BZ v EK

The child at the centre of this case is MN who was born in July 2016 and is accordingly nine years and three months old. MN’s parents are her father, BZ, and her mother, EK. Both parents hold parental responsibility for MN by virtue of her father being registered on the child’s birth certificate.

This matter came before me on 2 October 2025 listed as a first hearing dispute resolution appointment in relation to an application made by BZ in May 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing I indicated the order I would make - that the application would be dismissed and an order made under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 (“the 1989 Act”) for a period of 5 years restricting BZ’s ability to make further applications without permission concerning with whom MN was to live or what time he should spend with her - and gave brief reasons for making the order. The matter was listed today for the formal handing down of this written judgment giving the full reasons for the order. No attendance was required at today’s hearing.

Both parties appeared before me on 2 October 2025 as litigants in person. EK was supported in court by a domestic violence support worker from Wearside Women in Need. There was no Cafcass officer at the hearing as she had to leave court prior to the hearing commencing due to a domestic emergency.

To give this case some context, this is the fourth set of proceedings that involve MN. The first set of proceedings concluded in September 2022 with an order that MN lived with EK and was not to be removed from EK’s care by BZ. At that time MN was also subject to a child protection plan due to concerns about domestic violence in the relationship between BZ and EK.

Four months later, in January 2023, BZ made a further application to spend time with MN. A section 37 report was prepared by the local authority within those proceedings. BZ appealed, unsuccessfully, the direction for a section 37 report and did not fully engage with the local authority during the preparation of the report. The report raised serious concerns about BZ’s substance misuse, domestic violence perpetrated by BZ towards EK and other intimate partners, and BZ’s mental health. Recommendations were made that BZ address all those issues before it would be safe for him to spend time with MN and the proceedings concluded in July 2023 with an order that BZ could spent indirect time with MN.

The third set of proceedings concerning MN were commenced by BZ in June 2024. This set of proceedings was dismissed by a Deputy District Judge at the first hearing dispute resolution appointment in August 2024 as BZ failed to attend that hearing. The judge declined to make an order under section 91(14) of the 1989 Act on that occasion.

When the current set of proceedings commenced safeguarding information was directed. The Cafcass safeguarding letter indicated that the previously identified concerns remained an issue and further indicated that BZ continued to have significant involvement with the criminal justice system. It also recorded concerns about BZ’s presentation and his inability to recall or accept his admissions of domestically abusive behaviour in the previous proceedings. In light of the information from the safeguarding letter and previous proceedings, BZ was directed to file a witness statement in advance of the first hearing dispute resolution appointment which addressed what work, if any, he had done to address his domestically abusive behaviour and his views on whether an order should be made under section 91(14) of the 1989 Act. BZ’s statement did not address any of the matters that he had been asked to address although he told me at the hearing he was now working with probation and services to address his alcohol use and mental health issues. No work had been done to address domestic abuse.

Turning to the law, s.91(14) of the 1989 Act provides as follows:

The starting point for the case law relating to section 91(14) orders is the well-known decision of Butler-Sloss LJ in Re P (Section 91(14) Guidelines: Residence and Religious Heritage) [1999] 2 FLR 573, and that set out a number of guidelines which the court should have regard to when making s.91(14) orders. Those are helpfully set out in the Family Court Practice 2025 and I have had regard to them. There has also been more recent case law analysing the making of s.91(14) orders.

The starting point for that case law is a decision which was made shortly before the amendments to s.91(14) by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 had come into force. It was a judgment of King LJ in a case, Re A (A Child) (Supervised Contact) (s.91(14) Children Act 1989 Orders) [2021] EWCA Civ.1749. That judgment set out that there was a new landscape, a more permissive landscape, and that s.91(14) orders could be made in wider circumstances. What she noted was that the amendments to the legislation were effectively giving statutory force to the sixth guideline in Re P by making orders available in circumstances where further applications would put the parent or child at risk of physical or emotional harm.

The next case was F v M [2023] EWFC 5, a decision of Hayden J. That made clear that the filter of a section 91(14) order applies and exists to protect the child and the parent with whom the child lives. It made clear that an order:

The final case to which I have had reference is a decision of Knowles J, who is of course the lead on domestic abuse matters, in the case of A Local Authority v F & Ors [2022] EWFC 127. She clarified that:

In this case we have a father who plainly does not accept his admissions of domestically abusive behaviour. He has chosen not to engage properly with Cafcass, the local authority or the court in relation to this and previous applications. That, in my judgment, does amount to a form of “lawfare”. It is difficult to see that making repeated applications without addressing the underlying concerns which are preventing him spending time with MN is anything other than an attempt to upset EK, MN’s primary carer, and to continue to exert control over her.

In my view further applications and further litigation is likely to cause emotional harm to both MN by way of further professional involvement in her life, and to EK. The type of harm EK is likely to suffer is set out in her statement for the first hearing dispute resolution appointment and I accept her (unchallenged) evidence that she suffers from anxiety and is constantly fearful that BZ will once again try and reappear in her and MN’s lives.

I consider that it is necessary, proportionate and appropriate to both summarily dismiss the current application and to restrict BZ’s ability to make further applications which relate to who MN should live with, or what time BZ should spend with MN. It is difficult at this point to see how permission would be given for a further application by BZ unless he had done the work identified as long ago as June 2023 in the section 37 report and demonstrated a sustained period of abstinence from alcohol and drugs together with a period in which his mental health was stable. He also needs to avoid further engagement with the criminal justice system.

The appropriate duration of the section 91(14) order, in my judgement, is 5 years. That would take matters to a time when MN would be 14 years’ old. That would give the father time to do the work asked of him and demonstrate that it can be sustained. An order of that duration would also allow MN to transition through to secondary school free from unmeritorious applications.

I will also direct that any application for leave to bring any application by BZ should be considered on paper first by myself if I am available.