IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of Court. |
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Birmingham Civil Justice Centre
33 Bull Street
Birmingham
B4 6DS
Date of hearing:7th July 2025
Start Time: 12.37Finish Time: 12.58
Page Count: | 7 |
Word Count: | 2620 |
Number of Folios: | 36 |
Before:
DISTRICT JUDGE PARKER
Between:
BIRMINGHAM CHILDREN’S TRUST | Applicant |
- and - | |
(1) S (2) THE CHILD (Via their Children’s Guardian) | Respondents |
MS K OKUNNU appeared on behalf of the Applicant
MS M HUMAGAIN appeared on behalf of the First Respondent
MR M FIDDY appeared on behalf of the Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
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DISTRICT JUDGE PARKER:
I am dealing with a child who was born on 28th December 2024. This is a case where mother accepts that the gateway to make a final care order is passed, having regard to a document known as a threshold document prepared by the Local Authority which sets out a number of concerns. I will summarise those concerns.
The mother herself is young, she is vulnerable, a care leaver herself. She had previously failed to engage in prenatal care until she was six months pregnant and subsequently missed a number of health appointments. She had misused cannabis, her accommodation is unsuitable, and her lifestyle is described as chaotic, involving a number of missing episodes. She was in an abusive relationship with a person who we now know is not the putative father and that person also misuses substances and has mental health problems. There are also previous proceedings in relation to the mother herself being in care.
The pre-birth assessment was sadly negative. Mother, at the outset of proceedings, indicated she was no longer with the gentleman who was originally thought to be the father, and she had ceased her cannabis use.
At the outset the child’s Guardian supported the Local Authority in relation to making an interim care order and placing the child in foster care as there were too many concerns - mum being vulnerable, a chaotic lifestyle involving domestic abuse and drug misuse. There was also concern about the risks posed by the putative father who, it was considered, remained on the scene.
I made an order on 10th January 2025 by way of an interim care order removing the baby to a foster placement. With regards to a referral to the Family Drug and Alcohol Court, their response was that the referral was premature; mother remained vulnerable, her lifestyle was unstable and unpredictable, the level of drug use was uncertain and there was inconsistency in appointments with professionals.
There is a previous psychological assessment which indicates that there was significant trauma experienced in mother’s own parenting and her history makes her vulnerable. There is a history of substance and alcohol misuse, an inability to protect herself from sexual exploitation and violence, an inability to establish a stable home for herself and her child. She would require extensive therapeutic involvement due to those needs.
I have seen the police disclosure. There are a number of missing persons incidents, and reports of domestic abuse, stalking and harassment and concerns with regards to mum’s safety.
There was a hair strand test undertaken which was positive for cannabis, cocaine and opiates.
The order I made on 6th February 2025 timetabled matters to an issues resolution hearing and early final hearing. By order of 15th May 2025 various extensions were granted to that order. It was noted the mother had ceased to engage in the proceedings and her assessment and indeed in family time sessions.
I have read the health visitor’s statement which sets out the multiple concerns in relation to the mother which I will not repeat, but these are reflected in what I have already said. The fact is, she has a limited support network.
Mum, in her initial evidence, wished to care for the child and to be assessed alongside the putative father. She accepts that she needs to do a lot of work. She accepts the misuse of cannabis. She accepts her relationship with the putative father was not the best, there was domestic abuse, although she has previously said she made false allegations in relation to that.
She accepts that her housing is not suitable and accepts the previous lack of engagement. She has no alternative carer(s) to put forward.
She but does not know who the father is or their location. The only other person who potentially could be the father does not wish to get involved.
The assessment, due to mother’s lack of engagement and missed contact sessions, concluded that there was no evidence of motivation to effect change to enable her to promote the child’s needs.
The final evidence of the Local Authority points to these multiple risk factors, including the ongoing potential relationship with the alleged father, and mother’s inconsistent engagement.
The Local Authority therefore seeks final care orders and placement for adoption.
The child’s Guardian reiterates mum’s significant vulnerabilities and that sadly parental unification is not a viable option.
I have read the detailed analysis provided by the Guardian contained in paragraphs 24 - 34 of her report. It is well-balanced and provides the court with a full analysis in relation to the available options and which realistic options, having regard to a holistic analysis, that I am required to undertake. In essence the Guardian supports placement orders and endorses the care plan.
Mother has recently filed a position statement. She says she is no longer in a relationship with the person whom she believed was the father. They have separated recently in June 2025. She is living with her sister. She accepts there was domestic abuse in that relationship and that, she says, was the reason for her non-engagement with regards to missed contacts due to the controlling nature of her then partner. She accepts she still uses cannabis.
She has taken the very brave decision to not oppose the application before the court today, although for obvious reasons, which I fully understand, she cannot consent either. She has made a very brave, child-focused decision which must be extremely hard for her and indeed any parent. I commend her for that. The decision is the right one in this case.
She wishes for contact to remain as it was planned, two times per week, until an adoptive placement is found, rather than the Local Authority’s plan to reduce it to monthly by an incremental basis. She quite rightly asks why the Local Authority’s plan in relation to contact is as it is.
The Local Authority maintain that contact has not been consistent, and this is a case where there is a plan for placement for adoption with all that that entails, and it will ultimately be in the child’s welfare to ease the ultimate transition plan. The Guardian also supports that reduction.
I will briefly address the law as I am required to in this area because I am being asked to make extremely draconian orders, even though mother does not oppose, albeit she does not consent either.
It is clear that it is extremely important, wherever possible, for children to be brought up by their birth family and the Local Authority has a duty to promote that.
There is an evidential burden that must be met prior to a Local Authority being involved and indeed the removal of children from their parents’ care and that is reflected in the statutory gateway under the Children Act, known as “the threshold criteria”.
In this case, mother accepts the threshold is crossed and I find accordingly on the evidence before me.
Of course, that is not the end of the matter because, given the history of this matter and the difficulties that mother has faced as set out in the threshold document, I must still then go on to apply the welfare test to determine what order is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child, having regard to the Article 8 rights, respect for family life as to the mother and indeed the child.
I have to determine whether permanent removal of a child from its birth parents is proportionate to the risk of harm to which they would be exposed if they were allowed to remain in the parents’ care or be reunified to the parents’ care.
I am mindful of the fact that I should only permanently make an order separating a child from their parents if satisfied that it is necessary to do so and that nothing else will do, having undertaken a global holistic evaluation of the options and plans for the child’s future upbringing.
This is particularly relevant in cases where the plan is one for placement for adoption, the most serious of all orders, one that will sever the parental relationship altogether. In relation to that I also have to have regard, before making such orders, to Section 1 of the Adoption of Children Act 2002 and the appropriate checklist and the issue of proportionality and necessity. In this case, as I have indicated, I am satisfied that the conditions as to making a care order are met, for the reasons that I have alluded to.
In evaluating the whole of the evidence and of course the checklist set out in Section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act I am driven to the conclusion that because there are no alternative carers, and mum accepts that she is unable at this moment in time to care for the child, a placement order is the only order that can meet the child’s immediate and lifelong welfare needs.
I refer in particular to the case of Re HW (Children) [2022] UKSC 17, as well as Re D (A Child: Placement Order) [2022] EWCA 896. I will not rehearse what they say. I also have regard to Section 1(2) of the Adoption of Children Act, as well as Section 1(4), Section 1(5) and Section 1(6), and finally the checklist set out in Re C (Children) (Revocation of Placement Orders) [2020] EWCA 1598.
Therefore, evaluating the whole of the evidence by reference to the statutory criteria set out in the Adoption and Children Act and having regard to matters holistically, treating the child’s welfare as paramount, I am driven to the conclusion that a placement order is the only order that can meet the child’s immediate and lifelong welfare needs and that adoption is necessary and proportionate in this case, having regard to the Article 8 rights of the parent and the child concerned. So, I will make final care orders and placement orders and dispense with the mother’s consent.
In relation to contact, of course, the issue with regards to contact is a difficult subject in relation to the court’s balancing exercise in cases such as this. Indeed, there has been a recent case in relation to such matters which has been considered by the Court of Appeal, the most recent word on the subject being that of Mother v Local Authority [2025] EWCA 823, although it concentrates more so on post-adoption contact.
I will not repeat what is said, although it does set out that it might be helpful for professional evidence to set out a roadmap for contact looking forward through the initial placement stage and onto the longer term future, and that the court consider dividing the period to be covered by any Section 26 contact order into two phases: Phase 1 running up to the point where placement for adoption has been identified, and Phase 2 running thereafter; in other words, a bespoke analysis of the future contact arrangements in each case for each child. A form of Section 26 order, for example, which recognised the importance of continuing contact but would allow for flexibility, might be the most appropriate means of meeting a child’s needs in some cases.
Where a precise order for contact might not be appropriate the court should be encouraged to use recitals in a placement order and/or a Section 26 order setting out in short terms its welfare conclusion as to future contact. The terms of any order could and should be used to establish flexibility over the contact arrangements where that was justified.
Finally, in a case where the sole live issue is whether an agreed arrangement should be embodied in a court order, Section 1(6) prevents the judge from making an order unless they consider that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so.
Having regard to the above I have reached a conclusion as follows. There have been difficulties for whatever reason with regard to mum maintaining contact, and of course, that is destabilising for the child. The order that I have made provides for a trajectory in relation to a placement order and ultimately an adoption order. In my view, any decision I have to make with regards to contact has to be led by the child’s welfare, not by the parent’s wishes and their own aspirations, however laudable those may be. In my view, I accept the argument that due to the inconsistencies with regards to contact, the plan for the child in relation to placement for adoption and in order to ease the transition, the Local Authority’s’ proposals for an incremental reduction in mum’s contact, which is supported by the Guardian, is the right plan. I know that that will obviously be upsetting to the mother, but I have to make an order from the perspective of the child’s welfare.
Finally, I note mother wishes to meet with the adopters if at all possible. In my view that is also laudable. Mother has made a very brave decision. If it is possible, and if the adopters are willing, then I think nothing but good could come out of that, although that is not a decision I have to make, or should indeed make to bind the adopters and it will need to be fully risk assessed if the adopters wish to carry that forward. Suffice to say, I conclude matters today in the manner that I have described for the reasons that I have set out.
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