M v F

This is a fact-finding hearing to deal with allegations made in the context of Children Act proceedings. The parties are the two parents, M and F, and the proceedings concern their child A.

M and F were in a relationship from 2015. When A was born in 2020, they were not living together, and both accept that their relationship had been an ‘on/off’ one. A currently lives with M and spends supervised time with F in accordance with an order made by DJ Devlin on 13^th August 2024. A also has once a month video calls with F and indirect cards or gifts from him.

The proceedings commenced on 6^th June 2024 when M applied for a Prohibited Steps Order (PSO). Justices heard the first hearing, which appears to have been on an urgent basis because CAFCASS safeguarding was not complete, on 12^th June 2024. A PSO was granted preventing F from removing A from the care of M or any person or institution etc to whom M had entrusted her care. That order was made for the duration of the proceedings and to be reviewed at subsequent hearings. The case was allocated to District Judge, CAFCASS were directed to complete safeguarding, the Local Authority to file a letter detailing their involvement, and the matter listed for a Directions Hearing on 13^th August 2024.

By the hearing on 13^th August 2024 a safeguarding letter had been filed, but checks from the Local Authority remained outstanding. CAFCASS recommended consideration of PD12J and whether there needed to be a fact-finding hearing in relation to M’s allegations of domestic abuse towards her by F and of sexual abuse towards A by F. DJ Devlin, who heard the case on 13^th August, issued various case management directions and listed the matter for a Pre-Trial Review (PTR) on FAD after 11^th October 2024. He also made the aforementioned order for supervised contact between A and F.

The PTR took place on 24^th October 2024 before DJ Jenkins. He directed that a Qualified Legal Representative (QLR) be appointed by HMCTS to conduct cross-examination of M in the fact-finding hearing since F was a litigant in person. He made various other case management directions, including the exchange of schedules of allegations, and that the case be listed for a fact-finding hearing over three days on the FAD after 18^th November 2024. This led to the case first being listed for a fact-finding hearing commencing on 3^rd February 2025 before a District Judge.

Unfortunately, lack of judicial availability for the hearing on 3^rd February 2025 led to the hearing being vacated and re-listed to commence on 29^th April 2025 before HHJ Sweeney. Allocation remained formally to District Judge, however a Circuit Judge had earlier diary space. No QLR could be found for that listing, though, and the matter was re-listed before me on 6^th October 2025. A QLR was confirmed as available for this hearing on 26^th September 2025, and Ms Belegu duly attended to cross examine M on behalf of F during this FFH. Unfortunately, solicitors for M failed to send the bundle to Ms Belegu until 9am on 6^th October 2025. Quite why this happened is not clear, especially since the Court was sent the bundle on 2^nd October and solicitors for M were told by the court office (in answer to a question from them about this) on 29^th September 2025 that Ms Belegu was the appointed QLR. As a result of the late receipt of the bundle, Ms Belegu needed more time to prepare for her cross examination of M which I allowed, both at the start of the first day and subsequently during M’s evidence.

I have read the evidence contained in the Court Bundle, and heard evidence from M and F.

M alleges that F has sexually abused A, was emotionally abusive and manipulative to A by encouraging her to say negative things about M; and that he has been emotionally abusive and coercively controlling towards M during their relationship.

F denies the allegations, though he accepts that he removed A from nursery without M’s consent on 26^th April 2024 and was in the vicinity of A’s school on two occasions. He accepts that A has displayed sexualised behaviour for a number of years, though not that he has seen the same extent of the behaviour described by M.

Whoever makes an allegation has the burden of proving that it is true. They must do so to the civil standard, ie on balance of probabilities (Miller v Ministry of Pensions [1947] 2 ALL ER 372). I have considered both Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2008] 2 FLR 141 and Re Y (No 3) [2016] EWHC 503. As the case law makes clear, an allegation will therefore be proved if the person making it establishes that it is more likely than not that it happened. The seriousness of the allegation or the seriousness of the consequences make no difference to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the facts. Findings of fact must be based on evidence and not on suspicion or speculation, though can be based on inferences properly drawn from the evidence (Re A (A child) (Fact finding hearing: Speculation) [2011] ECWA Civ 12). Evidence is also not evaluated and assessed separately, “A Judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevant of each piece of evidence to the other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof” (Butler Sloss P in Re T [2004] ECWA (Civ) 556). The court looks at the ‘broad canvas of the evidence’ and “the range of facts which may properly be taken into account is infinite” (H and R (child sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1996] 1 FLR 80). A court considering allegations of sexual abuse must take into account all of the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all of the other evidence (Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558). It is, however, not necessary to determine every subsidiary date-specific factual allegation (K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468).

I have taken into consideration the principles outlined in Re H-N and others (children) (domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 with regard to domestic abuse allegations. Practice Direction 12J Child Arrangements and Contact Order: Domestic Violence and Harm is also relevant which provides key definitions of domestic abuse including coercive control.

A Court can take into account the demeanour of a witness or the way in which they gave evidence but needs to be careful in approaching this, noting that in the case of emotive evidence a truthful witness may stumble and struggle whilst giving their evidence, whilst an untruthful witness may give their evidence in a composed manner. The Court may be assisted by internal consistency of evidence and considering how it fits with other parts of the evidence.

The principles outlined in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 are relevant. There can be many reasons why someone may lie including shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion or emotional pressure, and that just because a witness may lie about one aspect of their evidence it does not necessarily mean that they may be lying about other aspects.

I have also borne in mind that abusive behaviour has at its heart an imbalance of power in the relationship and that this is exploited by an abuser for their benefit. As is clear in case law such as Re H-N noted above, it is insidious in nature and requires sophisticated analysis, including an awareness of the potential for abuse to be maintained after separation and even where protective orders have been in force.

At the same time, a Court has to draw a distinction between abusive behaviour and poor behaviour which falls short of being domestically abusive. Hence the need for the Court to focus upon those findings which will have a material impact on child arrangements if proved.

M’s schedule of allegations starts with allegations of emotional abuse and manipulation of A by encouraging her to say things about M and that F was emotionally abusive and coercively controlling of M during their relationship (A37). However, as Mr Broadbent noted in closing, the most serious allegations in this case are those of sexual abuse and it thus may be sensible to consider them first. These are at 3 (a)-(f) (A40-A42) on the updated schedule of M’s allegations.

It is broadly not in dispute that A has displayed sexualised behaviour, and that this went on for a considerable period from the summer of 2022, potentially continuing to date from the evidence before me. The precise nature of that behaviour and the extent to which F was aware of it is in dispute. M’s evidence was that she first became aware of it and concerned about it in July 2022, which was a month after M and F agree that they ended their relationship. M’s description of A’s behaviour at this point is at C2. She described raising her concerns with the health visitor and with F, though he told me that he did not know the specific details and only that M had sought advice from the health visitor and been given guidance about how to approach this and reassured that what A was doing was perfectly normal for a child of her age. It doesn’t seem to be in dispute that she shared the advice with F. In her statement M said of the behaviour that she “wondered if this could be a possible sign of sexual abuse” (C2 para 7). She has not produced any evidence from the health visitor about her contact with them in 2022, unlike in relation to her contact with them in 2024. She said that she was reassured by the health visitor’s advice.

M’s evidence was that A continued to display sexualised behaviour, and that “with hindsight, I now believe that her behaviours have slowly escalated” (C3 para 8). F accepted in his evidence to me that he had seen A displaying some of the alleged behaviours, but not the most sexualised behaviours and had never seen her ‘vigorously rubbing herself’ as M alleged. He did describe A as ‘stroking’ her skin over her body, including her lower body and genital region, using the label on a blanket. In relation to an allegation that A slept horizontal with her bare bottom in the air (C3 of M’s first statement), he accepted that A would sometimes sleep on her front but pointed out that she would also sleep in other positions. It is not in dispute that both parents would co-sleep with A.

Despite the concerns that M said she had in 2022, and her description of A’s behaviours from that point, she did not allege sexual abuse by F until March 2024. On 22^nd March 2024, as set out in her statement at C3 to C5, M alleged that A told her “daddy hurt my bits”, and responded “daddy put sweets in my bits” when asked by M how (C4). M said that she was “unsure if she was telling the truth or not. I couldn’t help myself and I asked her 3 times did daddy hurt your bits, she said “yes, no yes”, she got annoyed with me then she wouldn’t speak any more” (C5). Prior to these questions, M had contacted her aunt, who is a Teaching Assistant, and been advised not to ask A lots of questions but to listen out for specifics, as M put in her statement at C4-C5 and confirmed in her evidence to me. Yet despite this clear advice she did ask A mutliple questions as her statement made clear. It was submitted by Mr Broadbent in closing that these were not leading questions and A’s answers were spontaneous and clear. However, that presupposes that M’s account of the questions she asked and the answers that A gave is accurate. Her credibility is therefore pivotal to this aspect.

In relation to M’s credibility, she produced her original written evidence for this court on 25^th September 2024. She was permitted to file updating statements in April 2025, and in September in readiness for this hearing. Somewhat unusually, she was also permitted to revisit events in September 2024 in her statement filed in April 2025, though Mr Broadbent noted that this had the benefit of reducing the amount of clarification required in evidence in chief. At C88 M described in October 2024 asking A if she “remembered telling me that daddy put sweets in her bits”. I would note that this question could have been a prompt to A since it was suggesting to A that she had said this in the first place and, although it was ostensibly phrased to ask her if she remembered something, it must be borne in mind that a parent asking a young child if they remember something could itself be suggesting to the child that there was something to remember, such is the power dynamic between parent and child. M did go on to describe A showing her what had allegedly happened in response to a further question from M, but this is in the context of a child who had also been displaying sexualised behaviours. It is not clear why M felt the need to ask A again about the alleged events from March, her statement simply says that it was about a week after another alleged incident on 23^rd October where A supposedly said that F could ‘tickle her in her bum’ (C88), something that was also alleged to have happened on the way to nursery on 22^nd March 2024. I heard no evidence to explain why this was something she suddenly felt the need to ask about, though she herself noted that the 23^rd October 2024 was the night before a court hearing in these proceedings.

At C89 M also described an alleged incident when A’s maternal grandmother was bathing her, when she was screaming and shouting, and afterwards saying things like “daddy hates me” and “daddy doesn’t’ love me”, and apparently telling M afterwards (when questioned) that the reason she shouted in the shower was because it “reminded [her] of daddy’s shower as they look alike” (C89). There is no evidence from the maternal grandmother about this, and it seems to be common ground between the parties that M has fallen out with her family over the allegations against F. In fact, one of her allegations of coercive and controlling behaviour is also that F has attempted to manipulate her family by minimising her concerns and attempting to paint M in a negative light (A42). I will return to this allegation later in this judgment. The absence of statement from the maternal grandmother is therefore unsurprising given the breakdown in maternal family relationships, but it does mean that I do not have any other evidence about this alleged incident. It is striking that M’s evidence shows A making negative comments about F in the same way that M says she did in the allegation that F has manipulated A to say negative comments about her. On M’s own account there is thus evidence of A saying negative things about both parents, not just about M after she has spent time with F. It is not clear what relevance this aspect of M’s evidence has beyond her contention that this is part of a pattern of challenging behaviours by A which she asserts is evidence of sexual abuse. The account she gives at C89 is one that could simply be consistent with a child having an age-appropriate tantrum.

Directly relevant to M’s credibility is the fact that, during her evidence to me in this hearing, she provided details in relation to the domestic abuse allegations which had not been previously in her written evidence to this court and were not in her original police statement at E29-E30. She accepted that she had not mentioned these before, but I heard no credible explanation why she had not mentioned them before. When questioned by Ms Belegu, she accepted that she had not sought a non-molestation order and, when I look at the largely unparticularised nature of her evidence initially submitted to the court and police at the outset in relation to the alleged domestic abuse, it seems she would have struggled to establish that an order was necessary. She did say that she sought a prohibited steps order, and that was sufficient to protect A from the danger of F removing her from her school, however her oral evidence about the ‘harassment’ and ‘stalking’ that she alleged F had subjected her to also acknowledged that this amounted to him being seen outside the school on 3^rd and 17^th September 2024, and sending her messages and turning up at her house and which the police noted were simply attempts on his part to see A. M also said in her first statement that when F came to the house on 9^th May 2024 (C14) it was because he was working in the vicinity and wanted to see A.

There was also a curious detail in M’s evidence to me that, on day one, prior to my allowing Ms Belegu more time to prepare her cross examination, M volunteered in answer to a completely different question that she had only “recently changed the code” on her door lock at home. When I resumed hearing her evidence on day two and Ms Belegu asked her about this if she was alleging that she was scared of F coming to her home. M said that she had changed the code “recently” but that this meant “during the proceedings”. I did not find her credible about this, she was unable to supply any date when pressed by Ms Belegu and simply said that by recently she meant during the proceedings, which is an odd definition of the word ‘recently’.

M also alleged that F had threatened suicide as a means of trying to coerce and control her, though this was in her police statement not her primary evidence to this court (E29). F accepted that he had sent the messages appended to the police statement, and that they describe him as being sent ‘to a dark place’, but he was clear that he was on holiday without A as a result of M’s allegations, upset and simply saying that he was going to give up fighting to see his daughter. He told me that, when he got home, he spoke to his mother who encouraged him not to give up, so he didn’t. Having looked at all of the evidence about these messages, as F accepted, it was unwise of him to continue to message M in light of the allegations of sexual abuse and in light of her saying she didn’t want to speak to him, but she also responded to his messages and did not block him. In fact, as she told me, she has not blocked him to date but has instead been blocked by him. He was also not prevented by the PSO from going to A’s school and was clear that he did not know that she was at that school on 3^rd September and it was coincidence that he was in the vicinity. Both M and F were clear that they live in fairly close proximity, and the school is also close by, so his account of being nearby is credible. It was also not challenged that he did not know that A was at the school in question on 3^rd September, and that he missed her first day of school as a result, something that is clear from his text messages in the police disclosure too. He accepted that he had been in the vicinity of the school on 17^th September in the hope of seeing her, though. This was not prohibited by the PSO but was unwise and not necessarily in A’s welfare interest given the level of acrimony between M and F at that point in light of M’s allegations, but I accept that he was distraught and desperate to see his daughter as again the police evidence overall demonstrates.

The incident on 26^th April 2024 when F removed A from her nursery without M’s consent is largely not in dispute. F agrees that he removed A without either telling M or obtaining her consent. There is a dispute about the end of the incident, though, M alleging that F retained A when she went to collect A from him, F alleging that M agreed to A remaining with him. It seems from M’s evidence in her first statement about this that she knew on 12^th April 2024 that F might try to remove A from nursery without her consent (C11). It is not clear why she thought this, but this seems to be around the time that police and social services closed their investigations without having identified any safeguarding concerns or criminal activity in relation to F. It seems on 19^th April 2024 M kept A home because she thought that F would try to collect A (C13), again without explaining why she thought this, though she alleged that F turned up at the nursery that afternoon. This was not put to F.

M’s only evidence in her first witness statement about the end of the weekend in question is that “on 27^th April 2024, thankfully, the Respondent returned A home at 9am” (C14). Neither of her two subsequent statements addressed this, so the only additional evidence before me about the end of the incident was that of F. He addressed this at C37-C38 in his first statement, providing considerably more detail than M in relation to the end of the incident. Whilst he clearly asked A to choose where she wanted to go when M turned up at his house, and it was not a child focused action to force her to choose, I have had no credible evidence to challenge his account that M consented to A remaining with him because A wanted to. The only evidence, apart from that which I have noted, is some text messages in the police disclosure at E32 between the parties where M did say that A needed to be returned home to her and E46 that she was not in agreement with anything other than supervised contact as per correspondence from her solicitor. This was not put to F and, as I have noted, this was also not addressed by M in her evidence to me. The message at E46 appears to be after the event, and it seems the messages at E32 were sent after the event that F described. In M’s police statement at E30, which exihibited the text messages, M stated that her concern was that she “didn’t want him with her unsupervised. I do not have anything to stop him from seeing her so there was nothing that could be done. F told me that he would bring her back at 0900hrs in the morning, to which he did”. It does therefore seem more likely than not that events were as F described, and although M was not happy about A remaining with him and her texts suggest this afterwards, she also seems to have accepted A remaining with F until 9am the following morning based on her police statement. It is also of note that, despite apparently being concerned about the potential for F to remove A from nursery two weeks prior to this, M did not apply for any urgent court order to prevent this and, since F shares parental responsibility for A, it would not have been possible for the nursery to refuse to allow F to collect her without a court order preventing that. It was not until June that M applied for a prohibited steps order to prevent F from removing A from her care or from any nursery or other person or venue caring for A. That delay in applying, coupled with the absence of any primary evidence from her about the end of the weekend in question, does make it more likely than not that she consented to A remaining with F, I find. Which is perplexing in the context of her allegations of sexual abuse which were clearly in her mind by that point, according to her evidence of events from 22^nd March 2024 onwards.

F has no burden of proof in this case, unlike M who makes the allegations. However, it is necessary to consider the overall context of all of the evidence before me when considering whether M has discharged her evidential burden. F’s evidence about what M has alleged that A said was that he initially had no reason to doubt what M was saying, but that he now questioned the accuracy since he denies abusing A and noted that A has never told anyone else what she is alleged to have told M. It is clear from M’s evidence that A would have had opportunities at nursery, when seen by social workers and the police, as well as when seen by the GP in 2024, to have repeated her allegations but has not done so. Despite her concerns about sexual abuse in late March 2024, M accepted that she did not report it to the police despite (as she told me) being very familiar with safeguarding procedures as a result of her profession. Nor did she take any steps to prevent A spending the weekend of 22^nd March 2024 with F. Instead, she accepted in her evidence to me that she researched the NSPCC website, contacted them “for advice”, and it was the NSPCC who reported the matter to the police. When I asked her about why she didn’t report it, her answer was that she didn’t want to believe that F had sexually abused A. However, this is a strange answer if the trigger for her concluding that F had sexually abused A was what she said A had told her on 22^nd March 2024 and she was sufficiently concerned to be researching things on the NSPCC website. It does not sit comfortably with the fact that she did not prevent A spending the weekend with F in March and again in April if she even suspected or feared that F may have sexually abused A.

I also found F to be a credible witness about the allegation that A had told M that “C saved” her from F. He was very clear that this was the sort of thing that he accepted A might say, but explained that he regularly played a game where he was the ‘tickle monster’ and would chase A threatening to tickle her. A would run and C would also get involved in the game. It is not in dispute that C also lived with F at the paternal grandmother’s house at the time of this allegation.

M’s case about the sexual abuse allegations is that it was not just what she alleged that A told her on 22^nd March 2024, and allegedly repeated to her in October 2024, but also that A’s overall behaviour convinced her that sexual abuse had taken place. M has alleged that A had ‘meltdowns’ or ‘tantrums’ (see for example C6), and that these have been so severe that she has struggled to control them, has had to seek professional assistance from the health visitor and GP (C6-C7), and has taken these challenging behaviours as evidence of sexual abuse. It is not in dispute that A has had some tantrums, however there is a dispute as to how severe these have been and how challenging her behaviour has been since F’s evidence is that he has not seen the extreme behaviours described by M. It is of note that no professional has observed A displaying challenging behaviours beyond those which are normal tantrums for a young child. The GP considered and assessed her on 4^th March 2024 and noted no concerns about developmental delay or possible autism (D27), and her medical records also confirm that, as is shown in the nursery reports in the bundle, challenging behaviour from A has not been observed at a level that would cause the GP or nursery concerns.

F was also clear in his evidence to me that he has been a less strict parent than M, but once professionals advised that they should be more consistent with the parenting they each used towards A he had implemented more boundaries though this had not prompted any extremely challenging behaviour from A. I will return to the aspect of A’s tantrums when considering the allegation of F manipulating A to say things about M because it is of note that M told me in her evidence that A would say things like she hated M when having a tantrum. On balance, given that no professionals or others noted any extremely challenging behaviour from A, and specifically concluded that any tantrums were age appropriate, it seems clear that A did not display any behaviour that was unusual for her age and circumstances, and certainly not at a level that might be indicative of abuse, I find. In fact, as the GP noted in March 2024, at the time that M took A to the GP because of her concerns about A’s behaviour, A had recently experienced her parents separating for what appears to have been the final time (their relationship having been on and off again almost throughout as both accepted in evidence to me), her mother increasing her work from 2 days to 4 days a week, and F was no longer part of her bedtime routine at M’s house (D27). Any or all of these could have been triggers for A having tantrums, even age-appropriate ones, I find.

M alleged that F subjected her to domestic abuse in the form of coercive and controlling behaviour. She said in her first witness statement that much of his controlling behaviour was “very subtle” C18 para 79. I have looked at her evidence in detail and overall, conscious that this type of allegation does not sit well within a schedule of allegations, as the caselaw makes clear. At C17 paragraph 73 she described the relationship as “there was (sic) never any discussions, no listening and only defensive behaviour and I didn’t want the arguments any more. I wanted us to be good parents together, and I liked that as I never got to experience this with B, whose father never wanted a relationship with him. I think this is why I never stuck to my boundaries about the relationship; he could always win me back with all the messages of how much he loved me etc. I doubted myself and doubted my reactions, thinking he was right, I overreacted to situations. He would often say “I don’t know what’s in your head [M]”. And it made me question myself. I have wondered if he might be a narcissist and asked the health visitors this year for help on how to co-parent with a narcissist”. Further on in that statement she described feeling “manipulated” by F into allowing him to sleep with her and alleged that he gave A a bottle against her express instructions to wake her to try to breastfeed (C18), and that when she expressed concerns to F about co-sleeping with A, he dismissed her concerns. The only other primary evidence from M about this allegation is in her police statement dated 13^th May 2024, where she stated “when I look back now I believe that there must have been a series of emotional abuse. We would argue which would result in me leaving him. Then I would be called the crazy one and we would get back together. I believe that he was targeting my insecurities but did not realise this at the time” (E29).

It is of note that the officer in the case in May 2024 explained to her that there may be no action taken in relation to her allegations of F sending her threatening and harassing messages. Having reviewed the messages in question in the bundle, it is clear why the police reached the conclusion that the messages were not threatening nor designed to harass M, simply F (perhaps unwisely in view of the acrimony between them) trying to see A, as he said in interview and in his written evidence to this court. M replied to the officer explaining the likely outcome of no further action in the criminal jurisdiction and suggesting that the Family Court may be the most appropriate channel by saying “Oh, this means that I won’t get any legal aid” (E24).

What is striking about M’s evidence of coercive and controlling behaviour, which encompasses ‘gaslighting’, is the lack of detail. The only concrete details are in relation to the allegation that F failed to wake her up to enable her to try to breastfeed A, and that he dismissed or downplayed her concerns or feelings, especially in relation to them co-sleeping with A. On her account, it seems that this took place during the first week at home with A, when she told me that she was understandably very tired and having difficulty breastfeeding A. She accepted that she had expressed milk to supplement breastfeeding with a bottle, and thus F’s evidence that they were using a mixture of breast and bottle feeding is not in dispute. The issue is whether F deliberately overrode her wish to be woken up to feed A. I did not find her evidence about this to be credible or compelling. She said that he “knew” she wanted to be woken up to feed A in the night, but did not provide any specifics of the conversation concerned. She also accepted that it could be said that F not waking her up when she was incredibly tired was actually him trying to help.

She also alleged that F had “mood swings” and would drink alcohol to excess though “he does not often present as ‘drunk’” (C2). Hair strand testing of F ordered in these proceedings is in the bundle at D15 onwards, dated 13^th September 2024. These results confirm chronic excessive consumption of alcohol in line with the amount indicated by M, and accepted by F in his written evidence, namely around a bottle of wine per night. However, there is no detail in M’s evidence about what the mood swings actually entailed, nor how this affected her or led to her moderating or changing her behaviour beyond not discussing her thoughts and feelings in detail with him. Given that this seems to have arisen particularly at the point that they were finally separating, as well as during what she accepted was overall a relationship that was “on again and off again”, it is perhaps unsurprising that they had arguments at points and she did not feel able to discuss her thoughts and feelings with him. It is not, however, clear to me that this was as a result of anything that F was doing specifically to force her to be reticent about her wishes and feelings. At its highest, M’s evidence is that F would say to her “I don’t know what’s in your head” (C17). There is a real lack of detail and specificity about this, which was only addressed in her oral evidence to me when she suddenly started to volunteer other examples of when she alleged that F had been abusing her. These included alleging that he had played on her admitted insecurities about relationships by “being secretive about his messages” and that he “flirted with women in her presence”. This lack of detail is surprising and, if M sought to prove that his mood swings were part of his abusive behaviour, there also needs to be an evidential basis for her to assert that. As for the assertion in her statement that F was a narcissist, there is no expert assessment of F in this regard but also no concrete detail provided by her to establish what she meant by that, and it appears that she has simply asserted this to health visitors as a matter of her own opinion but, crucially, also without explaining why she felt that this was the case from her lay perspective.

In his evidence, F accepted that he would flirt with people but pointed out that this was something he has always done and is common to members of his family. He denied being secretive about his phone, and M’s evidence about this was also far from clear in any event. M also alleged in her oral evidence that F would cause an argument every year just before she had to re-qualify for her job, and that she thought he did this to sabotage her. It was very clear from M’s evidence about the alleged flirting and being secretive about the phone that her perception of whatever F did or didn’t do in this regard was heavily influenced by her own insecurities arising from previous relationships. I did not find her evidence in this respect of her allegations to be at all credible, both because of the lack of earlier detail and the sudden addition of details during her oral evidence, and because of her acceptance that it was her insecurities which seem to have fed into her perception.

In relation to the allegation that F has somehow manipulated the maternal family against M, her evidence about this is also lacking. It is pleaded on the basis that F has minimised her concerns and attempted to paint her in a negative light. However, again there is a lack of specific detail about this in M’s evidence beyond the fact that F has denied the allegations and has repeated those allegations to her family, who have chosen to side with F rather than her. She did allege in her first statement that she had realised that her mother was “in a triangle with F” and her (C17). The basis for her conclusion seems to be that he was close to her mum and would reach out to her after an argument, after which her mum would contact her, taking F’s side. This is not that unusual in relationships, and evidentially falls far short of establishing that F had deliberately manipulated the maternal grandmother to turn her against M.

M also alleged that F has been emotionally abusive towards A by encouraging her to say negative things about M. Her initial written evidence about this is at C18-C19 paras 80-82. It is a sum total of 10 lines. Only one alleged incident of A saying negative things to M after being with F is identified by reference to any time, namely the weekend when F accepts that he collected A from nursery in April 2024. The other two paragraphs give no indication of when approximately they may have happened nor how old A would have been when she supposedly said what M asserts. There is also a curious absence of detail as to the precise circumstances in which A came to say any of these things, apart from it being said in para 82 that she was looking at a picture of her aunt holding her (C19). What is said by M to have been said by A in that paragraph is “that’s when you left me mum”, though it is not clear why M thought that this was prompted by F’s actions. What M recounted in her evidence as being said by A could also have been prompted simply by seeing a photo of A on her own with her aunt. It is not clear how old A was when this supposed conversation took place, so it is difficult to gauge what A’s understanding on seeing such a photo may have been, and also not clear what level of articulacy A may have had at that point either. It is of note that A has not said anything negative about M, or that F encouraged her to do so, to anyone else, including numerous professionals. M’s evidence records an incident of A saying negative things about F too, as I noted earlier in this judgment in relation to an alleged incident when the maternal grandmother was bathing her. I also earlier noted that the evidence also demonstrated that A would say negative things about both parents during a tantrum. The only evidence that M relies on to prove that F manipulated A is what M says that A has said to her. Again, this is an issue of credibility. It is relevant to this aspect particularly, but also to the overall allegations that A has consistently and clearly enjoyed spending time with F, as the evidence of the contact notes from the supervised contact sessions in the bundle at section D show. There is no evidence of any inappropriate communications from F to A during any of the supervised contact sessions or by means of the permitted indirect contact. Of course, the face to face contact was being professionally supervised but this does not necessary prevent a parent from trying to manipulate a child to think negatively about the other parent and again it is striking that nobody else has ever heard A allege that it was F who encouraged her to say negative things about M. On balance, I find that M lacks credibility about this and it is more likely than not that A has simply said negative things about each parent at times when having a tantrum.

The final allegation on the schedule at A42 is one that F “accepts excessive alcohol usage in that he accepts that he drinks a bottle of wine a night and doesn’t see a problem with the level of his alcohol usage”. As Mr Broadbent accepted in closing, it is not clear how this relates to anything apart from welfare considerations and is not in dispute. I have noted that it was potentially relevant to the allegations of coercive and controlling behaviour, but have not found those to be made out on M’s evidence. F accepted that his evidence and that of the hair strand test results at D14 confirmed that he was consuming more alcohol units per week than is recommended. Beyond this I do not need to devote any more time to this allegation and would simply question why it was not removed from the scope of the fact-finding hearing in earlier case management hearings.

Overall, having weighed the evidence before me and in light of my findings above, I do not find that M has proved on balance of probabilities that F sexually abused A as she alleged. She was not a credible and compelling witness, and I was left with the distinct impression that at times she was simply adding details where she realised that her evidence was lacking. Mr Broadbent submitted that F had been unable to advance any reason for M to have fabricated the allegations, especially the ones of sexual abuse, beyond the argument which both parties accept they had about dog insurance. As he accepted, it is not for F to have to prove anything. I accept that there is no evidence that M had been actively trying to stop A from spending time with F at the time of the March 2024 allegations and that is relevant to the overall context of the evidence. However, it is notable that M and F were in dispute about the dog insurance and seems to have been in an ‘off’ phase of their on/off relationship, potentially finally separating then based on what the GP recorded M as saying about that (D27). Whilst a dispute about dog insurance alone would be an odd justification for someone to fabricate allegations, I do not have to investigate why M may have made these allegations and they are perhaps less surprising if viewed in the complex context of a volatile relationship that was finally ending and where it is entirely possible that M has simply misinterpreted A’s behaviour, and let her insecurities colour her view of perceptions of non-abusive behaviours by F, as well as perhaps exaggerated aspects of her evidence when confronted with the lack of detail in her written evidence before me. Whatever the reason for her making the allegations, I do not find M credible in her assertions that A has told her that F sexually abused her and told her that F made A promise to say negative things to M, nor in her allegations of domestic abuse against F. I do not therefore find her allegations proved and there is no safeguarding reason to prevent A from having a full relationship with F, as is her right. In light of this, the only potential welfare issue is the one of alcohol consumption as I have noted above, though that could be appropriately dealt with by way of F giving an undertaking not to consume excessive alcohol prior to and during A spending time with him. It may thus be possible to conclude the welfare stage of these proceedings expeditiously and I would urge the parties to consider that in readiness for the next hearing.