A v B & Ors

These proceedings concern the welfare of two boys, X, a boy aged 9 years, and Z, a boy aged 8 years. Their mother is A (aged 48 years) and their father is B (aged 41 years). The parents share parental responsibility. For ease of reference, I shall refer to A as “the mother” and to B as “the father” throughout this judgment.

By way of regrettable preface, I note that this is the fourth set of proceedings to concern these children. In essence, the children’s welfare has been before the court on-and-off since 2017; so for the vast majority of X’s life and all of Z’s. The substantive proceedings preceding this present application were issued in June 2018 under case number WR18P00405, which took over three years to be resolved. At the start of those proceedings, X lived in the father’s sole care while Z lived in the mother’s. The matter appeared before District Judge Khan for final hearing in September 2021, the judgment from which I have read.

The court made a number of findings against the mother while dismissing her cross-allegations against the father. In the course of conducting her enquiries, X had informed the Guardian that the mother pushed him and dug her nails into him, blaming it on the ‘Invisible Man’. The court did not make any findings in this regard, save that it did not accept that the father had manipulated or coached the child to make such allegations. District Judge Khan did find, however, that the children had been placed at risk of harm by the mother’s lack of supervision, rejecting the mother’s assertion this was to do with her ‘liberal’ parenting style. The court further found that the father ‘recognises the relationship between the mother and the children’ and that he would ‘not rush to stop contact unless a safeguarding concern arose’. The mother’s request for a shared care order was refused, with a final order being made (hereafter “the 2021 order”) for both children to live with the father, thus transferring Z’s residence to the father. They were to spend alternate weekends (Friday to Monday) with the mother as well as alternate Wednesday overnights, with all holidays to be shared equally.

I cannot help but note the prescience of the District Judge’s warning to the parties in late 2021:

This case appears before me today in its fourth iteration for a composite welfare and fact-finding final hearing on the applications of the mother. By Forms C100 and C79 dated 28 November 2024, she seeks enforcement or variation of the 2021 order. It is not disputed that the father suspended all contact between the children and their mother on 20 September 2024, prompting the mother’s application ‘to enforce compliance, to recognise repeated breaches with punitive measures and compensation, and to change the Child Arrangements Order’.

The events relied upon by the father to explain his decision to suspend contact formed the core focus of the fact-finding element of this hearing and involve an allegation said to have been made by the youngest child, Z, of what has been categorised by the professionals (the Guardian excepted) as “sexual abuse” perpetrated by the mother. At the time of this hearing, the children have seen their mother just once in the past thirteen months, and that contact was back in May, some five months ago. I have remained concerned throughout this hearing as to the approach adopted by professionals on the ground at the point allegations first emerged and thereafter; it seems to me that, sadly, their approach has played a direct role in leading to the sorry circumstances in which the family finds itself today, with one parent accused of sexual abuse, the other of lying, and the children left in the limbo of court proceedings.

At this hearing, the mother is represented by Miss Fitt of Counsel instructed by QS Parkinson Wright Solicitors. The father is represented by Mr Spollon of Counsel instructed by Waldrons Solicitors. The children (by their Guardian, a NYAS Caseworker) are represented by Miss Porteous of Counsel instructed by NYAS. I am very grateful to all advocates for their assistance.

The parents were in a relationship between around 2014 and separated in early 2017, by which time the mother was pregnant with their second child. They were not married. At the time of this hearing, both parties live in (redacted) and both children attend (redacted)School.

By March 2017 – when X was aged just over 1 year – the parties had already commenced their first round of what King LJ might describe as “lawfare”. I note at this stage that – save for the judgment and order in 2021 – I have seen no documents from the previous proceedings and so am reliant on the procedural summary set out in the helpful safeguarding letter of Cafcass dated 15 January 2025. That first application, issued under case number WR17P00169, was made by the father and was followed by a cross-application by the mother, both parents seeking orders for X to live in their sole care. Safeguarding issues appear to have been raised by both parents against the other along the lines of domestic abuse, substance misuse and parental mental health difficulties.

A s.7 report and addendum were prepared by Cafcass, with a final order being made in January 2018. Z had in fact been born during the course of the proceedings and – by the time of the final hearing – DNA testing had confirmed the father’s paternity. Z was to live with the mother and spend time with the father; X was to live with the father and spend time with the mother.

As I have already noted, the family were back before the Family Court just five months later, when the mother applied for orders inter alia that X live with her (case number WR18P00405). I am told, although I have not seen the decision itself, that the matter was considered by the Magistrates at an interim hearing on 15 November 2018, when the Justices found that the father had breached the order of January 2018 ‘without reasonable excuse’ in failing to make X available for contact with the mother. Ultimately, however, a final order (the 2021 order) was made by District Judge Khan in the terms and with the findings already set out at para. 3 above, with Z’s residence transferred to the father. Cafcass were again required to prepare a s.7 report (January 2019) and addendum (May 2019), with the children subsequently joined as parties before the final hearing.

Ultimately, save for a handful of months in 2022 when the mother alleged that the father was failing to make the children available to spend time with her, the 2021 order appears to have functioned with relative stability until contact was stopped abruptly on 20 September 2024.

In his statement dated 14 July 2025, the father sets out how ‘Z came to [him] one day’ and made comments about his mother. X was present and, at one point, Z said to X ‘mum had sex with me, not with you’. The father says he was alarmed by this and ‘gently asked him what did he mean by ‘sex’’, to which Z explained, ‘snogging and kissing’. Z is then reported to have made further comments, including an allegation that ‘his mother gets him to touch her boobs’. The father says that, in order to ensure Z was not confused, he ‘asked him [Z] about this’. Z is said to have repeated the comment about touching his mother’s breasts.

The father says that he informed the children not to tell their mother about what they had told him. He accepts that he did not report the comments to a professional at that time. His statement continues:

It will be noted that the father’s witness statement (as summarised above) contains no dates. That being said, it is common ground that the material date on which Z is said to have made comments to the headteacher at school was on Friday, 20 September 2024, on which date the children were due to be collected from school by their mother at the start of weekend contact. From the mother’s perspective, as set out in her statement dated 31 July 2025, the first she knew of an issue having arisen was when she attended school on 20 September to collect the children only to be told that they had already been collected by their father. The children were not made available to spend time with her as per the 2021 order.

It is in the above context that the mother made an application both to enforce and (potentially) to vary the 2021 order by way of Forms C100 and C79 dated 28 November 2024. An exemption was sought to the MIAM requirement based on urgency (the children by that time had not had any form of contact, direct or indirect, with their mother for over two months).

The application was listed for hearing on 19 December 2024, with Cafcass directed to undertake safeguarding checks (although no date was set for filing of the same). By the time of the hearing, at which both parties appeared in person before District Judge Solomon, safeguarding checks remained outstanding. The order records that the father informed the court ‘the allegations … were to him and the school’. The hearing was adjourned and re-listed for 15 January 2025.

On 15 January 2025, the matter appeared before District Judge Phillips. Both parties continued to act in person. The order records that the Cafcass safeguarding letter remained outstanding and gave a date for filing of the same by 22 January. The hearing was adjourned for a second time and relisted on 27 January, at which D County Council (“the local authority”) were directed to attend. Safeguarding checks were subsequently undertaken by Cafcass but remained incomplete because she had been unable to speak to the father; it was recommended that a s.7 report be completed by the local authority.

On 27 January 2025, the matter appeared before a Deputy District Judge, by which time the mother was represented by Counsel while the father remained in person. The children were made parties with directions for Cafcass to allocate a Guardian pursuant to rule 16.4 FPR 2010 and for an initial report to be filed ahead of the next hearing on 28 March 2025. In the interim, any contact was to take place as recommended by the Guardian, with the mother permitted to send letters or cards. I note in passing that it does not appear that the 2021 order has ever been formally suspended.

Cafcass subsequently contacted the court to confirm they were unable to allocate an officer to act as Guardian. On 18 February 2025, therefore, the matter was considered administratively by District Judge Khan, who directed NYAS to allocate a caseworker to act as Children’s Guardian. The Guardian was directed to arrange and observe contact between the children and the mother ahead of the hearing which remained listed in March.

On 28 March 2025, the matter was heard by District Judge Khan. From that hearing onwards, both parents have been represented along with the children. The court expressed concern (as recorded on the order) that the children had not seen their mother for six months and the emotional impact this must have had on them. A child arrangements order was therefore made for the children to spend supervised time with the mother at a contact centre, fortnightly for two hours; the first session was to be funded by the father, with all further sessions to be funded by the mother. Subject to the Guardian’s views, contact might progress into the community before the next hearing. Time for the Guardian’s first analysis was extended to 23 May 2025, with directions made for disclosure from the police and the school.

The next hearing was on 16 June 2025. Both parties were represented, the mother by Counsel. The matter was timetabled through to a three-day composite final hearing commencing 15 October 2025. Specific directions were made against the parents and three third parties – CD (social worker), EF (headteacher) and GH (teacher) – to provide witness statements by 14 July 2024, with each ‘outlining the details of how the allegation of inappropriate touching made by Z occurred’. The Guardian’s final analysis was to be filed by 25 August, which was to provide recommendations on an “either/or” basis in the event the allegation against the mother was/was not made out. The order records that no party sought for Z to give oral evidence, although that did not preclude a Re W application being made upon receipt of the written evidence directed.

In her position statement lodged the day before this hearing was due to commence, Miss Fitt makes a number of observations regarding deficiencies in the order of 16 June and issues of non-compliance with the same. She points out inter alia the omission of a direction for any witness template; the absence of a clear schedule particularising the allegations facing the mother; a failure to obtain the contemporaneous notes of professionals or any evidence from another social worker, IJ (who initially worked the case); the fact that the written evidence of the teachers is not compliant with the FPR 2010, both lacking statements of truth; and the absence of any direction for the parents to file statements addressing issues of welfare and their proposals for child arrangements, notwithstanding the matter was listed for final hearing with a welfare determination. To a large extent (though not in their entirety), I consider those observations to be well founded.

The matter appeared before me for a composite final hearing; that is, it was intended that I would determine both the disputed allegations and all outstanding issues of welfare. On the basis of those points outlined at para. 23 above, however, an application was made by the mother in the face of the court for the hearing to be adjourned.

For the reasons I set out in a detailed ex tempore judgment, that application was refused. Without wishing to repeat the reasons given in that decision, I note the following. First, it is plain from the order of 16 June 2025 that all parties had understood ‘the allegation’ to mean the ‘inappropriate touching’ as alleged byZ. The mother had directly responded to that allegation in her statement and had plainly understood the case being made against her. That being said, I directed that the allegation be crystalised into a clear, written form by the father, given his election to prosecute the allegation. Second, I considered that the absence of a witness template or statements of truth on the teacher’s statements might be easily remedied. Third, I noted that, in the past thirteen months, the boys have seen their mother only once, for two hours; further delay, it seemed to me, would be wholly inconsistent with their welfare.

Finally, on the issue of welfare, I reserved my position as to whether or not an adjournment would be needed and invited Miss Fitt to revisit that application in closing submissions, if necessary. In the event, it became clear over the course of the hearing that it would not be possible for welfare issues to conclude at this juncture, such that the scope of the hearing became limited to fact-finding, the interim contact arrangements and further case management.

In reality, the foregoing application to adjourn required the morning of day one to determine. By early afternoon, however, a succinct schedule of allegations had been drafted and a witness template agreed. That schedule read as follows:

The remainder of the first day was utilised hearing oral evidence from the headteacher followed by the father’s evidence-in-chief. On the second day, the father’s evidence was concluded in the morning. In the afternoon, I heard from CD (social worker) and the mother.

Very late in the mother’s oral evidence, towards the end of Mr Spollon’s cross-examination, the mother made an important concession; the matter was taken up by Ms Porteous in her cross-examination on behalf of the Guardian, along with some additional questions by the court. In light of that concession, I invited the parties to consider whether or not an appropriate form of words might be agreed in order to dispose of the factual dispute at the heart of this case. On the morning of the third and final day, the parties were able to agree a form of words acceptable to all parties, which fairly reflects the admission made by the mother:

On the basis of the mother’s oral evidence, I was willing to accept the above as an accurate and sufficient reflection of the mother’s admission. It was clearly a difficult and deeply personal concession for her to make, not least where she feared findings being made against her that she had harmed her child sexually. She is to be commended for her honesty, albeit it has come very late in the day. It is axiomatic in the circumstances that the mother’s counter-allegation – that the father had manipulated and/or caused his son Z to make a false allegation – was no longer pursued by the mother. Had it not been withdrawn, I would have had no hesitation in dismissing it.

Given the way in which the case had developed, I proposed to give an explanatory judgment, a suggestion met by agreement from all parties. I indicated that there were several areas upon which I would still be assisted and heard short oral submissions from all parties before handing down this judgment, the purpose of which is to address the following:

For completeness, I note that I have read the entirety of the papers, being a bundle of 276 pages, over a third of which consists of orders and applications. Unusually for a case involving allegations of sexual abuse, there is very little in the way of written evidence. The father’s statement dated 14 July 2025 consists of less than four sides of A4 paper; the mother’s statement dated 31 July 2025 is a little longer but still under five sides. There is a statement from the teacher (undated) consisting of half-page and from the headteacher (undated) of just under two pages. I have read the Social Work Assessment dated 28 November 2024 completed by CD as well as CD’s report dated 14 July 2025, which includes a 65-page chronology followed by three pages of analysis/recommendations. The Guardian has provided an initial report dated 23 May 2025 (14 pages) and a final analysis dated 26 August 2025 (eight pages). There is some disclosure from the school (six pages) and some limited police disclosure (25 pages). That fairly represents the entirety of the written evidence before the court.

While in the end the court has not been required to determine disputed allegations, I have over the course of these proceedings had recourse to consider several authorities which arise in cases of alleged sexual abuse within the context of private law proceedings, over and above the legal framework applicable in all fact-finding exercises.

In the context of allegations made within private law proceedings, Baroness Hale warned in Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2008] 2 FLR 141 at [29]:

In Re I-A (Allegations of Sexual Abuse) [2012] 2 FLR 837 at [13]-[15], Etherton LJ observed that the court is ‘required to conduct the investigation and set out [its] conclusions with a most detailed and conscientious examination of all the evidence’. This includes the need to both ‘scrutinise the context in which [the child] gave her accounts and her credibility’ as well as to ‘address in a conscientious and detailed way the evidence of the [accused parent]’.

In Re P (Sexual Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearing) [2019] EWFC 27, in considering what constitutes sexual abuse, MacDonald J made reference at [4] to the definition adopted in the statutory guidance Working Together to Safeguard Children (HM Government July 2018):

The question of whether or not conduct should be labelled as ‘sexual abuse’ was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re O (Description of Sexual Abuse) [2024] EWCA Civ 126, [2024] 2 FLR 96. I note in that decision the court’s caution, that Working Together to Safeguard Children does not create a legal definition nor is it intended to be an exhaustive definition. At [40], the court observed that a finding of sexual abuse should be treated as ‘a specific finding of a particular type of harm’. In making such a finding, Cobb J continued at [41]:

I have also been assisted by the helpful summary of the law as contained in the decision of MacDonald J in the case of AS v TH and others (False Allegations of Abuse) [2016] EWHC 532 (Fam) at [30]-[52]. At [31],his Lordship summarised the approach to be taken when determining allegations of child sexual abuse as follows:

Further, from [32]onwards MacDonald J draws together some of the key guidance concerning the investigation of sexual abuse allegations, as contained in the Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987 (“the Cleveland Report”) and the statutory guidance Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings (March 2011) (“the ABE Guidelines”). From that judgment, I identify the following points as being readily applicable to the current case:

The earliest record of the mother responding to the suggestion she had sexually abused Z appeared in the local authority’s assessment dated 28 November 2024. There is no doubt that the local authority were approaching their investigation as one of suspected sexual abuse; under the heading ‘Key Issues’, we see recorded ‘Z suffering emotional and sexual harm due to allegations by Z that [s]he asked him to touch her breast area’. There are other comments, which confirm sexual abuse to have been the primary focus, with an investigation into alleged ‘sexually inappropriate behaviour’. It is within that context that the mother was spoken to. The assessment records her response:

On 8 January 2025, the mother spoke to the Cafcass officer as part of safeguarding checks. The safeguarding letter records the mother reporting that ‘concerns were raised by Z of her asking him to inappropriately touch her, which is not true’. She went on to make several allegations against the father, including the suggestion that Z ‘has to lie and has to say what his father wants to hear’.

In the spring of 2025, the mother was spoken to by the Guardian, an outline of that interview being set out in the Guardian’s first report at paras. 3.16 to 3.22. Her answer remained broadly the same as previously, with criticism/cross-allegations against the father:

Finally, the mother responded to the allegation of inappropriate touching in her statement filed in these proceedings dated 31 July 2025. From the first paragraph, the statement is very much framed as a defence littered with criticism of the father: ‘It is my view that the issues raised are not reflective of genuine safeguarding concerns but are instead part of a pattern of behaviour aimed at damaging my relationship with the children’. The allegation of touching is specifically addressed at paras. 5-6:

It will be immediately obvious – in light of her subsequent admission – that the above statements were inaccurate and misleading in several regards. When speaking to the local authority, for example, it was plainly not correct for the mother to say that she did not know why Z would make a comment about touching her breasts. Nor was it correct to say that she had never asked Z to touch her ‘in any way’. As for her witness statement, it was incorrect for the mother to ‘categorically deny the allegation that … I asked him [Z] to touch my breasts’. In fact, she did just that.

The mother’s flat denial and insistence that Z’s comments were the result of manipulation or coaching by the father continued, undeterred, throughout her cross-examination of the father, the headteacher and the social worker. Miss Fitt’s questions – quite properly put and no doubt on instruction – pursued the mother’s case that this was all a fabrication cooked up by the father in response to an anonymous referral that had been made against him (which the mother denies making). Her denial also continued throughout the vast majority of Mr Spollon’s cross-examination, which (I observe) was carefully and sensitively approached.

On the second day, a little before 14:30, the mother entered the witness box. She was cross-examined by Mr Spollon from 15:05. It was a little before 15:40 when the following exchange took place (per my handwritten note), from which the admission of simulating breastfeeding emerged:

Further questioning through Mr Spollon, Ms Porteous and the court elicited the information now contained in the mother’s agreed schedule of findings. That is, that both the mother and Z had sought comfort from each other via Z latching on to and sucking the mother’s nipple (what the mother describes as “skin to skin”). This was despite the fact that she had been unable to express milk since he was aged 3 or 4 years (thus her description of ‘simulated’ breastfeeding). She informed me that, if Z initiated, he would lift up her top and take out her breast from her bra. Sometimes this would happen in bed, with X also present. Z was, she said, ‘very familiar with the process’ and she would ‘not object, I would consent’.

When asked to confirm the last time this had taken place, she answered ‘without being precise, towards the end of our experience together’, by which she later confirmed she meant when contact ceased in September 2024. She told me that she needed to find a way to ‘politely decline’ when Z sought comfort in this way, and said, ‘I have spoken to a breastfeeding consultant about this’. She explained that, while Z had once sought this comfort every weekend when he stayed with the mother, it had been reducing in frequency by the time contact stopped.

On being asked by Mr Spollon if it might happen now, the mother replied, ‘It is changing. For me, it is a problem because I don’t feel comfortable but if Z wants it, I will embrace it’. In providing further context, the mother explained as follows:

When asked why she had not simply informed the Guardian, the mother did not accept that she had sought to mislead or lie. Rather, she said, ‘When I hear the allegation is that I ask Z to come to my room and touch my breast in a sexual way, I denied it’. The question asked by the Guardian, she said, was ‘flawed’ because it implied she was deliberately exposing her breast to the children. It should be noted that all of the mother’s evidence (as set out above) was given in a timid, highly anxious manner, with much pausing and careful deliberation in choosing each word to say; while she began to display a sudden openness in what she was willing to share, it plainly touched upon a deeply personal topic which she had hoped to avoid discussing.

It is fair to say that the atmosphere in the courtroom shifted considerably during this latter section of the mother’s evidence. As Ms Porteous pursued her line of questioning following an adjournment, I began to detect a distinct shift in the mother’s attitude and openness. She became even more guarded and hesitant in her answers. Sadly, she also began to row-back on some of the admissions made a short while earlier. For example, she began to shift the timeframe back, saying that Z had not engaged in “skin to skin” for some years, and that this might have stopped altogether when he was aged 5 or 6 years. I got the distinct impression that the mother had become aware (via the robust questions put to her on behalf of the Guardian) that the Guardian was alarmed by the evidence she was hearing.

In the end, of course, and with the benefit of advice from experienced Counsel, the mother did not retreat from her concessions made in evidence. It is those concessions that now form the wording of an agreed finding. With hindsight, it is now possible to see that the mother had come remarkably close to (if ultimately short of) the truth in her witness statement at para. 7:

To some extent, I accept the mother’s submission that she felt unable to be open and frank with professionals for fear she would be branded (to adopt Mr Spollon’s description) a ‘deviant’ who sexually abused her son. Had she been honest and explained the above context, would professionals have understood or would she simply be helping to build the case against her? On the reverse of that coin, however, I agree with the submission well made by Ms Porteous: it has not helped the children that the mother has maintained a position in which she has continued to assert that Z was not telling the truth. Her position has prevented, until this hearing, the mother from having any opportunity to reflect upon and explain carefully her actions; in turn, it has prevented the Guardian from exploring this with the mother; it has driven an even deeper wedge between the parents in circumstances where their post-separation relationship was already utterly toxic; and critically, it has led to significant delay and stymied any progress being made in this case.

I conclude this section of my judgment by remarking on the categorisation of what the mother has admitted. It was not put to the mother by any party that she had engaged in simulated breastfeeding in order to gain sexual pleasure, nor that it was sexually abusive. Nor did any party seek to address me in submissions that this activity of simulated breastfeeding falls into the category of sexual abuse. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether or not the simulated breastfeeding (as admitted) properly falls under that descriptor. As highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Re O (supra), there are potential negative consequences in doing so, not least (as the mother fears in this case) because it is a generic term capable of being misunderstood by both lay parties and professionals. But as Cobb J made clear, ‘that is not a reason for judges to avoid using the term’.

I have born in mind the guidance in Re O and the need ‘to think about whether describing the conduct alleged by reference to a generic label will add to an understanding of the facts’. Further, that judges should ‘use descriptions that they consider appropriate to describe their findings and to convey their nature and relative gravity’. At this stage, and as I indicated to the parties, I do not consider that it would be appropriate to label the admitted acts as sexually abusive; nor at this stage am I satisfied I should even label it “abuse” per se. I have no doubt that the simulated breastfeeding of a child rising 8 years of age likely evidences a not insignificant lack of boundaries and may well signify underlying difficulties around attachment (either concerning the mother and/or Z). But that is as far as I am able to speculate at this juncture. There is certainly no obvious evidence before me that the mother received sexual gratification, as opposed to what she herself describes as ‘comfort’.As I have already said, the mother’s intention and/or motivation will now be the subject of further exploration and assessment.

Having had the benefit of hearing both parents over several hours of oral evidence, I thought it sensible to record my impressions of both.

In the course of listening to the father’s evidence I considered him to be a singularly unimpressive witness. Under cross-examination, he was frequently combative, not least when under pressure. It was only in oral evidence that Counsel for the mother teased from him an admission that he had – on 17 or 18 September – himself initiated a second discussion with Z about touching, a fact he had not disclosed hitherto. Objectively, had the matter proceeded to a determination, this information may well have proven critical given the proximity of this discussion to Z’s allegations made to professionals.

Often, when he was pressed, the father became defensive and flustered. At one stage, when asked about his own parental shortcomings, he launched into a tirade about the mother’s parental deficits and the harm she has caused to the children, inviting the court to consider events as far back as 2018. It is not much of a leap to believe that the children are well aware their father does not like their mother, or “this woman” (as he referred to her). The Guardian’s report of her own discussions with the children makes for concerning reading:

My impression of the mother has to some extent been addressed in the preceding section. To that, however, it should be added that the mother has what might be described as an extremely idiosyncratic presentation. In terms of her speech, her answers were generally very slow and hesitant, with as much expression in her handwringing as in the words she spoke. I have to confess to finding some of her evidence very odd indeed.

For example, she was asked about the greetings cards she sent to the children during indirect contact. They are in the mother’s first language but have not been translated into English; the handwritten messages are also “mirrored” so that the writing is back-to-front, right to left. Given the children do not speak the mother’s first language, she was asked to explain why she had written the cards backwards in a language they cannot understand. She told me the cards are “for them to keep, a souvenir from me to them”. When she was asked by Miss Fitt in chief why the cards are backwards, she replied:

The mother was also asked about a book she bought for the children called The Duckling Gets a Cookie!? by Mo Willems. It now seems to be accepted by the mother that the book was not age appropriate for the children (i.e. it is clearly targeted at younger readers). The illustrated book – about a yellow duckling who asks for a cookie and a jealous pigeon – has been annotated by the mother for reasons that remain unclear. For example, on a page where the pigeon asks “So, you got a cookie with nuts just by asking!?” the mother has twice underlined the last three words. On another page, she circled the words “You asked for it…”. When the duckling replies “I asked for it”, the mother circled those words several times, drawing two disconcerting eyes looking at the words from different directions. What (if any) is the mother’s message here?

The mother was asked why she had made these markings. Her explanation was that the book was given to Z because he struggles to communicate when in his father’s care and she wanted to “help him to communicate, to ask politely, that’s how he gets what he needs”. She continued, “that’s how civilised people communicate, they tell each other about their wants and needs politely”. Suffice to say, the mother never provided a satisfactory answer for her annotations to the book. In my view, the mother’s additions must have been very confusing for the children if not vaguely threatening for the father, to have the words “You asked for it…” circled and posted to your home. Whether or not there was (as was hinted in cross-examination) a coded message here is difficult to say. Either way, it was inappropriate.

With the benefit of knowing what we now know following the mother’s admissions, one cannot but sympathise with the father for his concern that one or both of his children may have been sexually abused by their mother; such a fear must only have been exacerbated by the way in which the professionals conducted the case. It is to the father’s great credit that he accepted the mother’s admission without hesitation and has not sought express findings that her conduct was sexually motivated. My plea to him now is this. There is now a danger that he may feel understandably vindicated and that his anger towards the mother is not misplaced. He has, after all, spent over a year convinced that something had happened while all the time being accused of lying and manipulating. In the end, we know that something did happen and that Z’s description of touching his mother’s “boobs” appears now to have been explained. Any sense of victory must not, however, be allowed to descend into even more anger, nor morph into a desire to punish the mother.

The relationship of these two parents would appear to have hit an all time low. And yet, with boys aged just 8 and 9 years, they are going to remain in each other’s lives in some form or another for at least the next decade, if not beyond. I am grateful for the Guardian for indicating she will put her mind toward some sort of mediation service which might assist these parties to move on from what has been, no doubt, an unpleasant and bruising experience over the past thirteen months.

But for the mother’s admission, I cannot help but suspect there was a strong possibility that this case might have concluded on the basis of no findings being made. Indeed, had we proceeded to a court determination, it is difficult to see how any finding could possibly have been made given the utter mess made in the initial stages of the investigation by the professionals. Nearly four decades since the Cleveland Report, some of the safeguarding practices on display in this case leave much to be desired.

I had the benefit of hearing from the children’s headteacher. For context, it appears to be accepted that he received a telephone call from the local authority on Friday, 20 September 2024 at around 14:15, following which he spoke to X and then Z. It was during that conversation that Z was said to have made an allegation of sexual abuse. My assessment of the headteacher is that he was (as one would hope) a fundamentally honest and straightforward witness. He was not, however, an especially good witness when it came to his ability to recall events from twelve months ago. Rather, it was obvious that he struggled to recall the order of events, or who spoke to whom and when, even with the benefit of his contemporaneous notes before him.

Within the bundle there is a safeguarding log which indicates it was created by the headteacher at 15:47 on Friday, 20 September 2024. It begins as follows:

The above is but a flavour of his evidence. I must confess, I found the headteacher’s recollection of the chronology of events to be especially poor, not least given his role as the school’s safeguarding lead. Of more concern is the admission that the contemporaneous notes, apparently typed up immediately following his discussion with Z, may have been materially wrong. An important factor in understanding the genesis of Z’s allegations lay in the timing of the father’s conversation with the school. In this regard, I consider the head’s evidence was especially unhelpful:

Ultimately, I must confess to finding the headteacher’s evidence incredibly difficult to follow and frequently contradictory in material regards. In many ways, one can sympathise with an attempt to recall in detail events from over a year ago. Of more concern, it seems to me, is the apparent admission that the written record of the circumstances surrounding the events of 19 and 20 September appear to be so inaccurate. Indeed, I get the distinct impression from what has been said that the headteacher felt under great pressure of time to complete his notes and get them sent across to the local authority before the school day ended. I am left with the unfortunate impression that the headteacher’s record keeping and ability to make accurate notes was seriously deficient. To his credit, when asked if he would do anything differently with the benefit of hindsight, he answered that he would probably ensure he had another member of staff with him in future to take a detailed note.

Between the school and the local authority, I have found it almost impossible to assess with any accuracy the genesis of Z’s allegation. Even at the end of oral evidence, the chronology remains a mess. There seems little contention that, at around 14:15 on Friday, IJ called the school and asked the headteacher to speak to the children, and that the head duly spoke to both X and Z. What is not clear, however, is who said what to whom first:

Finally, an answer emerged from the oral evidence: that the father had informed the local authority of his discissions with Z on the afternoon of 19 September in a telephone call. That fact must be true; who else could possibly have told the local authority? On that basis, however, why is there no reference to that discussion at all in the evidence of the local authority? That seems to me to be an unforgiveable omission, one which creates within the records a highly misdealing impression that the first ‘referral’ to the authority was made by the school. In fact, the start of the chain of events was the father speaking to children’s services following a conversation with Z on 18 September, for which there is no record and no reference in the evidence of the father.

As for what Z actually said, putting to one side what he is supposed to have said to the father, we have allegations made to the headteacher and the social worker. The headteacher describes how on 20 September 2024 he was requested by IJ to ask the boys “direct” questions, which she dictated to him on the phone. The incident log completed that day reads:

The headteacher was open in acknowledging he has had no specific training concerning child sexual abuse nor how to ask children questions or interview them about allegations of abuse. It is telling that he continues to use the words “disclose” and “disclosure”, notwithstanding the guidance in the Cleveland Report. It was interesting to note, however, that when asked by Miss Fitt how to approach questioning a child, he told me “it must be handled with care, sensitivity, don’t ask leading questions, write down their answers and keep a record”. He was unable to explain, therefore, why he had himself asked questions as blatantly leading as the ones above.

Z was asked the leading question, “does mummy ask you to touch her?” to which he replied “yes”. He was aged just 7 years at the time; his maturity is said to be perhaps a little below average for his age, although not significantly so. He was later asked “what else” mummy does, another leading question with the clear implication that something else must have happened. All of the evidence obtained through such questions was inherently tainted and Z’s answers – although not to be ignored – must be seen in that context.

The local authority records note that the headteacher telephoned the school to recount the above conversation. They record as follows: ‘Z was asked about touching mummy he said very openly that mum asks him to touch her here, here, and here whilst pointing at various places on the breast area’. In oral evidence, he was asked if he had used the words “here, here, and here” on the telephone call when recounting what Z had said to him. He responded that he “might have said it on the phone … I don’t recall”. If he did, however, and Z had used those words to him, why does that not appear in the contemporaneous note of what Z had said?

As for what Z did physically, the safeguarding log says that he ‘pointed to his own chest left side and right (area of breasts)’. When asked to demonstrate the gesture, however, the headteacher demonstrated Z’s right hand moving in a circular motion over the breast area. He accepted that the description of ‘pointing’ was inaccurate. He was asked whether or not Z himself used the word “breasts” or “boob”; no, he said, Z had only gestured with his hand in a circular motion over his breast area.

Next, the local authority spoke to Z when completing the ‘three houses’ work on 27 September 2024. Z informed the worker that there was ‘nothing worrying about seeing my mum, she is alright and a nice person’. The report continues:

The record contained in the local authority assessment is not entirely helpful. It does not indicate what questions were asked to elicit Z to speak ‘very openly’. It is unclear what comments are recorded verbatim and which are a summary. Did Z, for example, really use the words “nipple area”?

In oral evidence, social worker CD confirmed that Z used the word “nipple” and said “here, here and here”. As with the headteacher’s evidence, CD demonstrated Z gesturing to his chest in a circular motion, rather than ‘pointing’. He further confirmed that he began by asking Z “was there anything that happened when you went to see mum?” to which Z replied, “yes”. He asked “what happened?” and Z replied that he would be asked by his mother to go into another room. On being asked what happened next, Z went further and said his mummy “kisses me”. He was then asked if it was “motherly” (he was aged 7) to which Z said “I didn’t like it”. He was then asked “anything else?”, which elicited the answer “she touches me”. Where? “On my clothes and asks me to touch her”.

The above account given by CD in oral evidence appears to reverse the order of information as set out in the written record. The questions – although not as directly leading as the headteacher’s – were still not open. To ask a child ‘what happened?’ is to lead with an assertion that something did in fact happen. It seems that Z himself did not refer to touching until he had been asked, several times, to say if anything else had happened. It is hardly a spontaneous, unprompted account.

For all the reasons expounded in the Cleveland Report and the ABE Guidelines, where good practice is not followed the resulting interview may be of no forensic value ‘and may in fact impede or contaminate any further assessment of the child ordered by the court’. Had the police conducted the planned (but abandoned) ABE interview, it would have been at least the fourth time Z had been questioned by adults. What forensic value could such evidence possibly have had? At no time does it appear any professional actually listened to Z, allowed him to recall events freely, and limited themselves to open-ended questions where necessary.

As for the contemporaneous records kept by both the school and the authority, they are of shockingly poor quality. Matters seem to be paraphrased, missed out, muddled or even just wrong. Language appears to have been deployed with no sense of accuracy: Z did not ‘point’ but made the same circular movement over his chest, a movement that both the headteacher and the social worker demonstrated in oral evidence but had failed to reflect in writing. I am again reminded of MacDonald J’s summary of the guidance in AS v TH (supra), in which his Lordship said:

Even putting to one side the father’s evidence, the documentary record of what Z said to the professionals could not (in my view) be capable of founding any evidential basis for a finding. The tragedy in this case is that the incoherent series of interviews with Z did in fact contain a seam of truth, that Z had been asked to touch his mother’s breasts; a fact which may well have gone undetermined had the mother not finally made an admission. Were this a case of serious sexual abuse, as was originally suspected, a court’s ability to come close to the truth would likely have been scuppered from the start.

The Cleveland Report reminds local authorities that, within the context of the initial social work assessment and preliminary decision making, workers should be conscious of the fact that a presumption abuse has taken place can have damaging repercussions for the child and the family. Here, from the father informing children’s services on 19 September that Z had made an allegation, matters simply snowballed. The evidence of the headteacher suggests – as Ms Porteous described it – a panic, leading to a rushed approach between the school and children’s services; a hurried interview of the children with inadequate preparation; answers elicited from Z via blatantly leading questions; and all recorded inaccurately. Having reviewed the way in which the local authority launched into questioning the children before recommending an immediate cessation of contact, I am left wondering to what extent (if at all) the workers are aware of the Cleveland Report and its guidance.

In this case, the result for the children was some six months in which they had no contact at all with their mother. On any view, the children were severely let down by the collective actions of the professionals. I cannot help but suspect that – had professionals taken a calmer approach in September 2024 – this family might have been saved much of the trauma of the past year.

Given my observations in the foregoing section, I will direct that this judgment should be served on both the school and the local authority.

It seems to me the 2021 order should be formally suspended. I will hear submissions on interim arrangements for contact, noting as I do that Z in particular has expressed to the Guardian how much he loves and misses his mother.

I understand the Guardian may wish to make a Part 25 application on behalf of the children. In that light, I have invited her to consider whether or not a psychological assessment is necessary or if, in fact, a social worker specialising in attachment might be better placed to assess and undertake any necessary work with Z and the mother.