence on that. Further, when she was shown the P60 for 2024 on Ms Rothwell’s, counsel for the applicant, laptop during the hearing because she said she had never seen it, she saw the document, and she scoffed that it is clearly not genuine.

In the top left corner, as is always the case with a P60, it has in large words that it referred to the tax year up to 5 April 2024. Right at the bottom of the document, which is clearly not part of the part that was filled in by anyone else but part of the printed document, it says the following in blue writing “P60 (single sheet)(2023 to 2024)”. That is on the left side. In the middle, it says, “Do not destroy” and on the right side, it says, “P60 (substitute 2022 to 2023)”.

What the respondent says is that that clearly shows that this was a fake because it refers to 2022, 2023 and 2024. That is a complete and utter nonsense. It is 100% clear that this is a document that was printed no doubt for further use in 2022, 2023, just as many court documents still have the year they were produced, but it relates to the income that he received in 2024. The same is true when one looks at the 2023 P60 and it has exactly the same wording at the bottom. Therefore, presumably, the Respondent would not believe that one and if you look at the 2022 one, it then says refers to 2021, 2022.

It is incredibly clear that these are correct and appropriate P60s. They are produced by the applicant’s employer. It frankly beggars’ belief to imagine that an organisation such as that would enter into a conspiracy with the applicant in order to create any fraud to put before this Court. It is simply a nonsense. Therefore, that is the first thing he has produced, P60s, which in the vast majority of cases would be all that was ever produced apart from some payslips.

However, we also have the bank statements from him from 2019 onwards for March and May of each of the years. Why March and May? Because that is when the initial bonus payment is made and the deferred bonus payment is made? He has set those out and I have seen those. The applicant has seen those. Thirdly, he has provided documents from his employer, which set out the share bonuses that he has received from 2015 onwards. That is 10 years ago. Thirdly, there is confirmation documentation from his employer, which relate to each year’s bonus payment on a gross and net basis from 2019 onwards.

His original employment contract when he first joined the organisation has been produced. The respondent was outraged that he has not provided an updated employment contract. I do these cases every day. I simply cannot remember ever having seen such a document. Why the respondent thinks it is important is beyond me. What is important is what is his income.

We have also received his tax returns for the last three years, which include not only his employed income but also the dividends and the rental income that he has been receiving. The respondent again said, well, how could that be, what is in the tax return, be a different number to that which is in his P60? It is because it includes all his income not just his earned income. A complaint is made that the tax returns do not all include the tax calculation or computation. That is simply not important. We have got all the information.

Therefore, as I said within the hearing that is a far, far greater level of disclosure in relation to an individual’s income than would normally be the case. I accept that in cases involving a self-employed individual or one who works through their own limited company, there is a need for significant forensic examination to ensure that accurate figures have been provided. However, when we were dealing with an individual in the applicant’s position, employed by a blue-chip company, then it is difficult to see why it is necessary for him to jump through quite so many hoops. It is simply indicative of the suspicion of the respondent and the work that the applicant and his lawyers had to go through in an attempt to satisfy her suspicions. It is wholly disproportionate. I am completely satisfied that the applicant has disclosed his income fully and accurately.

A second example is the mortgage trail. The former matrimonial home in Surrey was remortgaged to the tune of £490,000 in 2020. The respondent is concerned that these monies have not been accounted for and, in some way, the applicant has benefited from these monies. Indeed, during the evidence the respondent seemed to be suggesting that the applicant had deliberately suppressed the net value of the matrimonial home for his own purposes. Again, this has been a theme that has been constantly raised by the respondent, and it is as ever her position that the applicant, has failed to give an appropriate explanation in relation to this. This is simply not true.

In her 75 questions worth of questionnaire, filed in October 2023, which perhaps rather surprisingly was approved by the Court, she raised the following question. “Where did the additional capital that was raised, deposited, and how have they been utilised with documentary evidence in support?” The applicant responded in table form setting out precisely what sums were raised, when, and the destination of those sums.

As an example, there was a £200,000 mortgage taken out in May 2020, which he states was deposited in the respondent’s NS&I account and dates provided and then transferred to a separate account and then returned in November 2020, before £50,000 was removed at Coventry Building Society before it all being returned to an account in the respondent’s name in June 2021. It was then used to purchase the flat in Central London as part of the £571,000 required to purchase the flat. All of the bank accounts are provided.

He set out all the other payments as well, which I do not intend to go through: the destination of those sums, which are all set out in great detail; precise amounts transferred; the dates of the transfer; the account numbers and the sort codes of each account into which the monies were paid. Again, I am fully satisfied that the explanation provided by the Applicant is as complete as it can be, and again, it beggars belief that the respondent, together with all of her legal advisers, cannot be satisfied with the disclosure in relation to that issue that has been made.

They are simply two examples of the respondent’s obsession with there being further non-disclosed assets. Therefore, the question I must ask myself is, are there any hidden assets? It is always difficult to prove any assets which a party has simply failed to disclose. I also accept in this case that the applicant is a man who understands the sophistications of the financial world. He would clearly have an understanding of how he could hide any assets. He also has a substantial income which would support an ability to invest in other assets. There is no documentary evidence at all that has been provided by the respondent to justify a finding that there are any other assets available.

In considering what to look for, in the case of Crowther v Crowther & Ors (Financial Remedies) [2021] EWFC 88, Peel J at paragraph 58 made the following observations regarding the options to find non-disclosure. He said:

“Usually, in my view, the evidential platform for a finding of non-disclosure is established by one or more of the following:

i)

Direct evidence of an asset which the alleged non-discloser has not revealed (the classic example being the revelation of the existence of a bank account or accounts which feature nowhere in his/her financial presentation, and holding large sums of money);

ii)

Failure to comply with court orders and/or provide adequate or complete responses to questions asked, from which failure the court feels able to draw inferences adverse to the alleged non-discloser;

iii)

Evidence of a lifestyle which is wholly inconsistent with disclosed financial resources”.

In this case, none of those apply. The respondent has not been able to point to a single piece of direct evidence relating to another asset. Many of the documents she is referring to are very, very old, 2008, she was talking about; 2011, we have seen lots of payments where she says there is money in an account. Clearly, there was, but that does not mean it is still there. The parties were living together. She would have heard or found or seen a document or something relating to another asset if it was there. As I say, the occasional bank statement has been provided, but just because there was a particular sum in an account at a particular date proves no forensic support for an allegation that there are any assets in a family which has, by any account, had access to substantial assets over the years.

I am satisfied that the applicant has complied with all orders in relation to disclosure and has done his best to answer in full the very extensive questionnaire which was approved by the court back in 2023. Further, it is his case that he is back living with his parents as a 52-year-old earning in excess of £400,000. That is hardly supportive of a lifestyle which is inconsistent with the disclosed financial resources because it is far less than any other person in his position would be living.

Therefore, looking at all of that, I simply cannot find any evidence at all to prove that there are any further assets. It follows that I am satisfied that, due to that lack of evidence, there is no finding that this Court could make that there are any other substantial assets.

This will undoubtedly be a huge disappointment for the respondent who is totally convinced that that is the case. In part, I can understand the basis upon which she states that. It is clear that when the parties were first separating, the applicant made substantial offers to the respondent. She has said that he indicated she would receive £5million. I do not know if that is what he said. However, she also stated that he would pay her £136,000 per annum and somewhat reluctantly the applicant agreed in his oral evidence that that is something that he did in fact say.

That does not mean for a moment that such a sum would be a reasonable figure for him to pay, but it is indicative of the types of conversation that were had between the parties when they were separating and it may well be that, in the heat of the moment, the applicant made statements which simply bore no relation to reality and if he had done so, the respondent has clung on to those words and wishes this Court to have found that those substantial assets do exist. I cannot make that finding.

Therefore, that being the case, in considering computation I review the assets set out within the ES2. I accept the figures in relation to the properties. That is £1.67million. I am also satisfied that the figures attributed to the respondent , however, are no longer accurate. She has not assisted herself by completely failing to disclose the accounts in which certain sums are retained, or indeed evidence as to the debts which she claims to be in existence.

She sets out in her section 25 statement that she has £70,000 in the Chinese bank account that used to have and last had when disclosed £124,000 in it. She also adds she has £10,000 in the UK bank account, and £50,000 worth of debts. That was evidence she repeated orally, although no documentary evidence whatsoever has been provided. As is said, it is somewhat ironic that her main complaint is a lack of disclosure by the applicant, and she has completely and utterly failed to disclose her documents.

However, having heard her evidence, and having heard the way she has presented the case, as I say, whilst it is sometimes difficult to be sympathetic with her, bearing in mind her unrealistic aims, I am satisfied that she has come here to tell the truth as best she can, and I am satisfied that the figures that she sets out are realistic. She has spent a huge sum of money on solicitors.

I asked the applicant, where would the sums held by the respondent have come from? He sets out she did have access to £200,000 in an account in China. She had the £65,000 that was paid and the £74,000 that was paid, and clearly those sums were paid. However, overall, I am satisfied that in the two years since all of that has occurred, she has spent significant sums and what she says is in fact the case.

Therefore, despite her wholesale lack of disclosure, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the figures she sets out are in fact accurate. On that basis, I am satisfied that the assets are now: (1) property, £1.67 million; (2) accounts, for the applicant, £16,000, and for the respondent, £70,000, that is a total of £86,000; investments, for the applicant , £7,600, and I have put £10,000 for the respondent.

For others, I have got the RSUs, effectively the bonuses, £96,000. Clearly, they are not all in his pocket. For the respondent, I have put nothing. What has been credited was the add-back figures for costs, which clearly are not appropriate. That totals £1.87million. On top of that, or subtracted from that, the applicant has liabilities of £81,000 and the respondent has liabilities of £50,000. That leaves net figures of £1.73million, and I am satisfied that that is the sum for distribution.

Looking at distribution, I have to go through how these sums should be shared between the parties. I have to take into account all of the factors that are set out in s.25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

The applicant’s income is extraordinarily well documented. He does say that he is aged 52, and the reality is he does not consider he is going to be able to work in that field for that long. I understand that and I can sympathise with that as a position, but at the moment that is what he is doing. He is earning well, and I hope that can continue for some time. His income is not the real issue. It is the Respondent’s income earning capacity.

She has not worked for a very long time, save for a short period. I accept her position that English is not her first language, and her English is not wholly polished. She can make herself understood and she can understand most of what is said, but it will be a barrier to many jobs. It is said that she could work as a Mandarin speaker doing some work in London, and clearly there is a significant need for that. Therefore, the question is, what sort of earning capacity does she have?

She says she has never worked for anyone for more than six months. She has always been self-employed, and she says she is a hard worker; I can believe that. I can see that ideally the best way for her to be able to work would be working for herself in her own business, such as she did for a number of years when she had her hair salon. Therefore, it may well be that that is her future. In order to do that she would need some capital, but it may well be that that is not forthcoming.

Therefore, she does have an earning capacity. It is suggested it was £24,000 odd. I suspect that is putting it too high. I also suspect it is going to take some time before she is able to obtain employment. Certainly, she would be able to obtain a minimum wage type job and, therefore, I assess her earning capacity to be in the region of £15,000, i.e., just over £1,000 a month. It is difficult to see at this stage that it is going to be far greater than that and it is going to take some time before she is able to get that. She has got to deal with Y getting through her A-levels and the aftermath of that and, therefore, I am satisfied it will take her some time.

In reality, in this case, that relates primarily to buying a property. In all cases such as this, in financial remedy cases, the order is made for each party to provide suggested suitable properties for the other party, and for themselves. The applicant complied with that. What he says is that each of the parties should have a two-bedroom property in London, which would cost about £900,000, and for which they would need £950,000, or thereabouts, as a housing fund.

The respondent has not provided that information. She has not said prior to this hearing what she would need for her housing. She did set out in her form E that £2million would be her housing need. Today, or during this hearing, she has said adamantly she will stay in the property in Surrey. That is worth £1.9million. She does not see any basis upon which that could be sold and she certainly is of the view that that would meet her needs.

When the respondent was in the witness box, she was asked to look at the property particulars suggested by the applicant at page 654 of the bundle. She adamantly refused to look at it. She has no interest in looking at anything that has been suggested by the applicant. That misses the point. The point is for her to be able to see what that sort of sum would buy and whether she considered that would be appropriate for her and Y. She simply failed to do so and refused to do so.

I am satisfied that the sort of figures put forward by the applicant is appropriate for each of them. £900,000 would be sufficient to buy a property for either the applicant or the respondent together with Y. As is said she is not married to a particular area or wedded to a particular area. She does not have a school to go to. She does not have a particular job to go to, so she can be flexible. However, that is the sort of sum that would be required and, therefore, a housing fund of £950,000 would be appropriate. As I have also said, it would meet her needs in terms of creating an income. She would need some capital ideally to set up a business. I would have thought £100,000 would be the appropriate level of capital for the Respondent to be able to set up her own business.

The next factor is “standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage”. Clearly, it is accepted that as a result of the applicant’s income, they had a very good lifestyle together with holidays, expensive purchases, eating out frequently, ski trips, private education for Y at the cost of £50,000 per year. Clearly, they did have a good standard of living.

I have said the applicant is 52. Bearing in mind his work, it does not seem realistic that he is going to work through to 67 the retirement age. The respondent is 50. She has got no health issues that have been proved. Clearly, she has a good 15 years’ worth of work ahead of her. The duration of the marriage, as I say, is a 17- or 19-year marriage. It is a long marriage. Clearly, the sharing principle is fully in operation.

Clearly, the applicant has undergone difficult cancer treatment, but I am not told that there are any ongoing issues as a result of that. As stated above, the respondent has stated that she has a number of health issues but there is simply no evidence whatsoever to support this position. I am not able to make any finding that the respondent suffers from any particular health issues.

It has not been suggested anything other than each party has made a full contribution. The applicant has clearly been a brilliant earner for the parties and the respondent has provided the main care for Y, and there has not been any criticism of that. Therefore, I am satisfied that each of them has made a full contribution.

The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 states that the Court has got to take into account the conduct of each of the parties if that conduct is such that it would be, in the opinion of the Court, inequitable to disregard it. The applicant has set out his application in his statement for conduct, which has been replied to by the respondent . It is his case that effectively the litigation conduct, or financial misconduct of the respondent, is such that it must be taken into account in the final decision as to how the assets should be distributed.

In his statement in support, he sets out the staggering list of legal advisers in a tabulated form that she has used. It sets out, as I say, no less than 13 firms of solicitors or direct access barristers or McKenzie Friends, and they include several well-known financial remedy solicitors. It runs from July 2022 through to September 2024. He points out that the respondent’s bank statements also reveal other legal advisers who have received payments but have not placed themselves on the record, which would bring the total up to 16.

The respondent has, as ever, failed to provide a breakdown of her costs which is required under the rules and has been ordered. However, the applicant states that, having gone through the bank statements up to May 2024, he could see that over £170,000 had been spent. There has clearly been money spent since that date. It was suggested to the respondent that the total would be over £200,000 now, and she did not disagree.

As at the date of his conduct statement, which was November 2024, the applicant had spent £83,000 as opposed to £170,000 for the respondent. He also complains that the respondent has breached orders on numerous occasions in terms of providing information either at all or late, providing information to the pension expert, replying to questionnaires, failing to agree the letter of instruction for the tax report on time, and failing to provide updating disclosure either on time or at all. I would add, obviously, the complete failure to provide an open offer, and there have been issues in relation to other documentation.

I am satisfied that there are a number of documents that the respondent has simply failed to provide. The most obvious examples are a Chinese bank account, which when last seen held £124,000, which I have accepted now has been reduced to £70,000. Clearly, it would have been a simple thing to disclose that. She states, as I say, it is now £70,000, although it was not within her updating disclosure, save for, as I understand it, being provided during this hearing, and I have not looked at that.

The applicant also complains of the unsubstantiated allegations and extensive requests for information that have been made by the respondent , and I have dealt with a number of those above. There is also a message from the respondent’s direct access barrister dated March 2024, in which it was stated that she did not agree to a private FDR or a court FDR and prefers the matter to go straight to a final hearing. That is simply not an appropriate way of conducting this sort of litigation. It is suggested by the applicant that the sum of £87,000 should be added back to the overall assets in the respondent’s name on the basis that she had incurred that much more costs than him, and also that his solicitors had conducted £13,500 of work, which has purely arisen as a result of the respondent’s poor litigation conduct.

There are always grey areas as to financial misconduct/litigation misconduct, but I am satisfied that the behaviour of the respondent more than meets the requirement whereby it would be inequitable to disregard her behaviour, or, alternatively, that her behaviour is such that an order for costs should be made. This is not a borderline case. I am satisfied that the threshold is well and truly crossed. There have been multiple breaches of orders, a significant lack of disclosure and a complete lack of offer. That is not a reasonable form of litigation. As has been said in many cases by Peel J, and as per the rule FPR PD28A 4.4, there is a duty to negotiate reasonably and if you do not make an offer, that cannot be reasonable.

I accept that this Court has the ability to make orders in relation to the conduct which can impact upon the needs of the respondent. It is said that this was done in WC v HC by Peel J, but it has to be recalled that in that case the responsible party still received the sum in excess of £7million after the order for costs in the sum of £150,000. Two other authorities are referred to within that case as examples where costs have been made in a needs-based awards. One was Traharne v Limb [2022] EWFC 27 and the other was WG v HG [2018] EWFC 84.

The assets in the first of those cases were in excess of £4million and in the second case the impact was to reduce the Duxbury fund from £2million down to £1.5million. In short, those cases are of a different hue entirely to this one, which means I have to be cautious in considering what adjustments, if any, should be made on the basis of those costs and that conduct.

Therefore, those are the assets. Those are my considerations of the section 25 issues. On that basis, I have to look at everything as a whole and attempt to reach a conclusion which is fair.

The starting point must be the capital needs of each of the parties and how they can be met. As I have said, the capital need for the respondent is a housing fund of £950,000 together with a capital sum to set up a business of £100,000. That would require a total of £1,050,000. In order to achieve that she would be receiving significantly more than 50% of the assets, and I can see that there is a good reason to depart from equality in a case such as this when there is such substantial income on behalf of one party as opposed to the other. There is no possibility of the respondent ever being able to get anywhere near the sort of income that the applicant has been able to achieve.

However, I also have to take into account the issue that I have just dealt with in terms of conduct/costs, and I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make some allowance for that but not the full allowance that the applicant seeks. Therefore, when I take that into account, I am satisfied that the appropriate figure for the respondent to receive would be one in the region of £1million. That is to be achieved by her retaining the Central London flat and that the Surrey property must be sold, it is impossible to imagine any other basis other than that and, for the Respondent to receive a further £478,000 from that sale. That amounts to 40.2% of the figure and it must be done in a percentage figure.

The other funds and liabilities that she has are close to leaving her with nothing more and I am not going to take those into account. Therefore, in essence, she will receive £1million, which means that the sum required to meet her needs is being reduced by £50,000 bearing in mind the litigation conduct/costs issue.

I have to look at it from the applicant’s point of view. On that basis, this would leave the applicant with £711,000 plus his other assets, which are just over £100,000 less his liabilities, which breaks it down to about even. Not all of the £96,000 is received as of yet, but he will be receiving them in due course, so long as he continues to work. On the basis that he receives around about that sort of figure, he would require a mortgage of £250,000 to reach his position of a £950,000 housing fund and I am satisfied that that is one that is entirely affordable and, therefore, that will be the division.

The order will be, in terms of capital, that the applicant retains all of the rental properties. The respondent will retain the flat in Central London and the former matrimonial home at Surrey will be sold as of July and divided 59.8% to the Applicant and 40.2% to the respondent.

That leads to the question of periodical payments. It is pointed out, completely fairly, that up until now whilst the applicant has a substantial income, he has also been having substantial outgoings. He has been paying, on average, £80,000 a year for the last two years for costs. He has been paying £50,000 a year for school fees and he has been paying £60,000 a year for the mortgages on the former matrimonial home. That adds up to £190,000 and that is clearly substantial.

However, school fees have now stopped, and they are not going to be starting again. The costs, I am not saying are at an end, but certainly the vast majority of them have stopped and, therefore, that is not going to be required. That relieves him of £130,000 worth of outgoings and, on top of that, I am making an order in due course for the property to be sold and, therefore, that mortgage liability will be substantially reduced. That means he has much greater ability to afford periodical payments in due course. On top of that, I am assessing the earning capacity of the respondent effectively as limited to £15,000 or thereabouts.

When one takes into account the length of the marriage, the sums that each of them are earning, I am satisfied that the figure put forward by the applicant is not quite sufficient. I will order from today that there should be periodical payments of £2,000 per month to the respondent, together with the Applicant continuing to pay the outgoings on the former matrimonial home. Once that is sold the periodical payments should be increased to £3,000 per month because he will not have the mortgages to meet as at that stage and that is to run until the respondent is 60.

Clearly, if he is not working, then he can make an application to vary at that stage. I agree entirely that there should be a section 28(1A) bar so no further applications can be made. However, it seems to me, bearing in mind the length of the marriage and the sums earned, that is the reasonable figure to pay.

On top of that, there is Y. The offer in relation to her is one of just over £1,000 per month. I have looked at and considered the James v Seymour calculation prepared, and, whilst I am not wedded again to that figure, I am satisfied, taking that into account, I am satisfied that the correct figure for Y is one of £1,500 per month. It should be paid directly to the respondent up until August 2025, i.e., this year, and thereafter directly to Y up until the end of her first degree.

I will also add that she is able to have a maximum of one year as a gap year, during which she should also receive the £1,500 per month so long as she provides evidence that she is applying for university the following year, because clearly if she is not she would not be entitled as she is not preparing for university. It would appear the evidence supports that she will in fact be studying during that year in any event. Clearly, I have the power to make such orders because this is a top-up case, bearing in mind the income level of the applicant. There will be CPI increases as offered by the applicant in his offer letter. That is entirely appropriate from 12 months thereafter.

In terms of the pension share, as I have indicated, it is now agreed by the applicant that the appropriate figure is to take into account all of the contributions that were made. It would be impossible to imagine it would be otherwise, bearing in mind PAG2 and the authorities. Therefore, there will be a pension share order of 10.11% of the pension accrued in his former employment and 100% of the two pensions accrued with his current employer. That will provide the respondent with an income of £26,000, or £26,097, as at the age of 60 because she will not be receiving her state pension and, therefore, artificial to use the figures set out by the PODE report, who contributes a £2,000 pension by averaging it out over the lifetime, I assume. Therefore, that will be the order.

They are the orders in terms of capital, in terms of periodical payments, and in terms of pension share. The only other issue that has been raised relates to enforcement. Clearly, the evidence was that the respondent is adamant that Surrey property should not be sold. I am ordering that it is to be sold, as of July 2025, to allow for Y to finish her education and on that sale, it is sought by the applicant for the respondent to vacate the property. It would be very unusual to make those sorts of orders prior to there being any difficulty, but I accept that the respondent has indicated with some force that she does not wish the property to be sold. However, that is different to actually coming to terms with a decision.

I am satisfied that it is not appropriate to make any enforcement type orders at present. I will order, however, that the price for sale is to be agreed between the parties, if possible, but if not, as stated by the appropriate estate agents, and in default, obviously, application to myself can be by writing, and indeed any further applications, as I recall, required can be reserved to myself. Again, it can be made in writing, but I sincerely hope that is not necessary. There must be the disclosure that is sought in relation to the Hampshire properties in terms of the tenant and in terms of the deposit.

The final issue relates to the mortgages on the former matrimonial home. I can see the point entirely that if the applicant is spending £5,000 per month on the mortgages, why should the respondent benefit from that if she is not willing to cooperate with the transfer of the mortgages to interest-only mortgages, bearing in mind that they are to be sold. Therefore, I will add, as suggested by Ms Rothwell, that the applicant should receive credit for any capital reduction made to the mortgages after July 2025, and as a result I encourage the parties to cooperate fully in varying the mortgages to interest-only mortgages pending their sale. However, as pointed out, I cannot make that order.