J, K, L & M, Re

This is the final hearing in this matter which concerns four children, J aged almost 9, K aged almost 7, L aged almost 5 and M aged 2 and 1/2. They are the children of D and P, separated parents.

The children had resided with both parents until they separated in 2024 with the children remaining with D; the local authority became involved in early 2024. The concerns include physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of the children, exposure to incidents of domestic abuse and elements of neglectful care. Initially, P moved out of the family home in February 2024 following his arrest for causing/inciting a child to engage in a sexual act, rape of D and neglect of the children.

D engaged in three “Achieving Best Evidence” interviews with police which highlighted concerns around P’s volatile and sexualised behaviour towards her. She also made a number of allegations regarding the care he afforded to the children including physical aggression, verbal aggression, targeting of L in particular, tickling of the babies penises, assaulting the family dog in front of the children, watching pornography and masturbating in front of the children and engaging in sexualised behaviour with the family dog in front of the children which had allegedly gone on to be replicated by K.

A Strategy Discussion took place in the light of D’s allegations and the fact that she told social care that she knew that the sexual matters were going on but did nothing about it. Concern was raised at this meeting about the children’s behaviour and D’s ability to manage them. L’s behaviour was deteriorating, and D had told J’s class teacher that she was struggling to manage him; M was occasionally inappropriately dressed; J was not up to date with his immunisations and not registered with a dentist.The children were subject to child protection plans from July 2024 under the category of neglect due to worries around D’s ability to safely parent all four children.

A further strategy discussion meeting took place in September 2024 due to information shared to the Primary school by D and recorded:

The children continued to be cared for by D alone, until they were made subject to Police Protection Orders in October 2024.On that date the social worker completed an unannounced visit to the family home, where the home conditions were poor, there was food and mess all over the floors both upstairs and downstairs. All four children were present with their mother. K accompanied the social worker to her bedroom first, where a pink sex toy was observed on K’s bed. K made an allegation of sexual abuse towards D and explained to the social worker how the sex toy is allegedly used. Following Children’s Services informing the police of this information the police attended the home address and D was arrested on suspicion of sexual assault of a child by penetration and inciting a child to engage in sexual activity and the children placed with their maternal grandparents. Proceedings were commenced in November 2024 with the concerns and threshold reflecting both the issues raised by D and also her own actions in relation to the same, including failing to protect the children. An interim care order was made on [..] November 2024 with the children remaining in placement with their maternal grandparents. D has contact 3 times each week but P has had no direct contact since February 2024 in accordance with his bail conditions. Indirect contact has recently recommenced. D was initially arrested but charges were later dropped.

The matter is outside the 26-week target for these proceedings due to the need for expert assessment and significant police evidence including ABE interviews with the children. This final hearing took place at week 49 which is regrettable but unavoidable.

During the proceedings there have been a number of assessments, including a cognitive assessment of the parents by Dr Allen, which did identify the need for an intermediary for P but not D. Participation measures were considered and applied throughout.

D has been the subject of a parenting assessment by the local authority and P by an ISW Adam McCarthy. Both were negative. In respect of D: “D has not demonstrated that she can safely care for the children, instead she has exposed them to a significant level of trauma by continuing in the relationship with P for as long as she did despite alleging that he has physically, sexually and emotionally abused the children over many years. D has not been forthcoming with serious and alarming information that could have been acted on to ensure that the children were kept safe. Instead she has concealed and failed to report this information in a timely manner so that children's needs could be prioritised.”

“Again as previously mentioned, should the children have been subject to the abuse D alleges against their father, they have suffered significant harm over a prolonged period of time without their mother reporting this to services in order to safeguard them. They would have seen and been subjected to terrifying events and sexual boundaries within the home would have been completely blurred.

However, should these allegations made against P by D, not be true and it is found that D has been dishonest about these, the children have also suffered significant harm. They have been stopped from having a relationship with their father for over 12 months as a result of bail conditions, they are currently not cared for by their mother and they have been subject to intrusive forensic medicals and police interviews. This level of interventions from services is extensive and intrusive and given the children's very young ages, theses experiences have no doubt been detrimental in their own way to their childhoods.”

The assessment recommended that D should undertake further work and training, but “The timescale for this work [significant recommended work including the CAT] to be completed by D is not within the children's timescales and sadly given that D has had interventions recommended to her previously that she hasn’t engaged in to change the situation for her and her children, it is unlikely that the children could be safely cared for at home in her care.”

In respect of P: “In my professional opinion, P does not demonstrate the ability to meet the competing needs of the children. He struggles to understand their lived experiences and he does not consider it his role to assist the children to develop and learn appropriate and positive sibling relationships”. P did not challenge the outcome of his assessment, D did until the hearing commenced.

There was also a psychological assessment of the whole family by Dr Jennifer Mathews which raised significant risk issues with the parents themselves and their ability to care for the children. The report confirmed that the children have secure attachments to their maternal grandparents but were not close to their father and were scared of him. They were closer to their mother than their father. She had no concerns about the children’s sibling relationships, with them having been in the protective care of their grandparents for 5 months. M and K were showing some signs of delay in developing in certain areas but these have improved since they moved from their parents. J and L have some organic difficulties. In her view “the care that they have been provided by their maternal grandparent has enabled them to begin to recover from harmful experiences, to feel safe and it is likely to have ameliorated emotional, social and behavioural harm to their development as a result of their experiences. This is a significant protective factor, and a reason why as described above the children’s relationships with the maternal grandparents are crucial”. Dr Matthews recommended therapy for the parents, twenty-four sessions of Cognitive Analytical Therapy for D and twenty sessions of Dialectical Behaviour Therapy for P. Prognosis was uncertain.

There is a considerable quantity of police evidence including interviews and there is also a separate bundle of video recordings. I have read and viewed all these. Only the three short CCTV videos were played during the hearing.

The guardian in her final analysis agreed with the recommendations of the parenting assessments and supported the children remaining with their maternal grandparents. As far as the children’s wishes and feelings were concerned “J shared that his care plan makes him “kinda sad” and he wants to live with his mum again. K was “happy living there”, with her maternal grandparents. L and M are too young to understand their care plan and share their views.” She was satisfied that the maternal grandparents are providing the children with a high standard of care. Contact between the children and D should be fortnightly but not be at their home as this would be confusing for them. Contact with their father could be reintroduced in due course with support and explanations and with P accepting that the children have been harmed by their lived experiences. It could be tailored for each child’s needs and wishes and feelings

I have read the evidence contained in the bundle and heard evidence from the initial social worker, the allocated social worker and author of D’s parenting assessment, the parents, and the guardian. I received late documents including a statement from D, text messages, medical records and amended threshold. I do not intend to review all the evidence in detail but will address where it was either relevant to my decision or particularly pertinent in my analysis section.

The local authority seek findings in accordance with their threshold, to determine whether the allegations against P and D are true and whether D has failed to protect the children from harm, in order to assist with future planning for the children, with their plan for the children being for them remaining with their maternal grandparents subject to care orders. D accepted much of the threshold, P accepted little and accordingly this hearing has proceeded as a combined fact finding and welfare hearing. With regard to the welfare issues and future plans for the children, until part way through the first day, D sought for the children to be rehabilitated to her care failing which she accepted they should remain with her parents. This suddenly changed to her accepting that the children should remain with her parents in long term foster care but seeking an immediate plan or “roadmap” setting out work which would ultimately lead to them being returned to her care. P agreed with the plans of the local authority. The Guardian supported the plans of the local authority. This has been a fully attended hearing over five days.

This case did not fulfil the criteria so as to justify a discrete fact-finding hearing. Both the social worker and the children’s guardian expressed the opinion that they would be supporting the making of care orders whether or not all the allegations and threshold were established. Nonetheless, I am called upon to consider and make or reject the allegations. Certainly, as far as P was concerned this was the crux of the dispute.

The legal framework resolving the threshold / schedule of findings sought is now well settled. In determining issues of fact, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities (Re B [2008] UKHL 35). The burden of proof lies upon the person or body that makes the allegations.

Findings of fact must be based on evidence and not speculation (Re A (A Child)(Fact Finding Hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12). In that case Munby J (as he then was) pertinently said:

Evidence must not be looked at in separate compartments and a judge must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion as to whether the allegations are made out to the appropriate standard of proof (Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558).

In relation to the issue of similar fact evidence and propensity I have considered Peter Jackson LJ in S (Children: Findings of Fact) [2023] EWCA Civ 1113 para [30]:

“I also consider that the judge was in error in relation to the issues of propensity and hindsight bias. The question of propensity or similar fact evidence arises where an individual's behaviour in other circumstances makes it more likely that he will have behaved in the manner now alleged: see R v P (Children: Similar Fact Evidence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1088, [2020] 4 WLR 132 at [23]. In that case, the question was whether a's behaviour towards one partner was admissible in relation to allegations made by another partner. Here, the court was concerned with a sequence of events within the same family. Self-evidently, one finding about a parent's behaviour towards a child might be relevant to another similar allegation and there was no need to resort to the concept of propensity or to erect artificial barriers around the assessment of evidence. Similarly, the well-known concept of hindsight bias cannot deflect the court from making a common-sense assessment of the evidence as a whole, and I do not understand the judge's apprehension that the local authority was asking him to do something unusual or impermissible.”

A leading case is Re P (Sexual Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearing) [2019] EWFC 27. where the comments and decision of Macdonald J throughout remain relevant and persuasive and they have been considered.

In the case of SR [2018] EWCA Civ 2738, Baker LJ set out a number of points about ABE guidance, which is relevant to the evidence of children both within and outside the formal process. I have also considered the very recent Court of Appeal case of Re H (Children) (Findings of Fact) [2025] EWCA Civ 993 which specifically considers issues of disclosures, ABE interviews and findings.

The principles to be applied in relation to the evidence of children have been set out in numerous authorities. In AS v TH [2016] EWHC 532, MacDonald J noted that the courts have endorsed a number of the general principles set out in the ABE guidelines:

I have also considered the recent Court of Appeal case of Re H (Children) (Findings of Fact) [2025] EWCA Civ 993 which specifically considers issues of disclosures, ABE interviews and findings.

Despite these cautions, findings of abuse based on ABE interviews are and will continue to be made in appropriate cases. The standard of proof remains a balance of probability.

If a court concludes that a witness has lied about one matter, it does not follow that he or she has lied about everything. A witness may lie for many reasons, for example, out of shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion and emotional pressure (R v Lucas [1981] QB 720). The application of this principle should go beyond the court merely reminding itself of it in broad terms: Re H-C (Children) [2016] 4 WLR 85.

In Lancashire County Council v C, M and F (Children; Fact Finding Hearing) [2014] EWFC 3, Peter Jackson J (as he then was) stated:

A judge should avoid placing excessive or exclusive reliance on the demeanour of a witness: Re B-M (Children: Findings of Fact) [2021] EWCA Civ 1371 albeit the assessment of the impression made by a witness may be given weight by a judge alongside other matters in a case where the facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents and where due account is taken of the pressure involved in giving oral evidence.

Finally in relation to issues of fact finding and threshold, there are many allegations against the parents and a very detailed threshold document. In this regard, I have also had in mind the very recent appeal decision in Re K and G (Care Proceedings: Fact-Finding) [2025] EWCA Civ 910 which addressed the fact that whilst in some fact-finding hearings, judges structured their judgment in line with a local authority's threshold document that set out the findings it sought, they were not obliged to do so. Provided the judge in a fact-finding hearing ensured that the parties had a fair hearing and delivered a judgment covering the ground within the known parameters of the case, it did not matter that the structure of the judgment departed from the threshold document. Noting this, I will further address my reason for making the findings as I consider to be necessary. In my judgment, it is the overall presentation of the family and the issue of domestic abuse, sexual boundaries, and failures to protect which are most pertinent.

Turning to the proceedings more generally I must consider the four questions at the heart of care proceedings. These are as follows: (i) Is the legal threshold set out in section 31 of the Children Act established? (ii) If so what are the permanence provisions of the care plan? (iii) What are the contact provisions? (iv) having regard to the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration of the Court, what final orders, if any, should be made?

The legal threshold requires the Court to find that the children have either suffered significant harm at a relevant date or were likely to suffer significant harm if an order is not made with such harm being attributable to the care given to them by their parent/carer and with such care falling below the care to be expected of a reasonable parent. The establishment of the threshold empowers the Court to make a public law order (care or supervision orders) but does not direct the Court to do so. Whether an order should be made will be assessed having regard to the welfare of the child, which is the Court’s paramount consideration, and with regard to the intersection between the order sought and the Article 8 rights of the family members to respect for their private family life and the right not to have this infringed save where to do so is proportionate, necessary, reasonable and lawful. I must consider the options for the children applying the considerations set out in Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 and other leading cases. I have also considered section 1 of the Children Act 1989 with regard to the no order principle and the issue of delay.

I heard oral evidence from the previous social worker. She was challenged strongly on the nuances of different wording in her initial note and statement to the police about precisely what K said to her but I was satisfied that the differences were minimal and her explanation was entirely adequate. Further, I do not accept that asking K whether “mummy rubs it” was a leading question in circumstances where K had just stated that she rubbed it on herself “with mummy.” I found her to be an impressive and professional witness who was fair and balanced. I accept her evidence that K made the disclosures as stated to her and that she acted appropriately and professionally thereafter.

The allocated social worker’s oral evidence was in line with her written evidence. She was clear and consistent throughout. She considered that D’s engagement with the local authority had reduced more recently, including at contact. P had fully engaged throughout and she had now re-introduced indirect contact and further progression would be planned based on the children’s responses.

D’s lower cognitive functioning level was apparent during her evidence with her appearing to be naïve and rather idealistic in some of her answers and her diagnosed avoidant coping style was also apparent. She sought to paint herself in the best possible light and attempted to avoid or minimise many of the significant concerns and issues raised as well as lying at times. There were several inconsistences in her evidence, both written and oral, and on occasions the concessions she made when challenged did not fit rationally with her reasons for the same. For example she was adamant that she had never used the word “tap” in relation to P hitting the children yet when confronted with the evidence from the police that she had used the word, she moments later conceded this but claimed she was merely using the officer’s own words. I simply cannot accept that. The officer carefully used the word “tapped” in quotes in his note, usually used to symbolise someone’s precise words. There is then the explanation about her shouting at the children which D insisted had never ever happened yet her own text message accepted that she screams and shouts at them, effectively when she is at the end of her tether due to their behaviour. The court was then told that this was not shouting and screaming as normal people would think but her merely being firm, certainly not shouting or screaming. Again I cannot accept this as a rational or reasonable explanation. Shouting and screaming is different from speaking firmly. There is also evidence from at least one of the children that she shouts.

Whether D’s evidential contradictions were due to her cognitive profile or to having a poor memory or even due to lies is not straightforward. Much of her evidence had a ring of truth to it and were it not for other contradictions, it could be entirely believable. I have of course considered the case of Lucas and finding that D has lied about one thing does not mean that she had lied about everything. In her oral evidence about P forcing her to have sex with him, she was clear that this had happened, that she had said no and that he had forced his hand between her legs and continued despite her saying no. She did not seek in her evidence to accuse him of rape and indeed in her police interview, despite revealing the abuse, she downplayed it, saying she had given in to avoid “aggro.” Had she been lying about these events, then she may have chosen to make a more detailed allegation and indeed a proper accusation. I note however that in her final statement, filed during the final hearing, she refers to showing P in “subtle” ways that she did not want to have sexual intercourse, another anomaly or contradiction. It is also correct that she did not mention any sexual assaults to the police when completing the police report on the log following P’s arrest save for rough sex. Her explanation was that she had only given information which related to the children and this may be understandable at what was no doubt a shocking and stressful time. If D has been the victim of domestic abuse throughout the relationship as she informed the psychologist, then she may have found it difficult to admit this or not even recognised such behaviour as abusive. It is common for victims of any form of abuse not to be open about them at the beginning and indeed only open up many years later. However, in my judgment there are simply too many inconsistencies in D’s accounts for me to make some of the findings either without corroboration or as isolated matters.

Her behaviour as explained in her evidence concerning the issue of K’s sexualised behaviour with the dog was unsatisfactory but was in line with her profile’s coping style of avoidance. It was clear that she chose not to question K as to the reasons for her behaviour with the dog, and attempted to justify this in her evidence by suggesting that K would not have been able to explain at her age. I do not accept that a normally developing five-year-old child like K would not be able to explain or give a reason, particularly as her own mother describes her as bright. It is notable that in other evidence D is happy to accept J’s words at the same age and he has communication difficulties. In my judgment, it was not simply a case of her acting to stop the behaviour as she claimed, but she deliberately chose not to question K, potentially as she may not want to know the answer, maybe she already knew or maybe the sexual boundaries in the family were so skewed that it was not thought to be such a big issue. Whatever the reason, failing to recognise the risks, including serious infection, and investigate the cause at all is not a normal caring or appropriate response to such a shocking act, particularly when there have been three instances of the same. She admitted never discussing reasons for the behaviour this with P despite claiming he was present on one occasion.

D’s evidence about the sexual acts by P which she saw taking place on the sofa in the presence of the children and in the kitchen with the dogs was clear and she stated that she had seen the behaviour with two different dogs. Such behaviour could help to explain how the behaviour and boundaries of the children have become so blurred and sexualised. P admitted in his evidence that the dogs had tried to lick his penis so D can legitimately claim to have seen this on the video. Her evidence was stated simply and dismissively to the police and she seemingly failed to appreciate that her own limited reactions to these incidents would leave her open to considerable criticism for not protecting the children due to her (lack of) response to the same. The fact that D appeared not to appreciate that what she had seen P doing with the dog and his penis was extremely inappropriate (per her police interview) raises significant concerns about her understanding of right and wrong and of proper sexual behaviour and boundaries within the family. There was no real evidence of shock and revulsion either in her evidence and she appears to have done little by way of challenging him other than a text message.

She also consistently left her vibrator where it could be found by the children. I do not agree with D’s opinion that K does not know what a penis or a vibrator is, K clearly has some understanding from her conversation with the social worker and from her embarrassment and hiding of the implement. Nor do I accept D’s denial that she told K off, I accept the evidence of the social worker about what K told her and her change of demeanour as well as D herself telling the social worker that she had told K off. Hiding the vibrator afterwards was likely done in panic but was not appropriate.

The matter of fact and dismissive way she dealt with most of the allegations, including those about K and the dog (three occasions), the several occasions of the children using the vibrator as a toy and the fact that she saw P (using his phone and so potentially watching porn) and masturbating with K next to him, and with the dog in the kitchen raises significant concerns about her understanding of sexual abuse and risk. It appears not to have occurred to her that the scenario of these matters, with the children also playing with themselves and being sexualised with each other is all part of a bigger picture which has caused remarkably little real concern in D or indeed P. There is no evidence she took steps to protect the children or truly change things as the behaviour was repeated in some instances, this is also evidenced in her claims to have allowed P to have sex with her when she had said no and not understanding that this was potentially rape. The sexual boundaries in the family were extremely poor and offered little or no protection to the children. She either chose to ignore the risks by avoidance or she simply cannot see them.

It was submitted on behalf of P that he was a straightforward and honest witness. I do not agree. Even if he was being more honest during his oral evidence, some of this directly contradicted his written evidence and consistent denials of bad behaviour on his part. P was simply a witness who was unable to maintain his denials in the face of challenge. He consistently minimised his behaviour or sought to justify it. As with D, I have taken account of his cognitive issues and additional needs and the support which he had during these proceedings but these cannot deflect from the fact that his oral evidence particularly when challenged, was very different to his written evidence, even in his very late witness statement where he finally made some concessions. In short he too has lied at times. His excuses included shame and poor recall. Both parents were poor witnesses, seeking to self-serve within the proceedings.

P’s diagnosis of a Semantic Pragmatic Disorder and its effect was apparent during his evidence. He had certain styles of speech, or turns of phrase, which could be interpreted as being deliberately avoidant such as not answering directly yes or no and instead saying “maybe,” such as for example “I may have voiced it.” It was hard at times to know whether this was him being natural, forgetful, minimising, lying, or indeed delaying, avoiding or hedging his bets to see what the next question would be. Follow up questions usually clarified the answers but they were not always willingly offered at first.

He minimised his own behaviour and responsibility on many occasions. This includes the pregnancies where he seemed to claim that they were all due to D’s wishes and that he was shocked when she became pregnant but he then agreed that they had been actively trying for a baby including a consultation about IVF and he eventually but very reluctantly accepted that he played a full part. He admitted being annoyed at the pregnancies and that he did not want them all, had considered termination at one point and admitted that he had told D that he did not want another baby at one point. He minimised the issue of D’s pre-eclampsia, sending her a “simple” text message about hospital saying “oh don’t bother”. Now he accepted that it was wrong but then he “didn’t think”. He was thinking about his own aversion to hospital. He downplayed D’s contribution to looking after the family, criticising her for taking a break by going to her parents after looking after the four children all day; it was clear that he considered his working contribution to be much more significant. This was particularly surprising as he accepted that he found it difficult to parent the children alone even for short periods. He was not pleased that she became pregnant with L and admitted making this clear to D. He felt overwhelmed, despite the pregnancy being foreseeable due to lack of birth control and was grumpy and scathing to her, accepted that she was sad, hurt, and unsupported by him. He was cross when told she was pregnant with M at 16 weeks and admitted this to D. She had told him she was scared to tell him until 16 weeks and he accepted that she felt afraid but he had thought about himself and needed space and time to process things. When asked whether he had suggested an abortion he did not deny it but replied that he did not remember this.

Clear examples of P’s lies and minimisations was evidenced by the videos shown to the court. P certainly showed remorse for his actions and was genuinely upset in the witness box at times, particularly when watching the videos. He, however, continued to maintain in his evidence that he did not think he had an anger problem, and that his behaviour was merely frustration. Indeed he said that his frustration could have turned to anger but had not. I accept none of this. His behaviour in the videos was appalling, he was physically abusive to the dog, used very abusive language to D and screamed at and terrified the children, who were cowering under a table. If P still considers that his behaviour was merely frustration and not as bad as anger, it is a significant concern how his behaviour could manifest itself in anger.

P has belatedly admitted some abusive behaviour towards the children. This included, despite earlier denials, roughness with L and J on occasions. The main disputed issue now is that he claims that other than these admissions, his reprimands of the children were only a tap whereas D describes a smack. One incident viewed by the police satisfied them that it was a tap but smack is also the word used by K and the children have told professionals that he hits and hurts them. In his oral evidence he demonstrated a firm two or three fingered tap on the forehead and admitted that sometimes he used more force than he should have to get their attention.

In addition to his abusive behaviour towards D he was dismissive and lacking in empathy and awareness, this may be exacerbated by his diagnosis. He did not consider that someone being squeezed whilst pregnant would ever feel frightened. He was completely unaware that the children were close for the incident in the kitchen in the recording of his abusive behaviour despite them being heard in the background. He accepted bad language to D in both videos but seemed to blame her for his behaviour in shouting and banging in the second video as she had not told him about a meeting and he considered that she should have done so. He said he was merely frustrated, not angry although he was getting angry. In the video it is very apparent that there was a loss of control and temper, he is visibly seething, with clenched fists, using foul language, stalking around the kitchen and appearing very threatening. He denied this, which in my judgment damages his credibility. He even admitted that the argument went on for one to one and a half hours with him trying to make his point. He finally admitted that he had gone too far and that when he focussed on himself this could happen.

His deflections and minimisations continued. The language which he has used abusively towards D was unacceptable but at one point he excused the sending of an abusive message because D had been antagonising him and on another sought to excuse his behaviour because D had failed to tell him about the meeting. He admitted swearing in front of the children but only by mistake. He admitted hitting the kitchen worktop but “not very hard.” The reality from the video is that he did hit it hard and with both hands clenched in fists whilst screaming at D.

P admitted that he could become entirely focussed on himself and not be aware of other matters around him. Examples of this were being unaware that the children were in earshot of his videoed behaviour as I have just addressed and when masturbating. He initially denied masturbating in the lounge, saying that he was merely scratching and blaming his work trousers and heat. He was sat in his dressing gown and it was clear that this behaviour was not a one off, he admitted it was “quite a few times” and that he had received text messages from D telling him to stop once or twice from what she had seen on the cameras. She, however was mistaken, as it was merely scratching he claimed. We now have the text message D sent on one occasion which specifically tells him “don’t do that in front of your children… stroking yourself”, which is corroborative evidence both that D has seen him touching himself and that the children were present on at least one occasion. His immediate response to such a significant allegation was not as you would expect to deny the accusation but rather to accuse D of doing similar, with a later denial almost as an afterthought. In his oral evidence he admitted having a quick scratch when he thought the children were not looking. He did finally admit to masturbating but only if the children were not downstairs. He said he would have seen the children if they were there but did admit that if he was very focussed on his own needs and could have missed them, admitting that he was not always aware of their presence (as in the video). He said that if he wanted to “do my needs” he would check that they are not there, “if they come downstairs I’ll stop and clear up.” There is then the issue of the involvement or presence of the dogs during masturbation, with P readily admitting that he would masturbate in the lounge with the dogs around and they would try to sniff and lick his penis. D claims to have seen the dogs licking him and it is possible that this may have taken place before P pushed them away, with him being so concentrated on himself as he admits. These issues raise significant concerns about appropriate sexual behaviour, boundaries, and awareness of risk in general. It is difficult to see how P thought that sitting in the living room, masturbating, scratching or stroking whilst in his dressing gown with dogs present and interested, children possibly present or likely to enter the room could ever be appropriate or safe behaviour.

P also stated in his oral evidence that he was aware and saw the dog run to L’s genital area when he was shouting in the video; L covered up. His explanations for this behaviour were they he had been teaching the children to cover themselves if a dog approached them in this manner. However, he denied ever having seen K being licked by the dog and claimed to be giving this advice to her independently. It would not be common teaching for a small child unless something has happened and L’s instinct was to protect himself too. It appears that neither parent ensured that the children were properly dressed and wearing underwear when around the dogs as would be the usual actions of a caring and protective parent, particularly if the dogs were showing interest. To me this is further evidence of the laissez-faire attitudes and blurred boundaries concerning the family and sexual matters. D’s evidence was that the dogs had licked K’s vulva in the kitchen with P present, his response was that he may not have seen it as his back was turned. I note that he denied even being aware of the behaviour which contradicts with his claim in his oral evidence of teaching the children to protect themselves against it, whilst additionally failing to ensure that they were protected by underwear. It simply does not make sense and to me this explanation is implausible. I accept D’s evidence that he was present on one occasion when K allowed the dog to lick her and that D mentioned it to him.

P denied tickling L’s penis and could not recall being told not to by D. He admitted being “handsy” when cleaning K’s genitals when he was washing her until age 4/5 years. He accepted that the children walked around nude. He accepted watching porn on his phone (as did D).

I now set out now the agreed parts of the threshold.

P had continued to deny much of the threshold save for where there was clear physical evidence of the same such as the videos of him punching the fridge, physically abusing the family dog or where it did not directly affect him such as D’s mental health diagnosis. His oral evidence, however, provided more information and admissions.

Before I address the individual disputed threshold findings I intend to address specific areas of concern related to the family. My concerns are not just linked to the findings and individual issues of threshold but the larger picture of this dysfunctional family, with a father whose behaviour to/in front of the mother and children can be both abusive, threatening and occasionally violent, with the inappropriate and blurred sexual boundaries and a wholesale failure by the mother to take action to protect the children against any of these.

DOMESTIC ABUSE

The domestic abuse issues also crossed over into sexual abuse issues with D tentatively suggesting rape but then admitting being subtle in her refusals. Her evidence to the police is contradictory and she has minimised the behaviour which she has alleged was perpetrated by P on occasion. I do not consider either of them to be particularly credible witnesses. This has meant that, where there are uncorroborated accusations and findings sought where it would be simply one persons word against the others, together with their contradictory evidence, some of the accusations cannot be proven to the civil standard even with the whole evidential picture being taken into account. I have considered the Lucas direction when making my decisions and considered all the evidence including the veracity of denials and the totality of the evidence. I cannot be satisfied that she clearly made P aware that she was saying no when she herself said in her final statement that she was subtle.

SEXUAL DYNAMICS AND BOUNDARIES

The only evidence for some of the sexual abuse allegations concerning the children is from D and it is uncorroborated. The children’s limited evidence is not sufficiently persuasive, taking into account all the guidance and caselaw, certainly not to the required burden of proof. These allegations relate to the tickling of L’s penis, which if done even in fun was inappropriate, and to the allegation of lifting K’s hands and touching her genitals. P denied these and there is no other evidence of the same, certainly not sufficient to satisfy this court to the requisite burden. Even though these cannot be proven, the children’s sexualised behaviour and the blurred sexual boundaries remain of great concern to this court. P has admitted being “handsy” with K when cleaning her genitals and denied “flicking” L’s penis. He denied masturbating when the children were around but later admitted that he could have been unaware. It is hard to know exactly what these children have actually witnessed but it appears likely that it is considerably more than their parents were aware of. I do not accept D’s assertions or submissions that the incident with the vibrator is as innocent as she claims, with the children using it as a wand. Nor do I accept that the social worker immediately jumped to the conclusion that there had been abuse. I have already said that she was an impressive witness. In her evidence D downplayed and suggested that the whole vibrator incident was not sexualised behaviour, that K did not know what a vibrator was and said that she did not believe what the social worker had said about K rubbing it. She said that she had no idea why or how K would know how to use it. I accept that K was embarrassed and had been told off.

It is not my role to ascertain precisely why K behaved as she did or made the disclosures about the vibrator in the absence of a plausible explanation which satisfies the burden and standard of proof, but what is clear is that there was a highly sexually charged and active relationship/atmosphere between the parents, with P masturbating and watching porn, potentially being unaware that the children were present in the same room, also nearby when he was in the kitchen and on other occasions. Both parents watch porn on their phones, both parents allow the children to play with the phones but denied porn being present on the phone. D’s evidence is of P frequently demanding sexual intercourse and one of the arguments on video is about this issue. A potential explanation may be that the children have witnessed certain behaviour by and between both of their parents potentially with the parents being unaware of the same. K may have witnessed her mother playing with her vibrator and may have seen her father masturbating, with the dog if not directly involved then on the periphery, and seen porn on either her mother or father’s phone. These could explain her behaviour with the dog and her disclosures about the vibrator. We will likely never know, but I have addressed the parents’ evidence earlier and my comments on the issues of sexual boundaries and risk and those comments are particularly relevant in relation to these issues. D’s dismissive way of dealing with P’s demands for sex, with denials but laughter and acceptance do not suggest a suitable and appropriately protective atmosphere where precautions were taken to protect, keep private and not to expose the children to adult behaviour. The same casual lack of care is evidenced by the apparent ease whereby K could locate D’s sex toy on several occasions and with how D has dealt with the sexual behaviour as I have already addressed. The dismissiveness and lack of curiosity and concern are stark. I cannot be satisfied to the standard of proof that the actual sexual abuse suggested by the local authority in the threshold has happened as opposed to the children merely being exposed to sexual behaviour in some other way such as witnessing the same in person, on a screen or even hearing such behaviour. Children are naturally very inquisitive and most parents are very careful to protect them. Given the behaviour of the children individually and with each other, it is highly likely that these children have witnessed sexual acts in some form, although not necessarily deliberately. They have certainly been exposed to sexualised behaviour, there is no other rational explanation. Children do not simply and suddenly become sexualised beings.

FAILURES TO PROTECT

Mother has admitted failure to protect. I am satisfied that P has failed to protect too, that he failed to take any action when aware of the behaviour of K and the dog and any other behaviour he may have witnessed between the children.

I will now directly address the disputed findings

The order which is sought in relation to all four children is a profound order which would result in the loss for them of a chance to be brought up by their own mother or father at this time. To make such an order I must be satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate to the gravity of the harm which they would suffer if I do not. I must be satisfied that all avenues have been explored to allow them to be cared for by their mother, including with the provision of appropriate services. In view of D’s late change of position and indeed the duty upon the court to choose the best option for these children, I still need to consider and address the welfare issues.

Here I am weighing up two realistic options; D who despite her later position dearly wishes to care for her children and a placement remaining with their present relative carers with whom they have lived since October 2024. Whichever option I approve, they will have the benefit of remaining within their family long term which is a great positive. They will have regular contact with their mother and if appropriate and safe, their father.

It is in that context that I should consider the capacity of D and anyone else I think relevant to meet those needs. Firstly, I will note that until the final hearing D disputed parts of the threshold which I have found proven, mainly in relation to issues concerning failures to protect and act appropriately. The fact that she still disputed these matters raises concerns that she does not fully appreciate the risks. P of course denied most allegations until very late and many have been found proven as I have stated. This raises significant concerns about his honesty, understanding and ability to protect the children as well as his continued placing of blame on the children or their mother and his failure to take personal responsibility. It is noted that it is only after the allegations were made that D sought to end the relationship with P, that she initially maintained contact with him and that it took her some time before she spoke openly about the nature of their relationship.

The Local Authority has prepared a detailed analysis of the options for the children in the final SWET, likewise the Guardian in her Final Analysis. I agree with the conclusions therein.

Contact with D is presently twice each week and the local authority’s final plan was for contact to take place on a monthly basis. The guardian recommended fortnightly and the local authority agreed, with the frequency to be reconsidered at the fortnightly stage, some weeks into the final plan implementation. D sought flexibility – “as and when” but wanted three times each week and to include putting them “to bed at least twice a week, and do a nice activity with them at the weekend, as we would normally do, and go out for the day.” This is wholly unrealistic. I agree entirely with the guardian in her analysis that contact should be at least fortnightly and “be dependent on the arrangements and how long the duration could be. The children are within a family placement, with their mother living locally with risks that can be managed, as D has not done anything to undermine the safety planning for the children. A limited amount of contact within a family placement could risk the children wanting to gravitate back to their mother as they grow older, if their relationship is not suitably promoted, and risks them feeling resentment towards their grandparents if they feel they are prevented from having a relationship with their mother. I have the view that the children’s mother visiting them at maternal grandparents’ home, whilst would be more convenient, would not be recommended as this could confuse matters in terms of their main carer, but also may undermine the guidance and boundaries that [MGPs] have in place.” I accept that at least fortnightly contact, of at least 1.5 hours but potentially with varying durations dependent upon plans and supervision is the appropriate level to balance their time, relationships and need for security and routine. The local authority with the input of the family will be able to make suitable arrangements for contact as the children grow and develop.

Regarding the time with P, I agree with the guardian and the Local Authority’s view that only indirect would be appropriate initially. Their plan stated “The children require their time with their father to be re-introduced, but also be offered a child-friendly explanation about why they have not had any communication with their father in over a year, to prevent them feeling a sense of rejection. P also needs to be able to show an acceptance to the impact on the children based on their lived experience, and his responsibility with this. However, once this is in place and implemented, it could be considered following this whether direct contact would be appropriate for each child individually (as the feelings for each child would differ due to their different relationship they had with their father).” Happily, indirect contact has commenced, and the local authority continue to plan for future contact. It would be useful if they could set out a basic plan, subject to the progress and children’s needs merely as a guide.

I did not require the local authority to prepare a swift reconciliation roadmap for D as suggested by her, as there are numerous issues which need to be addressed and considered in respect of potential support, therapy and work, for both parents and children alike, over a significant period of time. To set out a road map at this time would be rushed and based on an unclear picture, and could be disruptive or cause problems later with misunderstandings. There should be time allowed after this decision for matters to settle and for contact and its progress to be assessed before future planning. I stress that the court does not make short term care orders, the order which I make will be on the basis that it will last until the children achieve their majority without a plan of rehabilitation, but of course matters will be reviewed and plans can be challenged if appropriate. A document setting out the general nature of what D (and P) need to do to improve themselves and indeed for contact would however be useful for them following these proceedings.

All four children are very comfortable and settled with their grandparents. K is happy living with them and does not want things to change. She did not mention her father to the guardian. J would like to live with his mum and see his father L and M are too young to properly express their own wishes and feelings verbally. They would most likely wish to be brought up by one of their birth parents. They are all dependent on their carers.

They have been protected from harm since being in the care of the grandparents. If I do not make orders which sufficiently protect them, this failure would leave them exposed to future harm from the matters which I have set out in relation to the threshold.

The flipside of course is that the local authority’s plan, which would have them remain placed with the grandparents, exposes them to the possible long-term harm which will flow from being separated from the care of a parent, and in particular, the harm that that can do to a child’s sense of their own identity. This would of course be alleviated by contact. It may well be necessary for the children to have individual separate plans for contact with their father depending upon their reactions and with D if she remains unable to truly work as a family unit during contact. All this can be reviewed as time progresses.

Their physical, emotional, educational needs are essentially those of any other children of their age, having regard to their age and characteristics. They are receiving appropriate support for their learning needs. They need attention to be paid to their physical and emotional health, they need to be protected from harm, they need to have opportunities to socialise and learn, and commitment from their carers to provide them with what they need for the whole of their childhood. At home now, they have clear boundaries in place but a high level of emotional warmth. Feedback from J’s and K’s school mirrors what was reported by the grandparents, that they appear much more settled. There have also been improvements observed by school in terms of the children’s presentation, punctuality and having necessary items available. If they remain with the maternal grandparents they will not be subjected to change. The evidence of the social worker was that there have been great improvements in the children’s presentation and relationships with each other whilst in foster care and this can continue if they remain with their carers.

Given the harm suffered in the care of P and D, as I have found established in the threshold, they are at risk of suffering further harm. In view of D’s failures to protect her children, which was only partially or latterly accepted by her, no support would be able to protect them at this time given that the recommended work is of significant length, outside the children’s timescales.

Sadly at this time neither parent is able to care for the children but they have both recognised this and I give them credit for this. They now need to support the children in placement and promote this to them, making no attempts to unsettle them by any talk of change or return home without the express agreement of the local authority after all work and necessary consequent reassessment had been completed.

I have considered all of the options for placement of the children in accordance with Re B. The best place for any child would be within a child’s birth family unless there were clear welfare grounds to prefer an alternative. I have considered the detailed analysis of the options, by both the LA and the Guardian. I endorse their recommendations and accept their analysis. The proposed family placement is the best option for these children. It will provide the stability and security they need and will enable them to maintain links with their parents and within the extended family.

I make the findings as stated and final care orders.

I approve the plans including the amendments to the contact plans

This concludes my judgment